Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding ’s Kurdish Policy

Ayşegül Aydin Cem Emrence

turkey project policy paper Number 10 • December 2016 policy paper Number 10, December 2016

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Ayşegül Aydin Cem Emrence

ike in the early 1990s, Kurdish groups in the to disarm the Workers’ Party (PKK). The LMiddle East are occupying the headlines today. Dolmabahçe Consensus (Mutabakatı) (2015) repre- In Western media, their image as a trustworthy sented the peak moment in these exchanges, when friend remains unscathed in a region that is char- the government acknowledged a ten-point democ- acterized by confessional wars and a fundamental- ratization program prepared by the rebel leader. ist threat. Yet, have become both part of the Since then, the Turkish government has moved in problem and part of the solution in the Middle East. the opposite direction. It has arrested a large number They emerged as a credible ally in the fight against of elected Kurdish politicians. Among these were the Islamic State of and the (ISIS) in Iraq Gülten Kışanak, a seasoned politician and may- and Syria, and yet, their state-building efforts in or of Diyarbakır, who was arrested on October 26, northern Syria are increasingly giving Turkey the and the co-chairs of the Peoples’ Democratic Party goosebumps. The mobilization of Syrian Kurds (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, around a self-rule agenda convinced the Turkish who were arrested on November 3.1 In the aftermath government that the Syrian experiment will only of the coup attempt on July 15, pressure on Kurdish exacerbate its own Kurdish problem. Viewed to- movement further intensified since emergency laws gether, these developments undermined the fight that were put in effect across the country allowed au- against ISIS and Turkey’s democratization. Fur- thorities to ban protests and prohibit political mobi- thermore, they strained Turkey’s relations with the lization against the government. United States and European Union. Why did the Turkish government change its mind? Only a few years ago, there was great hope about the Peace would have created a win-win scenario for Kurdish issue. Peace talks between the rebel leader all actors involved, including the Turkish govern- Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish government were ment, Kurds, and the international community. continuing unabated, and the members of the Kurd- This optimistic reading however misses an im- ish political party were allowed to visit him regularly portant part of the puzzle: The Kurdish issue has in the prison on the İmralı Island, located 40 miles become deeply politicized inside Turkey and im- away . In these meetings, Öcalan assessed plies different things for the government and its the government’s position and prepared a roadmap Kurdish opponents. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments have followed an instru- This report tackles Turkey’s Kurdish problem with mentalist approach to the Kurdish issue, relegating an emphasis on government policies. It aims to de- it to electoral priorities, presidential ambitions, tail what we call the instrumentalist approach of and foreign policy choices. Meanwhile, Kurdish the AKP and discusses its implications and conse- political actors have often spoken from a maxi- quences for the Kurdish issue. The report unpacks malist position, which has allowed the PKK to de- the instrumentalist approach at domestic and in- termine their policy priorities, including self-rule ternational levels. Our analysis at the domestic and Öcalan’s freedom. It is the mismatch between level suggests that AKP governments viewed the these positions, we argue, that created a deadlock Kurdish issue as a problem to be dealt with in in the Kurdish issue. The turned order to stay in power by securing electoral suc- the deadlock into an open confrontation by hard- cess. Over time, Erdoğan’s ambitions for a strong ening these positions and presenting each side presidency became the most critical item on this with an opportunity to pursue their goals. agenda. At the international level, the report high- lights the fact that the Kurdish issue became sub- These incompatible views on the Kurdish issue servient to AKP’s foreign policy interests in Syria. have important consequences. First, they exported The Turkish government made a deliberate choice the problem to neighboring countries, internation- to support Sunni, Arab, and extremist groups at alizing the conflict. Turkey’s intervention the expense of Syrian Kurds. In doing so, it sent a in Syria against ISIS targets on August 24, 2016 strong message to Kurdish constituencies at home through Operation Euphrates Shield put the AKP that it would remain indifferent to the plight of government at odds with the Syrian Kurds. Sim- Kurds on the other side of the border. ilarly, the PKK’s efforts to practice state-building inside Turkey escalated the conflict. Second, such There are important policy implications of our ar- diametrically opposed policies polarized Kurdish gument. International actors need to strike a bal- society, deepening existing divisions. The threat of ance between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. Yet, insurgent governance mobilized the opponents of this balancing act has to be done in a principled Kurdish political party and consolidated them in way. Sacrificing the Kurdish political movement in- the AKP ranks. At the other end, the government’s side Turkey in exchange for a U.S.-friendly Kurdish policies created mistrust among large sections of regime in northern Syria will not work. As we ex- Kurdish society. Counterinsurgency (COIN) cam- plain in the following pages, there are important paigns in 2015 and 2016, in particular, hampered reasons why the experience of northern Iraq can- the Kurds’ relations with further by paving not be replicated in Syria. To address the Kurdish the way for the destruction of urban centers and problem in a genuine fashion, the Turkish govern- loss of civilian lives in southeast Turkey. Finally, in ment needs to invest in inclusive policies where its unison, both approaches tied the solution of Kurd- approach to the Kurdish issue is not dictated by ish issue to the piety of two strongmen, President electoral and foreign policy concerns. A major re- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the rebel leader Öcalan. form package that goes beyond discourse is neces- The peace process was reduced to a secretive deal sary. Meanwhile, the Kurdish political actors have between the two sides with no public input and to understand that raising the bar every time an was shelved overnight, when one side defected. opportunity arises will not solve the Kurdish prob-

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 2 lem. They need to build coalitions in Turkish soci- hard facts about Syria. Despite its efforts, the Turk- ety. Violence and the Kurdish governance model ish government cannot transform Syria according in Syria are not the most effective instruments to to its own priorities, and targeting Syrian Kurds accomplish this task. will not get the job done.

The report follows the arguments outlined above. Meanwhile, Kurdish political actors have to mod- The first part provides a historical background on erate their demands to garner public support for the Kurdish conflict in Turkey until the AKP’s rise their cause. Unlike neighboring countries with a to power in 2002. It shows that the AKP govern- Kurdish minority, securing Kurdish rights in Tur- ment found a dramatically weakened PKK and a key is (and should be) a matter of institutional pol- rejuvenated Kurdish political party. The second itics and broad political legitimacy. Kurdish poli- part examines the domestic origins of the AKP’s ticians also need to pay attention to the changing failure and suggests that, despite changes in pol- demands of their constituency. Neither PKK’s self- icy instruments, the government collaborated rule attempts nor arrests of Kurdish political ac- with the Kurds to keep the PKK at bay and stay tors generated the kind of public support that the in power. The third part evaluates the AKP’s for- movement once mobilized in the 1990s. Hence, it eign policy in Syria in light of the Kurdish issue. is time to start considering Kurds’ aspirations and It shows that the AKP’s support for Sunni groups day-to-day struggles in Turkish society and start in Syria mobilized radical Islamic groups inside delivering services instead of asking for more sac- Turkey against Kurdish political actors, which in rifices. The self-governance agenda announced turn convinced a large portion of the Kurds that by the umbrella organization Democratic Society the government had no genuine interest in solv- Congress (DTK) in December 2015 contrasts with ing the Kurdish issue. Since fall 2015, the Turkish this vision. The DTK document, which was later government also engaged in an open conflict with adopted into HDP’s program, promised to estab- the Syrian Kurds, once its plans to remove Bashar lish autonomous regions and transfer state func- al-Assad from power fell through. tions to local councils. These councils would have the ultimate authority on the delivery of public The final part of the report discusses policy rec- goods (health, education, and justice) and on is- ommendations. Our main thesis is that politics of sues related to security, which would be financed moderation offers the best chance to resolve the by taxpayers.2 By demanding far-reaching rights Kurdish issue and achieve peace and security in which are difficult to sell to the Turkish public, the region. Each side, including the Turkish gov- HDP’s maximalist approach does not help the eth- ernment, Kurdish political actors, and interna- nic movement inspire support and build coalitions tional community, has to settle for a second-best for legislative success. option. This is the case because no actor has the power and commitment to pursue its own agen- The international community and the U.S. in da at the expense of others in the long run. The particular need to realize that helping the Kurds’ Turkish government has to stop targeting Kurdish state-building efforts in Syria in return for securing political actors and start improving Kurds’ stand- their geopolitical interests in the region might not ing in Turkish society. It also has to accept the cold work in the long-run. The Kurdish leadership and

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 3 the war in northern Syria share few commonalities tical support from regional countries, a guerrilla with the (northern) Iraqi experience. The Syrian war could be waged against the Turkish state. Kurds have long defined their interests against the U.S. and are using the multiplayer setting of the war The PKK started its guerrilla campaign in 1984 to their advantage. Accordingly, the race for enlist- and simultaneously attacked the remote districts ing the support of the Kurds only serves the inter- of Şemdinli and Çatak.3 Within two years, how- ests of the Syrian Kurds, not the bidders themselves. ever, the rebel group realized that it could bare- In addition, the partnership between the U.S. and ly survive in the mountains. Forced recruitment the Syrian Kurds in its current form may under- and raids on Kurdish villages allied with the state mine Turkish democracy and restrict Kurds’ rep- saved the day: the PKK acquired the manpower it resentation by giving the government a free hand needed and polarized Kurdish society through vi- at home in return for compliance with the U.S. po- olence. In the 1990s, the PKK expanded beyond sition in Syria. Finally, the U.S. can do a great deal the border: It became capable of attacking military toward the resolution of the Kurdish problem by installations, economic targets, and state institu- rewarding and punishing all actors involved. As we tions deep inside Turkey. In the meantime, it also argue in the report, regional cooperation requires a established an urban organization, the National watchful peace which cannot be sustained without Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK), for pro- the commitment of all stakeholders. paganda, financial support, and recruitment pur- poses. Insurgent violence transformed southeast Anatolia primarily by weakening its ties to the An- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1984- kara government. Thousands of schools remained 2002 closed, and, at the peak of its power in 1993, the PKK banned all political parties and the distribu- The origins of the current conflict in Turkey date tion of national newspapers in the region.4 back to the 1960s. The first group of ethnic entre- preneurs to raise the Kurdish issue came from the The 1990s also witnessed the birth of a full-blown ranks of the Turkish left (Turkish Workers Party, ethnic movement. Protests became widespread as TIP). Political groups that campaigned for Kurdish government pressure intensified. Detentions and rights soon multiplied and eventually became rad- extra-judicial killings, which targeted movement icalized in the 1970s. The majority of these groups activists, motivated these mobilizations. Ethnic cel- emerged from secular-leftist movements that sub- ebrations and funerals for insurgents, where pro- scribed to a revolutionary agenda. They engaged in test campaigns were staged, helped build a Kurd- a fierce competition among themselves especially ish political identity. These mobilization efforts on college campuses. The military coup in 1980 also brought success in the 1991 election. Several suppressed these groups along with the Turkish Kurdish activists entered the Turkish Grand Na- left. The PKK was one of them. While others failed tional Assembly (TBMM) when the newly founded to regroup under state surveillance, the PKK sur- Kurdish political party, People’s Labor Party (HEP), vived the coup by relocating its leadership to Syria struck an electoral alliance with the main opposi- and northern Iraq and building a public presence tion, Social Democratic (SHP).5 By in Europe. Öcalan was convinced that with logis- the end of 1993, these activists left the SHP in a dis-

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 4 pute over the Kurdish issue and later formed a new The OHAL’s borders were drawn with a preventive political party (, DEP). Multiple logic. While seventy percent of insurgent attacks party closure cases at the Constitutional Court and were concentrated in only three districts on the an increasingly powerful insurgency pushed the Iraqi border, the government incorporated 87 dis- Kurdish political party closer to the PKK. Kurdish tricts -which would later fall under 13 provinces- politics entered a new phase in 1999, when DEP’s into the OHAL framework. Emergency rule prac- successor, the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) tices alienated civilians, while winning hearts and won 37 municipal mayorships in local elections, minds remained an unattainable goal. The OHAL giving the ethnic movement an opportunity to gov- legislations suspended individual freedoms, giving ern for the first time.6 security forces a de facto immunity in their dealings with civilians. Wholesale detentions, which accord- Throughout the 1990s, the PKK was unsure about ing to official statistics, targeted more than 55,000 how to translate its success in guerrilla warfare into civilians and resulted in few convictions, worked political outcomes. It was particularly difficult to against the government.9 Recruiting local allies set up a well-functioning bureaucracy and manage and outsourcing security to pro-government tribes the rebellion in organizational terms. Öcalan was polarized Kurdish society. The number of village adamant in enforcing one-man rule in the orga- guards, who were mainly Kurdish villagers armed nization which led to operational difficulties and and paid by the government, soared from 6,000 in tactical mistakes. In addition, a nominal under- November 1985 to 95,000 by August 1998.10 Rely- standing of ethnicity that downplayed other forms ing on their privileged position in Kurdish society, of belonging in Kurdish society at the expense of village guards became more interested in punishing ethnicity alienated conservative and Alevite Kurds their local rivals than delivering tangible outcomes from the PKK’s political program. Accordingly, as on the security front, and have been reported by the PKK expanded beyond its stronghold on the human rights organizations to have abused civil- Iraqi border into Turkey, the rate of civilian sup- ians in several cases.11 By the end of the 1990s, the port, measured by the PKK’s capacity to wage vi- PKK was forced to retreat from Turkey and take up olence, declined.7 The organization was forced to a defensive position on the Iraqi border. However, rely on indiscriminate targeting of civilians and Turkish governments found it particularly difficult destruction of property. At the end, the PKK was to implement a political program that would back unable to translate its military gains into tangible up their military superiority on the battlefield and political outcomes in 1993, the heyday of its mili- win back Kurds’ loyalties.12 tary capacity. Instead, it preferred to stay within its comfort zone, relying heavily on guerrilla warfare In sum, when the AKP came to power in 2002, that imposed costs on the government, and kept there were two important outcomes in the Kurd- the organization together around familiar routines. ish conflict. First, the PKK was no longer a serious military threat. It was weakened, demoralized, and The Turkish government also could not reform its forced to recede to northern Iraq. The rebels expe- long-term policies. A state of emergency (OHAL) rienced heavy losses and could only survive in a was declared in southeast Turkey to contain the few sanctuaries inside Turkey. The urban organiza- PKK and was in effect for 25 years (1987-2002).8 tion, ERNK, also became ineffective. Öcalan’s cap-

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 5 ture in Kenya in 1999 and his cooperation with the approach to protect electoral gains. They sustained Turkish state as a political prisoner only accelerat- a winning coalition by adopting a polarizing dis- ed the PKK’s downfall that had started in 1994.13 course where politicians, particularly Erdoğan, To the surprise of many, an opposite scenario increasingly relied on stigmatizing opposition materialized in institutional politics. The Kurdish parties and groups.15 Not surprisingly, the AKP’s political party survived against all odds and skill- electoral share remained stable and its gains and fully used state repression to expand its constitu- losses stayed within the 3-4 percent range in this ency. In the 2002 election, the Democratic People’s second period (2008-2014). The era of stability Party (DEHAP) received the level of support only ended with the June 2015 election when the AKP comparable to the HEP’s earlier success in 1991. A lost almost nine percent of its vote share from the rejuvenated ethnic movement and a crippled in- previous election. To recover the losses, another surgency were the major legacies of the 1990s. electoral strategy was put in place: The AKP gov- ernment sought ways to win back defectors. In this third period (2015-2016), Kurdish politicians, who MECHANISMS OF ELECTORAL increased their electoral share at the expense of the SUCCESS AKP, became the targets of selective repression in an attempt to regain the support of Kurdish con- In its long reign, the AKP governments used a va- servatives and Turkish nationalists. This approach riety of mechanisms to manage the Kurdish ques- rewarded the government with an additional nine tion. This process was characterized by neither points in the snap election of November 2015, natural progression toward peace nor experiments re-establishing one-party rule in the TBMM and of a ‘mad scientist’. There were distinct periods of resuming Erdoğan’s efforts for a constitutional AKP rule (expansion, stability, and decline) that change that would overhaul Turkish politics to es- required alternative approaches to the Kurdish tablish a presidential system. issue in order to secure favorable electoral out- comes. The AKP benefitted from the erosion of The AKP’s views on the Kurdish issue changed ac- center-right parties in the 2002 election. It came cording to its distinct electoral needs in each pe- to power by receiving roughly one-third of the riod. The instrumentalist approach meant that the general vote where the bulk of support came from Kurdish problem became an issue mediated by the center-right voters who recently switched to the desire to stay in power. As a rule of thumb, one can AKP ranks. There was still room for expansion argue that the more AKP rule consolidated nation- in the 2007 election. The incumbent increased its ally, the less it became interested in its Kurdish con- vote share by another 13 percent, reaching out to stituency. In the first period (2002-2007), the AKP almost half of the electorate. This unprecedented government offered several incentives and searched victory completed the consolidation of the cen- for ways to connect with the Kurds. This was part ter-right voters around the AKP and marked the of the AKP’s agenda to expand its electoral base. end of a period of rapid expansion.14 Political reforms implemented in conjunction with membership talks with the European Union were In the aftermath of its 2007 election victory, the well received by the Kurdish community whose AKP governments adopted a more conservative memory was still fresh with political repression in

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 6 recent past. Meanwhile, the injection of money into ber 2015 election, Kurds were no longer seen as the economy and efficient delivery of public goods relevant political actors. in east and southeast Anatolia created a sense of well-being in the short term and mobilized poor Period 1, 2002-2007: Rewarding the Kurds voters who would appreciate such basic offerings. The initial reaction of the Kurds to the AKP was hard- In the second period (2008-2014), the AKP gov- ly promising in the 2002 election. Despite the pres- ernment tried to keep the Kurds as part of its win- ence of influential Kurdish politicians such as Den- ning coalition. Perhaps, more accurately, it tried gir Mir Fırat, the newly established party received to make sure that the Kurds did not undermine it. meager support from Kurdish populated areas. For The Kurdish issue was increasingly seen as a po- instance, it received only a modest 16 percent from tential threat because of the PKK’s capability to Diyarbakır, a province with immense political and escalate violence and destabilize the government. economic importance in the region. By 2007, how- Two new instruments were employed to keep the ever, the support for the AKP had risen with lighting Kurds in check: talks with rebel leader Öcalan and speed. Within five years, the incumbent increased its the promotion of Islamic solidarity through NGO vote share by 20 percent on average in 13 provinces work and government activity. The former strategy that hosted significant Kurdish populations and were in particular saved the day for the AKP by halting previously under emergency rule. At that point, the insurgent violence and preventing the formation Kurdish support to the AKP caught up with national of an opposition front at critical moments. This average. How did the incumbent convince the Kurds dynamic was visible during the Gezi protests, con- who were hesitant in the beginning? stitutional referendum in 2010, and the presiden- tial election in 2014, when the Kurdish activists re- First, there was the obvious enthusiasm among the fused to align with opposition groups and parties. Kurds generated by Turkey’s accession talks to the European Union. The AKP government took con- In the final period (2015-2016), the Kurdish polit- crete steps to expand democratic freedoms in the ical party’s dramatic gains in the June 2015 elec- country.17 The Kurds welcomed this development, tion led to a change of heart. The HDP victory as they had borne the brunt of repressive policies brought the AKP’s majority rule to an end in the in the 1990s. Civilians and politicians were de- TBMM and prevented Erdoğan from establishing tained, convicted, or faced far worse consequenc- a powerful presidency. To return the votes to its es for giving a speech, attending a demonstration, ‘rightful owner’, the AKP mobilized anti-Kurdish signing a petition, or simply being a supporter of sentiments and campaigned against the Kurd- the ethnic movement. The fact that insurgent vio- ish political party. The government also engaged lence also stopped for a few years raised prospects in a major COIN campaign in HDP strongholds. for a democratic Turkey, where freedom of expres- Towns known for their support of the Kurdish po- sion would be protected under the rule of law. litical party experienced round-the-clock curfews, which together with insurgent violence, brought Then, economic transfers and public goods deliv- the defectors back to the government side.16 As ery helped to increase support for the AKP. One of soon as the AKP secured a majority in the Novem- the difficulties associated with the war setting in

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 7 the 1990s was the Turkish government’s inability politically-sanctioned short-term expenditures to provide social services to its Kurdish citizens. driven by electoral expectations. They were far The AKP government addressed this problem. from creating a self-sustaining economy and ad- First, there was significant improvement in health dressing regional inequalities. The geographical services. Notably, the persons per doctor ratio de- distribution of state expenditures clearly shows creased from 2,314 in 2001 to 1,349 in 2006.18 This that there was no corrective toward southeast forty percent reduction was almost four times bet- Turkey. 23 Furthermore, no effort was made to es- ter than the average improvement across the rest tablish an industry that would create employment of the country and a big step for a region formerly opportunities in the long term. This was evident under emergency rule and characterized by limit- in the region’s low ranking in electricity consump- ed resources. As the 2007 election approached, the tion compared to the rest of Turkey in the same government also made a concerted effort to im- period.24 Finally, private wealth measured by bank prove its record in education. Between 2006 and savings only grew modestly, because most of the 2008, the student per teacher ratio went down sig- capital attracted to the region under the auspices nificantly, approaching the national average.19 of the government left, once the political incentive was removed. In short, the AKP’s economic poli- Economic transfers also played an important cies gave a lifeline to the region but kept the Kurds part in securing votes for the government. In the dependent on its good will and intentions. 1990s, financial resources were scarce in the re- gion. Banks refused to lend; there was little gov- Period 2, 2008-2014: Pacifying the Kurds ernment support for the would-be investors; and the wealthy left the region. The situation changed In the second period, Kurdish political actors were under the AKP government. This was evident in instrumental in maintaining the AKP’s winning credit offerings, local municipal expenditures, and coalition. It was critical to keep the PKK at bay government support to the private sector. As banks and avoid security casualties which could turn the opened new branches, the credit per capita went public opinion against the government. Initiating up drastically. It rose from 22 dollars in 2001 to talks with Öcalan emerged as an effective instru- 288 dollars in 2006 with a spectacular thirteen-fold ment in this period. Although it delivered low div- increase.20 The local expenditures of municipalities idends politically, the government also supported also recorded a significant upward trend between Islamic actors, organized mostly as NGOs, to chal- 2005 and 2008.21 Finally, the support for private lenge the hegemony of the ethnic movement in the sector skyrocketed before the 2007 election. While region. By the end of the second period, Kurdish it rose three-fold in the rest of Turkey (2001-2008), political actors failed to register any concrete gains the increase was seven-fold in the region for the from the peace talks with the government. In this same period. More critically, this trend set in after period, the AKP not only sustained one-party rule 2006; one year before the general election.22 and its level of support in consecutive elections but also prevented Kurdish activists from uniting with The channeling of economic resources to the re- opposition parties and movements critical of gov- gion convinced more Kurds of the good intentions ernment policies.25 of the AKP. However, most of these measures were

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 8 Ironically, this period is commonly viewed as the 2010) and the “peace process” (2013-2015) were golden age of the Kurdish issue. Domestic and in- not transparent processes. The talks were held in ternational media praised government efforts and secret between the rebel leader and officials from remained confident of their success.26 An analy- the Turkish Secret Service (MIT). The Kurdish po- sis of key legislation that includes constitution- litical party became a messenger between the PKK al amendments (2010) and the democratization and the rebel leader with no real say. For the same package (2014), however, suggests that the Kurd- reason, opposition parties and the TBMM were ish problem was hardly the center of attention in excluded from the process. When minutes of a sin- domestic politics. Constitutional amendments gle meeting were leaked to the press, Erdoğan ex- that were approved by a referendum in Septem- pressed his discomfort about the newspaper in no ber 2010 only included an article which allowed uncertain terms: “if this is journalism, then down MPs to keep their seats in the TBMM if their par- with your journalism…This news hurt the peace ty was closed down by the Constitutional Court.27 process”. 30 Later, the democratization package, which was approved by the TBMM in March 2014, legalized Meanwhile, the AKP government fielded a group the use of local languages on the campaign trail of ‘wise men’ (Akil Adamlar) to build public sup- and recognized the right to teach Kurdish in pri- port for the peace process. The group included vate schools.28 Yet, both items had limited signif- academics, entertainers, businessmen, and jour- icance, partly because they were established prac- nalists who toured the country to inform the pub- tices by then. Besides, there was limited interest in lic.31 The major problem was that wise men knew education in Kurdish language among the locals. no more than anyone else about the peace process. Meanwhile, roughly two thousand people, most When questioned by the audience about the sub- of whom were members and administrators of the stance of the talks, they were forced to mention Kurdish political party, were arrested (2009-2011) that they were not informed by the government for being a member of the PKK’s new urban or- about its specific content. Hence, through the wise ganization, the Union of Kurdistan Communities men, the government sent out feelers to measure (KCK).29 The Kurdish political party itself, the public reaction.32 After six years of talks, the gov- (DTP), was closed down ernment rejected all rebel demands and put pres- by the Constitutional Court around the same time sure on Öcalan to make calls to the PKK to leave in December 2009. the country first (which he did) and then lay down their arms. Öcalan’s belief that he could be free one How then did the government keep Kurds on its day after making concessions to the government side? More than anything else, it had to do with cost the ethnic movement dearly. As a matter of opening talks with the rebel leader. The way that fact, every round of new concessions made negotia- negotiations were conducted was highly strategic. tions harder, simply because successive electoral vic- By designating Öcalan as the sole decision maker tories reduced the relevance of the Kurdish issue for and keeping talks secret, the government acquired the government. an enormous leverage on Kurdish political actors without facing pressure from the Turkish public. Ac- The peace process had two major outcomes. First, cordingly, both the “democratic opening” (2009- it eliminated the PKK’s capacity to wage violence.

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 9 Despite violent intervals, the government entered gain personally from an Islamic message (mainly elections without being bothered by violence. Sec- because they were products of state modernization ond, Kurdish political actors refused to ally with projects!), and knew how Islam failed as a unify- the opposition at critical moments. This approach ing ideology in past rebellions.37 Furthermore, the was visible during the Gezi protests (2013) and emphasis on youth and women, two groups who the presidential elections (2014). The underly- were traditionally at the bottom of the Kurdish so- ing rationale, as pro-Kurdish journalists also ac- cial hierarchy, helped with rebel recruitment and knowledged, was to be on Erdoğan’s good side in attached certain demographic groups firmly to the order to get a better deal from him.33 During the ethnic movement. Gezi protests, the Kurdish political party was cau- tious.34 While it had a presence in Taksim Square, Meanwhile, several state agencies, NGOs, and its strongholds were among the few places where political movements took part in the Islamiza- there were no protests. One year later, the HDP tion agenda. A newly invented tradition, Holy entered the presidential race with its own candi- Birth Week celebrations (Kutlu Doğum Haftası) date. In doing so, it divided the opposition vote that commemorate the birth of the Prophet Mu- and allowed an easy victory to go to Erdoğan. hammad, was especially instrumental. They were Öcalan hinted at that possibility as early as Febru- organized by the Directorate of Religious Affairs ary 2013 and saw no reason not to support him.35 (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) and the Ministry of Ed- Ironically, the co-chair of the HDP, Demirtaş, who ucation as mosques and schools served as key sites later claimed36 that he would not allow Erdoğan to for an impressive number of activities.38 With the become an all-powerful president, played his part help of NGOs affiliated with Hizbullah, an Islamist in the process and paid his respects to Erdoğan by group with a violent history in the region, Holy giving him a standing ovation in the TBMM. Birth Week celebrations also mobilized thousands in mass demonstrations, especially in Diyarbakır. The other strategy that the AKP employed in this Right around the same time, the Gülen movement period was to promote Islam. This agenda served targeted teenagers from poor households through two specific purposes. First, it offered Islamic boarding schools, kick-starting an Islamic renais- brotherhood as an alternative source of identity for sance in the region. The Diyanet also expanded its the Kurds. Second, it allowed the AKP to distin- ‘Lecture and Enlighten’ (Vaaz and İrşat) program, guish itself from the Kurdish political actors. This extending its outreach to remote villages in order ideological separation was set in motion in the to win local residents to Islam and oppose any sep- mid-1990s when the predecessor of the AKP, the aratist (Kurdish) tendencies. (RP), received substantial support from the Kurds by opposing the secular agenda of Period 3, 2015-2016: Punishing the Kurds the ethnic movement. Kurdish political actors dis- covered secular politics during the socialist wave After securing the presidency, Erdoğan and the of the 1970s and became increasingly attached to AKP government became less committed to keep- it as the PKK downplayed Islam and challenged ing good relations with the Kurdish political ac- social hierarchies in Kurdish society. Like in Aceh, tors. Erdoğan in particular was disillusioned by the Indonesia, ethnic entrepreneurs had nothing to Kobani demonstrations.39 In early October 2014,

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 10 Kurdish protestors took to the streets in an attempt Erdoğan gave to the press on his return from Uk- to pressure the AKP government to help defend Ko- raine. He rejected all rebel demands and expressed bani, a Kurdish town in northern Syria, against ISIS his disapproval about the way that national secu- attacks and unleashed a wave of violence through- rity issues were discussed in front of the press.44 out the country (more on this later).40 In the wake of Kobani demonstrations, the government also The June 2015 election was the critical turning brought a new legislation (İç Güvenlik Paketi) to point. The government lost nine percent of its the TBMM that severely curtailed freedom of as- vote from the previous election and the Kurdish sembly and gave security forces extensive powers.41 political party entered the TBMM on its own as Around this time, in January 2015, the AKP also a group for the first time. The HDP successfully insisted that Öcalan issue a call to the PKK to lay built coalitions with several groups in Turkish so- down arms. As a counter-proposal, the Kurdish ciety including liberals, leftists, and young voters.45 political actors announced a 10-point program on Winning an astonishing 80 seats in the TBMM, democratization in late February.42 The program the HDP blocked the path to Erdoğan’s all-power- was prepared by Öcalan as a pre-condition for the ful presidency by preventing the AKP from for- demilitarization of the rebel group. ming a majority government. If allowed to stand, this result would also have improved the HDP’s The program dealt with several issues. Most im- bargaining position vis-a-vis the AKP govern- portant, it suggested creating structures of re- ment substantially. At this point, Erdoğan made a gional rule and incorporating Kurdish rights into qualitative change in his approach to the Kurdish the constitution. To expand the Kurdish political problem. This change was also predicated on the space, it also requested changes in anti-terror- escalating violence in southeast Turkey. In his spe- ism and political party laws. Finally, the program eches, he began to target Kurdish political actors asked the government to find ways to re-integrate and presented them as a terrorist threat. Anti-Kur- demobilized rebels into society and allow them to dish mobilizations gained momentum across the operate in institutional politics. The government country, as the PKK also re-started a campaign of refused to make any promises about its imple- violence after the election.46 mentation. The only concession that the Kurdish political actors received was the indirect acknowl- The AKP’s response to these developments was a edgement of the democratization program. Four massive COIN campaign, where police forces and government officials, including the Deputy Prime were given the green light to adopt Minister Yalçın Akdoğan and three MPs from the civilian control measures. Long curfews and spe- HDP, announced the program to the public in a cial security zones became widespread across the joint press conference held in Dolmabahçe Palace. region.47 According to human rights groups, 321 Based on information received from an anony- civilians died during curfews imposed on urban mous source familiar with the meeting, the daily areas.48 Some of the deaths occurred simply becau- newspaper Cumhuriyet also insisted that Erdoğan se civilians could not access medical aid. Estimates was aware of the meeting.43 A few weeks later, how- suggest that also three-to-four hundred thousand ever, the Dolmabahçe Consensus (Dolmabahçe people left their homes to avoid violence. The go- Mutabakatı) ended with one short interview that vernment justified these tactics as part of its fight

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 11 against and cited the urban encroach- turnout decreased by 3.5 percent in HDP strong- ment of the insurgency in southeast Turkey. Du- holds, it went up by almost two percent in AKP ring the ‘peace process’, the newly formed youth strongholds.52 wing of the PKK, the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H) dug holes in the As such, electoral priorities of the government ground and set up barricades to block the entry of were an important determinant of its COIN pol- security forces into certain neighborhoods and to icy.53 Governors targeted the HDP strongholds realize the self-rule agenda promoted by Öcalan in with curfews but refrained from doing so when his prison writings.49 However, similar to the expe- electoral expectations were involved. To under- rience of its influential predecessor, the ERNK, the stand this dynamic, a little background on elec- YDG-H’s role was reduced to organizing violent toral geography of the region is necessary. Fifteen attacks against security forces. As such, despite the districts in southeast Turkey host half of the elec- use of novel repertoires, neither PKK presence nor torate in the region. Astonishingly, there was no the share of rebel violence in urban areas was an overlap between the curfew districts and the vote- entirely new development in the long history of rich districts. Not experiencing civilian control the Kurdish armed conflict. measures, the vote-rich districts awarded the AKP with an additional line of support in the November Most interesting in all of this, perhaps, was the use election. Accordingly, 56 percent of all AKP gains of both military and legal means by the govern- in the November election came from these areas. ment to cut down civilian support for the Kurdish political party. More specifically, suppressing voter In this part, we have examined the domestic ori- turnout emerged as the key mechanism to secure gins of the AKP government’s Kurdish policy and favorable electoral outcomes in Turkey’s Novem- argued that electoral expectations and establishing ber 2015 election, especially in southeast Turkey. a powerful presidency were its main determinants. Even before the June 2015 election, there was a de- This argument explains why Kurdish policy shift- liberate effort to relocate ballot boxes and reduce ed more than once under the AKP rule, and the the number of polling stations that would require Kurdish political actors were unable to extract any voters to travel long distances in order to vote.50 practical concessions from the government. We Then, between the two elections, roughly three now turn to the second source of the AKP’s in- thousand people were detained. A considerable strumentalist approach and show how the Turkish part of these detentions targeted mayors and offi- government’s foreign policy in Syria also shaped cials from the Kurdish political party. In Septem- its policy toward the Kurds. ber 2016, another innovative measure was in place: the government removed 28 mayors from office under terrorism charges and appointed trustees TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF to replace them.51 Finally, the craze of curfews KURDISH PROBLEM announced in southeast Turkey, which started in August 2015 and continued through April 2016, The role of the Kurdish issue in contemporary served the same objective by displacing civilians. Turkish foreign policy remains largely understud- Accordingly, in the November 2015 election, while ied. In the 1990s, the international dimension of

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 12 the Kurdish conflict was primarily about diasporic of and allowed its Kurdish citizens to communities in Europe and rebel bases in north- mobilize around the rebel group. Turkey and Syria ern Iraq that provided a number of resources to came to the brink of war in 1998, and nothing less the PKK, including safe havens and logistical sup- than the departure of Öcalan from Syria to Europe port.54 Neither Syrian Kurds nor the Turkish gov- resolved the issue. A decade later, the relations ernment’s foreign policy priorities were part of between the two countries were better than they the story. This has changed with the Syrian civil had ever been. Erdoğan and Assad were now close war. The Turkish government saw Syrian Kurds as friends, even spending their holidays together. a threat to its geostrategic ambitions in Syria and Joint cabinet meetings were held, a document on became alarmed by the fact that their self-gover- strategic partnership was signed, and restrictions nance attempts might send the ‘wrong message’ on the free travel of people and goods were lifted. to its own Kurdish community. Syrian Kurds were long influenced by Öcalan’s secular brand of Kurd- Societal ties also developed quickly. As early as ish nationalism, joined the PKK in large numbers, 2003, Turkish became the most preferred foreign and had close ties with the Kurds inside Turkey. language course at the University of Aleppo.56 Syr- ians who visited Turkey increased nine-fold in a Over time, Turkey’s position evolved from hostile decade, reaching nine-hundred thousand by 2010. neutrality to open confrontation with the Syrian The volume of trade also grew exponentially and Kurds. Initially, the Turkish government promot- presented new opportunities for Turkish business- ed regime change in Syria by supporting the Sun- men. According to official statistics, Turkish -ex ni-Arab rebels. In doing so, it developed an uneasy ports to Syria increased nine-fold in this period, relationship with the Syrian Kurds who refused and hit the 1.8-billion-dollar mark in 2010. Border to fight against the Assad government and faced provinces especially benefitted from deepening re- constant pressure from ISIS.55 The intervention of lations. For instance, a globally-recognized shop- Russia in the Syrian civil war beginning in Sep- ping mall, Forum Mersin, was built in Mersin with tember 2015 eliminated the possibility of regime foreign capital. The belle époque of Turkish-Syrian change in Damascus and this decision fortified the relations ended with the Syrian civil war that was ranks on the battlefield, accelerating the scramble triggered by the Arab Spring. For the AKP govern- for Syria. Accordingly, as U.S. and Russian-backed ment, this was an opportunity to extend Turkey’s forces began to compete for territory (that once influence over Syria. belonged to ISIS), this development also allowed the Turkish government to enter Syria, bringing it Governing Syria into open conflict with the Syrian Kurds and their coethnics inside Turkey. When protests turned into civil war in Syria in 2011, the Ankara government predicted a short Syrian Karma fight that would lead to the overthrow of the As- sad government. Taking their cue from Iraq, the For almost two decades, the Syrian government AKP leaders argued that political power should be supported the PKK’s fight against Turkey. It hosted transferred to the (Sunni) majority in Syria. This the rebel leader Öcalan who stayed in the safety perspective rested on the idea that a Sunni gov-

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 13 ernment in Damascus would be more inclined to- geographical clusters. Gaziantep and Adıyaman wards expanding cooperation with Turkey and to in particular provided fertile grounds for recruit- accept the latter’s leadership position. It was also ment and civilian support. The Weavers Group informed by a historical precedent. In the late Ot- (Dokumacılar Grubu), which operated as an ISIS toman period, the Istanbul government ruled Syr- cell, stood out amongst others by organizing ma- ia in alliance with a Sunni Muslim bloc, and this jor violent attacks inside Turkey. Its members were political framework worked extremely well until all recruited from Adıyaman. Interviews with re- World War I.57 latives of group members and opinion leaders in the city suggest that the group practiced its own To install a Sunni government in Damascus, the version of Islam and utilized social ties to recruit Turkish governments worked closely with rebels. teenagers with limited economic prospects.59 First, they organized the Syrian political opposi- tion. The was announced The main target of Islamic radicals inside Turkey in Istanbul in 2011 and spearheaded the formation was the Kurdish political actors. This had to do of the National Coalition for with two factors. First, ISIS was fighting against and Revolutionary Forces, the political body rec- the . Second, ognized by the international community as the le- expanded its geographical coverage in southeast gitimate Syrian government. Second, they played Turkey after 2002 and came into contact with Isla- important roles in the war effort. The Free Syrian mist constituencies. These new settings were char- Army (FSA) was hosted, trained, and assisted by acterized by confessional and ethnic rivalries. Not Turkey. When exposed, the MIT’s secret delivery surprisingly, the first major suicide bombing attack of weapons to Syrian rebels became a diplomatic by ISIS took place in Şanlıurfa, targeting a group of scandal.58 Finally, Turkish governments pursued college students who had gathered to show solidar- a lax border policy for those who wanted to fight ity with the defense of Kobani against ISIS assaults. the Assad government. This approach benefitted Several suicide attacks that followed this incident foreign nationals who were interested in waging a also targeted the Kurdish political party. The most global jihad in Syria, and provided manpower for spectacular example was the bomb explosion in the ISIS and other extremist groups. center of Ankara on October 10, 2015 where 107 civilians died and more than 500 were wounded. At the beginning, it was unclear how the Syrian Being the deadliest explosion in Turkish history, civil war would affect Turkey’s Kurdish question. the attack aimed at a peace rally organized by the When the Turkish government made a concerted Turkish left and the HDP that opposed Turkey’s in- effort to support Sunni-Arab rebels around an Is- volvement in Syria against the Kurds.60 lamic agenda, radical groups inside Turkey found an opportunity to expand and mobilize. Hundreds The major event that crystallized the Kurdish op- of Turkish citizens, who went to Syria to fight position to the AKP’s Syrian policy was the Ko- against the Assad government, became involved in bani demonstrations. Kobani was a Kurdish town Jihadist networks and acquired radical ideas. Just in northern Syria under siege by ISIS starting in like the Hizbullah experience in the 1990s, radi- September 2014. It was only a few miles away cal Islamists operated in secrecy and yet lived in from the Turkish border. Its proximity to Turkey

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 14 allowed the media to report on the events on a reg- inter-communal clashes.64 Protestors viewed the ular basis, leading to round-the-clock exposure of defense of Kobani as a heroic act against a pow- civilians to what was unfolding across the border. erful predator, and Erdoğan was depicted as a When Kobani came close to falling into the hands cold-hearted, calculating actor in this narrative. of ISIS in late September, the Kurdish political ac- When the dust settled, 46 civilians were dead and tors mobilized inside Turkey. Civilians, attempting 682 were injured. The mobilization of Kurds reg- to join the war effort in defense of Kobani, were istered two points about the changing nature of pushed back by the Turkish security forces.61 The the Kurdish issue: first, it had evolved into a trans- fact that these skirmishes were broadcast live frus- national problem and Syrian Kurds had become trated the Kurdish community further. a part of it; and, second, the AKP’s foreign policy priorities in Syria, which worked against the Syr- The AKP’s Syria policy played a key role in the un- ian Kurds, were strongly contested by the ethnic folding of events. Kobani was isolated from oth- movement in Turkey. er Kurdish towns controlled by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and Barzani’s forces would Scramble for Syria (Fall 2015- ) have had to travel across ISIS-held territory to reach the town. The only option was to create a Russia’s intervention into the Syrian civil war on corridor from the Turkish border, but Erdoğan behalf of the Damascus government unsettled mil- refused to do so. To its credit, the Turkish gov- itary balances on the battlefield. Assad’s forces be- ernment allowed 130,000 civilians fleeing Kobani gan pushing back against the rebels and contesting to enter Turkey and permitted a small contingent rebel control over Aleppo. The relations between of Iraqi to join the People’s Protection the Syrian Kurds and the U.S. had already entered Units (YPG), the military arm of the PYD. Yet, a new phase a few months ago, and the American despite tremendous international and domestic policy makers now considered the Kurds as use- pressure, Erdoğan was reluctant to support the ful allies in the fight against ISIS. They formed Syrian Kurds. He let ISIS weaken them day by day. the (SDF) in Octo- Erdoğan worried that the Kurds’ claim to autono- ber 2015 – a military force that mainly consisted my, including establishing self-governing cantons, of YPG units supported by smaller non-Kurdish would complicate Turkey’s plans for Syria as well dissident groups. ISIS also began to lose territo- as its own Kurdish issue.62 ry both in Syria and Iraq as it struggled to keep a vast region under its control after a period of rapid As a response, Kurdish political actors organized expansion. As a result, the struggle for territorial the largest Kurdish mobilization in modern Turk- control gained pace while taking the option of re- ish history. Thousands took to the streets across gime change in Damascus off the table. With other Turkey to protest the AKP’s unwillingness to help options closed, Turkey decided to join the race for the town of Kobani. Street protests on October territorial control and quickly found out that it has 6-7 often turned violent and involved rioting and conflicting interests with the Syrian Kurds.65 destruction of property.63 Furthermore, provinces such as Gaziantep, where radical Islam and Turk- In the meantime, the Syrian Kurds vastly expand- ish nationalism grew with Syrian war witnessed ed their territories by fighting only one enemy,

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 15 ISIS. They also wasted no time to translate their would bring the only highway to Aleppo and west- territorial gains into a political outcome. In March erly regions under Turkish control. The main idea 2016, the PYD announced the autonomous fed- however was to prevent the Kurds from physical- eration of Rojava that united the self-governing ly uniting their newly established cantons. As the cantons of Afrin, Jazira, and Kobani. Rojava now YPG made a push toward the west by crossing the has a flag, a constitution and a political body.66 This Euphrates River, air strikes by the Turkish forces political experiment partly owed its success to an periodically hit the Kurdish group. As of October implicit understanding between the U.S. and the 2016, the conflict took an interesting turn, when Syrian Kurds. Both sides overcame issues of mis- the FSA forces directly engaged the SDF/YPG in trust and were content with the idea of replicating the east of the Afrin canton. This aggressive move the Iraqi Kurdish experience in northern Syria. suggests that Turkish government is now interest- The U.S. was looking for a credible ally to fight ed in occupying some of the territory under Kurd- against ISIS and the Syrian Kurds saw an opportu- ish control as well as using its absence from the nity for state-building with the help of a powerful campaign to its advantage. benefactor as their Iraqi counterpart had done in the aftermath of the . In sum, the AKP’s foreign policy interests in Syria played a major role in shaping its Kurdish policy. The scramble for Syria added another complica- First, support for Sunni rebels radicalized groups tion to AKP’s policy in Syria. We call it the al-Ja- inside Turkey who violently targeted the Kurdish zira Syndrome. With the dissolution of the Otto- political actors. Erdoğan’s refusal to help the Syri- man state in World War I, Western powers created an Kurds mobilized their co-ethnics inside Turkey, nation-states in the Middle East. Turkish officials who protested to show their anger and disappoint- were historically alert about the prospects of client ment with the government’s Syria policy. Second, states around Turkey.67 They believed that Europe- as the door for regime change closed in Syria with an powers were interested in carving out political Russian intervention, the AKP’s growing interest units populated by minorities in Anatolia. The for territorial control paved the way for an open British involvement with Assyrians and Kurds in conflict between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. The northern Iraq and the French support enjoyed by scramble for Syria continues as of November 2016, Armenian and Kurdish nationalists in Syria com- and one can only expect it to intensify with ma- municated the idea that these groups could mo- jor consequences for the region, if no agreement is bilize their co-ethnics inside Turkey, if given an reached in the near future. opportunity. Hoybun (1927-1946), a rebel organi- zation of Kurds and Armenians, tried this strategy without much success in the interwar period. LOOKING AHEAD

The quest for territorial control guided partly by The future of Kurdish issue in Turkey will in part security concerns pushed Turkey into Syria by be determined by the policies of three actors. These providing military assistance to the FSA. Erdoğan are international community (mainly the U.S.), suggested that Turkey was interested in extend- the Turkish government, and the Kurdish politi- ing its reach as far as Al-Bab in the south, which cal actors. Each side can insist on policies that best

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 16 serve its interests. The U.S. may refuse to settle for PYD espouses a revolutionary brand of Kurdish anything short of securing its geopolitical interests nationalism that the Turkish government fears the in the region; the AKP government can priori- most. As such, enlisting the support of the Syrian tize domestic political concerns in its approach to Kurds against ISIS was the right thing to do, and Kurdish issue at home and abroad; and the Kurd- yet, it would be overly optimistic to think that they ish political actors can try to govern themselves can (or are willing to) serve the U.S. interests in the without taking into account larger forces at play. region against a Russian-backed alliance.68 Our analysis suggests that each of these scenarios represents a plausible alternative but would be a There might be two repercussions of giving the failed policy in the long run. This is the case be- Syrian Kurds a green light toward self-rule. First, cause none of these actors are capable of forcing allowing the Turkish government to punish its own its policy preferences on others in the long-haul. Kurds so that the U.S.-Kurdish partnership would Instead, we argue below that all sides should settle work smoothly in Syria without Turkish opposi- for a second-best option. Politics of moderation tion would be morally wrong and short-sighted. can bring a negotiated settlement to the Kurdish Early signs from those who are close to the new issue and in turn promote peace, security and de- Trump administration suggest that the U.S. might mocracy in the Middle East. be interested in giving a free check to Turkey in its domestic affairs in return for its acquiescence Politics of Moderation in Syria.69 This approach might deal a heavy blow to Turkish democracy by suspending the political The overwhelming success of the U.S. in the Gulf rights of Turkey’s Kurdish community and facili- War (1990-1991) led to the creation of Iraqi Kurd- tating radical changes in Turkey’s constitutional istan as an autonomous region in 1992. Kurds as- order. It might also destabilize the Middle East fur- sisted the U.S. war effort against ther as it would give a political cause and a physical and proved that they were reliable allies in the long sanctuary to the PKK to start a new campaign of run. Turkey’s stiff resistance to a Kurdish state in violence. Second, self-rule attempts of the Syrian northern Iraq was broken by giving it a free hand Kurds would put considerable political pressure in its dealings with the PKK. Massoud Barzani co- on and the Barzani leadership, a operated with the Turkish government on securi- staunch ally of the U.S. in the region. It is worth ty issues and developed close economic ties with remembering that long before the PKK and its Turkey’s southeast. The U.S. policy makers seem leader influenced the political trajectory of the to see the situation in northern Syria in similar Syrian Kurds, the same strategy was put in place in terms. There are two problems with this assess- northern Iraq, gaining ground in the early 1990s. ment. First, unlike the Gulf War, there are multiple It was only the U.S. support against the PKK inside actors involved in Syria with divergent interests, Turkey and in favor of an autonomous Kurdish and the resolution of the civil war is rather com- government in northern Iraq that turned the tide, plex. Kurds are yet to pledge their full allegiance to a fact that Öcalan lamented deeply.70 the U.S. and the coalition forces. Second, it is un- likely that Turkey can develop the kind of relation- Meanwhile, the short-term objective of U.S. pol- ship with the PYD that it had with Barzani. The icy makers needs to be de-escalating the conflict

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 17 between the Turkish government and the PYD. As a result, the increasing reliance of the U.S. on As the struggle for territorial control intensifies the Syrian Kurds to avoid audience costs at home in northern Syria, the U.S. is stuck between a rock is breeding another conflict nearby. The U.S. has and a hard place. This is partly the case because to aim for a compromise in northern Syria that in- thus far the U.S. government adopted ad hoc mea- cludes the FSA, Turkish government, Syrian Kurds, sures to save the day. Recent developments on the and perhaps the Assad government. It might be battlefield show that the benefits of this approach possible to get rid of ISIS with the help of the Kurds, will expire sooner than expected. The Turkish but as post-Hussein Iraq suggests, what happens af- government is eager to get something out of the terwards is perhaps more critical in the long run. chaos in Syria since it was effectively excluded It is time for the U.S. to start using sticks to reduce from the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq and its dream tensions and manage expansionist aims. Currently, of removing Assad from power fell on deaf ears. there is not a win-win scenario in the Syrian civil Meanwhile, as pragmatists, the Syrian Kurds seem war: therefore, all actors involved will have to pay to take advantage of every opportunity to expand their dues to avoid major conflicts in the future. their territory and give it a political makeover. As the primary actor in the conflict, the U.S. has to The Turkish government also needs to confront the intervene firmly to discourage expansionism. cold hard facts about Syria today. Most important, transforming Syria around Turkey’s priorities will Currently, there are two wars being fought in Syria; not materialize. It is true that the AKP govern- a war fought over control of the central govern- ments were particularly invested in regime change. ment and one over northern Syria. With the Rus- They trained, financed, and supported rebels; bore sian intervention in support of Assad against the the costs of ISIS violence; and even accepted mil- Sunni insurgency, the U.S. does not have the final lions of refugees with the implicit understanding say in the center-seeking war and will be forced that these would give them leverage over Syria.71 to accept the reality on the battlefield. However, Yet, the growing involvement of outside actors and the localized conflict in the north involves the al- the urgency of the ISIS threat pushed the U.S. gov- lies of the U.S. and a rogue actor (ISIS) who has ernment towards working with the Kurds, and took been roaming freely in these lands. Turkey has a Turkish demands off the table. It would not be a window of opportunity to put the Syrian Kurds in wise policy for Turkey at this point to switch targets their place: the Turkish government faces no audi- and blame the PYD for what went wrong in Syria. ence costs or budgetary constraints at home, and works with a compliant military that has received Inside Turkey, the AKP government has an equally a make-over after the coup-attempt on July 15. For urgent task to accomplish. It needs to address the the Syrian Kurds, the chaos in Syria represents an trust deficit between the Kurds and the Turkish historic moment to establish territorial control state and take no less than legal steps to secure the and build a self-defense force before Assad consol- rights of Kurds as citizens. Allowing the Kurdish idates his power or ISIS violence returns. For each issue to be guided by electoral expectations and side, the only constraint seems to be the U.S. and the foreign policy agenda may deliver short-term their own military shrewdness. dividends but promises no stability when the in- cumbent, rather than law, determines the extent of

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 18 rewards and punishments. A good starting point mands and distancing themselves from Syrian for the AKP government is to refrain from punish- Kurds are two potential solutions that can serve ing Kurdish political actors through legal and oth- them well in this impasse. Self-rule experiments er means.72 Lifting the immunity of Kurdish MPs in southeast Turkey attracted the wrath of the in- and jailing journalists from pro-Kurdish newspa- cumbent: they cost lives and created tremendous pers (Özgur Gündem, Azadiya Walat) may stop destruction when the Turkish security forces and political mobilization of the Kurds, but it does not the PKK engaged in an intense urban warfare in present a long-term solution. Along with citizen- 2015-2016. The PKK’s ill-judged belief that the ship rights, Kurds need what we call an affirma- Kurds were ready for self-rule and that the con- tive-action plan. They live shorter than the national ditions were ripe for autonomy turned out to be average; they have limited access to basic services; fatally wrong. Kurdish political actors lost civilian and they hardly possess the necessary human and support, as the discourse of democratic autonomy social capital to compete in the national economy. and self-governance died in the trenches of . A Kurdish affirmative action plan needs to break Instead, this period will be remembered in the his- the culture of dependency and political patronage tory of the Kurdish conflict as the heyday of civil- that kept Kurdish society underdeveloped and its ian victimization. Most ironically, it was the Kurd- social hierarchies almost fixed in modern times. ish movement in Turkey that paid a heavy price for the political success of the Syrian Kurds. The Syrian Kurds have emerged as the major ben- eficiaries of the Syria’s civil war by a large margin. Solving the Kurdish issue also requires taking into They expanded their territories, won a powerful account the demands of the Kurdish electorate. For friend, the U.S., and began practicing self-gover- the Kurdish political party, this means building co- nance. This might be the right moment when the alitions with other political parties and civil soci- Syrian Kurds need to pace themselves and not ety groups, and de-prioritizing Öcalan’s freedom push further for more territory and political uni- as well as his political agenda. The Kurdish politi- ty. It is true that areas under Kurdish control are cal party tried this strategy only twice in its history not united. But the Syrian Kurds cannot convince (1991, 2015) and achieved tremendous success. Yet, all (U.S., Turkey, Syria, Russia, and other region- the AKP governments, the PKK, and the old guard al powers) at once of their maximalist demands. within the movement oppose this move vehemently. Unlike in northern Iraq, both sides of the conflict For their own reasons, they want to keep the Kurd- are supported by powerful outside actors who ish political party as a subsidiary of the rebel group. have made strong commitments and would there- As long as the Kurdish political party fails to de- fore not easily accept a proposal that disrupts the clare its independence from the warring parties, it is balance on the battlefield against their favor. After forced to stay in survival mode and to give the PKK all, it remains to be seen what the consolidation of the right to defend and lead the Kurdish movement, Kurdish rule in northern Syria will offer to other as urban clashes of 2015-2016 vividly demonstrated. minority groups in the region. This vicious cycle needs to be broken if the Kurd- Kurdish political actors inside Turkey might also ish movement wants to solve the Kurdish ques- be better off with moderation. Scaling down de- tion with a negotiated settlement that involves all

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 19 stakeholders in Turkey. A secretive deal secured approach is best characterized as instrumental. It from higher echelons of the Turkish state does views the Kurdish issue/actors as a function of its own not promise a long-term resolution. The deal has priorities in domestic politics and foreign policy. Elec- to have a legal basis and should be considered le- toral outcomes and the presidential ambitions of Er- gitimate by most in Turkish society. Meanwhile, doğan shaped how the government interacted with improving Kurds’ everyday lives should re-enter Kurdish political actors and Kurdish constituencies. the to-do list of Kurdish politicians. The authors of Accordingly, we witnessed a variety of tactics em- this report have a hard time remembering the last ployed over time depending on the AKP’s electoral time that Kurdish politicians searched for ways to needs. The government injected hard cash into the improve the socio-economic position of Kurds in region in 2007; negotiated with Öcalan in 2013; and Turkish society. It is time for Kurdish politicians then three years later put Kurdish cities on round- to stop asking for favors from the AKP officials or the-clock lockdown. Recently, the government’s in- sacrifices from civilians, and instead find ways to terest in reinstating capital punishment, targeting do coalition-building with other groups and deliv- primarily the Kurdish political actors, and Öcalan er material benefits to their constituency. in particular, is likely to facilitate a rapprochement with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and gen- erate sufficient political capital for a constitutional CONCLUSION amendment that might transform Turkey’s parlia- mentary system into an executive presidency. Since 2015, the AKP government has been fighting the Kurds on two fronts. In southeast Turkey, mas- The Turkish government’s policy on Syria impact- sive counterinsurgency operations have brought ed the Kurdish issue in two ways. First, it created daily life to a complete halt. In Syria, the clash- a major security problem for the ethnic move- es with the SDF/YPG have become increasingly ment and its leftist allies inside Turkey. It indirect- commonplace over the previously ISIS-controlled ly boosted radical Islamic groups and increased territory. It is challenging to remember that until Ankara’s reluctance to help the Syrian Kurds. As a late 2014 there was almost complete consensus response, the Kurdish political actors inside Tur- in Turkey and abroad that the AKP governments key mobilized to show their disappointment in the had taken courageous steps to solve the Kurdish Kobani case. Second, Syrian Kurds became a prob- issue, and we could expect a negotiated settlement lem for the AKP government when their agenda anytime soon.73 Similarly, the Turkish government clashed with that of Erdoğan’s. Russian interven- rarely assigned strategic importance to Kurds in tion took the possibility of replacing Assad with its foreign policy until recently (something we call a Sunni government off the table. Afterwards, the hostile neutrality) and instead concentrated its U.S. support to the Syrian Kurds excluded Turkey efforts to remove Assad from power. How do we from the process.74 Finally, Syrian Kurds emerged explain this dramatic shift in the Turkish govern- as the public enemy number one partly because ment’s policy toward the Kurds? they now directly challenge Turkey’s interests.

We suggested in our report that the AKP govern- To move forward, we argued in the third part of ment has no fixed position towards the Kurds. Its this report that politics of moderation is neces-

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 20 sary for the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish issue. If history is any guide, this is the route that is least likely to be taken. However, we hope that the Turk- ish government, Kurdish political actors, and the international community will think this through and implement policies that will not leave any side out in the open. Politics of moderation offers a credible route to a negotiated settlement. It does so by forcing all sides to moderate their extreme demands. The Kurds have to settle for less than self-rule in Turkey; the AKP government needs to accept the fact that it will not get the return on its investment in Syria, and the Syrian Kurds are not best suited to protect the U.S. geopolitical interests in the Middle East. In sum, managing the Kurdish issue is an important part of guaranteeing peace, security, and democracy in the region precisely because it forces all sides to co-exist by settling for second-best options.

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 21 NOTES 12. As early as 1995, influential columnists and high-ranking bureaucrats were warning the gov- 1. Nick Danforth, “Erdogan’s Crackdown on ernment to have a political program in place to win pro-Kurdish Party Plays into the Hands of Turkey’s back Kurdish loyalties. Şükrü Elekdağ, “PKK ile Enemies,” Washington Post, November 4, 2016, Mücadele Stratejisi,” Milliyet, December 29, 1995. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world- The OHAL governor, Necati Bilican, asked the gov- views/wp/2016/11/04/erdogans-crackdown-on- ernment ministers in Ankara to shift the priorities pro-kurdish-party-plays-into-the-hands-of-tur- of the emergency region from security to economy keys-enemies/. and presented a long list of recommendations. Ayın 2. “HDP’den Özyönetim Deklarasyonu,” Al Jazeera Tarihi, May 26, 1996. Turk, December 27, 2015, http://www.aljazeera. 13. Aydin and Emrence, op cit. com.tr/haber/dtkdan-oz-yonetim-deklarasyonu. 14. The biggest losers were the Motherland Party 3. İsmet G. İmset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP) that en- Violence in Turkey, 1973–1992 (Ankara: Turkish joyed wide support from center-right constituen- Daily News, 1992). cies in the 1990s. 4. The exception was the Kurdish political party. 15. “Erdogan Victory Will Extend Turkey’s Polariza- “PKK’dan Meclise Tehdit,” Milliyet, October 22, tion, Tensions with US,” Atlantic Council, August 1993. 11, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ 5. Despite being shut down by the Constitution- new-atlanticist/erdogan-victory-will-extend-tur- al Court many times, the Kurdish political par- key-s-polarization-tension-with-us. ty survived under different names with the same 16. On the electoral impact of PKK violence, see Ayseg- core cadre of leaders and competed in all elections ul Aydin and Cem Emrence, “How Violence Helped except in 1994. The People’s Labor Party (HEP) Erdogan and his Kurdish Opponents in Turkey’s competed in the 1991 election (on SHP ticket), the Elections,” Washington Post, June 3, 2016, https:// Democracy Party (DEP) in the 1994 election, the www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/ People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) in the 1995 wp/2016/06/03/how-violence-helped-both-erdogan- and 1999 elections, and the Democratic People’s and-his-kurdish-opponents-in-turkeys-elections/. Party (DEHAP) in the 2002 election. 17. Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkey’s Political Reforms 6. On Kurdish political parties in the 1990s, see Ni- and the Impact of the European Union, ” South Eu- cole Watts, Activists in Office – Kurdish Politics and ropean Society & Politics 10, no. 1, (1995). Protest in Turkey (Seattle: University of Washing- 18. Turkish Institute of Statistics (TUIK), Various Ta- ton Press, 2010). bles, http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod= 7. Aysegul Aydin and Cem Emrence, Zones of Rebel- kategorist. lion – Kurdish Insurgents and the Turkish State (Itha- 19. Ibid. ca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), Chp 3. 20. The Banks Association of Turkey (TBB). Various 8. For the government decree, see T.C. Resmi Gazete, Tables. https://www.tbb.org.tr/tr/bankacilik/ban- No. 19517, July 14, 1987, 1-4. ka-ve-sektor-bilgileri/istatistiki-raporlar/59 9. Sezgin Tanrıkulu and Serdar Yavuz, “İnsan Hakları 21. TUIK, Various Tables. Açısından Olağanüstü Hal’in Bilançosu,” Sosyal 22. Ibid. Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi 5, no. 6(2005). 23. In 2007, the Turkish government spent on average 10. The AKP government recently became interested 105 dollars per capita in the region. The provinc- in increasing the number of village guards, giving es in the rest of Turkey received 35 percent more them permanent government employee status and on average (142 dollars) from the pool of state ex- heavy weaponary. “Bakan Soylu: Geçici Köy Koru- penditures in the same period. Calculations were cuları Kalıcı Olacak, Ağır Silah Verilecek,” Sputnik, based on data available from TUIK. September 24, 2016, https://tr.sputniknews.com/ 24. While the use of electricity per capita rose from turkiye/201609241024975796-suleyman-soy- 624 mwh in 2001 to 873 mwh in 2008 in the re- lu-koy-korucu-silah/. gion, it jumped from 1338 mwh to 2132 mwh in 11. İnsan Hakları Derneği, Ocak 1990-Mart 2009 Döne- the rest of Turkey in the same period. Calculations minde Köy Korucuları Tarafından Gerçekleştirilen İn- were based on data available from TUIK. san Hakları İhlallerine İlişkin Özel Rapor, May 8, 2009, 25. “Erdogan pulls it off,” The Economist, September http://www.ihd.org.tr/images/pdf/ocak_1990_ 13, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/news- mart_2009_koy_koruculari_ozel_raporu.pdf. book/2010/09/turkeys_constitutional_referendum.

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 22 26. Harvey Morris, “Will Turkey Make Peace with the 39. “Erdoğan Paralel Yapı ile İlgili Çok Farklı Bir Kurds,” New York Times, February 27, 2013, http:// Adım Atacağız,” Al-Jazeera Turk, October 11, 2014, rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/will- http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/erdogan-para- turkey-make-peace-with-the-kurds/. lel-yapiyla-ilgili-cok-farkli-bir-adim-atacagiz. 27. “Factbox: Turkey’s Constitutional Amendments,” 40. “Protests and Deaths Around Turkey Over Han- Reuters, September 12, 2010, http://www.reuters. dling of Kobani,” Deutsche Welle, October 10, com/article/us-turkey-referendum-articles-idUS- 2014, http://www.dw.com/en/protests-and- TRE68B28B20100912. deaths-around-turkey-over-handling-of-ko- 28. “Demokratikleşme Paketi TBMM Kurulunda bani/a-17986274. Kabul Edildi,” Hürriyet, March 3, 2014, http:// 41. “İç Güvenlik Yasası Resmi Gazete’d e ,” Anadolu www.hurriyet.com.tr/demokratiklesme-paketi-tb- Ajansı, April 4, 2015, http://aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/ mm-genel-kurulunda-kabul-edildi-25923518. ic-guvenlik-yasasi-resmi-gazetede/60789. 29. The KCK’s mission can be found in ERNK’s foun- 42. “10 Madde Diyor Ki,” Hürriyet, March 2, 2015, dational text. Abdullah Öcalan, Kürdistan Yurtsev- http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/10-madde-diy- erliği ve Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi (Köln: Weşanen or-ki-28334292. Serxwebun, 1992), 48. On the KCK, Fatma Aktaş, 43. Can Dündar, “Dolmabahçe Sırları,” Cumhuriyet, Demokratik Siyaset ve Demokratik Toplum Savun- July 18, 2015, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/ ması: KCK Savunmaları, (Istanbul: Aram, 2012). koseyazisi/324711/Dolmabahce_sirlari.html#. 30. Adam Taylor, “17 Things Turkey’s Erdoğan Has 44. “Erdoğan: Dolmabahçe Toplantısını Doğru Bul- Said About Journalists,” Washington Post, June muyorum,” Cumhuriyet, March 22, 2015, http:// 10, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/233651/ worldviews/wp/2015/06/10/17-things-turkeys-er- Erdogan__Dolmabahce_toplantisini_dogru_bul- dogan-has-said-about-journalists/. muyorum.html. 31. “İşte Akil İnsanlar Listesi,” Akşam, April 3, 2013, 45. Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Erdogan’s http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/iste-akil-insan- Governing Party in Turkey Loses Parliamentary lar-listesi/haber-183297. Majority,” New York Times, June 7, 2015, http:// 32. The audiences pressured the ‘wise men’ in several www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/world/europe/ occasions, watch “Niğde’de Akilleri Çaresiz Bırakan turkey-election-recep-tayyip-erdogan-kurds-hdp. Soru,” Youtube, November 11, 2016, https://www. html. youtube.com/watch?v=dEnKt_Uu0n4. 46. Aykan Demir, “Six Takeaways from the Turkish 33. Veysi Sarısözen, “Türk Türk’e Tükürür, Kürt Türk’e Elections,” Politico, November 1, 2015, http://www. Tükürmez,” Özgür Gündem, August 31, 2014, politico.eu/article/six-takeaways-turkish-elec- http://www.ozgur-gundem.com/yazi/117628/turk- tions-akp-victory-november-erdogan/. turke-tukurur-kurt-turke-tukurmez. 47. For special security zones, see Aysegul Aydin and 34. Jenna Krajeski, “In Taksim Square, Where are Cem Emrence, “A New Episode in the Turkish Civ- the Kurds?,” New Yorker, June 11, 2013, http:// il War,” Washington Post, August 21, 2015, https:// www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/in-taksim- www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/ square-where-are-the-kurds. wp/2015/08/21/a-new-episode-in-the-turkish-civ- 35. “Öcalan-BDP Görüşmesinin Zabıtları Ortaya il-war/. Çıktı,” Radikal, February 28, 2013, http://www. 48. Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, “16 Ağustos 2015-16 radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ocalan-bdp-gorusmesi- Ağustos 2016 Tarihleri Arasında Sokağa Çıkma nin-zabitlari-ortaya-cikti-1123269/. Yasakları ve Yaşamını Yitiren Siviller Bilgi Notu,” 36. Watch the short announcement by Selahattin http://tihv.org.tr/16-agustos-2015-16-agustos- Demirtaş at HDP’s group meeting. Al Jazeera Turk, 2016-tarihleri-arasinda-sokaga-cikma-yasaklari- “Selahattin Demirtaş: Seni Başkan Yaptırmayaca- ve-yasamini-yitiren-siviller-bilgi-notu/. ğız,” Youtube, November 8, 2016, https://www.you- 49. Abdullah Öcalan, Demokratik Uygarlık Manifesto- tube.com/watch?v=FwKUBhyny8Y. su Vol. 1-3 (Istanbul: Aram Yayınları, 2009). 37. Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Re- 50. These requests came from election councils of 20 bellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Stanford, Calif.: Stan- provinces and 69 districts, and were denied by the ford University Press, 2009). High Election Commission by a 4-6 vote. “YSK’dan 38. Visit the official website of Holy Birth Week cele- Sandık Taşımaya Ret,” Hürriyet, October 3, 2015, brations by Diyanet, http://kutludogum.diyanet. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yskdan-sandik-tasi- gov.tr/Etkinlik. maya-ret-30224449.

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 23 51. In the press release, the government stressed that 60. Ceylan Yeginsu and Tim Arango, “Explosions while democratic representation is protected by During Peace Rally in Ankara, Turkey’s Capital, law and should be respected by all, elected politi- Kill Scores,” New York Times, October 10, 2015, cians should not abuse their privileges of office to http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/world/eu- assist terrorist organizations. rope/ankara-turkey-explosion-deaths.html. 52. Aysegul Aydin and Cem Emrence, “Politics of Con- 61. “Kobani’ye Geçmek İsteyenlere Müdahale,” Hür- finement: Curfews and Civilian Control in Turkish riyet, January 27, 2015, http://www.hurriyet. Counterinsurgency,” presented at the Workshop on com.tr/kobaniye-gecmek-isteyenlere-muda- Contemporary Turkish Politics, Baker Institute for hale-28060295. Public Policy and Project on Middle East Political 62. Jenna Krajeski, “What Kobani Means for Turkey’s Science (POMEPS), Rice University, Houston, Tex- Kurds,” New Yorker, November 8, 2014, http:// as, October 14, 2016, http://pomeps.org/2016/11/14/ www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/koba- politics-of-confinement-curfews-and-civilian-con- ni-means-turkeys-kurds. trol-in-turkish-counterinsurgency/ 63. Amnesty International, Kobani Protests in Turkey 53. The idea that recent Turkish COIN campaign had (London: Amnesty International Ltd, 2015). to with electoral concerns can be confirmed by re- 64. “Gaziantep’te Olaylar Nasıl Böyle Büyüdü,” Al-Ja- jecting alternative explanations. Among others, the zeera Turk, October 11, 2014, http://www.aljazee- most important one is this: did the AKP govern- ra.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/gaziantepte-olaylar-na- ment simply respond to a national security threat? sil-boyle-buyudu. A detailed analysis of insurgent attacks over time 65. Ishaan Tharoor, “Turkey’s Syria Offensive is as suggests that a preventive rather than a preemptive much about the Kurds as ISIS,” Washington Post, logic guided the COIN campaign. Insurgent attacks August 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost. stopped in the first two weeks of October. And yet, com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/24/turkeys- more than one-third of all curfew announcements syria-offensive-is-as-much-about-the-kurds-as- took place within these 14 days. Likewise, all self- isis/?tid=a_inl. rule declarations were made during the second 66. On Kurdish self-rule experiment, see Michael week of August, the PKK’s 37th anniversary. It was Knapp, Anja Flasch and Ercan Ayboga, Revolution weeks later that the government decided to act and in Rojava (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, implemented measures that directly affected resi- 2016). dents of the region. 67. Saygı Öztürk, Kasa’daki Dosyalar (Adana: Ümit 54. Kemal Kirişci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Yayıncılık, 2003). Question and Turkey (Frank Cass: London, 1997). 68. Sardar Mlla Drwish, “Why Syria’s Kurds are Co- 55. “Syrian Kurds Refuse To Fight Assad Army: Kurd- operating with Russia,” Al-Monitor, June 22, ish Leader,” Sputnik, October 13, 2014, https:// 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/origi- sputniknews.com/world/20141013194037601- nals/2016/06/syria-kurds-accusation-coopera- Syrian-Kurds-Refuse-To-Fight-Assad-Army- tion-regime-russia.html. Kurdish-Leader/. 69. “ABD’nin Yeni Başkanı Trump’ın Başdanışmanından 56. “Suriye’de Türkçe’ye Rağbet Artıyor,” Hürriyet, ‘Fetullah Gülen’ Açıklaması,” Cumhuriyet, No- July 20, 2003, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/suri- vember 10, 2016, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/ yede-turkceye-ragbet-artiyor-160433. haber/dunya/628699/ABD_nin_yeni_baskani_ 57. Behlul Ozkan, “Turkey’s Imperial Fantasy,” New Trump_in_basdanismanindan__Fethullah_Gu- York Times, August 28, 2014, http://www.ny- len__aciklamasi.html. times.com/2014/08/29/opinion/ahmet-davuto- 70. See Abdullah Öcalan, Güney Kürdistan’da Ege- glu-and-turkeys-imperial-fantasy.html. menlik Mücadelesi ve Devrimci Demokratik Tutum 58. “Turkish President Erdogan Wants Editor Jailed (Istanbul: Çetin, 2003), 9–20, 69, 79–91, 131–138; for Espionage in Video Row,” The Guardian, June 3, and Abdullah Öcalan, Ortadoğu’nun Çehresini 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/ Değiştireceğiz (Köln: Weşanen Serxwebûn, 1994), jun/03/turkish-president-erdogan-wants-edi- 228–229, 270–273, 313–328. tor-jailed-for-espionage-in-video-row. 71. On Syrian refugees, see Elizabeth Ferris and Ke- 59. Çağıl Kasapoğlu, “İŞİD Neden Adıyaman’da mal Kirişci, Not Likely to Go Home: Syrian Refugees Örgütlendi?,” BBC Türkçe, October 22, 2015, http:// and the Challenges to Turkey-and the Internation- www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151022_ al Community (Brookings Institution, September isid_adiyaman. 2015).

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 24 72. “…why not ask the Kurds if they want to live to- gether or become independent although there might be practical difficulties in organizing a ref- erendum since a territorial classification would leave out the Kurds living on western parts of the country.” Kadri Gürsel, “Ümit Pamir’in Önerisi Işığında... Kürtlerden Boşanmayı Tartışabilmek,” Milliyet, August 10, 2009, http://www.milliyet.com. tr/kurtlerden-bosanmayi-tartisabilmek/kadri-gur- sel/dunya/dunyayazardetay/10.08.2009/1126656/ default.htm. 73. Ömer Taşpınar and Gönül Tol, Turkey and the Kurds: From Predicament to Opportunity (Brook- ings Institution, 2014). 74. This is a theme that Mr. Erdoğan keeps coming back to. Most recently, on October 26, 2016, in a meeting he regularly holds with village headmen, he said “after the beginning of the Syrian crisis, we tried to stay ready but kept out for a long time. At the end, we realized that no one was going to help us. We accomplished our projects on own… Turkey has the necessary reasons to be in Syria and Iraq. The kind of obstacles thrown at us are not faced by other countries fighting against ISIS. They come from thousands of kilometers away and be in charge and Turkey won’t. How can this happen? Not so easy! This plot could only work in ‘old Tur- key’. Today, it is unacceptable. “Erdoğan’dan Flaş Münbiç Açıklaması,” Hürriyet, October 26, 2016, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogandan-onem- li-aciklamalar-40259457.

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 25 THE AUTHORS

Ayşegül Aydın is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado-Boulder. She is also a Faculty Fellow of Aa- lims—Association for Analytical Learning about Islam and Muslim Societies. Aydın was previously a visiting research fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (University of Notre Dame). Her research is on third-party intervention, political violence and counterinsurgency in civil wars, and her work has been published in the Journal of Politics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Conflict Man- agement and Peace Science, Journal of Peace Research and European Journal of International Relations among others. Aydın’s first book, Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts, was published by Stanford University Press (2012). Her second book, Zones of Re- bellion: Kurdish Rebels and the Turkish State is now published by Cornell University Press (2015, with Cem Emrence).

Cem Emrence is a Visiting Researcher at Leiden University with interests in violence, collective mobilization and political identity. His research explores how conflict processes transform identities and create divided groups within the context of the Middle East and modern Turkey. His latest book, Zones of Rebellion: Kurdish Insur- gents and the Turkish State, co-authored with Aysegül Aydın, is now published Cornell University Press. Emrence’s previous work, Re- mapping the Ottoman Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2012), explored the historical origins of deep divides that characterize Middle Eastern societies.

Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 26 The Turkey Project at Brookings 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036 brookings.edu