Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy Ayşegül Aydin Cem Emrence turkey project policy paper Number 10 • December 2016 policy paper Number 10, December 2016 About CUSE The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings fosters high-level U.S.-Europe- an dialogue on the changes in Europe and the global challenges that affect transatlantic relations. As an integral part of the Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Center offers independent research and recommendations for U.S. and European officials and policymakers, and it convenes seminars and public forums on policy-relevant issues. CUSE’s research program focuses on the transforma- tion of the European Union (EU); strategies for engaging the countries and regions beyond the frontiers of the EU including the Balkans, Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine; and broader European security issues such as the future of NATO and forging common strategies on energy security. The Center also houses specific programs on France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey. About the Turkey Project Given Turkey’s geopolitical, historical and cultural significance, and the high stakes posed by the foreign policy and domestic issues it faces, Brookings launched the Turkey Project in 2004 to foster informed public consideration, high‐level private debate, and policy recommendations focusing on developments in Turkey. In this context, Brookings has collaborated with the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) to institute a U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings. The Forum organizes events in the form of conferences, sem- inars and workshops to discuss topics of relevance to U.S.-Turkish and transatlantic relations. The Turkey Project also produces a range of policy-relevant publications to encourage independent thinking and debate on how the United States should engage this pivotal country. With this goal in mind, the Turkey Policy Pa- per Series publishes quarterly reports on a range of issues that are shaping U.S.-Turkish relations. Previous Turkey Project Policy Papers can be accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/turkeyprojectpapers. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation. Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy Ayşegül Aydin Cem Emrence ike in the early 1990s, Kurdish groups in the to disarm the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The LMiddle East are occupying the headlines today. Dolmabahçe Consensus (Mutabakatı) (2015) repre- In Western media, their image as a trustworthy sented the peak moment in these exchanges, when friend remains unscathed in a region that is char- the government acknowledged a ten-point democ- acterized by confessional wars and a fundamental- ratization program prepared by the rebel leader. ist threat. Yet, Kurds have become both part of the Since then, the Turkish government has moved in problem and part of the solution in the Middle East. the opposite direction. It has arrested a large number They emerged as a credible ally in the fight against of elected Kurdish politicians. Among these were the Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria (ISIS) in Iraq Gülten Kışanak, a seasoned politician and may- and Syria, and yet, their state-building efforts in or of Diyarbakır, who was arrested on October 26, northern Syria are increasingly giving Turkey the and the co-chairs of the Peoples’ Democratic Party goosebumps. The mobilization of Syrian Kurds (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, around a self-rule agenda convinced the Turkish who were arrested on November 3.1 In the aftermath government that the Syrian experiment will only of the coup attempt on July 15, pressure on Kurdish exacerbate its own Kurdish problem. Viewed to- movement further intensified since emergency laws gether, these developments undermined the fight that were put in effect across the country allowed au- against ISIS and Turkey’s democratization. Fur- thorities to ban protests and prohibit political mobi- thermore, they strained Turkey’s relations with the lization against the government. United States and European Union. Why did the Turkish government change its mind? Only a few years ago, there was great hope about the Peace would have created a win-win scenario for Kurdish issue. Peace talks between the rebel leader all actors involved, including the Turkish govern- Abdullah Öcalan and the Turkish government were ment, Kurds, and the international community. continuing unabated, and the members of the Kurd- This optimistic reading however misses an im- ish political party were allowed to visit him regularly portant part of the puzzle: The Kurdish issue has in the prison on the İmralı Island, located 40 miles become deeply politicized inside Turkey and im- away Istanbul. In these meetings, Öcalan assessed plies different things for the government and its the government’s position and prepared a roadmap Kurdish opponents. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments have followed an instru- This report tackles Turkey’s Kurdish problem with mentalist approach to the Kurdish issue, relegating an emphasis on government policies. It aims to de- it to electoral priorities, presidential ambitions, tail what we call the instrumentalist approach of and foreign policy choices. Meanwhile, Kurdish the AKP and discusses its implications and conse- political actors have often spoken from a maxi- quences for the Kurdish issue. The report unpacks malist position, which has allowed the PKK to de- the instrumentalist approach at domestic and in- termine their policy priorities, including self-rule ternational levels. Our analysis at the domestic and Öcalan’s freedom. It is the mismatch between level suggests that AKP governments viewed the these positions, we argue, that created a deadlock Kurdish issue as a problem to be dealt with in in the Kurdish issue. The Syrian civil war turned order to stay in power by securing electoral suc- the deadlock into an open confrontation by hard- cess. Over time, Erdoğan’s ambitions for a strong ening these positions and presenting each side presidency became the most critical item on this with an opportunity to pursue their goals. agenda. At the international level, the report high- lights the fact that the Kurdish issue became sub- These incompatible views on the Kurdish issue servient to AKP’s foreign policy interests in Syria. have important consequences. First, they exported The Turkish government made a deliberate choice the problem to neighboring countries, internation- to support Sunni, Arab, and extremist groups at alizing the conflict. Turkey’s military intervention the expense of Syrian Kurds. In doing so, it sent a in Syria against ISIS targets on August 24, 2016 strong message to Kurdish constituencies at home through Operation Euphrates Shield put the AKP that it would remain indifferent to the plight of government at odds with the Syrian Kurds. Sim- Kurds on the other side of the border. ilarly, the PKK’s efforts to practice state-building inside Turkey escalated the conflict. Second, such There are important policy implications of our ar- diametrically opposed policies polarized Kurdish gument. International actors need to strike a bal- society, deepening existing divisions. The threat of ance between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. Yet, insurgent governance mobilized the opponents of this balancing act has to be done in a principled Kurdish political party and consolidated them in way. Sacrificing the Kurdish political movement in- the AKP ranks. At the other end, the government’s side Turkey in exchange for a U.S.-friendly Kurdish policies created mistrust among large sections of regime in northern Syria will not work. As we ex- Kurdish society. Counterinsurgency (COIN) cam- plain in the following pages, there are important paigns in 2015 and 2016, in particular, hampered reasons why the experience of northern Iraq can- the Kurds’ relations with Ankara further by paving not be replicated in Syria. To address the Kurdish the way for the destruction of urban centers and problem in a genuine fashion, the Turkish govern- loss of civilian lives in southeast Turkey. Finally, in ment needs to invest in inclusive policies where its unison, both approaches tied the solution of Kurd- approach to the Kurdish issue is not dictated by ish issue to the piety of two strongmen, President electoral and foreign policy concerns. A major re- Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the rebel leader Öcalan. form package that goes beyond discourse is neces- The peace process was reduced to a secretive deal sary. Meanwhile, the Kurdish political actors have between the two sides with no public input and to understand that raising the bar every time an was shelved overnight, when one side defected. opportunity arises will not solve the Kurdish prob- Two Routes to an Impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Policy The Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings — Turkey project 2 lem. They need to build coalitions in Turkish soci- hard facts about Syria. Despite its efforts, the Turk- ety. Violence and the Kurdish governance model ish government cannot transform Syria according in Syria are not the most effective instruments to to its own priorities, and targeting Syrian Kurds accomplish this task. will not get the job done. The report follows the arguments outlined above. Meanwhile, Kurdish political actors have to mod- The first part provides a historical background on erate their demands to garner public support for the Kurdish conflict in Turkey until the AKP’s rise their cause. Unlike neighboring countries with a to power in 2002. It shows that the AKP govern- Kurdish minority, securing Kurdish rights in Tur- ment found a dramatically weakened PKK and a key is (and should be) a matter of institutional pol- rejuvenated Kurdish political party. The second itics and broad political legitimacy.