Transitional and National Reconciliation

BY RADWAN ZIADEH

n the aftermath of war crimes and committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, in 2005 the General Assembly of the established Ian initiative known as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The R2P concept departs from traditional principles of international relations regarding the protection of national sovereignty, stating that sovereignty is not a right but a responsibility. R2P argues that when a regime commits war crimes and crimes against humanity, it forfeits its sovereignty, and the international com- munity then has the right, indeed the responsibility to take necessary measures to protect civilians and prevent further crimes against them. This principle has not been applied in , where indiscriminate aerial bombardment has taken the lives of more than 20,000 civilians so far.1 Bashar al-Assad’s forces have made extensive use of weapons of mass destruction, including SCUD missiles and chemical weapons, against areas of Syria with utter disregard for the lives of Syrian civilians or for the amount of destruction done to residential areas and infrastructure. The fractured Syrian military opposition, which includes extremist radical elements like the Islamic State of and al-Sham, have also commit- ted crimes, such as kidnapping religious leaders and destroying Shia mosques in pro-Assad com- munities. If one compares the conflict in Syria to other conflicts that have occurred throughout the world labeled “civil wars,” it is clear that the term “civil war” is far from the reality of the situation in Syria. In fact, Syria is in the midst of a popular revolution against an authoritarian regime. If we conduct a simple comparison of the number of victims in Syria with the number of victims in countries in which a civil war has actually occurred—in Peru, for example—we can see that the conflict in Peru, which lasted for twenty years, from 1980 to 2000, and had more than 70,000 victims,2 is nearly incomparable to the 120,000 victims in Syria during only the past three years. According to U.N. High Commissioner for , the number of victims has risen from 1,000 per month at the start of the revolution to 5,000 per month today.3 If Assad is

Dr. Radwan Ziadeh is the executive director of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies and a former member of the .

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 95 ZIADEH allowed to continue his war against the Syrian implementation of a successful transitional people, the number of victims can be expected justice program, will feel confident that to exceed 250,000. there is a path toward national reconciliation It will not be possible to start a genuine that ensures adequate pluralism, credibility process of transitional justice or a process of and legitimacy. political transition toward pluralism, democ- Launching a transitional justice process in racy, and reconciliation in Syria without a Syria will be among the most difficult and complete cessation of violence. As transitional complicated processes that the Syrian commu- justice experiences across the world have nity will face after the fall of the regime. But taught us, reconciliation is closely linked to considering the division of society currently the path of political transition, and it depends taking place in Syria, it is unlikely the Syrian mainly on the political will and vision of both judicial system will be ready to launch a cred- the actors and the political forces on the ible and effective accountability process. Assad ground. The launching of transitional justice and his militias have through intimidation processes can let victims feel that those respon- and provocation set the Syrian people against sible for committing crimes against their chil- each other. The recent establishment of the dren and daughters will be brought to justice so-called Army of National Defense, which is and that the time of impunity is over. With the practically a governmental institutionalization SANANews Agency

President Assad with his Troops, August 1, 2013

96 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION of Assad’s semi-regular militias (al-) have participated. Two important initiatives continues this intimidation and provocation. have resulted from these engagements: the One option for Syrians is international Association for the Defense of the Victims of justice. The crimes of the Assad regime are cer- the Syrian Revolution—which will serve as the tainly within the scope of work of the voice of justice for the victims of the conflict— International Criminal Court. However Russia, and the National Preparatory Committee for with its position in the UN Security Council, Transitional Justice, which will develop pro- may prevent the referral of Syrian criminals to grams, perceptions, and policies necessary for the Court. Any future Syrian government the future transitional justice phase. formed by the opposition or formed after the Transitional justice links two fundamental fall of the Assad regime should ratify the Rome concepts: justice and transition. The semanti- Statute, which will enable a prosecutor to open cally accurate meaning of the concept is an investigation into these crimes. The path of achieving justice during a transitional period international justice however is not an ideal experienced by a state.4 During the political choice; international justice is slow. Moreover transition following an extended period of vio- is appears to be subject to the ambiguities of lence or oppression, a society and its commu- global geopolitics. The Syrian victims need nities often find themselves burdened with the their rights to be guaranteed, not set aside or difficult task of addressing pervasive human compromised in the process of political com- rights violations. The state seeks to deal with promise. Therefore, it seems that so-called the crimes of the past in order to promote jus- hybrid courts may be a better option for Syria tice, peace, and reconciliation.5 and Syrians. Such tribunals should be held on The establishment of a culture of account- Syrian territory and involve the direct partici- ability, replacing the culture of impunity, gives pation of Syrian judges supported by interna- a sense of security to the victims and sends a tional expertise, possibly under the supervi- warning to those who might commit such vio- sion of the United Nations. The necessity of lations in the future. It also provides a measure international experts participating in hybrid of fairness to the suffering victims, and helps courts held in divided societies remains the to curb the tendency to practice vigilante jus- best option, as it will send the message to all tice or retribution. And it provides an impor- Syrians that revenge is not the goal, as well as tant opportunity to strengthen the credibility reassure them that the toughest standards of of judicial systems suffering from corruption justice and international transparency will be and destruction, or that did not function prop- required, carefully scrutinized and guaranteed. erly in the past. In preparation for transitional justice pro- The National Preparatory Committee for grams in Syria, the Syrian Center for Political Transitional Justice, a committee of highly and Strategic Studies has organized confer- regarded Syrian judges, lawyers, human rights ences, workshops and discussions in which activists, and academics (formed to conduct numerous representatives of political forces, exhaustive research on transitional justice and associations, civil society organizations, present specific recommendations for a future human rights activists, judges and lawyers, and Syrian transitional justice program) is cur- family members of the victims of the conflict rently deeply engaged in an effort to open a

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dialogue with civil society representatives in achieving five key objectives: fact-finding and order to make transitional justice a priority commissions of inquiry, filing lawsuits, com- after the fall of the Assad regime. The Syrian pensation, institution building for the future, Expert House recommends that the interim and memorialization. government support the National Preparatory 1. Fact-Finding and Commissions of Inquiry Committee by legally transforming it into a formal institution under the name, “National The National Commission for Transitional Commission for Transitional Justice and Justice and Reconciliation will gather all data- Reconciliation,” and then build its capacity bases containing evidence of human rights and facilitate its efforts in every possible way. violations currently maintained by Syrian The next section describes in detail how this human rights groups and will form commis- commission should function. sions of inquiry for conducting investigations regarding extrajudicial killings, cases, prisoners of conscience, and enforced disap- The National Commission For Transitional Justice And Reconciliation pearances. These commissions of inquiry will be The National Commission for Transitional capable investigative bodies charged to Justice and Reconciliation will focus on uncover all the facts regarding conflict-related Photo by Maha Zimmo

Syria’s Supreme Court in . Will the Syrian Judicial System be able to Provide Justice?

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violence, whether perpetrated by the state or ■■ Hold general forums for the victims to non-state actors. The establishment of such encourage a public debate on issues of tran- committees must follow after efforts have been sitional justice and reconciliation. made to ensure there is an expanded national ■■ Give recommendations regarding com- consultation process, appropriate terms of ref- pensation for the victims via direct dialogue. erence for each commission of inquiry, and the ■■ Give recommendations for necessary presence of a clear political commitment that legal and institutional reforms. will allow independent and effective investiga- ■■ Promote social reconciliation at multi- tions. The commissions of inquiry that will be ple levels of society, the most important created by the National Commission for being the grassroots level. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation should ■■ Help strengthen the democratic transi- not be equated with or considered substitutes tion.7 for trials. The commissions will be non-judi- cial organizations; therefore, their terms of Therefore, the Syrian Expert House recom- reference and powers are complementary to mends that the National Commission for those of the courts. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation orga- Simultaneously, the National Commission nize a number of public hearings, to give the must encourage civil society to carry out tran- victims a forum to talk about their suffering. sitional justice initiatives and support its work These hearings will break the sectarian barrier both directly and indirectly. Indeed, many when they show that the victims are not lim- NGOs—such as the Syrian Network for ited to any single , but indeed represent all Human Rights, the Local Coordinating of Syria’s . And they will play an impor- Committees, the Damascus Center for Human tant role in social healing, after the intense Rights Studies, and the Syrian Observatory for violence that Syrian society has experienced in Human Rights—have documented the viola- the last three years. tions and abuses perpetrated by the Assad 2. Filing Lawsuits regime, often at great personal risk to them- selves.6 The establishment of criminal justice is an The National Commission for Transitional essential element of addressing the massive Justice and Reconciliation should work to violations of human rights in Syria. Lawsuits achieve the following: must be brought against individual perpetra- tors, and prosecutions should seek to restore ■■ Seek and establish the truth regarding the dignity of the victims and restore Syrian the grave human rights violations perpe- citizens’ confidence in the rule of law. Trials trated by the Assad regime against the Syrian must include criminal investigations and other people. legal proceedings against the perpetrators of ■■ Hold accountable the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity that human rights violations by providing evi- took place in Syria during the revolution. dence to courts and tribunals. These trials should specifically seek to target the upper ranks of the Assad regime: those responsible for both giving orders to commit

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 99 ZIADEH violations, and those who oversaw the execu- experienced. The concept of compensation has tion of those orders. Even members of the several meanings, including direct compensa- armed opposition must be held accountable, tion (for damage or loss of opportunity), res- and their trials should be conducted according titution (moral and mental support for victims to the same international standards to avoid in their daily lives), and recovery (restoring any challenges to these trials’ legitimacy. what has been lost as much as possible). There will undoubtedly be some contro- Compensations can be distinguished by their versy regarding the ability of the domestic types, physical and moral, and the targeted Syrian courts to hold perpetrators accountable. groups, individual and collective. Physical If the domestic courts prove incapable of con- compensation can take the form of money or ducting these trials, Syria may have no choice material goods. It can also include the provi- but to conduct judicial proceedings at the sion of free or preferential services, such as international level. health, education, and housing. Moral com- The post-Assad transitional government pensation can be made by issuing a formal will invite the international community to apology, by dedicating a public place (e.g., a assist in the establishment of hybrid courts museum, park, or monument), or by declaring presided over by Syrian judges and advised by a national day of remembrance. international judges, all operating under the Post-Assad Syria will need a Committee supervision of the United Nations. This hybrid for Compensation and Reparation as the com- court system will simultaneously uphold both pensation of Syria’s victims perhaps presents Syrian and international law, resorting to inter- the greatest moral, legal, and political chal- national law only in the places in which the lenges, particularly for massive government- Syrian law code has gaps. The courts can also run programs. A range of considerations and rely on the provisions of various international challenges must be considered during the treaties that Syria has signed in order to design of material reparation programs. It is develop their procedures. Mixed courts ensure necessary to first clearly define the “victims,” that the Syrian population feels a sense of or categories of beneficiaries, in order to be ownership regarding judicial proceedings able to decide who deserves access to such while at the same time bringing international compensation. Unfortunately, due to the lim- legitimacy to the court’s rulings. ited nature of state resources, the wider the category of victims, the lower the amount of 3. Compensation compensation. Conversely, if “beneficiary” is In light of recent pervasive violations of narrowly defined, the government could be human rights in Syria, it has become incum- inadvertently excluding a large number of bent upon governments to not only address legitimate victims. the perpetrators of these abuses but also to A second consideration is to decide guarantee the rights of victims. Governments whether compensation will be distributed can create the appropriate conditions to pre- directly to individuals or to groups that have serve the dignity of the victims and to ensure been wronged en masse. It is no surprise that justice, using methods of compensation for the structuring compensation in the form of col- damage and the suffering that victims have lective grants often involves political gains that

100 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION could include a larger number of beneficiaries, and villages affected by indiscriminate shelling but the value of restitution is minimal in most conducted by the Assad regime’s forces. Other cases. Usually, these types of programs are examples could include restoring ownership of viewed as normal social development efforts, stolen land or reintegrating victims into previ- and not necessarily as compensation for dam- ously held jobs within the Syrian government. age done to victims. Second, it may be important in some contexts The third challenge is to organize com- to develop special programs for the rehabilita- pensation in the form of an integrated set of tion of victims, including psychological sup- services (e.g., medical aid, education, and port and physical therapy or medical assistance housing), or an exchange of payments, or a for the many victims of physical and sexual combination of the two. Conducting compen- violence. Third, a wide range of actions could sation via the provision of integrated services be taken to provide redress for other damages, may be more expensive and limits the auton- both for individual victims (e.g., finding final omy of individuals to clearly receive a personal resting places for the dead) and victims in gen- form of compensation. Additionally, the qual- eral (e.g., the formal recognition by the transi- ity of provided services depends directly on the tional government of regime-perpetrated ability of the state to invest in public infra- crimes to open a new page, or customize pub- structure and to conduct the programs in an lic places and street names or care for special effective manner. exhibitions, works of art, or building memori- There are significant challenges that a rep- als and public monuments and museums). aration program might face, including the The advantage of symbolic measures is need to determine the types of damages for that they are relatively achievable, can reach all which victims can be compensated and how to parts of Syrian society, adopt a broad defini- differentiate compensation from basic welfare. tion of victims, encourage the creation of a col- The Committee for Compensation and lective memory, and promote social solidarity. Reparation will need to decide if compensa- The inherent drawbacks of these measures are tion will be administered for economic, phys- that they do not provide any directed financial ical, or psychological damage, and whether or other material compensation for the vic- compensation levels will be based on the tims. amount of damage, or of need, or both. 4. Institution Building for the Future Another challenge will be how to quantify the extent of the damage (e.g., determining the Syria will need comprehensive reform of amount of appropriate compensation to those its institutions, laws, and policies to achieve its who have lost their sight, been raped, or psy- long-term social, economic, and political chologically tortured) and then find the objectives, and to avoid any civil or democratic resources to fund compensation programs. collapse in the future.8 The general objective of Additionally, it will be important for the these institutional reforms will be to remove transitional government to seek to restore vic- the conditions that gave rise to the recent con- tims’ legal ownership of property. Examples flict or the repression that catalyzed it. include performing procedures to assist resi- Therefore, the National Commission for dents who were forcibly displaced from towns

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Transitional Justice and Reconciliation will simple piecemeal reforms, because the reform ensure institutional reform by: of the state “security services” requires the Restructuring state institutions that were reform of the army, police, judiciary, customs, complicit in acts of violence or abuse. immigration control, intelligence services, and Removing any long-standing racial, eth- many other related agencies and elements of nic, or sectarian , which some the state. Thus, an attempt to change institu- feel was perpetrated by the Ba’ath Party in state tional structures and sensitivities within any institutions, especially within the armed forces one institution would affect many others, and and security institutions. all the linkages between these different institu- Preventing the former perpetrators of tions are not always clear. For instance, the human rights violations from continuing to reform of the police and the review of their benefit from positions in public institutions. recruitment procedures are both incomplete It cannot be over-emphasized that without solutions, whether the goal is to punish viola- reforms in areas such as the judicial system, tions of human rights or to prevent corruption. Parliament, and the state security services, any These reforms can and must necessarily be accountability process will be almost certainly accompanied by full, comprehensive reforms incomplete, and thus it will fail to build cred- and other measures capable of achieving pre- ibility among the general public. It will be dif- vention, accountability, and reparations. ficult for citizens who have learned to look at Reform of the Security Forces and Intelligence the police, army, and government with suspi- Agencies cion to believe in the usefulness of any pro- ceedings, or the accountability of those institu- During the Syrian revolution, the mission tions. If they are expected to do so, they should of the police to impose law and order has be confident that the institutional cultures that often apparently been understood as a green allowed or fueled pervasive violations of light to commit political crimes. Syrian police human rights have been evaluated and cor- officers have often colluded with the intelli- rected once and for all. gence services in the commission of gross vio- Constitutional and legal reforms should lations of human rights, including ignoring accompany police reform. These constitutional rights related to inspection, orders of arrest, and legal reforms must promote democracy, and detention procedures, leading to beatings, human rights, and the rule of law. They will torture, and even murder. be relevant and visible in many areas, such as Once the Syrian conflict ends, the focus equity in wages; nomination of judges; fair should shift to mental reforms, realizing that assigning of positions, promotions, and disci- the duty of the police officer is to act profes- plinary actions; election procedures; the inde- sionally, to maintain the rule of law, and to pendence of the media; freedom of access to respect the human rights of all citizens. information and the media; affirmative action; However, the recovery of such a mentality will disarmament; the funding of political parties; not be easy. Even if the complex relations and criminal law and penal procedures. among the systems of the state police and the Furthermore, the dynamics within the state other security agencies were to be discon- apparatus do not allow for a diagnosis of nected, it is very likely that the required

102 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION reforms will collide with resistance from multiethnic; and believes in the principles within the system itself from officers and offi- of a community police force. cials who fear losing power, resent the conse- quences of their actions, and reject the need This reform should contain a comprehen- for any control or external intervention. sive, strategic set of elements, including the A reconstructed police force must be char- adoption of an ethical institutional charter; acterized by professional conduct, nondiscrim- working on public education and retraining ination, and integrity, which all require follow- the police based on new political procedures; ing a comprehensive approach to institutional the application of administrative, communica- reform (e.g., reform in the areas of employ- tions, and management procedures to pro- ment, retraining, restructuring, and reform of mote transparency and control; the applica- management/reporting and control measures). tion of corrective measures to ensure The Syrian Expert House recommends the fol- discipline, providing a means of complaint lowing three goals for police reform: and evaluation; and reviewing recruitment procedures to encourage participation in the ■■ Restructuring of the police forces; police force so that all communities are repre- ■■ Reform through the application of new sented on the force without discrimination. procedures for training, selection, and certi- The culture of impunity institutionalized fication; and in Syria during Assad’s rule encouraged the ■■ A democratic method for establishing a perversion of the intelligence agencies, which police force that is not subject to political must be resisted by encouraging a nondiscrim- control; is fair, accountable, and inatory employment policy for all Syrians. Photo by Maha Zimmo

Central Security Forces are back and were trying to control protestors but some police officers asked them to leave

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More than eighty percent of Syrian security to pay attention to the risks that could be services staff belong to the Alawite sect (nearly involved in isolating people from public office the same percentage as in the military), (especially former officials of the police force, although the proportion of in Syrian the army, and the intelligence services, who society does not exceed 10-12 percent.9 often become criminals after they are termi- Therefore, the vast majority of Syrians feel that nated from state service.) This challenge these forces do not represent them nor seek to should be anticipated by allowing the review ensure their safety. So an adjustment of the and inspection body to develop ways to pre- proportions of representation within the pare those officials for a new life. Additionally, police forces could have a double benefit: first, in the transitional periods in particular, where to preempt further police abuse perpetrated levels of unemployment and crime are high, against citizens; and second, to restore public vocational retraining and civil participation confidence in the integrity of the police force. programs might be considered, as well as other Effective and objective control is a prereq- methods for more permanent economic rein- uisite for ensuring respect for the new proce- tegration. dures. Therefore, the Syrian Expert House rec- Finally, and perhaps most important, the ommends the creation of new institutions to reform of arbitrary or abusive institutions achieve this end, including bodies of civilian should be considered a long-term process. It control, a national committee for human takes many years before the success or failure rights, a Supreme Audit Agency, an office of of new laws and institutions can be discerned. grievances (to receive complaints against offi- Cleansing Institutions of Corrupt Officials cials of the state and to investigate them), and an office for fighting corruption, responsible The National Commission for Transitional for the development of effective anti-corrup- Justice and Reconciliation should develop the tion programs and policies. necessary mechanisms to remove corrupt and incompetent staff members, along with those Restructuring Institutional Reforms who have violated the law, from government In the context of reforming abusive insti- service in order to build more effective and tutions, as in all other areas of transitional jus- trustworthy institutions. A comprehensive tice, constraints are imposed by the existing investigation and examination of past perfor- political climate, the available resources, and mance is often a central element in the reform the need to draft a project with realistic targets. of abusive institutions, and it is adopted by Among the lessons learned from past attempts new governments as a way to isolate the indi- to reform abusive institutions is that efforts viduals responsible for serious abuses of their made to achieve reform in quantity and qual- positions in the public sector. ity should not exceed the local capacity in There is a difference between screening terms of institutional structure as well as and “cleansing,” a term that was used exten- human and financial resources. Making such a sively in Central and Eastern Europe and used mistake could take the reform process back- later in Iraq to refer to laws and policies that ward instead of forward. Another lesson linked include the processes of isolation and dis- to the first, especially in the field of testing, is missal, not according to the records of

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individuals but to their party affiliation, polit- People seek to commemorate the events of the ical positions, or continued involvement with past for many reasons, including the desire to a repressive intelligence system. There are evoke the memory of the victims and/or to many pros to the screening process as one of identify them, to educate people about their the mechanisms for achieving transitional jus- past, to increase community awareness, to sup- tice. Screening, for example, helps reduce the port or amend an historical narrative, or to risk of new or continued violations, enhances encourage the adoption of the commemora- public confidence in state institutions, contrib- tion / transitional justice process at the local utes to removing barriers among prosecutions, level. Understanding the needs of victims and and assists in the rehabilitation of officials their families, along with the needs of survi- who have had their reputations damaged vors of mass atrocities and brutal violations of unfairly as a result of their names being listed human rights, represents one of the key ele- among those of corrupt officials within their ments of transitional justice. organizations. The struggle over the control of the Screening mechanisms must conform to the basic principles of procedural fairness or Understanding the needs of victims and their legal practice. Efforts to prevent corruption or families, along with the needs of survivors of mass reform institutions must not resort to wrong atrocities and brutal violations of human rights, practices. Therefore, those to be dismissed represents one of the key elements of transitional from office should have the right to be justice. informed of the accusations against them, to protest against these accusations before a screening committee, to appeal the decision before an unbiased body, and to be informed national memory, or “collective memory,” is of these rights in a timely manner. The screen- located in the heart of the accountability pro- ing committee should have the authority to cess that will ensue following the end of the impose a range of sanctions. For particularly conflict or the fall of the regime. Two different serious violations, cases might in fact be pre- narratives for the Syrian conflict will exist in sented to law enforcement authorities for fur- Syrian society. Human rights activists and vic- ther action. tims may feel deeply aggrieved by the new gov- ernment or the old (should it survive) if either 5. Memorialization seeks to create an official final narrative of the Memorialization can be accomplished by past. Sometimes, certain transitional justice way of an event, occurrence, or building being strategies—such as the creation of a truth com- used as a tool of remembrance. Moreover, mission—are seen as a necessary step in the remembrance can entail formal commemora- direction of remembrance; but at the same tion (e.g., the establishment of a monument) time, this step alone is insufficient. The reason or informal commemoration (building a for this is that keeping the memory alive is memorial wall in a community). In other extremely difficult, and the official truth com- words, remembrance can be done in an official missions become a rigid part of the new offi- way by the state or voluntarily by citizens. cial narrative of the past which competes and

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may conflict with the evolving understanding Transitional Justice and National of the past. Reconciliation The requirement to never forget what hap- pened to victims of human rights violations in The concept of reconciliation has roots far the past necessitates a discussion about what back in Arab-Islamic history,11 however the to teach in schools, how the victims should be modern use of the he term “national recon- remembered, and whether people will con- ciliation” can be traced to French leader tinue to listen to the voices of the victims, even Charles de Gaulle. It was later used by Georges after the publication of the report of the truth Pompidou and François Mitterrand, when the commission or the completion of trials of need to take responsibility for erasing debts human rights violators. Even if history books and past crimes that occurred under occupa- ensure the telling of the stories of victims, tion during the Algerian war was cemented in remembrance must still make people engage their beliefs.12 in a dynamic, long-lasting dialogue, not only There is no way that Syria will be able to about the past—and events and their implica- escape from its deep social rifts following the tions—but also about how the present can end of the conflict unless a historic decision is benefit from the past and how the suffering made to institute a comprehensive national communities can better prepare for the reconciliation program. Reconciliation repre- future.10 sents a culmination of all the phases of transi- tional justice referred to above, and thus it can enable Syrian society to overcome its deep Reconciliation represents a culmination of all social and sectarian divisions by creating a the phases of transitional justice referred to national partner-ship for building a new above, and thus it can enable Syrian society future. to overcome its deep social and sectarian divisions by creating a national partner-ship Recommendations for building a new future. 1. The establishment of a documentation and auditing committee whose main pur- pose will be collecting and verifying the names of the victims and their families. The Syrian Expert House recommends 2. Training documentation staff to gain transforming centers of torture and abuse (e.g., knowledge about similar experiences from Tadmour and Sednaya) into memorial squares other countries, such as the Truth and and building memorial walls in public places, Reconciliation Committee in South Africa, such as Umayyad Square in Damascus, Assi the Equity and Reconciliation Committee in Square in , and Jabri Square in Aleppo. Morocco, and similar entities in Chile and All these efforts will commemorate the victims Peru. and inspire a continuing and lively discussion 3. Achieving community dialogue in Syria of the past. regarding general human rights issues by focusing on areas such as accountability,

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justice, enforced disappearances, and - the victims. Such a process should occur ers of conscience. according to the active penal law code. In 4. Revealing the truth about human rights addition, encouraging civil society organiza- violations committed in the past, seeking to tions and NGOs to report the cases of miss- expose the truth to public opinion, and ing individuals to human rights committees compensating the victims of enforced disap- and the Committee on Enforced pearances and their families both morally Disappearances of the United Nations, and financially. assisting the families of the victims on how 5. Adopting and supporting political, to report their cases while fully explaining to social, and cultural development programs them that such procedures will lead to based on need. revealing the fate of the missing person. 6. Seeking to adopt constitutional and leg- Furthermore, families should realize how islative reforms in human rights, security, essential it is to file these cases despite lim- and justice and endorsing a national strategy ited resources to close missing persons’ files. against impunity to hold those who com- 10. Filing discrimination lawsuits on behalf mitted human rights violations accountable victims of torture, prisoners of conscience, via active participation from the community, and those who were subject to enforced dis- while promoting the principle of separation appearance— especially those who have suf- of powers, and protecting the judicial fered in the past thirty years and during the authority from any interference by the exec- Syrian uprising. Such lawsuits must be based utive authority. on Syrian law and the international human 7. Prohibiting the enforced disappearance, rights standards that the Syrian government arbitrary detention, genocide, or any other has ratified. crimes against humanity, torture, cruel and 11. Working on acquiring the necessary unusual punishment, racism, insult, or pro- experience to qualify certain individuals and hibited discrimination, and any incitement organizations to assist victims of torture, of racism, hatred, and violence. prisoners of conscience, and the families of 8. Clarifying and disseminating the legal the disappeared. This process should be framework and regulatory texts regarding the based on similar experiences of other coun- authority and organization of security forces, tries along with the assistance of the exper- limits of intrusion during operations, sur- tise of international organizations. veillance systems, and evaluating the perfor- 12. Emphasizing the humanitarian dimen- mance of security forces, as well as the sion and the suffering endured by the fami- administrative authorities assigned to main- lies of the missing individuals during the tain order and those who have the authority process. For example, instead of completely to use force. focusing on the documentation process and 9. Urging civil society, civil organizations, legal procedures, a Web site can be devel- and NGOs to file lawsuits against the perpe- oped to honor Syria’s victims. Moreover, the trators who committed extrajudicial killings, families of the victims can connect with torture, or enforced disappearances against other individuals who have had the same civilians, while maintaining the privacy of

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experience, whether in Syria or in other on the future will test our skills and ability to post-conflict countries. learn from the experiences of others. An effec- 13. The suffering endured by the families of tive transitional justice program cannot undo the victims must be addressed. This includes what has been done, but will surely mitigate issuing an apology by the transitional gov- some of the pain allowing Syrians to forge ernment, providing them with compensa- confidently into the future. PRISM tion, and establishing a national institution specialized in the field of the psychological and social rehabilitation of victims of tor- ture, prisoners of conscience, those subject to enforced disappearance, and victims of enforced disappearance who were released. Moreover, offering the families of enforced disappearance victims’ guidance and advice on how to follow the progress of their case at various levels, and printing and dissemi- nating publications specifically for that pur- pose. In fact, there has not been any guide for dealing with this issue for the families of missing individuals on which they can rely. 14. Determining the locations of detention facilities and secret so they can be subject to legal observation and control. Also, prohibiting detentions from being conducted by the security intelligence agen- cies, which are numerous and difficult to subject to any form of control. In addition, holding the security agencies accountable if they are proven to have been involved in enforced disappearances.

Studies show that half of countries emer- geing from conflict return to conflict within five years. Because of the intensity and inti- macy of the violence in Syria, the post-conflict transition in Syria will undoubtedly be extremely tense and subject to repeated threats of the resumption of conflict. Finding the right balances between justice and reconcilia- tion, between compensation and retribution, and between atoning for the past and focusing

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Notes 11 George Emile Irani, “Apologies and Reconciliation: Rituals,” in Taking Wrongs Seriously, ed. Barkan and Karn; Abdel Hussein Shaaban, The Jurisprudence of Tolerance in 1 For current numbers of civilian victims of the Arab Islamic Thought: Culture and the State (Beirut: Syrian revolution, see Megan Price, Jeff Klingner, Anas Dar al-Nahar, 2005). Qtiesh, and Patrick Ball, “Full Updated Statistical 12 See Jacques Derrida et al., Tolerance and Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Reconciliation Policies Memory, translated by Urban Arab Republic,” Human Rights Data Analysis Group, Hassan (Casablanca: Toubkal, 2005), 7.37. commissioned by United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 13, 2013. 2 See Hatun Willakuy, Abbreviated Version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru (Lima, 2004). 3 See USAID Fact Sheet, Syria – Complex Emergency, January 3, 2013, https://dec.usaid.gov/ dec/GetDoc.axd?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00Yj RmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=MzM3NDE x&pID=NTYw&attchmnt=VHJ1ZQ==&uSesDM=False &rIdx=NDM3MjM3&rCFU= 4 Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, 3 vols. (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995). 5 Alex Boraine, Janet Levy, and Ronel Scheffer, eds., Dealing with the Past (Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 1997); D. A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs :A Normative Framework,” Ethics & International Affairs 13 (1999): 43–61. 6 Mapping Accountability Efforts in Syria, Public International Law & Policy Group, February 2013, http://www.dchrs.org/ english/File/Reports/ mapping-accountability-efforts-in-syria.pdf 7 Robert I. Rotberg, “Apology, Truth Commissions, and Intrastate Conflict,” in Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation, edited by Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 33–48. 8 See International Center for Transitional Justice, Annual Report of the International Center for Transitional Justice, 2003/2004 (: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2004). 9 For more on this, see Radwan Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria (I.B. Tauris, 2011). 10 Vamik D.Volkan, What Some Monuments Tell Us about Mourning and Forgiveness, Taking Wrongs Seriously Apologies and Reconciliation,Edited by Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, Stanford University Press ,2006,P.115-130.

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