“We've Never Seen Such Horror”
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Syria Sitrep October 28
Syria Situation Report: October 28 - November 10, 2020 1 Oct. 29 - Nov. 1: ISIS Continues Assassination Campaign against Leaders 5 Nov. 4 - 7: ISIS Attack Cells May Have of Security and Governance Institutions in Eastern Syria. ISIS claimed the Strengthened in Aleppo Province. ISIS claimed assassination of the director of the oil department within the Syrian Democratic Forces responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) (SDF)-supported Deir e-Zor Civil Council in al-Sabha on October 29. Possible ISIS that killed a commander of the Turkish-backed Faylaq militants attempted and failed to assassinate Abu Khawla, the head of the Deir e-Zor al-Sham in al-Bab on November 4. ISIS militants Military Council in Hasakah city, Hasakah Province, on November 1. ISIS also claimed detonated an IED in al-Bab on November 7, killing three the assassination of Commander Hafal Riad of the Kurdish Internal Security Forces in Free Syrian Police officers. On the same day, ISIS Markadah, Hasakah Province, on the same day. claimed responsibility for an IED that killed one and injured an unknown number of people in 2 Nov. 2: Iranian-affiliated Militiaman Shamarikh. This amount of Confesses Plot to Degrade Security Situation 4 Qamishli ISIS activity is unusual in by Assassinating Key Figures. Authorities Turkish-controlled Aleppo arrested Radwan al-Hajji when he attempted to 5 Province and may indicate assassinate Hammouda Abu Ashour, the leader of Manbij increased capabilities in the the Al-Furqan Brigade, in Kanaker, Damascus 5 Hasakah region or that ISIS is transitioning Province. Al-Hajji revealed a list of 17 Kanaker 1 this area to an attack zone. -
The Situation in Daraa Since the Government of Syria Took Control of the Province Monitoring of Violations – Report 6 21 June 2019 I
The Situation in Daraa since the Government of Syria Took Control of the Province Monitoring of Violations – Report 6 21 June 2019 I. Introduction The Syrian Civic Platform (SCP) monitors violations in the Daraa province, which has been subject to Russian-brokered settlement agreements with the Government of Syria (GoS). This report is the sixth report monitoring the situation in Daraa since the GoS took control of the province. A sense of anticipation prevailed in Daraa during May 2019 as a result of recent developments in Idlib province. This report monitors the security situation in Daraa, which was marked by an increasing number of kidnappings and killings in various areas. Additionally, this report monitors the poor economic situation as a result of high prices and scarcity of materials during the month of Ramadan, and the absence of many basic materials due to the fuel crisis. II. Security situation The following is a summary of assassinations and killings according to the areas where they occurred: § Al-Sanamayn: The town of al-Sanamayn witnessed tensions that led to the blocking of all the entrances to the town, including agricultural roads, which prevented the entry of materials. This occurred after clashes erupted following the arrest of four young men by the GoS’s Criminal Security Branch in the town. The clashes resulted in injuries to a police officer and a number of civilians, prompting the GoS to send heavy military vehicles to protect the security complex in the town center. The town center is the center of the Syrian Army's Ninth Division as well as the operation center of the Lebanese-Hezbollah militia. -
Tribal 'Sulh' and the Politics of Persuasion in Volatile Southern Syria
Tribal ‘Sulh’ and the Politics of Persuasion in Volatile Southern Syria Abdullah Al-Jabassini and Mazen Ezzi Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria (WPCS) Research Project Report 22 March 2021 2021/04 © European University Institute 2021 Content and individual chapters © Abdullah Al-Jabassini and Mazen Ezzi 2021 This work has been published by the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the authors. If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the year and the publisher. Requests should be addressed to [email protected]. Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the European University Institute. Middle East Directions Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Project Report RSCAS/Middle East Directions 2021/04 22 March 2021 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ cadmus.eui.eu Funded by the European Union Tribal ‘Sulh’ and the Politics of Persuasion in Volatile Southern Syria Abdullah Al-Jabassini* and Mazen Ezzi** * Abdullah Al-Jabassini holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Kent in Canterbury. He is a research fellow on the Wartime and Post-Conflict in Syria project in the Middle East Directions Programme at the European University Institute in Florence. He is also an associate fellow on the Striking for the Margins (SFM) project at the Central European University in Vienna and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C. -
Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation
Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation BY RADWAN ZIADEH n the aftermath of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, in 2005 the General Assembly of the United Nations established Ian initiative known as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The R2P concept departs from traditional principles of international relations regarding the protection of national sovereignty, stating that sovereignty is not a right but a responsibility. R2P argues that when a regime commits war crimes and crimes against humanity, it forfeits its sovereignty, and the international com- munity then has the right, indeed the responsibility to take necessary measures to protect civilians and prevent further crimes against them. This principle has not been applied in Syria, where indiscriminate aerial bombardment has taken the lives of more than 20,000 civilians so far.1 Bashar al-Assad’s forces have made extensive use of weapons of mass destruction, including SCUD missiles and chemical weapons, against areas of Syria with utter disregard for the lives of Syrian civilians or for the amount of destruction done to residential areas and infrastructure. The fractured Syrian military opposition, which includes extremist radical elements like the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, have also commit- ted crimes, such as kidnapping religious leaders and destroying Shia mosques in pro-Assad com- munities. If one compares the conflict in Syria to other conflicts that have occurred throughout the world labeled “civil wars,” it is clear that the term “civil war” is far from the reality of the situation in Syria. In fact, Syria is in the midst of a popular revolution against an authoritarian regime. -
Situation Report: WHO Syria, Week 19-20, 2019
WHO Syria: SITUATION REPORT Weeks 32 – 33 (2 – 15 August), 2019 I. General Development, Political and Security Situation (22 June - 4 July), 2019 The security situation in the country remains volatile and unstable. The main hot spots remain Daraa, Al- Hassakah, Deir Ezzor, Latakia, Hama, Aleppo and Idlib governorates. The security situation in Idlib and North rural Hama witnessed a notable escalation in the military activities between SAA and NSAGs, with SAA advancement in the area. Syrian government forces, supported by fighters from allied popular defense groups, have taken control of a number of villages in the southern countryside of the northwestern province of Idlib, reaching the outskirts of a major stronghold of foreign-sponsored Takfiri militants there The Southern area, particularly in Daraa Governorate, experienced multiple attacks targeting SAA soldiers . The security situation in the Central area remains tense and affected by the ongoing armed conflict in North rural Hama. The exchange of shelling between SAA and NSAGs witnessed a notable increase resulting in a high number of casualties among civilians. The threat of ERWs, UXOs and Landmines is still of concern in the central area. Two children were killed, and three others were seriously injured as a result of a landmine explosion in Hawsh Haju town of North rural Homs. The general situation in the coastal area is likely to remain calm. However, SAA military operations are expected to continue in North rural Latakia and asymmetric attacks in the form of IEDs, PBIEDs, and VBIEDs cannot be ruled out. II. Key Health Issues Response to Al Hol camp: The Security situation is still considered as unstable inside the camp due to the stress caused by the deplorable and unbearable living conditions the inhabitants of the camp have been experiencing . -
Chapter Five
chapter five GOLAN, BASHAN, HAURAN AND TRANSJORDAN Historical and Geographic Background In the last decades of the Second Temple period and on into the mishnaic and talmudic periods, Jews regarded the Golan Heights as the hinterland of Galilee.1 Jews had also settled to the east of Golan in Bashan (Batanaea) and Hauran. Administratively, Bashan and Hauran were not part of Palestine. Hauran and southern Bashan had been part of the province of Arabia as early as the first half of the second century, and at the beginning of the third century the rest of Bashan and Trachonitis became part of this province. Golan, by contrast, remained within the borders of Palestine during that entire period.2 It should be noted, however, that the sages established their own borders of Palestine for observing the commandments dependent upon theLandofIsrael.Theseborders(discussedbelowandexplainedindetail in Chapter ) incorporate much of these regions. Sages were active in the areas immediately across these borders. They regarded these areas as part of the country’s hinterland and not as part of the Diaspora. Galilean sages maintained ties with the sages in the Golan, Bashan and Hauran, as they did with sages in other parts of Palestine, and from what we can gather from rabbinic literature, these were close ties. During the talmudic 1 Josephus, War, :, . Compare idem, Antiquity, : and Sifra, Behar :, ed. Weiss, c, in which Gamla is regarded as a mountain in Galilee. See also t. Makkot :, ed. Zuckermandel, , Gamla replaces the Galilean Kadesh as a “city of refuge.” 2 For more on the Golan, Bashan and Trachonitis districts, which comprised the kingdom of Agrippa II, see Josephus, War, :; ibid., :, . -
SYRIA, YEAR 2020: Update on Incidents According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Compiled by ACCORD, 25 March 2021
SYRIA, YEAR 2020: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) compiled by ACCORD, 25 March 2021 Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality Number of reported fatalities National borders: GADM, 6 May 2018a; administrative divisions: GADM, 6 May 2018b; incid- ent data: ACLED, 12 March 2021; coastlines and inland waters: Smith and Wessel, 1 May 2015 SYRIA, YEAR 2020: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 25 MARCH 2021 Contents Conflict incidents by category Number of Number of reported fatalities 1 Number of Number of Category incidents with at incidents fatalities Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality 1 least one fatality Explosions / Remote Conflict incidents by category 2 6187 930 2751 violence Development of conflict incidents from 2017 to 2020 2 Battles 2465 1111 4206 Strategic developments 1517 2 2 Methodology 3 Violence against civilians 1389 760 997 Conflict incidents per province 4 Protests 449 2 4 Riots 55 4 15 Localization of conflict incidents 4 Total 12062 2809 7975 Disclaimer 9 This table is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 12 March 2021). Development of conflict incidents from 2017 to 2020 This graph is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 12 March 2021). 2 SYRIA, YEAR 2020: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 25 MARCH 2021 Methodology GADM. Incidents that could not be located are ignored. The numbers included in this overview might therefore differ from the original ACLED data. -
Reference Map: Governorates Along Jordan and Syria Border
Reference Map:] Governorates along Jordan and Syria Border Qudsiya Yafur Tadmor Sabbura Damascus DAMASCUS Obada Nashabiyeh Damascus Maliha Qisa Otayba Yarmuk Zabadin Deir Salman Madamiyet ElshamDarayya Yalda Shabaa Haran Al'awameed Qatana Jdidet Artuz Sbeineh Hteitet Elturkman LEBONAN Artuz Sahnaya Buwayda ] Hosh Sahya Jdidet Elkhas A Tantf DarwashehDarayya Ghizlaniyyeh Khan Elshih Adleiyeh Deir Khabiyeh MqeilibehKisweh Hayajneh Qatana ZahyehTiba Khan Dandun Mazraet Beit Jin Rural Damascus Sa'sa' Hadar Deir Ali Kanaker Duma Khan Arnaba Ghabagheb Jaba Deir Elbakht SYRIA Quneitra Kafr Shams Aqraba Jbab Nabe Elsakher Quneitra As-Sanamayn Hara As-Sanamayn IRAQ Nimer Ankhal Qanniyeh I Jasim Shahba Mahjeh S Nawa Shaqa R Izra' Izra' Shahba Tassil Sheikh Miskine Bisr Elharir A Al Fiq Qarfa Nemreh Abtaa Nahta E Ash-Shajara As-Sweida Da'el Alma Hrak Western Maliha Kherbet Ghazala As-Sweida L Thaala As-Sweida Saham Masad Karak Yadudeh Western Ghariyeh Raha Eastern Ghariyeh Um Walad Bani kinana Kharja Malka Torrah Al'al Mseifra Kafr Shooneh Shamaliyyeh Dar'a Ora Bait Ras Mghayyer Dar'a Hakama ManshiyyehWastiyya Soom Sal Zahar Daraa] Dar'a Tiba Jizeh Irbid Boshra Waqqas Ramtha Nasib Moraba Legend Taibeh Howwarah Qarayya Sammo' Shaikh Hussein Aidoon ! Busra Esh-Sham Arman Dair Abi Sa'id Irbid ] Milh AlRuwaished Salkhad Towns Kofor El-Ma' Nassib Bwaidhah Salkhad Mazar Ash-shamaliCyber City Mghayyer Serhan Mashari'eKora AshrafiyyehBani Obaid ! National Capital Kofor Owan Badiah Ash-Shamaliyya Al_Gharbeh Rwashed Kofor Abiel NULL Ketem ! Jdaitta No'ayymeh -
"Al-Assad" and "Al Qaeda" (Day of CBS Interview)
This Document is Approved for Public Release A multi-disciplinary, multi-method approach to leader assessment at a distance: The case of Bashar al-Assad A Quick Look Assessment by the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)1 Part II: Analytical Approaches2 February 2014 Contributors: Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of British Columbia), Mr. Bradford H. Morrison (University of British Columbia), Mr. Ryan W. Cross (University of British Columbia) Dr. Larry Kuznar (Indiana University – Purdue University, Fort Wayne), Maj Jason Spitaletta (Joint Staff J-7 & Johns Hopkins University), Dr. Kathleen Egan (CTTSO), Mr. Sean Colbath (BBN), Mr. Paul Brewer (SDL), Ms. Martha Lillie (BBN), Mr. Dana Rafter (CSIS), Dr. Randy Kluver (Texas A&M), Ms. Jacquelyn Chinn (Texas A&M), Mr. Patrick Issa (Texas A&M) Edited by: Dr. Hriar Cabayan (JS/J-38) and Dr. Nicholas Wright, MRCP PhD (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) Copy Editor: Mr. Sam Rhem (SRC) 1 SMA provides planning support to Combatant Commands (CCMD) with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are not within core Service/Agency competency. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff, J3, DDSAO and executed by OSD/ASD (R&E)/RSD/RRTO. 2 This is a document submitted to provide timely support to ongoing concerns as of February 2014. 1 This Document is Approved for Public Release 1 ABSTRACT This report suggests potential types of actions and messages most likely to influence and deter Bashar al-Assad from using force in the ongoing Syrian civil war. This study is based on multidisciplinary analyses of Bashar al-Assad’s speeches, and how he reacts to real events and verbal messages from external sources. -
The Syrian Civil War a New Stage, but Is It the Final One?
THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR A NEW STAGE, BUT IS IT THE FINAL ONE? ROBERT S. FORD APRIL 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-8 CONTENTS * SUMMARY * 1 INTRODUCTION * 3 BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, 2011-14 * 4 DYNAMICS OF THE WAR, 2015-18 * 11 FAILED NEGOTIATIONS * 14 BRINGING THE CONFLICT TO A CLOSE * 18 CONCLUSION © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY Eight years on, the Syrian civil war is finally winding down. The government of Bashar al-Assad has largely won, but the cost has been steep. The economy is shattered, there are more than 5 million Syrian refugees abroad, and the government lacks the resources to rebuild. Any chance that the Syrian opposition could compel the regime to negotiate a national unity government that limited or ended Assad’s role collapsed with the entry of the Russian military in mid- 2015 and the Obama administration’s decision not to counter-escalate. The country remains divided into three zones, each in the hands of a different group and supported by foreign forces. The first, under government control with backing from Iran and Russia, encompasses much of the country, and all of its major cities. The second, in the east, is in the hands of a Kurdish-Arab force backed by the U.S. The third, in the northwest, is under Turkish control, with a mix of opposition forces dominated by Islamic extremists. The Syrian government will not accept partition and is ultimately likely to reassert its control in the eastern and northwestern zones. -
Up to 11 Killed in Daraa.Pdf
Up To 11 Killed While Negotiations Are Underway in Daraa Province About Syrians for Truth and Justice Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) is an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization whose members include Syrian human rights defenders, advocates and academics of different backgrounds and nationalities. It also includes members of other nationalities. The initiative strives for SYRIA, where all Syrian citizens (males and females) have dignity, equality, justice and equal human rights. 1 Up To 11 Killed While Negotiations Are Underway in Daraa Province Up To 11 Killed As Syrian Regular Forces and Their Allies Violate Ceasefire Agreement While Negotiations Are Underway in Daraa Province Shelling Occurred in the East Countryside of Daraa During July 1, 2018 and July 6th 2 Up To 11 Killed While Negotiations Are Underway in Daraa Province At least 11 persons killed, including women and children, when the Syrian regular forces and their allies shelled many areas in Daraa province- South Syria from July 1, 2018 to July 6th, during the period of the beginning of negotiations and reaching a final agreement regarding the fate of these areas. The shelling was a breach to the ceasefire deal and calm announced by the negotiating parties. On July 6, 2018, Um al-Mayathen town was exposed to an airstrike believed to be from Russian warplanes killing a volunteer in the Syrian Civil Defense. In addition, Saida town was subjected to airstrikes by Syrian/Russian aircrafts killing four children and two women. On July 4, 2018, one person was killed as a result of barrel bombs shelling, the Syrian Civil Defense reported, and counted shelling with ground-to-ground missiles on armed opposition factions-controlled Daraa city, plus aerial bombardment on towns of Tafas, Saida, Um al- Mayathen, Yadoda, and al-Nouaima. -
A Violent Military Escalation on Daraa, and Waves of Idps As a Result 0.Pdf
A Violent Military Escalation on Daraa, and Waves of IDPs as a Result About Syrians for Truth and Justice-STJ Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) is an independent, nongovernmental organization whose members include Syrian human rights defenders, advocates and academics of different backgrounds and nationalities. The initiative strives for SYRIA, where all Syrian citizens (males and females) have dignity, equality, justice and equal human rights . 1 A Violent Military Escalation on Daraa, and Waves of IDPs as a Result A Violent Military Escalation on Daraa, and Waves of IDPs as a Result A flash report highlighting the bombardment on the western and eastern countryside of Daraa from 15 to 20 June 2018 2 A Violent Military Escalation on Daraa, and Waves of IDPs as a Result Preface With blatant disregard of all the warnings of the international community and UN, pro- government forces launched a major military escalation against Daraa Governorate, as from 15 to 20 June 2018. According to STJ researchers, many eyewitnesses and activists from Daraa, Syrian forces began to mount a major offensive against the armed opposition factions held areas by bringing reinforcements from various regions of the country a short time ago. The scale of these reinforcements became wider since June 18, 2018, as the Syrian regime started to send massive military convoys and reinforcements towards Daraa . Al-Harra and Agrabaa towns, as well as Kafr Shams city located in the western countryside of Daraa1, have been subjected to artillery and rocket shelling which resulted in a number of civilian causalities dead or wounded. Daraa’s eastern countryside2 was also shelled, as The Lajat Nahitah and Buser al Harir towns witnessed an aerial bombardment by military aircraft of the Syrian regular forces on June 19, 2018, causing a number of civilian casualties .