sign in sign up
<<
Home , Jason Rezaian, Shammar, Syria, Syrian opposition, Syria (region)

Next Steps in

BY JUDITH S. YAPHE

early three years since the start of the , no clear winner is in sight. and defections of civilian and military loyalists close to President Bashar Nal-Assad, rebel success in parts of and other key towns, and the spread of vio- lence to itself suggest that the regime is losing ground to its opposition. The tenacity of government forces in retaking territory lost to rebel factions, such as the key town of Qusayr, and attacks on Turkish and Lebanese military targets indicate, however, that the regime can win because of superior military equipment, especially airpower and missiles, and help from and Hizballah. No one is prepared to confidently predict when the regime will collapse or if its oppo- nents can win. At this point several assessments seem clear: ■■ The will continue to reject any compromise that keeps Assad in power and imposes a transitional government that includes loyalists of the current Baathist regime. While a compromise could ensure continuity of government and a degree of institutional sta- bility, it will almost certainly lead to protracted unrest and reprisals, especially if regime appoin- tees and loyalists remain in control of the police and internal security services. ■■ How Assad goes matters. He could be removed by coup, , or an arranged exile. Whether by external or internal means, building a compromise transitional government after Assad will be complicated by three factors: disarray in the Syrian opposition, disagreement among (UN) Security Council members, and an intransigent sitting govern- ment. Assad was quick to accept ’s proposal on securing chemical weapons but may not be so accommodating should Russia or Iran propose his removal. ■■ U.S. ambivalence has neither helped to shore up opposition to the Assad regime nor quelled the violence.While most observers acknowledge the complexity of the situation on the ground, Syria’s civil war is spreading sectarian and ethnic fighting and instability to its neighbors. Religious and ethnic extremists are attacking each other as well as regime targets. Sunni and Shi’a extremists may be few in number, but they are able to draw on financial support from similarly minded individuals in , , , and the Persian Gulf, according to a Council on Foreign Relations study and interviews with regional experts.1 Kurdish

Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. This article is also published as Strategic Forum 283, Next Steps in Syria (NDU Press, 2013).

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 15 YAPHE

nationalists in Syria and Iraq focus more on Abdallah Salih in , Russia and Iran anti-Turkish operations, which the Assad would negotiate an amnesty and safe exit for regime encourages. Extremists could grow in Assad and his immediate family. Officials of size and strength as the violence continues the old regime would assume a prominent role or if the intervenes. Fighting in the transitional government, which would Assad or foreign military intervention will be led by a “credible” regime figure with lim- draw attention and give them legitimacy, ited authority. whether religious or ethnic based. This option has several flaws. First, Russia claims to be interested in an international con- consensus on continuity reflects in part an ference to include pro- and anti-regime fac- important lesson learned from the inability tions, but it also continues to insist that an of the Shi’a-dominated government in Iraq to externally imposed solution is unacceptable. win national backing, and the highly diverse Moscow at one point hinted that it could sup- population in Syria, where Alawi, , port Syria rather than Assad, a significant shift, Christians, and other minorities all seek parity but it is unclear if ’s Syria strat- with the Sunni Arab majority. egy assumes Assad remains in power. It is also not clear that Russia could deliver Assad should the international community agree on a negotiated outcome that does not include It Matters How Assad Is Removed him. It does seem certain, however, that the How regime change occurs in Syria is as Syrian opposition would not accommodate a important as what replaces the current regime. solution that includes amnesty for Assad and Assad could be removed by civil war or assas- inclusion of Baathist loyalists in the new gov- sination, by a military or party coup, or by an ernment. Assad’s opponents may lack unity arrangement brokered by foreign powers in and clarity of purpose, but they do agree on consultation with regional partners and with two points: rejection of any compromise with the Syrian regime and/or opposition factions. the old regime and exclusion of Baathist loyal- Most and Syria watchers expect there ists in a transitional authority. will be a degree of continuity in which ele- Finally, it is unlikely that Syria’s neighbors ments of the regime play a role in whatever most invested in the ’s transition—par- replaces the current government. This consen- ticularly and Saudi Arabia—would sus on continuity reflects in part an important accept a narrow Yemen-style transition. These lesson learned from the inability of the Shi’a- support the opposition because they dominated government in Iraq to win national prefer a broader strategic realignment that backing, and the highly diverse population in replaces a pro-Iran Shi’a or Alawite regime Syria, where Alawi, Kurds, Christians, and with a Sunni majority government that looks other minorities all seek parity with the Sunni to or for partnership. The Arab majority. Yemen solution removed Salih but left his The Yemen Option: A Negotiated Exit. family in power and granted him immunity. It Similar to the plan negotiated by the Gulf was a bargain made by and for elites—not the Cooperation Council (GCC) that removed Ali people. The Syrian opposition is less likely to

16 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA accept half-measures negotiated by a few their strategy fails to work. The sectarian nature Syrian elites and their international backers. of the conflict and the that charac- The Option: Removal by Coup. This terizes Saudi and Iranian competition in Syria option assumes there is a point at which key will ultimately perpetuate a long-term low- insiders decide that the leader’s survival is intensity conflict as Syrians compete for polit- more of a liability than an asset, the examples ical power and foreign support along sectarian being the Egyptian army’s removal of President and ethnic lines similar to those that divide and his successor Mohammed Lebanon. Morsi. In a Syrian version of this scenario, Iraq since 2003 offers us grim images of senior leaders remain in power and Russia and what could go wrong in Syria if and when the Iran quickly assert their influence through government collapses. Disbanding the entire them to restrict the scope of change. They cal- Baathist infrastructure and the military could culate that the higher the level of continuity have dire consequences in reestablishing a from the old regime to a transitional authority, semblance of security and stability under a the greater the chance that they will remain transitional government. Iran’s ability to stir influential. A coup, however, may produce less up local unrest using surrogate militias and continuity and greater change than antici- other assets in Iraq should serve as a warning pated. Assad’s successor will be under pressure of what it could do in Syria if Assad’s regime from many sides to respond to broader oppo- falls. Syria may not be Iraq, but a post-Assad sition concerns and to begin a process of inter- Syria will not receive the same kind of intense nal negotiation to end the crisis. He will also scrutiny as post-Saddam Iraq did under have to consolidate his base of support and American occupation. No matter how Assad establish his party’s legitimacy, which could departs, a key question remains: who or what mean opening opportunities for some actors, will protect Syrian citizens, especially its ethnic including pro-U.S. or Syrian opposition sup- and religious minorities, once the state’s insti- porters, and closing them for others. tutions collapse? The Lebanon Option: Ongoing Proxy War for What Do the Neighbors Want? Sectarian Solidarity. Saudi Arabia, , and other Gulf states are providing money and Syria’s neighbors—Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, arms to the Syrian opposition to fight Assad and Saudi Arabia as well as Iran—all see risk and Iranian-backed elements. This kind of in what is happening in Syria whether the involvement is a high-stakes gamble for the six Assad regime survives or falls. The nature of GCC countries, which usually shun direct mil- the risk runs from the spillover effect of mili- itary engagement. They also tend to prefer the tary confrontation, flows, and stability of a government dominated by a - expanded sectarian warfare to loss of leverage gle strong-man military figure rather than the over key domestic and regional security inter- uncertainty of a democratically shaped Islamist ests. government, which may not share their reli- Iran: Preserving Influence, Fighting Isolation. gious or political values. Nonetheless, support The Assad regime’s survival has been a top for one set of strategies has never prohibited national security priority for Iran. Syria has these countries from switching tactics when been the Islamic ’s strongest regional

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 17 YAPHE

ally since the 1979 . security and military forces, with which Iran is has provided Damascus with weapons, money, closely linked. logistics support, and strategic advice on deal- Enter President Hasan Ruhani. He has ing with domestic opponents while stonewall- made clear Iranians’ distaste for Assad’s repres- ing international critics. Syria is important to sion of his people, especially his use of chem- Iran for geostrategic reasons: it is a key Arab ical weapons, and hinted that the Syrian leader and Muslim ally in a that rejects non- may not be an essential element of Iran’s Arab and non-Sunni influence; it provides Iran Syrian strategy.5 In a speech in mid-September with a platform to support Hizballah, to commanders of the IRGC, Ruhani wel- Palestinian extremists, and disaffected comed a possible deal between Washington Lebanese Christians; and it enables Iran to and Moscow to reduce Syria’s chemical weap- challenge as a frontline state and disrupt ons stockpile and warned the IRGC, with units efforts at Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Under fighting openly in Syria, not to get involved in former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, politics.6 support for the embattled Assad and his Iran does not want to see a Saudi “victory” Alawite-dominated regime was also a symbol in Syria or elsewhere in the region, but efforts of national pride and revolutionary Islamic to improve relations with the Arab states have leadership in the face of American and Western failed. Egypt under the military transitional interests. authorities and Morsi have been unwilling to Iran’s leaders have preferred the civil war improve ties, open the to permit as an acceptable risk to full-scale regime passage by Iranian warships, or allow Iran change in Damascus. Some Iran scholars access to Gaza. Iran has also tried to expand its believe that Tehran will use every asset in its ties to political allies in Lebanon, offering arsenal to save Assad, including support for reconstruction and development assistance as him against foreign military intervention.2 well as military to Christian and Sunni Press sources document the presence of the communities. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The consequences for Iran should Assad’s from the fighting with Syrian and regime fall will be significant externally and Hizballah forces in northern and western unpredictable. Iran’s standing in the Arab Syria.3 Other experts believe Iran’s leaders are had already been undermined by its more pragmatic; they could accept an denial of the ’s Arab and secular alternative to Assad and may even be willing origins. The Islamic Republic could become to accede to a transitional government should more isolated and less able to intimidate its he be removed by coup, a negotiated neighbors. It will be more difficult to transfer settlement, or even outside intervention.4 Iran money and weapons to Hizballah or retaliate would insist on an interim government that against Israel. Iranian leaders before Ruhani’s included Alawite and other elements friendly election were also worried that their increas- to Iran and recognition of Tehran as ingly unpopular support for Assad could rekin- participants in any post-Assad negotiations. It dle domestic support for the Green Revolution would also insist that change in regime not protest movement of 2009. Foreign military include fundamental changes in Syria’s intervention in Syria, however, could also

18 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA

create opportunities for Iran to minimize its Lebanon, divisions in and a sectar‑ losses and even expand its regional influence. ian war in Iraq.9 Iraq: Managing the Syrian Crisis. The con- flict in Syria presents a major dilemma for Iraq The issue for most is national inter- based on inextricably linked sociopolitical, est, not sectarian identity. Maliki and most tribal, ethnic, religious, and security-based ties. Iraqis see themselves as Iraqis and first. Many Iraqis have family, clan, and tribal con- They criticize the Assad regime’s brutality, nections in Syria overlaid with longstanding Baathist origins, and lack of accountability. religious, trade, and smuggling interests. After Their greater worry, however, is that Assad the collapse of Saddam’s regime, Syrian could be replaced by a – authorities allegedly facilitated the transit of dominated government encouraged by Turkey, armed Sunni Islamist extremists, including Saudi Arabia, and Qatar and eager to destabi- al‑Qaeda operatives and renegade Iraqi lize neighborhood regimes that are Sunni or Baathists, across the to fuel instability insufficiently Shi’a. in Iraq.7 Press sources indicate that this “rat- line” has been reversed as the civil war in Syria Iraq remains too divided by sectarian politics expands, with al-Qaeda in and and weakened by its own security challenges militia elements loyal to Iran, Muqtada al- to fend off Iranian pressure to support its Sadr, or Sunni tribal leaders now sending arms Syrian client. and fighters into Syria to fight for the Assad regime or against it.8 These linkages complicate ’s pol- Iraq remains too divided by sectarian pol- icy on Syria and Assad. Prime Minister Nuri itics and weakened by its own security chal- al-Maliki, who spent long years of exile in Iran lenges to fend off Iranian pressure to support and Syria, has voiced support for Assad, its Syrian client. Over time, however, this cal- advised him to accept political reforms to end culation may change. Maliki will need to the crisis, and offered to mediate between weigh carefully the costs of supporting Iran in Assad and his opponents. In a press interview Syria against the costs to Iraqi security should in late February, he warned that a victory for Assad’s regime fail. Iran will place a much rebels in the Syrian civil war would create a higher value on a compliant government in new extremist haven and destabilize the wider Baghdad if Assad falls and Iraq becomes Iran’s , sparking sectarian wars in his new strategic depth against the United States, own country and in Lebanon. Maliki stated: Israel, and Western influence in the Middle East. This could have serious security and eco- If the world does not agree to support a nomic consequences as Baghdad struggles to peaceful solution through dialogue . . . assert greater power under a centralized gov- then I see no light at the end of the tunnel. ernment, expand oil production and exports, Neither the opposition nor the regime can and strengthen its military capabilities. finish each other off. The most dangerous as a Unifier and Divider. The thing in this process is that if the opposition Arab Spring permitted long-suppressed griev- is victorious, there will be a civil war in ances among religious and ethnic groups to

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 19 YAPHE UNHCR / G. Gubaeva

Hundreds of Syrian cross into Iraq at the Peshkhabour border crossing in Dohuk Governorate on August 17, 2013 come to light. Sunni and Shi’a, Muslim and democratic model. Would he insist on rigid Christian, religious and secular, Arab and Kurd enforcement of shariah law? Would he protect were all initially part of the new discourse in the rights of all citizens, including minorities? ’s Tahrir Square and in Baghdad. Muslim Would his party concede power if it lost the Brotherhood parties and more extremist Salafi next election? Morsi was soon under elements soon replaced the secular-minded from the military, which he had purged after moderates of the Arab Spring in Egypt, , his election, and from Salafis, who warned that and and began to play a significant role harder-line, anti-democratic elements would in the opposition to Assad. The initial political come to power. The military’s removal of success of President Morsi, the Brotherhood, Morsi was a dangerous moment in Egyptian and more radical Salafi elements in Egypt politics, but it was also a warning to the neigh- warned Syria’s Arab neighbors of what Syria borhood of the future under sectarian rule. without Assad could become. Morsi appointed Most experts familiar with Arab political Brotherhood members to senior government history and popular culture discount the idea posts, supported a constitution reflecting the of a resurgent pan-Arab or pan-Sunni national- Brotherhood’s agenda, and asserted his control ism linking Muslim Brotherhood or other over parliament and the supreme court. For Salafi parties that have come to power or have many , he clearly favored sectarian a significant presence in Turkey, Syria, Egypt, values and interests over a nationalist or Jordan, and the . They note the

20 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA differences in national identity, interests, cul- GCC concerns. They do, however, share a com- ture, religious custom, and ambivalence mon threat perception: all feel threatened by regarding total Islamist control of state institu- the Shi’a political takeover in Iraq, the civil war tions and political culture. But the issue lies as in Syria, and Iran’s looming shadow as a mili- well with foreign intervention. Much of the tant state whose aggressive regional stance responsibility or blame for parties’ includes using sectarian polarization to spark success in Egypt and Syria is credited to Saudi domestic unrest in their countries. The Gulf Arabia and Qatar, who sheltered Brotherhood states actively confront Iranian interests in the members during their long years of exile from region through careful monitoring of Iranian Syria and Egypt. Responsibility for their lack of activities (especially those centered on recruit- cooperation is also placed with Riyadh and ment efforts and operational planning), secu- . Brotherhood and Salafi loyalists have rity cooperation, and the specter of sectarian- long been at odds, with Qatar backing ism, which is intended to rally popular Brotherhood affiliates and the favoring support and paint opponents and critics as more extremist Salafi groups. Iran as a Shi’a disloyal. state is seen as sectarian, encouraging Shi’a Gulf aid in Syria has gone to a number of communities in Arab Gulf states to demand a factions fighting the Assad regime. There is no share of power and threatening their Arab rul- set standard for how the GCC states choose ers for denying it. whom to support and whom to ignore in the GCC Support Is a Mixed Blessing. Saudi conflict. They probably know little about their Arabia and the smaller GCC states are autocra- clients or their reliability. It is not enough to cies whose political, social, and foreign policy be a pious Muslim and loyal to conservative behavior is shaped by traditional conservative Sunni principles. GCC support for proxies to tribal and religious values. Their reaction to challenge Iran’s allies in Syria has proved dif- the Arab Spring and the conflict in Syria ficult to confine to those who are trustworthy reflects these interests and values. They worry as proxies or who follow a patron’s policies. that Islamists in Syria will encourage domestic The GCC are playing a com- critics to demand greater political participation plex game in which their influence and ulti- and social change. The GCC states find their mate survival are at stake. Yet in all of them best defense in their oil wealth and the ability few people outside the ruling families and it gives them to buy off unhappy citizens with dominant sect are in charge of decision-mak- promises of more jobs, higher wages, better ing on foreign or security policy, and any radi- housing, and subsidies whether they are cal reorientation of policy or institutions that needed or not. Their wealth, along with citizen could affect family interests is not to be toler- acceptance of a benevolent autocracy, allows ated. During the events marking the Arab the ruling families to ignore demands for Spring, all of the GCC countries experienced accountability, greater popular participation in some degree of unrest, and Saudi Arabia, governance, and a more open economy. , and the (UAE) The GCC has no uniform political or secu- deployed GCC military units to to rity policies and foreign relations are tailored “protect infrastructure” and prevent any threat mostly to state-specific interests rather than to destabilize the government. Saudi Arabia,

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 21 YAPHE

Qatar, and the UAE provided direct military Syria to maintain as much continuity as pos- support against the Qadhafi regime and urged sible between old and new governments and Organization (NATO) to preserve Russian interests and influence. forces to remove him. Moscow wants to remain Syria’s great power The red line for the GCC states is unrest ally, but a prolonged proxy war could divide on the Peninsula itself, in Bahrain or Yemen, the country and limit Russia’s overall influence but not civil war in Syria. GCC leaders blame there. Iran for all the unrest in the Gulf, including Similarly, opposes foreign military Bahrain, and they pledge money to many intervention in principle but is not likely to do states to keep them “secure.” Their funding of anything to prevent it. China has little eco- the proxy war with Iran in Syria does not nomic or strategic interest in Syria. It opposes increase the likelihood of military conflict the use of military force and a declaration of between Sunni Arab states and Iran. They were no-fly zones and safe havens for rebels as hap- quick to congratulate Ruhani on his election pened in Libya. China will back Russia in to the Iranian presidency in June and to recog- expectation that Russia will support it on mat- nize and reward the Egyptian military’s ters that are important to China. removal of Morsi and the Brotherhood from The question of whose interests must be public office. satisfied or sacrificed is a primary one. Is it important to offer Russia, China, and Iran What Do Russia and China Want? inclusion in the process of determining the When the Syrian crisis began, U.S. and post-Assad transition? What is the price to be European policymakers assumed that armed paid for offering them inclusion? Would intervention would lead to fragmentation and Syrians, the Gulf Arabs, and Turkey find this civil war. Moscow argued this as well. Its sup- kind of bargain acceptable or useful? The cost port has been critical in helping Assad hang to U.S. interests could prove too high for a bar- onto power and many now assume that the gain that could not be kept. Finally, what hap- longer the Assad regime holds on, the more pens if the timetable on the ground in Syria likely it is that he will survive. What does outpaces the slowness of the international Russia want? Moscow might be satisfied with negotiating process? Time may not be on the a negotiated outcome that would include it, side of international mediation or engage- Iran, and possibly China in talks similar to ment. As the crisis continues, Russia could those held in that produced the Karzai become increasingly irrelevant. It could use its government in . Some even see this veto in the UN, but events on the ground and as a way to resolve broader issues, including not in New York will determine what happens drawing Iran into a process that could then be in Syria. linked to progress on nuclear issues. It is What Could Go Wrong? doubtful that this “Grand ”–style approach could resolve Syria’s woes quickly or What could change these assumptions? satisfactorily, nor is it likely to convince What are we missing? Several questions need Moscow or to come to the table. The to be addressed. would like to delay a resolution in

22 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA

Do Tribes Matter? Tribes—membership in Tribal constituencies are essential for them, loyalty to them—define political iden- Assad as well, especially those in eastern Syria tity and reality in many areas of the Middle and areas south of Damascus. They may be as East. States observe the geographic boundaries much as 20 percent of Syria’s population; they laid out nearly 100 years ago, but several large are armed (guns, not tanks), have loyal follow- tribal include constituent parts ers, and are situated in the heart of Syria’s living and trading in countries that are occa- hydrocarbon infrastructure. Syria’s tribes are sionally antagonistic.10 These tribes have com- governed by a consultative and hierarchical plex ties to influential families and political process, but once a decision is made, it is leaders that cross and . definitive. Both Saddam and the Assads gave According to press reports and interviews with the tribes autonomy in exchange for support, Iraqi political leaders, Sunni Arab tribes of but Bashar al-Assad does not have as substan- western Iraq support the Syrian uprising in tial a tribal presence as his father had. Military hopes of ending Iranian influence in Syria and intelligence monitors the tribes but may not Iraq, returning Syria to Sunni leadership and be able to contain them. Their influence in boosting their leverage with Baghdad. Others Syria and Iraq and the flow of arms to them may be assisting the Assad regime in return for will probably grow as security conditions favors from Damascus during the Iraqi surge worsen and government control weakens. of 2005–2007. Mikhail Klimentyev

Russia Wants to Preserve Interests and Influence

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 23 YAPHE

Does the Baath Party or Another Political many reasons for ignoring anti-Assad move- Ideology Matter? Probably not. Neither Iran nor ments. They reject political groups that are by Saudi Arabia is thinking in strictly ideological definition Arab and they distrust the Muslim or sectarian terms. For the Saudis and other Brotherhood, which dominates the opposition Gulf Arabs, stability takes precedence over movement, for its Turkish links. The PYD/PKK as a desirable endstate. They uses the Assad regime to sustain its radical offered Egypt’s military financial assistance Kurdish nationalist agenda and anti-Turkish soon after Mubarak and Morsi were removed operations. The Assad government, in turn, by the military in hopes that authoritarian rule encourages—and arms—several Kurdish would secure the stability that eluded political extremist factions to destabilize Turkey and parties, even Islamist ones. Iran under undermine the Syrian opposition. Ahmadinejad wanted to deny victory in Syria Syrian Kurdish political demands can be to the Saudis and their U.S. backers. Ruhani, seen on a spectrum from assimilation into a however, has put a high priority on rapproche- new Syrian state to self-rule or outright inde- ment with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, which pendence. The KNC has said it is interested in could be impeded by Iran’s current policy on and political decentralization, Syria. which suggests an autonomous Kurdish gov- What Do the Kurds Want? , ernment to apply wherever a Kurd is. More Syria, and Iran watched enviously as Iraq’s inclusively, this would suggest the confessional Kurds made significant gains in getting exter- style of politics in Lebanon, but hardline nal protection and ultimately acquiring status Kurdish independents may seek the ethnogeo- as a self-governing province within the new graphic division of Iraq. Regardless, Syria’s Iraqi state. Kurdish unity is a powerful rallying Kurds seem unwilling or unable to articulate cry, but the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and how their vision for a new state would work in Syria speak different dialects, follow different practice. They will probably reject any post- leaders, and often set opposing priorities for Assad settlement or transitional government in themselves and other Kurdish factions. which Turkey has been involved, but they have Syrian Kurds belong primarily to either few alternatives. Encouraged by Ankara, Iraq’s the (KNC) or the Kurdish leader Masud Barzani has tried to woo Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Syria’s Kurds into cooperation, but he has had Demokrat, or PYD), a branch of the anti-Turk- little success in part because of his ties to ish Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Turkey and in part because of his own ambi- , or PKK) that is based in northern tions to gamble for an independent Kurdish Iraq and operates primarily against Turkish state. targets. More than one-third of the PKK is Syria’s Kurds are unlikely to play a signifi- Syrian Kurdish. Few Syrian Kurds have joined cant role in ending or rescuing Assad’s regime, the Arab opposition to Assad, although a but they are armed and dangerous and could Syrian Kurd was named president of the exile pose a major challenge to a post-Assad govern- in 2012 in an effort ment. Whatever their ambitions or hopes, by the predominantly Arab Sunni opposition Turkey will oppose any moves by Syria’s Kurds to more actively include them. The Kurds give to acquire any form of self-rule. Syrian Kurdish

24 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA factions signed an accord in 2012 at the direct them to get involved with nonconven- encouragement of Iraqi Kurdish leaders to tional weapons. If Hizballah were to do so and unify as a means of better attaining Kurdish if Israel were to retaliate, then the expert autonomy in Syria. Despite that, it is unlikely warned, the violence would be hard to con- that the PKK/PYD will take orders from tain. “The Syrian crisis,” he stated, “would Barzani or the KNC. Internal power struggles almost be an afterthought.” within Syrian Kurdish groups are likely to con- tinue within Syria’s political vacuum. Al–Qaeda in Mesopotamia was once Should We Worry about Hizballah or encouraged by Assad to cross into Iraq to al‑Qaeda? Hizballah is directly involved in launch attacks aimed at destabilizing the military operations inside Syria in defense of country after the collapse of Saddam’s the Assad regime according to press accounts government; now it is re-entering Syria to and its leader Nasrallah.11 Hizballah attack government targets. shifted from a low-profile, high-deniability strategy to high-profile engagement when the Syrian military was unable to hold off rebel Sunni extremist factions, such as al‑Qaeda, advances. Nasrallah’s statement acknowledged are a small part of the Syrian opposition move- for the first time that the organization’s mili- ment. They operate from bases in Lebanon tary wing was fighting on behalf of Assad in and Iraq with fighters and weapons crossing Syria. In a virtual on into Syria and Syria launching retaliatory al‑Qaeda and other Sunni extremist factions, attacks on their sites in Lebanon. Al‑Qaeda in Nasrallah warned, “If Syria falls, the Mesopotamia was once encouraged by Assad Palestinian cause will be lost,” and, he pre- to cross into Iraq to launch attacks aimed at dicted, Israel then will enter Lebanon. destabilizing the country after the collapse of Hizballah is a critical component of Iran’s Saddam’s government; now it is re-entering deterrent posture. Preserving Assad is Syria to attack government targets. Leaders of extremely important, but without assistance the Syrian extremist Jabhat al-Nusra and the from Tehran and Moscow, Hizballah probably Iraqi-based al‑Qaeda announced earlier this can do little more to protect him. The costs year that they would unite efforts, but would be high and their resources are limited. al‑Qaeda leader Shaykh Zawahiri and al-Nusra Some experts believe that threats of attack denied this. Al‑Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra’s from Israel keep Hizballah from trying to presence remains relatively small and they remove advanced weapons or technology from must compete with other factions for Syria, but no one interviewed would guess the resources. This could change if violence esca- level of fear required to keep Hizballah from lates, if al‑Qaeda leaders in Iraq or Yemen see smuggling weapons into or out of Syria or the an opportunity to establish a base in ungov- degree of its loyalty to Iran should it be erned space in Syria, or if foreign forces inter- ordered to do so. One military expert said vene in Syria. Hizballah’s leaders view the possession of Does Assad Have an Exit Strategy? Bashar chemical weapons more as a hazard or burden al-Assad is described as moody, unpredictable, than an asset. He believes Iran would have to irrational, and Janus-faced. One scholar stated,

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 25 YAPHE

“He will say one thing in the morning and Conclusion and Recommendations another in the afternoon.” Assad himself said in his interview with PBS’s that An expert on Syria described the country casualties, referring to 100,000 dead in the as “the most begrudging society in the Middle civil war, are irrelevant in a war that is total. East. It is not like any of its neighbors, with the Some believe the breakup of Syria is inevitable possible exception of Iraq. It is a minority and that Assad and Alawi allies will eventually regime in a country of minorities.” Solutions retreat to the Syrian coast, possibly to , that recall Syria’s colonial era or an elite-level an dominated by Alawis between the deal with foreign powers, which allows the coast and the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Assad regime a role in a transitional authority, Similarly, little is known about the prob- probably would not last, he concluded: “Even able fate of Alawis and other prominent if you break off a chunk of the regime, you Syrians supporting Assad should he retreat or need the people to agree to it or else they will be removed. The Alawite minority comprises not leave the street. If we have a negotiated about 10 percent of the country and is the exit, who steps in? It’s nothing like Yemen; you heart of Assad’s support base. They govern the can’t get around the sectarian nature of the provinces and control his military-security ser- regime.” vices. Many are politically radicalized, It is difficult to conclude from a few inter- extremely loyal, and have access to Syria’s non- views and assessments that a simple, straight- conventional weapons systems. They are also forward negotiated settlement of Syria’s polit- probably worried about their fate should the ical crisis is possible in the short term. Nor is Assad regime fall and a Sunni-dominated gov- there much evidence to suggest that Syria’s ernment take over. Some Alawis might hope diverse ethnic and religious communities will for amnesty under a successor regime, but be able to resolve their differences and success- many probably would suspect this as a ploy fully manage a post-Assad transitional govern- and join the elements used by the ment. As military confrontations continue, regime in local battles to initiate a bloody many of these communities are growing post-Assad . increasingly isolated and desperate. Collapse What if a desperate Assad, looking for a of the regime could magnify the risk of retali- way to retaliate or divert attention away from ation and blood feuds, tribal warfare, and, as his internal woes, attacks Israel or Jordan as a in Iraq, fueled by religious or eth- last gasp? What if Assad decides to attack refu- nic extremists who are well-armed and ill-dis- gee safe havens in Jordan, Lebanon, or Turkey? ciplined. Are in Jordan and Syria tools that Nevertheless, a possible solution may lie Assad could use to threaten Israel and Jordan? in a settlement negotiated and monitored by No one knows at what point the Syrian leader an international consortium under UN or Arab may feel the need to resort to extreme mea- League monitors that establishes a ruling coali- sures, but his strategy is survival. He does not tion. This ruling coalition could include appear to have an exit strategy other than win- bureaucrats and technocrats from the Baathist ning through military confrontation. regime, members of the exiled Syrian opposi- tion movement, and most significantly a

26 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA cross-section of prominent Syrian civilian and Syria’s neighbors are looking to the United military leaders willing to work together in a States and the other NATO countries to lead in transitional administration. This may preserve removing Assad, but no one appears to have institutional integrity and a functional the will or courage to assume responsibility. national command authority, but the prospect A Syrian expert who worked on The Day of a peaceful transition along these lines is After Assad Project for the United States doubtful. Like Russia and Iraq after revolution, Institute of Peace (USIP) believes the regime is exiles are unlikely to be welcomed back to run a broader group than just the Assad family and the country. Moreover, the opposition groups that institutional frameworks, such as the secu- thus far appear incapable of overcoming indi- rity apparatus, the military, the justice sector, vidual differences and internecine rivalries to and police forces will survive the removal of establish a unified position. This bodes poorly the regime. A key challenge will be figuring out for their ability to govern the country. Iraq’s what elements of the regime could play a pro- post-Saddam governments survived to a great ductive role. For other Syria watchers, the key extent because of the American occupation, is not the institutional framework but its con- but even Americans’ obsession with the rule of trol by the same elements that ran it under law and proportional representation could not Assad and are complicit in his regime’s repres- prevent the rise of militias and insurgency. sive measures. Syria has long been governed There seems to be even less international con- most intimately by multiple branches of the sensus on or in Syria than there was in Iraq. security services, which report directly to the Odd Anderson

Rebel Fighters Help Syrian Women Crossing the to Turkey

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 27 YAPHE

Assad family and are complicit in the regime’s or loans from international organizations such actions. Should these elements remain, large as the International Monetary Fund or World swaths of Syrian society may reject the entire Bank will be tempered by their need to show government, extending the country’s instability independence of great powers and refusal to into the postconflict rebuilding process. Will accede to reforms or end subsidies often lessons from Iraq or the recommendations required by foreign borrowing. They will watch from the USIP study be sufficient to prevent the situation in Egypt most closely to see if the civil war or ethnic cleansing by armed Syrian Brotherhood can regain power despite efforts militias? Probably not. to break it,12 if the military turns power over to What to do about Syria is an especially civilian authority and allows free and fair elec- difficult issue for the United States at a time tions, and if the United States and wealthy when U.S. forces are withdrawing from the Arab donors continue to back the military and region and the Obama administration is look- exert influence on political succession. ing to pivot attention toward . President Whatever happens in Egypt and Syria, the Obama’s recent pledge of military aid may be United States will be held responsible. Our vic- sufficient to create a pause in the fighting while tory in Iraq did not ensure a compliant succes- both sides reassess their ability to continue the sion or a smooth transition to democratic rule war or seek a cease-fire, but it is not likely to or national reconciliation, both necessary if resolve the basic conflict or bring peace. It is there is to be hope for an end to sectarian war. unlikely to weaken either side’s resolve to The options for the end of Assad laid out change the regime or save it. Most experts in the beginning of this paper remain the most interviewed believed that “these things inside likely ones. A negotiated exit and settlement Syria are going to happen regardless, but if we may be the most preferable option for the continue doing nothing, many trends will con- United States and the international commu- tinue to get worse.” If Assad leaves power or nity, but the most likely one is some version of stays in a nominal role, a large part of society the Arab option: a prolonged civil war, will remain close to his regime, especially whether by proxy or not, fought on sectarian among the Alawite community, whose mem- and/or ethnic terms with the patron/sponsor bers fear Sunni retribution. Their fight for sur- having little influence over the outcome. vival will continue, one scholar observed: Despite its announcement of limited “After forty years of ruling the country, the engagement in Syria in support of the opposi- will not be content with walking tion, U.S. policy remains unclear and unde- away. It will be messy.” clared to many observers. Does America’s new- The U.S. delay in delivering military aid to found concern for containing Syria’s chemical the Syrian opposition has probably cost it weapons and promises of military aid to the some leverage in the region, especially with opposition promise greater engagement if governments seeing Assad’s survival as a direct Assad’s forces stabilize the battlefront, retake threat to their security. Countries with Muslim more territory, cross another red line, and rout Brotherhood members in positions of influ- the Free (FSA)? Or is the U.S. goal ence need foreign aid and trade to survive, but to give the FSA just enough support to level the their willingness to accept American support playing field to the point where both sides opt

28 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA for a cease-fire and negotiations? If so, the and as a way to create a watchdog on the other United States may be creating a quagmire in side’s postwar behavior. which more, not less, military support and Urge the international community to sup- involvement becomes inevitable as the fighting port an interim government and monitor spreads further into Lebanon and Iraq and domestic compliance with international possibly threatens Israel as well. norms of protection to civilians. The Arab Several specific recommendations for U.S. League, Organization of the Islamic engagement are in order: Conference, and European Union (EU) should Be clear on goals. If the goal is a military support an armed UN peacekeeping mission victory, then further support to include that would offer assurances of protection to all advanced equipment may become necessary, Syrians, including Alawis and minorities, in a but the danger will be that the United States post-Assad Syria. This force would protect the slips into backing a full-blown war. If the goal transitional government and offer amnesty to is to equalize the battlefield and bring both regime supporters, excluding those responsible sides to negotiations, then the level of military for crimes against the Syrian people. The ben- and financial aid must be carefully calibrated efit for Syrians is no retaliation for past crimes, to maintain a balance. This, however, requires except for crimes against humanity. Terms cooperation from Assad’s backers, Russia and would include arrest and trial for violators. Iran, and would come at a cost to U.S. inter- ests. The , Organization of the Islamic Decide if the benefits of a broader strategy Conference, and European Union (EU) should outweigh a purely Syrian strategy. Trading support an armed UN peacekeeping mission Russian and Iranian cooperation on Syria for that would offer assurances of protection to compromise on non-Syrian issues may not be all Syrians, including Alawis and minorities, worth the cost of ending the Syrian crisis. Be in a post-Assad Syria. prepared for this strategy to fail because of Syrian resentment of what will be seen as neo- colonial intervention in their internal affairs Continue humanitarian aid to Syrian refu- and because the Russians lack the influence to gees. The aid could extend to the establish- deliver the deal. ment of safe haven zones inside Syria and Promote the Syrian Opposition might require a no-fly, no-drive zone similar Coalition13 and its military partner, the FSA, to the protection afforded the Kurds in north- and insist they form a or, ern Iraq in 1991. U.S. efforts would be if practical, on liberated Syrian territory. strengthened, but not assured, if backed by the Syrians may spurn efforts by exiles to return UN, Arab League, and EU. The risk would be and join the transitional government, but they that extended support to Syrian opposition need the talent, money and expertise of the bases inside Syria would be used by the oppo- exile community. Syrians from inside and out- sition to bring more international military side the country need to be seen participating forces directly into the fighting. in their liberation and implementing transi- Reach out to Assad’s domestic support tional justice measures to protect civil society base. Fear of retribution may outweigh fear of

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 29 YAPHE sanctions for Sunni Arab, Christian, and other Notes minorities, but the United States needs to con- vince them it is too costly to keep siding with Assad. Syrians may be more encouraged to 1 Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. defect if the U.S. military were engaged in Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 2013, operations and they believed Moscow and available at http://www.cfr.org/Iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k- Washington were willing to guarantee postcon- islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811 flict security. 2 Professor Mohsen Milani (University of Make clear U.S. and international intoler- South Florida), interview by author, July 2012 and June 2013. ance for religious and political extremism and 3 See Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow . Also make clear that further efforts Commander,” The New Yorker, September 30, 2013, by terrorist organizations such as al‑Qaeda to available at http://www.newyorker.com/ reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_ cross borders to disrupt or destabilize any filkins?printable=true&c; see also Farnaz Fassihi, Jay country are unacceptable. Solomon, and Sam Dagher, “Iranians Dial Up With red lines comes responsibility for Presence in Syria,” The Wall Street Journal, September monitoring and punishing infractions. Great 15, 2013, A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB10001424127887323864604579067382861 attention and sympathy are focused on the fate 808984.html of innocent civilians, but Assad clearly links 4 Iranian scholars, interview by author, February collateral damage to retribution.14 Syrians may and September 2012. 5 be reluctant to break with the regime, but the Cited by Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 16, 2013, but not seen in any other press report. point is to make it more dangerous and costly 6 Jason Rezaian, “Iranian leader responds to to support the regime than break with it. Syria weapons deal,” , September The current political turmoil in Turkey 17, 2013, A20; “Stay out of politics, Rowhani tells Iran Revolutionary Guards,” Arab News, September and Egypt is not likely to have much effect on 17, 2013. Assad or the Syrian civil war. The election of 7 After a car bombing in Baghdad in 2006, Iraqi Hasan Ruhani, a cleric, former diplomat and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki claimed Syria had nuclear negotiator, to the presidency in Iran, trained al Qaeda and other foreign fighters before sending them to Iraq. In 2009, Baghdad and however, could present an opportunity to Damascus recalled their ambassadors after the change the course of the civil war. Tehran’s government of Iraq accused Syria of sheltering Iraqis support for Assad has raised questions among responsible for bomb attacks. See “Syria and Iraq,” Iranians, including some officials, who not GlobalSecurity.org, October 10, 2013, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/ only see Assad as a dictator but also believe his forrel-iraq.htm opponents are “dominated by extremist groups 8 See Jessica Stern, “Iraq: Where Terrorists Go to with frightening agendas.” He cautions that School,” , 19, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/ “Syria is a matter of national security and opinion/iraq-a-school-for-terrorists and Masters. that’s why the president can’t solely manage it. 9 “Iraq Prime Minister warns of Syria Crisis It has to be discussed with the Supreme Leader, Spillover,” Al-Jazeera, February 20, 2013, available at the Revolutionary Guards and the National http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middlee- ast/2013/02/201322812730766202.html See also Ned Security Council.” PRISM Parker and Raheem , “Notes from the Underground: The Rise of Nouri al-Maliki,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2013.

30 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA

10 The , a tribal of several million in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, are primarily Sunni but include Shi’a components as well. 11 Anne Barnard, “In Syrian Victory, Risks Broader Fight,” The New York Times, June 6, 2013, A1; Karl Vick, “The Fall of al-Qusayr: Capture of Strategic Syrian Town Marks a New Phase in the War,” Time.com, June 5, 2013, available at http://world. time.com/2013/06/05/the-fall-of-qusayr-capture-of- strategic-syrian-town 12 By mid-September, the successor government under General al-Sisi had arrested many of the Brotherhood’s and banned the organization. Morsi himself is under arrest and may be tried for crimes allegedly stemming from his 2011 imprisonment. Mubarak is under house arrest but may be retried. 13 The exact title of the Syrian Opposition Coalition is the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, which was created from the Syrian National Coalition. 14 Bashar al-Assad, interview by Charlie Rose, PBS Newshour, September 8, 2013, available at http:// www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/09/Assad- tells-pbs-charlie-rose-syria-prepared-to-retaliate-if-hit. html

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 31

Men march during the funeral of Mohamed Ammar, who was killed by the Syrian Army in Al Qusayr, February 28, 2012