DOCSLIB.ORG

Russia's Military Intervention in Syria. Its Operation Plan, Objectives, And

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russia's Military Intervention in Syria. Its Operation Plan, Objectives, And Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Russia’s Military Intervention in Syria WP Its Operation Plan, Objectives, and Consequences for the West’s Policies Markus Kaim and Oliver Tamminga S The deployment and use of Russian air forces in Syria could be a turning-point for Presi- dent Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Since the start of the Russian air strikes on 30 September 2015, discussion has been rife in the media and in political circles as to what intentions Russia might be pursuing with its intervention in Syria. However, if one takes into ac- count the force package deployed to Syria, the manner in which the Russian air forces have proceeded, and the Kremlin’s official statements after the Assad visit to Moscow, the main features of an operation plan quickly emerge. It has repercussions far beyond Syria. On 30 September 2015, the Russian mili- Lebanese Hezbollah, even though these tary embarked on a series of operations actors are pursuing different interests. in Syria that had been prepared from the beginning of September onwards with the establishment of a base south of Latakia Russia’s military capacity in Syria and the deployment of the relevant forces. In the past few weeks, Russia has been However, the military and political aims increasing its deployment of military forces of the Russian government, as well as the to the air base near Latakia, in the north- motives behind the military intervention, west of Syria. are still unclear. The marines, T-90 tanks, combat vehicles The Russian government has never and artillery deployed there mainly serve hidden its willingness to act against all to protect the air base from attacks by IS forces fighting the Damascus regime. In or other opposition groups. The number of fact, Moscow and Damascus view all mili- marines, between 300 and 500, is sufficient tarily active opposition groups as terrorists to provide lasting force protection and com- that must be combated. And yet Russia has bat service support for a base of this kind, always avoided joining the US-led coalition but too small to be used offensively. of 60 states and international organisations The Su-24 and Su-34 fighter bombers, that was formed to counter IS. Instead, the Su-25 ground attack aircraft, Mi-24 attack Russian government began early on to forge helicopters and reconnaissance drones an alliance with Syria, Iran, Iraq and the that Russia has deployed to Syria are pri- Dr. habil. Markus Kaim is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s International Security Division SWP Comments 48 Lieutenant Colonel GS Oliver Tamminga is an Associate in SWP’s International Security Division November 2015 1 marily useful in contributing to land opera- risks that can now be incurred are the tions. incidents where a Russian fighter plane Their main application would seem to “strayed” into Turkish airspace; US fighter be guaranteeing the operational freedom of planes aborted their attacks after getting action and freedom of manoeuvre of Syrian too close to Russian jets; and an allegedly or other troops on the ground, supporting Russian drone that was brought down in counter-offensives and destroying, disrupt- Turkish airspace. ing and degrading the enemy’s ground Russia thus has a de-facto veto over air forces, even the enemy’s depth position operations in Russian-controlled Syrian air- in the area of operations. With their arma- space. Put differently, through its military ments and ability to fly relatively slowly, actions, Russia has gained direct leverage the Su-25 ground attack aircraft in particu- over the aircraft movements of the inter- lar specialise in providing close air support national anti-IS coalition and is effectively for ground troops. The fighter bombers limiting the coalition’s operational freedom. can stay in the theatre of operations for a comparatively long time because of their deployable radius, waiting to be assigned The objectives behind potential targets. The Russian government Russia’s actions has confirmed that the ground offensive Viewed collectively, these elements give a by Syrian troops is being carried out under preliminary picture of the situation, and Russian air operations cover. This corrobo- the contours of an operation plan emerge. rates the intent behind the military capa- Russia intends to pursue several different bilities that have been transferred to Syria. goals with its military intervention. However, Moscow has also relocated On the operational level, Moscow is cur- weapons systems into Syria that have rently pursuing the goal of protecting the nothing to do with the fight against IS or Assad regime from opposition members of rebel forces, but are instead expressly all stripes, and not just from IS. A glance intended for protecting the Syrian regime. at the regions of Syria where Russian air The ostensible purpose of these radars, anti- attacks have so far taken place makes clear aircraft missile systems and Su-30 multi- that the purpose is to crush opposition role fighter aircraft, as well as the means groups in the north of the country and on for electronic warfare, is to prevent or limit the periphery of areas controlled by Assad’s enemy aerial warfare, protect one’s forces troops, as well as rebel enclaves. So far, at from enemy air attacks and ensure the least, the fight against IS appears to be of integrity of one’s air space. However, since secondary importance, as an ingredient in neither IS nor any other opposition group the process of political legitimisation for has airplanes or the means of carrying out Russia’s engagement. That, at any rate, is air strikes, these systems must have quite the direction in which Russia’s choice of a different rationale: the very presence of targets for its air operations has been these weapons systems acts as a “protective pointing from the start. shield” over the Russian and Syrian forces In an interview, President Putin declared in a specific area of western and north- that the goal of the intervention was to western Syria, because it represents a seri- stabilise what he deemed to be the legally ous danger to western combat aircraft. This recognised government in Damascus, and form of air superiority has an immediate create the preconditions for a political com- impact on the use of US and allied means promise in Syria. Until further notice, the for aerial warfare, and forces them to co- strategic goal is therefore to preserve an ordinate and de-conflict their own opera- Alawite “core Syria”. This has been achieved tions with Russia so as to avoid incidents inter alia by the creation of an undeclared, and even accidents. Examples of the new de-facto no-fly zone for the western anti-IS SWP Comments 48 November 2015 2 coalition over parts of Syria, whose effect will have to coordinate and de-conflict its was barely lessened by the Russian-Ameri- movements in Syrian airspace with Mos- can Memorandum on Air Safety in Syria of cow. That will make it more difficult in the 20 October. future for Israel to carry out air attacks, as The transfer of parts of the Russian it has occasionally done in the past with Black Sea fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, the aim of preventing Iranian arms deliv- which Moscow is considering, also serves eries reaching Hezbollah via Syria. On the this goal and could be interpreted as con- other hand, Israel now has a powerful con- tributing to an “anti-access/area denial” tact, should the future course of the war strategy, whereby other military forces are in Syria ever fundamentally affect Israeli prevented from invading an area of opera- security interests. tions or else have their operational freedom in a certain territory curtailed. On the political level, following the Conclusion Ukraine crisis, Russia appears to link its Russia’s engagement in Syria has taken the military intervention with efforts to make West by surprise, and substantially changed the international community see it as a the framework for the fight against IS and central actor in containing or even solving for containing the Syrian civil war. To what the Syria conflict. At the same time, Mos- extent this is also a setback for the fight cow is anxious to demonstrate, by building against IS in Syria (and in Iraq) depends on a counter-alliance with Syria, Iran and Iraq, the willingness of Russia and the US to co- that this alliance is more effective than the operate with one another in the coming US-led coalition and that, moreover, it has months. greater potential legitimacy since it is based Politically speaking, a series of assump- on initiatives by the respective governments tions underpinning the West’s Syria policy and includes local partners. The advantage have been made void by Russia’s military of the Russian position became evident on intervention, or need to be nuanced or 9 October, when the US government an- revised: nounced that it would discontinue its pro- 1. The premise of many western govern- gramme to train and equip Syrian rebels, ments that President Assad cannot play any which had only started in December 2014. part in Syria’s future political order is no In September, Washington had been forced longer sustainable. Despite the countless to admit that it had trained fewer than 50 human rights violations and war crimes, fighters to date, and announced that it and despite his responsibility for the exodus would concentrate instead on providing and expulsion of millions of Syrians, Assad support for existing groups already fighting will have to be accepted as a provisional IS in Syria. Thus, while Moscow has a mili- interlocutor by all those governments and tary partner “on the ground” in Syria, the internal opposition forces who count on international coalition – some parts of the Syrian civil war being containable with which are committed to fighting IS, others Moscow’s help.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Offensive Against the Syrian City of Manbij May Be the Beginning of a Campaign to Liberate the Area Near the Syrian-Turkish Border from ISIS
    June 23, 2016 Offensive against the Syrian City of Manbij May Be the Beginning of a Campaign to Liberate the Area near the Syrian-Turkish Border from ISIS Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters at the western entrance to the city of Manbij (Fars, June 18, 2016). Overview 1. On May 31, 2016, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-dominated military alliance supported by the United States, initiated a campaign to liberate the northern Syrian city of Manbij from ISIS. Manbij lies west of the Euphrates, about 35 kilometers (about 22 miles) south of the Syrian-Turkish border. In the three weeks since the offensive began, the SDF forces, which number several thousand, captured the rural regions around Manbij, encircled the city and invaded it. According to reports, on June 19, 2016, an SDF force entered Manbij and occupied one of the key squares at the western entrance to the city. 2. The declared objective of the ground offensive is to occupy Manbij. However, the objective of the entire campaign may be to liberate the cities of Manbij, Jarabulus, Al-Bab and Al-Rai, which lie to the west of the Euphrates and are ISIS strongholds near the Turkish border. For ISIS, the loss of the area is liable to be a severe blow to its logistic links between the outside world and the centers of its control in eastern Syria (Al-Raqqah), Iraq (Mosul). Moreover, the loss of the region will further 112-16 112-16 2 2 weaken ISIS's standing in northern Syria and strengthen the military-political position and image of the Kurdish forces leading the anti-ISIS ground offensive.
    [Show full text]
  • From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations — Aron Lund
    7/2019 From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations — Aron Lund PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE Abstract The Russian-Syrian relationship turns 75 in 2019. The Soviet Union had already emerged as Syria’s main military backer in the 1950s, well before the Baath Party coup of 1963, and it maintained a close if sometimes tense partnership with President Hafez al-Assad (1970–2000). However, ties loosened fast once the Cold War ended. It was only when both Moscow and Damascus separately began to drift back into conflict with the United States in the mid-00s that the relationship was revived. Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Russia has stood by Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime against a host of foreign and domestic enemies, most notably through its aerial intervention of 2015. Buoyed by Russian and Iranian support, the Syrian president and his supporters now control most of the population and all the major cities, although the government struggles to keep afloat economically. About one-third of the country remains under the control of Turkish-backed Sunni factions or US-backed Kurds, but deals imposed by external actors, chief among them Russia, prevent either side from moving against the other. Unless or until the foreign actors pull out, Syria is likely to remain as a half-active, half-frozen conflict, with Russia operating as the chief arbiter of its internal tensions – or trying to. This report is a companion piece to UI Paper 2/2019, Russia in the Middle East, which looks at Russia’s involvement with the Middle East more generally and discusses the regional impact of the Syria intervention.1 The present paper seeks to focus on the Russian-Syrian relationship itself through a largely chronological description of its evolution up to the present day, with additional thematically organised material on Russia’s current role in Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • The Syrian Civil War a New Stage, but Is It the Final One?
    THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR A NEW STAGE, BUT IS IT THE FINAL ONE? ROBERT S. FORD APRIL 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-8 CONTENTS * SUMMARY * 1 INTRODUCTION * 3 BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, 2011-14 * 4 DYNAMICS OF THE WAR, 2015-18 * 11 FAILED NEGOTIATIONS * 14 BRINGING THE CONFLICT TO A CLOSE * 18 CONCLUSION © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY Eight years on, the Syrian civil war is finally winding down. The government of Bashar al-Assad has largely won, but the cost has been steep. The economy is shattered, there are more than 5 million Syrian refugees abroad, and the government lacks the resources to rebuild. Any chance that the Syrian opposition could compel the regime to negotiate a national unity government that limited or ended Assad’s role collapsed with the entry of the Russian military in mid- 2015 and the Obama administration’s decision not to counter-escalate. The country remains divided into three zones, each in the hands of a different group and supported by foreign forces. The first, under government control with backing from Iran and Russia, encompasses much of the country, and all of its major cities. The second, in the east, is in the hands of a Kurdish-Arab force backed by the U.S. The third, in the northwest, is under Turkish control, with a mix of opposition forces dominated by Islamic extremists. The Syrian government will not accept partition and is ultimately likely to reassert its control in the eastern and northwestern zones.
    [Show full text]
  • Prospects for Political Inclusion in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan
    ISSUE BRIEF 09.05.18 False Hopes? Prospects for Political Inclusion in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan Mustafa Gurbuz, Ph.D., Arab Center, Washington D.C. Among those deeply affected by the Arab i.e., unifying Kurdish cantons in northern Spring were the Kurds—the largest ethnic Syria under a new local governing body, is minority without a state in the Middle depicted as a dream for egalitarianism and East. The Syrian civil war put the Kurds at a liberal inclusive culture that counters the forefront in the war against the Islamic patriarchic structures in the Middle East.1 State (IS) and drastically changed the future U.S. policy toward the Kurds, however, prospects of Kurds in both Syria and Iraq. has become most puzzling since the 2017 This brief examines the challenges that defeat of IS in Syria. While the U.S.—to hinder development of a politically inclusive avoid alienating the Turks—did not object culture in Syrian Kurdistan—popularly to the Turkish troops’ invasion of the known as Rojava—and Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdish canton of Afrin, the YPG began Political and economic instability in both forging closer ties to Damascus—which regions have shattered Kurdish dreams for led to complaints from some American political diversity and prosperity since the officials that the Kurdish group “has turned early days of the Arab Spring. into an insurgent organization.”2 In fact, from the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Syrian Kurds have been most careful to not THE RISING TIDE OF SYRIAN KURDS directly target the Assad regime, aside from some short-term clashes in certain places The civil war in Syria has thus far bolstered like Rojava, for two major reasons.
    [Show full text]
  • The Syrian Civil War Student Text
    The Syrian Civil War Student Text PREVIEW Not for Distribution Copyright and Permissions This document is licensed for single-teacher use. The purchase of this curriculum unit includes permission to make copies of the Student Text and appropriate student handouts from the Teacher Resource Book for use in your own classroom. Duplication of this document for the purpose of resale or other distribution is prohibited. Permission is not granted to post this document for use online. Our Digital Editions are designed for this purpose. See www.choices.edu/digital for information and pricing. The Choices Program curriculum units are protected by copyright. If you would like to use material from a Choices unit in your own work, please contact us for permission. PREVIEWDistribution for Not Faculty Advisors Faculty at Brown University provided advice and carefully reviewed this curriculum. We wish to thank the following scholars for their invaluable input to this curriculum: Faiz Ahmed Meltem Toksöz Associate Professor of History, Department of History, Visiting Associate Professor, Middle East Studies and Brown University Department of History, Brown University Contributors The curriculum developers at the Choices Program write, edit, and produce Choices curricula. We would also like to thank the following people for their essential contributions to this curriculum: Noam Bizan Joseph Leidy Research and Editing Assistant Content Advisor Talia Brenner Gustaf Michaelsen Lead Author Cartographer Julia Gettle Aidan Wang Content Advisor Curriculum Assistant Front cover graphic includes images by Craig Jenkins (CC BY 2.0), Georgios Giannopoulos (Ggia) (CC BY-SA 4.0), and George Westmoreland. © Imperial WarPREVIEW Museums (Q 12366).
    [Show full text]
  • UK Home Office
    Country Policy and Information Note Syria: the Syrian Civil War Version 4.0 August 2020 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies: x A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm x The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules x The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules x A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) x A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory x A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and x If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • Nationbuilding in Rojava
    СТАТЬИ, ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ, РАЗРАБОТКИ Кризисы и конфликты на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке M.J.Moberg NATION-BUILDING IN ROJAVA: PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AMIDST THE SYRIAN CIVL WAR Название Национальное строительство в Роджаве: демократия участия в условиях на рус. яз. гражданской войны в Сирии Ключевые Сирия, гражданская война, сирийские курды, Роджава, демократический конфе- слова: дерализм Аннотация: В условиях гражданской войны в Сирии местные курды успешно использовали ослабление центральной власти для того, чтобы построить собственную систему самоуправления, известную как Роджава. Несмотря на то, что курдские силы на севере Сирии с энтузиазмом продвигают антинационалистическую программу левого толка, они сами при этом находятся в процессе национального строительства. Их главный идеологический принцип демократического конфедерализма объединяет элементы гражданского национализма и революционного социализма с целью создания новой нации в Сирии, построенной на эгалитарных началах. Политическая система Роджавы основана на принципах демократии участия (партиципаторной демократии) и федерализма, позволяющих неоднородному населению ее кантонов участвовать в самоуправлении на уровнях от локального до квазигосударственного. Хотя вопрос о признании Роджавы в ходе мирного процесса под эгидой ООН и политического урегулирования в Сирии остается открытым, практикуемый ей демократический конфедерализм может уже служить моделью инклюзивной партиципаторной демократии. Keywords: Syria, civil war, Syrian Kurds, Rojava, democratic confederalism Abstract: During
    [Show full text]
  • The Syrian Armed Conflict: Nearing the End ?
    THE WAR REPORT 2018 THE SYRIAN ARMED CONFLICT: NEARING THE END ? © ICRC JANUARY 2019 I MARIJA SULCE THE GENEVA ACADEMY A JOINT CENTER OF and interests amid the unrest. The struggle for power in the CONTEXT AND HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT1 region has drawn into the conflict countries such as the US, The Syrian armed conflict began in 2011 as a civil Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel and many others. To a degree, war, stemming from the Arab Spring protests. The Syrian the conflict has become more international in character, people started protesting in March 2011 in Daara against rather than remaining faithful to its non-international the corruption of President Bashar al-Assad’s government, civil war roots. The conflict is no longer only about Syria’s lack of political freedom and unemployment. The government and Assad’s corruption; in recent years, it has demonstrations took an ugly turn when the regime tried become a pawn in the geopolitical struggles of the Middle to crush the dissent by force.2 After the forceful response East.7 Having said that, the international community has to the demonstrations, protests against the regime erupted played an important role in trying to facilitate peace talks nationwide. The regime’s opponents started taking up between the Assad regime and the opposition groups. One arms and the unrest began its descent into civil war in July example is the Astana talks in 2017, which managed to set 2011, when a group of defectors from the Syrian military up de-escalation zones in Syria, sponsored by Russia, Turkey began forming the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the aim and Iran,8 as well as the demilitarized zone brokered by of overthrowing President Assad’s regime.3 During the Turkey and Russia in the last remaining rebel stronghold in almost eight years of ensuing civil war, many parties have Idlib in September 2018.9 joined the conflict, including many rebel groups as well Approaching its eighth year, the Syrian war is one of the as other states, highly complicating the war.
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S
    Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Christopher M. Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs June 14, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33487 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response Summary The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion in Syria is in its third year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. The Obama Administration has signaled a pending expansion of U.S. civilian and military assistance to the opposition in the wake of the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that President Bashar al Asad’s forces used chemical weapons in limited attacks in recent months. U.S. officials and many analysts have asserted that President Asad and his supporters will be forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to the crisis. Further escalation in fighting or swift regime change could jeopardize the security of chemical and conventional weapons stockpiles, threaten minority groups, or lead to wider regional conflict. Opposition forces are formidable, but regime forces, backed by Hezbollah fighters and Iranian and Russian material support, have initiated successful tactical counteroffensives in recent weeks. The Syrian military continues to use air strikes, artillery, and pro-government militias in punishing attacks on areas where rebels operate. Some members of Syria’s Sunni Arab majority and of ethnic and sectarian minority groups view the conflict in communal, zero-sum terms.
    [Show full text]
  • Spillover from the Conflict in Syria
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for re- search quality and objectivity. Spillover from the Conflict in Syria An Assessment of the Factors that Aid and Impede the Spread of Violence William Young, David Stebbins, Bryan A.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey's Security and the Syrian Civil
    Master Thesis Turkey’s Security and the Syrian Civil War A Case Study about how the Syrian Civil War has Impacted Turkey’s State and Human Security from 2011 until 2019. Author: Frida Berg Supervisor: Daniel Silander Examiner: Emil Uddhammar Term: HT19 Subject: Political Science Level: Advanced Course code: 5SK30E Fr Abstract This essay addresses the issue of how the Syrian civil war has impacted Turkey’s state and human security. The study aimed to provide an enhanced understanding of how the Syrian war has impacted Turkey’s security, within the timeframe of 2011-2019. The method that was applied to this study was a single case study where theories of state and human security were used to analyze the Syrian war’s impact on Turkey’s security. The results showed that the advancement of Kurdish forces as well as the Islamic state’s territorial expansion posed a threat towards the Turkish state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The war also impacted the authoritarian turn of the Turkish government, which generated in a coup attempt causing additional internal disability and threat towards the state’s security. In terms of Turkey’s human security, increased terrorism within the state as a cause of the Syrian war has impacted the physical security of the people. Moreover, health concerns arose due to the vast number of Syrian refugees in Turkey and posed a threat to the Turkish population. The refugee influx also changed the ethnic balance in some areas showing indications of ethnic tensions to foster, threatening the population. One can conclude that the Syrian war has impacted Turkey’s state security, through direct military threats regarding the rise and expansion the of PKK-YPG and ISIS.
    [Show full text]
  • The Syrian Civil War REGIME of BASHAR AL-ASSAD
    STANFORD MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 2014 The Syrian Civil War REGIME OF BASHAR AL-ASSAD Arnav Mariwala | Class of 2017 | E-Mail: [email protected] Assistant Chair: Ashwin Sreenivas | Crisis Director: Chloe Rickards Educational Topics Covered: Students analyze the effects of the First World War. • Describe the effects of the war and resulting peace treaties on population movement, the international economy, and shifts in the geographic and political borders of Europe and the Middle East. Students analyze instances of nation-building in the contemporary world in at least two of the following regions or countries: the Middle East, Africa, Mexico and other parts of Latin America, and China. • Understand the challenges in the regions, including their geopolitical, cultural, military, and economic significance and the international relationships in which they are involved. • Describe the recent history of the regions, including political divisions and systems, key leaders, religious issues, natural features, resources, and population patterns. • Discuss the important trends in the regions today and whether they appear to serve the cause of individual freedom and democracy. Students analyze the integration of countries into the world economy and the information, technological, and communications revolutions (e.g., television, satellites, computers). Source: “History-Social Science Content Standards for California Public Schools”, 1998 The Advisory Council of His Excellency Bashar al-Assad, Honorable President of the Syrian Arab Republic Dear Delegates, My name is Arnav Mariwala and I am a sophomore at Stanford University, planning to major in physics and history. I’ve been involved in Model UN since eighth grade, and I was a crisis director at SMUNC last year.
    [Show full text]