Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Russia’s Military Intervention in Syria WP Its Operation Plan, Objectives, and Consequences for the West’s Policies Markus Kaim and Oliver Tamminga S The deployment and use of Russian air forces in Syria could be a turning-point for Presi- dent Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Since the start of the Russian air strikes on 30 September 2015, discussion has been rife in the media and in political circles as to what intentions Russia might be pursuing with its intervention in Syria. However, if one takes into ac- count the force package deployed to Syria, the manner in which the Russian air forces have proceeded, and the Kremlin’s official statements after the Assad visit to Moscow, the main features of an operation plan quickly emerge. It has repercussions far beyond Syria. On 30 September 2015, the Russian mili- Lebanese Hezbollah, even though these tary embarked on a series of operations actors are pursuing different interests. in Syria that had been prepared from the beginning of September onwards with the establishment of a base south of Latakia Russia’s military capacity in Syria and the deployment of the relevant forces. In the past few weeks, Russia has been However, the military and political aims increasing its deployment of military forces of the Russian government, as well as the to the air base near Latakia, in the north- motives behind the military intervention, west of Syria. are still unclear. The marines, T-90 tanks, combat vehicles The Russian government has never and artillery deployed there mainly serve hidden its willingness to act against all to protect the air base from attacks by IS forces fighting the Damascus regime. In or other opposition groups. The number of fact, Moscow and Damascus view all mili- marines, between 300 and 500, is sufficient tarily active opposition groups as terrorists to provide lasting force protection and com- that must be combated. And yet Russia has bat service support for a base of this kind, always avoided joining the US-led coalition but too small to be used offensively. of 60 states and international organisations The Su-24 and Su-34 fighter bombers, that was formed to counter IS. Instead, the Su-25 ground attack aircraft, Mi-24 attack Russian government began early on to forge helicopters and reconnaissance drones an alliance with Syria, Iran, Iraq and the that Russia has deployed to Syria are pri- Dr. habil. Markus Kaim is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s International Security Division SWP Comments 48 Lieutenant Colonel GS Oliver Tamminga is an Associate in SWP’s International Security Division November 2015 1 marily useful in contributing to land opera- risks that can now be incurred are the tions. incidents where a Russian fighter plane Their main application would seem to “strayed” into Turkish airspace; US fighter be guaranteeing the operational freedom of planes aborted their attacks after getting action and freedom of manoeuvre of Syrian too close to Russian jets; and an allegedly or other troops on the ground, supporting Russian drone that was brought down in counter-offensives and destroying, disrupt- Turkish airspace. ing and degrading the enemy’s ground Russia thus has a de-facto veto over air forces, even the enemy’s depth position operations in Russian-controlled Syrian air- in the area of operations. With their arma- space. Put differently, through its military ments and ability to fly relatively slowly, actions, Russia has gained direct leverage the Su-25 ground attack aircraft in particu- over the aircraft movements of the inter- lar specialise in providing close air support national anti-IS coalition and is effectively for ground troops. The fighter bombers limiting the coalition’s operational freedom. can stay in the theatre of operations for a comparatively long time because of their deployable radius, waiting to be assigned The objectives behind potential targets. The Russian government Russia’s actions has confirmed that the ground offensive Viewed collectively, these elements give a by Syrian troops is being carried out under preliminary picture of the situation, and Russian air operations cover. This corrobo- the contours of an operation plan emerge. rates the intent behind the military capa- Russia intends to pursue several different bilities that have been transferred to Syria. goals with its military intervention. However, Moscow has also relocated On the operational level, Moscow is cur- weapons systems into Syria that have rently pursuing the goal of protecting the nothing to do with the fight against IS or Assad regime from opposition members of rebel forces, but are instead expressly all stripes, and not just from IS. A glance intended for protecting the Syrian regime. at the regions of Syria where Russian air The ostensible purpose of these radars, anti- attacks have so far taken place makes clear aircraft missile systems and Su-30 multi- that the purpose is to crush opposition role fighter aircraft, as well as the means groups in the north of the country and on for electronic warfare, is to prevent or limit the periphery of areas controlled by Assad’s enemy aerial warfare, protect one’s forces troops, as well as rebel enclaves. So far, at from enemy air attacks and ensure the least, the fight against IS appears to be of integrity of one’s air space. However, since secondary importance, as an ingredient in neither IS nor any other opposition group the process of political legitimisation for has airplanes or the means of carrying out Russia’s engagement. That, at any rate, is air strikes, these systems must have quite the direction in which Russia’s choice of a different rationale: the very presence of targets for its air operations has been these weapons systems acts as a “protective pointing from the start. shield” over the Russian and Syrian forces In an interview, President Putin declared in a specific area of western and north- that the goal of the intervention was to western Syria, because it represents a seri- stabilise what he deemed to be the legally ous danger to western combat aircraft. This recognised government in Damascus, and form of air superiority has an immediate create the preconditions for a political com- impact on the use of US and allied means promise in Syria. Until further notice, the for aerial warfare, and forces them to co- strategic goal is therefore to preserve an ordinate and de-conflict their own opera- Alawite “core Syria”. This has been achieved tions with Russia so as to avoid incidents inter alia by the creation of an undeclared, and even accidents. Examples of the new de-facto no-fly zone for the western anti-IS SWP Comments 48 November 2015 2 coalition over parts of Syria, whose effect will have to coordinate and de-conflict its was barely lessened by the Russian-Ameri- movements in Syrian airspace with Mos- can Memorandum on Air Safety in Syria of cow. That will make it more difficult in the 20 October. future for Israel to carry out air attacks, as The transfer of parts of the Russian it has occasionally done in the past with Black Sea fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, the aim of preventing Iranian arms deliv- which Moscow is considering, also serves eries reaching Hezbollah via Syria. On the this goal and could be interpreted as con- other hand, Israel now has a powerful con- tributing to an “anti-access/area denial” tact, should the future course of the war strategy, whereby other military forces are in Syria ever fundamentally affect Israeli prevented from invading an area of opera- security interests. tions or else have their operational freedom in a certain territory curtailed. On the political level, following the Conclusion Ukraine crisis, Russia appears to link its Russia’s engagement in Syria has taken the military intervention with efforts to make West by surprise, and substantially changed the international community see it as a the framework for the fight against IS and central actor in containing or even solving for containing the Syrian civil war. To what the Syria conflict. At the same time, Mos- extent this is also a setback for the fight cow is anxious to demonstrate, by building against IS in Syria (and in Iraq) depends on a counter-alliance with Syria, Iran and Iraq, the willingness of Russia and the US to co- that this alliance is more effective than the operate with one another in the coming US-led coalition and that, moreover, it has months. greater potential legitimacy since it is based Politically speaking, a series of assump- on initiatives by the respective governments tions underpinning the West’s Syria policy and includes local partners. The advantage have been made void by Russia’s military of the Russian position became evident on intervention, or need to be nuanced or 9 October, when the US government an- revised: nounced that it would discontinue its pro- 1. The premise of many western govern- gramme to train and equip Syrian rebels, ments that President Assad cannot play any which had only started in December 2014. part in Syria’s future political order is no In September, Washington had been forced longer sustainable. Despite the countless to admit that it had trained fewer than 50 human rights violations and war crimes, fighters to date, and announced that it and despite his responsibility for the exodus would concentrate instead on providing and expulsion of millions of Syrians, Assad support for existing groups already fighting will have to be accepted as a provisional IS in Syria. Thus, while Moscow has a mili- interlocutor by all those governments and tary partner “on the ground” in Syria, the internal opposition forces who count on international coalition – some parts of the Syrian civil war being containable with which are committed to fighting IS, others Moscow’s help.