ISSUE BRIEF 09.05.18 False Hopes? Prospects for Political Inclusion in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan Mustafa Gurbuz, Ph.D., Arab Center, Washington D.C. Among those deeply affected by the Arab i.e., unifying Kurdish cantons in northern Spring were the Kurds—the largest ethnic Syria under a new local governing body, is minority without a state in the Middle depicted as a dream for egalitarianism and East. The Syrian civil war put the Kurds at a liberal inclusive culture that counters the forefront in the war against the Islamic patriarchic structures in the Middle East.1 State (IS) and drastically changed the future U.S. policy toward the Kurds, however, prospects of Kurds in both Syria and Iraq. has become most puzzling since the 2017 This brief examines the challenges that defeat of IS in Syria. While the U.S.—to hinder development of a politically inclusive avoid alienating the Turks—did not object culture in Syrian Kurdistan—popularly to the Turkish troops’ invasion of the known as Rojava—and Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdish canton of Afrin, the YPG began Political and economic instability in both forging closer ties to Damascus—which regions have shattered Kurdish dreams for led to complaints from some American political diversity and prosperity since the officials that the Kurdish group “has turned early days of the Arab Spring. into an insurgent organization.”2 In fact, from the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Syrian Kurds have been most careful to not THE RISING TIDE OF SYRIAN KURDS directly target the Assad regime, aside from some short-term clashes in certain places The civil war in Syria has thus far bolstered like Rojava, for two major reasons. the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its First, given the common enemies of Political and economic political platform, the Democratic Union the Kurds and the Assad regime, Damascus instability in the region Party (PYD); these groups have received continued to pay the salaries of civil both U.S. and Russian military support. In have shattered Kurdish servants in PYD-controlled regions and order to placate Turkey—which declared the dreams for political pursued an accommodative policy.3 Rojava aforementioned groups as “terrorists” due diversity and prosperity has been immune from the regime’s air to their links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party strikes since the beginning of the Syrian since the early days of (PKK)—American officials called U.S.-YPG civil war. In addition, Damascus enabled the Arab Spring. relations “tactical,” “transactional,” and Rojava residents to enjoy access to central short-term; likewise, they also downplayed government services such as public sector the PYD’s links to the PKK. The threat of IS salaries, schools, health care, travel on has led the American media to reimagine civilian airlines, and the issuance of identity Kurdish fighters as the United States’ “best cards, passports, and property records. allies” with a secular and egalitarian Given the Assad regime’s resilience and ideology; this view is often presented with high likelihood of staying in power for the a juxtaposition of a “malevolent IS” and foreseeable future, Syrian Kurds will keep “freedom fighter women.” The Rojava project, RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 09.05.18 this strategy of realpolitik. In the words of out that Arab representation has increased PYD’s former co-chair Saleh Muslim, “The over time.9 At the leadership level, however, PYD is part of the Syrian revolution, but it is Kurds dominate the SDF ranks and pursue not prepared to be used as its soldiers.”4 an agenda of indoctrination. For example, Second, Syrian Kurds pragmatically used in a recent graduation ceremony of 140 PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s writings as Arab fighters joining SDF following a 45-day an asset to gain international recognition, training program, pro-PKK slogans such as blurring the line between separatism and “No Life without Our Leader!” were chanted local governance. While denying their as a pledge of allegiance.10 organizational links with the PKK, YPG Ethnic tensions mattered less when declared Ocalan as the group’s visionary there was a strong coalition between the leader. Ocalan’s idiosyncratic theories on Kurds and the Arabs against IS; some Arab Given the Assad “democratic confederalism,” “autonomy,” tribes sought revenge against IS, while and the “dangers” of the nation-state others have long been allied with the Assad regime’s resilience support Kurdish demands for autonomy regime. The post-IS era, however, has and high likelihood of in Syria while claiming that Kurds do not unleashed ethnic competition over limited staying in power for to pose a real threat to the Assad regime, local resources. the foreseeable future, as they do not seek independence. For One factor that drives tensions is the Ocalan, Kurds should not aim to establish an oil fields. Kurdish cantons include key oil Syrian Kurds will keep a independent nation-state structure because fields in southern Hasaka. The al-Shaddadi strategy of realpolitik. the modern nation-state is intrinsically oil fields, for example, are located in a top-down project that is based on predominantly Arab lands and are deemed homogenization and assimilation—what especially valuable for Rojava’s economic Kurds have suffered most in recent history.5 future. Before the Syrian civil war, Hasaka Ocalan argues that capitalism enforces “the and Raqqa provided almost two-thirds of centralization of the state” and fascism is Syria’s total oil extraction—251,000 out of the “purest form” of nation-states.6 Thus, 387,000 barrels per day.11 Syrian Kurds have tried hard to balance Oil revenue is already significant for ideology and political opportunity—and to Rojava’s economy and will be a major present their socialist worldview with an source of revenue if Kurds can initiate emphasis on democratic ideals that target a transactions with Damascus via the Western audience for support. original pipeline. Negotiations with the regime, however, may not ease Kurdish- Arab tensions as some of the local Arab THREATS TO POLITICAL INCLUSION tribes have long supported Damascus. In IN ROJAVA fact, during the 2004 Kurdish uprising in Qamishli, the Assad regime offered armed Despite the aforementioned factors in favor support to Arab tribes in Jazira—namely of what Syrian Kurds call “the Rojava project,” Adwan, Jabbour, Ougaidat, and Tay—to quell major challenges feed ethnic tensions between the riots.12 Despite the somewhat cordial the Kurds and the Arabs and, therefore, relations between Damascus and the Kurds threaten stability in northern Syria. during the civil war, the Assad regime aimed Being heavily Kurdish, the U.S.-backed to continue close relations with these Arab Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) currently tribes. When Kurds began offering higher have sway over 27% of Syrian territory in salaries to Arab locals after the SDF captured the north.7 In the Kurdish cantons of the lucrative oil fields, the regime did not eastern Euphrates, Kurds constitute only a hesitate to conduct air bombings of Hasaka slim majority of 55% and in some places in August 2016 to defend its public image as such as southern Hasakah, Kurds rule the arbiter of Kurds and Arabs.13 over the Arab-majority towns.8 The SDF’s In addition to oil, fertile agricultural land ethnic composition has long been a point of in the Jazira and Hasaka region may cause discussion in Washington, D.C.; U.S. officials mayhem if Kurdish authorities choose to have provided conflicting numbers, pointing redistribute land to attract thousands of 2 FALSE HOPES? PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL INCLUSION IN ROJAVA AND IRAQI KURDISTAN landless peasants. Before the civil war, the the ideology is particularly attractive to region produced 43% of Syria’s grains and Kurdish youths due to its Kurdish nationalist 80% of its cotton.14 Although the region is flavor, which does not resonate with considered Syria’s food basket, the Assad Arabs.17 Moreover, the Arab tribes’ fear regime did not invest in it when farmers of Kurdish irredentism will be reinforced faced severe water shortages in the past two as long as the SDF structure facilitates decades. Years of drought and increasing indoctrination of PKK ideology. The Syrian consumption of water on the Turkish side regime’s “Arabization” policies since the pressured the farmers whose traditional 1970s have changed the demographics agricultural practices such as gravity feed of the region; therefore, the Arab tribes’ systems demand extremely high water anxiety regarding the “re-Kurdification” of usage. The regime promised to develop Rojava under YPG rule is not baseless. The modernized irrigation techniques following YPG’s earlier practice of forced conscription the 2004 Kurdish revolt, but this was of Arab boys and girls (under the age of 18) never implemented. According to Fabrice is still fresh in the memories of local Arabs.18 Balanche’s research based on French Ministry of Agriculture statistics, the Hasaka province witnessed a 25% decrease in cultivated areas THE RISE AND FALL OF IRAQI between 1995 and 2008, causing a steady KURDISTAN outflow of the region’s population into urban The Arab Spring and ensuing meltdown of centers such as Aleppo and Damascus.15 The the Iraqi security architecture have led to regime’s food and fuel policies—extracting dramatic changes in the fortunes of Iraqi maximum resources while deliberately not Kurdistan, which is the most thriving region establishing industries—were consistent over of the post-Saddam era. Kurdistan was often the years, making the region subservient to praised as a virtual island of stability—a the state. Thus, access to water and resources reference to its secular character and will remain as the key flashpoint in the Kurds’ immunity to Shia-Sunni sectarian tensions.19 relations with the central government.