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ISSUE BRIEF 09.05.18 False Hopes? Prospects for Political Inclusion in Rojava and Iraqi

Mustafa Gurbuz, Ph.D., Arab Center, Washington D.C.

Among those deeply affected by the Arab i.e., unifying cantons in northern Spring were the —the largest ethnic under a new local governing body, is minority without a state in the Middle depicted as a dream for egalitarianism and East. The Syrian put the Kurds at a liberal inclusive culture that counters the forefront in the war against the Islamic patriarchic structures in the .1 State (IS) and drastically changed the future U.S. policy toward the Kurds, however, prospects of Kurds in both Syria and . has become most puzzling since the 2017 This brief examines the challenges that defeat of IS in Syria. While the U.S.—to hinder development of a politically inclusive avoid alienating the Turks—did not object culture in —popularly to the Turkish troops’ invasion of the known as Rojava—and . Kurdish canton of Afrin, the YPG began Political and economic instability in both forging closer ties to —which regions have shattered Kurdish dreams for led to complaints from some American political diversity and prosperity since the officials that the Kurdish group “has turned early days of the . into an insurgent organization.”2 In fact, from the beginning of the , Syrian Kurds have been most careful to not THE RISING TIDE OF SYRIAN KURDS directly target the Assad regime, aside from some short-term clashes in certain places The civil war in Syria has thus far bolstered like Rojava, for two major reasons. the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its First, given the common enemies of Political and economic political platform, the Democratic Union the Kurds and the Assad regime, Damascus instability in the region Party (PYD); these groups have received continued to pay the salaries of civil both U.S. and Russian military support. In have shattered Kurdish servants in PYD-controlled regions and order to placate —which declared the dreams for political pursued an accommodative policy.3 Rojava aforementioned groups as “terrorists” due diversity and prosperity has been immune from the regime’s air to their links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party strikes since the beginning of the Syrian since the early days of (PKK)—American officials called U.S.-YPG civil war. In addition, Damascus enabled the Arab Spring. relations “tactical,” “transactional,” and Rojava residents to enjoy access to central short-term; likewise, they also downplayed government services such as public sector the PYD’s links to the PKK. The threat of IS salaries, schools, health care, travel on has led the American media to reimagine civilian airlines, and the issuance of identity Kurdish fighters as the ’ “best cards, passports, and property records. allies” with a secular and egalitarian Given the Assad regime’s resilience and ideology; this view is often presented with high likelihood of staying in power for the a juxtaposition of a “malevolent IS” and foreseeable future, Syrian Kurds will keep “freedom fighter women.” The Rojava project, RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 09.05.18

this strategy of realpolitik. In the words of out that Arab representation has increased PYD’s former co-chair Saleh Muslim, “The over time.9 At the leadership level, however, PYD is part of the Syrian revolution, but it is Kurds dominate the SDF ranks and pursue not prepared to be used as its soldiers.”4 an agenda of indoctrination. For example, Second, Syrian Kurds pragmatically used in a recent graduation ceremony of 140 PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s writings as Arab fighters joining SDF following a 45-day an asset to gain international recognition, training program, pro-PKK slogans such as blurring the line between and “No Life without Our Leader!” were chanted local governance. While denying their as a pledge of allegiance.10 organizational links with the PKK, YPG Ethnic tensions mattered less when declared Ocalan as the group’s visionary there was a strong coalition between the leader. Ocalan’s idiosyncratic theories on Kurds and the against IS; some Arab Given the Assad “,” “autonomy,” tribes sought revenge against IS, while and the “dangers” of the nation-state others have long been allied with the Assad regime’s resilience support Kurdish demands for autonomy regime. The post-IS era, however, has and high likelihood of in Syria while claiming that Kurds do not unleashed ethnic competition over limited staying in power for to pose a real threat to the Assad regime, local resources. the foreseeable future, as they do not seek independence. For One factor that drives tensions is the Ocalan, Kurds should not aim to establish an oil fields. Kurdish cantons include key oil Syrian Kurds will keep a independent nation-state structure because fields in southern Hasaka. The al-Shaddadi strategy of realpolitik. the modern nation-state is intrinsically oil fields, for example, are located in a top-down project that is based on predominantly Arab lands and are deemed homogenization and assimilation—what especially valuable for Rojava’s economic Kurds have suffered most in recent history.5 future. Before the Syrian civil war, Hasaka Ocalan argues that capitalism enforces “the and provided almost two-thirds of centralization of the state” and fascism is Syria’s total oil extraction—251,000 out of the “purest form” of nation-states.6 Thus, 387,000 barrels per day.11 Syrian Kurds have tried hard to balance Oil revenue is already significant for ideology and political opportunity—and to Rojava’s economy and will be a major present their socialist worldview with an source of revenue if Kurds can initiate emphasis on democratic ideals that target a transactions with Damascus via the Western audience for support. original pipeline. Negotiations with the regime, however, may not ease Kurdish- Arab tensions as some of the local Arab THREATS TO POLITICAL INCLUSION tribes have long supported Damascus. In IN ROJAVA fact, during the 2004 Kurdish uprising in , the Assad regime offered armed Despite the aforementioned factors in favor support to Arab tribes in Jazira—namely of what Syrian Kurds call “the Rojava project,” Adwan, Jabbour, Ougaidat, and Tay—to quell major challenges feed ethnic tensions between the riots.12 Despite the somewhat cordial the Kurds and the Arabs and, therefore, relations between Damascus and the Kurds threaten stability in northern Syria. during the civil war, the Assad regime aimed Being heavily Kurdish, the U.S.-backed to continue close relations with these Arab (SDF) currently tribes. When Kurds began offering higher have sway over 27% of Syrian territory in salaries to Arab locals after the SDF captured the north.7 In the Kurdish cantons of the lucrative oil fields, the regime did not eastern , Kurds constitute only a hesitate to conduct air bombings of Hasaka slim majority of 55% and in some places in 2016 to defend its public image as such as southern Hasakah, Kurds rule the arbiter of Kurds and Arabs.13 over the Arab-majority towns.8 The SDF’s In addition to oil, fertile agricultural land ethnic composition has long been a point of in the Jazira and Hasaka region may cause discussion in Washington, D.C.; U.S. officials mayhem if Kurdish authorities choose to have provided conflicting numbers, pointing redistribute land to attract thousands of 2 FALSE HOPES? PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL INCLUSION IN ROJAVA AND IRAQI KURDISTAN

landless peasants. Before the civil war, the the ideology is particularly attractive to region produced 43% of Syria’s grains and Kurdish youths due to its Kurdish nationalist 80% of its cotton.14 Although the region is flavor, which does not resonate with considered Syria’s food basket, the Assad Arabs.17 Moreover, the Arab tribes’ fear regime did not invest in it when farmers of Kurdish will be reinforced faced severe water shortages in the past two as long as the SDF structure facilitates decades. Years of drought and increasing indoctrination of PKK ideology. The Syrian consumption of water on the Turkish side regime’s “” policies since the pressured the farmers whose traditional 1970s have changed the demographics agricultural practices such as gravity feed of the region; therefore, the Arab tribes’ systems demand extremely high water anxiety regarding the “re-” of usage. The regime promised to develop Rojava under YPG rule is not baseless. The modernized irrigation techniques following YPG’s earlier practice of forced conscription the 2004 Kurdish revolt, but this was of Arab boys and girls (under the age of 18) never implemented. According to Fabrice is still fresh in the memories of local Arabs.18 Balanche’s research based on French Ministry of Agriculture statistics, the Hasaka province witnessed a 25% decrease in cultivated areas THE RISE AND FALL OF IRAQI between 1995 and 2008, causing a steady KURDISTAN outflow of the region’s population into urban The Arab Spring and ensuing meltdown of centers such as and Damascus.15 The the Iraqi security architecture have led to regime’s food and fuel policies—extracting dramatic changes in the fortunes of Iraqi maximum resources while deliberately not Kurdistan, which is the most thriving region establishing industries—were consistent over of the post-Saddam era. Kurdistan was often the years, making the region subservient to praised as a virtual island of stability—a the state. Thus, access to water and resources reference to its secular character and will remain as the key flashpoint in the Kurds’ immunity to Shia-Sunni sectarian tensions.19 relations with the central government. The 2011 protests inspired It is unclear how the local population by the Arab uprisings, however, revealed will perceive the redistribution of land under institutional fragility. To quell the protests, the YPG. The YPG believes in a communal the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) system of government that provides food approved a parliamentary bill that consisted and fuel security and education through of 17 points of agreement between the The Arab Spring and local councils. The communes take care of government and the opposition, including a most functions of a modern state; in many ensuing meltdown promise for structural economic reforms and ways, local autonomy in Rojava appears to of the Iraqi security to fight against cronyism and corruption.20 constitute a type of socialist revolution. Some The institutional problems, however, architecture have led local residents, however, have begun to raise have remained a major problem.21 Although to dramatic changes concerns, complaining about the decision- the KRG has introduced some measures in the fortunes of Iraqi making authority and unaccountability for accountability in the oil sector, the of YPG leaders.16 There is also criticism Kurdistan, which is the opposition has claimed such steps are of YPG’s strict budgetary control over the most thriving region of too little too late. Iraqi Kurdistan faced a communes and its practice of channeling major danger when IS directly threatened the post-Saddam era. funds and humanitarian aid in exchange to invade . The war against IS caused for the recipients’ loyalty to its authority. not only a shrinking economy but also a For dissident Kurds, such problems may domestic refugee flow: internally displaced be a failure of the YPG’s socialist ideology; people now represent one-third of however, for dissident Arabs, such conditions Kurdistan’s population of 5.2 million.22 Mass are also seen through an ethnic lens—that is, outrage about the economic downturn the failure of Kurdish rule. grew as the KRG failed to properly pay public The YPG’s ideology may on occasion employees and unconstitutionally postponed appeal to anti-establishment Arab youths presidential elections several times.23 who are alienated from their tribes; however, 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 09.05.18

As the IS threat vanished, the KRG’s representative committee to pursue push for an independence referendum in negotiations with Baghdad until the Kurdish September 2017 was a major gamble. On parliamentary elections, scheduled for one hand, it could boost the ruling elite’s September 30, 2018. legitimacy and authority—and indeed, By pitting opposition-stronghold the referendum galvanized Sulaymaniyah against Erbil—the seat of the sentiment among and beyond. government and home to —Baghdad On the other hand, failure could seriously will continue to benefit from the intra- undermine the KRG’s legitimacy. High Kurdish divide. Kurdistan’s multifaceted emotions turned into major frustrations and structural problems signal major future when the Iraqi military undertook operations challenges and vulnerability of the region to in the territories around , areas of outside interference. dispute between the KRG and the central government in Baghdad in the immediate aftermath of the referendum. The Kurdistan POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR region not only lost massive oil revenues but WASHINGTON also faced an economic embargo, including In the post-Arab Spring era, Kurds have the blockade of international flights that was become a critical player for U.S. policy imposed by the central government.24 toward Syria and Iraq. In Syria, a key In Syria, a key question Specifically, after the loss of Kirkuk to question for Washington is how to maintain for Washington is how Baghdad, the KRG’s oil production fell from political inclusion under the SDF structure. 550,000 to 250,000 barrels per day.25 The to maintain political In immediate danger is the Kurdish-Arab dire outcomes have led the ruling parties inclusion under the SDF alliance in the absence of a front line against to accuse each other of treason, while IS. In Iraq, the United States should also structure. In Iraq, the opposition parties forcefully demanded the focus on political inclusion and therefore U.S. should focus on resignation of the government. In a historic help Kurds to achieve structural reforms in decision and with deep embarrassment, political inclusion and political accountability, economic resilience, left the presidential office in therefore help Kurds and transparency in the oil sector. The lack November 2017. to achieve reforms in of U.S. support on these issues will imperil In December 2017, protests, thousands stability in the region. political accountability, strong, once again rocked Sulaymaniyah Ensuring political inclusion will be a economic resilience, and . In clashes with security forces, daunting task for the U.S. officials in Rojava, five protesters lost their lives and a hundred and transparency in especially due to Turkey’s open war against were wounded. Given that protesters set fire the oil sector. the Syrian Kurds. Washington took a positive to the offices of the ruling parties, namely step in supporting Arab local representation Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) by helping to establish a new political party, and the late Iraqi President Talabani’s the Future Syria Party, to shape Raqqa’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdish future with its inclusive motto, “Democratic, authorities justified their harsh measures Pluralistic, Decentralized Syria.”27 Turkish on security grounds. The crackdown on the officials, however, were quick to express opposition media was particularly violent, their cynicism—they perceived it as yet with hundreds arrested.26 another PKK-led organization with a new The Sulaymaniyah protests revealed a brand name.28 Once the Islamic State’s deep split in Iraqi Kurdistan following the capital, Raqqa is now under SDF rule, but independence referendum. The Kurdish how Kurdish leaders will guarantee political opposition parties, specifically the Gorran inclusion where Arabs constitute majority Movement and the Kurdistan Islamic Group is a mystery. The assassination of Omar (Komal), have withdrawn their ministers Alloush, a key figure for reconciliation from the government. The opposition between Kurds and Arab tribes who served accused the KDP and PUK of failing the as a member of the Raqqa Civilian Council, nation before and after the independence is a recent example of targeted killings that referendum, demanding of the seek to exploit ethnic tensions.29 current cabinet and formation of a national 4 FALSE HOPES? PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL INCLUSION IN ROJAVA AND IRAQI KURDISTAN

Moreover, it behooves the Trump 8. Fabrice Balanche, Sectarianism in administration to pursue long-term Syria’s Civil War: A Geopolitical Study, The policy goals in Iraqi Kurdistan with an Washington Institute, 2018, p. 51. understanding that current instability in 9. Daniel Wilkofsky and Khalid , Iraqi Kurdistan is deeply related to the “Northern Syria’s Anti-Islamic State Coalition institutional problems of political inclusion. has an Arab Problem,” War on the Rocks, After the referendum fallout, Kurdish Sept. 18, 2017, https://warontherocks. prospects for have become com/2017/09/northern-syrias-anti-islamic- even more fragile due to Baghdad’s state-coalition-has-an-arab-problem/. “divide-and-rule” strategy toward the 10. For video footage of the ceremony, Kurds. Ad hoc deals by different Shia see https://twitter.com/NSO_SY/ leaders reaching out to various Kurdish status/975042465576210432, accessed actors with different forces August 27, 2018. invite further instability. Washington 11. David Butter, “Syria’s Economy: can helpfully remind the Iraqi central Picking up the Pieces,” Chatham House government that settlement on the Research Paper, June 23, 2015, pp. 15-16. disputed territories and other key issues 12. Balanche, Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil with Kurds cannot be peacefully resolved War, 89. without ensuring stability in Kurdistan. 13. Aron Lund, “Bombers over Hasakah: Assad Clashes with the Kurds,” Diwan, Carnegie Middle East Center, Aug. 22, 2016, ENDNOTES http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/64375. 1. See, for example, Wes Enzinna, “A 14. “Syria: Crop Progress Report,” U.S. Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard,” Department of Agriculture Office of Global Magazine, Nov. 24, 2015, Analysis, Jan. 24, 2009, https://ipad.fas.usda. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/ gov/pdfs/Syria/Syria_January2009_Monthly_ magazine/a-dream-of-utopia-in-hell.html. Report.pdf. 2. “YPG is Becoming an ‘Insurgent Group’ 15. Balanche, Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil in Syria: U.S. Senator Rubio,” Ahval News, War, 126. July 27, 2018, https://ahvalnews.com/pyd- 16. Dan Wilkofsky, “The Commune ypg/ypg-becoming-insurgent-group-syria- System: A Look at Local PYD Governance in us-senator-rubio. Northeastern Syria,” SyriaSource, Atlantic 3. Ghadi Sary, Kurdish Self-Governance Council, March 12, 2018, http://www. in Syria: Survival and Ambition, Chatham atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the- House Research Paper, Sept. 15, 2016, p. 14. commune-system-a-look-at-local-pyd- 4. Cengiz Gunes and Robert Lowe, “The governance-in-northeastern-syria. Impact of the Syrian War on Kurdish Politics 17. Rod Nordland, “Syrian Kurds: Across the Middle East,” Chatham House U.S. Allies, but Followers of Leader Research Paper, July 23, 2015, p. 5. Jailed as Terrorist,” The New York Times, 5. Abdullah Ocalan, Demokratik Uygarlık March 10, 2018, https://www.nytimes. Manifestosu: Ortadoğu’da Uygarlık Krizi ve com/2018/03/10/world/middleeast/syria- Demokratik Uygarlık Çözümü, Mezopotamya kurds-turkey-rojava-abdullah-ocalan.htm Yayınları, 2010, p. 195. l?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2F 6. Abdullah Ocalan, Democratic middleeast&action=click&contentCollection Confederalism, Transmedia Publishing, 2011, =middleeast®ion=stream&module=stre pp. 24-28. am_unit&version=latest&contentPl. 7. Josie Ensor, “U.S.-Backed Syrian Kurds 18. Abdullah Al-Jabassini, “Civil Meet with Regime for First Time in Hope of Resistance to Military Conscription in Kurdish Protecting Territory,” The Telegraph, July Areas of Northern Syria: The Untold Story,” 27, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ Journal of Peacebuilding and Development news/2018/07/27/us-backed-syrian-kurds- 12, no. 3 (Nov. 27, 2017): 104-110. meet-regime-first-time-hope-preserve/. 5 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 09.05.18

19. See, for example, Thomas L. 29. Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “Omar Friedman’s columns on Iraqi politics, Alloush—Murdered for Building a Shared including “The Kurdish Secret,” The Future for Syria’s Arabs and Kurds?” The New York Times, Sept. 2, 2007, https:// Defense Post, March 17, 2018, https:// www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/ thedefensepost.com/2018/03/17/omar- This issue brief is part opinion/02friedmancolumn.html. alloush-murder-turkey-syria-arabs-kurds/. of a two-year research 20. “Iraq’s Kurdistan Parliament project on pluralism in Introduces Changes,” E-Kurd, 25, 2011, https://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/ AUTHOR the Middle East after misc2011/2/state4721.htm. the Arab uprisings. Mustafa Gurbuz, Ph.D., is a nonresident 21. For a detailed account of institutional fellow at the Arab Center in Washington, The project is generously problems, see Kawa Hassan, “Kurdistan’s D.C., and an adjunct faculty member of the supported by a grant Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanistic Studies program at American System,” Carnegie Middle East Center paper, from the Carnegie University. He is the author of Rival Kurdish August 2015. Corporation of New York. Movements in Turkey: Transforming Ethnic 22. “Official: IDPs Make Up 35% of Conflict (Amsterdam University Press, 2016). Population,” Rudaw, Oct. 20, 2015, http://www.rudaw.net/english/ kurdistan/201020153. 23. Kamal Chomani, “To Prevent Violence, Kurdish Government Must Address Demands of Protesters,” The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, January 5, 2018, https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/ See more issue briefs at: to-prevent-violence-kurdish-government- www.bakerinstitute.org/issue-briefs must-address-demands-of-protesters/. This publication was written by a 24. Joost Hiltermann and Maria researcher (or researchers) who Fantappie, “Twilight of The Kurds,” Foreign participated in a Baker Institute project. Policy, Jan. 16, 2018, https://foreignpolicy. Wherever feasible, this research is com/2018/01/16/twilight-of-the-kurds- reviewed by outside experts before it is released. However, the views expressed iraq-syria-kurdistan/. herein are those of the individual 25. “KRG to Make More Salary author(s), and do not necessarily Cuts in 2018 after Losing Kirkuk Oil,” represent the views of Rice University’s Rudaw, http://www.rudaw.net/english/ Baker Institute for Public Policy. kurdistan/121220176. 26. “Journalists Arrested to Prevent © 2018 Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy Coverage of Iraqi Kurdistan Protests,” Reporters without Borders, Dec. 28, 2017, This material may be quoted or https://rsf.org/en/news/journalists- reproduced without prior permission, arrested-prevent-coverage-iraqi- provided appropriate credit is given to kurdistan-protests. the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. 27. “The Future Syria Party: A New Signal for the U.S.’ Syria Strategy?” TRT World, Cover image credit: March 30, 2018, https://www.trtworld.com/ AFP/The Telegraph mea/future-syria-party-a-new-signal-for- the-us-syria-strategy--16350. Cite as: 28. Dorian Jones, “Turkey Criticizes Gurbuz, Mustafa. 2018. False Hopes? Prospects for Political Inclusion in U.S. Support of New ‘Syria’s Future’ Political Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan. Party,” Voice of America, March 29, 2018, Issue brief no. 09.05.18. Rice https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey- University’s Baker Institute for us-tensions-over-ypg-syria-future- Public Policy, Houston, Texas. party/4322673.html.

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