Opportunities and Challenges in Rojava Democratic Autonomy

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Opportunities and Challenges in Rojava Democratic Autonomy PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE MIDST OF A WAR: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ROJAVA DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY By YASİN DUMAN Submitted to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Sabancı University Spring 2015 i ii © Yasin Duman 2015 All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE MIDST OF A WAR: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ROJAVA DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY Yasin Duman Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2015 Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik Discussions on political autonomies have been centered on two main arguments. Some argue that political autonomy is an effective conflict resolution mechanism especially in the settings where social, political, and economic conflicts are common and the autonomy seekers want a political and administrative resolution. De-centralization and power-sharing are two main pillars of political autonomies in which local citizens get the right to rule themselves with their own local resources without changing national borders of a state. Some others however discuss political autonomy as a conflict escalating tool, particularly, if an ethnic group has a strong motivation for independence and state-building. To this end, in the light of the existing literature on autonomy, this thesis investigates the nature of the Rojava Democratic Autonomy (RDA) declared in January 2014 in the midst of a civil war in Syria. In-depth interviews were conducted with the heads and deputies of official bodies and civil society organizations in Cezîre (Jazeera) Canton of RDA to investigate how they perceive both the past and ongoing socio-political and ethno- religious conflicts in Syria, and what strategies and policies they implement to resolve them. The thesis evaluates the resolution practices based on RDA’s relation with the Syrian government (national), regional and international powers (international) and with its civil society organizations (domestic). The thesis also discusses the RDA policies and strategies for solving the socio-political and ethno-religious conflicts through power-sharing and by providing group autonomies to all ethnic and religious groups based on the Social Contract drafted by members of all ethnic and religious groups in Rojava. Besides presenting these solutions, the thesis also discusses the already-existing problems as stated by the participants of this study. Keywords: Rojava Democratic Autonomy, Syrian Civil War, de-centralization, self- management, power-sharing, conflict resolution and peace iv ÖZET BİR SAVAŞIN ORTASINDA BARIŞ VE ÇATIŞMA ÇÖZÜMÜ: ROJAVA DEMOKRATİK ÖZERKLİĞİ’NDE OLANAKLAR VE ZORLUKLAR Yasin Duman Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2015 Danışman: Doç. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik Siyasi özerkliğe dair tartışmalar iki temel gruba odaklanmış durumda. Bir grup özellikle toplumsal, siyasi ve ekonomik çatışmaların yoğun ve özerklik talep edenlerin siyasi ve idari bir çözüm arayışında olduğu durumlarda siyasi özerkliğin etkili bir çatışma çözümü mekanizması olduğunu düşünmektedirler. Yurttaşların bulundukları yerelde kendilerini kendi kaynaklarıyla ve devletin sınırlarını değiştirmeden yönetme hakkını elde ettiği siyasi özerkliğin iki temel ayağı adem-i merkezileştirme ve güç paylaşımıdır. Diğer grup ise, özellikle bir etnik grubun bağımsızlık ve devlet kurmaya dair güçlü bir motivasyonu olduğu durumlarda, siyasi özerkliğin çatışmayı tırmandırma aracı olduğunu düşünmektedir. Özerklik literatürü ışığında, bu tez Suriye iç savaşının ortasında Ocak 2014’te ilan edilen Rojava Demokratik Özerk Yönetimi’nin doğasını incelemektedir. Suriye’de geçmişte ve şimdi yaşanan sosyo-politik ve etnik-dini çatışmaları nasıl algıladıkları ve bu çatışmaları çözmek için ne tür strateji ve politika uyguladıklarını incelemek için Cezîre Kantonu bakanları, bakan yardımcıları ve sivil toplum örgütü temsilcileriyle derinlemesine görüşmeler yapıldı. Bu çalışma, çözüm pratiklerini Rojava Demokratik Özerk Yönetimi’nin Suriye hükümetiyle (ulusal), bölgesel ve uluslararası güçlerle (uluslararası) ve sivil toplum örgütleriyle (dâhili) ilişkisi temelinde değerlendirmektedir. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda Rojava Demokratik Özerk Yönetimi’nin sosyo-politik ve etnik-dini sorunların çözümü için Toplumsal Sözleşme esasına göre özerklik içinde güç dağılımı ve Rojava’daki bütün etnik ve dini gruplara tanıdığı grup özerkliği çerçevesinde geliştirdiği politikaları ve stratejileri tartışmaktadır. Bu çalışma ayrıca katılımcılar tarafından dile getirilen hali hazırdaki problemleri de tartışmaya açmaktadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Rojava Demokratik Özerkliği, Suriye İç Savaşı, ademi-merkeziyetçilik, öz yönetim, iktidar paylaşımı, çatışma çözümü ve barış v Ji bo bîranîna cangoriyên azadiyê û rûmeta mirovahiyê vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik who supported, guided and encouraged me to complete the thesis. I am grateful for all the opportunities she provided me during my study. I would like to offer special thanks to the thesis jury members, Assist. Prof. Seda Altuğ and Assist. Prof. Özge Kemahlıoğlu, for their comments and critiques that helped me improve the thesis. I would like to thank journalists and reporters at Hawar News Agency and Ronahî TV who made it possible and easier to meet the interviewees. The academic staff and students at Mesopotamian Academy of Social Sciences also deserve to be acknowledged for hosting me during my field research. I also offer my special thanks to my journalist friend Evangelos Areteos who patiently read my thesis and provided feedback. I also acknowledge the financial support provided by TÜBİTAK during my graduate study. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. IV ÖZET .............................................................................................................................................. V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................................... VII TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... VIII LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... XI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... XII CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................... 4 2. 1. Autonomy and Autonomy Types ......................................................................................... 4 2.2 Autonomy in Conflict Resolution ........................................................................................... 6 2.3 Autonomy in Multiethnic and Multicultural Context ........................................................... 12 CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND OF THE KURDISH ISSUE IN SYRIA ................................ 16 3.1. Demography and Nationalism in Syria ............................................................................... 16 3.2. Civil War in Syria ................................................................................................................ 18 3.3 Kurdish Conflict: Borders and Ban on Political Activity ..................................................... 20 3.4 History of Mass Killings, Denial and Oppression of Kurds ................................................. 22 3.4.1 The Fire at the Amûdê Cinema ...................................................................................... 22 3.4.2 1962 Population Census and Stripping Civic Rights ..................................................... 23 3.4.3 2004 Qamişlo Uprising .................................................................................................. 24 3.5. Kurds in the Syrian Civil War ............................................................................................. 25 3.5.1. Declaration of Autonomy in 2014 ................................................................................ 27 3.5.2 Civil Society Organization in the RDA ......................................................................... 29 3.5.2.1. Commune System .................................................................................................. 30 3.5.2.2. People’s Assemblies and People’s Municipalities ................................................ 31 3.5.2.3. People’s Houses ..................................................................................................... 32 3.5.2.4. Women’s Houses ................................................................................................... 33 3.5.2.5. Unions .................................................................................................................... 34 3.5.2.6. Academies ............................................................................................................. 34 3.5.2.7. Martyrs’ Families Institution ................................................................................. 36 3.5.2.8. Peace and Reconciliation Commissions (PRCs) ................................................... 36 viii 3.6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................
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