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Key actors and abbreviations The Assad regime and its allies ‘The regime’ Bashar al-Assad, Syrian President 2000– Hafez al-Assad, Syrian President 1971–2000 Asma al-Assad (née Akhras), Syria’s First Lady 2000– Maher al-Assad, brother of Bashar al-Assad, Commander of Republican Guard and 4th Armoured Division Anisa Makhlouf, mother of Bashar al-Assad Assif Shawkat, brother-in-law of Bashar al-Assad, head of military intelligence 2005–9, deputy minister of defence 2011–12 Rami Makhlouf, cousin of Bashar al-Assad, wealthy businessman Manaf Tlass, Republican Guard General, defected 2012 Farouk al-Sharaa, First Vice President of Syria 2006– Walid al-Muallem, Foreign Minister 2006– Bouthaina Shabaan, political and media adviser to the Syrian President 2008– Ba’ath – Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the ruling party of Syria since 1963 Mukhabarat – Set of notorious regime intelligence agencies Shabiha – Gangs of irregular pro-regime thugs NDF – National Defence Force, formed 2013 Russia Vladimir Putin, Russian President 2000–8, 2012–, Russian Prime Minister 2008–12 Dmitri Medvedev, Russian President 2008–12, Russian Prime Minister 2012–20 Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister 2004– Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Foreign Minister 2011– Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran 1989– xii 5146.indd xii 19/06/20 5:00 PM KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS xiii Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranian President 2005–13 Hassan Rouhani, Iranian President 2013– Ali Akbar Salehi, Foreign Minister 2010–13 Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister 2013– Qassem Suleimani, Commander of the Quds Force 1998–2020 IRGC – Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force – Special forces unit of IRGC Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah Secretary General 1992– The Assad regime’s opponents ‘The opposition’ Political SNC – Syrian National Council, formed 2011 SOC – The National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, formed 2012 LCCs – Local Coordination Committees (tansiqiyat), formed 2011 MB – The Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian branch formed 1940 NCB – National Coordination Body for Democratic Change, formed 2011 HNC – Higher Negotiations Committee, formed 2015 Burhan Ghalioun, President of SNC 2011–12 Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, President of SOC 2012–13 Riad Seif, Vice President of SOC 2012–17, President of SOC 2017–18 Suhair Atassi, Vice President of SOC 2012–13 Ghassan Hitto, Prime Minister of SOC, March–September 2013 Ahmed Jarba, President of SOC 2013–14 Hadi al-Bahra, President of SOC 2014–15 Khaled Koja, President of SOC 2015–16 Anas al-Abdeh, President of SOC 2016–17, 2019– Michel Kilo, veteran oppositionist affiliated with Damascus Declaration, SNC and SOC Haytham Manna, leftist veteran oppositionist, joint founder of NCB Mahmoud Farouq Tayfour, MB’s Second Deputy Riad Hijab, head of HNC 2015– Armed FSA – Free Syrian Army, formed 2011 FSA–SMC – Free Syrian Army Supreme Military Council, formed 2012 5146.indd xii 19/06/20 5:00 PM 5146.indd xiii 19/06/20 5:00 PM xiv KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS SILF – Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, active 2012–13 SIF – Syrian Islamic Front, active 2012–13 Islamic Front, active 2013–15 The Southern Front, formed 2014 Jaysh al-Fateh (Army of Conquest), formed 2015 National Army or Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (TFSA), formed 2017 Riad al-Asaad, founder and commander of FSA 2011–12 Selim Idriss, commander of FSA–SMC 2012–14 Hassan Abboud, founder of Ahrar al-Sham, active 2011–14 Zahran Alloush, founder of Jaysh al-Islam, active 2011–15 Leading jihadists ISIS ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Greater Syria), also known as Islamic State, ISIL, Da’ash, adopted name 2013 ISI – Islamic State in Iraq, ISIS forerunner, active 2006–13 AQI – al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISI forerunner, active 2004–6 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of ISIS and its predecessors 2010–19 Jabhat al-Nusra Jabhat al-Nusra, active 2011–16 Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, rebranded name for Nusra 2016–17 HTS, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, new coalition dominated by Nusra, formed 2017 Abu-Mohammad al-Jolani, founder and leader of Nusra/HTS 2011– Kurdish forces KNC – Kurdish National Council PYD – Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) YPG – People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel), the PYD’s militia SDF – Syrian Democratic Forces, mixed Arab/Kurdish fighting group aligned with PYD KRG – Kurdistan Regional Government, mostly Kurdish autonomous region of northern Iraq PKK – Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê), Turkish Kurdish militant group Abdel Hakim Bashar, chairman of KNC 2011–, Vice President of SOC 2013– Salih Muslim, chairman of PYD 2010–17 5146.indd xiv 19/06/20 5:00 PM KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS xv Massoud Barzani, President of KRG 2005–17 Mazlum Kobane Abdi, Commander in Chief of the SDF, 2015– United States and Western allies United States Barack Obama, US President 2009–16 Joe Biden, US Vice President 2009–16 Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State 2009–13 John Kerry, US Secretary of State 2013–17 Robert Gates, Defense Secretary 2006–11 Chuck Hagel, Defense Secretary 2013–15 Ash Carter, Defense Secretary 2015–16 Samantha Power, Special Assistant to the President, National Security Council 2009–13, Ambassador to the UN 2013–16 Susan Rice, Ambassador to the UN 2009–13, National Security Advisor 2013–16 Thomas Donilon, National Security Advisor 2010–13 Denis McDonough, Deputy National Security Advisor 2010–13, White House Chief of Staff 2013–16 Ben Rhodes, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speechwriting 2009–16 John Brennan, Homeland Security Advisor 2009–13, CIA Director 2013–16 Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011–15 Tony Blinken, Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President 2009–13 Robert Ford, US Ambassador to Syria 2011–14 Donald Trump, US President 2017– Mike Pence, US Vice President 2017– Rex Tillerson, US Secretary of State 2017–18 James Mattis, Defense Secretary 2017–18 Nikki Haley, Ambassador to the UN 2017–18 H.R. McMaster, National Security Advisor 2017–18 Brett McGurk, Special envoy for the anti-ISIS coalition 2015–18 John Bolton, National Security Advisor 2018–19 Key Europeans Nicolas Sarkozy, French President 2007–12 François Hollande, French President 2012–17 Eric Chevallier, French Ambassador to Syria, 2009–14 David Cameron, British Prime Minister 2010–16 5146.indd xiv 19/06/20 5:00 PM 5146.indd xv 19/06/20 5:00 PM xvi KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS William Hague, British Foreign Secretary 2010–14 Simon Collis, British Ambassador to Syria, 2007–12 Angela Merkel, German Chancellor 2005– Saudi Arabia Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, King of Saudi Arabia 2005–15 Salman bin Abdulaziz, King of Saudi Arabia 2015– Nayef bin Abdulaziz, Interior Minister 1975–2012, Crown Prince 2011–12 Saud Al Faisal bin Abdulaziz, Foreign Minister 1975–2015 Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz, Interior Minister 2012–17, Crown Prince 2015–17 Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz, Director General of the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Agency 2012–14 Mutaib bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, Chief of National Guard 2010–13, Minister of National Guard 2013–17 Muqrin bin Abdulaziz, Director General of Saudi Intelligence Agency 2005– 12, Crown Prince January–April 2015 Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, Minister of Defence 2015–, Deputy Crown Prince 2015–17, Crown Prince 2017– Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani, Emir of Qatar 1995–13 Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, Emir of Qatar 2013– Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, Foreign Minister 1992–2013, Prime Minister 2007–13 Yusuf Qaradawi, al-Jazeera presenter affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister 2003–14, Turkish President 2014– Ahmet Davutoğlu, Foreign Minister 2009–14, Turkish Prime Minister 2014–16 Hakan Fidan, head of MİT 2010– AKP – Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) MİT – National Intelligence Organisation (Milli İstihbarat Teșkilatı) Israel Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister 2009– Ehud Barak, Defence Minister 2007–13 Moshe ‘Bogie’ Yaalon, Defence Minister 2013–16 Avigdor Lieberman, Foreign Minister 2009–12, 2013–15 5146.indd xvi 19/06/20 5:00 PM KEY ACTORS AND ABBREVIATIONS xvii China Hu Jintao, Chinese President 2003–13 Xi Jinping, Chinese President 2013– The United Nations UNSMIS – United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria, April–August 2012 UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary General 2007–16 Kofi Annan, Joint United Nations and Arab League Envoy to Syria, February– August 2012 Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint United Nations and Arab League Envoy to Syria, 2012–14 Staffan de Mistura, Joint United Nations and Arab League Envoy to Syria, 2014–19 Geir Otto Pedersen, Joint United Nations and Arab League Envoy to Syria, 2019– 5146.indd xvi 19/06/20 5:00 PM 5146.indd xvii 19/06/20 5:00 PM.
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