“Leaving Them to Stew in Their Own Juice”

“Leaving them to Stew in Their Own Juice” US-Syrian Relations and the Lebanese Civil War,1981-1984 Magnus Seland Andersson Master’s Thesis in History – Institute of Archeology, Conservation and History – Faculty of Humanities University of OSLO Spring 2018 II “Leaving them to Stew in Their Own Juice” US-Syrian Relations and the Lebanese Civil War,1981-1984 III © Magnus Seland Andersson 2018 “Leaving Them To Stew in Their Own Juice:” US-Syrian Relations and the Lebanese Civil War, 1981-1985 Magnus Seland Andersson Cover photo: The National Security Planning Group discussing the Beirut barracks bombing, October 23rd 1983. Courtesy of Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum http://www.duo.uio.no/ Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo IV Summary US-Syrian relations in the first half of the 1980’s was dominated by the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). US involvement in the conflict started with the 1981 missile crisis in which a stand-off between the Phalange, a Christian Maronite militia backed by Israel, challenged Syria’s hold over the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. The Reagan administration saw Syria as a Soviet proxy, but there was no consensus on how to approach Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, or the Lebanese conflict. The US entered the stand-off as a mediator, concluding negotiations in late July 1981. But there was little follow-up between Syria and the United States. Instead, the Reagan administration consistently attempted to increase its cooperation with Israel in the Middle East, as well as that of other “moderate” Arab states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to combat the PLO, the US again inserted itself into the conflict as a mediator between Syria and Israel, and the PLO and the Lebanese to withdrawal of “all foreign forces” from the country. A multinational force (MNF) consisting US, French and Italian troops was inserted into Lebanon to oversee the withdrawal of the PLO in the summer of 1982. But Syria was deadlocked, refusing to withdraw before the Israelis had. The Israelis for their part refused without a “security zone” southern Lebanon, something which was anathema to the Assad regime. The US then tried to exclude Syria from negotiations on the future of Lebanon, but from outside the negotiations, the Syrians did their best to “spoil” the US-led mediations that would become the May 17th Agreement in 1983. By September 1983, the US and Syria was on a collision course over Lebanon. The MNF became a target of Lebanese groups backed by Syria, and after a car bomb destroyed the US Marine headquarters in Beirut in October 1983, the Reagan administration was faced with waning Congressional support for their presence in Lebanon. From After a failed air-raid on Syrian positions to “punish” the Syrians for their complicity in the attack on the Marines, Reagan was facing a defeat in Congress in early 1984. Fearing defeat in Congress, Reagan withdrew the Marines from Lebanon, and left the Lebanese civil war under Syrian suzerainty. V VI VII Preface This is my small contribution to never-ending discussions I’ve had friends about the Middle East and United States’ role in global politics over the years. Whenever someone has said something to the likes of “the Americans want this…” or “the Americans do this because of that…” I can finally answer confidently that “they did this” because of something I found in a document few people have even laid their hands on since the mid-1980s. When I started this project in 2016 I had no idea how it would turn out, and at the time of writing I still don’t. Without the help of some great people I have come to know, this project would never have been finished. I would first and foremost like to thank my supervisor Hilde Henriksen Waage for having put up with my never-ending questions and late email replies. Without Hilde and Toufoul Abou-Hodeib’s seminars what once were overlong and meandering drafts have become slightly less long and hopefully less meandering chapters. I would also like to thank all the other students those seminars as well. I would also like to thank all those who have been struggling with their own master’s projects here on the third floor of Niels Treschows hus here at Blindern. I would also like to thank Jim and Shirley for their hospitality during my stay in Simi Valley, as well as Kelley Gilliland who I randomly met on the bus from LAX to Van Nuys. Originally intent on borrowing a bicycle in the schorching heat of Simi Valley, Kelley took it upon himself to drive me to and from the Reagan Library for almost two weeks. A debt of gratitude is also owed to Astrid Greve, Martha Holmes and Oda Svisdal who all have jobs and lives of their own, but who’s input on my writing has been invaluable. I would also like to thank my family for, well, being my family. And finally, I would like to thank Teresa Southwell for making sure that I eat and sleep at correct intervals each day. Without you, I don’t even know where to start… Thank you for putting up with my nerdy interests and general weirdness. Magnus Seland Andersson Oslo, May 2018 VIII IX X Table of Contents 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 Trapped in Rhetoric of Escalation .......................................................................................... 1 Research Questions and Delimitations: Isolating Syria ......................................................... 2 US Middle East Policy ........................................................................................................... 3 The Institutions of American Foreign Policy ......................................................................... 6 Existing Theory ...................................................................................................................... 7 Foreign Policy Making in the Reagan Administration........................................................... 7 Primary Source Material ...................................................................................................... 10 Literature .............................................................................................................................. 11 2 Hafez al-Assad’s Syria ..................................................................................................... 15 From Penetrated State to Mukhabarat State ......................................................................... 15 The Challenges of Independence ......................................................................................... 15 The State Within the State: The Politicization of the Syrian Armed Forces ........................ 16 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba’ath Party ................................................................... 17 Syria and the Early Cold War .............................................................................................. 19 Pan-Arab Climax: The United Arab Republic and the Military Committee ........................ 20 The Ba’ath Party Seizes Power ............................................................................................ 21 Jadid’s Coup and the “Six Day Walkover” .......................................................................... 21 The Rise of Hafez al-Assad and the “Corrective Revolution” ............................................. 22 The 1973 October War: Assad’s Foreign Policy “Realism” ................................................ 23 “Pax Syriana:” Syrian Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War ........................................... 24 Outcast: Syrian Relations with the Soviet Union and Iran ................................................... 27 Going into the 1980s: Challenges at Home and Abroad ...................................................... 28 3 The “Strategic Consensus” and the Lebanese Missile Crisis .......................................... 29 The Phalange Enters Zahleh ................................................................................................. 29 The “Vicar of Foreign Policy:” Alexander Haig’s Troubled Tenure as Secretary of State . 30 The Situation in Zahleh Seen from Washington .................................................................. 31 Philip Habib Appointed as Special Envoy ........................................................................... 34 US Lebanon Policy: “Don’t Die, but Don’t Get Well Either” ............................................. 35 Habib in Damascus ............................................................................................................... 36 Contingency Planning in Washington: The “Regionalists” vs. the “Globalists” ................. 37 XI Was Assad Signalling Washington? .................................................................................... 39 The Saudi Backchannel and the Hama Rebellion as Leverage over Assad ......................... 41 The Road to a Cease-Fire: Was the “War of Katyushas” a Diversion? ............................... 41 Habib’s Stop-Gap Solution .................................................................................................. 44 Conclusion: Learning by Doing in Lebanon ........................................................................ 45 4 “Free of all Foreign Forces” ........................................................................................... 47 The Strategic Partnership with Israel ..................................................................................

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