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Why States Rebel Understanding State Sponsorship of Terrorism

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Why States Rebel Understanding State Sponsorship of Terrorism Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg Fakultät für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften Institut für Politische Wissenschaft Why States Rebel Understanding State Sponsorship of Terrorism Magdalena Kirchner Betreuer: Prof. Dr. Sebastian Harnisch Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Dr. rer. pol. eingereicht an der Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften der Ruprecht-Karls- Universität Heidelberg Heidelberg, im Februar 2014 ! Table of Content Tables _________________________________________________________________________ V Figures ________________________________________________________________________ VI Abbreviations __________________________________________________________________ VII 1 Introduction: Internationalizing intrastate conflict ................................................ 1 1.1 Why states interfere – an empirical puzzle __________________________________________ 1 1.2 State of research _____________________________________________________________ 3 1.3 Theoretical overview __________________________________________________________ 7 1.4 State sponsorship of terrorism ___________________________________________________ 9 1.4.1 Definitions ............................................................................................................ 9 1.4.2 Pyramid or rag rug? Patterns of sponsorship revisited ............................................ 12 1.5 Research questions __________________________________________________________ 17 1.6 Research design _____________________________________________________________ 18 1.7 Outline of the study __________________________________________________________ 21 2 Realist alliance theory and the quest for the optimum balance ................................. 23 2.1 Neorealism: A theory of foreign policy constraints ___________________________________ 24 2.1.1 Foreign policy in neorealism: Sealing Pandora’s (black) Box? ............................... 24 2.1.2 In-, not outside the box: Taking domestic politics seriously ................................... 25 2.2 Neoclassical realism: A theory of mistakes _________________________________________ 25 2.2.1 Neoclassical realism and the state ......................................................................... 26 2.2.2 Third World only? Neoclassical realism and regime vulnerability .......................... 28 2.3 “Whoe’er would form eternal bonds…” - Alliance formation ___________________________ 30 2.3.1 The external security dilemma ............................................................................. 31 2.3.2 The domestic security dilemma ............................................................................ 32 2.3.3 A simple equation? Costs and benefits of alliance formation .................................. 33 2.3.3.1 Tying the knot: Benefits of alliance formation .............................................................. 33 2.3.3.2 Fatal attraction: Costs of alliance formation ................................................................. 36 2.3.4 Conclusion: Alliance formation in a multifaceted security environment ................. 37 2.4 “… should weigh if heart to heart responds.” - Alliance management _____________________ 38 2.4.1 The alliance security dilemma .............................................................................. 38 2.4.2 How the security dilemma influences alliance management .................................. 39 2.4.3 Domestic politics in the alliance dilemma ............................................................. 41 2.4.4 Conclusion: Risk management in alliances ........................................................... 42 3 Realism and state sponsorship of terrorism ........................................................ 45 3.1 Informality and secrecy in alliance politics _________________________________________ 45 3.1.1 Formality: From shaking hands to signing treaties ................................................ 46 3.1.2 Publicity: Can a secret deter anyone? .................................................................... 47 3.2 When your best friend is said to be invisible: Non-state actors in alliance politics _____________ 48 3.2.1 Non-state actors in international politics ............................................................... 49 3.2.2 How terrorism affects national security ................................................................. 51 3.2.3 Shadow boxing? Realism and the war against terrorism ........................................ 53 3.3 Sponsorship as a functional equivalent to interstate alliances ___________________________ 56 3.3.1 What terrorist groups need support for ................................................................. 56 3.3.1.1 Hosting ...................................................................................................................... 58 3.3.1.2 Military support .......................................................................................................... 58 3.3.1.3 Financial support ........................................................................................................ 59 3.3.1.4 Endorsement .............................................................................................................. 59 I ! 3.3.2 A bird in a gilded cage: The alliance security dilemma from a terrorist perspective . 61 3.3.2.1 Costs of sponsorship for the supported group ............................................................... 61 3.3.2.2 When terrorists fall prey to international politics .......................................................... 62 3.3.3 State sponsorship and the security dilemma .......................................................... 63 3.3.3.1 Benefits of sponsorship ................................................................................................ 63 3.3.3.2 Costs of sponsorship ................................................................................................... 65 3.4 When do states decide to sponsor? _______________________________________________ 69 3.5 Sponsorship and the alliance dilemma ____________________________________________ 71 3.5.1 Abandonment risks in sponsorship relations ......................................................... 72 3.5.2 Entrapment risks in sponsorship relations ............................................................. 72 3.6 Sponsorship and the domestic alliance dilemma _____________________________________ 74 4 Research design: Assessing state sponsorship of terrorism ..................................... 77 4.1 Independent variable: Systemic incentives for alliance behavior _________________________ 77 4.2 Conditional variable: Domestic politics ___________________________________________ 80 4.3 Dependent variable: Sponsorship commitment ______________________________________ 82 4.3.1 Hosting ............................................................................................................... 83 4.3.2 Military support ................................................................................................... 84 4.3.3 Financial assistance ............................................................................................. 85 4.3.4 Endorsement ....................................................................................................... 85 4.4 The case of Syria ____________________________________________________________ 88 5 From joint defeat to open war: Syria & Fatah ..................................................... 93 5.1 Nature of the Sponsorship Dilemma _____________________________________________ 94 5.1.1 Drifting apart: The power imbalance between Syria and Israel .............................. 94 5.1.2 Bridging the gap? Fatah/PLO’s capacity as an ally ............................................... 96 5.1.2.1 Attacks against Israel .................................................................................................. 97 5.1.2.2 Support base ............................................................................................................... 98 5.1.2.3 Cohesion of command ................................................................................................ 99 5.1.2.4 Ability to escape or resist retaliation .......................................................................... 100 5.1.3 Severity of conflict .............................................................................................. 102 5.1.4 Availability of alternative allies ........................................................................... 104 5.1.5 Strategic interest in upholding the alignment ....................................................... 106 5.1.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 108 5.2 Domestic politics: The Struggle for Syria _________________________________________ 110 5.2.1 Ties that divide: Ba’thist factionalism and the struggle for Syria 1963-1970 ........... 112 5.2.2 One to rule them all: Asad’s consolidation of power 1970-1976 ............................ 118 5.2.3 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 122 5.3 Syria’s policy towards Fatah (1964-1976) ________________________________________ 124 5.3.1 Hosting .............................................................................................................. 124 5.3.2 Military support .................................................................................................
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