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The United States and Russian Governments Involvement in the Syrian Crisis and the United Nations’ Kofi Annan Peace Process

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The United States and Russian Governments Involvement in the Syrian Crisis and the United Nations’ Kofi Annan Peace Process ISSN 2039-2117 (online) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol 5 No 27 ISSN 2039-9340 (print) MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy December 2014 The United States and Russian Governments Involvement in the Syrian Crisis and the United Nations’ Kofi Annan Peace Process Ken Ifesinachi Ph.D Professor of Political Science, University of Nigeria [email protected] Raymond Adibe Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria [email protected] Doi:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p1154 Abstract The inability of the Syrian government to internally manage the popular uprising in the country have increased international pressure on Syria as well as deepen international efforts to resolve the crisis that has developed into a full scale civil war. It was the need to end the violent conflict in Syria that informed the appointment of Kofi Annan as the U.N-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria on February 23, 2012. This study investigates the U.S and Russian governments’ involvement in the Syrian crisis and the UN Kofi Annan peace process. The two persons’ Zero-sum model of the game theory is used as our framework of analysis. Our findings showed that the divergence on financial and military support by the U.S and Russian governments to the rival parties in the Syrian conflict contradicted the mandate of the U.N Security Council that sanctioned the Annan plan and compromised the ceasefire agreement contained in the plan which resulted in the escalation of violent conflict in Syria during the period the peace deal was supposed to be in effect. The implication of the study is that the success of any U.N brokered peace deal is highly dependent on the ability of its key members to have a consensus, hence, there is need to galvanize a comprehensive international consensus on how to tackle the Syrian crisis that would accommodate all crucial international actors. We recommended that there is need for a negotiated solution that will involve a compromise agreement by the conflicting parties on the basis of mutual consent since the zero-sum nature of the Syrian conflict in which both regime and its opponents seek total victory make political settlement elusive. Keywords: Annan Peace Process, Syrian Crisis, Strategic Interest, UN Security Council, Zero-Sum Game 1. Introduction Since taking office in 2000, President Bashir al-Assad has offered and retracted the prospect of limited political reform in Syria despite the serious socio-economic and political challenges that the nation of Syria face. As noted by Sharp and Blanchard (2012B), some of these challenges which include high unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, rampant corruption, lack of political freedom, and repressive security forces have fuelled persistent opposition to the Syrian authoritarian government. As unrest emerged in other Arab countries in early 2011, limited calls for organized reform protests in Syria failed, but the government torture of children involved in an isolated incident in the southern town of Dara’a in March 2011, provided a decisive spark for the emergence of demonstrations (Sharp and Blanchard, 2012B). The government use of force against demonstrators in Dara’a and later in other cities created a corresponding swell in public anger and public participation in protests. Faced with a vicious response by government forces, the initially nonviolent uprising has progressively changed into an armed rebellion and civil war between government forces loyal to President Assad and opposition forces led by the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a group made up of largely soldiers who defected from the Syrian army (Dunne, 2012). Nearly 70,000 people have died in the conflict to date, and one million refugees have fled into neighboring countries, with another 5,000 joining them everyday (Dunne, 2012). A UN estimate further suggest that two and a half million Syrians are internally displaced. The Syrian civil war has received significant international attention, and both the Syrian government and the opposition have received support from foreign powers. As noted by Dunne (2012), the Syrian crisis is no longer a confrontation between the rulers and the ruled, but a looming multilateral struggle between varying foreign interest with the very identity of Syria, and its future as a potential democracy at stake. 1154 ISSN 2039-2117 (online) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol 5 No 27 ISSN 2039-9340 (print) MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy December 2014 The uprising in Syria has provided an opportunity for both the United States and Russian governments to improve and consolidate on their bilateral relations with the country either through support or non-support for the embattled government. They see cordial bilateral relations with Syria as a means to further broaden and strengthen their spheres of influence in the Middle East. It is therefore not surprising that the United States and Russian governments have been very vocal foreign actors since the Syrian unrest began. While the United States’ support has been for the opposition group calling for President Assad to step down in order to usher in a transition programme, Russia, on the other hand, has supported many multilateral processes aimed at establishing a political transition in Syria, but has refused to back any demand for President al-Assad to step down as a pre-condition for talks (Dunne, 2012). Beyond rhetoric’s however, both the United States’ and Russian governments have made considerable efforts to provide strategic supports that will help advance and secure their interests in post–war Syria. The United Nations’ Security Council approval of the appointment of Kofi Annan as the U.N-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria signaled international commitment to resolve the Syrian crisis in a non-partisan manner, ruling out the possibility of any form of direct military intervention in support of any of the conflicting parties by the U.N. The aim of the peace deal brokered by Kofi Annan was to establish a long-term ceasefire that would support the opening of a national dialogue between the Syrian government and opposition groups on Syria’s political future (Sharp and Blanchard, 2012B). The Annan six-point peace plan specifically called for: • A Syrian–led political process to address the aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people; • A U.N–supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians; • All parties to ensure provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting; and to implement a daily two–hour humanitarian pause; • Authorities to intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily determined persons; • Authorities to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists; and • Authorities to respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully (www.un.org/news/ press/does/2012). However, the involvement of the U.S and Russian governments in the Syrian crisis have been on partisan basis with both nations reported to have provided various forms of financial and military assistance to the opposing actors in the conflict. These assistances were aimed at giving a comparative advantage to the group they align with in the conflict over the other. The partisan involvement of the U.S and Russian governments in the Syrian crisis meant that both governments, despite being permanent members of the U.N Security Council that sanctioned the Annan peace process, also adopted certain unilateral measures directed at giving an extra advantage to the party they aligned with in the conflict. This study therefore attempted an investigation of the effect of the divergence in the nature of the United States and Russian governments’ involvement in the Syrian crisis on the Kofi Annan peace process. 2. Theoretical Explanation on why the Annan Peace Process for Syria Failed The resignation of Kofi Annan as the UN-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria by the end of August 2012 as the Syrian government remained entangled in a violent conflict of survival with the opposition force led by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) signaled the collapse and failure of his peace process for Syria. The adoption of the two persons’ zero-sum model of the game theory in the analysis of the United States and Russian governments’ strategic and economic interest in Syria explains better why the Annan peace process failed. Plano and Riggs (1973:33) defined game theory as “a body of thought dealing with rational decision strategies in situations of conflict and competition, when each participant or player seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses”. Schelling (1960) defined game theory as the formal study of the rational, consistent expectations that participants can have about each other’s choices. Game theory is generally played according to what is called the minimax strategy. This implies that players try to minimize their maximum possible losses. Varma (1975) itemized the six fundamental features of game theory as: (i) Rational Behaviour; (ii) Strategy; (iii) Play-Off or Outcome; (iv) Rules of the Game; (v) Alliances; and (vi) Solution. In the two person’s zero-sum model of game theory, there are two plays and the gain of one equal the loss of the other. That is, the victory and loss always cancel each other out. The United States and Russian governments represent two rational actors engaged in a game of conflict and cooperation in the Middle East, and Syria in particular. The zero-sum nature of this conflict emanates from the fact that the U.S. gains in the Middle East, and Syria in particular strategically amounts to Russia’s loss. For instance, while regional stability of the Arab world is crucial to the U.S government in ensuring reduction and stability of global oil prices that beneficial to her as an oil importing nation, instability in the region however leads to soaring of oil prices in the global 1155 ISSN 2039-2117 (online) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences Vol 5 No 27 ISSN 2039-9340 (print) MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy December 2014 market, a situation favourable to Russia as an oil–exporting country.
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