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Home , 2014 Latakia offensive, Russian Air Force, Syrian Air

NR. 14 APRIL 2018 Introduction

Control of the Syrian Airspace Russian Geopolitical Ambitions and Air Threat Assessment Can Kasapoğlu

Russia has mounted its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) footprint in the Levant and also boosted the Syrian Arab Air Defense Force’s capabilities. Syrian skies now remain a heavily contested combat airspace and a dangerous flashpoint. Moreover, there is another grave threat to monitor at low altitudes. Throughout the civil war, various non-state armed groups have acquired advanced man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), which pose a menacing challenge not only to the deployed forces, but also to commercial aviation around the world. In the face of these threats, NATO needs to draw key lessons-learned from the contemporary Russian opera- tional art, and more importantly, to develop a new understanding in order to grasp the emerging reality in . Simply put, control of the Syrian airspace is becoming an extremely crucial issue, and it will be a determining factor for the war-torn country’s future status quo.

Russia’s integrated air defense footprint regard, advanced defensive strategic weapon in Syria was mounted gradually following systems, such as the S-400s and the S-300V4s, its intervention, which began in September were deployed to the Hmeimim Air Base. 2015. That year, the Armed Forces of the This formidable posture was reinforced Russian Federation established the Hmei- by high-end offensive assets, such as SS-26 mim Air Base in the Mediterranean gate- Iskander short-range ballistic missiles and way city of , adjacent to the Basel Su-35 air superiority fighters. In addition, al-Assad International Airport, named after Russian tactical (e.g., Su-34s) the late heir apparent of Hafez al-Assad. started carrying air-to-air missiles during their missions. Finally, the Krasukha-4 elec- tronic warfare system, which almost blinded Russia “Flying High” in the eastern , was also spotted in Syria Syrian Airspace in 2015. All in all, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the time, General When downed a Russian Su-24 Philip Breedlove, depicted the Russian aircraft in November 2015, efforts as an attempt to build an “A2/AD responded by beefing up its surface-to-air bubble” in the Eastern Mediterranean. missile (SAM) capabilities in Syria. In this

Strikingly, an engagement that took place would go well beyond “simple” military in late 2017 starkly illustrated the present modernization. Robust air defenses had status quo. On December 13, a US already transformed the Syrian skies from a F-22 stealth fighter deployed flares against permissive combat airspace into a contested two Russian Su-25s. While Washington ex- combat airspace. Such a shift could limit plained that it was the Russians who crossed Israel’s surgical interventions. This would over the east of the Euphrates, Moscow in- challenge “the Begin doctrine,” namely pre- sisted that the F-22 violated the de-conflic- venting hostile strategic weapons prolif- tion zone westwards, and an Su-35 air eration beyond borders, which culminated superiority fighter confronted it to protect with Operation Orchard, when Syria’s the two Su-25 . Regardless of secret nuclear reactor in Deir ez-Zor was which argument was accurate, the political- hit by the in 2007. military exchange highly resembled that Nevertheless, Israeli military planners of two neighbor states quarreling over a can come up with a solution such as using disputed national airspace issue. tactical ballistic missiles or guided rockets Furthermore, one particular incident to intervene in Syria. An alternative might encouraged the Russians to invest more be to assign the newly received F-35 stealth in the Syrian air defenses. On April 7, multirole fighters. However, the oppor- 2017, the US Navy’s USS Porter and USS Ross tunity to test new SAM systems on F-35s, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers struck Syria’s which will form the backbone of NATO’s al-Shayrat Air Base from the Eastern Medi- future tactical aviation, could whet the terranean waters with a salvo of 59 Toma- Russians’ appetite, and could lead to addi- hawk Land Attack Missiles. The attack came tional arms transfers to . In fact, after the regime’s chemical weapons use the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold in the town of Khan Shaykun, . At the War offered good opportunities to make time, the global defense community had a comparative assessments between Ameri- huge debate discussing whether the Russian can and Soviet weaponry. Moscow, having air and missile defense contingent was ca- already tested more than 200 new weapon pable of intercepting the incoming Toma- systems on the Syrian battleground, would hawk Block IVs or not, or whether Moscow not refrain from such a bonanza, which sent orders not to do so to avoid an esca- would also pave the way for further lucra- latory response. tive arms sales. Besides, since state orders Following the US strike, which targeted constitute a substantial proportion of the one of the most important bases of the Russian defense industry’s workload at Syrian Arab Air Force – where some Rus- present, Syria is serving as an important sian platforms were also deployed, but ap- reference for the Kremlin’s military mod- parently Moscow was warned right before ernization plans. the operation – the Russian Defense Minis- try bluntly announced its plans to bolster the Syrian air defenses. Some argue that “Minefields” at Low Altitudes: The the recent downing of the Israeli F-16I was Cases of the Su-25 and the T-129 a result of these efforts. As explained earlier, apart from the defen- sive strategic weapon systems risk at high- Downing of the Israeli F-16I: and mid-altitudes, the lower echelons of Putting an End to the Operation the Syrian airspace are also dangerous. Orchard Legacy? On February 3, 2018, on a mission in Idlib, a Russian Su-25 attack aircraft was A breakthrough in the Syrian Arab downed, allegedly by MANPADS fire. Hay’at Armed Forces’ air defense capabilities Tahrir al Sham, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, would produce key geopolitical results that claimed the responsibility.

SWP Comment 14 April 2018

2 MANPADS in the hands of terrorists Syria As a Military Testbed pose a grave threat not only to military platforms, but also to commercial aviation. All in all, there is a significant showdown These weapons are shoulder-fired missiles over the Syrian airspace, and the winner(s) – weighing some 15–20 kg – used will shape the country’s future. What did against low-flying aircraft. MANPADS tech- not happen in and around this airspace? Fol- nology has achieved impressive improve- lowing is a brief recap of the past six years. ments, in particular in the guidance sys- In 2012, a Turkish RF-4E Phantom tems and in avoiding countermeasures. reconnaissance aircraft was downed by the Depending on certain technical features, Syrian air defenses; in the same year, the a MANPADS’ engagement envelope – the rebels downed a Syrian Mig-23 fighter air- danger zone – is at an altitude of 10,000– craft at low altitude, marking the first 15,000 feet, and it has a range of 3 to 7 kilo- aircraft loss for the regime. Again in 2012, meters. the regime launched Scud missiles onto the It is estimated that up to 750,000 rebel positions in . Consequently, MANPADS might be present in the world. NATO deployed three missile defense con- Open-source intelligence suggests that a tingents in Turkey. In 2013, the Turkish Air broad array of non-state armed groups have Force downed a Syrian Mi-17 . managed to lay their hands on these danger- In 2014, an Israeli Patriot downed a Syrian ous weapons throughout the Syrian Civil Su-24 over the Golan Heights. In the same War. Interestingly, although many of the year, a Jordanian F-16 crashed near Raqqa Syrian Arab Army’s stockpiles were looted, – some claimed it was downed by ISIS – the types of MANPADS that Damascus did and the pilot was later executed, tragically. not possess, such as the Chinese FN-6, were In 2015, notably, a NATO nation, Turkey, also spotted in Syria, hinting at the possibil- downed a Russian aircraft violating its ities of a dangerous gray and black market airspace. Then, Russia established a robust flow. A2/AD posture in Syria. In the same year, The Turkish T-129 incident is another Assad’s forces allegedly downed an Ameri- case showing that flying at low altitudes in can MQ-1 Predator drone over Latakia. In the Syrian airspace resembles an infantry 2016, Russia sent the Admiral Kuznetsov air- platoon walking through a minefield. craft carrier to the Eastern Mediterranean On February 10, 2018, Turkey lost a T-129 for combat operations, which was a highly during Operation Olive symbolic move signaling to the West. In Branch. There is no visible sign of MAN- 2017, the hit Syria’s al-Shayrat PADS having been used in Turkey’s gunship airbase with Tomahawks, downed a Syrian crash. Yet, there is the likelihood that the Su-22 attack aircraft, and intercepted sev- attack helicopter might have been hit by eral Iranian drones. anti-aircraft gunfire. Finally, at the time of writing, a Russian In fact, rotary-wing platforms have Su-25 attack aircraft, an Israeli F-16I multi- become more vulnerable in contemporary role fighter, a Turkish T-129 attack heli- hybrid conflicts. Since Operation Iraqi Free- copter, and an Iranian surveillance drone dom in 2003, each loss has made helicopter were added to the record only within a survivability in modern warfare more ques- week. All of these incidents reveal the ten- tionable. Keeping these platforms safe in sion in the Syrian airspace. the 21st century’s contested airspaces is hard. After all, performing evasive maneu- vers while flying very low in order to avoid Key Takeaways and Policy MANPADS makes more prone to Recommendations anti-aircraft gunfire. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet solution for choppers, or Firstly, the Syrian skies can no longer be even for light attack aircraft. assessed through the lens of Operation

SWP Comment 14 April 2018

3 Orchard. Rather, Moscow’s A2/AD contin- the Baltic States might be worrying about gent in the country, which remains there have had their combat debuts in Syria. The to stay for at least half a century, along with Russian military-industrial complex is now the boosted Syrian air defense capabilities, able to test the detection and tracking have turned the country’s permissive air- limits of their radar systems, sensors, and space into a heavily contested one. Under integrated air defenses on various NATO air- these conditions, no Western aircraft – craft in the Syrian front. In addition, Rus- even the high-end stealth platforms such as sian military planners now better under- the F-22s and the F-35s – can fly confidently stand the comparative analyses between within the engagement envelopes of the SAM several key platforms, including the US Air © Stiftung Wissenschaft systems in Syria, let alone non-stealth ones. Force’s F-22s and the Russian Su-35s (and und Politik, 2018 Furthermore, Russia has come into the the recently deployed Su-57s), under real All rights reserved picture as the new boss in the Syrian air- battlefield conditions. space – definitely so in the western axis Consequently, NATO needs a holistic This Comment reflects of the country. For example, Ankara, being strategy to cover both flanks, and even the author’s views. a NATO member, had to pursue top-level more importantly, a thorough intelligence The online version of diplomatic talks with Moscow before effort to understand the real meaning of this publication contains launching Operation Euphrates Shield to Moscow’s military scorecard in Syria. After functioning links to other al-Bab, and to Afrin. all, open-source pieces of evidence suggest SWP texts and other relevant This tellingly sets forth the new strategic that, as of late summer 2017, the relatively sources. balance. Moreover, the Russian contingent’s small group managed to SWP Comments are subject A2/AD capabilities have provided it with the strike some 90,000 targets and flew approxi- to internal peer review, fact- key advantage of influencing the operational mately 28,000 missions with negligible checking and copy-editing. tempo of the during losses. According to Russian defense ex- For further information on cross-border campaigns. perts, this marked a true breakthrough, our quality control pro- The Syrian Arab Army vitally needs the keeping in mind that the Soviets lost one cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- Russian air cover and close air support to combat aircraft on average for every 750 berlin.org/en/about-swp/ operate, whereas the Syrian Arab Air Force sorties flown in Afghanistan. quality-management-for- and the Syrian Arab Air Defense Force Thirdly, despite the emphasis on stra- swp-publications/ strongly depend on the Russian defense tegic weapon systems, tactical game- industry to sustain their combat readiness. changers below 10,000–15,000 feet should SWP Strikingly, at the time of writing, the be monitored carefully, especially regarding Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik head of the State Duma Defense Commit- threats from terrorists and foreign fighters. German Institute for tee, Vladimir Shamanov, hinted at the pros- The efforts in hunting down the Libyan International and pects of denying the Syrian airspace to for- MANPADS following the 2011 intervention Security Affairs eign actors that did not receive permission were not effective. Some of these low-alti- from Damascus. Although it is not the offi- tude air defense weapons, or their compo- Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin cial stance of Moscow, yet, the idea was nents, were spotted across a broad axis, Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 speculated upon by one of the most influ- ranging from Mali to Egypt. Furthermore, Fax +49 30 880 07-100 ential figures of the Russian military estab- when it comes to Syria, we are talking www.swp-berlin.org lishment. Thus, the operational security of about advanced MANPADS. [email protected] Operation Inherent Resolve might become All in all, the geopolitical showdown problematic, should the tensions between over the Syrian airspace will determine the ISSN 1861-1761 the West and Russia continue to mount. future of the war-torn country, as well as Secondly, NATO’s decades-long dichoto- the further fallout for regional and global my of eastern and southern flanks has been security. militarily rendered abortive. Simply put, many of the Russian weapon systems that

Dr. Can Kasapoğlu is 2018 IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP. The Mercator IPC Fellowship Programme at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator.

SWP Comment 14 April 2018

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