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THE RUSSIAN AEROSPACE FORCE Nicholas Myers

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THE RUSSIAN AEROSPACE FORCE Nicholas Myers 3. ARMED FORCES, MILITRY TECHNOLOGY THE RUSSIAN AEROSPACE FORCE NICHOLas MYERS ABSTRACT DOI: 10.26410/SF_1/18/8 The Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) retains great ca- pabilities for both defensive and offensive operations. Despite difficulties acquiring 5th-generation stealth technology, the VKS has replaced aging Soviet jets with 4++-generation fighters and fighter-bombers such as the Su-34 and Su-35 that will continue to provide it a powerful edge over its immediate neighbours while it develops its space policy and completes the moderni- zation of its other services. NICHOLAS MYERS KEY WORDS War vs Peace Foundation, President, Russia, Air Force, Military Modernization, Space. The United States of America Since 1 August 2015, the Russian Fede- military infrastructure and to prevent at- ration has combined its Air Force with its tacks coming from air and space spheres7. Space Forces, creating the Aerospace The doctrine specifically requiresimproving Force1. In Russian, this is called the the systems available to the VKS during Vozduzhno-kosmicheskiesily,2 or VKS. The peacetime to fulfil these missions8. 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Fed- eration defines the main missions and The importance of the air responsibilities of both the air and space dimension dimensions3 not only as air-delivered deg- Doctrinally, the VKS is tasked with air and radation of a potential enemy,4 but also pro- space defence, communication systems, viding timely information of enemy threats5. intelligence assets, electronic warfare, un- Recognizing that modern warfare involves manned aerial vehicles, automatic weapon the entirety of the depth of the country’s systems, military transport aviation, and aerospace, the VKS possesses considera- personal protective equipment. These rep- ble early warning capacities on the ground, resent a rather large set of tasks, though in the air, and in space. The next mission only air and space defence and long-range is to provide security to critical civilian and military transportation aviation are exclu- “Russia establishes Aerospace Forces as new sively in the domain of the VKS. Russia armed service – Defense Minister,” TASS, 3 August faces numerous diverse threats against 2015, http://tass.com/russia/812184 [accessed: 10 October 2017]. which the VKS must prepare. Russian Воздушно-космическиесилы military expert Ruslan Puchow formulates Военнаядоктрина Российской Федерации (Mili- tary Doctrine of the Russian Federation), Mos- that Russia has problems almost from all cow 2 December 2014, section 15, 32, 35, and sides. Japan denies ownership of the Kuril 4,http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ 41d52755bec8deb3530.pdf [accessed: 17 Janu- Islands, the political system in China is get- ary 2017]. ting more unforeseeable; the withdrawal of Military Doctrine, Article 32.F. Military Doctrine, Article 32.D. Military Doctrine, Article 33. Military Doctrine, Article 15.C. Military Doctrine, Article 35.C. 92 3.2. ARMED FORCES, MILITARY TECHNOLOGY the US from Afghanistan could destabilize it across a country as enormous as Russia. the entire Central Asia. I do not know how Large-scale Russian military modernization the conflict with Ukraine will progress, and began in 2008 under former Defence Min- we must take this into account” Conse- ister Anatoly Serdyukov. Some 1tn roubles quently, Russia continues its force build-up (400bn Euro; 50 bln USD) were dedicated as it is “‘capabilities, not intentions’ which with the objective of keeping the military count” according to the traditional Rus- budget at 3% of GDP through 2020. Re- sian maxim10. Whereas other aspects of cent economic contraction has simplified Russian government spending have been this goal with 3.% of GDP spent in 201, cut due to its current economic woes, de- though this represented a slight reduction fence spending has been preserved from from the allocation in 201514. The Russian cuts as best as possible, only finally start- procurement plan envisions “100 military ing to reduce in 201711. Continued defence use space devices, more than 600 modern spending has been especially important aircraft, including 5th generation fighters, for the VKS as its programs are expensive over a thousand of helicopters, 28 regiments require long-term resources to preserve of air defence weapon system S-400, 38 bat- advantages over other major developing talions of air defence weapon system ‘Vityaz’, Asian nations. The operational acceptance and 10 brigades of theatre ballistic missile of China’s 5th-generation J-2012 before Rus- system Iskander-M”15 will be deployed, and sia’s Su-5713 has mounted concern about all of them meeting the requirements of the Russia’s traditional technological edge. future battlefield. To support the modernized Russian aerospace modernization is a of the air fleet, “about 50 military airfields priority within the Armed Forces, which bit- will be repaired and supplied with modern terly remember observing NATO air forces equipment in Russia by 2020” as stated by decimate the Yugoslavian and Iraqi mili- the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air taries in the years since the end of the Cold Force, Colonel General Viktor Bondarev1. War. Russia has also prioritized the VKS Such developments are causing some because of the huge firepower capabilities concerns in Europe, which is also strug- it possesses along with its ability to deliver gling with funding shortfalls. In Asia, major Rosja sięga po broń, (Russia grasps for weapon) military powers such as the PRC, India, and Rzeczpospolita, Portal BIZTOK.pl, Warsaw 08 Oc- Japan are increasing the speed of their mili- tober 2014, http://www.biztok.pl/gospodarka/rosja- siega-po-bron_a18031 [accessed: 08 October tary modernization and the US presence is 2017]. being reinforced. While some Asian nations 0 A. Calvo, No Place for China in Russia’s New Military Doctrine? 30 December 2014, http://www. are deepening their ties with the Kremlin, the academia.edu/Documents/in/Sino-Russian_Rela- general trajectory of military developments tions [accessed: 08 January 2017]. Alex Calvo is a guest professor at Nagoya University in Japan and in Asia worries the Russian leadership. member of the Center for International Maritime Se- curity. 14 IISS, The Military Balance, 2017, p. 210. 11 “Minfinpredlozhilsokratit’ byudzhetnyeraskhodyna 15 Владимир Путин: Бытьсильными: гарантиинацио 2018 god v ramkakhstat’I ‘Natsional’nayaoboron нальнойбезопасностидля России, (Vladimir Putin: a’,” VPK, 18 September 2017, http://vpk-news.ru/ to be strong: the guarantee of national security for news/3877 [accessed: 10 October 2017]. Russia) Российская газета 20 February 2012, http:// 12 “China’s J-20 fighter jet put into service,” Xinhua, www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html and also 28 September 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com. Russia plans $50bn defence spend up to 2020, cn/china/2017-0/28/content_320345.htm [ac- BBC News, 24 February 2011, http://www.bbc. cessed: 10 October 2017]. co.uk/news/world-europe-1257043 [accessed: 14 13 “V Minoboronynazvalisrokivnedreniyaseriynykh Su- September 2017]. 57 v armiyu,” RIA Novosti, 24 August 2017, https:// 16 Russia to upgrade 50 military airfields by 2020, ria.ru/defense_safety/20170824/150101574.html ITAR-TASS 11 August 2012, http://itar-tass.com/en/ [accessed: 10 October 2017]. russia/744503 [accessed: 14 September 2017]. THE RUSSIAN AEROSPACE FORCE 93 Contemporary Russian Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) An-0 Clank 4 Aerospace Force Equip- Su-24MR Fencer 79 ment Tu-214ON The current numbers in the VKS repre- Tu-214R sent a considerable overhaul of the quality Tankers of the aircraft deployed, though the over- Il-78/Il-78BM Midas 15 all numbers of combat aircraft continue to Airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) decrease overall. In 1991, the Soviet Union A-0/A-0U Mainstay 18 Command and control featured nearly 5,000 combat aircraft17. By Il-0 Maxdome 4 2017, the Russian Federation possesses Il-82 18 1,04 . The table below breaks down the Tu-214SR numbers for the individual platforms; the Transport numbers in [brackets] represent the gen- An-124 Condor (12); An-22 Cock (); 111 eration of the aircraft. Il-76MD/MF Candid (118) – heavy An-12/An-12BK Cub- medium 65 Table 1. VKS aircraft An-24 Coke (25); An-26 Curl (0); An-72 Coaler (15); An-140 (); L-410 Type of aircraft Total number 235 (0); Tu-134 Crusty (0); Yak-0 Co- Bombers dling (0) – light Tu-22M/MR Backfire C [] 63 Training Tu-95MS Bear [] 48 L-39 Albatros (190); Yak-130 Mitten 231 Tu-95MSM Bear [+] 12 (0) Tu-160 Blackjack [] 11 Source: The Military Balance 2017, the International Tu-160M Blackjack [+] Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, Fighters London 2017, p. 217. MiG-29/UB Fulcrum [] 70 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound [] 0 This table represents a broad standardi- MiG-31BM Foxhound [+] 0 zation of quality across the VKS that had Su-27 Flanker [] 0 been famously lacking during the Soviet Su-27UB Flanker [] 0 era. Whereas the Soviet Air Force and Air Fighter ground attack Defence Forces operated a range of air- MiG-29SMT Fulcrum [] 36 craft from outdated second-generation Su- MiG-29UBT Fulcrum [] 15 Flagons to MiG-31 Foxhounds in 1991, Su-27SM Flanker [] 47 today all aircraft are fourth-generation or Su-27SM Flanker [] 14 better. Nevertheless, efforts to reach the Su-27SM Flanker [] 0 stealth requirement of the “fifth-generation” Su-0M Flanker-C [] 0 Su-0SM Flanker-C [+] 62 have been long-delayed in Russia, as not- Su-34 Fullback [++] 86 ed above. This has forced Russian propa- Su-35S Flanker [++] 52 ganda to extol the equalizing effects of their Attack/ground attack technological advances without achieving Su-24M/M Fencer [] 100 stealth, requiring the invention of the term Su-25 Frogfoot [] 0 “4++ generation.”1 Su-25SM/SMFrogfoot [+] 140 Nevertheless, VKS assets are also nota- Su-25UB Frogfoot [] 15 ble in how much equipment is still held over Electronic intelligence 19 “Equalizer: How a Russian 4th Gen Su-35S Will Be Il-22 Coot B 32 Able to Defeat 5th Gen F-22s,” Sputnik, 14 June 17 IISS, The Military Balance, 1991, p.
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