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The August 6 Bombing Incident in Georgia: Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Region

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The August 6 Bombing Incident in Georgia: Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Region The August 6 Bombing Incident in Georgia: Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Region Svante E. Cornell David J. Smith S. Frederick Starr SILK ROAD PAPER October 2007 The August 2007 Bombing Incident in Georgia: Implications for thethethe EuroEuro----AtlanticAtlantic Region Svante E. Cornell David J. Smith S. Frederick Starr © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Institute for Security and Development Policy, V. Finnbodav. 2, SE-13130 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org “TheThe August 2007 Bombing Incident iinn Georgia: ImplicationsImplications for the EuroEuro----AtlanticAtlantic RegionRegion” is a Silk Road Paper published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. The Silk Road Papers series is the Occasional Paper series of the Joint Center, published jointly on topical and timely subjects. The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program is a joint transatlantic independent and non-profit research and policy center. The Joint Center has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first Institution of its kind in Europe and North America, and is today firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders and journalists. The Joint Center aims to be at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security and development in the region. Through its applied research, publications, teaching, research cooperation, public lectures and seminars, it seeks to function as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion regarding the region. © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2007 ISBN: 91-85473-43-X Printed in Sweden Distributed in North America by: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute School of Advanced International Studies 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel. +1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 E-mail: [email protected] Distributed in Europe by: The Silk Road Studies Program Institute for Security and Development Policy V. Finnbodavägen 2, SE-13130 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden [email protected] Editorial correspondence should be addressed to Svante E. Cornell, Director, at either of the addresses above. (preferably by e-mail) Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................ ........... 555 A Chronology of the Tsitelubani Events ............................................................................................................................ 999 Conclusions and Implications ............................................................................................................................................................................. ............. 202020 Appendix A: JPKF/OSCE JoiJointnt Monitoring Team Spot ReportReport ....................... 262626 Appendix B: The Report of the Joint Monitoring Group ............................................................................ 303030 Appendix C: Report of First International Group of Experts ............................. 343434 Appendix D: Press Release of Russian Group of Experts ............................................................................ 373737 Appendix E: Report of Second International Group of Experts ........................ 444444 Appendix F: Commentary of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ............. 525252 Appendix G: Statement of the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the OSCE ................................................................................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................ ................... 545454 Appendix H: Declaration of the EU Presidency .................................................................................................. 585858 Appendix I: Talking points by Vitaly Churkin .................................................................................................... 595959 Appendix J: Statement of Georgian UN Representative ................................................................................ 646464 Appendix K: Visit Of PR CiO Žužul to Georgia and Moscow, 2222----2424 August 2007 ................................................................................................................................................................................... ................................................................................................ ........................... 707070 Appendix L: Fabricated Document of Western Experts’ Opinions on Georgia Circulated in Tbilisi and Brussels .................................................................................................................... 757575 AuthorsAuthors................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .............................................................................................. ................. 818181 Introduction On August 6, 2007, an unidentified aircraft dropped a large air-to-surface missile near a newly upgraded Georgian military radar station, in the vicinity of the South Ossetian conflict zone. The bomb failed to detonate. Subsequently, two groups of independent experts commissioned by European and American governments confirmed the Georgian government’s allegation that the military aircraft and explosive device, both of types not possessed by Georgia, entered Georgian airspace from the Russian Federation, fired rather than jettisoned the device, and then returned back to Russian airspace. A separate group of experts, convened by the Russian government and consisting only of Russians, nevertheless disputed these conclusions, finding no evidence of Russian involvement. Why does this incident merit the publication of a Silk Road Paper ? Several reasons make this relevant. First, the incident was not an isolated event, but rather part and parcel of an increasingly aggressive effort by Russia’s foreign policy establishment to undermine Georgia’s western orientation.1 Second, the broader context of the incident has important implications for Euro- Atlantic security interests. Third, the international reaction to the incident – particularly on the part of multilateral organizations such as the OSCE and EU – remained grossly inadequate. Fourth, it is imperative that the Euro- Atlantic community draw the right conclusions from this incident, for at least two reasons: to be better prepared for similar incidents in the future; and to avoid the adoption of policies that may inadvertently encourage this type of actions. The incident constitutes a flagrant violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and is difficult to interpret as anything other than an act of war. In spite of this, European policy-makers, and particularly multilateral institutions, refrained from identifying, let alone condemning the aggressor. In so doing, they 1 For background, see Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe , Washington/Uppsala: CACI & SRSP Silk Road Paper, June 2006; Svante E. Cornell, Post-Revolutionary Georgia: Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for U.S. Policy , Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2007. [http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/2007/0703USAWC.pdf] 6 Cornell, Smith, Starr implicitly gave credence to Moscow’s seemingly outrageous assertion that for the second time in six months, Georgia bombed itself with aircraft and weaponry it does not possess, and for the sole purpose of blaming Russia for it. That assertion is eerily reminiscent of an incident that took place in 1993, during the war in Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia, when unmarked aircraft regularly pounded Georgian positions. Russia’s then- defense minister asserted that Georgia attacked its own positions in order to put the blame for its military weakness and territorial losses on Russia. When Georgian forces succeeded in downing a plane, they dragged out of its cockpit a Russian air force pilot in full uniform, with detailed instructions in his uniform pocket that unequivocally indicated his point of departure – an air base in southern Russia – and mission, to pound Georgian forces along the frontline. As in 1993, Moscow’s assertion this August was intended not so much to be believed, but to sow confusion and permit anyone so inclined to conclude that the situation was not crystal clear; that there were two sides to the story, ostensibly with equal value; and that consequently, there was no requirement for external forces to identify the perpetrator and respond to the incident with concrete measures. And undoubtedly, Moscow’s bold choice to stick to a line that flew in the face of all available evidence was bolstered
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