Assured Victory Assured Victory How “Stalin the Great” Won the War, but Lost the Peace Albert L. Weeks Copyright 2011 by Albert L. Weeks All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Weeks, Albert Loren, 1923- Assured victory : how “Stalin the Great” won the war but lost the peace / Albert L. Weeks. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-39165-1 (alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-313-39166-8 (ebook) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Soviet Union. 2. Stalin, Joseph, 1879–1953—Military leadership. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Diplomatic history. 4. Soviet Union— Foreign relations—1917–1945. 5. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Eastern Front. I. Title. D764.W44 2011 940.53’47—dc22 2010039732 ISBN: 978-0-313-39165-1 EISBN: 978-0-313-39166-8 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America Contents Preface ix Note on Transliteration xv Introduction xvii Fallout from the Medvedev Decree xxii Poll on Stalin ’s Greatness xxiii Revising School Textbooks xxiv Historiographers ’ View Toward Writing History xxviii PART ONE: Age of Dictators 1 1 Stalin: The Twentieth Century ’s Second Dictator 3 Unique Dictator 3 Advantages Enjoyed by Stalin 4 Contrasts with Western Leadership 6 Stalin Uses Diplomacy as a Weapon 7 Stalin ’ s Personal Qualities 9 Dealing with the West and America 11 Stalin ’ s Use of Bluff 13 A “Master Politician” 13 2 Stalin ’ s Methods and Accomplishments 17 The Stalin Cult 17 Machiavellian Methods 21 Legacy of the Cautious Leader 23 vi Contents 3 The Vozhd ’ Prepares for War 25 Consolidating the Home Front 25 Were the Purges Justifi ed? 27 The Kirov Case 28 Mainstream Historiography on the Purges 30 The Watershed Year 31 4 The World as Seen from Stalin ’s Kremlin 37 Foundation of German-Soviet Relations 38 Red Army-German Military Collaboration 41 Soviet-Fascist Totalitarian Kinship 44 Treacherous Currents of Europe 48 5 Soviet Two-Track Policy 51 Counterpoint of Early Soviet Diplomacy, 1918–1930s 52 Peredyshki 55 Fomenting Inter-Imperialist Tensions 56 Diplomacy in Stalin ’ s Industrialization 57 Stalin ’ s Emphasis on Defense 60 Trail of Broken “Friendship” Treaties 62 Comintern Factor 64 United Front (Lenin)/Popular Front (Stalin) 66 6 Soviet Pro-German Posture 71 Early Roots 71 The Brest-Litovsk Precedent (1918) 72 Straws in the Wind 76 The “Communazi” Factor 78 Stalin Navigates European Waters 81 Far East Dangers 82 PART TWO: Stalin Prepares for War 85 7 The Myth of Collective Security 87 League Weaknesses 90 Soviet View toward the League 91 Stalin ’ s Cautiousness 99 8 America in Stalin ’ s Future 105 Stalin Watches America ’ s Slide toward War 106 Stalin ’ s American Affi nities 109 Stalin at the Eighteenth Party Congress 111 Contents vii Stalin ’ s Defensism 112 Stalin on the West ’s Plans 113 The Signifi cance of Stalin ’ s Hints 114 Stalin and the CPUSA 115 American “Colossus” 116 Stalin’ s Hoped-for Lend-Lease 119 A “Strange” U.S.-Soviet Alliance 123 Stalin Defends State Interests 126 Stalin and FDR 131 Spies and Agents of Infl uence 132 Stalin among the Big Three 134 9 Nazi-Soviet Pacts and Aftermath 143 Controversy over Stalin ’ s Defense Policies 144 Specifi cs of Nazi-Soviet Pacts and Protocols 146 Carving up the World 149 New Tensions 151 Gaining Territory by the Pacts 159 10 Pre-Barbarossa War Plans 161 Stalin ’ s First Reactions 162 Early German Successes 163 Stalin ’ s Behavior on the Dramatic Day 164 Development of Historiography on Stalin ’ s Reactions 168 New Versions of Stalin ’ s Behavior on June 22 172 Additional Observations and Issues 182 PART THREE: The War and Its Aftermath 191 11 Stalin Bluffs and Defeats Wehrmacht 193 Reassessing Stalin 193 Stalin Bluffs in the “Great Game” 198 Barbarossa Materializes 200 Stalin ’ s Not-So-Blind Eye 201 The “Bluff” 202 Stalin ’ s Costly Errors 205 Soviet Weaknesses 206 Stalin Approves a Modifi ed Kutuzov Strategy 208 Did the Bluff Pay Off? 209 Preventing a Russian “Gleiwitz” 210 Stalin ’ s Military Defense Plan 211 How “Unprepared” Was the RKKA? 211 viii Contents 12 Epilogue: Winning the War, Losing the Peace 215 Hints of a Coming Cold War, 1946 216 Cold War Chronology 219 A “New” Stalin? 222 Today ’ s Russian Historians on the Cold War 223 Assessing Stalin ’ s Alleged Greatness 225 Appendix I: Stalin, Soviet Premier, Broadcast to the People of the Soviet Union 229 Appendix II: Stalin’s Biography in Current Russian Military Encyclopedia 235 Appendix III: Stalin ’ s Speech at the Reception in the Kremlin in Honor of the Commanders of the Red Army 237 Bibliography 239 Notes 253 Index 273 Preface In canvassing Stalin ’s supporters ’ claim of the Vozhd ’ ’ s (leader ’ s) greatness and the controversial treatments of the dictator by today ’ s Russian historians from their differing perspectives, we single out seven authors and their books for examination. Other authors, lead- ing Western, Russian, and other writers, will also be examined. Some of the works by the highlighted Russian historians or memoirists have appeared in English and other languages. Others have been published only in Russian. All of the seven authors to some degree are critical, often harshly so, of Stalin for his bloodstained record of leadership of the Soviet Union before, during, and after World War II. None of the authors, including even Vyacheslav Molotov, can be described as biased to the point of being entirely useless as a source of a number of valuable insights into the leadership of the Soviet dictator. A case in point here is memoirist Sergo Beria. He is of importance not only for being the son of a top Soviet offi cial in Stalin’ s inner circle, Lavrenti Beria, secret police tsar and overseer of the Gulag. Beria ’ s son was also an adult in Stalin ’ s most productive years. On many occasions he was in Stalin ’ s company and was privy to inside information about the Vozhd ’ and Stalin ’ s poli- cies as related confi dentially by his father, to whom the son was close and with whom he had numerous revealing conversations. Sergo ’ s experience was fi rsthand. As it concerns Stalin, his account does not seem unduly biased one way or the other, especially since his father was targeted for purge by the dictator. x Preface The above-cited Russian memoirists and historians represent vari- ous approaches to the Stalin era and the leader ’ s legacy. Although they are in many ways critical of the dictator, the information and insights they provide are occasionally extremely useful. In some cases, the his- torians ’ research is commendable because of its depth and originality. Moreover, the writers are valuable sources in that for the most part they represent, quite naturally, a variety of perspectives and “inter- ests” relating to their own time and place in the Soviet as well as in the post-Soviet period. Below is a list of these authors together with brief descriptions of their writings as well as biographic information about them: • Dmitri Volkogonov : Late, retired Soviet Army General, former chief of the main political administration of the armed forces in charge of military indoctrination during the time of Leonid Brezh- nev. Volkogonov was one of the fi rst top Soviet offi cials who, after the demise of the USSR in 1991, enjoyed access to various archives. His books include biographies of Stalin, Lenin, and Trotsky. He also authored a study entitled Autopsy of an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet Empire, as well as writing articles for the post- Soviet civilian and military post-Soviet press before his death in 1995 by natural causes. To say he was a bitter critic of Stalin is an understatement. • Georgi K. Zhukov, the so-called “Soviet Eisenhower,” was appointed by Stalin to head the Soviet General Staff in the critical early months of 1941. During the war, Zhukov served as commander of various war fronts, especially in the crucial defense of Moscow against the Germans ’ Operation Typhoon that reached a peak in December 1941. Zhukov played a major operational role in the fi nal Soviet victory in taking Berlin in the spring of 1945. Marshal Zhukov earned a repu- tation as fi eld commander on the Eastern Front as an outstanding tactician as well as a most demanding and some would say brutally tough disciplinarian. Zhukov published more than 10 editions (in three lengthy volumes) of his extended memoirs before he died in retirement in 1974. His recollections contain both negative and posi- tive references to Party General Secretary/Commander-in-Chief/ Premier Stalin. For the most part, Zhukov, a loyal Communist to the end, endorsed in retrospect most of Gensek Stalin ’ s domestic and foreign policies as well as his diplomatic maneuvers of the 1930s and 1940s. On the whole, the marshal commended the fearsome Vozhd ’ Preface xi for his prescient prewar and able, hands-on wartime leadership. Zhukov ’ s generally favorable treatment of Stalin—the marshal, after all, had nothing to fear from Stalin over a generation after his death!—tends to be overlooked by his biographers and historians.