Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Syrian Still a Crucial Actor WP S Inclusivity the Order of the Day in Dealings with ’s Opposition Petra Becker

Summer 2013 brought severe setbacks for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Firstly, one of its most important regional supporters, lost its leading role in the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, the alliance of states and organisations backing Syria’s opposition, to . Secondly, the Brotherhood has been hit by stinging criti- cism of the Egyptian MB’s performance in government and the media witch-hunt against political following the ouster of Mohammed Morsi. In the face of these events the Syrian Brotherhood – to date still a religious and – post- poned the founding of a political party planned for late June. Thirdly, the Brotherhood – like its partners in the National Coalition which opposes the Syrian regime – bet on an American-backed military intervention in August/September. This intervention did not occur due to the American-Russian brokered agreement providing for Syria to join the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. As a result, the National Coalition and its Supreme Military Command have faced defections of major rebel forces, which may lead to a major shift towards Jihadi Salafism and the marginalization of moderate forces on the ground. Yet the Brother- hood remains the best-organised political force within the alliances and still sees itself becoming the leading force in post-revolutionary Syria. and Europe should encourage moderate forces whatever their political colours and foster the implementation of democratic concepts.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which formation of opposition alliances: coordi- has operated in exile since the suppression nating contacts between groups, partici- of the 1982 uprising in , has always pating in all opposition meetings abroad, sought to topple the Assad regime. But like and organising with Turkish assistance the the rest of the opposition, the revolution of October 2011 inaugural conference of the March 2011 took it by surprise. Building on (SNC). In addition exile structures it was, however, relatively to the seats it negotiated for itself, the quickly able to play a central role in the Brotherhood’s tactical dexterity enabled it

Petra Becker is a Research Fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the ” SWP Comments 34 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office October 2013 in framework of the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

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to claim seats for ideologically close repre- from Western countries. The new forma- sentatives and groups. tion, however, failed to achieve the objec- Repeated restructurings and an ever- tive of changing power relations within changing composition mean that even the exile opposition. The SNC joined the insiders find it impossible to assess the National Coalition, but operating as a bloc Brotherhood’s real weight within the SNC. of its own. Furthermore, with Qatari sup- Moreover, most Brotherhood members of port the Brotherhood was able to insist on the SNC officially represent other groups. the inclusion of other forces that shifted In December 2011, for example, 78 of the the balance to such an extent that it largely SNC’s 320 members were from the Brother- replicates the imbalance within the SNC. hood, but only 20 were on the Brotherhood On the initiative of the Group of Friends list. The others counted as independents or of the Syrian People a new attempt was representatives of civil society groups and launched at the end of May 2013 to con- organisations. To this day Brotherhood tain the influence of the Islamists in the spokesman Molham Al-Droubi figures as an National Coalition by integrating addi- independent in the SNC membership list. tional secular forces. By including a bloc The head of the Brotherhood office in Istan- around the left-wing intellectual Michel bul and editor-in-chief of the Brotherhood Kilo the intention was to also strengthen newspaper Al-Ahd is listed as a member of the bloc seeking a negotiated solution the “Revolutionary Youth”, while Brother- rather than outright military victory. But hood member Bassem Hatahet represents once more this measure was watered down. the “National Coalition for the Protection After days of talks, under massive pressure of Civilians”, to mention but a few from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the proposed examples. twenty-two secular liberal members were Apart from its representation on the joined by fourteen new representatives of SNC, three other factors explain the the revolutionary movement, largely from Brotherhood’s influence: firstly, the weak- spectrum, and fifteen from the ness and fragmentation of its rivals from Free (FSA). the secular liberal camp; secondly, its While the Brotherhood is certainly ability, unlike them, to forge coalitions, for not solely to blame for opposition power example with the communist Democratic struggles, many hold it responsible for the People’s Party, whose central committee opposition’s paralysis. That applies to left- member is the current SNC wing, liberal and rival Islamist forces, as president; thirdly its good relations with well as activists and rebels operating within and Qatar, both of which play a the country. For example, in a declaration crucial role in funding the opposition. of 30 March 2013 the FSA accused the But the strength of the Brotherhood Brotherhood of obstructing the work of led to a loss of confidence in the SNC both the opposition and blamed it indirectly among the domestic opposition, which felt for the death of thousands of Syrians. inadequately included, and among the Qatar losing the leading role in the secular exile opposition and the Group of Group of Friends of the Syrian People to Friends of the Syrian People. Accordingly, a Saudi Arabia in May 2013 brought about new opposition grouping was founded in a new turn of events. Saudi Arabia is fun- November 2012, the National Coalition of damentally critical of the Brotherhood, not Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces least because a monarchy finds no place in (National Coalition). Here, liberal and secu- the latter’s ideological platform. Ahmad lar forces around the widely respected long- Jarba’s election as president of the National serving dissident sought to place Coalition in early July 2013 can also be the opposition body on a broader footing attributed to Saudi Arabian influence. As and thus win greater support especially a leader of the Shammar tribe he enjoys

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traditionally close relations with Saudi hood member Mohammed Hikmat Wulaid Arabia. While the Brotherhood thus ap- was elected as the provisional leader of pears to have lost influence in the National the party, with Rimon Maajoun and Nabil Coalition, it nonetheless remains the best- Qassis there are also two Christians in the organised force within it, and with Moham- leadership. But at the same time the con- med Farouq Tayfour indeed provides one of ference decided to wait for a more suitable its three vice-presidents. time to publish the statutes and launch the party. Yet the work on the ground contin- ued and the party opened offices both in Postponed Party Launch and , preparing for an offi- Developments in led the Brotherhood cial launch in November 2013. to delay realisation of a long-planned proj- ect: in summer 2012 the Brotherhood, to date a religious and social movement, had Structure, Base and Strategies announced plans to set up a political party In parallel to its political involvement in with a modern liberal programme open to the opposition alliances, the Brotherhood politicians from the liberal spectrum and has been working since 2011 to consolidate members of other confessions. In the last its domestic base. During its first decades in week of June 2013 a spokesperson an- exile the Brotherhood coordinated its work nounced that the Brotherhood and other primarily from Amman and , but moderate forces would hold a three-day in 2011 shifted its main presence to Turkey, conference in Istanbul, at the end of which where it set up an office in Istanbul and a new party was to be launched. On the operates from the Turkish-Syrian border agenda, he said, was the discussion and region. In April 2013 the Brotherhood’s adoption of statutes, choosing a name and supreme guide (i.e. leader), Riad Al-Shaqfeh, electing the leadership of the new party, declared that it had begun setting up which is to consist of one-third Brother- offices in certain rebel-held areas. The first hood members and two-thirds other Brotherhood office in Aleppo officially moderate Islamists and Liberals. opened in August 2013. Its well-organised exile structures and a Selected dates in the history large reservoir of loyal followers allowed of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood the Brotherhood to expand its base in Syria. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood claims 1945/46 Emergence of the Syrian Muslim several thousand members in 130 coun- Brotherhood, followed by phase of tries, but reliable information on member- political participation ship is not available. The Brotherhood 1963 Baath Party seizes power, Muslim counts many exile Syrians who are loosely Brotherhood banned associated with the organisation through 1963–1982 Phase of militarisation and study circles or other front organisations armed struggle as followers, although they are not strictly 1980 Emergency Law 49: membership speaking members. punishable by death The Brotherhood pursues various strate- 1982 Armed uprising and Hama gies and employs diverse means to establish massacre, exile structures within Syria: Humanitarian aid: From the beginning Conference participants confirmed that a of the uprising the Brotherhood was in a name had been agreed, the National Party position to provide effective humanitarian for Justice and Constitution. The aid, profiting from well-networked family acronym is waad, which means “promise”. structures especially in its former strong- Statutes were also agreed, and Brother- holds in Aleppo, Hama, Homs and . It

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is supported by the similarly Islamist- Building Brotherhood military structures: influenced Turkish aid organisation İHH. In September 2011, just one month after At the beginning of 2013 activists asso- the regime forced the protest movement ciated with the Brotherhood in Turkey into militarisation through massive attacks founded their own humanitarian organi- on Homs and Hama, the Brotherhood sations, under the umbrella organisation began preparations for an organisation Watan (Arabic for “homeland”) to supply to secure military influence: the General aid to Syria. Committee to Protect Civilians (GCPC). Influence on the revolutionary commit- Its task is to make contact with existing tees inside Syria: By its own account the militias and link them to the Brotherhood Brotherhood ensured that its young activ- through financial and logistical support. ists joined the local revolutionary commit- The GCPC is led by Haitham al-Rahme, a tees inside Syria at an early stage. In Idlib moderate Islamist from Quseir near Homs and Aleppo it is reported to have founded who is linked to the Brotherhood. The revolutionary committees itself. But accord- Brotherhood has been supplying funding ing to activists inside Syria the Brother- to several rebel groups: the Tawheed Bri- hood’s influence in the committees is lim- gade that dominates in Aleppo and sur- ited. Reading the discussions in the elec- roundings, the Farouq brigades concen- tronic forums of the Syrian revolutionary trated around Homs, and the so-called committees another phenomenon also Shield brigades, which operate in various becomes clear: the Brotherhood has frit- locations. However, militia loyalties fluc- tered away support through its contentious tuate and are generally based less on role in the exile opposition. ideology than on the financial strength Participation in building a civil adminis- of donors. According to activists on the tration: The Brotherhood participates in the ground the influence of Brotherhood- establishment and working of an alterna- related militias is restricted to the prov- tive civilian administration in the so-called inces of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs and liberated territories. This was the case for – which were also Brotherhood example in Aleppo, where in elections in strongholds in the 1970s. In contrast, early March 2013 five Brotherhood mem- Brotherhood-related militias do not play bers were elected to the twenty-nine-mem- any role in the other provinces, neither in ber civil administration council. Brother- the north-east nor in the Euphrates region, hood members are also represented in nor along the coast or in the south. The the Syrian Civil Administration Councils defection of some of the rebel forces, (SYCAC) network, which identifies, trains among them the Tawheed Brigade, from and funds the newly emerging local coun- the National Coalition and its Supreme cils. Military Committee can be seen as evidence Establishing Brotherhood media: The that the Brotherhood’s influence on mili- Brotherhood has begun publishing its own tias is limited and diminishing. Although newspaper, Al-Ahd (“the covenant”), which leading members of the Brotherhood admit has been circulating in rebel-controlled their discomfort with the announcement territories since early March 2013. It initial- of the “Army of Mohammad” in the north ly appears fortnightly. Plans to go daily and the “Army of Islam” in the south, they have not materialized so far. The editors try obstain from criticising them openly. to give the paper a modern appearance but their choice of topics – devoting great atten- tion to Brotherhood history and ideology – Religious Networks makes it more party organ than mass-circu- Over the past three decades Syrian society lation paper. has increasingly turned to religious con- servatism. The regime promoted this trend

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by coopting and generously funding qui- groups forced it to consider their ideas. etist religious leaders. These elites, which When the Baath Party took power in 1963, are overwhelmingly anchored in affluent it banned the Brotherhood and pursued a urban milieus, engaged in religious in- radical secularisation policy. This led to the struction and proselytising, education and Brotherhood splitting into three wings: welfare through various organisations. 1. the politically moderate Damascus wing, Examples include the missionary and led by supreme guide Issam al-Attar (in welfare organisation of the Zayd move- exile from 1964), which rejected armed ment, whose leader Sheikh Osama al-Rifai struggle against the regime; fled abroad in autumn 2011; the Abu Nour 2. the conservative Hama wing under Institute, an Islamic education institution Marwan Hadid (1934–1976), which founded by the late Grand Mufti Sheikh propagated armed struggle as the only Ahmad Kuftaro; and al-Qubaysiat, a strong- means to change the regime; ly hierarchical religious women’s organisa- 3. the equally conservative Aleppo wing, tion whose work concentrates on Islamic whose leader Sheikh Abdel Fattah Abu instruction and education. Since about Ghudda (1917–1997) also favoured 2000 the latter has succeeded in recruiting armed struggle but unlike Marwan particularly wives of influential business- Hadid argued that such a course re- men and decision-makers. quired better preparation and therefore The Brotherhood could use the networks had to wait for a later opportunity. maintained by these groups and institu- While the Damascus wing no longer tions for its work within Syria, and is like- plays any role, the other two still exist ly to have already established relevant today. The Aleppo wing is regarded as lib- contacts before the revolution. By its own eral and pragmatic. Under Ali Sadreddine account the Brotherhood leadership began al-Bayanouni (born 1937 in Aleppo, su- building new underground networks with- preme guide from 1996 to 2010) the Brother- in Syria after the Assad handover from hood undertook several attempts to reach father to son in 2000. an understanding with the regime, but without success. Nonetheless, in the 1990s and again after the accession of Bashar Objectives and Wings al-Assad, Brotherhood supporters were Unlike its counterpart in Egypt, the Syrian released from prison or permitted to return Muslim Brotherhood is not a movement to Syria. But at no point did the regime with a broad popular base. Its political goal concede larger concessions such as legalisa- is to create a socially just Islamic society, tion or lifting Law 49 of 1980, which places achieved through education and mission- the death penalty on membership. ary work rather than by forcing The Hama wing is more conservative and upon the population. It assumes that the more irreconcilable towards the regime. dissemination of Islamic values will grad- When Riad al-Shaqfeh (born 1944 in Hama) ually persuade society to adapt its laws emerged in 2010 as victor of the internal to sharia, and sees such a society as the elections for supreme guide this was inter- nucleus of an all-embracing community preted in the press as evidence of the de- of Islamic societies. cline of the Aleppo wing. The background was criticism of the Brotherhood leader- ship’s line during the Gaza War of 2008/ Pragmatism vs. Dogmatism 2009, when it suspended opposition activi- After its founding in the mid-1940s the ty against the regime in order to strengthen Brotherhood went through a phase of the “resistance front” against Israel. political participation, during which co- Al-Bayanouni’s pragmatic course had operation with nationalist and left-wing already led to conflict in 2005, when the

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Brotherhood joined renegade vice-president complement one another and the main Abdelhalim Khaddam to form the National task of the woman lies in the family – Salvation Front. The move met with incom- although it should be noted that such views prehension among Brotherhood supporters are also held by conservative European and and in other opposition groups, as Khad- American parties. Another restriction is dam had been a central figure in the Assad associated with the statement that women regime for decades and moreover stood are equal with men “apart from a small accused of massive corruption. number of legislative provisions [based on Also under al-Bayanouni’s leadership sharia]”. For example, citing sharia on in- the Brotherhood published the so-called heritance clearly disadvantages women. national pact of honour on political work While not progressive, this position cor- in May 2001, in which it distanced itself responds to the current legal position in from violence and argued for cooperating Syria and as such is not retrogressive. with other political forces towards a plu- The document states that media laws ralist Syria. In 2004 it presented a com- should conform with “the basic principles prehensive programme with “The Political of the umma [Islamic community] and noble Project for the Future Syria”. This docu- human values” and be responsible for pro- ment casts a vision of Syria as a modern, moting “purposeful art”. Censorship is pluralist state, a parliamentary restricted to protecting the “principles of based on the principle of equality of all the umma”, but without defining who for- citizens, and a state embracing the rule of mulates these principles and values nor law and division of powers. The programme who decides whether they are being speaks of a revitalised Islam compatible observed. with the principles of modern governance, including women’s rights, minority rights, free speech, freedom of religion, etc. Generation Conflicts Because the programmatic discussions are conducted behind closed doors, it is un- vs. clear what ideological fractures exist and However, closer scrutiny of the document where they run: between the old wings reveals crucial points that are formulated as occasionally claimed in the media, or extremely vaguely. That bears the danger of between the generations? The founding freedoms being curtailed through the back- of the National Action Group can be inter- door of religious norms and values. Some preted as the expression of a generation critics see the choice of formulations as a conflict. It was established in 2010 by wilful strategy, although it is more likely Brotherhood members close to al-Baya- that the lack of clarity is due to the broad nouni, such as Ahmad Ramadan and al- spectrum of opinions within the Brother- Bayanouni’s long-serving office manager, hood, which discussed the project inten- Obeida Nahhas. The group’s mostly young sively for three years before its members members espouse a moderate and liberal were able to agree on a final version. Islam. In the SNC it has about the same For all its vagueness, certain restrictions representation as the Brotherhood, but of freedoms are nonetheless identifiable, because many of its members also belong especially concerning women and the to the Muslim Brotherhood it is difficult to media. Although the final version recog- clearly distinguish the two. nises equality of the sexes as a fundamental Some observers suggest that after the principle and accepts the right of women March 2011 outbreak of the revolution to political activity and political office, this youth in the Brotherhood became frus- position is relativised by a traditional role trated when the leadership blocked the attribution under which men and women recruitment of larger numbers of young

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people inside Syria out of concern that and rejuvenate. To that extent it is likely opening the organisation would leave it to play a more than negligible role in the vulnerable to subversion. Another reason future Syria, all the more given that no for its reticence might be that a substantial other opposition grouping has to date intake of new members could have dis- succeeded in agreeing shared goals and rupted power relations within the Brother- strategies. hood. This “underground mentality” is For thirty years the Brotherhood has rightly criticised by the Brotherhood youth, been much better protected against the dis- as even members of the leadership admit. ruptive tactics of the Syrian intelligence How is the Brotherhood to win confidence services than other opposition groups, as long as it is unwilling to reveal its stat- because it recruits selectively (members utes or declares that the names of three out need a personal recommendation and must of five of the supreme guide’s deputies are complete a probationary period) and has secret? operated underground. But this advantage The Brotherhood has plainly recognised becomes a disadvantage where the Brother- the need for reform. That can be seen both hood needs a certain degree of transpar- in the April 2013 election of women to the ency to win popular trust. consultative council and executive com- The ultimate ideological direction of the mittee and in the holding of a youth con- Brotherhood is likely to become clear only ference in December 2012. At the confer- when currently vague concepts need to be ence 350 young members spent three days concretised, specifically in the context of preparing proposals that were later pre- parliamentary or governmental responsi- sented to the consultative council. For the bility. Also only then will it be seen if the young Brotherhood members it was a Brotherhood can integrate the broad spec- revelation to have young women and men trum of positions, or fragments into several discussing together in the working groups. parties. Not least, ideological developments and influence will also depend on positions adopted by other Islamist currents such as Conclusion and Outlook conservative and moderate Salafists. The Syrian Brotherhood has worked hard In free elections absolute majorities for since the beginning of the revolution to re- the Brotherhood or other Islamist currents establish a basis in Syria. But judging by the are not to be expected, assuming that Syria discussions in the internet forums of the retains its present borders. For neither the Syrian revolutionary movement it has lost religious minorities that make up about ground again through the bickering in the 30 percent of the population nor the more exile opposition. Like the other opposition nationalist or left-leaning Kurds, who groups it is accused of placing its own represent about 12 percent, are likely to ambitions above the interests of the Syrian vote Islamist. Finally, a considerable pro- population. The poor performance of the portion of Arab Sunni Syrians are also Egyptian Brotherhood in government also secular-leaning. causes it difficulties. And since the ouster of Egyptian President Morsi, who stems from the Brotherhood, has faced Recommendations an aggressive media campaign across the Europe is already supporting the Syrian whole Arab world. At the same time the opposition through bilateral measures and Syrian Brotherhood has been the only oppo- in the frame of the Group of Friends of sition force capable of consistently pur- the Syrian People. Looking ahead, three suing strategies and finding majorities. It maxims should be observed. Europe and its has long exercised internal democratic partners should, firstly, work to support mechanisms and is motivated to modernise the emergence of new political and civil

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society structures in Syria and in this con- nection seek dialogue with representatives of all political currents in society. This should include, for example, discussing concepts of modern governance with these actors. Young actors especially should be shown how democratic processes function in Europe and how political rights and freedoms can be guaranteed. There are im- portant roles here for Germany’s political foundations, political parties and parlia- ments as well as European NGOs. Secondly, Europe will be most likely to boost its credibility by respecting demo-

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und cratically elected bodies and avoiding Politik, 2013 seeking to shape the opposition to fit their All rights reserved own preconceptions. All dialogue-willing

These Comments reflect actors in opposition bodies and in a future solely the author’s views. transitional government should be ac-

SWP cepted as partners for dialogue. Stiftung Wissenschaft und The choice of dialogue and cooperation Politik German Institute for partners, thirdly, should not be restricted International and to actors that are already politically orga- Security Affairs nised. Instead, it would be important to Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 integrate into such efforts those who are 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 currently working to maintain public life Fax +49 30 880 07-100 and multi-confessionality through the www.swp-berlin.org revolutionary committees and newly estab- [email protected] lished local civil administrations. ISSN 1861-1761

Translation by Meredith Dale

(Updated English version of SWP-Aktuell 52/2013)

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