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PRISM

A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS About PRISM PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners Vol. 4, Syria Supplement on complex and integrated operations; reconstruction and state-building; 2014 relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development

Editor Michael Miklaucic Communications Contributing Editors Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct Alexa Courtney communications to: David Kilcullen Nate Rosenblatt Editor, PRISM 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Copy Editors Fort Lesley J. McNair Dale Erikson Washington, DC 20319 Rebecca Harper Sara Thannhauser Lesley Warner Telephone: Nathan White (202) 685-3442 FAX: (202) 685-3581 Editorial Assistant Email: [email protected] Ava Cacciolfi

Production Supervisor Carib Mendez Contributions PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Advisory Board and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the Dr. Gordon Adams and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to prism@ Dr. Pauline H. Baker ndu.edu with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Ambassador Rick Barton Professor Alain Bauer This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Ambassador James F. Dobbins without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. Ambassador John E. Herbst (ex officio) Dr. David Kilcullen The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within Ambassador are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Dr. Roger B. Myerson Dr. Moisés Naím MG William L. Nash, USA (Ret.) Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering Dr. William Reno PRISM wishes to express its gratitude to Salameh Nemat for the cover art, LtGen John F. Sattler, USMC (Ret.) and use of his paintings in this issue. PRISM also wishes to thank Ammar Abd Rabbo, Maha Zimmo, and Bernd Schwab for their generous contribution of Dr. James A. Schear photographs for this issue. Dr. Joanna Spear Dr. Ruth Wedgwood

ISSN 2157–0663

6 2 FEATURES 162 162 153 144 INTERVIEWS 132 FROM THEFIELD 118 110 94 84 68 58 42 32 14

Advice to Policy-Makers Who WouldWho Policy-Makers to Advice Tackle Syria by Tim Grimmett, Todd and Harrod Bryan Hurley Memorandum for President Assad Memorandum forPresident by Rocigliano and Karen Grattan Karen and by Rocigliano Robert by Thomas R.Pickering A Diplomat’s Perfect Storm Miklaucic by Michael Courtney Alexa and An Unfolding Tragedy An Interview with Osama Kadi Osama with An Interview withMurhafAn Interview Jouejati C.Hof An Interview with Frederic by AlexZerdenLara Setrakian and Ecosystem Information-Sharing inSyria Mapping the by Ziadeh Radwan TransnationalNationalReconciliation Justice and byBlume Susanna inSyria Opposition How the to Support by Kreitlow Brian Moving Past BosniaFallacythe by Zuhdi Jasser Syria’sConflict Sectarian SterlingJensen by and Walid al-Rawi Syria’s SalafiNetworks by David Rosenblatt Nathaniel and Kilcullen Will BeFought Country’s Over the New Urban Villages of Syria’sWarRise Why the The UrbanPoor; for Syria’sFuture by Judith S.Yaphe Next Steps inSyria

ndupress.ndu.eduwww.ndu.edu Passing Through Fleeting Words 4, by Salameh Nematt, from the Series An Unfolding Tragedy

BY ALEXA COURTNEY AND MICHAEL MIKLAUCIC

hile world leaders’ attention is drawn to nuclear negotiations with , the ISAF withdrawal from , and a host of pressing domestic issues, the human Wtragedy in Syria continues unabated. Millions of Syrian civilians have been uprooted by the conflict, either as refugees in neighboring countries, or displaced within Syria itself. Villages and neighborhoods have been destroyed. The dead exceed 150,000. In a world grown anaesthe- tized to the brutality of civil , the conflict in Syria is especially disconcerting, sending as it has a wave of de-stabilization rippling through concentric dimensions of security. Syria’s heterogeneous population of 22.4 million (2012) has lived under the heavy authori- tarian hand of the Assad regime since 1971. The uprising that began in 2011, following similar uprisings throughout the Arab , had hopeful expectations. It has since devolved into a Hobbesian struggle of all against all. The promise of a moderate successor regime to Assad is all but lost in the emerging sectarian, communal and inter-confessional carnage. The once capa- ble human resource base has been depleted; much of the country’s economic infrastructure is destroyed; any social capital that may have bridged between communities is gone. Prospects for resolution of this conflict in the foreseeable future are not promising. Any progress on the destruc- tion of chemical weapons, though welcome, will have limited if any impact on the civil war cur- rently raging. Syria’s neighborhood is perennially volatile. though its civil war ended in 1991 remains extremely fragile. is more robust, but with grave vulnerabilities. The festering wounds of ’s insurgency continue to suppurate with casualty rates approaching those of the Provisional Authority period. is still suffering the consequences of the removal of its long-reigning dictator Hosni Mubarek and a coup removing his feckless successor . Even , an otherwise strong member of the family of states, continues to struggle with a simmering Kurdish separatist movement on its southern – Syrian – border. The influx into these countries of vast numbers of Syrian refugees exacerbates the pro- found problems already afflicting them. As they struggle to cope with weak economies and their

Alexa Courtney is former Executive Vice President of Caerus Associates.

Michael Miklaucic is Director of Research and Editor of PRISM at the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 3 COURTNEY AND MIKLAUCIC

own political tensions, the contagion of con- stabilization, and counterinsurgency, not to flict threatens to engulf them. Cross-border mention state-building, is gone. The problems fault lines link these countries inescapably of Syria seem remote to Americans. They are together. not as remote as many think though. The This is the heartland or core of the broader humanitarian tragedy in Syria as well as the Middle East, North Africa (MENA) . immediate risk of spillover of the violence into Rumbling in the core ripples through the American allies such as Jordan, Turkey, and entire region, with impact detectable along the put Syria irremovably on America’s entire southern Mediterranean littoral, as well radar. as in the Gulf and further east. , More significantly American reticence in , the , and Iran are the MENA region is beginning to look like deeply invested in the Syrian conflict, each withdrawal from the region. Though the supporting their favorite faction. Needless to American administration has protested that say the ramifications for the security of Israel the “rebalancing toward ” will not come at and European democracies are profound. the expense of other key , indeed America appears to be bowing out. American images are significant in international leadership has been absent throughout the relations, and the image America is currently region lately – in Egypt, , and now in projecting is decidedly passive. Syria. America’s allies have noticed. There are many explanations for America’s strategic deci- sions, but images are significant in interna- A larger struggle in the region pits the tional relations, and the image America is cur- Islamic Republic of Iran against Saudi Arabia rently projecting is decidedly passive. This for leadership within the world of . Syria comes with a cost as America’s allies no longer forms the land bridge between Iran and its feel assured of American commitment. It is a most prominent protégé, Lebanese . slow, but tectonic shift. Bashar Assad’s Alawite regime is a key element Geo-strategy has long acknowledged the in the Shia coalition that now includes Iraq fundamental importance of location - proxim- with outposts in the Arab Gulf countries. Syria ity, insularity, topography, resources. We must is a majority Sunni country – as goes Assad so now equally acknowledge the importance of goes the Shia regime, and the direct link timing. The velocity of political events and between Iran and Hezbollah. These are stakes processes is such that windows of opportunity both Iran and Saudi Arabia appear willing to open and close in the blink of an eye. Decisive go to the matt for. action two years ago, or even six months ago And how does this all affect the United might have incurred risks, or even have failed, States? Americans are justifiably exhausted by but might also have averted the current catas- expeditionary campaigns in far-away places, trophe in Syria. A no-fly zone over Syria in having spilled vast amounts of blood and trea- 2011 might have enabled the Free sure in Iraq and Afghanistan with very little to defeat Assad regime forces, thus possibly apparent return on the investment. What appe- avoiding the chaos that permitted radical salafi tite there once was for reconstruction, domination of the battlespace. A punitive U.S.

4 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL AN UNFOLDING TRAGEDY strike against the regime after it crossed the This special PRISM supplement dedicated chemical weapons redline might have pre- to Syria is the product of a partnership vented Syria’s further descent into chaos. Those between the Center for Complex Operations options are no longer available. Officials and (CCO) at National Defense University and analysts now contemplate a deal with the Caerus Associates, a strategy and design firm oppressive Assad regime. Others propose dia- that has been conducting primary research on log with the least radical of the salafi jihadists. the ground in Syria since late 2012. PRISM and However, it now appears likely a protracted Caerus collaborated throughout 2013, as the struggle will ensue, punctuated by interna- situation in Syria changed by the day. The tional negotiations removed from the violence essays and interviews were submitted and in Syria itself. Therefore, an outcome favorable done during the course of 2013, and naturally to U.S. national security seems hard to imag- reflect the evolving circumstances of a highly ine. How did things reach this point? It is complex and tragic situation. By joining forces incumbent upon us to pose the awkward ques- to publish this issue, we amplify the voices of tion, “Was the course taken the best to protect Syrian scholars, advocates, and officials and American interests and at what cost to our provide context to the ongoing policy debates national security?” highlighted in this issue by American academ- PRISM journal’s inaugural supplemental ics, diplomats, and practitioners. The contribu- issue explores the complexities of Syria’s vio- tions in this edition are diverse and reflect a lent transition through a broad spectrum of wide range of styles including feature articles, Syrian and American voices. The contributions interviews, opinion pieces, an info-graphic, in this edition underscore the complex nexus and a fictitious policy brief from within the of political, social, and economic challenges Assad regime. threatening Syria’s future, and highlight the We hope this issue of PRISM will inspire profound impact of chronic instability on readers’ empathy for the daily struggles weath- Syria’s citizens and neighbors. Many of the ered by the Syrian population; deeper under‑ authors cautiously advocate military, diplo- standing of the interrelated dynamics fueling matic, or development engagements designed the chronic conflict; imagination of new to interrupt the cycle of increasing violence approaches to interrupt the violence and inse- and bring Syria back from the brink of self- curity; and, ultimately, action for a safe and destruction. This issue of PRISM offers readers peaceful future for Syria. PRISM insights into Syria’s struggle in an effort to catalyze cooperation across boundaries— between communities in Syria fighting for their survival; and committees in Washington and international capitals charged to develop responsible engagement policies. We hope the perspectives reflected in this issue will ignite readers’ creativity and commitment to influ- encing positive change on the ground in Syria.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 5 A Diplomat’s Perfect Storm: How to Move Forward in Syria

BY THOMAS R. PICKERING

or over two years, we have watched the disintegration of Syria, the shredding of its popula- tion and the anguish of a civil war which has now killed over 150,000 - 200,000. A critical Fcountry in the heart of the Middle East remains suspended between death by a thousand cuts and a world apparently incapable or unable to come together to attend to even its most elemental needs. It has now descended into a three cornered conflict between the Assad regime and among its opponents – al Qaeda-related fronts against more moderate fighters. Those who two years ago foresaw a short if brutal war have been shown to be wrong. Those who hoped for but saw no signs of a political settlement have been honored only in the failure of their hopes. This brief article is designed to evaluate where we now find ourselves and suggest some ways forward. A hard task in any such situation it is made even harder by the intensifying conflict inside the country and the competing interests of foreign powers in dealing with Syria. There is much to write about the history of this successor state (one among many) to the . A period of French rule under a League of Nations Mandate ended with Syria’s independence in 1946. A period of rotating governments with military rule pre-dominating ended nearly four decades ago with the rise to power of Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite Air Force , who held on to power for the following three decades until he died and was succeeded by his son, Bashar al-Assad in 2000. Syria never pretended to be a modern democracy. It was an Alawite minority-ruled, majority Sunni state. It lost the Golan Heights to Israel in 1967 and while small adjustments were made

Thomas R. Pickering served as U.S. Ambassador in numerous coutries and retired from the foreign service as the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in 2000. through U.S. brokered negotiations in 1974, the territorial occupation of the Golan has remained a thorn in the flesh of Syria and the Assad family and their supporters ever since. In 2010, Assad’s minority rule was challenged by peaceful demonstrations to replace the regime, largely articulated by majority Sunni groups. The other minorities, , Druze and Christians in the main, hung on with their long-term Alawite benefactors and protectors or sought to stay out of the conflict altogether. The , a minority themselves representing only 12 percent of the population, understood the value any ruling minority in the Middle East attaches to aligning itself with the rulers, whether a minority or majority of the population. They played that card skillfully over the years. Syria has always been impacted by outside players to a significant extent, although the tight hand of the Assads and their rule sought seriously to limit foreign influence. Turkey to the north enjoyed mixed relations with Syria. In times of stress, the Turks knew how important water flow- ing out of their high plateau hinterland through the was to the survival and prosperity of Syria. And when necessary, they were ready and able to shut it off or slow its flow. To the east, Iraq - an independent fellow Arab state since 1932 - has been at odds with Syria from the time the ruling moved from to at the beginning of the ninth century. Saudi Arabia and Jordan, long linked with the families of Damascus , followed their own interests. In the case of the former, generous assistance, especially in times of conflict, made a difference. In the case of Jordan, often presumed by Syria to be a legitimate part of “Greater Syria” built around its capital Damascus, the play has been more careful and balanced. Jordan was attacked by Syria following the conflict with Israel in 1967, but resisted by Jordan with support from Israel and the west. King Hussein enjoyed a longish honey moon with Hafez al-Assad in the 1970s. He then shifted his interests and sources of income to and Iraq in the buildup and following the eight -year war between Iraq and Iran when the military supply and other pipelines to Iraq ran mainly through Jordan. Israel has always seen Syria as the most recalcitrant and hard-nosed of its enemies in the . Close links between Syria and Iran made this conclusion even more salient. Iran, a supplier of arms and a defender of Syria’s political interests, significantly increased its influence in the region by patronizing the Assads and Damascus. It continues to do so.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 7 PICKERING

To the west Lebanon has always been fundamentalist fighters and more moderate viewed by Damascus as another legitimate part Sunni opposition fighters has added to the of “Greater Syria,” that was severed illegally by complexity and frustration of all efforts to find the French from the organic Syrian state. a solution. In the meantime, the death toll Occupied at times by the , the Lebanese rises inexorably and uncontrollably. If this is have sought to escape Syrian clutches, particu- not genocide in one sense, it is a double geno- larly those parts of Lebanese society, mainly cide in another. According to the United Christians, who see Syria as a natural adver- Nations both sides are dying at a combined sary. In the meantime the Lebanese based Shi’a rate of over 6000 per month. The cruelty and militia group, Hizbullah, has played an impor- deep ideological and theological commitment tant role in fighting in support of the Assad on both sides seems unalloyed by any sense of regime which has undermined to some extent respect or mercy for a civilian population its influence in Lebanon. largely caught up in the fighting or the nine Needless to say, each of these players has million refugees who have moved to escape been deeply engaged in the civil war in Syria the carnage. The displaced are largely within and widely impacted by it. Saudi Arabia, Syria itself, but well over a million have left, joined by Qatar, has supported Sunni opposi- putting tremendous pressure on Lebanon, tion elements including the growing number Jordan, Turkey and Iraq in roughly that order. influenced heavily by al-Qaeda and its subor- Indeed, both the fighting itself and the dinate Jabhat al Nusra. Iran’s close relation- proximity and partial involvement of other ship to Assad and the Alawites, an offshoot of players, has led to a destabilization of big Shi’a Islam, has helped stimulate a wider Shi’a- swaths of the region. Here again, Lebanon and Sunni sectarian conflict among in Jordan are perhaps the most seriously Syria and beyond. impacted. Also, as noted above, inside Syria there is seemingly an inexorable movement Iran’s close relationship to Assad and toward radicalization, particularly where the the Alawites, an offshoot of Shi’a Islam, opponents of the Assad regime are concerned. has helped stimulate a wider Shi’a-Sunni Moderate elements among them have been sectarian conflict among Muslims in Syria eclipsed in their influence both by the external and beyond. support for more radical and fundamentalist fighters on the one hand, and by the latter’s reputation as a committed, hard fighting force Crisis in a Region in Crisis on the other. Despite early predictions of military vic- We should not overlook the less visible, tory, mainly on the part of the opposition, no but nevertheless important training effort of military victory for them appears in sight on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps any horizon. While the Assad forces have made (IRGC). General Qasem Suleimani and his some gains, including in some critical pieces IRGC, now apparently responsible in Iran for of geography, there is also no likely military the full Syria account, have been training victory on their side any time soon. The newest Alawite militias as well as the Syrian Armed subset of the conflict between al Qaeda-linked

8 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL A DIPLOMAT’S PERFECT STORM

Forces and some of their brutal auxiliary mili- Syria rapidly accepted this proposal, and tiamen. an agreement was worked out by the U.S. and In its own form of radicalization, the Russia. UN inspectors verified the stockpiles major effect of this support from Iran within and their locations, production facilities and the Assad regime is to backstop and stiffen its unfilled delivery vehicles were destroyed, The refusal to move toward a political resolution U.S. agreed to provide a vessel (MV Cape Race) of the problems on grounds demanded by a equipped to destroy at sea the 500 tons of large part of the international community – lethal agent still in storage under UN supervi- the removal of the Assads from power. sion in Syria. Free passage within Syria for the A further Iranian training effort is also lethal chemicals was guaranteed, and Danish reported in and around the Alawite homeland and Norwegian naval vessels were committed in northwestern Syria. Here, the effort appears to transport the material to , where the to be to build up a militia which can consoli- U.S. will assume custody and responsibility for date, through “ethnic cleansing,” and defend its at-sea destruction. The apparent rapid shift this “homeland” under any and all future con- in developments in Syria has raised a number ditions. The Alawites, once oppressed by the of interesting questions. Sunni majority before the Assad ascendancy, Were the remarks by Secretary Kerry on have now turned the tables for years on their the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons former oppressors. The result is that Syria has impromptu and un-planned? Though this become the epitome of a brutal interior con- might be the case it has emerged that begin- flict with all its outrages and killings. ning at least a year or more ago the U.S. and Syria has long been known to possess a Russia had discussed the need to deal with significant capability in chemical weapons, Syria’s chemical weapons and possibly the including some modern and highly lethal option of seeking to remove them entirely nerve gases, among them , as well as a from the conflict zone. There were initial delivery capability based on Soviet doubts both about Russian readiness to actu- Scud and equipment. On August ally carry out the destruction that has begun 21, there was a major attack in Damascus from under UN supervision. There were also doubts the area controlled by the , about Syria’s willingness to go along with a killing over 1500 and using gases known to be rapid and demanding time schedule for doing in the Syrian inventory. In a seemingly unex- so. However, at this point the process is mov- pected reversal of objectives after this attack ing ahead with perhaps surprising success. and before the United States could riposte The question then arises, why did Russia with military force – there were clearly differ- align itself with the U.S. on this issue? The ent views in the U.S. public and Congress over answers here are less clear, but several need to what action to take at that point – Russia took be considered. Russia had no easy answer to the lead in following up a suggestion by the immanent U.S. use of military force in Secretary of State that the Syrian response to the regime’s August 21 gas attack, chemical weapon stockpile be destroyed, revealing their inability to meet commitments thereby shifting the terms of the debate over to the Assad regime. Of even greater concern action in Syria. for Russia was leaving the regime at risk of

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 9 PICKERING destruction and disintegration from which it Israel and others would not be seen as sup- would be unlikely rapidly to recover as a result porting the Syrian regime. Also, subsequent of the anticipated attacks by the U.S. and oth- Russian statements about the possible removal ers. Russia has also been concerned by the of the regime through negotiations have added radicalization of the Islamic elements and the to the persuasiveness of that argument. fact that their radicalism and perhaps even the Similarly, while Russia gained status and use of on both sides could standing in its own search for great power rec- quickly spread to its own 20 million Muslims ognition, the U.S. administration sought to beginning in the South Caucasus. Finally, the use this as an effort to move from the chemical in the past and today Russia issue to the broader question of a negotiated under President Vladimir Putin aspires to great political settlement in Syria. While Russia and power status which in part is exemplified by the United States are still not fully aligned on joining the United States in the resolution of the substance of such an effort, Secretary Kerry major conflicts around the globe. Co-equal was able to persuade Russian Foreign Minister status in the project of the destruction of Lavrov to support the resumption of political Syrian chemical weapons met that aspiration talks on Syria’s future, to begin on January 22 neatly and rapidly. in Geneva. The third question is whether in fact the The ultimate question is, would the use of U.S. and its public wanted to engage more military force by the U.S. have made a differ- deeply in Syria through the commitment of ence? While highly dependent on circum- military force? The uncertainties here are mag- stances, such as the target set chosen for such nified by President Obama’s decision to seek attacks, it is not clear that such U.S. strikes Congressional approval for such military com- would have altered the present situation sig- mitment, by public polling data which indi- nificantly. It appeared that one motivation for cated widespread public opposition to further such attacks was punishment for Assad’s cross- military engagement in the Middle East and ing the chemical weapons redline. The dangers Syria in particular, and by the sense of relief in of attacking Syrian chemical installations the U.S. at Russia’s acceptance of and coopera- would have been substantial with potentially tion with the program to destroy Syria’s chem- many more innocent civilian casualties. U.S. ical weapons arsenal. administration officials were clear that they A fourth question is whether the chemical would not go in that direction. A punishment weapons agreement represents a victory for the option then might involve efforts to remove Russians and President Putin in a zero sum from play areas where the regime held some contest with the U.S.? Opponents of President particularly strategic advantage over the oppo- Obama sought to describe it as such and felt sition – , , , fixed and that a major opportunity was missed by not rotary aircraft, etc. Attacks on these military using military force. The administration under- assets might have shifted the balance between stood that the arguments against this view the opposition and the regime, and that might would play out in its favor. Principally, a in turn have also reinforced the need and the Russian effort to remove from play in the possibility of moving ahead on a political set- region Assad’s most powerful deterrent against tlement. But that conclusion is based on the

10 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL A DIPLOMAT’S PERFECT STORM assumption that the targets were all well The Road Ahead known, could not be hidden, and were indeed major game changers. Many analysts would Though all roads ahead appear fraught have pointed out that stand-off and aerial with peril, there are several possible options or attacks against artillery presented a large intel- combinations of options available. ligence problem - finding and destroying them While for years there was great distrust before they could be moved involved a much and indeed scathing comment about the longer engagement and the provision of an air potential success of any political negotiation, force for the opposition. The risk of mission the failure of any faction or side to achieve creep in any broader set of options would have immediate military dominance on the field, been real. and possibly the growing in-fighting among Finally, over the past year and a half the opposition, have added to the urgency if increasing but still sporadic efforts have been not the promise of peace talks. In the mean- made to broker or find a political solution to time, the early high confidence that a military the conflict. First begun under former Secretary victory was only a few weeks or months away General of the , Kofi Annan, has declined in the face of the hard reality that these efforts early on produced an agreement neither side seems capable of prevailing mili- on some limited principles to guide the pro- tarily. In the end, the result will be heavily gov- cess in 2012. Annan has been succeeded in his erned by developments on the ground, and the leadership role of international efforts to find reaction to those developments of the warring a diplomatic solution by former Algerian parties and their supporters. Foreign Minister, Lahkdar Brahimi. A date, January 22, has now been set for the resump- Most believe that to be effective tion of talks, though it is still unknown negotiations must be pursued genuinely by whether the will participate, the Syrian parties themselves, including valid and if so which factions. representative of all the major factions. In recent days, the split in the opposition between salafists and moderates has grown with an attack by the latter on supply ware- Most believe that to be effective negotia- houses in which American assistance had been tions must be pursued genuinely by the Syrian stored prior to its distribution. The radicals parties themselves, including valid representa- have won and the moderate leadership of the tive of all the major factions. Getting them to has been dealt a serious set- the table will be the first, and as yet unfulfilled back. The U.S. has stopped distributing aid task. Only so many meetings without Syrians and there are reports of a major rethink going can take place without a rapid and serious loss on in Washington, though little indication of of credibility for the current process. what direction that might take. Enthusiasm for external military interven- tion - beyond supplying and training the vari- ous factions - seems to have diminished; cer- tainly amongst the Western external powers. Such enthusiasm peaked at the time of the

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 11 PICKERING

August 21 chemical weapons attack. The first purpose of a should be Negotiation seems now more likely than to allow time and space to address the human increased external intervention in the fighting. disaster imposed on the Syrian people by the What might be the course and importance of conflict. Feeding, sheltering and caring medi- such an effort? cally for their needs should be prioritized and At rock bottom U.S. and Russian agree- facilitated by such a step and be a primary rea- ment over the general approach and parame- son for undertaking it. Clearly, any such effort ters of any negotiations must be reached. That will also need to consider how to slow down will certainly be necessary if not sufficient. But and stop military supply, and confine military it could help to persuade others to join in, forces to areas where they are safe but cannot including Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey and engage in breaking the terms of the ceasefire. possibly Iran, each of which is a necessary Any cease fire would have to be monitored player. With that sort of consensus agreement, by the United Nations or a similar body, but it it might be possible over time to get the Syrian could not be induced or indeed controlled if players on board. Without it, it is highly major forces in Syria were determined to break unlikely the Syrians will engage seriously. it. One important role for the UN in this Many will question why they should join regard would be to set up stronger contingents in? For Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, it in and around the areas dominated by minor- would mean a decision to pursue their objec- ity populations wherever that can be done. tive of regime change by other methods. And Minorities groups will require some confi- right now these other methods may seem dence that they will not become the first vic- slightly to be gaining in credibility, especially tims of an agreement, just as the majority will as it seems that fractures in the opposition and need some confidence that depredations by military gains by the Assad regime are making strong minorities will not serve to create new the early military solution they hoped for pretenses for further warfare. appear beyond reach. A cease fire will not only provide time for While I will briefly examine later some of negotiations to proceed without undue exter- the process questions in a negotiation, it seems nal pressure, but also will allow an opportu- highly likely that the first major task after the nity to begin to re-build within Syria a legiti- Syrians engage, if they do engage, will be to mate and sustainable Syrian control structure. seek a cease fire or regional variants of a cease Here perhaps the gradual training of new and fire in Syria. Though it will not be easy, three the replacement of old security and police factors press the urgency of a cease fire. The forces by the UN and others could create first is the slaughter of innocents and the greater confidence in the future and effect the urgent requirement for greater humanitarian required change. This was done in El Salvador relief. Second, a corridor to move lethal gas to after the peace there; could it begin in Syria a port, preparatory to its destruction at sea is immediately in some areas? needed. Finally, the requirement to have some The next task will be to seek a new, tem- measure of stability during peace talks so they porary, transitional government. The negotia- will not be unduly influenced by the persistent tors will have to undertake this task. The best ebb and flow of combat. approach for dealing with Assad might well

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have to be, “In at the beginning, but out at the Conference of 2001 for Afghanistan, those par- end.” There are various ways of doing this, ties should be invited by Brahimi if, as and including appointing a group of technocrats when he believes they can bring to bear posi- not closely linked to any of the contesting fac- tive influence in the negotiating process. Most tions to undertake the initial effort at transi- controversial at the present time will be Iran. tional government. They might immediately In the West there is a strong suspicion that Iran replace Assad’s current ministers. Later they wants to cause trouble and prevent the process could move on to building up a new adminis- from succeeding. General Suleimani is not trative and governmental apparatus that is seen as friendly to a result that over time more broadly and fairly representative through shunts Assad aside. In the past, Iran was help- a negotiated time table of steps toward such a ful in Afghanistan under different conditions. change. In Bonn Brahimi opened the meetings to all Another approach might be to conduct who wished to attend. With discrete German select electoral activities under close UN super- support he then skillfully arranged the lodg- vision as part of the process. Local leaders at ings to suit his negotiating purposes - the more village and city government level might be helpful participants were lodged nearer the selected this way while the appointed techno- process venue itself and had greater access. crats govern at the national level. Over time, Conclusion elections might also become important in the future definition of national leadership. The If there is an increasing convergence of UN has strong skills and extensive experience views between the U.S. and Russia, and in the in conducting elections, even in troubled end neither wants a radicalized and frag- areas. Beginning small in each of these steps mented Syria to be a permanent condition would seem wise both to test run the process impacting Muslims around the world as well and to winnow out any mistakes early, but also as in their own territories, there is a reasonable not to stress this sensitive process, and its par- possibility of “something to work with” here. ticipants, prematurely. Continued fighting seems unlikely to produce anything but more death and carnage. The A Viable Process beginnings of some common interests in a Ambassador Brahimi will naturally have ceasefire and a stable transition are surfacing to play the leading role in any initiative, and which might be exploited to determine will most certainly have his own ideas, but whether a political solution can be crafted some thoughts based on his past success in with the parties and others. This will take sus- Afghanistan are worth considering. tained and committed diplomacy and may The primary parties concerned are Syrians. break down from time to time. However a dip- They should be the centerpiece of negotia- lomatic negotiating process should be seen tions, along with Brahimi and members of his overall as a much better result than any other immediate team. However a critical role will process is likely produce. PRISM be played by those associated with the various Syrian factions who accept negotiations and the Annan plan as its basis. Like the Bonn

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 13 Nathaniel Rosenblatt

The Road to Damascus Next Steps in Syria

BY JUDITH S. YAPHE

early three years since the start of the , no clear winner is in sight. Assassinations and defections of civilian and military loyalists close to President Bashar Nal-Assad, rebel success in parts of and other key towns, and the spread of vio- lence to Damascus itself suggest that the regime is losing ground to its opposition. The tenacity of government forces in retaking territory lost to rebel factions, such as the key town of Qusayr, and attacks on Turkish and Lebanese military targets indicate, however, that the regime can win because of superior military equipment, especially airpower and missiles, and help from Iran and Hizballah. No one is prepared to confidently predict when the regime will collapse or if its oppo- nents can win. At this point several assessments seem clear: ■■ The Syrian opposition will continue to reject any compromise that keeps Assad in power and imposes a transitional government that includes loyalists of the current Baathist regime. While a compromise could ensure continuity of government and a degree of institutional sta- bility, it will almost certainly lead to protracted unrest and reprisals, especially if regime appoin- tees and loyalists remain in control of the police and internal security services. ■■ How Assad goes matters. He could be removed by coup, assassination, or an arranged exile. Whether by external or internal means, building a compromise transitional government after Assad will be complicated by three factors: disarray in the Syrian opposition, disagreement among United Nations (UN) Security Council members, and an intransigent sitting govern- ment. Assad was quick to accept Russia’s proposal on securing chemical weapons but may not be so accommodating should Russia or Iran propose his removal. ■■ U.S. ambivalence has neither helped to shore up opposition to the Assad regime nor quelled the violence.While most observers acknowledge the complexity of the situation on the ground, Syria’s civil war is spreading sectarian and ethnic fighting and instability to its neighbors. Religious and ethnic extremists are attacking each other as well as regime targets. Sunni and Shi’a extremists may be few in number, but they are able to draw on financial support from similarly minded individuals in Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the , according to a Council on Foreign Relations study and interviews with regional experts.1 Kurdish

Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University. This article is also published as Strategic Forum 283, Next Steps in Syria (NDU Press, December 2013).

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nationalists in Syria and Iraq focus more on Abdallah Salih in , Russia and Iran anti-Turkish operations, which the Assad would negotiate an amnesty and safe exit for regime encourages. Extremists could grow in Assad and his immediate family. Officials of size and strength as the violence continues the old regime would assume a prominent role or if the United States intervenes. Fighting in the transitional government, which would Assad or foreign military intervention will be led by a “credible” regime figure with lim- draw attention and give them legitimacy, ited authority. whether religious or ethnic based. This option has several flaws. First, Russia claims to be interested in an international con- consensus on continuity reflects in part an ference to include pro- and anti-regime fac- important lesson learned from the inability tions, but it also continues to insist that an of the Shi’a-dominated government in Iraq to externally imposed solution is unacceptable. win national backing, and the highly diverse Moscow at one point hinted that it could sup- population in Syria, where Alawi, Kurds, port Syria rather than Assad, a significant shift, Christians, and other minorities all seek parity but it is unclear if Vladimir Putin’s Syria strat- with the Sunni Arab majority. egy assumes Assad remains in power. It is also not clear that Russia could deliver Assad should the international community agree on a negotiated outcome that does not include It Matters How Assad Is Removed him. It does seem certain, however, that the How regime change occurs in Syria is as Syrian opposition would not accommodate a important as what replaces the current regime. solution that includes amnesty for Assad and Assad could be removed by civil war or assas- inclusion of Baathist loyalists in the new gov- sination, by a military or party coup, or by an ernment. Assad’s opponents may lack unity arrangement brokered by foreign powers in and clarity of purpose, but they do agree on consultation with regional partners and with two points: rejection of any compromise with the Syrian regime and/or opposition factions. the old regime and exclusion of Baathist loyal- Most Syrians and Syria watchers expect there ists in a transitional authority. will be a degree of continuity in which ele- Finally, it is unlikely that Syria’s neighbors ments of the regime play a role in whatever most invested in the country’s transition—par- replaces the current government. This consen- ticularly Turkey and Saudi Arabia—would sus on continuity reflects in part an important accept a narrow Yemen-style transition. These lesson learned from the inability of the Shi’a- countries support the opposition because they dominated government in Iraq to win national prefer a broader strategic realignment that backing, and the highly diverse population in replaces a pro-Iran Shi’a or Alawite regime Syria, where Alawi, Kurds, Christians, and with a Sunni majority government that looks other minorities all seek parity with the Sunni to Ankara or Riyadh for partnership. The Arab majority. Yemen solution removed Salih but left his The Yemen Option: A Negotiated Exit. family in power and granted him immunity. It Similar to the plan negotiated by the Gulf was a bargain made by and for elites—not the Cooperation Council (GCC) that removed Ali people. The Syrian opposition is less likely to

16 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA accept half-measures negotiated by a few their strategy fails to work. The sectarian Syrian elites and their international backers. of the conflict and the proxy war that charac- The Egypt Option: Removal by Coup. This terizes Saudi and Iranian competition in Syria option assumes there is a point at which key will ultimately perpetuate a long-term low- insiders decide that the leader’s survival is intensity conflict as Syrians compete for polit- more of a liability than an asset, the examples ical power and foreign support along sectarian being the ’s removal of President and ethnic lines similar to those that divide and his successor Mohammed Lebanon. Morsi. In a Syrian version of this scenario, Iraq since 2003 offers us grim images of senior leaders remain in power and Russia and what could go wrong in Syria if and when the Iran quickly assert their influence through government collapses. Disbanding the entire them to restrict the scope of change. They cal- Baathist infrastructure and the military could culate that the higher the level of continuity have dire consequences in reestablishing a from the old regime to a transitional authority, semblance of security and stability under a the greater the chance that they will remain transitional government. Iran’s ability to stir influential. A coup, however, may produce less up local unrest using surrogate militias and continuity and greater change than antici- other assets in Iraq should serve as a warning pated. Assad’s successor will be under pressure of what it could do in Syria if Assad’s regime from many sides to respond to broader oppo- falls. Syria may not be Iraq, but a post-Assad sition concerns and to begin a process of inter- Syria will not receive the same kind of intense nal negotiation to end the crisis. He will also scrutiny as post-Saddam Iraq did under have to consolidate his base of support and American occupation. No matter how Assad establish his party’s legitimacy, which could departs, a key question remains: who or what mean opening opportunities for some actors, will protect Syrian citizens, especially its ethnic including pro-U.S. or Syrian opposition sup- and religious minorities, once the state’s insti- porters, and closing them for others. tutions collapse? The Lebanon Option: Ongoing Proxy War for What Do the Neighbors Want? Sectarian Solidarity. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf states are providing money and Syria’s neighbors—Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, arms to the Syrian opposition to fight Assad and Saudi Arabia as well as Iran—all see risk and Iranian-backed elements. This kind of in what is happening in Syria whether the involvement is a high-stakes gamble for the six Assad regime survives or falls. The nature of GCC countries, which usually shun direct mil- the risk runs from the spillover effect of mili- itary engagement. They also tend to prefer the tary confrontation, refugee flows, and stability of a government dominated by a sin- expanded sectarian warfare to loss of leverage gle strong-man military figure rather than the over key domestic and regional security inter- uncertainty of a democratically shaped Islamist ests. government, which may not share their reli- Iran: Preserving Influence, Fighting Isolation. gious or political values. Nonetheless, support The Assad regime’s survival has been a top for one set of strategies has never prohibited national security priority for Iran. Syria has these countries from switching tactics when been the Islamic Republic’s strongest regional

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ally since the 1979 . Tehran security and military forces, with which Iran is has provided Damascus with weapons, money, closely linked. logistics support, and strategic advice on deal- Enter President Hasan Ruhani. He has ing with domestic opponents while stonewall- made clear Iranians’ distaste for Assad’s repres- ing international critics. Syria is important to sion of his people, especially his use of chem- Iran for geostrategic reasons: it is a key Arab ical weapons, and hinted that the Syrian leader and Muslim ally in a region that rejects non- may not be an essential element of Iran’s Arab and non-Sunni influence; it provides Iran Syrian strategy.5 In a speech in mid-September with a platform to support Hizballah, to commanders of the IRGC, Ruhani wel- Palestinian extremists, and disaffected comed a possible deal between Washington Lebanese Christians; and it enables Iran to and Moscow to reduce Syria’s chemical weap- challenge Israel as a frontline state and disrupt ons stockpile and warned the IRGC, with units efforts at Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Under fighting openly in Syria, not to get involved in former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, politics.6 support for the embattled Assad and his Iran does not want to see a Saudi “victory” Alawite-dominated regime was also a symbol in Syria or elsewhere in the region, but efforts of national pride and revolutionary Islamic to improve relations with the Arab states have leadership in the face of American and Western failed. Egypt under the military transitional interests. authorities and Morsi have been unwilling to Iran’s leaders have preferred the civil war improve ties, open the Suez Canal to permit as an acceptable risk to full-scale regime passage by Iranian warships, or allow Iran change in Damascus. Some Iran scholars access to Gaza. Iran has also tried to expand its believe that Tehran will use every asset in its ties to political allies in Lebanon, offering arsenal to save Assad, including support for reconstruction and development assistance as him against foreign military intervention.2 well as military aid to Christian and Sunni Press sources document the presence of the communities. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) The consequences for Iran should Assad’s from the Quds Force fighting with Syrian and regime fall will be significant externally and Hizballah forces in northern and western unpredictable. Iran’s standing in the Arab Syria.3 Other experts believe Iran’s leaders are world had already been undermined by its more pragmatic; they could accept an denial of the Arab Spring’s Arab and secular alternative to Assad and may even be willing origins. The Islamic Republic could become to accede to a transitional government should more isolated and less able to intimidate its he be removed by coup, a negotiated neighbors. It will be more difficult to transfer settlement, or even outside intervention.4 Iran money and weapons to Hizballah or retaliate would insist on an interim government that against Israel. Iranian leaders before Ruhani’s included Alawite and other elements friendly election were also worried that their increas- to Iran and recognition of Tehran as ingly unpopular support for Assad could rekin- participants in any post-Assad negotiations. It dle domestic support for the Green Revolution would also insist that change in regime not protest movement of 2009. Foreign military include fundamental changes in Syria’s intervention in Syria, however, could also

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create opportunities for Iran to minimize its Lebanon, divisions in Jordan and a sectar‑ losses and even expand its regional influence. ian war in Iraq.9 Iraq: Managing the Syrian Crisis. The con- flict in Syria presents a major dilemma for Iraq The issue for most is national inter- based on inextricably linked sociopolitical, est, not sectarian identity. Maliki and most tribal, ethnic, religious, and security-based ties. Iraqis see themselves as Iraqis and first. Many Iraqis have family, clan, and tribal con- They criticize the Assad regime’s brutality, nections in Syria overlaid with longstanding Baathist origins, and lack of accountability. religious, trade, and smuggling interests. After Their greater worry, however, is that Assad the collapse of Saddam’s regime, Syrian could be replaced by a Muslim Brotherhood– authorities allegedly facilitated the transit of dominated government encouraged by Turkey, armed Sunni Islamist extremists, including Saudi Arabia, and Qatar and eager to destabi- al‑Qaeda operatives and renegade Iraqi lize neighborhood regimes that are Sunni or Baathists, across the border to fuel instability insufficiently Shi’a. in Iraq.7 Press sources indicate that this “rat- line” has been reversed as the civil war in Syria Iraq remains too divided by sectarian politics expands, with al-Qaeda in and and weakened by its own security challenges militia elements loyal to Iran, Muqtada al- to fend off Iranian pressure to support its Sadr, or Sunni tribal leaders now sending arms Syrian client. and fighters into Syria to fight for the Assad regime or against it.8 These linkages complicate Baghdad’s pol- Iraq remains too divided by sectarian pol- icy on Syria and Assad. Prime Minister Nuri itics and weakened by its own security chal- al-Maliki, who spent long years of exile in Iran lenges to fend off Iranian pressure to support and Syria, has voiced support for Assad, its Syrian client. Over time, however, this cal- advised him to accept political reforms to end culation may change. Maliki will need to the crisis, and offered to mediate between weigh carefully the costs of supporting Iran in Assad and his opponents. In a press interview Syria against the costs to Iraqi security should in late February, he warned that a victory for Assad’s regime fail. Iran will place a much rebels in the Syrian civil war would create a higher value on a compliant government in new extremist haven and destabilize the wider Baghdad if Assad falls and Iraq becomes Iran’s Middle East, sparking sectarian in his new strategic depth against the United States, own country and in Lebanon. Maliki stated: Israel, and Western influence in the Middle East. This could have serious security and eco- If the world does not agree to support a nomic consequences as Baghdad struggles to peaceful solution through dialogue . . . assert greater power under a centralized gov- then I see no light at the end of the tunnel. ernment, expand oil production and exports, Neither the opposition nor the regime can and strengthen its military capabilities. finish each other off. The most dangerous Sectarianism as a Unifier and Divider. The thing in this process is that if the opposition Arab Spring permitted long-suppressed griev- is victorious, there will be a civil war in ances among religious and ethnic groups to

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Hundreds of Syrian refugees cross into Iraq at the Peshkhabour border crossing in Dohuk Governorate on August 17, 2013 come to light. Sunni and Shi’a, Muslim and democratic model. Would he insist on rigid Christian, religious and secular, Arab and Kurd enforcement of shariah law? Would he protect were all initially part of the new discourse in the rights of all citizens, including minorities? ’s and in Baghdad. Muslim Would his party concede power if it lost the Brotherhood parties and more extremist Salafi next election? Morsi was soon under siege elements soon replaced the secular-minded from the military, which he had purged after moderates of the Arab Spring in Egypt, , his election, and from Salafis, who warned that and Libya and began to play a significant role harder-line, anti-democratic elements would in the opposition to Assad. The initial political come to power. The military’s removal of success of President Morsi, the Brotherhood, Morsi was a dangerous moment in Egyptian and more radical Salafi elements in Egypt politics, but it was also a warning to the neigh- warned Syria’s Arab neighbors of what Syria borhood of the future under sectarian rule. without Assad could become. Morsi appointed Most experts familiar with Arab political Brotherhood members to senior government history and popular culture discount the idea posts, supported a constitution reflecting the of a resurgent pan-Arab or pan-Sunni national- Brotherhood’s agenda, and asserted his control ism linking Muslim Brotherhood or other over parliament and the supreme court. For Salafi parties that have come to power or have many , he clearly favored sectarian a significant presence in Turkey, Syria, Egypt, values and interests over a nationalist or Jordan, and the Maghreb. They note the

20 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA differences in national identity, interests, cul- GCC concerns. They do, however, share a com- ture, religious custom, and ambivalence mon threat perception: all feel threatened by regarding total Islamist control of state institu- the Shi’a political takeover in Iraq, the civil war tions and political culture. But the issue lies as in Syria, and Iran’s looming shadow as a mili- well with foreign intervention. Much of the tant state whose aggressive regional stance responsibility or blame for the Islamist parties’ includes using sectarian polarization to spark success in Egypt and Syria is credited to Saudi domestic unrest in their countries. The Gulf Arabia and Qatar, who sheltered Brotherhood states actively confront Iranian interests in the members during their long years of exile from region through careful monitoring of Iranian Syria and Egypt. Responsibility for their lack of activities (especially those centered on recruit- cooperation is also placed with Riyadh and ment efforts and operational planning), secu- . Brotherhood and Salafi loyalists have rity cooperation, and the specter of sectarian- long been at odds, with Qatar backing ism, which is intended to rally popular Brotherhood affiliates and the Saudis favoring support and paint opponents and critics as more extremist Salafi groups. Iran as a Shi’a disloyal. state is seen as sectarian, encouraging Shi’a Gulf aid in Syria has gone to a number of communities in Arab Gulf states to demand a factions fighting the Assad regime. There is no share of power and threatening their Arab rul- set standard for how the GCC states choose ers for denying it. whom to support and whom to ignore in the GCC Support Is a Mixed Blessing. Saudi conflict. They probably know little about their Arabia and the smaller GCC states are autocra- clients or their reliability. It is not enough to cies whose political, social, and foreign policy be a pious Muslim and loyal to conservative behavior is shaped by traditional conservative Sunni principles. GCC support for proxies to tribal and religious values. Their reaction to challenge Iran’s allies in Syria has proved dif- the Arab Spring and the conflict in Syria ficult to confine to those who are trustworthy reflects these interests and values. They worry as proxies or who follow a patron’s policies. that Islamists in Syria will encourage domestic The GCC monarchies are playing a com- critics to demand greater political participation plex game in which their influence and ulti- and social change. The GCC states find their mate survival are at stake. Yet in all of them best defense in their oil wealth and the ability few people outside the ruling families and it gives them to buy off unhappy citizens with dominant sect are in charge of decision-mak- promises of more jobs, higher wages, better ing on foreign or security policy, and any radi- housing, and subsidies whether they are cal reorientation of policy or institutions that needed or not. Their wealth, along with citizen could affect family interests is not to be toler- acceptance of a benevolent , allows ated. During the events marking the Arab the ruling families to ignore demands for Spring, all of the GCC countries experienced accountability, greater popular participation in some degree of unrest, and Saudi Arabia, governance, and a more open economy. , and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) The GCC has no uniform political or secu- deployed GCC military units to to rity policies and foreign relations are tailored “protect infrastructure” and prevent any threat mostly to state-specific interests rather than to destabilize the government. Saudi Arabia,

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Qatar, and the UAE provided direct military Syria to maintain as much continuity as pos- support against the Qadhafi regime and urged sible between old and new governments and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to preserve Russian interests and influence. forces to remove him. Moscow wants to remain Syria’s great power The red line for the GCC states is unrest ally, but a prolonged proxy war could divide on the Peninsula itself, in Bahrain or Yemen, the country and limit Russia’s overall influence but not civil war in Syria. GCC leaders blame there. Iran for all the unrest in the Gulf, including Similarly, China opposes foreign military Bahrain, and they pledge money to many intervention in principle but is not likely to do states to keep them “secure.” Their funding of anything to prevent it. China has little eco- the proxy war with Iran in Syria does not nomic or strategic interest in Syria. It opposes increase the likelihood of military conflict the use of military force and a declaration of between Sunni Arab states and Iran. They were no-fly zones and safe havens for rebels as hap- quick to congratulate Ruhani on his election pened in Libya. China will back Russia in to the Iranian presidency in June and to recog- expectation that Russia will support it on mat- nize and reward the Egyptian military’s ters that are important to China. removal of Morsi and the Brotherhood from The question of whose interests must be public office. satisfied or sacrificed is a primary one. Is it important to offer Russia, China, and Iran What Do Russia and China Want? inclusion in the process of determining the When the Syrian crisis began, U.S. and post-Assad transition? What is the price to be European policymakers assumed that armed paid for offering them inclusion? Would intervention would lead to and Syrians, the Gulf Arabs, and Turkey find this civil war. Moscow argued this as well. Its sup- kind of bargain acceptable or useful? The cost port has been critical in helping Assad hang to U.S. interests could prove too high for a bar- onto power and many now assume that the gain that could not be kept. Finally, what hap- longer the Assad regime holds on, the more pens if the timetable on the ground in Syria likely it is that he will survive. What does outpaces the slowness of the international Russia want? Moscow might be satisfied with negotiating process? Time may not be on the a negotiated outcome that would include it, side of international mediation or engage- Iran, and possibly China in talks similar to ment. As the crisis continues, Russia could those held in Bonn that produced the Karzai become increasingly irrelevant. It could use its government in Afghanistan. Some even see this veto in the UN, but events on the ground and as a way to resolve broader issues, including not in New York will determine what happens drawing Iran into a process that could then be in Syria. linked to progress on nuclear issues. It is What Could Go Wrong? doubtful that this “Grand Bazaar”–style approach could resolve Syria’s woes quickly or What could change these assumptions? satisfactorily, nor is it likely to convince What are we missing? Several questions need Moscow or Beijing to come to the table. The to be addressed. Russians would like to delay a resolution in

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Do Tribes Matter? Tribes—membership in Tribal constituencies are essential for them, loyalty to them—define political iden- Assad as well, especially those in eastern Syria tity and reality in many areas of the Middle and areas south of Damascus. They may be as East. States observe the geographic boundaries much as 20 percent of Syria’s population; they laid out nearly 100 years ago, but several large are armed (guns, not tanks), have loyal follow- tribal confederations include constituent parts ers, and are situated in the heart of Syria’s living and trading in countries that are occa- hydrocarbon infrastructure. Syria’s tribes are sionally antagonistic.10 These tribes have com- governed by a consultative and hierarchical plex ties to influential families and political process, but once a decision is made, it is leaders that cross borders and histories. definitive. Both Saddam and the Assads gave According to press reports and interviews with the tribes autonomy in exchange for support, Iraqi political leaders, Sunni Arab tribes of but Bashar al-Assad does not have as substan- western Iraq support the Syrian uprising in tial a tribal presence as his father had. Military hopes of ending Iranian influence in Syria and intelligence monitors the tribes but may not Iraq, returning Syria to Sunni leadership and be able to contain them. Their influence in boosting their leverage with Baghdad. Others Syria and Iraq and the flow of arms to them may be assisting the Assad regime in return for will probably grow as security conditions favors from Damascus during the Iraqi surge worsen and government control weakens. of 2005–2007. Mikhail Klimentyev

Russia Wants to Preserve Interests and Influence

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Does the Baath Party or Another Political many reasons for ignoring anti-Assad move- Ideology Matter? Probably not. Neither Iran nor ments. They reject political groups that are by Saudi Arabia is thinking in strictly ideological definition Arab and they distrust the Muslim or sectarian terms. For the Saudis and other Brotherhood, which dominates the opposition Gulf Arabs, stability takes precedence over movement, for its Turkish links. The PYD/PKK democracy as a desirable endstate. They uses the Assad regime to sustain its radical offered Egypt’s military financial assistance Kurdish nationalist agenda and anti-Turkish soon after Mubarak and Morsi were removed operations. The Assad government, in turn, by the military in hopes that authoritarian rule encourages—and arms—several Kurdish would secure the stability that eluded political extremist factions to destabilize Turkey and parties, even Islamist ones. Iran under undermine the Syrian opposition. Ahmadinejad wanted to deny victory in Syria Syrian Kurdish political demands can be to the Saudis and their U.S. backers. Ruhani, seen on a spectrum from assimilation into a however, has put a high priority on rapproche- new Syrian state to self-rule or outright inde- ment with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, which pendence. The KNC has said it is interested in could be impeded by Iran’s current policy on federalism and political decentralization, Syria. which suggests an autonomous Kurdish gov- What Do the Kurds Want? , ernment to apply wherever a Kurd is. More Syria, and Iran watched enviously as Iraq’s inclusively, this would suggest the confessional Kurds made significant gains in getting exter- style of politics in Lebanon, but hardline nal protection and ultimately acquiring status Kurdish independents may seek the ethnogeo- as a self-governing province within the new graphic of Iraq. Regardless, Syria’s Iraqi state. Kurdish unity is a powerful rallying Kurds seem unwilling or unable to articulate cry, but the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and how their vision for a new state would work in Syria speak different dialects, follow different practice. They will probably reject any post- leaders, and often set opposing priorities for Assad settlement or transitional government in themselves and other Kurdish factions. which Turkey has been involved, but they have Syrian Kurds belong primarily to either few alternatives. Encouraged by Ankara, Iraq’s the (KNC) or the Kurdish leader Masud Barzani has tried to woo Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Syria’s Kurds into cooperation, but he has had Demokrat, or PYD), a branch of the anti-Turk- little success in part because of his ties to ish Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Turkey and in part because of his own ambi- , or PKK) that is based in northern tions to gamble for an independent Kurdish Iraq and operates primarily against Turkish state. targets. More than one-third of the PKK is Syria’s Kurds are unlikely to play a signifi- Syrian Kurdish. Few Syrian Kurds have joined cant role in ending or rescuing Assad’s regime, the Arab opposition to Assad, although a but they are armed and dangerous and could Syrian Kurd was named president of the exile pose a major challenge to a post-Assad govern- in 2012 in an effort ment. Whatever their ambitions or hopes, by the predominantly Arab Sunni opposition Turkey will oppose any moves by Syria’s Kurds to more actively include them. The Kurds give to acquire any form of self-rule. Syrian Kurdish

24 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA factions signed an accord in 2012 at the direct them to get involved with nonconven- encouragement of Iraqi Kurdish leaders to tional weapons. If Hizballah were to do so and unify as a means of better attaining Kurdish if Israel were to retaliate, then the expert autonomy in Syria. Despite that, it is unlikely warned, the violence would be hard to con- that the PKK/PYD will take orders from tain. “The Syrian crisis,” he stated, “would Barzani or the KNC. Internal power struggles almost be an afterthought.” within Syrian Kurdish groups are likely to con- tinue within Syria’s political vacuum. Al–Qaeda in Mesopotamia was once Should We Worry about Hizballah or encouraged by Assad to cross into Iraq to al‑Qaeda? Hizballah is directly involved in launch attacks aimed at destabilizing the military operations inside Syria in defense of country after the collapse of Saddam’s the Assad regime according to press accounts government; now it is re-entering Syria to and its leader Hassan Nasrallah.11 Hizballah attack government targets. shifted from a low-profile, high-deniability strategy to high-profile engagement when the Syrian military was unable to hold off rebel Sunni extremist factions, such as al‑Qaeda, advances. Nasrallah’s statement acknowledged are a small part of the Syrian opposition move- for the first time that the organization’s mili- ment. They operate from bases in Lebanon tary wing was fighting on behalf of Assad in and Iraq with fighters and weapons crossing Syria. In a virtual on into Syria and Syria launching retaliatory al‑Qaeda and other Sunni extremist factions, attacks on their sites in Lebanon. Al‑Qaeda in Nasrallah warned, “If Syria falls, the Mesopotamia was once encouraged by Assad Palestinian cause will be lost,” and, he pre- to cross into Iraq to launch attacks aimed at dicted, Israel then will enter Lebanon. destabilizing the country after the collapse of Hizballah is a critical component of Iran’s Saddam’s government; now it is re-entering deterrent posture. Preserving Assad is Syria to attack government targets. Leaders of extremely important, but without assistance the Syrian extremist Jabhat al-Nusra and the from Tehran and Moscow, Hizballah probably Iraqi-based al‑Qaeda announced earlier this can do little more to protect him. The costs year that they would unite efforts, but would be high and their resources are limited. al‑Qaeda leader Shaykh Zawahiri and al-Nusra Some experts believe that threats of attack denied this. Al‑Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra’s from Israel keep Hizballah from trying to presence remains relatively small and they remove advanced weapons or technology from must compete with other factions for Syria, but no one interviewed would guess the resources. This could change if violence esca- level of fear required to keep Hizballah from lates, if al‑Qaeda leaders in Iraq or Yemen see smuggling weapons into or out of Syria or the an opportunity to establish a base in ungov- degree of its loyalty to Iran should it be erned space in Syria, or if foreign forces inter- ordered to do so. One military expert said vene in Syria. Hizballah’s leaders view the possession of Does Assad Have an Exit Strategy? Bashar chemical weapons more as a hazard or burden al-Assad is described as moody, unpredictable, than an asset. He believes Iran would have to irrational, and Janus-faced. One scholar stated,

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“He will say one thing in the morning and Conclusion and Recommendations another in the afternoon.” Assad himself said in his interview with PBS’s Charlie Rose that An expert on Syria described the country casualties, referring to 100,000 dead in the as “the most begrudging society in the Middle civil war, are irrelevant in a war that is total. East. It is not like any of its neighbors, with the Some believe the breakup of Syria is inevitable possible exception of Iraq. It is a minority and that Assad and Alawi allies will eventually regime in a country of minorities.” Solutions retreat to the Syrian coast, possibly to , that recall Syria’s colonial era or an elite-level an area dominated by Alawis between the deal with foreign powers, which allows the coast and the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Assad regime a role in a transitional authority, Similarly, little is known about the prob- probably would not last, he concluded: “Even able fate of Alawis and other prominent if you break off a chunk of the regime, you Syrians supporting Assad should he retreat or need the people to agree to it or else they will be removed. The Alawite minority comprises not leave the street. If we have a negotiated about 10 percent of the country and is the exit, who steps in? It’s nothing like Yemen; you heart of Assad’s support base. They govern the can’t get around the sectarian nature of the provinces and control his military-security ser- regime.” vices. Many are politically radicalized, It is difficult to conclude from a few inter- extremely loyal, and have access to Syria’s non- views and assessments that a simple, straight- conventional weapons systems. They are also forward negotiated settlement of Syria’s polit- probably worried about their fate should the ical crisis is possible in the short term. Nor is Assad regime fall and a Sunni-dominated gov- there much evidence to suggest that Syria’s ernment take over. Some Alawis might hope diverse ethnic and religious communities will for amnesty under a successor regime, but be able to resolve their differences and success- many probably would suspect this as a ploy fully manage a post-Assad transitional govern- and join the elements used by the ment. As military confrontations continue, regime in local to initiate a bloody many of these communities are growing post-Assad insurgency. increasingly isolated and desperate. Collapse What if a desperate Assad, looking for a of the regime could magnify the risk of retali- way to retaliate or divert attention away from ation and blood feuds, tribal warfare, and, as his internal woes, attacks Israel or Jordan as a in Iraq, insurgencies fueled by religious or eth- last gasp? What if Assad decides to attack refu- nic extremists who are well-armed and ill-dis- gee safe havens in Jordan, Lebanon, or Turkey? ciplined. Are in Jordan and Syria tools that Nevertheless, a possible solution may lie Assad could use to threaten Israel and Jordan? in a settlement negotiated and monitored by No one knows at what point the Syrian leader an international consortium under UN or Arab may feel the need to resort to extreme mea- League monitors that establishes a ruling coali- sures, but his strategy is survival. He does not tion. This ruling coalition could include appear to have an exit strategy other than win- bureaucrats and technocrats from the Baathist ning through military confrontation. regime, members of the exiled Syrian opposi- tion movement, and most significantly a

26 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA cross-section of prominent Syrian civilian and Syria’s neighbors are looking to the United military leaders willing to work together in a States and the other NATO countries to lead in transitional administration. This may preserve removing Assad, but no one appears to have institutional integrity and a functional the will or courage to assume responsibility. national command authority, but the prospect A Syrian expert who worked on The Day of a peaceful transition along these lines is After Assad Project for the United States doubtful. Like Russia and Iraq after revolution, Institute of Peace (USIP) believes the regime is exiles are unlikely to be welcomed back to run a broader group than just the Assad family and the country. Moreover, the opposition groups that institutional frameworks, such as the secu- thus far appear incapable of overcoming indi- rity apparatus, the military, the justice sector, vidual differences and internecine rivalries to and police forces will survive the removal of establish a unified position. This bodes poorly the regime. A key challenge will be figuring out for their ability to govern the country. Iraq’s what elements of the regime could play a pro- post-Saddam governments survived to a great ductive role. For other Syria watchers, the key extent because of the American occupation, is not the institutional framework but its con- but even Americans’ obsession with the rule of trol by the same elements that ran it under law and proportional representation could not Assad and are complicit in his regime’s repres- prevent the rise of militias and insurgency. sive measures. Syria has long been governed There seems to be even less international con- most intimately by multiple branches of the sensus on or in Syria than there was in Iraq. security services, which report directly to the Odd Anderson

Rebel Fighters Help Syrian Women Crossing the Orontes River to Turkey

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Assad family and are complicit in the regime’s or loans from international organizations such actions. Should these elements remain, large as the International Monetary Fund or World swaths of Syrian society may reject the entire Bank will be tempered by their need to show government, extending the country’s instability independence of great powers and refusal to into the postconflict rebuilding process. Will accede to reforms or end subsidies often lessons from Iraq or the recommendations required by foreign borrowing. They will watch from the USIP study be sufficient to prevent the situation in Egypt most closely to see if the civil war or ethnic cleansing by armed Syrian Brotherhood can regain power despite efforts militias? Probably not. to break it,12 if the military turns power over to What to do about Syria is an especially civilian authority and allows free and fair elec- difficult issue for the United States at a time tions, and if the United States and wealthy when U.S. forces are withdrawing from the Arab donors continue to back the military and region and the Obama administration is look- exert influence on political succession. ing to pivot attention toward Asia. President Whatever happens in Egypt and Syria, the Obama’s recent pledge of military aid may be United States will be held responsible. Our vic- sufficient to create a pause in the fighting while tory in Iraq did not ensure a compliant succes- both sides reassess their ability to continue the sion or a smooth transition to democratic rule war or seek a cease-fire, but it is not likely to or national reconciliation, both necessary if resolve the basic conflict or bring peace. It is there is to be hope for an end to sectarian war. unlikely to weaken either side’s resolve to The options for the end of Assad laid out change the regime or save it. Most experts in the beginning of this paper remain the most interviewed believed that “these things inside likely ones. A negotiated exit and settlement Syria are going to happen regardless, but if we may be the most preferable option for the continue doing nothing, many trends will con- United States and the international commu- tinue to get worse.” If Assad leaves power or nity, but the most likely one is some version of stays in a nominal role, a large part of society the Arab option: a prolonged civil war, will remain close to his regime, especially whether by proxy or not, fought on sectarian among the Alawite community, whose mem- and/or ethnic terms with the patron/sponsor bers fear Sunni retribution. Their fight for sur- having little influence over the outcome. vival will continue, one scholar observed: Despite its announcement of limited “After forty years of ruling the country, the engagement in Syria in support of the opposi- Alawites will not be content with walking tion, U.S. policy remains unclear and unde- away. It will be messy.” clared to many observers. Does America’s new- The U.S. delay in delivering military aid to found concern for containing Syria’s chemical the Syrian opposition has probably cost it weapons and promises of military aid to the some leverage in the region, especially with opposition promise greater engagement if governments seeing Assad’s survival as a direct Assad’s forces stabilize the battlefront, retake threat to their security. Countries with Muslim more territory, cross another red line, and rout Brotherhood members in positions of influ- the Free Syrian Army (FSA)? Or is the U.S. goal ence need foreign aid and trade to survive, but to give the FSA just enough support to level the their willingness to accept American support playing field to the point where both sides opt

28 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA for a cease-fire and negotiations? If so, the and as a way to create a watchdog on the other United States may be creating a quagmire in side’s postwar behavior. which more, not less, military support and Urge the international community to sup- involvement becomes inevitable as the fighting port an interim government and monitor spreads further into Lebanon and Iraq and domestic compliance with international possibly threatens Israel as well. norms of protection to civilians. The Arab Several specific recommendations for U.S. League, Organization of the Islamic engagement are in order: Conference, and European Union (EU) should Be clear on goals. If the goal is a military support an armed UN peacekeeping mission victory, then further support to include that would offer assurances of protection to all advanced equipment may become necessary, Syrians, including Alawis and minorities, in a but the danger will be that the United States post-Assad Syria. This force would protect the slips into backing a full-blown war. If the goal transitional government and offer amnesty to is to equalize the and bring both regime supporters, excluding those responsible sides to negotiations, then the level of military for crimes against the Syrian people. The ben- and financial aid must be carefully calibrated efit for Syrians is no retaliation for past crimes, to maintain a balance. This, however, requires except for crimes against humanity. Terms cooperation from Assad’s backers, Russia and would include arrest and trial for violators. Iran, and would come at a cost to U.S. inter- ests. The , Organization of the Islamic Decide if the benefits of a broader strategy Conference, and European Union (EU) should outweigh a purely Syrian strategy. Trading support an armed UN peacekeeping mission Russian and Iranian cooperation on Syria for that would offer assurances of protection to compromise on non-Syrian issues may not be all Syrians, including Alawis and minorities, worth the cost of ending the Syrian crisis. Be in a post-Assad Syria. prepared for this strategy to fail because of Syrian resentment of what will be seen as neo- colonial intervention in their internal affairs Continue humanitarian aid to Syrian refu- and because the Russians lack the influence to gees. The aid could extend to the establish- deliver the deal. ment of safe haven zones inside Syria and Promote the Syrian Opposition might require a no-fly, no-drive zone similar Coalition13 and its military partner, the FSA, to the protection afforded the Kurds in north- and insist they form a or, ern Iraq in 1991. U.S. efforts would be if practical, on liberated Syrian territory. strengthened, but not assured, if backed by the Syrians may spurn efforts by exiles to return UN, Arab League, and EU. The risk would be and join the transitional government, but they that extended support to Syrian opposition need the talent, money and expertise of the bases inside Syria would be used by the oppo- exile community. Syrians from inside and out- sition to bring more international military side the country need to be seen participating forces directly into the fighting. in their liberation and implementing transi- Reach out to Assad’s domestic support tional justice measures to protect civil society base. Fear of retribution may outweigh fear of

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 29 YAPHE sanctions for Sunni Arab, Christian, and other Notes minorities, but the United States needs to con- vince them it is too costly to keep siding with Assad. Syrians may be more encouraged to 1 Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. defect if the U.S. military were engaged in in Iraq and Greater Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, October 2013, operations and they believed Moscow and available at http://www.cfr.org/Iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k- Washington were willing to guarantee postcon- islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811 flict security. 2 Professor Mohsen Milani (University of Make clear U.S. and international intoler- South Florida), interview by author, July 2012 and June 2013. ance for religious and political extremism and 3 See Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow . Also make clear that further efforts Commander,” The New Yorker, September 30, 2013, by terrorist organizations such as al‑Qaeda to available at http://www.newyorker.com/ reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_ cross borders to disrupt or destabilize any filkins?printable=true&c; see also Farnaz Fassihi, Jay country are unacceptable. Solomon, and Sam Dagher, “Iranians Dial Up With red lines comes responsibility for Presence in Syria,” The Wall Street Journal, September monitoring and punishing infractions. Great 15, 2013, A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB10001424127887323864604579067382861 attention and sympathy are focused on the fate 808984.html of innocent civilians, but Assad clearly links 4 Iranian scholars, interview by author, February to retribution.14 Syrians may and September 2012. 5 be reluctant to break with the regime, but the Cited by Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 16, 2013, but not seen in any other press report. point is to make it more dangerous and costly 6 Jason Rezaian, “Iranian leader responds to to support the regime than break with it. Syria weapons deal,” , September The current political turmoil in Turkey 17, 2013, A20; “Stay out of politics, Rowhani tells Iran Revolutionary Guards,” Arab , September and Egypt is not likely to have much effect on 17, 2013. Assad or the Syrian civil war. The election of 7 After a car bombing in Baghdad in 2006, Iraqi Hasan Ruhani, a cleric, former diplomat and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki claimed Syria had nuclear negotiator, to the presidency in Iran, trained al Qaeda and other foreign fighters before sending them to Iraq. In 2009, Baghdad and however, could present an opportunity to Damascus recalled their ambassadors after the change the course of the civil war. Tehran’s government of Iraq accused Syria of sheltering Iraqis support for Assad has raised questions among responsible for bomb attacks. See “Syria and Iraq,” Iranians, including some officials, who not GlobalSecurity.org, October 10, 2013, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/syria/ only see Assad as a dictator but also believe his forrel-iraq.htm opponents are “dominated by extremist groups 8 See Jessica Stern, “Iraq: Where Terrorists Go to with frightening agendas.” He cautions that School,” , March 19, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/ “Syria is a matter of national security and opinion/iraq-a-school-for-terrorists and Masters. that’s why the president can’t solely manage it. 9 “Iraq Prime Minister warns of Syria Crisis It has to be discussed with the Supreme Leader, Spillover,” Al-Jazeera, February 20, 2013, available at the Revolutionary Guards and the National http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middlee- ast/2013/02/201322812730766202.html See also Ned Security Council.” PRISM Parker and Raheem Salman, “Notes from the Underground: The Rise of Nouri al-Maliki,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2013.

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10 The Shammar, a tribal confederation of several million in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, are primarily Sunni but include Shi’a components as well. 11 Anne Barnard, “In Syrian Victory, Hezbollah Risks Broader Fight,” The New York Times, June 6, 2013, A1; Karl Vick, “The Fall of al-Qusayr: Capture of Strategic Syrian Town Marks a New Phase in the War,” Time.com, June 5, 2013, available at http://world. time.com/2013/06/05/the-fall-of-qusayr-capture-of- strategic-syrian-town 12 By mid-September, the successor government under General al-Sisi had arrested many of the Brotherhood’s and banned the organization. Morsi himself is under arrest and may be tried for crimes allegedly stemming from his 2011 imprisonment. Mubarak is under house arrest but may be retried. 13 The exact title of the Syrian Opposition Coalition is the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, which was created from the Syrian National Coalition. 14 Bashar al-Assad, interview by Charlie Rose, PBS Newshour, September 8, 2013, available at http:// www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/09/Assad- tells-pbs-charlie-rose-syria-prepared-to-retaliate-if-hit. html

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 31 ANONYMOUS

Men march during the funeral of Mohamed Ammar, who was killed by the Syrian Army in Al Qusayr, , 2012 THE RISE OF SYRIA’S POOR

The Rise of Syria’s Urban Poor: Why the War for Syria’s Future Will Be Fought Over the Country’s New Urban Villages

BY DAVID KILCULLEN AND NATE ROSENBLATT

The divisions between town and country or between the main cities and the country towns are very old social and cultural divisions and, historically, their interests have tended to be intrinsi- cally at variance. For long the peasants lived at the mercy of the cities.

–Hanna Batatu Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics

yria’s urban poor fight the Assad regime for the soul of Syria’s cities. Syrian government troops have abandoned large swaths of countryside to a fractured opposition, focusing Sresources on key loyalist leverage points: keeping connected the big four cities Aleppo, Damascus, , and , and maintaining a path to the coast. This intensely urban conflict is a byproduct of over ten years of rural village migrations into the outskirts of Syria’s ancient Men march during the funeral of Mohamed Ammar, who was killed by the Syrian Army in Al Qusayr, February 28, 2012 cities. Fueled by economic necessity and a persistent drought, these villagers created vast, insulated neighborhoods of urban poor. Three things characterize these communities: they are predomi- nantly controlled by the opposition, they have been among the hardest hit during the conflict, and their guns and recent political activism mean they will be a key power broker in the post- conflict order. Syria’s ancient cities long reigned over the surrounding villages. Urban elites traditionally wielded significant leverage over villagers: they were the landowners, market-setters for farm produce, and funders of major religious institutions. This balance has shifted over the past decade. Nepotistic economic policies and an ongoing drought fueled unprecedented migrations of rural

Dr. David Kilcullen is the Chairman and Founder of Caerus Associates.

Nate Rosenblatt is a Senior MENA Analyst at Caerus Associates.

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villagers into Syria’s cities. An explosion in assimilate such large numbers of rural Syria’s population amplifies the effects of this migrants. Today, these vulnerable communi- migration. Syria’s population doubled over the ties bear the brunt of the conflict: their young past twenty-five years, with a disproportionate male residents are armed and fighting the majority occurring in its main cities. This regime. No matter how the conflict ends, these growth has not only stretched Syria’s limited groups will have guns and grievances associ- urban infrastructure, but has also forced these ated with a lack of services, high unemploy- once-rural communities to come in near-direct ment, and extreme income inequality in an contact with the wealth of the city itself. Long indebted, post-conflict economy. For many separated from cosmopolitan city life, these armed groups, particularly Islamists, this is an urban poor now see the rich beneficiaries of a opportunity to build political constituencies. new economic policy that has tripled Syria’s Though the future of Syria is highly uncertain, GDP in the past ten years, magnifying their one thing is clear: the urban poor have risen. relative deprivation. This acute delta between Coming Down the Mountain Syria’s “haves” and “have-nots” exacerbated historic urban-rural tensions, as a flood of Despite the present conflict, rural-urban rural migrants sought assimilation into city migration is not new to Syria. Ibn Khaldun life. In , the word commonly used to recognized this phenomenon seven hundred describe the countryside is rif. The city itself is years ago. “The desert is the basis and reservoir the . In Syria today, one can hardly dis- of civilization and cities;” he wrote, “the cern where the medina stops and the rif toughness of desert life precedes the softness begins. of sedentary life. Therefore, urbanization is found to be the goal to which the No matter how the conflict ends, these groups aspires.”1 Six hundred years later, Philip will have guns and grievances associated with Khoury describes a similar phenomenon after a lack of services, high unemployment, and the creation of modern Syria: “With the ongo- extreme income inequality in an indebted, ing settlement of the tribe,” he writes, “the post-conflict economy. shaykh developed a taste for city life… He built homes in Damascus and Aleppo and began to participate in the life and politics of Today, the words rif and medina have the cities.”2 Traditionally, the city dominated developed not just geographic connotations, the country, and was able to assimilate those but social ones as well. The rif not only that decided to settle permanently inside its describes village farmers but those urban poor walls. living in the slums sprouting up around Syria’s Hafez al-Assad lived this rural-urban cities. This “village-izing” of Syria’s ancient cit- migration and understood it as the key to ies has changed the complexion of urban space social mobility. Assad once described to histo- with the growth of large unplanned, parallel rian Patrick Seale that, “coming down the communities of urban poor. Syria’s cities are mountain,” from the northeastern Alawite vil- still the gateway to economic and political lage of was, “the crucial turning point power, but they no longer have the capacity to of my life.”3 Hafez went to Lattakia in 1945 as

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the first member of his family to receive a basic “liberalization” policies. But that money was education. “Rich boys didn’t bother to work,” not for everyone. Hafez later recalled, “but simply gave them- Nowhere was Syria’s expanding wealth selves what marks they wanted at the end of more clearly denied than to the residents of its the year, and very few were the teachers who burgeoning suburbs. Mojahed Ghadbian, a dared to stand up to them.” Hafez’s now- young activist now based in the United States, embattled son, Bashar, was not shaped by this watched the posh developments of rich new history. He knew nothing of this “toughness of Damascus neighborhoods from Al Tal, a desert life.” Unlike his father, who was careful northern suburb of the capital. He remembers to pay attention to rural provincial capitals like his parents’ childhood stories of raising live- Suweida and Dera’a, Bashar built a state stock. Rare then was the trip to the city itself. enjoyed by friends and relatives like Rami Today, these burgeoning suburbs bleed into Makhouf.4 This city-centric nepotism margin- city life. The first protest of the Syrian revolu- alized a peasant class frustrated by misman- tion occurred on February 17, 2011 in the heart aged resources and scarce economic opportu- of Damascus.5 But residents of Douma, a blue- nity. It also accelerated a decade of mass collar Sunni Muslim suburb, not Damascenes, rural-urban migration. Impressively, Syria’s were the participants. “The reality of this revo- GDP nearly tripled from $21 billion to $59 lution,” says Mojahed, “is that the people who billion under Bashar’s economic started it did not have economic opportunities that those close to the regime did. They did Ammar Abd Rabbo Ammar Abd

People chant and dance during an anti-regime demonstration in Bustan Al Qasr area in Aleppo, Syria on May 10, 2013

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not have the wasta (influence) to get a good neighborhoods of urban villagers. Twenty job, nor did they have the baksheesh (bribe years ago, Charles Glass observed the early money) to buy one, either.” days of this phenomenon in his travelogue, The lack of economic opportunity in Syria Tribes with Flags. From Aleppo’s poor eastern was exacerbated by unprecedented population suburbs, the section of the city most firmly growth. Despite unreliable statistics, consider- under opposition control today, he wrote, able indirect evidence suggests Syria’s recent “Now, I realized the village had come to the population boom occurred disproportionately city, planting itself outside and growing in. The in its cities. Syria’s population almost doubled poor farmers were bringing their customs… to in the past 25 years, from 10.9 million in 1986 cosmopolitan Aleppo. …They were turning to 20.8 million in 2010.6 This population rose their apartments into compact versions of their predominantly in the slums surrounding mud houses. It was not poverty, but tradition, Syria’s cities. From 2000 to 2010, Syria grew by that had put a whole family in one room.”7 For 4.92 million people; 3.23 million of whom – thousands of years, rural migrants were assim- or nearly 65 percent - were born into urban ilated into urban life. Today, rapid population areas. Today, Aleppo and Damascus together growth and unprecedented urban migration hold approximately 4.5 million people. This have upset the historical balance between vil- means that these cities have likely doubled in lage and city life. population in the past decade. Al Tal residents The Country and City in the Present used to raise livestock; today, it is a popular Conflict destination for Syria’s underground nightclub industry. The relatively ungoverned urban sprawl The sheer mass of new urban migrants on the outskirts of Syria’s cities is the breeding makes them impossible to assimilate ground for opposition activity. Baba Amr, a smoothly. Instead, they transform large swaths slum of Homs adjacent to the orchards that of Syria’s cities into stagnant, transplanted once fed the city, is synonymous with the

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revolution.8 , once farmland outside frustrations are the same ones that drove Damascus, is another example of a boomtown to self-immolate in Sidi now besieged by Syrian government troops. Bouzid, Tunisia, on December 17, 2010. Civil The map of opposition-held neighborhoods in activists were prominent while the revolution Aleppo is almost exactly that of the blue-collar remained peaceful, but they have been side- working class Sunni neighborhoods: densely lined by this mass of urban poor who now packed, poorly planned relatively recent urban drive the violent conflict. “Syria had been emp- growth. These areas share similar characteris- tied of most of its peaceful activists,” confirms tics in that they are religious, conservative, pre- an anonymous writer in Syria.11 Unlike such dominantly Sunni Muslim working class com- activists, Syria’s urban poor cannot leave. munities with transplanted villagers long Armed groups take advantage of neighbor- ignored by the government and deprived of hoods like Tadamon by providing residents services and economic opportunity. with jobs, services, and basic necessities. That These neighborhoods of urban poor are is how they get them to fight. Today, these the most heavily contested in Syria. According groups spend as much time fighting each other to Syria Tracker, a collaborative, crowd-sourced as they do the Syrian government, recognizing effort to document and geo-tag deaths in Syria, the economic and political benefit of control- there have been 14,125 deaths since the begin- ling these neighborhoods. Tadamon could not ning of 2013. Of those 14,125 deaths, over half afford to keep armed groups out. have occurred in Aleppo and Damascus and Nowhere is this divide clearer than in their surrounding suburbs. Syrian Martyrs, one Aleppo. The rebels started the insurgency there of the contributors to this effort, was able to in late July 2012, dragging the city’s eastern track deaths at the neighborhood level. By suburbs into the fight. “We liberated the rural December 2012, they estimated that more than parts of this province,” said a rebel fighter in half of all deaths in Aleppo occurred in only the first days of the rebel offensive. “We waited 15 of 56 city neighborhoods.9 In Damascus, and waited for Aleppo to rise, and it didn’t. We 65% of all deaths occurred in only seven couldn’t rely on them to do it for themselves neighborhoods.10 These neighborhoods gener- so we had to bring the revolution to them.”12 ally share three things in common: they have The attack was poorly organized because the grown rapidly over the past decade, they align rebels thought the city would fall to them closely with the opposition (in many cases easily. “Insurgents went in divided and they are controlled by the opposition), and are overconfident,” writes International Institute predominantly poor, working class city sub- for Strategic Studies scholar Emile Hokayem. urbs. “The mostly rural fighters made no attempt at In Tadamon, a neighborhood of outreach and offered no guarantees to the Damascus, people were considered criminals city’s terrified residents and anxious and homeless. “These were the projects,” said minorities.”13 Most Aleppans had little interest one activist. “You don’t start a revolution from in the conflict; many came to the city from these places.” For these communities, the rural communities and did not know their way Syrian revolution is not about new govern- around. This only reinforces the reality that the ments; it is about the economy. Their

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revolution began with young activists but is destroyed infrastructure. The poorest neighbor- now fought by the urban poor. hoods are home to many refugees – they are The neighborhoods that accommodate among the most vulnerable populations the rebel fighters do so out of economic neces- affected by some of the heaviest conflict. sity. Rebel groups provide cash and arms to Unlike rich Syrians, the urban poor cannot neighborhood kids, who often constitute the rent an apartment in to wait out the informal police forces in opposition-held conflict; these are the areas from which many areas. They are then called Ibna’ al-Hayy of the one million plus registered refugees flee. (“sons of the lanes”), a loaded term suggesting The UN recognizes this, declaring recently that that foreign-funded militant groups have local 10 million persons, or more than half of the concerns in mind. Now, the majority of the pre-war population of Syria, will need human- money and the training comes from Islamists itarian assistance by the end of 2013.14 If the who provide economic opportunity, social ser- level of destruction and death in major city vices, and law enforcement that both the suburbs is any indication of need, humanitar- regime and the secular opposition fail to offer. ian agencies must prioritize the urban poor’s The secular fighters once offered an alternative, needs. but infighting and lawlessness among the so- In the absence of effective international called “Free Syrian Army” has led to its demise. efforts to provide relief and security, intense Basic services and honest dealing is how these localism blooms. Neighborhood gangs run Islamists gained a foothold in the poor neigh- rampant. Lawlessness is rife. Warlordism is on borhoods. Today groups like Jabhat al Nusra the rise. Iraqi sociologist Ali al-Wardi observed and others are the most respected law of the this phenomenon in Baghdad fifty years ago: land. the insularity of rural migrant communities means that they continue to rely on group and kinship ties to provide protection. In the Unlike rich Syrians, the urban poor cannot rent absence of state or municipal efforts to provide an apartment in Beirut to wait out the conflict; security and rule of law enforcement, these these are the areas from which many of the groups reinforce their position as quasi-gov- one million plus registered refugees flee. ernments.15 Before the conflict, these highly insular communities built their own solutions to basic service provision and, to some extent, The Future of Syria’s Urban Poor even rule of law enforcement. Now these com- This problem of unmanaged urban sprawl munities are armed. This has major implica- will be even worse after the conflict. Syrian tions for the future of the Syrian state: for average life expectancy is reportedly 75 years, when local militias take charge of their own yet less than 8 percent of the country is over services, they are loath to return them to insti- 55. This means that Syria is due for a popula- tutions they do not control. If you are looking tion bulge despite the deaths of tens of thou- for a model for Aleppo’s future, Libya’s second sands of young men in the past two years. This city of Benghazi is not a bad place to start. population growth compounds the damage Amid this chaos, one ideological frame- inflicted on Syria’s already dwindling or work overcomes community insularity and

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provides workable solutions for providing the lawlessness and religiosity of opposition- basic necessities and an effective cross-neigh- held Syria. Central Damascus and parts of borhood governing structure: religion. Islamist regime-held Aleppo remain the safest parts of groups thrive in these neighborhoods. They are the country. But the fear felt by these loyalists generously funded, well equipped, highly is more visceral than and the chaos experienced and the least corrupt organiza- of opposition-led Syria. It is not the Islamists tions among opposition groups in Syria. They they fear, but rather the cause of Islamism also provide a framework for governance that itself that they fear: the uneducated, vulnera- is familiar to each community: though civil ble, long-oppressed communities of the Rif society was heavily repressed in Syria, religion who now rise up against them. “There was not was afforded greater leeway to operate. In tap- one person who demonstrated in Harasta (a ping into this network of frustrated urban Damascus suburb) who could read,” one poor, Jabhat al Nusra is quickly becoming the Damascene industrialist explained to Daily Hezbollah of Syria’s Sunni Muslims. In Star reporter Lauren Williams in March; “They Aleppo, four Salafist Jihadist groups, led by were illiterate and angry. They would rather see Jabhat al Nusra, have set up the country destroyed.”18 In Aleppo, an activist Commissions that are to date the only effective in regime-held areas of the city describes the law enforcement bodies in opposition-held feeling among those still loyal to Assad: “A lot areas of the city. They have a police force, a of people are closer to the opposition in these judicial body, a religious scholarship network areas (than you think),” he writes, “but after that issues fatwas (legal rulings), and a services the theft and lawlessness that occurs among branch that even runs public transportation elements of the Free Syrian Army, there is services.16 Combining armed groups with civil- major concern among residents over newly ian assistance delivery mechanisms like the freed areas.” When the opposition recently Sharia Commission, these religious groups took the key strategic neighborhood of remain the only cohesive structure that pro- Maqsoud, he reports, armed elements stole tects residents and provides basic services in more than 300 cars and looted local shops. opposition-held areas. A new civilian council Conclusion was formed for Aleppo City recently after elec- tions in Gaziantep,17 but has yet to display the While country towns Dera’a and capability to curb pervasive lawlessness or the sparked Syria’s revolution, their fight quickly rigorous self-discipline to avoid local percep- metastasized to Syria’s cities. The first violent tions of corruption. The longer the conflict outbreak of the Syrian conflict took place in continues, the more powerful these Islamist Homs, where the frustration of the urban poor groups will grow because they are winning boiled over into open hostility. Brought on by over Syria’s urban poor. the grievances of village communities This dynamic not only improves the lot of crammed into Baba Amr’s unplanned slums, extreme Islamists among the opposition, but Syria’s rebels took a stand. Today the commu- also reinforces the appeal of the Syrian govern- nities of urban poor in the hands of the oppo- ment in pro-regime areas. To these residents, sition are the hardest hit during the conflict the regime increasingly represents order amid

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 39 KILCULLEN AND ROSENBLATT

Their frustrations and their guns will motivate moves to Damascus from the fictional a key power base in Syria’s post-Assad future. Christian village of Mala. There, he falls in love Sixty years before Dera’a, a group of young with a Damascene girl: “She spoke fluent activists sought to transform similar rural French,” Elias recalls, “which sounded to his grievances into a revolutionary political move- ears like civilization, liberation from cow dung ment. Much as now, these activists dreamed of and the smell of sweat.” In another chapter, a revolution that would lift the Arab world out Schami writes of a Damascene police officer of its collective myopia. “Ba’athism” was the sent to Mala to resolve a dispute between the term they coined – “renaissance” – to describe village’s two main families: “The CID officer their lofty aspirations. But the dreams of knew that by giving away the name he might and Salah ad-Din al-Bitar, the cause a murder, but he hated peasants and the movement’s co-founders, required the power very smell of them. In the city, he would never of Syria’s rural community to channel their have revealed the identity of a man who had ambitions into political power. Enter Akram laid a complaint, not for all the money in the al-Hourani, a “Syrian Castro,” who rallied world.”20 Sixty years ago, the peasants rose up hundreds of thousands of Syrian workers to and were granted Ba’athism. Today, this pan- the cause of . According to historian Arab socialism is tarred with the brush of Patrick Seale, Hourani “roused the peasants, Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein. politicized the army, and gave the theorists of Today a new order grips Syria and much the Ba’ath a cutting edge. The anger of country of the Arab world. Islamism is on the rise. Post boys, raging against the entrenched privilege Arab-Spring demands for “one man – one of the cities, was given a sharper focus by his vote” push the urban poor into government. example.”19 In 1953, his socialism combined Their superstitions and suspicions are chan- with al-Bitar and Aflaq’s Ba’athism to create neled into a new, untrained mandate for reli- the modern-day Arab Socialist Ba’ath party gious-based government. When the conflict that now rules Syria. The Ba’athist revolution finally subsides, many activists and regime in Syria would not have been possible without lackeys will have left the country. the support from the very same communities Picking up the scraps of what remains, Syria’s they fight today. urban poor will try to rebuild it without the Unlike sixty years ago, when the country- knowledge and experience of generations of side rose up against the city during Hourani’s rich Syrians who have abandoned it for greener time, contemporary urbanization in Syria pastures. PRISM means the city has risen up against itself. The fight for Syria’s future is a fight for the future of its cities, pitting urban-rural tensions in smaller, denser pockets of ungovernable spaces. One remarkable work of recent fiction captures the essence of the deeply-felt suspi- cions of the city and the country. In The Dark Side of Love by Syrian author Rafik Schami, Elias, one of the book’s central characters

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Notes accessed at http://www.syrianassistance.com/6/ post/2013/02/syriaa-battle-royale.html 14 Martin Chulov, “Half of Syrian population 1 Franz Rosenthal, trans., The Muqaddimah: An ‘will need aid by end of year’,” The Guardian, April Introduction to History (Princeton: Princeton 19, 2013, available at at http://www.theguardian.com/ University Press, 1967), 93. world/2013/apr/19/half-syrian-population-aid-year 2 Philip Khoury, Syria Under the French 15 Ali al-Wardi, A Study in the Society of Iraq, Mandate, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, (Baghdad, 1965). 1987). 16 From a twitter post by reporter Jenan Moussa 3 Patrick Seale, Asad, the Struggle for the Middle while in Aleppo, dated April 7, 2013, Available at East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), https://twitter.com/jenanmoussa/sta- 11 . tus/320964677851041792 4 See, for example: Oliver Holmes and 17 See the council’s active web presence on Suleiman al-Khalidi, “Syria moneyman is target of display here: https://www.facebook.com/ anti-Assad hatred,” Reuters, July 18, 2012, available at TheLocalCouncilOfAleppoCity and news about their http://reut.rs/173NqFC election here: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ 5 It was a spontaneous protest outside the syrians-vote-for-aleppo-council-. famous Souq al-Hamidiyeh market in downtown aspx?pageID=238&nid=42271 Damascus. The Interior Minister himself arrived 18 Lauren Williams, “Damascus Split on Support quickly to disperse the protest after police were for Regime” The Daily Star, March 21, 2013, available unable to stop the demonstrators. The first words at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle- shouted in the video are “Haramiyeh! Haramiyeh” East/2013/Mar-21/210937-damascus-split-on-support- (“Thieves! Thieves!”) in reference to the corruption of for-syrian-regime.ashx#ixzz2QySY8aqI the regime, available at https://www.youtube.com/ 19 Seale, Asad, Op.Cit., 49. watch?v=qDHLsU-ik_Y 20 Rafik Schami, The Dark Side of Love, Anthea 6 These figures are all courtesy of the World Bell (trans.), (Northampton, MA: Interlink Books, Bank (databank.worldbank.org) and date from before 2009). the start of the uprising. 7 Glass, Charles, Tribes with Flags: A Journey Curtailed (London: Secker & Warburg, 1990), 165. 8 See, for example: Erika Solomon, “Syrian army recaptures symbolic Baba Amr district in Homs,” available at http://reut.rs/104zXWO 9 In order from most to fewest: Salah ad-Din, al-Sukkari, Bustan al-Qasr, al-Sha’ar, al-Firdos, Hanano, al-Haydariyah, Sakhour, Tariq al-Bab, al-Marjeh, Qadi Askar, Saif al-Dawla, Karm al-Jabal, Bustan al-Basha, and al-Amriyah. 10 In order from most to fewest: al-, , al-Hajjar al-Aswad, al-, Tadamon, Yarmouk, and Sayyida Zeinab 11 An anonymous author from Syria under the pseudonym “Rita” writes “Syrian Activist Communities: The Inside,” openDemocracy weblog, April 16, 2013, available at http://www. opendemocracy.net/rita-from-syria/syrian-activist- communities-battle-inside 12 Erika Solomon, “Rural fighters pour into Syria’s Aleppo for battle” Reuters, July 29, 2012, available at http://reut.rs/1dwT1VT 13 Emile Hokayem, “Syria’s Battle Royale,” Syrian Assistance (Blog post), February 12, 2013,

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 41 REUTERS/Muzzafar Salman

Abu al-Taib, leader of Ahbab Al-Mustafa Battalion, during a military training for female fighters in a in the Seif El Dawla neighbourhood in Aleppo” Syria’s Salafi Networks More Local Than You Think

BY WALEED AL-RAWI AND STERLING JENSEN

ne of the key factors contributing to the success of efforts to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was that “foreign” fighters, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and others primarily Ofrom Jordan and Syria, dominated the organization. These outsiders attempted to impose their influence in Iraq, alienating local Sunni communities and turning them against AQI. Will Syria’s extreme Islamists make the same mistakes, or will they build strong local connections? Will they play the role of spoilers in the political process, as suggested by announcements coming from the Nusra Front and others, or can they be convinced to participate in the political process? Reports indicate there are up to 10,000 foreign fighters, many affiliated with al-Qaeda, currently in Syria.1 In what directions and how far will they pull the Syrian opposition? Security analysts are raising questions about the organizational structure, ideology and poten- tial unintended impacts of Salafi networks within the umbrella of Syrian Islamist groups fighting the Assad regime in Syria.2 Whatever the post-conflict power sharing arrangement, important decisions must be made about these Salafi networks: will they be spoilers or will they be power- ful political brokers? There is no question that battlefield heroes will wield significant sway; however the secular opposition groups supported by the West lack discipline, loyalty, and a united overarching vision for a post-Assad Syria. Meanwhile Syrian Salafi jihadists have set themselves apart from traditional armed groups like the Free Syrian Army (FSA), gaining popularity and credibility due to their bravery, guerrilla fighting capabilities, access to arms, financing and unit- ing ideology.3 As Salafi influence grows, the secular elements of the Syrian opposition still strug- gle to obtain strategic weapons, training, and international financing to help make tangible military advances on the ground.

Dr. Waleed al-Rawi is a retired general in the and from 2001 to 2003 was Department Head of Research and Development in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Dr. Waleed has published three books in Arabic about political and armed movements in the Islamic world. His latest book, The Iraqi Islamic State, was published in 2012 in , Jordan. Sterling Jensen is a Research Associate at the National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.

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Yet, while Salafists are united fighters, they form stronger ties with foreigners sharing sim- lack political flexibility and maturity.4 They are ilar Salafi views, than with their own national not like their fellow Islamists in the Muslim compatriots. This aversion to internationally Brotherhood who have a deeper history in accepted state structures such as a secular political Islam and are well structured. Salafists autocracy or democracy becomes an obstacle and members of the Muslim Brotherhood during times of national reconciliation, espe- share the same historical sources of Sunni cially in a country like Syria, which is multi- jurisprudence, but in the 20th century divi- ethnic and sectarian. sions arose in Egypt during the Nasserist era Much has been written on Salafi groups in that led to the radicalization of disillusioned Syria; however, this article addresses the wide members of the Brotherhood—most notably diversity among Salafists and likely scenarios Egyptian Sayed Qutb.5 Sayed Qutb’s writings that might emerge based on lessons learned and interpretation of are an important from Iraq. Whether Syrian or foreign, many of source for contemporary Salafi jihadists. Since the competent Salafists fighting in Syria have the Nasserist era, the Muslim Brotherhood has combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen remained more vertically structured and polit- and Libya. Each of these presented ical than the Qutbists, while the Qutbists have new challenges and opportunities that taught been more clandestine and horizontally struc- jihadists valuable lessons and will likely influ- tured. ence their behavior. This article is structured as follows: first, a while Salafists are united fighters, they lack brief background of Salafism in Syria; then a political flexibility and maturity look at the range of Salafists within the Syrian opposition; next, Salafi lessons from Iraq for Syria; and finally, an examination of three sce- As seen in Iraq after 2003, Salafi networks narios describing how Salafists might react were useful when the Iraqi national resistance when the Assad regime falls and a transitional needed fighters, resources and expertise to government is proposed. fight the U.S. occupation, but they were highly Salafism in Syria disruptive and divisive when the Iraqi Sunni resistance wanted to get more involved in the Salafism has deep roots in Syria. Most political process. Additionally, Salafists lack modern Salafists look to the writings of four- experience and know-how in international teenth-century Syrian cleric Ibn Taymmiya finance and economics, and therefore cannot who taught and was incarcerated in Damascus offer their constituencies a prosperous life and wrote about fighting jihad against the once their struggle, whether armed or not, has Mongol occupation of Muslim lands. Ibn ended. Egypt recently experienced this with Taymmiya also wrote about those he viewed as Salafists, who aligned with the Muslim heretics, in particular the Shiites, who Salafists Brotherhood, but have become spoilers in do not recognize as Muslims. Additionally, in Egyptian efforts to revitalize the economy. the last century a few Syrian Salafi scholars Finally, Salafists are generally adverse to non- have helped shape the actions of Salafi Islamic state structures, and therefore often

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jihadists and members of the Muslim The second school of thought, predomi- Brotherhood in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and nantly supported by the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere. and traditional Salafists, generally argued that Following the Iranian Revolution, from armed jihad is not permissible in Muslim 1979 to 1982 Syria endured a brutal crack- countries where no foreign occupation exists. down on political Islam.6 Inspired by the rise Instead of fighting their own regimes, these of Islamic revolutionaries across the region, jihadists were encouraged to return to their the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood home countries and either be examples of attempted to overthrow the Assad regime and Islamic living in their local communities, or was crushed. Many of Syria’s Salafists learned organize politically to prepare, non-violently, from this failure that they could not rely on for more Islamic governments. Traditional political Islam to confront a dictator. To sur- Salafists largely returned to Gulf countries, vive they either needed to not threaten the whereas the Muslim Brotherhood and its affil- authoritarian or to be better organized, expe- iates found modest space for Islamic activism rienced and trained to confront the state mili- in Algeria and Jordan. tarily. They distanced themselves from the Two prominent Syrian thinkers emerged Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and sought alter- from the Afghan experience and represent the native adaptations of political Islam. Many two different schools of Salafist thinking. The Syrian Salafists went to the jihad in first, Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Afghanistan after the 1982 crackdown partly Naser, also known as Abu Musab al-Suri, was as a means to gain valuable military experi- heavily critical of the Muslim Brotherhood and ence. the role of political Islam. In his 1989 work, Differences between Salafi camps, as well The Islamic Jihadi Revolution in Syria, then his as their relationships with the Muslim 2004 opus, The Global Islamic Resistance Call, Brotherhood, crystallized in Afghanistan dur- al-Suri argues that the Muslim Brotherhood’s ing the fight against the Soviets beginning in approach of political Islam failed in Syria in 1979. Two main jihadist schools of thought 1982 and will fail in other countries.7 A second emerged from the Afghanistan experience. The prominent Syrian Salafist thinker, Mohammed first advocated exporting jihad to countries in al-Saroor, developed a niche between the Salafi which Muslims were repressed, including their jihadist camp and the Muslim Brotherhood own countries. They believed the Afghanistan camp. Born in 1938, Saroor joined many experience provided a training ground for Syrian Salafists in distancing himself from the jihadists to fight any government they deemed Muslim Brotherhood after its uprising failed in un-Islamic, regardless of there being a foreign 1982. After the brutal assault on the religious presence or not. This was popular among the community, particularly in Hama, Saroor extremist elements such as Ayman al-Zawahi- sought refuge in Saudi Arabia then England. ri’s Egyptian Gamaa al-Islamiya. Salafi jihadists Saroor developed an approach to Salafism that of this school either stayed in Afghanistan with is both academic and practical: willing to the or joined jihadist causes in other accommodate Muslim leaders even if they are countries. aligned with Western and secular governments. While followers of Saroor may share the

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 45 AL-RAWI AND JENSEN AFP PHOTO GUILLAUME BRIQUET

Nusra Front fighters in Aziza, near Aleppo in April, 2013

revolutionary fervor and sectarianism of Salafi the more active Syrian Salafists have moved jihadists, they fall more closely in line with the abroad, whereas the less active Salafists Muslim Brotherhood approach of a political remained in Syria but supported Salafist causes Islam willing to work within a democratic abroad. political system. Three Types of Salafi Groups Operating The Syrian government has also played a in Syria role in developing the Salafi networks in Syria. Despite the Baathist government’s distrust of Today there are three main Salafi camps Salafists, after the U.S.-led Coalition Forces operating in Syria: 1) the moderates, 2) the invaded Iraq in 2003 the Syrian government traditional and scientific, and 3) the radical nurtured relations with foreign jihadists seek- jihadists. Moderate and traditional Salafists ing to fight the Americans in Iraq. This rela- largely fall within the school of thought which, tionship developed through the years and like the Muslim Brotherhood, did not advocate played an important role in the rise of al-Qae- revolutionary and violent jihad in their native da’s offshoot the , as Syria countries after the Soviet withdrawal from became its main safe-haven in the region, Afghanistan. The moderate or al-muatadhila or along with Syria’s ally Iran.8 al-wasitiya Salafists are now the most liberal of The Syrian uprising in 2011 ushered in the the three camps. Moderate Salafists resemble “activation” and return of many Syrian Salafists the Muslim Brotherhood with their adoption who previously were involved in jihadist of political Islam. These moderate Salafists tra- adventures abroad. In the past the secular ditionally do not advocate the use of violence Syrian government has been hostile to Salafists against their governments as the radical Salafi and practitioners of political Islam, therefore jihadists do, but accept organizing politically

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to participate in the political process of their themselves because they do not want to be countries. While moderate Salafists are similar seen as political parties or opposing their gov- to the Muslim Brotherhood in disavowing the ernment. They generally avoid confrontation use of violence, moderate Salafists compete with government leaders in Muslim countries. with the Muslim Brotherhood as the voice of Most believe that a Muslim ruler, even if political Islam. The group Harikat al-Muminoon flawed, must be obeyed. These likely represent Yusharikoon (The Believers Participation the largest group of Syrian Salafists. Many tra- Movement) fits the moderate mold: this is a ditional Salafists follow the teachings of Syrian Salafi group that does not support the Muslim thinker Mohammed al-Saroor and are called Brotherhood, but believes in using the demo- the Sarooreen. While the Sarooreen don’t have cratic political process to achieve its Islamic an official armed group, their philosophy and goals. Members of this movement are concen- interpretation of Islam is spread out in differ- trated in the southern Syrian city of Dera’a as ent groups ranging from those oriented toward well as the outskirts of Damascus. They claim the Muslim Brotherhood to the radical Salafi to have 3700 active fighters and 2300 fighters jihadists. Sarooreen are well represented in on reserve.9 This group is led by Sheikh Louay units of the new Syrian (SIF). al-Zabi, a Syrian veteran jihadist from The SIF was announced on December 21, 2012 Afghanistan who followed and comprises eleven armed Salafi groups to Sudan as one of his drivers. He also partici- working in Syria. These Salafi groups, includ- pated in the jihadist fight in Bosnia in 1995. ing the Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham (Liberators of Sheikh Louay joined those within the Salafi the ), seek the downfall of the jihadist camp who opposed the September 11, Assad regime and a future government based 2001 attacks. He was subsequently imprisoned on Islamic principles for all Syrians.11 The SIF in Syria. In an interview with Asharq al-Awsat is led not by one leader, but by a coalition of in September 2011, Sheikh Louay estimated different armed Salafi groups seeking the that 60% of Syria’s Salafists support the prin- ouster of the Assad regime and a modern ciple of a democratic political system.10 Syrian state based on sharia law. The SIF plans Then there are the taqlidiya (traditional) to organize politically and join the political and al-salafia al-elmiya (scientific) Salafists who process of a future government.12 share the end goal of other Salafi jihadists, but Finally the radical Salafi jihadists espouse do not believe in jama, or organizing the the revolutionary spirit of Egyptian scholars Islamic community, to overthrow Muslim gov- Sayed Qutb and Ayman al-Zawahiri and ernments. Traditional Salafists participated in strongly advocate the use of violence to bring the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, but did sharia law to Islamic countries, eventually turn- not continue radical jihadist activities in their ing them into parts of an Islamic caliphate. home countries or adopt the Muslim The radical Salafi jihadists likely represent the Brotherhood’s political model. Islamic purists smallest, yet most impactful and noteworthy believe the Quran prohibits political parties Salafi group. These are aligned with Jabhat al- other than Allah’s. Traditional and scientific Nusra, or the Nusra Front. In January 2012 the Salafists support jihadist efforts, but tradition- Nusra Front’s leader Abu Mohammed al- ally do not actively participate or organize Golani claimed responsibility for suicide

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 47 AL-RAWI AND JENSEN

bombings in Damascus and announced the Islamic community.16 A statement by a group formation of the Nusra Front for Syria, which of al-Qaeda-affiliated Salafi jihadists on is believed to have originated in Iraq.13 The October 10, 2012 highlights differences Nusra Front seeks to unite Syrian jihadists, between the moderate and traditional Salafists many of whom had previously fought in Iraq, who adopt political Islam as does the Muslim but had since left for Syria or other countries.14 Brotherhood, and the more radical Salafi Al-Golani insists that Syrian veterans of jihad jihadists. This statement, published on the in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries lead International Jihad Network’s website, lam- the Nusra Front, as opposed to the foreign basts the Muslim Brotherhood and its fighter-led resistance efforts headed by Abu approach of supporting a future democratic Musab al-Zarqawi against U.S. forces in Iraq Syrian government and constitution based on after 2003. Yet, there are reports of some popular elections. It claims the Muslim Jordanian leaders in the Nusra Front. The Brotherhood does this to appease the West and Nusra Front’s declared objective is to “restore that they are willing to join hands with the Allah’s Sultan and revenge innocent blood.”15 enemies of Allah to gain power. The statement Radical Salafi jihadists condemn any effort says: “Oh you people of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, at bringing a political system to Syria other Tunisia and Iraq, wherever the ‘Bankrupt’ than an Islamic state. They believe not only Brotherhood [Muslim Brotherhood] is found, that a democratic system is un-Islamic, but your choice is either with them where you will that it will be compromised by corrupt and receive international support and military and Western-backed leaders who will suppress the financial aid and only have benefit in this ANONYMOUS

Syrian rebels stand atop Sham II, a homemade armored vehicle

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short life [or with Allah] because in the next condones or turns a blind eye to jihadist life you will be harshly punished with the efforts against the regime. This has caused a pains of the fire of hell.”17 These radical Salafi flooding of foreign fighters into Syria. Foreign jihadists seek to build an Islamic State in Syria, fighters in Syria are called muhajereen, reminis- similar to the Islamic State in Iraq. In fact, in cent of the followers of the early April of this year the head of the Islamic Mohammed during the hijra, or escape from State of Iraq (ISI) announced the ISI and Nusra to Medina. Front would be merging into the Islamic State Regional support for Salafi networks in of Iraq and the Levant.18 Al-Qaeda leader Syria is largely non-state sponsored. Support Ayman al-Zawahiri has since clarified that ISI to the Syrian opposition from key state spon- and the Nusra Front should remain separate sors, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and entities, but that they should cooperate on the UAE is primarily monetary and is funneled shared goals. Even though members of the through Muslim Brotherhood networks, as Nusra Front do not expect to be able to control well as the Syrian National Coalition. To date, all of Syria’s territory, they wish to establish the state sponsors are not directly providing safe havens as ISI has done in Iraq. They will arms to Salafists, though their financial sup- use Syria as a base for future attacks against port is likely being used to buy arms. However, Israel, as “liberating” Palestine will be a main wealthy Salafists in the Gulf countries, calling card.19 Lebanon and Turkey are giving both financial and armed support to Salafi networks in Syria. Regional Ties to Salafi Groups in Syria These wealthy Salafists also support jihadists The ongoing conflict in Syria has given from their own countries trying to enter the local and regional Salafi networks an opportu- fight in Syria. Most foreign fighters have to go nity to undermine the Alawite-led (Shiite) and through Lebanon or Turkey to enter Syria, as Iranian-backed Assad regime. As a result a full it is difficult for them to enter and exit through spectrum of Salafists is currently rallying in Jordan and Iraq.20 support of regime change. Syria has become Salafi groups in Iraq, Jordan and Syria their gathering point partly because the inter- have an interconnected history. These ties national community, including their own began in the 1970s with the rise of the dawa, countries, is interested in regime change and or evangelical Salafists who sought to revive

Table 1: Three types of Salafi groups operating in Syria

The Believers Participation Movement led by Sheikh Moderates Louay al-Zabi The led by a coalition of Traditional & Scientific armed Salafi groups leaning toward the phi- losophy of Mohammed al-Saroor The Nusra Front led by Abu Mohammed Radical Jihadists al-Golani

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religiosity in their communities in response to council that Zarqawi established and in 2011 the rise of Arab Communist parties. Ties it ordered the shura’s affiliate ISI to send between Salafists in these countries were not resources to aid the fighters in Syria. This same organized, but groups were nonetheless united Jordanian-oriented shura council has also by common beliefs. They exchanged pam- named the leader of the Nusra Front and is the phlets and recorded sermons of Salafi thinkers. body behind a new Islamic State of Iraq and The Salafi jihadist migration to Afghanistan in the Levant. The presence of Zarqawi’s close the 1980s solidified some of these relation- associates—including his former brother-in- ships. After the first in 1990, a num- law—in the leadership of the Nusra Front sug- ber of Iraqi Salafists moved to Jordan and Arab gests that elements within this radical group Gulf countries for refuge and refined their reli- come from the same highly sectarian line of gious thought, mostly as unaffiliated Salafists thought as Zarqawi, and would push for an without a clear political platform. Sfter the increase in sectarian violence and possibly for- , many of Iraq’s Salafists bid political participation.25 moved to and from Syria.21 Some leaders of the Nusra Front report- Many Jordanian influences are active in edly forged relations with other Arab jihadists Syria.22 In fact, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s in Afghanistan during the late 1980s, then dur- brother-in-law Ayad al-Tubaysi, also known as ing the reign of the Taliban in the , and Abu Jalybib al-Tubaysi, commanded a unit in in Iraq after 2001.26 This is where they worked the Nusra Front until his death. There are over with Zarqawi,27 and likely with other well- 700 Jordanian jihadist fighters currently in known jihadists such as Libyan Abdul Hakim Syria. The Nusra Front’s Shura council report- Belhadj who is now commander of the Libyan edly appointed the Jordanian Mustafa Abdul Military Council. In fact, at the beginning of Latif, aka Abu Anas al-Sahaba, as Emir of the the Syrian uprising Abdul Hakim Belhadj sent Nusra Front.23 Salafists organize themselves in a Libyan combat group with volunteers from shuras, or religious councils, because the Quran members of Libya’s Ansar al-Sharia and other mentions this as the mode of political leader- Islamic groups to assist fighters in Syria. He ship. When Zarqawi was in Afghanistan, he sent those fighters with money and weapons.28 concentrated his efforts on bringing jihadists Belhadj likely worked and fought closely with into bilad al-sham, or the Levant. When he later Syrian jihadists in Afghanistan where they formed a shura council in Iraq, he largely did developed their ideas of political Islam and it with like-minded jihadists from the Levant, jihad. Lebanese author Camille Tawil docu- such as Abu Muslim al-Lubnani, to establish mented similar jihadist ties in his seminal recruitment networks in Lebanon and Syria.24 2010 book, Brothers in Arms.29 Establishing a foothold in Iraq after the U.S. Another notorious Libyan jihadist group invasion in 2003 was a means to increase their relocated to Syria under the direction of Mahdi depth in the Levant. Zarqawi was named an al-Harati, a member of al-Qaeda, who com- Emir of al-Qaeda when he swore allegiance to manded the Tripoli Battalion in Libya. In the Osama Bin Laden in the fall of 2004 and was northern Syrian city of Edlib, al-Harati formed given responsibility over Iraq. The Jordanians the Military Umma that provides cover have since had a prominent role in the shura for Libyan fighters.30 Al-Harati is assisted by a

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British-Libyan jihadist named Hissam, whose soon fought the U.S. occupation. Foreign fight- father is Libyan and mother Irish.31 ers, many of them Salafi jihadists, entered Iraq One of Osama Bin Laden’s former chauf- mainly from Syria and joined the resistance. feurs, Sefian al-Kumi, is also commanding a Up until the first operation in April unit in Syria. Al-Kumi commands the Abu 2004, most Islamic and nationalist resistance Salim brigade, which consists largely of fight- groups were unorganized, but united in fight- ers from the Libyan city of Darna.32 The major- ing U.S. troops. Both nationalist and religious ity of Libya’s Ansar al-Sharia fighters who went Iraqi resistance groups welcomed the help of to Syria joined the Nusra Front. the muhajereen. However, as Zarqawi’s radical International assistance for the Libyan group Tawheed wal-Jihad gained regional pres- revolt provided an opportunity for many dis- tige and significant financing during the sum- parate Libyan jihadists to come together to mer of 2004 and later swore allegiance to al- fight for a common cause. They used that Qaeda in the fall, many of Iraq’s Islamists felt opportunity to become acquainted and estab- sidelined. The majority of Iraq’s Islamists, lish ties. These ties are being used in Syria. especially affiliates of the Muslim Apart from the Libyans and Jordanians, Brotherhood, as well as many Salafists, wanted jihadist fighters in Syria also came from Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, In the absence of international support to halt Algeria, and European countries.33 Assad’s carnage or armed support to the Free Those on the front lines of the Syrian opposi- Syrian Army, the Syrian opposition has gravely tion welcome these muhajereen, though it is needed brave men with combat experience and reportedly difficult for them move around in skills in urban warfare. Syria as they fear being captured or kid- napped.34 In the absence of international sup- port to halt Assad’s carnage or armed support to join the nascent political process while for the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian opposition maintaining attacks against U.S. troops. Sunni has gravely needed brave men with combat clerics, including Salafists, also called on Iraq’s experience and skills in urban warfare. It is yet Sunnis to join the new and Army to be seen who these Salafi fighters, both in order to protect their communities. Syrian and muhajereen, will follow when and However, Zarqawi and his radical Salafi jihad- if a transitional government is established. ist shura council forbade anyone from joining Based on their experiences in Afghanistan, the political process or the security forces and Iraq, Chechnya and other countries, a funda- ultimately targeted any Salafi cleric, tribal mental issue they will face is whether to accept leader or politician that openly took a different or reject a pluralistic and democratic political stance. At the height of al-Qaeda in Iraq’s process. power, in October 2006, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was announced, bringing together Iraq and Syria Salafi jihadists who had aligned with Zarqawi. The future of Syria’s Salafists can be read Today the ISI’s survival has largely relied in Iraq’s present struggle. After Saddam’s on the sectarian policies of the present Iraqi regime fell in 2003, Sunni resistance fighters government, which sideline Iraqi Sunnis and

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fuel grievances that provide the ISI safe havens. merger with the Nusra Front. It wants the In 2011 when the crackdown on Sunni protes- Nusra Front’s success in Syria to foreshadow a tors in Syria became violent and protestors rebirth for al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was sig- called for armed opposition, the ISI saw an nificantly weakened by the Iraqi Sunni opportunity not only to help future allies in Awakening from 2006 to 2009. Syria, but also to rally its base in Iraq. Iraqi Many Syrians now fighting with the Nusra Sunnis view regime change in Syria as a wel- Front have combat experience in Iraq and come relief that they assume will weaken some witnessed first hand how al-Qaeda over- Baghdad’s pressure on them. Since 2003, Iraq’s played its hand with not only the Sunni com- Sunnis have felt sandwiched between Shiite munity, but with other Salafists in Iraq. Only Iran to the east, its sectarian ally Syria to the a few of Iraq’s Salafists were radical jihadists. west, and the new Shiite government in When Saddam’s regime fell in 2003, the major- Baghdad. ity of Salafists were traditional and moderate and many initially did not choose armed con- frontation with U.S. forces.35 And the leaders The majority of Iraq’s Islamists, especially of armed Iraqi Salafi groups, such as units affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood as well from the Islamic Army of Iraq, Abu Bakr Army as many Salafists wanted to join the nascent and the Saad Army followed the teaching of political process while maintaining attacks Syrian Mohammed al-Saroor, not Ayman al- against U.S. troops. Zawahiri or Osama Bin Laden. These tradi- tional and scientific Salafists did not join the al-Qaeda sponsored Islamic State of Iraq in The ISI now seeks to exploit weakened 2006. Starting in 2005 many Iraqi resistance Sunni support for the Iraqi government and to groups fought against Zarqawi’s efforts to cre- assist in whatever ways it can in Syria. Iraqi ate a sectarian war and build an Islamic state. Sunni demonstrations that sparked in Anbar Muslim Brotherhood affiliates such as the province after the arrest warrant of Sunni Islamic Party of Iraq participated in the Iraqi Minister of Finance Rafi al-Essawi’s security elections and were active members in parlia- guards were issued in December 2012 have ment because they believed that they could given ISI new hope for a more established safe “fight the occupation” through political haven. While the peaceful Sunni demonstra- means. In fact, some Iraqi Salafi jihadists tions have condemned al-Qaeda, some Sunnis opened political of their organizations are preparing for a “New Iraqi Army” patterned secretly to be involved in the political process, after the Free Syrian Army if the Iraqi govern- while denouncing it publicly.36 Traditional ment uses the security forces against demon- Salafists did not prevent affiliates of the strators as Assad did in Syria. If the Iraqi Army Muslim Brotherhood and anti-al-Qaeda Sunni starts to clash with Sunni demonstrators, ISI tribes from taking the armed fight against will again rebrand itself as the protector of the Zarqawi’s network in 2006 and 2007. people, as the Nusra Front has done in Syria, Traditional Salafists generally did not agree and support a “New Iraqi Army.” ISI’s rebrand- with Zarqawi’s assassinations of Sunni tribal ing has already started with its attempted and religious leaders, nor the slaughter of

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Iraq’s Shiite communities. While they agreed strengthen their positions against the Assad with Zarqawi on the apostasy of some Sunni regime—similar to how Libyan Salafists wel- for working for the occupation, or comed NATO against Gaddafi air Shiites being heretics, they did not advocate capabilities in 2011. using violence to confront them.37 While tra- Syrian Salafists post-Assad ditional Iraqi Salafists generally did not join the Sunni Awakening, neither did they work How Assad falls will largely determine against it. The relationships between radical, how Syrian Salafi networks cooperate with or traditional and moderate Salafists in Syria will fight against a future Syrian government. Those likely be tested by similar disagreements and credited for bringing down Assad and ushering challenges concerning political participation in the transitional government will expect rep- as were faced by their counterparts in Iraq. resentation in the next government commen- However traditional and moderate Salafists surate with their achievement. Before and after will have this confrontation with the radical the transitional government, radical Salafi Salafists before the Assad regime falls because jihadists will likely not join or com- those supporting the political process do not mittees receiving direct assistance from non- want the radical Salafists to be seen as the win- Muslim countries. However, they will not bar ners on the ground when Assad leaves power. cooperation with coalitions and committees It is important to note a significant differ- that do receive this outside assistance.38 The ence between the post-Saddam government in harshness of the radical Salafist response to Iraq and any future post-Assad government in international assistance will have an inverse Syria. Many radical Salafi jihadists in Iraq relationship to the degree to which Salafists rejected the new Iraqi government because it believe they alone brought down the Assad came through a foreign invasion and subse- regime. That is, if the international community quent occupation. The prospect of a long-term increases its role in ousting Assad and ushering presence of foreign forces in Iraq united many in a transitional government, whether through Salafists with other Islamists to fight the new a political settlement, limited air strikes or Iraqi government because there was a clear arming the Free Syrian Army with strategic religious precedent for fighting an occupation. weapons, radical Salafists will be less harsh This will not likely be the case in Syria as for- and violent in their response to an interna- eign forces are not expected to occupy Syria in tional role in the future government. On the order to change the government. As long as the other hand, if the international community international community does not heavily fails to reach a political settlement or does not influence the new government in Syria, Salafi give the FSA a strategic advantage in the armed jihadists will be less effective in violently conflict, then radical Salafists will be much opposing those Syrians who join the political more harsh and violent in response to any process as happened in Iraq. Additionally, the international role in the future government. prospect of the U.S. striking Syrian chemical They do not want the international commu- weapons capabilities will not be interpreted by nity to benefit from the sacrifices they believe Salafists in Syria as a foreign invasion and will they made to topple Assad. With this said, likely be welcomed by them because it will

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there are three post-Assad scenarios for the agendas. They simply seek more Islamic societ- Salafi networks during the transitional period. ies and are more pragmatic in seeking to First scenario “equals among many”: achieve those goals. As such, the traditional Moderate and traditional Salafists of armed Salafists have received the most financial and coalitions such as the SIF and the Believers armed support from Arab Gulf countries. Participation Movement align with the Muslim Once Assad leaves power and Syria goes Brotherhood to strengthen the hand of politi- through the process of a transitional govern- cal Islam and use their wide popular Islamist ment, the moderate and traditional Salafists base and backing from Arab Gulf governments will likely throw their support to political par- to out-maneuver the radical Salafi jihadists. ties that match their ideology and thus align This scenario will be somewhat reminiscent of with the Muslim Brotherhood. In turn, these the scenario in Iraq in 2007 during the Sunni Islamic coalitions will gain significant backing Awakening when Salafists aligned with the from Arab Gulf countries and will likely be key Muslim Brotherhood with a shared interest of players in the post-Assad power-sharing expelling radical Salafi jihadists from Sunni dynamic. This scenario would be similar to the areas. This scenario would not begin with the coalition, during the Egyptian national elec- ouster of Assad, but rather before a transitional tions in 2012, between the Salafi Nour Party government is negotiated. Moderate and tradi- and the Muslim Brotherhood. Arab Gulf back- ing and relative unity between the moderate How Assad falls will largely determine how and traditional Salafists and the Muslim Syrian Salafi networks cooperate with or Brotherhood will divide the radical Salafi fight against a future Syrian government. jihadists. Foreign fighters will likely return to their home countries, or to other regions of conflict, such as Iraq, Yemen or Mali if the tional Salafists would want to prevent radical Syrian Salafi jihadists are divided. Divisions Salafists from having leverage in the negotia- among Salafists will strengthen emphasis on tions, which they would clearly reject. nationalist loyalties rather than Islamic ones. The Arab Gulf countries, in particular Some Syrian Salafi jihadist groups will com- Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the United promise and organize politically, while others, Arab Emirates, are heavily invested in regime the most radical, will likely leave Syria with change in Syria. Aside from Qatar, these mon- foreign fighters. Those who remain in Syria archies and emirates are greatly skeptical of the will also look for safe havens in areas of sectar- Muslim Brotherhood. For years both the ian conflict where the new government’s secu- Muslim Brotherhood and radical Salafi jihad- rity forces are unable to protect Sunni com- ists have worked to undermine Arab Gulf gov- munities, especially along Syria’s eastern coast. ernments: they see them as puppets of the They might try to act as spoilers as al-Qaeda West that do not properly use their oil wealth affiliates in Libya have done since its transi- for Islamic causes. However, the traditional tion, but they will not be able to derail the Salafists are more in line with the Arab Gulf’s transitional government as long as the tradi- foreign and domestic policies because they tional and moderate Salafists are actively par- usually do not have political or revolutionary ticipating in the political process.

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Second scenario “strong Salafi hand”: Third scenario “inter-Sunni civil war”: Syrian Salafi jihadists organize politically in Radical Salafi jihadists remain violent during line with the traditional Salafists, undermine the transitional period, which causes signifi- the Muslim Brotherhood and moderate cant infighting between political Islam and Salafists, and push an Islamic agenda in the radical Salafi jihadists and derails any hopes transitional government with international for the transitional government. This would consequences. This would be similar to basically be an inter-Sunni civil war. Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet In this scenario, radical Salafi jihadists use troops in 1989. While the Taliban was not a the political capital they gained on the battle- Salafi government, radical elements of the field to build the case that only they will pro- Taliban and other radical groups outmaneu- tect the Sunni community from corrupting vered and fought more moderate voices within outside influences. They will likely establish the Muslim Brotherhood camp to form a radi- safe havens in rural areas, from which they will cal government. base future attacks. These extremists will not In this scenario, elements within the Salafi compromise or participate in a transition gov- jihadist community willing to work with a ernment that is facilitated by the international democratically elected government see an community and will become spoilers. Because opportunity to undermine the Muslim of this hard line, they will cause divisions Brotherhood and will align with the tradi- among other Salafi groups and violence will tional Salafists backed by the anti-Muslim occur between them. The constant fighting Brotherhood Arab Gulf countries. This could between Salafists will destabilize the country occur if a significant number of Syrians credit and there will be no alternative strongman radical Salafi jihadists with toppling the with credibility in all camps to lead the coun- regime. This Salafi coalition would antagonize try out of civil strife. This scenario will likely minorities or secular coalitions, but it will not spark discussions about dividing Syria into dominate the new government. It will merely separate regions or even states. dominate the Sunni Islamist bloc of govern- ment. Through their presence in the govern- Conclusion ment, they will oppose significant Western aid The first scenario is the most likely. While efforts for reconstruction. They will rely on there are differences between the moderate support from the Arab Gulf countries to and traditional Salafists and the Muslim rebuild communities. Under this scenario, Brotherhood, they have the largest following Syria will face less of a threat of radical Salafi among Syria’s Islamist groups. They also have jihadist attacks because Salafi jihadists in the significant backing from the Arab Gulf coun- government will prevent them from happen- tries and Turkey. Generally, Turkey and Qatar ing. However, Syria’s relations with non-Mus- support the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and lim countries will not be smooth. Their inter- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab action with the international community will Emirates support the traditional Salafists. be purely based on immediate interests and Radical Salafi jihadists also receive backing they will not want to support any international from the Arab Gulf, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and initiatives that might make Syria more secular. Jordan, but their support is not

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 55 AL-RAWI AND JENSEN state-sponsored and is only connected to inter- NOTES national jihadists networks. A transitional gov- ernment in Syria will require tremendous backing from Turkey and the Arab Gulf for 1 Nada Bakos, “Terrorist Group Fills Power reconstruction, rebuilding the economy and Vacuum Among Syria Rebels”, CNN, January 10, 2013 2 Note on terms: there are many types of ultimately for its political process to succeed. Islamists, including Salafists, members of the Muslim Radical jihadists currently fighting in Syria Brotherhood, Shiites (Lebanese Hezbollah is an are tolerated and in some areas welcomed Islamist group), Sufis, Ismailis and Islamic-oriented because of their courage and combat capabili- activists. 3 Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat ties at a time the Syrian opposition does not al-Nusra li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi receive military backing from the international Sahat al-Jihad: A Strategic Brief” The Quilliam community. However, Syrians in general, and Foundation, January 2013; link http://www.quilliam- foundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publica- Syria’s Islamists in particular, do not agree with tions/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf the radical Salafi jihadist revolutionary agenda 4 There is a wide range of Salafists. The term and rejection of political Islam. Moreover, “salafi” originates from the “salaf al-saleh” or Syrian Islamists may tolerate the sectarian “righteous ancestors” who claimed to be companions of the prophet Mohammed. They consider themselves attacks by radical Salafi jihadists as long as Iran part of the old tradition of Islam and adhere to the and Hezbollah organize and arm Syrian Shiite Hanbali school of Islamic law. Some self-proclaimed militias in areas with Sunnis, Christians and Salafists choose to express their Puritanism simply Shiites. Radical foreign fighters, or muhajereen, through outward appearance, i.e., a beard, a shorter dishdasha to keep their clothes clean, and they do not seeking to undermine political Islam through visit religious shrines. Whereas Salafi jihadists, who terrorism will find it very difficult to find safe follow thinkers such as the Egyptian Sayed Qutb, havens in Syria and will have to flee the coun- believe that they must be revolutionary in jihad, espouse violence for political change and reject the try once the fighting has stopped and a transi- rise of Islamic offshoots, such as Shiites. tional government is formed. Syria’s radical 5 For more on the difference between the Salafi jihadists will likely compromise by pro- Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists, see March Lynch, viding tacit support to an Islamic agenda in “Islam Divided Between Salafi-jihad and the Ikhwan,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33:6, p. 467-487; Syria’s new government, partly because they May 2010 know they will never have a majority voice in 6 Al-Jazeera, “Political Islam and the Syrian the future government. However, they will Revolution,” 10 June 2012, http://studies.aljazeera. harp on any violence inspired by revenge, cor- net/en/reports/2012/06/2012610962880192.htm 7 For more on al-Suri see Brynjar Lia’s Architect ruption or sectarianism post-Assad to protect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu and defend Sunni communities in Alawite and Mus’ab al-Suri, Columbia University Press; New York; Christian areas. Radical Salafists’ future in Syria 2008. 8 From 2002 to 2005 Iran was an important will look like their future in other multi-sectar- conduit for jihadist fighters coming from Afghanistan ian and politically diverse countries such as and into Iraq. Depending on the tempera- Iraq and Yemen: oppressed Sunni communi- ture of Al-Qaeda rhetoric, the Iranian regime ties without protection will provide them their periodically allowed Al-Qaeda members free passage through their country depending on the impact of safe-havens. PRISM Al-Qaeda’s activities in areas of mutual interest such as Iraq and Yemen. See Waleed al-Rawi’s 2012 book

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Dawla al-Iraq al-Islamiya (The Islamic State of Iraq) al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/01/jabhat-al- for more information. nusras-goals-extend-beyond-syria.html 9 Al-Gad TV Channel interview with Sheikh 26 Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat Louy al-Zabi on its Suriya al-Yum program on al-Nusra…” February 5, 2013 27 Waleed al-Rawi interview with senior Libyan 10 Asharq al-Awsat, “amin am ‘almuminoon academic, December 2012. yusharikoon’ al-salafiya: al-adu al-haqiqi lana 28 Ibid. Khamenai thuma Hezbollah fa Bashar al-Assad” 29 Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: the story of September 26, 2011 no. 11990 Al-Qaeda and the Arab jihadists, SAQI Books, 11 Zvi Bar’el, “World awaits Assad’s head, but London, 2010. Syrian president is hell-bent on ,” 30 Waleed al-Rawi interview with senior Libyan Haaretz, December 22, 2012. http://www.haaretz. academic, December 2012. com/news/middle-east/world-awaits-assad-s-head- 31 Ibid. but-syrian-president-is-hell-bent-on-war-of-attrition. 32 Ibid. premium-1.489275 33 Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat 12 Aaron Zelin, “The Syrian Islamic Front’s al-Nusra…” Order of Battle,” Al-Wasat, January 22, 2013 http:// 34 Sterling Jensen interview with Islamist leader thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/01/22/syrian-islamic- in the Free Syrian Army, January 2013. fronts-order-of-battle/ 35 Sterling Jensen interview with Nadem 13 Noman Benotman and Roisin Blake, “Jabhat al-Jabouri, December 2010. al-Nusra…” 36 Waleed al-Rawi interview with Abu Wael, 14 One source claims the Nusra Front has no Emir of Ansar al-Sunna, 2007 formal ties with the Islamic State of Iraq, but that 37 Sterling Jensen and Waleed al-Rawi interviews many of its fighters have jihadist experience in Iraq. with various leaders of the Islamic Army of Iraq and See Time article by Rania Abouzeid “Syria: Interview Ansar Al-Sunna. with Official of Jabhat al-Nusra, Syria’s Islamist 38 Al-Hayat, January 8, 2013 http://alhayat.com/ Militia Group” Details/470180 see English translation: Al-Monitor 15 Ibid. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/01/ 16 Ibid. jabhat-al-nusras-goals-extend-beyond-syria.html 17 Shabakah al-Jihad al-‘Alemi, October 10, 2012. 18 BBC, “Syria’s al-Nusra Front ‘part of al- Qaeda,’” April 9, 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-middle-east-22078022 19 Sterling Jensen interview with Islamist leader in the Free Syrian Army, January 2013. 20 It is easier for Jordanian and Iraqi jihadists, largely with tribal ties, to enter and exit Syria. 21 Waleed al-Rawi interview with Abu Wael, Emir of the Iraqi Ansar al-Sunna group, 2007. 22 Taylor Luck, “Over 700 Jordanian jihadists fighting in Syria,” The Jordan Times; July 13, 2013. 23 On December 13, 2012 Al-Jazeera TV reported Abu Anas al-Sahaba as Emir, but then on January 6, 2013 reported he was just a unit commander in the Nusra Front. 24 Rum Online, April 10, 2010 “hafaya jadida min haya abu musab al-zarqawi takshif awal marra” 25 Al-Hayat, January 8, 2013”jabhat al-nusra,” http://alhayat.com/Details/470180 see English translation: Al-Monitor January 2013 http://www.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 57 US State Department / wikimedia.org

A close-up view of the Za’atri camp for Syrian refugees as seen on July 18, 2013 Sectarian Conflict in Syria

BY M. ZUHDI JASSER

yria’s civil war is now well into its third year. The international community, including the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and many non-governmen- Stal organizations, largely agree that the Assad regime has committed wide-ranging human rights abuses during the conflict. This includes violating its obligations under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, a 1977 amendment that added provisions that the gov- ernment has clearly violated, including indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations, and destruction of food, water, and other materials needed for survival. In addition, extrajudicial killings, rape, and torture have been well documented. Most recently, U.S. President Obama confirmed that the Syrian regime has unleashed chemical weapons. There are also groups associ- ated with the opposition who have committed crimes against humanity including extrajudicial punishments as well as targeting Christian clergy. With human suffering and risks to regional stability rising, there is a growing urgency to end the strife and plot a course to ensure stability for all Syrians. As the son of Syrian-American immigrants and a member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), the violence in Syria is personal. My immediate and extended family in Aleppo and Damascus deal with this war and humanitarian disaster every day. Healing ethno-sectarian divisions is necessary for ending hostilities and transitioning to a democracy where the rule of law protects fundamental civil and religious liberties. Both current President Bashar al-Assad and his late father, former President Hafez al-Assad, have manipulated inter-communal divisions to maintain power, routinely selecting for favor individual Syrians based on their identity, in addition to their fealty to the national socialist Ba’ath Party. A cessation of current hostilities is necessary, but will be insufficient to stem sectarian differences, first planted by the Assad regime, that have spread like wildfire in Syria. Once the civil war started in 2011, Assad began pitting groups against each other and amplified long quiet ethno-sectarian divisions. In addition to the issues above this article reports findings from a ten day UNHCR delegation trip in June 2013, in which USCIRF staff visited Syrian refugee communities in Jordan and Turkey. It will conclude with some of the Commission’s chief recommendations that are also highlighted in the report released in April 2013, Protecting and Promoting Religious Freedom in Syria.1

M. Zuhdi Jasser is Vice-Chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF).

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 59 JASSER

The Conflict significantly. Since 2012 the sources of foreign military aid to the opposition and to the Since the conflict began with the violent regime fall almost wholly along the Sunni- repression of peaceful protests in 2011, the Shi’a divide. The notable wildcard is that the Assad regime has targeted majority Sunni Assad regime has a long history of working Muslim communities with exceptions being closely with terrorist groups like and made for the few who displayed continued al-Qaeda as part of its divide and conquer loyalty to the regime. The London-based strategy. It has, in fact, given radical Sunni Syrian Network for Human Rights reported in Islamists even more access to Syria today than September 2012 that the regime already had they had during the , when the Assad destroyed more than 500,000 buildings, regime supported al-Qaeda militants entering including and churches.2 The same Iraq through Syria to kill Americans. In addi- NGO reports that the regime targeted 1,451 tion, terror elements from Hizballah receive mosques and that at least 348 have been unfettered access to Syrian communities fight- destroyed. Opposition forces have also ing alongside the regime. attacked mosques and churches, but with far Additionally, U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia less frequency. and Qatar are supporting various warring par- The Syrian regime has created one of the ties, providing considerable assistance to the worst humanitarian crises in memory. The Islamist factions of the opposition. Islamist United Nations reports that more than 110,000 factions from within Syria and from abroad Syrians have died, more than 1.7 million are came not to fight for freedom, but to fight a now refugees, and 4.5 million have been inter- religious “jihad” against Assad’s secular gov- nally displaced.3 It is estimated that by the ernment. Islamist groups like the Islamic State end of 2013 more than half of Syria’s popula- of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are by definition inher- tion - over 10 million people - will need urgent ently motivated by sectarian animus and humanitarian assistance. Women and children essentially do not believe in state of have been affected disproportionately: nearly Syria. Instead they are motivated by a desire to three-quarters of all refugees who fled to implement Sharia law and establish an Islamic Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and elsewhere are state. The moderate opposition, the spark of women and children under the age of 17. Syria’s revolution, has slowly lost its promi- The Assad regime has turned an initially nence on the ground and in the court of public peaceful political protest into an overtly sectar- opinion. ian conflict. By introducing the element of A recent story in the Wall Street Journal armed conflict, the regime’s actions brought in describes a war being fought on multiple foreign fighters who fuel the sectarian fires of fronts, one of which exists within the opposi- the conflict. Members of the regime, and to a tion itself, between militant Islamists and the lesser extent the opposition, are supported by Free Syria Army.4 As the sectarian nature of the foreign military aid and training. Inflows of conflict broadens, individuals will be targeted foreign fighters, some of whom the United not only because of their perceived or true alle- States has designated as terrorists, such as giance to a particular political side, but simply Hizballah members, have increased because they follow a particular faith.

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Additionally, the massive numbers of refu- Background gees fleeing Syria are destabilizing an already unstable region. Economically and politically Syria is a multi-religious country, where fragile countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and people have traditionally lived together as Lebanon have been put under even greater eco- Syrians without religious or sectarian animos- nomic pressure by hosting hundreds of thou- ities. Its prewar population of 22 million sands of Syrians (Egypt 90,000, Jordan broke down generally as follows: 75% Sunni, 500,000, and Lebanon 600,000). In these of which 14% is Kurdish Sunni, 12% Alawite, countries already struggling with the Arab 10% Christian, 4% Druze, and 1% Yezidi. awakening and sectarian blowback, an influx There are also very small Jewish communities of Syrian Sunni Muslim refugees, radicalized in Damascus, Al , and Aleppo. by a sense of hopelessness, could have a disas- Alawites, which include the Assad family in trous impact. their ranks, practice an offshoot of Shi’a Islam. wikimedia.org

A map showing the ethnic and religious distribution of Syria’s sects

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The Assad family’s 40-year old authori- capitalizes on Alawite fears of Sunni rule. The tarianism created the political conditions for regime spreads rumors of Sunni atrocities the current conflict and its sectarian compo- against Alawites and depicts the conflict as a nents. Both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad banned fight to prevent Alawite extermination. In late political opposition to the Ba’ath Party, and December 2012, Time Magazine reported alle- under each security forces perpetrated egre- gations that the Assad government provided gious human rights abuses against government up to $500 per month to individuals posing as critics. In response to this repression, dozens members of the opposition and painting graf- of groups emerged to oppose the regime. Some fiti on buildings or chanting slogans with of these groups, including the internationally overtly sectarian rhetoric, including, “the recognized Syrian National Coalition, espouse Christians to Beirut and the Alawites to the democratic reform. Other groups are driven by Tarboot (Grave).”5 In response to growing religious ideologies advocating violence, such fears, civilian Alawites formed pro-Assad and as the U.S.-designated terrorist organization, government-supported domestic militia such al-Nusra Front. Some are comprised of Syrians as Jaysh al-Sha’bi (The People’s Army) and – others are made up of foreigners. The varied Shabiha (pro-Assad armed gangs). The U.S. nature of these groups constrains their ability government has designated both as terrorist to work together, further complicating the organizations, which have committed gross situation and prospects for human rights and human rights violations against Sunni com- religious freedom in Syria. munities.6 Sectarian tensions pervade the conflict. The Assad regime, including its army, Prior to 2011, both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad security forces and related militias, has delib- selectively permitted or denied religious rights. erately targeted Sunni Muslims. In May 2013, The country’s smallest religious minority the regime killed more than 200 civilians, groups, including Christians, were permitted including women and children, in al-Bayda, a to worship freely so long as they did not massacre described by many as the worst sec- oppose the regime. Assad restricted Sunni reli- tarian attack against Sunnis during the conflict. gious freedom in a variety of ways, including On May 25, 2012, in what has become known controlling the selection of . as the , 108 Sunni Muslims, Additionally both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad including 49 children, were killed in two restricted Sunni participation in government opposition-controlled villages in the Houla and ability to organize political parties. region just north of the central city of Homs. The United Nations Supervision Mission in A Sunni-Alawite War? Syria (UNSMIS) determined that most of the The Assad regime and its most loyal sup- victims were “summarily executed” and “entire porters, predominately Alawites associated families were shot in their houses,” and that with Assad’s Ba’athist Party, portray opposition regime-supported Shabiha were the likely per- forces, predominately Sunni Muslims, as a petrators.7 Some victims reportedly had pro- threat not just to their power but to the very Shi’a or regime slogans carved into their fore- existence of Alawites in Syria. To ensure con- heads. In July 2012, more than 200 Syrians, tinued support for the regime, the government mostly Sunni Muslim civilians, were killed in

62 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL SECTARIAN CONFLICT IN SYRIA a village in the opposition-held Hama region. detonated explosives in a Damascus suburb, The Syrian army attacked the village with heli- wounding 14 people and damaging one of copters and tanks, followed by militia forces, Shi’a Islam’s holiest shrines, a mausoleum of which reportedly executed civilians including the Prophet’s ’s granddaughter. women and children. The opposition also has targeted religious In June 2012, USCIRF staff members trav- minorities, including Alawite and Christian elled to the region to speak with Syrian refu- civilians. It is unclear who kidnapped two gees about religious freedom in Syria. Refugees Orthodox Bishops, Yohanna Ibrahim and reported that the regime forced Sunnis to pro- Boulos Yaziji, or why. This kidnapping report- claim that Assad is their god, with refusal met edly occurred in April 2013 near the town of by torture and death. A former Syrian officer Kafr Dael, close to Aleppo in northern Syria. confided that regime forces only killed Sunnis Most individuals allege that the kidnappers and that his senior officer said they were fight- were opposition fighters, while some opposi- ing Sunni terrorists. When this officer refused tion groups claim regime affiliates kidnapped to kill women and children who had been the Bishops to further inflame sectarian fears. deemed Sunni terrorists, he was arrested and tortured for months. The government has also Regime abuses have led Sunnis to view the conflict attacked and desecrated Christian churches. In as not Assad’s ruthless attempts to stay in power, February 2012, for example, regime forces but an Alawite-led attack against them. raided the historic Syriac Orthodox Um al- Zennar Church in Homs.8 Anti-regime activ- ists have reported that the government plants In January 2013, Human Rights Watch people within refugee camps and elsewhere, reported that opposition forces destroyed and both within and outside Syria, to stoke sectar- looted minority religious sites in northern ian fears.9 Syria. Human Rights Watch also reported that Regime abuses have led Sunnis to view the two churches were stormed and ransacked in conflict not as Assad’s ruthless attempts to stay the villages of Ghasaniyeh and Jdeideh, in the in power, but an Alawite-led attack against region of Latakia, in November and December them. Some Syrian refugees in Jordan and 2012.12 Various reports indicate that the Egypt expressed strong anti-Alawite senti- Christian population of the city of Homs— ments, referring to Alawites as “dogs.”10 They approximately 160,000—almost entirely has apparently opposed Alawites due to, not their fled for safety, with only 1,000 Christians faith, but the perception that they were invari- remaining.13 In late 2012, opposition forces ably pro-Assad and anti-Sunni. There have reportedly attacked churches and used as safe been reports of Sunni groups attacking houses an evangelical school and a home for Alawites and Shi’a Muslims. A December 2012 the elderly in Homs. video released by the Saudi-sponsored Takfiri Religious Minorities in Crossfire Wahhabi, a Sunni opposition group, shows a Shi’a mosque that was burned down amid Religious minority communities, includ- dozens of individuals congratulating each ing Christians, Druze, Ismailis and other non- other.11 That same month, a suicide Alawite minorities, largely have tried to stay

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out of the conflict. But the violence described for militant Islamists seeking the thrill of above is forcing them to choose sides. Regime “jihad.” They have hijacked the national awak- rhetoric pushes these groups as well. The ening for freedom of the majority of Syrians. regime refers to the opposition, and some- Like the regime, some of the more extremist times all Sunni Muslims, as extremists and ter- groups utilize sectarian rhetoric and iconogra- rorists who seek to transform Syria into an phy to perpetuate fear and sectarianism. Islamic state unwelcoming to religious minor- While al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, and the other ities. The regime cites the plight of Egyptian extremists groups are becoming more influen- Coptic Christians and Iraqi Christians to show tial, most fighters in Syria are Syrians and are what would happen to Syrian Christians if the fighting an inherently decentralized chaotic opposition prevailed. The presence of foreign campaign against the Assad regime. The terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda supports this loosely organized opposition are affiliated argument. with the Free Syria Army (FSA), and number approximately 100,000. Since the United Outside Forces Fuel Sectarian Strife States weighed in on possibly supplying lethal A number of outside actors are entering aid to the FSA in April 2013, reports suggest Syria and increasing sectarian divisions. that Saudi Arabia and Qatar have hinted they Hizbollah, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary will then actively back off supporting militant Guards, and Shi’a fighters from Iraq have Islamist groups and direct more of their aid arrived to support Assad bolstered by financial also to vetted elements of the FSA. In conversa- and political backing from Iran and Russia. tions with Syrian refugees in Jordan and Egypt, The civil war has ripped Syrian communities all of them Sunnis, USCIRF found that they apart, devolving into a primal, Darwinian bat- expressed disagreement with the religiously tle for survival. The opposition has become motivated ideologies of extremist groups. more influenced by radical Islamist groups Nonetheless, they supported the shared goal funded by Islamist sympathizers from abroad of removing Assad from power. in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Al-Nusra Front, an The and Religious al-Qaeda affiliate originating in Iraq, which Minorities the United States has deemed a terrorist orga- nization, has gained fighters and at last esti- Religious minorities in Syria are not flee- ing the country in numbers as anticipated. The overwhelming majority of the more than The civil war has ripped Syrian communities 1.7 million Syrian refugees in the Middle East apart, devolving into a primal, Darwinian and North Africa are Sunni Muslims. UNHCR battle for survival. reports that, as of the end of April, less than one percent of each minority community -- Christians, Alawite, Ismaili, Mandaean and mate has as many as 10,000.14 Additionally, Yezidi -- is registered in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the Syrian Liberation Front, also thought to be and Lebanon.15 There are reports that upwards dominated by Islamists, has numbers upwards of 300,000 Christians are internally displaced. of 37,000. Syria has become a global magnet

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Accurate figures for other communities are Lebanese for housing, jobs, and access to ser- unavailable. vices provided by health clinics and schools. The small number of minorities in the Further destabilization of such countries will refugee population reflects two phenomena, have negative implications for the region, as which apply to Christians and Alawites in par- well as beyond, including for U.S. national ticular. First, Christians and Alawites are mov- security. ing to their home areas or to regime-held areas Alarmingly, Syria’s sectarian conflict itself because these areas tend to be safe from gov- now appears to be spreading beyond its bor- ernment bombing. This suggests that ders. In the last few months, Lebanon has Christians and Alawites may be accepting the experienced fighting between Alawite and regime’s argument that Alawites and Christians Salafi groups. In addition, it is widely argued are safer with the government than with the that Iraq’s spike in sectarian violence that has opposition. left about 2,500 people dead between April Second, evidence suggests that if and July is a spillover from the Syrian crisis. Christians and Alawites do flee Syria, they are Some analysts have suggested that a sig- simply not registering with the local UN refu- nificant number of Syrians and current refu- gee agency because, as USCIRF staff was told, gees will seek entry into Europe and that they fear being associated with the Assad European nations need to focus on aiding regime. Some refugees try to pass as Sunni refugees in current host countries and start Muslims by, among other measures, wearing planning for inflows to Europe. the hijab. Minority refugees do not return Recommendations home because they also fear government offi- cials viewing them as disloyal for having Dealing with sectarian divisions, exacer- sought safety outside of Syria. bated by the regime and extremists, is central to any lasting peace in Syria. Healing the sec- Regional Dangers tarian divides of a diverse nation like Syria is As mentioned, more than 1.7 million not only necessary, but can become a focal Syrians have fled the country, representing a point for a future more secure, stable, and massive humanitarian crisis and an emerging democratic region. Protecting religious free- destabilizing threat to the region. Jordan, dom and human rights for every Syrian is cru- Lebanon, and Turkey now each host more cial. More detail on ways to heal this divide than half a million Syrians. While Egypt is and next steps can be found in the April 2013 hosting about 90,000 refugees, it is expecting report of the U.S. Commission on at least 120,000 more. International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) These refugees are putting enormous eco- entitled, “Protecting and Promoting Religious nomic and political strains on already-weak Freedom in Syria.”16 Our recommendations governments. In Jordan, 80 percent of the for the United States fell into four categories: refugees live outside of camps and no Syrian 1) Promoting Protection for Religious Freedom refugee camps exist in either Lebanon or Egypt. in Syria; 2) Prioritizing Human Rights in U.S. Instead, refugees live in cities and towns, com- relations through the ; peting with Egyptians, Jordanians, and 3) Promoting Freedom of Religion or Belief

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 65 JASSER through U.S. Programs; and 4) Addressing the religious freedom and related rights to Situation of Internally Displaced Persons and ensure that a future Syria respects these fun- Refugees. damental freedoms. The ability of countries Below are seven specific recommenda- like Saudi Arabia and Qatar to increase tions: Sunni Islamist influence thus far was due to the vacuum created by the end of regime ■■ The U.S. should, where appropriate, military control in certain regions. It was assist the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) also due to the lack of western civil society and any future post-Assad government to programs to engage the Syrian population. provide security to protect likely targets of Without advocates from our democratic sectarian or religion-motivated violence. allies in the West for genuine on the This includes areas where religious or ground in Syria, the majority of Syrians will minority communities live or congregate, continue to be lost in a sectarian battle that such as neighborhoods with religious sites gives them two equally distasteful and and places of worship. The protection of oppressive alternatives. religious minorities is a key element to the ■■ The U.S. government should ensure that possibility of a successful Syrian evolution all international cooperation with the Syrian out of the Assad era and a three-year civil opposition leadership emphasizes the war. Nations which protect the religious importance of ensuring the rights to free- freedom of their minorities are far more dom of religion or belief. It should also likely to enjoy security and freedom; ensure freedom of opinion and expression, ■■ To offset the influence of extremist as well as protection of minority religious groups who are establishing Sharia courts in communities; liberated areas, the U.S. government should ■■ The U.S. government should direct U.S. provide training and support to officials and recipients of U.S. grants to pri- local councils, courts, lawyers and judges on oritize religious tolerance and understand- domestic laws and international standards ing, foster knowledge of and respect for uni- relating to human rights and religious free- versal human rights standards, and develop dom. The ability to provide viable legal the political ability of religious minorities to alternatives to Shi’a courts or Assad’s author- organize themselves and convey their con- itarianism in establishing the rule of law in cerns. Studies have shown that the prioritiza- a diverse Syria will be essential to free Syria tion of religious liberty provides the neces- of the divisions of sectarianism; sary foundation of liberty for nations that ■■ With Saudi Arabia and Qatar vying for will then keep them more secure and less influence in Syria against the region’s Shia torn apart by religiously motivated conflict. powers behind Assad, the U.S. government ■■ The U.S. government should establish a should form a special coalition with like- refugee resettlement program for Syrian minded partners for a third pathway among refugees fleeing targeted religious persecu- the Friends of Syria. This pathway would tion by Syrian government forces, affiliated fund and develop efforts to promote intra- militias, or non-state actors opposed to the and inter-religious tolerance and respect for Assad regime. This resettlement will help

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prevent the regional destabilization which 3 United Nations Statistics can be found at the the over two million displaced Syrians are website for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: http://www.unocha.org/crisis/ currently fueling in their host nations; syria ■■ In anticipation of another mass exodus 4 Malas, Nour, “Rebel-on-rebel violence seizes from Syria, this time of religious minorities, Syria,” the Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2013. 5 Ajami, Fouad, The Syrian Rebellion (Stanford, who could be targeted for sectarian reprisal CA: The Hoover Institution Press, 2012), 111. attacks in refugee camps, we must encourage 6 The Alawite community is hardly monolithic UNHCR to make preparations for increased on this matter. Some Alawite elites have abandoned refugee flows of religious minorities, to the Assad regime for the opposition and denounced the violence perpetrated against civilians. In March develop a protection program to ensure their 2013, a group of Alawites supporting a democratic safety in refugee camps, and to sponsor alternative met in Cairo to discuss a declaration interfaith dialogues among the various refu- supporting a united Syria and opposing sectarian gee communities. A post-Assad Syria which revenge attacks. 7 Nebehay, Stephanie, “Most Houla victims devolves even deeper into a society of retri- killed in summary executions: U.N.,” Chicago Tribune, bution will undercut any chance that the May 29, 2012 8 revolutionaries had hoped to provide of reli- USCIRF Special Report, April 2013 9 Ibid. gious freedom emerging out of the dust of 10 Ibid. over 42 years of Assad regime oppression. 11 See video here, published December 13, 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B2rx8fjeCCw 12 If post-Assad Syria is ever to heal and Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Attacks on Religious Sites Raise Tensions,” January 23, 2013, move forward, human rights, including free- http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/23/syria-attacks- dom of religion, must be woven tightly into religious-sites-raise-tensions the fabric of its new national life. Only by 13 “Syria: Situation and treatment of Christians replacing the government’s divide-and-con- since March 2011; whether insurgents perceive Christians to be loyal to President Assad; treatment of quer approach toward sectarian groups with Christians by insurgents in Homs,” Report by United one that affirms the fundamental identity and Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – Syria, rights of every Syrian – irrespective of group June 29, 2012, http://www.refworld.org/ docid/5121fde92.html membership -- can this deeply fractured land 14 Ignatius, David, “Al-Qaeda affiliate playing be made whole again. PRISM larger role in Syrian rebellion,” Washington Post, , 2012 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/post-partisan/post/al-qaeda-affiliate-playing- NOTES larger-role-in-syria-rebellion/2012/11/30/203d06f4-3 b2e-11e2-9258-ac7c78d5c680_blog.html 15 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Syria: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 1 U.S. Commission on International Religious 16 USCIRF Special Report, April 2013 Freedom (USCIRF), “Protecting and Promoting Religious Freedom in Syria,” Special Report, April 2013, http://www.uscirf.gov/images/Syria%20 Report%20April%202013(1).pdf 2 Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Major violation of media freedom in Syria in September 2013,” http://dchrs.org/english/File/SNHR_Major_ violation_of_media_freedom_September_2013.pdf

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 67 United States Government

President addressing the Third High School in Sarajevo Moving Past the Bosnia Fallacy New Models for Understanding Syria

BY BRIAN KREITLOW

“But [Syria] is not so much like Libya last year, where of course we had a successful interven- tion to save lives. It is looking more like Bosnia in the 1990s, being on the edge of a sectarian conflict in which neighboring villages are attacking and killing each other so I don’t think we can rule anything out.” – British Foreign Secretary William Hague1

“The way Syria is heading resembles the situation in Srebrenica.” – Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu2

s the slaughter in Syria rages on, it has become fashionable to look to Bosnia as an anal- ogy for the violent conflict. Statements from foreign ministers, politicians and respected Ajournalists highlight the similarities between the two conflicts. Headlines claim, “Syria Turning into Another Bosnia,” and “Syrian Conflict a Haunting Reminder of Bosnia,” though reading below the headlines on most articles reveals the true nature of the similarities between Bosnia and Syria. They are more circumstantial than substantive; the actual conflicts bear little similarity. In reality, the conflict in Syria is fundamentally different from Bosnia, making com- parisons with Bosnia extremely misleading. Furthermore, prescriptions which call for the forma- tion of enclaves, safe havens or statelets are based on an incomplete understanding of the conflict of Syria, and disregard many of the experiences of Bosnia – and other instances of ethnically based partition, for that matter. As Robert Jervis once noted: historical analogies “are rarely accurate and solutions based on false analogies can be devastating.”3 Policymakers and military strategists watching Syria would do well to read past the “sound bite” and embrace the lessons of other, more instructive situations, to help find appropriate approaches to the conflict in Syria. This paper first seeks to expose the logical fallacy in attempting to make serious com- parisons between the situations in Syria and Bosnia, by clearly identifying the major differ- ences between the two conflicts. While Bosnia stemmed from a top-down maneuver insti- gated by a regime seeking to exploit ethnicity to achieve its political goals, Syria began as a

Lieutenant Brian Kreitlow is a Political-Military Officer at Headquarters, United States European Command.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 69 KREITLOW bottom-up social revolution aimed at gain- and territories. Josip Tito’s model for ing greater freedoms. Despite some report- Yugoslavia was based on the Soviet model, ing to the contrary,4 Syria has remained favoring full national self-determination for generally free of the intense sectarian fight- Yugoslav nationalities, while ensuring that ing that consumed Bosnia, precisely because the strong, centralized party organization the politicization of ethnicity has not (yet) served as the sole political expression of become a useful tool. each nation’s will. This arrangement simul- Second, this paper presents three mod- taneously strengthened ethnically derived els for broadening our understanding of the states while ensuring that ethnicity was not situation in Syria: as a transition towards politicized. Prior to the conflict, Bosnia was democracy from a “sultanistic” form of an ethnically diverse society and Muslims authoritarian rule; as a battleground for were generally well represented in the competing political ideologies; and as a Bosnian government, though representation proxy war between the West and Iran. Each was skewed in favor of Serbs and Croats in of these models provides a different, com- both the Communist Party and Yugoslav plementary lens for evaluating the unfolding federal government positions. Comprising situation in Syria and helps us to build a only 15 percent of the 1981 Yugoslav popula- more complete understanding of the crisis. tion,5 Bosnian Muslims still retained a voice Using models helps us to avoid the pitfalls of in the system, aided by Tito’s 1974 recogni- individual cases, and understanding what tion of “Muslim” as a separate nationality, we are dealing with in Syria is a vital step to which opened up access to positions of determining how we deal with Syria, both influence. It was Slobodan Milošević’s advo- now and in a post-Assad environment. cacy of Serb that would politi- As there is no international legal basis cize ethnicity in Yugoslavia and set the stage for intervention in Syria, this paper offers a for the crises to come. handful of recommendations for U.S. policy Milošević was a relative political new- in Syria. The key elements are; avoiding the comer in 1987 when he took up the flag of politicization of ethnicity before, during and Serb nationalism. Vowing to protect the Serb after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime; populace from victimization in Kosovo, opposing the creation of ethnic or confes- Croatia, and Bosnia, he incited ethnic Serbs sionally-based states and starting the polit- throughout Yugoslavia by promising the ical dialogue between key actors now, to support of the federal government and the ease the pain of transition; speeding the for- Yugoslav National Army. Milošević’s goal mation of a relevant interim government; was a very deliberate move to bring ethnic and improving the consolidation of democ- Serbs into a Serb state – a move underscored racy in a legitimate ruling body. by the 1989 installation of his supporters The war in Bosnia had its origins in the into key positions in the leadership of collapse of Yugoslavia – which is, notably, Serbia’s two autonomous provinces also very different from the collapse of Syria. (Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro.6 The crisis in Yugoslavia was primarily a cri- Kosovo and Montenegro each had votes sis of government based on historical states in the Yugoslav national council,

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strengthening his influence in the federal more to do with restricted social and eco- government and triggering the failure of the nomic privileges, corruption and the 43 government. This ultimately led to declara- years of emergency rule. tions of independence by Slovenia and When Assad cracked down on the pro- Croatia, and an ill-fated referendum by the tests, an anti-regime insurgency erupted, Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović on with over 1,000 deaths in the first few an independent state of Bosnia and months. The spiral of violence has continued Herzegovina, precipitating the crisis often and expanded from there. The Assad gov- referred to as “Bosnia.”7 In the same man- ernment promised token reforms in 2012, ner as Croatia, Bosnia became a battle- but the elections were boycotted by the ground for protecting and advancing the opposition, cementing their position that rights of the ethnic Serb population and its Assad’s removal from power is their primary territory (and later for expanding Croat ter- goal. ritories) - especially as it became clear that a solution would be based on ethnic parti- In contrast to the top-down political maneuver tion. To cover his political maneuver, that instigated the conflict in Bosnia, the Syrian Milošević fed the West a steady stream of conflict sprung up from the local level. propaganda - that the conflict was an ethnic clash rooted in historic hatred - effectively presenting the conflict as one with no reso- lution.8 Instead, it was a modern concoction Despite the huge divide between the which politicized ethnic differences in order privileged Alawite leadership and the Sunni to advance an agenda which served one eth- masses, the conflict in Syria has remained nic group at the expense of others. In short, remarkably non-sectarian—in large part due tensions between ethnic groups in Bosnia to the Ba’ath Party’s ideology of secular were the result, not the cause of the war in nationalism, which has guided the regime Yugoslavia.9 for over fifty years. Alawites rely on this In contrast to the top-down political secular nationalism, because they would be maneuver that instigated the conflict in marginalized in a Sunni-dominated state Bosnia, the Syrian conflict sprung up from which combines political and religious ide- the local level. The Syrian uprising began in ologies. The Ba’ath Party’s nationalist ideol- Deraa, in southern Syria, when locals ogy allowed for a secular, if autocratic gov- demanded the release of 14 schoolchildren ernment, and provided an opportunity for arrested for graffiti-ing a popular Arab both minority Alawites and some Sunnis to Spring slogan: “The people want the down- rise to prominent government positions. fall of the regime.”10 Five protesters were Former Syrian Minister of Defense subsequently shot by security forces over Mustafa Tlas (Sunni) served as Syria’s min- the next two days, triggering more protests. ister of defense for over 30 years; his son, The original protestors are likely to have Manaf, was a general in Syria’s Republican been Sunni, but their outrage had little to do Guard until his defection in 2012. Recently with religion or religious differences and slain Sunni cleric Sheikh Mohammed

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 71 KREITLOW al-Bouti was also a fervent and long-stand- clear that the motive is due to religious, ing supporter of the Assad regime. The effec- rather than political, differences – as fine of tive result of this strategy is a focus on a line as that may be.11 Eliminating challeng- crushing political dissent rather than reli- ers to the regime (and their supporters) gious groups. Hafez al-Assad’s infamous belies an agenda in which ethnicity and 1982 massacre in Hama did not specifically religion take a back seat to domestic politics target Sunni Muslims per se; rather it was to and clearly differentiates these atrocities blunt an anti-government insurgency by the from those perpetrated in Bosnia in the Ba’ath Party’s long-standing political and 1990s. ideological rival, the Muslim Brotherhood. After only a quick review, it is readily The growing presence of the Muslim apparent that there are few actual similari- Brotherhood, and other more extremist ties between Bosnia and Syria. Nonetheless, Islamist groups (such as the al-Qaeda- following on popular comparisons between linked al-Nusra Front) in the Syrian opposi- Syria and Bosnia, the logical next step has tion poses ideological and political chal- been to advance solutions for Syria based on lenges to the regime every bit as much as it perceived “successes” in Bosnia. A 2012 edi- introduces sectarian elements into the con- torial in the Wall Street Journal offered: “A flict. While there is an apparent trend Bosnia-style air campaign targeting elite towards “sectarian” violence, it is not overtly Syrian military units could prompt the U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Brian Schlumbohm

President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and President Franjo Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia initial the Dayton Peace Accords

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General Staff to reconsider its contempt for Professor Milton Esman notes that the international opinion, and perhaps its alle- creation of sub-states does not eliminate giance to the Assad family. Short of that, ethnic conflicts, as “successor states become carving out some kind of safe haven inside new venues for the pursuit and the regula- Syria would at least save lives.”12 These pre- tion of conflicting ethnic claims” through scriptions are fraught with danger, and not both civil and violent means.13 At the same only show a lack of understanding of the time, federations of co-existing ethnic com- differences between the two conflicts, but munities, in which collectivities are incor- also a lack of understanding of how these porated through consocietal or power-shar- strategies “worked” in Bosnia. Most of the ing arrangements (as in Bosnia) have solutions proposed to end the conflict in repeatedly failed.14 In short, ethnic partition Bosnia failed – even the Dayton Accords in Syria trends toward creating a situation have only had limited success in solving the like Bosnia. core problems. Where the Dayton Accords Safe havens in Bosnia were poorly succeeded was in implementing a cease-fire defined and poorly enacted, and as a result, – in part by creating two separate sub-states generally unsuccessful (Srebrenica was a along ethnic lines. These partitions limited United Nations-designated safe haven). the justification for further interethnic con- Most UN bodies and Security Council mem- flict and generally served to protect the indi- bers did not support the idea of safe havens viduals in each sub-state. In the longer term, – safe havens were to be employed only as a though, these features have proven unsus- last resort – and member nations were not tainable and have left behind a permanently willing to provide the appropriate level of crippled country incapable of self-gover- protection to make the safe havens work.15 nance. Bosnia does, however, offer some useful Introducing partitions in Syria based on lessons on the idea of safe havens. First, safe ethnic or confessional difference neither havens must be clearly defined; the interna- resolves nor addresses the core issues of the tional commitment to protecting them must conflict. Bashar al-Assad has been fighting be made clear to both the protected and the to maintain his power against an insurgency aggressors. Second, they need to be defen- – ceding territory to the insurgents is an sible and established in a manner that unacceptable solution. Additionally, since allows for protection of the civilian popu- the battle is for rightful ownership of the lace. Massive, inter-confessional cities such state of Syria and not for protection of ethnic as Homs and Hama, situated along main groups, the creation of a rump sub-state led lines of communication are simply not by Assad would be tenuous and prolong the defensible as safe havens. Third, safe havens conflict. Establishing ethnically based meant to protect civilians cannot be used as enclaves or sub-states in Syria is likely to a base for insurgent operations. Doing so produce one of two results: ethnic cleansing removes the impartiality that underpins the to consolidate power; or the introduction of sanctity of the safe haven. Fourth, sufficient constant ethnic tensions. forces must be in place on the ground to protect the zone and they must not be seen

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 73 KREITLOW

as combatants in their own right. Finally, Romania in 1989 and Libya in 2011, though any forces charged with securing safe- Saddam Hussein’s sultanistic regime in Iraq havens must be granted sufficiently robust offers the best mirror of Syria in terms of rules of engagement (ROE) to protect the religion, ethnicity and political distribution. area – ROE that UN personnel lacked in In April 2013, Linz and Stepan evaluated Bosnia. the Arab countries and their forms of gov- ernment, noting that none is truly sultanis- “We need to not lose sight of the fact that tic and instead introducing a “continuum of this was a populist uprising – to uproot a sultanism.”19 While Gaddafi receives their dictatorial regime – that was faced with billing for the most sultanistic of the Arab the utmost brutality and Bashar al-Assad Spring leaders (Assad, Mubarak, and Ben Ali seems like not giving up, however, we’re round out the group), they note that the not giving up either on our rights to trans- Assad regime has strong sultanistic features, form Syria into a democratic, civil state.” consistent with those identified above.20 – Yaser Tabbara, legal advisor for the There is (or has been) some internal auton- Syrian National Coalition16 omy in the Syrian business community and One way to view the conflict in Syria is state apparatus, though this does not extend through the lens of scholarship on demo- to the rigidly controlled Syrian military. cratic transitions. Juan Linz and Alfred Regardless of the degree of sultanism, the Stepan, who chronicled transitions to resultant political conditions created by the democracies throughout Latin America and extreme nature of this regime type remain Eastern Europe, identified five different consistent with the original sultanistic model types of modern regimes.17 Based on model. Lacking political moderates and soft- the models they offered, Syria would be liners within the regime, democratic transi- most-likely categorized as a “sultanistic” tions from sultanistic regimes do not usually regime, “where the private and public are occur through negotiations with the opposi- fused, there is a strong tendency toward tion, nor by the leader stepping down—they familial power and dynastic succession, often end only with the death of the leader there is no distinction between a state career through armed revolt, as readily witnessed and personal service to the ruler, there is a in Romania, Libya, and Iraq. The precarious lack of rationalized impersonal ideology, position of the Alawite minority in Syria economic success depends on a personal heightens the regime’s resistance to a nego- relationship to the ruler, and, most of all, the tiated solution, achieving the same effective ruler acts only according to his own result as a truly sultanistic regime. unchecked discretion, with no larger imper- The categorization of Syria as a sultanis- sonal goals.”18 This label is often applied to tic regime in transition has two key implica- Slobodan Milošević as well as Nicolae tions: first, it clarifies that Syria is not a Ceauşescu, Saddam Hussein, Moammar complex and intractable interethnic conflict Gaddafi, and North Korean rulers since Kim – it is a revolution seeking control of the Il-Sung. It is no surprise that the course of state. Second, it gives us a more constructive events in Syria rings eerily similar to model for analyzing the situation and

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understanding what comes next. Linz and the authoritarian political rule did not allow Stepan note the tendency for non-demo- for the formation of any significant orga- cratic regimes to follow the collapse of sul- nized opposition. Political opposition was tanistic regimes, and prescribe, “The best not allowed, and threats to the regime were chance for democratic transition is if revo- harshly dealt with. It would not be unfair to lutionary upheaval is led by internationally suggest the Egyptian Supreme Council of the supported, democratically inclined leaders Armed Forces effectively “stole” the who set a date for elections and allow free Egyptian revolution in 2011, as it intervened contestation of power.”21 The evolution of between the protestors and the collapsing the conflict, however, challenges the focused regime to protect its interests and shape the application of this model. The range of post-Mubarak political scene.24 Iraq never potential motives amongst actors in the experienced a revolution, but the U.S. inva- Syrian opposition sets the stage for a battle sion triggered the same result – a power for influence during the transition time vacuum with no clear mobilized political frame, potentially “hijacking” the revolu- movements. tion. Syria shows these same symptoms, as Conditions are ripe for a stolen revolu- the lack of opposition movements has tion specifically when there is no central opened the door for motivated actors to driving force or ideology behind the revolu- seize control of the revolution. Foremost tion. The revolutions in Romania and across among these actors are the Muslim Yugoslavia (1989) were spontaneous, but the Brotherhood, various al-Qaeda affiliated style of government had not allowed for the groups, and the people in the Syrian formation of an organized political opposi- National Coalition, all of whom are jockey- tion necessary to push through the reforms ing for position in a post-Assad Syria. The the protestors sought. In each case, a moti- Syrian populace has long been disengaged vated social or government actor was able to from political dialogue, in part because there seize the controls and guide the revolution has been no room for dissent with the towards meeting its own needs. In Romania, regime – a belief reinforced by the 1982 this was Ion Iliescu, who stepped in to lead Homs massacre and the government’s harsh the movement and consolidate power, response to the initial protests in Deraa. though his supporters were primarily After more than two years of war, much of regime officials.22 Similarly, the 1989 anti- the original revolution seems to have died government protests in the Yugoslav repub- out, leaving these armed groups to carry on lic of Montenegro did not advance a particu- the fight against the regime. lar political actor to replace the government. Instead, Milo Đukanović and Momir Bulatović (members of the regime) crossed Conditions are ripe for a stolen revolution over to the opposition and then negotiated specifically when there is no central driving force their new positions as Prime Minister and or ideology behind the revolution. President, respectively.23 Similar circum- stances existed in Egypt and in Libya, where

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The primary opposition to the ruling al-Assad (both Alawite). In supporting their Ba’ath Party has been its long-time ideo- Ba’athist policies, he was known for actively logical rival, the Muslim Brotherhood, which speaking out against the Muslim Hafez al-Assad ordered into exile in 1980, Brotherhood. As the Brotherhood gains following an assassination attempt against strength in the opposition, it is likely that him. Today, it is the largest and most orga- members of the movement will seek to nized bloc of the otherwise fragmented expand their political agenda against others, Syrian National Coalition. The Brotherhood’s meaning that the victims of anti-regime public statements evince a commitment to violence will not only be Alawites or Shi’a, a democratic social order, though its motives but will include Sunnis and Christians remain suspect. The Muslim Brotherhood’s opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood. This March 2012 Covenant and Pact called for the ideological dispute should also be borne in “institution of a State that respects human mind as a new post-Assad government rights as enshrined by divine texts and seeks to form. A dominant Muslim international instruments, such as dignity, Brotherhood could, as in Egypt, seize the equality, freedom of thought and speech; [a revolution from the hands of secular nation- state] where no citizen’s beliefs or religion alists and deliver them into the clutches of a shall be subject to prejudice.”25 This should competing vision of Syria’s future that is no sound familiar – it is nearly identical to more democratic than the last forty years Mohamed Morsi’s pre-electoral pledges of have been.27 inclusiveness in Egypt.26 This messaging “We most definitely have a proxy war in gave Morsi the political support and inter- Syria. At this point of the conflict it is dif- national backing to take power – specifically ficult not to say that the international when contrasted against the unrestrained dimension of the Syrian conflict precedes radicalism of the opposing Salafists. the domestic one.” – Ayham Kamel, Messaging aside, the Muslim Brotherhood Eurasia Group28 likely believes that democracy is a useful tool in Syria, sensing that a democratic elec- Threats to transitions do not only come tion would result in a victory for it, as hap- from within. Weak states and states in revo- pened in Egypt. lution become battlegrounds for foreign The prominent role of the Muslim actors seeking to affect the shape of the new Brotherhood should not, however, be mis- state, and Syria is no exception. To a much construed as introducing a sectarian com- greater extent than Bosnia, Syria is showing ponent to the conflict; instead, it introduces signs as a proxy battlefield for influence an important ideological and political com- between regional power brokers – or more ponent to the dispute. The recent assassina- directly, between the Gulf States and Iran. tion of Mohamed Saeed al-Bouti, the prom- While Western actors are getting much of inent pro-regime Sunni cleric, highlights the the attention, there are a number of other importance of politics over religion. The actors whose motives deserve to be Sunni cleric was a strong supporter of addressed. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Gulf Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez States are heavily supporting the Syrian

76 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL MOVING PAST THE BOSNIA FALLACY opposition. These countries are driving sup- Security Council resolutions that would port to the opposition, focused on curbing condemn Assad in any way. growing Iranian influence in the Gulf and The inherent danger of a proxy war is Middle East, and establishing a friendly gov- that the conflict is restrained only by the ernment in Syria. The Arab League has rec- limitations of the conflicting parties. In this ognized the Syrian National Coalition for case, neither Iran nor the West or Gulf States Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the seem overly constrained in the resources legitimate government of Syria, and the they are able to provide to support the Coalition’s then-president, Sheikh Moaz al- regime. This means that Syria will face con- Khatib, attended the League’s March meet- tinued destruction—the citizens and the ing in Qatar. Iran is providing political and fighters will never reach a breaking point, material support to the Syrian regime, both for they are now only the venue and the directly and via Lebanese Hezbollah. pawns in a larger conflict. At the same time, According to Syrian opposition leaders “Iran the proxy war can change not only the has dispatched hundreds of advisers, secu- nature of the war, but also the constitution rity officials and intelligence operatives to of its primary actors. Factions become more Syria, along with weapons, money and elec- or less powerful or coherent often because tronic surveillance equipment.29 This sup- of foreign incentives, which change the port is to ensure that the Alawite regime, a course of eventual compromise within a key Iranian ally, remains in power. The loss country. of the Syrian government would deal a sig- The point of this paper is not to label nificant blow to Iranian regional aspirations, Syria as an example of one of these indi- including the export of its own Islamic rev- vidual models, but rather to give a greater olution. Russia and China, with their own and more accurate understanding of the interests in mind, support the Syrian regime dynamics at work. Each of the models rep- in international politics, preventing UN resents a part of the overall situation, and Syrian National Coalition

Historic photo of National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces members in Doha, Qatar, 18 November 2012

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 77 KREITLOW the Syrian civil war is a mixture of all three from the newfound availability of power, variants. Each of the proposed models rep- money and benefits as parties look to exploit resents a body of theory and discussion, and the vacuum left by the receding state. Greed each has its own formulations, expectations and traditional loyalties to families, tribes, and prescribed actions. Just as importantly, and more tangible communities will super- these models do not prescribe a clear path sede the commitment to the revolution and for external actors to successfully intervene the vague idea of a Syrian state. These in a domestic transition. Libya and Iraq do changes open the door for the politicization not provide ideal or convincing scenarios for of religious differences as budding politi- an international presence; Romania, cians scramble to mobilize support and Tunisia, Egypt, Serbia (2000) were decided build power and influence. Retribution from within. In the absence of direct action, against Alawite or Shi’a regime figures is a the most effective steps the United States likely part of this – though it may be difficult and its allies can take are ones designed to to determine if the cause is sectarian or sim- prevent the politicization of ethnicity or ply anti-regime retribution. religion, strengthen the organization of the The United States should work to pre- opposition, and help produce international vent politicization of ethnicity or religion consensus on a way ahead. prior to the transition. Thus far, the United The primary goal of the U.S. and inter- States has generally taken the right steps – national community must be preventing the identifying the Nusra Front as a terrorist politicization of ethnicity throughout the group, pressing the Syrian opposition to transition. This is certainly easier said than support democratic and inclusive ideals, done – especially as neither the United working to shut down Iranian shipments to States nor the international community the Syrian regime – though all with mixed have any role or meaningful presence inside results. The Syrian National Coalition has Syria. Instead, efforts must focus on engag- repeatedly selected broad-based ethnic ing the Syrian National Coalition, the Free minorities and secular figures for its leader- Syrian Army and external actors who are ship, such as former Prime Minister, involved in the conflict. The effort to prevent , who was selected over the the politicization of ethnicity must focus on three candidates fielded by the Muslim maintaining a secular, democratic opposi- Brotherhood. Many of the former Syrian tion prior to and throughout the transition, National Coalition Presidents, such as while maintaining the territorial integrity of George Sabra and Moaz al-Khatib, are the state. known for their secular political views. Should the various opposition forces Unfortunately, the Syrian National manage to succeed in overcoming the Coalition has been anything but stable and regime, the disparate goals of the various has little legitimacy inside of Syria. The only opposition factions will become more pro- real body in the opposition that has legiti- nounced, raising the likelihood for greater macy is the Muslim Brotherhood due to its violence, along political, ideological and history of opposition to the Syrian regime. confessional lines. In part, this will result Its philosophical background and endurance

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give it a legitimacy that other factions do not tolerant, representative and multi-confes- have, and (as in Egypt) by presenting a mid- sional state in Iraq, as well as in Lebanon dle ground between radical Islamist parties and Jordan. At worst, breakaway sub-states and secular democratic parties it gains com- could lead to redrawing the entire map of mand of the electorate. To this point, the the Middle East. While this is probably a Muslim Brotherhood has wielded its consid- much-needed step towards resolving the erable influence to exploit the transitional larger regional problems, it undermines the period to its advantage. U.S. Ambassador to integrity of the international system if it is Syria Robert Ford, in a meeting with the not a deliberate process undertaken by sov- Syrian National Council in June 2012,30 made ereign states. The only way to prevent a American support contingent upon imple- disastrous overhaul of the region is to fur- mentation of reforms recommended by an ther the mythical state which is Syria, and independent committee.31 The committee’s ensure that minority groups understand that recommendations, which were eventually they will have a voice in a future govern- signed by most of the opposition forces, ment. struck at the Brotherhood’s monopoly on Even if territorial partition is avoided, power by outlining the transitional period, the new government will become a venue detailing the disposition of armed factions for competition between political actors, and criminalizing the use of money to buy and ethnicity is a proven tool for mobilizing political loyalty. Despite international oppo- and consolidating support. The United States sition, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded should not support the enshrinement of in staving off a follow-up committee and ethnic, religious or confessional-based dif- excluding the plan from the Syrian National ferences in a post-Assad government. Rather Coalition’s November 2012 founding state- than leveling representation, the allocation ments. The United States cannot fight this of government positions by ethnicity or reli- battle alone – it needs to press the Arab gion (e.g., Iraq under the Coalition League and other western donors to hold to Provisional Authority or Lebanon under the high standards in ensuring the Syrian National Pact) has been historically proven National Coalition holds to agreed principles to increase the likelihood of sectarian con- in exchange for international support. flict. While ethnic political parties are not As discussed previously, the United inherently dangerous or violent (their ulti- States should oppose the creation of ethnic mate goal is to advance the goals of their or confessional-based sub-states in Syria. ethnic / religious group); they indirectly (or The formation of ethnic states, such as an sometimes directly) threaten those outside in the West, a Kurdish state in of their group. Special electoral processes or the northeast and a Druze state along the arrangements that ensure diversity in gov- Jordanian border would be unsustainable ernment may alleviate the overt domination and unacceptable to other states in the of one social group, but negatively impact region. At best, the creation of ethnically or the quality of the resultant democracy. confessional-based mini-states in Syria As a final step, the United States should could undermine U.S. efforts to promote a encourage political dialogue on the future of

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Syria now. The transition to democracy will to ensure the formation of a democratic and be very complicated and will take time, inclusive government. These conditions especially given the absence of political life must become prerequisites for the delivery under Assad. Now is the time for political of aid and assistance, not only from the discussion between the Muslim Brotherhood West, but also from the Gulf States and other and secular members of the opposition on international actors. the future relationship between state and Syria is not Bosnia, nor is it necessarily religions, the nature of the transitional gov- Iraq, Egypt or Lebanon. It is not a foregone ernment, amnesty for former regime and conclusion that Syria’s day of sectarian Ba’ath Party members (and the status of the infighting is here, or that it is even coming. Ba’ath Party), and on the desired functions To help prevent that scenario, the interna- of the new government. Waiting to begin tional community must use its leverage to these discussions until Assad falls (or even avoid the mobilization of ethnic groups for months later as was the case in Egypt) political purposes, the division of territory delays the development of political society based on ethnic or religious identification, and the consolidation of a democratic alter- and the constitutional enshrinement of con- native to authoritarian rule. societal arrangements. Rather than solving Rather than pinning our Syrian fore- problems, these “solutions” only create fresh casts on naïve comparisons with select his- avenues for conflict, setting the stage for torical examples, looking to different models Syria to become another Bosnia or Iraq. provides a rich and diverse backdrop for Only by understanding and addressing the examining the multiple layers of the Syrian problem at hand, can we stop solving past conflict. These models provide us with more problems and focus on preventing their relevant examples on the role of ideology, recurrence. PRISM ethnicity and foreign involvement, which are essential ingredients of the current situ- ation. This analysis has also underscored the NOTES very important role of the Muslim Brotherhood in “hijacking” the revolution, a continuing development that will have long-lasting impacts on the future of the 1 The Telegraph. “William Hague compares revolution and the transition to a post-Assad Syria to Bosnia in 1990s,” 19 Jun 2012. http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ regime. There is no clear way for the United syria/9322600/William-Hague-compares-Syria- States to control or confront these develop- to-Bosnia-in-1990s.html ments, though efforts to require the Syrian 2 Today’s Zaman. “Davatoglu compares Syrian National Coalition to undergo review by an killings to Srebrenica massacre,” 4 March 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-273288-da- independent committee are a step in the vutoglu-compares-syrian-killings-to-srebreni- right direction. The United States must con- ca-massacre.html tinue to push for such efforts which allow 3 Jervis, Robert. Perception and the international community to maintain a Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 217. hand in the oversight of the transition, and

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4 Sherlock, Ruth. “Syrian Rebels Accused of Democracy, , , Sectarian Murders,” 11 August 2013. http://www. Post-Totalitarianism and Sultanism. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ 18 Ibid., p. 52. syria/10236362/Syrian-rebels-accused-of- 19 Linz Juan and Alfred Stepan. sectarian-murders.html “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’”, 5 Ramet, Sabrina P. The Three Yugoslavias: Journal of Democracy 24:2, April 2013, p. 26. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005. 20 Ibid., p. 28. (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2006), 21 Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 58 p. 304. 22 Darmanović, Srđan. “Demokratske 6 Sell, Louis. Slobodan Milosevic and the Tranzicije u Južnoj i Istočnoj Evropi,” Doktorska Destruction of Yugoslavia. (Durham & London: Disertacija. (Podgorica: Univerzitet Crne Gore, Duke University Press, 2002), pp. 57-59, 63-64, 2002), pp. 166-167. 108-110; Dania, Robert J. and John. M.A. Fine, Jr. 23 Ibid., pp. 185-187. Bosnia: A Tradition Betrayed. (New York: Columbia 24 Dobson, William J. The Dictator’s Learning University Press, 1994), p. 205. Curve. (New York: Doubleday, 2012), pp. 209, 7 Ibid., pp. 143-165. Owen, David. Balkan 211-212. Odyssey. (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1995), p. 25 Carnegie Middle East Center. “The Muslim 46. Brotherhood in Syria” http://carnegie-mec.org/ 8 Popović, Srdja. “Milošević’s Motiveless publications/?fa=48370 Malignancy” in Blitz, Brad, ed. War and Change in 26 Kirkpatrick, David D. “Named Egypt’s the Balkans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Winner, Islamist Makes History” The New York Press, 2006), pp. 52-53. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/ 9 Dania and Fine 1994, pp. 220-221. world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim- 10 BBC News – Middle East. “Guide: Syria brotherhood-declared-as--president.html Crisis,” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-mid- 27 Ajami, Fouad. “The Arab Spring at One: A dle-east-13855203 Year of Living Dangerously” Foreign Affairs, March/ 11 Sterling, Joe, Saad Abedine and Salma April 2012. Abdelaziz. “Syria fight now ‘overtly sectarian,’ U.N. 28 Nakhoul, Samia. “Analysis: No happy Says,” 20 Dec 2012. http://edition.cnn. outcome in Syria as conflict turns into proxy war” com/2012/12/20/world/meast/syria-civil-war; August 1, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/arti- Cheterian, Vicken. The Syrian War Is Not Only cle/2012/08/01/us-syria-crisis-scenario-idUS- Sectarian, Al-Hayat, 19 May 2013. http://www. BRE8700S420120801 al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/05/syrian- conflict-failed-sectarian-analysis.html 29 Warrick, Joby and Liz Sly. “U.S. officials: 12 The Wall Street Journal. “Syria’s Cease-Fire Iran is stepping up lethal aid to Syria” The of the Grave,” June 15, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/ Washington Post, March 3, 2012. http://articles. article/SB100014240527023037539045774527422017 washingtonpost.com/2012-03-03/ 22640.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_AboveLEFTTop world/35449594_1_homs-bab-amr-intelligence- 13 Esman, Milton J. Ethnic Politics. (Ithaca: reports Cornell University, 1994), p. 217. 30 The Syrian National Council was the 14 Ibid., 1994, p. 223. predecessor to the current National Syrian political 15 Honig, Jan W. and Norbert Both. Srebrenica: opposition, The Syrian National Coalition, formed Record of a . (London: Penguin Books, in November, 2012. 1996), pp. 99-103. 31 Hasssan, Hassan. “How the Muslim 16 Al-jazeera.com. “Where is the Syrian Brotherhood Hijacked Syria’s Revolution” Foreign Conflict Heading?” http://www.aljazeera.com/ Policy.com. March 13, 2013. http://www.foreign- programmes/inside- policy.com/articles/2013/03/13/how_the_mus- syria/2013/03/20133177557742685.html lim_brotherhood_hijacked_syria_s_revolution 17 Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996), p. 44. The five types of modern regimes they identified are:

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 81 DESIGNING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-WAR SYRIA This graphic incorporates information and insights provided by Ambassador Donald Planty FROM Pre-War Power Structure Concentric Circles of Loyalty Around Bashar al-Assad*

Note: Size of figure and distance Assad from Assad correspond to relative power and level of direct contact and influence with regime leaders.

National Security Council

Ba’ath Party Machine Intelligence Agencies

Syrian Armed Forces

Local Municipal Workers Politcal Security Local Ba’ath Offices Air Force Intelligence Governors State Security Political Bureaus “Shabiha” Military Intelligence Provincial Governance (paid armed gangs) Syrian Arab Air Defense Syrian Arab Navy Syrian Arab Army Syrian Arab Air Force THE GOAL TO Post-War Security Sector Democratic, Institutionalized Separation of Powers

The security sector transition process creates the space for new institutions to succeed. Good habits will be reinforced by an engaged electorate.

Civilian-Elected National Leadership

Ministry of Interior Ministry of Defense Elected Provincial Leadership

Army National Civilian Police Navy Border Patrol Air Force Elected Muncipal Leadership Immigration Patrol National Intelligency Agency Political Parties Local Municipal Workers

*Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) DESIGNING SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-WAR SYRIA

500,000 fighters 400,000 in the Syrian Armed Forces 70,000 in the Free Syrian Army 30,000 in the Islamic Fronts THE PROCESS

>1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons 2 million Refugees in Camps .5 million Armed Fighters 14 million Addt’l Civilians In-Country >15 million Living in Diaspora *Pre-war pop: 20.3 million

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Priorities, metrics, and timetable for transition

Newly elected government

© 2013 Zoe Bockius-Suwyn & Nathaniel Rosenblatt, Caerus Associates wikimedia.org

Afghan village destroyed by the Soviets How to Support the Opposition in Syria New Models for Understanding Syria

BY SUSANNA BLUME

mericans’ understanding of the current civil war in Syria is firmly rooted in their recent : the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the past Adecade. These conflicts have made U.S. policy makers painfully aware of the costs of the kind of intervention required by modern counterinsurgency doctrine, and of the limits of U.S. ability to create enduring political change in foreign lands. However, another slightly older case exists that may be more relevant to the civil war currently raging in Syria. U.S. intervention during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was successful in achieving its proximate goal (Soviet withdrawal), though the consequences of that conflict have been grave and far-reaching. This article explores similarities and differences between these two conflicts, and offers lessons learned from U.S. intervention during the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Specifically, to support the opposition in Syria, the United States should: 1) vet and select recip- ients of U.S. military aid itself; 2) provide military assistance overtly under Title 10 military and Title 22 diplomatic authorities, vice covertly under Title 50 intelligence authorities; 3) carefully consider the type and number of weapons to be provided in order to maximize their account- ability and recoverability; and 4) continue to work with Syrian factions as well as other interested parties to develop a lasting political resolution to the conflict. Lastly, this article examines how these lessons might be applied to the current conflict in Syria to achieve the U.S. long-term stra- tegic objective: a democratic Syria with a robust civil society that is a stabilizing force in the greater Middle East.

Susanna Blume is Senior Advisor in the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The views in this article are her own and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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Importance of Stability in Syria to U.S. greater Middle East, or whether it will devolve National Security further into chaos, becoming a haven not just for Hezbollah, but for extremists of all stripes After a decade mired in Middle Eastern and ambitions, with destabilizing effects to be and South Asian conflicts with uncertain out- felt certainly throughout the region, and comes, it is easy to see why so much of the potentially on a global scale. This instability American public, not to mention the punditry could manifest itself in countless ways: pro- and policy-making class, is deeply skeptical of tracted civil war and ethnic cleansing; contin- yet another intervention in the region. The ued instability and loss of life caused by terror- conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria can all ist organizations with local, regional or even accurately be described as civil wars, to greater global ambitions; or worsening prospects for or lesser degrees. What stake does the United the global economy and the global economic States have in these conflicts? Hasn’t recent recovery as a result of continued instability in history demonstrated that U.S. intervention oil markets. only makes things worse for the affected popu- Perhaps even more disconcerting is the lations? What can the United States really do fact that the conflict has not been, and will not to resolve these conflicts? be, confined neatly within Syria’s borders. The While it is still too soon to tell whether, in massive influx of nearly 525,000 Syrian refu- the long run, the benefits of the wars in Iraq gees (and counting) into neighboring Jordan and Afghanistan will outweigh the tremendous has placed the already precarious Hashemite costs in both lives and treasure, one can justly dynasty, a stalwart friend of the United States describe the outcomes as at best mixed. The and consistent supporter of shared interests, in U.S. military is extraordinarily efficient at further peril.1 Approximately 760,000 refugees deposing tyrannical regimes such as those of have fled to Lebanon, stretching government Saddam Hussein or the Taliban, but the U.S. resources and distorting local economies.2 government as a whole is far less adept at the Turkey is host to nearly 500,000 Syrian refu- exponentially more difficult task of bringing gees, as well as the headquarters of the Free about lasting political solutions that might Syrian Army.3 Skirmishes across the Syrian/ allow these countries to flourish post-conflict. Turkish border, combined with long-standing Regardless, this mixed track record is not a tension between not only Turkish Kurds, but license to revert to isolationism, nor is it a rea- the Kurdish populations of Syria, Iraq, and son to assume that the United States, along Iran, could draw all of NATO into the conflict, with partners who are equally interested in the at a time and under circumstances not of our stability and prosperity of the greater Middle choosing. The emergence of a de facto East are unable to help unstable countries Kurdistan spanning northern Iraq and north- build stable civil societies. eastern Syria could have a profoundly destabi- So, why indeed, should the United States lizing effect on Turkey. Finally, the current care about the now three year old conflict in power vacuum in Syria has resulted in an envi- Syria? The outcome of the current conflict will ronment highly permissive of the activities of determine whether Syria will ultimately extremist groups (e.g., Hezbollah, al-Nusra) become a force for peace and stability in the and their state backers (Iran, and some Gulf

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states) whose ambitions, to depose both auto- public reticence has been mirrored in a cau- cratic and democratic regimes replacing them tious Executive. with highly restrictive Islamic , When confronted with the Soviet invasion extend far beyond Syria’s borders. of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Carter Administration’s response was shaped by a Parallels between 1980s Afghanistan and Syria Today recent history rife with very public foreign policy disasters. The tops the list, Admittedly, the geopolitical cli- manifest in deep reluctance by both the mate surrounding Afghanistan in the 1980s is Administration and the public to engage in more different from than similar to the current another large-scale intervention in a far off conflict in Syria. However, there are several rel- land. More proximate were the Iran hostage evant common currents worth noting, as they crisis and the storming of the U.S. Embassy in indicate potential to apply lessons learned Islamabad, both of which occurred that same from U.S. intervention in the Afghan conflict year. Made cautious by that history, when first to Syria’s current civil war. alerted to the fact that the Soviets were becom- Perhaps most obvious is the similarity in ing involved in the Afghan conflict, the Carter the U.S. domestic political climate of the two Administration elected to provide only non- eras, particularly the public’s lack of appetite lethal aid to anti-communist forces. To avoid for foreign policy generally, and costly military openly provoking the Soviet Union, it did so commitments in particular. In both cases, covertly.4 It was not until was wikimedia.org

President Reagan meeting with Afghan Freedom Fighters to discuss Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan

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elected in 1980 that the United States began covertly through Pakistani intermediaries. providing arms to the fighting President Obama has the additional burden of against the Soviets; at first only Enfield rifles in having to convince the American people that small quantities. It was not until the interven- the potential harm to U.S. interests warrants tion of the now famous Representative Charlie intervention. Wilson that the United States began providing, On a positive note, both conflicts are char- through Pakistani intermediaries, the surface- acterized by a deeply committed indigenous to-air Stinger missiles that would steadily opposition that prefers to fight its own battles, erode Soviet dominance of the airspace over requiring only materiel assistance from foreign Afghanistan, a contributing factor in the Soviet governments. Both the Afghan mujahideen and Union’s decision to withdraw from the Syrian opposition were/are fighting for the Afghanistan in February 1989.5 right to control the fate of their country. The Mirroring the triple specter haunting the existence of these vested local leaders and Carter Administration, the Obama fighters with robust domestic constituencies Administration is also faced with three cau- indicates that Syrians, like the Afghans before tionary tales from recent history: Operation them, currently have and will retain ownership Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, over the conflict now and into the post-conflict and the attack against the U.S. diplomatic reconstruction phase. This state of affairs con- compound in Benghazi, Libya. Like the Carter trasts starkly with Operation Iraqi Freedom, Administration before him, President Obama where the United States led the invasion to has exercised caution, initially determining depose Saddam Hussein’s regime backed by that the safest course of action, and the most only a handful of Iraqi expatriates. Iraqis did palatable to the American public, was to pro- not own the deposition of Saddam Hussein vide only non-lethal aid to the Syrian opposi- and were thus poorly positioned to create a tion. And, just as in Afghanistan in the 1980s, lasting political reconciliation after his fall. this non-lethal aid was not enough to alleviate Unfortunately, both the Afghan mujahi‑ the suffering of hundreds of thousands of peo- deen and the Free Syrian Army and its affiliates ple displaced by the conflict, nor did it appre- are also characterized by deep divisions within ciably help to weaken the regime. Rather, as their ranks, a lack of clear leadership and com- reported in the press, even additional military mand and control, and widely divergent polit- and non-military aid from other supporters ical positions ranging from extremist funda- such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, has mentalists to moderate secularists, and not prevented the tide from turning against the covering much ground in between. The frac- Free Syrian Army and its affiliates.6 tured nature of the opposition is one of the Also in both cases U.S. national security primary challenges to foreign governments interests in the outcome of the conflicts were wishing to aid the rebellion. How can the real, arguably even more so in Syria. But these United States know who it is arming, and what interests remain profoundly difficult to explain kind of Syria they will create should Bashar to a deeply skeptical public. This public reluc- al-Assad fall? tance was less an issue for the Carter and Reagan Administrations, who provided aid

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U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan moderate elements in the anti-communist opposition and toward those who would ulti- Though the Soviet-backed regime per- mately become enemies of the United States sisted after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal until two decades later. the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, what Secondly, U.S., Soviet, and United Nations came after (a protracted period of civil war that efforts to create a lasting political solution to resulted in the rise of the Taliban and created the conflict in Afghanistan failed. While the a safe haven for al-Qaeda) could hardly be United States did not maliciously abandon the called success, by the Soviet Union, its succes- Afghan opposition following Soviet with- sors, or the United States. However, it would drawal, a series of domestic political factors led be revisionist to overlook the fact that U.S. to decreased interest in the subject in military assistance to the mujahideen was suc- Washington, reduced funding, and a devolu- cessful in achieving its proximate goal: to tion of decision making authority that led to make the conflict in Afghanistan as costly as inconsistencies in U.S. policy.9 In particular, possible for the Soviet Union.7 U.S. military the United States devoted considerable effort assistance to the Afghan mujahideen is a rela- to recovering the Stinger surface-to-air missiles tively rare example of a policy that was success- distributed to the mujahideen during the Soviet ful in bringing about its strategic objective, in occupation.10 As the country devolved into a a relatively short time and with relatively little bloody, protracted civil war, the United States cost to the United States. The civil war that fol- continued to fund warlords with interests lowed Soviet withdrawal, allowing the Taliban completely contrary to its own by buying back to rise to power in Afghanistan and creating a Stinger missiles under the Central Intelligence safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his asso- Agency’s (CIA) recovery program. As for the ciates, might have had a less catastrophic out- Soviets, though they continued to support the come if the United States and other interested communist regime for three years after the parties had acted differently in two key withdrawal of Soviet forces, the collapse of the instances during and immediately following Soviet Union in 1991 derailed the U.S.-Soviet the Soviet-Afghan War. dialogue on Afghan transition.11 Without First, the U.S. Government did not vet and strong U.S. or Soviet leadership, the UN’s select recipients of U.S. military aid itself, peace plan collapsed under pressure from rival instead giving U.S. funds and weapons to Afghan and Pakistani factions.12 Thus, the fun- Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to damentalist cancer that emerged in the 1980s distribute to recipients of its own choosing. was left to metastasize in the highly permissive Doing so allowed the United States to main- environment created by the protracted period tain plausible deniability of involvement in of civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal the conflict. Unfortunately the ISI’s selection from Afghanistan. criteria diverged significantly from what our 8 Lessons Learned, Applied to the Syrian own might have been. Seeking to strengthen Civil War and empower extremist elements within the mujahideen to be used as proxies against India, So, what can we learn from the U.S. expe- the ISI channeled U.S. resources away from rience during the Soviet invasion and

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 89 BLUME occupation of Afghanistan? First, providing Title 50 intelligence authorities as was the case arms to a committed, indigenous opposition in Afghanistan; 3) the United States should force can be an effective way to advance carefully consider the type and number of mutual interests limited to the scope of the weapons to be provided in order to maximize conflict in question (e.g., forcing the Soviets their accountability and recoverability; and 4) out of Afghanistan; deposing Bashar al-Assad). the United States must continue to work with This model is far less resource-intensive (for Syrian factions as well as other interested par- the United States) than the counterinsurgency ties to develop a lasting political resolution to doctrine developed during Operation Iraqi the current conflict. Freedom, and ensures that the local popula- The United States must not rely on tion retains ownership of the conflict, and thus regional partners to designate recipients of ownership of an eventual political solution. military assistance; it must vet and select recip- However, there are several key adjustments the ients itself. Though U.S. partners in the region, United States should make to this model such as Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, may before applying it to the current conflict in understand the Syrian insurgency better than Syria: 1) the United States must vet and select the United States does, their interests in select- recipients of U.S. military aid itself; 2) the ing recipients of military aid may be different, United States should provide military assis- or worse, contrary to U.S. interests in a demo- tance overtly under Title 10 military and Title cratic Syria. Currently, extremist organizations 22 diplomatic authorities, vice covertly under are receiving the bulk of foreign military aid Public domain photograph from defenseimagery.mil

U.S. Airmen with the 386th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron load pallets of nonlethal aid for the Syrian Opposition Coalition

90 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL HOW TO SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION IN SYRIA from individuals, organizations, and even potentially altering the decision calculus in the some governments. For example, Qatar’s Gulf rebels’ favor, not only for the Assad regime, but neighbors have accused it of funding the al- also for Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. In addi- Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front.13 In order to tion, the transparency gained by working ensure that moderate factions have a robust through Title 10 and Title 22 authorities would role in shaping post-Assad Syria, the odds make it easier to hold recipients of military aid must be evened. Particularly if the United accountable for the whereabouts of weapons, States and like-minded partners wish to have reducing the risk of U.S. military hardware fall- any influence over what shape the political ing into the hands of those who would use it resolution will take, we must ensure that mod- against the U.S., its allies, and partners. erates and secularists are strong enough mili- To further mitigate the risk that U.S. weap- tarily to make their voices heard in the process ons could come to be possessed by extremist of developing that political resolution, or, in factions, the United States should carefully the worst case, that moderate factions are able consider the ability to account for and recover to hold their own if a post-Assad struggle for different types of weapons when deciding power becomes violent. U.S. envoys must work what kind and how much military assistance closely with the Syrian Military Council and to provide. The Stingers provided to the muja‑ collect intelligence independently to ensure hideen were highly effective even in relatively that U.S. military aid is put against objectives small numbers; the United States only pro- common to the Syrian opposition and the vided between 2,000 and 2,500 in total.14 United States – ending the Assad dynasty and Because the Stingers were few in number and replacing it with an inclusive democratic sys- rare in the environment in which they were tem supported by a robust civil society. distributed, they could be tracked relatively Second, any military assistance provided easily by the CIA using unique serial num- should be executed by the Department of State bers.15 The United States should consider these and the Department of Defense under Title 10 factors when determining what to provide the military and Title 22 diplomatic authorities, Syrian opposition, as well as what types of not covertly under Title 50 intelligence author- weapons would offer the opposition a decisive ities. During the Soviet invasion and occupa- advantage over the Assad regime. tion of Afghanistan, U.S. military assistance to Finally, providing military assistance does the mujahideen had to be covert; overt assis- not obviate the need to work aggressively tance would have demanded a reaction from towards an enduring political resolution to the the Soviets, at a minimum resulting in escala- conflict. As the past decade of war has demon- tion and potentially in contagion of the strated, military victory is not adequate to Afghan conflict. At worst, the result could have secure lasting stability. Without reconciliation been open war between the two superpowers. and an inclusive, representative political sys- Conversely, the circumstances surrounding the tem backed by a robust civil society, old pat- current conflict in Syria encourage public terns of conflict will continue to reemerge, acknowledgement of U.S. military aid to the often manifest in violence. Building this kind opposition. Overt U.S. intervention could have of a system is exponentially more difficult than significant impact on the course of the conflict, achieving military victory, and only the Syrians

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 91 BLUME can do it. Post-conflict reconciliation and Conclusion reconstruction is not a process that can be led by outsiders; it must be wholly owned by the There are plenty of reasons to proceed domestic constituencies in Syria, with foreign with extreme caution when contemplating parties in clearly supporting roles. military assistance to the Syrian opposition. As Consequently, the U.S. role is limited to ensur- the U.S. intervention during the Soviet occupa- ing that moderate factions have what they tion of Afghanistan demonstrates, military need, and creating space in the international assistance to insurgents with weak command system for change in Syria to occur. Specifically, and control is a dangerous undertaking. the United States must do what it can diplo- However, failure to intervene can have equally matically to prevent spoilers (like Russia, Iran, severe consequences. Foreign fighters and arms Qatar, and Hezbollah) from obstructing Syria’s continue to flow into Syria, further bolstering democratic development. Though the U.S. dip- the capability and capacity of the regime’s lomatic role in this political space is necessar- forces, as well as extremists in opposition. ily limited, it is equally if not more important Asking the rebels to come to the negotiating than any military assistance the United States table when they are obviously weak, and can provide. moreover when moderate factions within the opposition are weaker still, could have disas- trous consequences for the future of Syria as a Commons: FIA Novosti

Last Soviet troop column crosses Soviet border after leaving Afghanistan

92 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL HOW TO SUPPORT THE OPPOSITION IN SYRIA democratic state supported by a robust civil NOTES society. Because of Syria’s vital role in the greater Middle East, extremist dominance post- Assad could further destabilize the already 1 According to the United Nations Refugee fragile region, with significant implications Agency, as of September 24, 2013. http://data.unhcr. org/syrianrefugees/regional.php most immediately for Israel’s security, but also 2 Ibid. for the global security environment as a whole. 3 Ibid. There is some hope that democratic societies 4 Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the outside the region can help avoid this outcome CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Books: New by ensuring that moderate factions within the York, 2004. opposition are militarily strong enough to be 5 Ibid. credible actors in the political process should 6 Sly, Liz. "Syrian Regime Gains Ground." Washington Post, 12 May 2013, page 1. the Assad regime fall. In so doing, policy mak- 7 Grau, Lester W. and Michael A. Gress. The ers should consider both the successes and Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost. failures of prior U.S. intervention during the University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 2002. 8 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, Bearden, Milt. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB. and be guided by their lessons. PRISM Presidio Press: New York, 2004. 9 Maley, William. The Afghanistan Wars. Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2002. 10 Coll. 11 Maley. 12 Ibid. 13 Khalafa, Roula, and Abigail Fielding-Smith. “How a Tiny Oil-Rich Gulf State Siezed Control of the Syrian Revolution.” Financial Times Magazine, 18 May 2013, page FTM12. 14 Coll. 15 Ibid. 16 Barnard, Anne, and Hwaida Saad. “Hezbollah Aids Syrian Military in a Key Battle.” New York Times, 20 May 2013, page 1.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 93 Bernd Schwabe, Hannover

Gravestone without name symbolizing children killed in the war Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation

BY RADWAN ZIADEH

n the aftermath of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, in 2005 the General Assembly of the United Nations established Ian initiative known as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The R2P concept departs from traditional principles of international relations regarding the protection of national sovereignty, stating that sovereignty is not a right but a responsibility. R2P argues that when a regime commits war crimes and crimes against humanity, it forfeits its sovereignty, and the international com- munity then has the right, indeed the responsibility to take necessary measures to protect civilians and prevent further crimes against them. This principle has not been applied in Syria, where indiscriminate aerial bombardment has taken the lives of more than 20,000 civilians so far.1 Bashar al-Assad’s forces have made extensive use of weapons of mass destruction, including SCUD missiles and chemical weapons, against areas of Syria with utter disregard for the lives of Syrian civilians or for the amount of destruction done to residential areas and infrastructure. The fractured Syrian military opposition, which includes extremist radical elements like the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, have also commit- ted crimes, such as kidnapping religious leaders and destroying Shia mosques in pro-Assad com- munities. If one compares the conflict in Syria to other conflicts that have occurred throughout the world labeled “civil wars,” it is clear that the term “civil war” is far from the reality of the situation in Syria. In fact, Syria is in the midst of a popular revolution against an authoritarian regime. If we conduct a simple comparison of the number of victims in Syria with the number of victims in countries in which a civil war has actually occurred—in Peru, for example—we can see that the conflict in Peru, which lasted for twenty years, from 1980 to 2000, and had more than 70,000 victims,2 is nearly incomparable to the 120,000 victims in Syria during only the past three years. According to U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, the number of victims has risen from 1,000 per month at the start of the revolution to 5,000 per month today.3 If Assad is

Dr. Radwan Ziadeh is the executive director of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies and a former member of the Syrian National Council.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 95 ZIADEH allowed to continue his war against the Syrian implementation of a successful transitional people, the number of victims can be expected justice program, Syrians will feel confident that to exceed 250,000. there is a path toward national reconciliation It will not be possible to start a genuine that ensures adequate pluralism, credibility process of transitional justice or a process of and legitimacy. political transition toward pluralism, democ- Launching a transitional justice process in racy, and reconciliation in Syria without a Syria will be among the most difficult and complete cessation of violence. As transitional complicated processes that the Syrian commu- justice experiences across the world have nity will face after the fall of the regime. But taught us, reconciliation is closely linked to considering the division of society currently the path of political transition, and it depends taking place in Syria, it is unlikely the Syrian mainly on the political will and vision of both judicial system will be ready to launch a cred- the actors and the political forces on the ible and effective accountability process. Assad ground. The launching of transitional justice and his militias have through intimidation processes can let victims feel that those respon- and provocation set the Syrian people against sible for committing crimes against their chil- each other. The recent establishment of the dren and daughters will be brought to justice so-called Army of National Defense, which is and that the time of impunity is over. With the practically a governmental institutionalization SANANews Agency

President Assad with his Troops, August 1, 2013

96 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION of Assad’s semi-regular militias (al-Shabiha) have participated. Two important initiatives continues this intimidation and provocation. have resulted from these engagements: the One option for Syrians is international Association for the Defense of the Victims of justice. The crimes of the Assad regime are cer- the Syrian Revolution—which will serve as the tainly within the scope of work of the voice of justice for the victims of the conflict— International Criminal Court. However Russia, and the National Preparatory Committee for with its position in the UN Security Council, Transitional Justice, which will develop pro- may prevent the referral of Syrian criminals to grams, perceptions, and policies necessary for the Court. Any future Syrian government the future transitional justice phase. formed by the opposition or formed after the Transitional justice links two fundamental fall of the Assad regime should ratify the Rome concepts: justice and transition. The semanti- Statute, which will enable a prosecutor to open cally accurate meaning of the concept is an investigation into these crimes. The path of achieving justice during a transitional period international justice however is not an ideal experienced by a state.4 During the political choice; international justice is slow. Moreover transition following an extended period of vio- is appears to be subject to the ambiguities of lence or oppression, a society and its commu- global . The Syrian victims need nities often find themselves burdened with the their rights to be guaranteed, not set aside or difficult task of addressing pervasive human compromised in the process of political com- rights violations. The state seeks to deal with promise. Therefore, it seems that so-called the crimes of the past in order to promote jus- hybrid courts may be a better option for Syria tice, peace, and reconciliation.5 and Syrians. Such tribunals should be held on The establishment of a culture of account- Syrian territory and involve the direct partici- ability, replacing the culture of impunity, gives pation of Syrian judges supported by interna- a sense of security to the victims and sends a tional expertise, possibly under the supervi- warning to those who might commit such vio- sion of the United Nations. The necessity of lations in the future. It also provides a measure international experts participating in hybrid of fairness to the suffering victims, and helps courts held in divided societies remains the to curb the tendency to practice vigilante jus- best option, as it will send the message to all tice or retribution. And it provides an impor- Syrians that revenge is not the goal, as well as tant opportunity to strengthen the credibility reassure them that the toughest standards of of judicial systems suffering from corruption justice and international transparency will be and destruction, or that did not function prop- required, carefully scrutinized and guaranteed. erly in the past. In preparation for transitional justice pro- The National Preparatory Committee for grams in Syria, the Syrian Center for Political Transitional Justice, a committee of highly and Strategic Studies has organized confer- regarded Syrian judges, lawyers, human rights ences, workshops and discussions in which activists, and academics (formed to conduct numerous representatives of political forces, exhaustive research on transitional justice and associations, civil society organizations, present specific recommendations for a future human rights activists, judges and lawyers, and Syrian transitional justice program) is cur- family members of the victims of the conflict rently deeply engaged in an effort to open a

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dialogue with civil society representatives in achieving five key objectives: fact-finding and order to make transitional justice a priority commissions of inquiry, filing lawsuits, com- after the fall of the Assad regime. The Syrian pensation, institution building for the future, Expert House recommends that the interim and memorialization. government support the National Preparatory 1. Fact-Finding and Commissions of Inquiry Committee by legally transforming it into a formal institution under the name, “National The National Commission for Transitional Commission for Transitional Justice and Justice and Reconciliation will gather all data- Reconciliation,” and then build its capacity bases containing evidence of human rights and facilitate its efforts in every possible way. violations currently maintained by Syrian The next section describes in detail how this human rights groups and will form commis- commission should function. sions of inquiry for conducting investigations regarding extrajudicial killings, torture cases, prisoners of conscience, and enforced disap- The National Commission For Transitional Justice And Reconciliation pearances. These commissions of inquiry will be The National Commission for Transitional capable investigative bodies charged to Justice and Reconciliation will focus on uncover all the facts regarding conflict-related Photo by Maha Zimmo

Syria’s Supreme Court in Damascus. Will the Syrian Judicial System be able to Provide Justice?

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violence, whether perpetrated by the state or ■■ Hold general forums for the victims to non-state actors. The establishment of such encourage a public debate on issues of tran- committees must follow after efforts have been sitional justice and reconciliation. made to ensure there is an expanded national ■■ Give recommendations regarding com- consultation process, appropriate terms of ref- pensation for the victims via direct dialogue. erence for each commission of inquiry, and the ■■ Give recommendations for necessary presence of a clear political commitment that legal and institutional reforms. will allow independent and effective investiga- ■■ Promote social reconciliation at multi- tions. The commissions of inquiry that will be ple levels of society, the most important created by the National Commission for being the grassroots level. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation should ■■ Help strengthen the democratic transi- not be equated with or considered substitutes tion.7 for trials. The commissions will be non-judi- cial organizations; therefore, their terms of Therefore, the Syrian Expert House recom- reference and powers are complementary to mends that the National Commission for those of the courts. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation orga- Simultaneously, the National Commission nize a number of public hearings, to give the must encourage civil society to carry out tran- victims a forum to talk about their suffering. sitional justice initiatives and support its work These hearings will break the sectarian barrier both directly and indirectly. Indeed, many when they show that the victims are not lim- NGOs—such as the Syrian Network for ited to any single sect, but indeed represent all Human Rights, the Local Coordinating of Syria’s sects. And they will play an impor- Committees, the Damascus Center for Human tant role in social healing, after the intense Rights Studies, and the Syrian Observatory for violence that Syrian society has experienced in Human Rights—have documented the viola- the last three years. tions and abuses perpetrated by the Assad 2. Filing Lawsuits regime, often at great personal risk to them- selves.6 The establishment of criminal justice is an The National Commission for Transitional essential element of addressing the massive Justice and Reconciliation should work to violations of . Lawsuits achieve the following: must be brought against individual perpetra- tors, and prosecutions should seek to restore ■■ Seek and establish the truth regarding the dignity of the victims and restore Syrian the grave human rights violations perpe- citizens’ confidence in the rule of law. Trials trated by the Assad regime against the Syrian must include criminal investigations and other people. legal proceedings against the perpetrators of ■■ Hold accountable the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity that human rights violations by providing evi- took place in Syria during the revolution. dence to courts and tribunals. These trials should specifically seek to target the upper ranks of the Assad regime: those responsible for both giving orders to commit

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 99 ZIADEH violations, and those who oversaw the execu- experienced. The concept of compensation has tion of those orders. Even members of the several meanings, including direct compensa- armed opposition must be held accountable, tion (for damage or loss of opportunity), res- and their trials should be conducted according titution (moral and mental support for victims to the same international standards to avoid in their daily lives), and recovery (restoring any challenges to these trials’ legitimacy. what has been lost as much as possible). There will undoubtedly be some contro- Compensations can be distinguished by their versy regarding the ability of the domestic types, physical and moral, and the targeted Syrian courts to hold perpetrators accountable. groups, individual and collective. Physical If the domestic courts prove incapable of con- compensation can take the form of money or ducting these trials, Syria may have no choice material goods. It can also include the provi- but to conduct judicial proceedings at the sion of free or preferential services, such as international level. health, education, and housing. Moral com- The post-Assad transitional government pensation can be made by issuing a formal will invite the international community to apology, by dedicating a public place (e.g., a assist in the establishment of hybrid courts museum, park, or monument), or by declaring presided over by Syrian judges and advised by a national day of remembrance. international judges, all operating under the Post-Assad Syria will need a Committee supervision of the United Nations. This hybrid for Compensation and Reparation as the com- court system will simultaneously uphold both pensation of Syria’s victims perhaps presents Syrian and international law, resorting to inter- the greatest moral, legal, and political chal- national law only in the places in which the lenges, particularly for massive government- Syrian law code has gaps. The courts can also run programs. A range of considerations and rely on the provisions of various international challenges must be considered during the treaties that Syria has signed in order to design of material reparation programs. It is develop their procedures. Mixed courts ensure necessary to first clearly define the “victims,” that the Syrian population feels a sense of or categories of beneficiaries, in order to be ownership regarding judicial proceedings able to decide who deserves access to such while at the same time bringing international compensation. Unfortunately, due to the lim- legitimacy to the court’s rulings. ited nature of state resources, the wider the category of victims, the lower the amount of 3. Compensation compensation. Conversely, if “beneficiary” is In light of recent pervasive violations of narrowly defined, the government could be human rights in Syria, it has become incum- inadvertently excluding a large number of bent upon governments to not only address legitimate victims. the perpetrators of these abuses but also to A second consideration is to decide guarantee the rights of victims. Governments whether compensation will be distributed can create the appropriate conditions to pre- directly to individuals or to groups that have serve the dignity of the victims and to ensure been wronged en masse. It is no surprise that justice, using methods of compensation for the structuring compensation in the form of col- damage and the suffering that victims have lective grants often involves political gains that

100 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION could include a larger number of beneficiaries, and villages affected by indiscriminate shelling but the value of restitution is minimal in most conducted by the Assad regime’s forces. Other cases. Usually, these types of programs are examples could include restoring ownership of viewed as normal social development efforts, stolen land or reintegrating victims into previ- and not necessarily as compensation for dam- ously held jobs within the Syrian government. age done to victims. Second, it may be important in some contexts The third challenge is to organize com- to develop special programs for the rehabilita- pensation in the form of an integrated set of tion of victims, including psychological sup- services (e.g., medical aid, education, and port and physical therapy or medical assistance housing), or an exchange of payments, or a for the many victims of physical and sexual combination of the two. Conducting compen- violence. Third, a wide range of actions could sation via the provision of integrated services be taken to provide redress for other damages, may be more expensive and limits the auton- both for individual victims (e.g., finding final omy of individuals to clearly receive a personal resting places for the dead) and victims in gen- form of compensation. Additionally, the qual- eral (e.g., the formal recognition by the transi- ity of provided services depends directly on the tional government of regime-perpetrated ability of the state to invest in public infra- crimes to open a new page, or customize pub- structure and to conduct the programs in an lic places and street names or care for special effective manner. exhibitions, works of art, or building memori- There are significant challenges that a rep- als and public monuments and museums). aration program might face, including the The advantage of symbolic measures is need to determine the types of damages for that they are relatively achievable, can reach all which victims can be compensated and how to parts of Syrian society, adopt a broad defini- differentiate compensation from basic welfare. tion of victims, encourage the creation of a col- The Committee for Compensation and lective memory, and promote social solidarity. Reparation will need to decide if compensa- The inherent drawbacks of these measures are tion will be administered for economic, phys- that they do not provide any directed financial ical, or psychological damage, and whether or other material compensation for the vic- compensation levels will be based on the tims. amount of damage, or of need, or both. 4. Institution Building for the Future Another challenge will be how to quantify the extent of the damage (e.g., determining the Syria will need comprehensive reform of amount of appropriate compensation to those its institutions, laws, and policies to achieve its who have lost their sight, been raped, or psy- long-term social, economic, and political chologically tortured) and then find the objectives, and to avoid any civil or democratic resources to fund compensation programs. collapse in the future.8 The general objective of Additionally, it will be important for the these institutional reforms will be to remove transitional government to seek to restore vic- the conditions that gave rise to the recent con- tims’ legal ownership of property. Examples flict or the repression that catalyzed it. include performing procedures to assist resi- Therefore, the National Commission for dents who were forcibly displaced from towns

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Transitional Justice and Reconciliation will simple piecemeal reforms, because the reform ensure institutional reform by: of the state “security services” requires the Restructuring state institutions that were reform of the army, police, judiciary, customs, complicit in acts of violence or abuse. immigration control, intelligence services, and Removing any long-standing racial, eth- many other related agencies and elements of nic, or sectarian discrimination, which some the state. Thus, an attempt to change institu- feel was perpetrated by the Ba’ath Party in state tional structures and sensitivities within any institutions, especially within the armed forces one institution would affect many others, and and security institutions. all the linkages between these different institu- Preventing the former perpetrators of tions are not always clear. For instance, the human rights violations from continuing to reform of the police and the review of their benefit from positions in public institutions. recruitment procedures are both incomplete It cannot be over-emphasized that without solutions, whether the goal is to punish viola- reforms in areas such as the judicial system, tions of human rights or to prevent corruption. Parliament, and the state security services, any These reforms can and must necessarily be accountability process will be almost certainly accompanied by full, comprehensive reforms incomplete, and thus it will fail to build cred- and other measures capable of achieving pre- ibility among the general public. It will be dif- vention, accountability, and reparations. ficult for citizens who have learned to look at Reform of the Security Forces and Intelligence the police, army, and government with suspi- Agencies cion to believe in the usefulness of any pro- ceedings, or the accountability of those institu- During the Syrian revolution, the mission tions. If they are expected to do so, they should of the police to impose law and order has be confident that the institutional cultures that often apparently been understood as a green allowed or fueled pervasive violations of light to commit political crimes. Syrian police human rights have been evaluated and cor- officers have often colluded with the intelli- rected once and for all. gence services in the commission of gross vio- Constitutional and legal reforms should lations of human rights, including ignoring accompany police reform. These constitutional rights related to inspection, orders of arrest, and legal reforms must promote democracy, and detention procedures, leading to beatings, human rights, and the rule of law. They will torture, and even murder. be relevant and visible in many areas, such as Once the Syrian conflict ends, the focus equity in wages; nomination of judges; fair should shift to mental reforms, realizing that assigning of positions, promotions, and disci- the duty of the police officer is to act profes- plinary actions; election procedures; the inde- sionally, to maintain the rule of law, and to pendence of the media; freedom of access to respect the human rights of all citizens. information and the media; affirmative action; However, the recovery of such a mentality will disarmament; the funding of political parties; not be easy. Even if the complex relations and criminal law and penal procedures. among the systems of the state police and the Furthermore, the dynamics within the state other security agencies were to be discon- apparatus do not allow for a diagnosis of nected, it is very likely that the required

102 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION reforms will collide with resistance from multiethnic; and believes in the principles within the system itself from officers and offi- of a community police force. cials who fear losing power, resent the conse- quences of their actions, and reject the need This reform should contain a comprehen- for any control or external intervention. sive, strategic set of elements, including the A reconstructed police force must be char- adoption of an ethical institutional charter; acterized by professional conduct, nondiscrim- working on public education and retraining ination, and integrity, which all require follow- the police based on new political procedures; ing a comprehensive approach to institutional the application of administrative, communica- reform (e.g., reform in the areas of employ- tions, and management procedures to pro- ment, retraining, restructuring, and reform of mote transparency and control; the applica- management/reporting and control measures). tion of corrective measures to ensure The Syrian Expert House recommends the fol- discipline, providing a means of complaint lowing three goals for police reform: and evaluation; and reviewing recruitment procedures to encourage participation in the ■■ Restructuring of the police forces; police force so that all communities are repre- ■■ Reform through the application of new sented on the force without discrimination. procedures for training, selection, and certi- The culture of impunity institutionalized fication; and in Syria during Assad’s rule encouraged the ■■ A democratic method for establishing a perversion of the intelligence agencies, which police force that is not subject to political must be resisted by encouraging a nondiscrim- control; is fair, accountable, and inatory employment policy for all Syrians. Photo by Maha Zimmo

Central Security Forces are back and were trying to control protestors but some police officers asked them to leave

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More than eighty percent of Syrian security to pay attention to the risks that could be services staff belong to the Alawite sect (nearly involved in isolating people from public office the same percentage as in the military), (especially former officials of the police force, although the proportion of Alawites in Syrian the army, and the intelligence services, who society does not exceed 10-12 percent.9 often become criminals after they are termi- Therefore, the vast majority of Syrians feel that nated from state service.) This challenge these forces do not represent them nor seek to should be anticipated by allowing the review ensure their safety. So an adjustment of the and inspection body to develop ways to pre- proportions of representation within the pare those officials for a new life. Additionally, police forces could have a double benefit: first, in the transitional periods in particular, where to preempt further police abuse perpetrated levels of unemployment and crime are high, against citizens; and second, to restore public vocational retraining and civil participation confidence in the integrity of the police force. programs might be considered, as well as other Effective and objective control is a prereq- methods for more permanent economic rein- uisite for ensuring respect for the new proce- tegration. dures. Therefore, the Syrian Expert House rec- Finally, and perhaps most important, the ommends the creation of new institutions to reform of arbitrary or abusive institutions achieve this end, including bodies of civilian should be considered a long-term process. It control, a national committee for human takes many years before the success or failure rights, a Supreme Audit Agency, an office of of new laws and institutions can be discerned. grievances (to receive complaints against offi- Cleansing Institutions of Corrupt Officials cials of the state and to investigate them), and an office for fighting corruption, responsible The National Commission for Transitional for the development of effective anti-corrup- Justice and Reconciliation should develop the tion programs and policies. necessary mechanisms to remove corrupt and incompetent staff members, along with those Restructuring Institutional Reforms who have violated the law, from government In the context of reforming abusive insti- service in order to build more effective and tutions, as in all other areas of transitional jus- trustworthy institutions. A comprehensive tice, constraints are imposed by the existing investigation and examination of past perfor- political climate, the available resources, and mance is often a central element in the reform the need to draft a project with realistic targets. of abusive institutions, and it is adopted by Among the lessons learned from past attempts new governments as a way to isolate the indi- to reform abusive institutions is that efforts viduals responsible for serious abuses of their made to achieve reform in quantity and qual- positions in the public sector. ity should not exceed the local capacity in There is a difference between screening terms of institutional structure as well as and “cleansing,” a term that was used exten- human and financial resources. Making such a sively in Central and Eastern Europe and used mistake could take the reform process back- later in Iraq to refer to laws and policies that ward instead of forward. Another lesson linked include the processes of isolation and dis- to the first, especially in the field of testing, is missal, not according to the records of

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individuals but to their party affiliation, polit- People seek to commemorate the events of the ical positions, or continued involvement with past for many reasons, including the desire to a repressive intelligence system. There are evoke the memory of the victims and/or to many pros to the screening process as one of identify them, to educate people about their the mechanisms for achieving transitional jus- past, to increase community awareness, to sup- tice. Screening, for example, helps reduce the port or amend an historical narrative, or to risk of new or continued violations, enhances encourage the adoption of the commemora- public confidence in state institutions, contrib- tion / transitional justice process at the local utes to removing barriers among prosecutions, level. Understanding the needs of victims and and assists in the rehabilitation of officials their families, along with the needs of survi- who have had their reputations damaged vors of mass atrocities and brutal violations of unfairly as a result of their names being listed human rights, represents one of the key ele- among those of corrupt officials within their ments of transitional justice. organizations. The struggle over the control of the Screening mechanisms must conform to the basic principles of procedural fairness or Understanding the needs of victims and their legal practice. Efforts to prevent corruption or families, along with the needs of survivors of mass reform institutions must not resort to wrong atrocities and brutal violations of human rights, practices. Therefore, those to be dismissed represents one of the key elements of transitional from office should have the right to be justice. informed of the accusations against them, to protest against these accusations before a screening committee, to appeal the decision before an unbiased body, and to be informed national memory, or “collective memory,” is of these rights in a timely manner. The screen- located in the heart of the accountability pro- ing committee should have the authority to cess that will ensue following the end of the impose a range of sanctions. For particularly conflict or the fall of the regime. Two different serious violations, cases might in fact be pre- narratives for the Syrian conflict will exist in sented to law enforcement authorities for fur- Syrian society. Human rights activists and vic- ther action. tims may feel deeply aggrieved by the new gov- ernment or the old (should it survive) if either 5. Memorialization seeks to create an official final narrative of the Memorialization can be accomplished by past. Sometimes, certain transitional justice way of an event, occurrence, or building being strategies—such as the creation of a truth com- used as a tool of remembrance. Moreover, mission—are seen as a necessary step in the remembrance can entail formal commemora- direction of remembrance; but at the same tion (e.g., the establishment of a monument) time, this step alone is insufficient. The reason or informal commemoration (building a for this is that keeping the memory alive is memorial wall in a community). In other extremely difficult, and the official truth com- words, remembrance can be done in an official missions become a rigid part of the new offi- way by the state or voluntarily by citizens. cial narrative of the past which competes and

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may conflict with the evolving understanding Transitional Justice and National of the past. Reconciliation The requirement to never forget what hap- pened to victims of human rights violations in The concept of reconciliation has roots far the past necessitates a discussion about what back in Arab-Islamic history,11 however the to teach in schools, how the victims should be modern use of the he term “national recon- remembered, and whether people will con- ciliation” can be traced to French leader tinue to listen to the voices of the victims, even . It was later used by Georges after the publication of the report of the truth Pompidou and François Mitterrand, when the commission or the completion of trials of need to take responsibility for erasing debts human rights violators. Even if history books and past crimes that occurred under occupa- ensure the telling of the stories of victims, tion during the was cemented in remembrance must still make people engage their beliefs.12 in a dynamic, long-lasting dialogue, not only There is no way that Syria will be able to about the past—and events and their implica- escape from its deep social rifts following the tions—but also about how the present can end of the conflict unless a historic decision is benefit from the past and how the suffering made to institute a comprehensive national communities can better prepare for the reconciliation program. Reconciliation repre- future.10 sents a culmination of all the phases of transi- tional justice referred to above, and thus it can enable Syrian society to overcome its deep Reconciliation represents a culmination of all social and sectarian divisions by creating a the phases of transitional justice referred to national partner-ship for building a new above, and thus it can enable Syrian society future. to overcome its deep social and sectarian divisions by creating a national partner-ship Recommendations for building a new future. 1. The establishment of a documentation and auditing committee whose main pur- pose will be collecting and verifying the names of the victims and their families. The Syrian Expert House recommends 2. Training documentation staff to gain transforming centers of torture and abuse (e.g., knowledge about similar experiences from Tadmour and Sednaya) into memorial squares other countries, such as the Truth and and building memorial walls in public places, Reconciliation Committee in South Africa, such as in Damascus, Assi the Equity and Reconciliation Committee in Square in Hama, and Jabri Square in Aleppo. Morocco, and similar entities in Chile and All these efforts will commemorate the victims Peru. and inspire a continuing and lively discussion 3. Achieving community dialogue in Syria of the past. regarding general human rights issues by focusing on areas such as accountability,

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justice, enforced disappearances, and prison- the victims. Such a process should occur ers of conscience. according to the active penal law code. In 4. Revealing the truth about human rights addition, encouraging civil society organiza- violations committed in the past, seeking to tions and NGOs to report the cases of miss- expose the truth to public opinion, and ing individuals to human rights committees compensating the victims of enforced disap- and the Committee on Enforced pearances and their families both morally Disappearances of the United Nations, and financially. assisting the families of the victims on how 5. Adopting and supporting political, to report their cases while fully explaining to social, and cultural development programs them that such procedures will lead to based on need. revealing the fate of the missing person. 6. Seeking to adopt constitutional and leg- Furthermore, families should realize how islative reforms in human rights, security, essential it is to file these cases despite lim- and justice and endorsing a national strategy ited resources to close missing persons’ files. against impunity to hold those who com- 10. Filing discrimination lawsuits on behalf mitted human rights violations accountable victims of torture, prisoners of conscience, via active participation from the community, and those who were subject to enforced dis- while promoting the principle of separation appearance— especially those who have suf- of powers, and protecting the judicial fered in the past thirty years and during the authority from any interference by the exec- Syrian uprising. Such lawsuits must be based utive authority. on Syrian law and the international human 7. Prohibiting the enforced disappearance, rights standards that the Syrian government arbitrary detention, genocide, or any other has ratified. crimes against humanity, torture, cruel and 11. Working on acquiring the necessary unusual punishment, , insult, or pro- experience to qualify certain individuals and hibited discrimination, and any incitement organizations to assist victims of torture, of racism, hatred, and violence. prisoners of conscience, and the families of 8. Clarifying and disseminating the legal the disappeared. This process should be framework and regulatory texts regarding the based on similar experiences of other coun- authority and organization of security forces, tries along with the assistance of the exper- limits of intrusion during operations, sur- tise of international organizations. veillance systems, and evaluating the perfor- 12. Emphasizing the humanitarian dimen- mance of security forces, as well as the sion and the suffering endured by the fami- administrative authorities assigned to main- lies of the missing individuals during the tain order and those who have the authority process. For example, instead of completely to use force. focusing on the documentation process and 9. Urging civil society, civil organizations, legal procedures, a Web site can be devel- and NGOs to file lawsuits against the perpe- oped to honor Syria’s victims. Moreover, the trators who committed extrajudicial killings, families of the victims can connect with torture, or enforced disappearances against other individuals who have had the same civilians, while maintaining the privacy of

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experience, whether in Syria or in other on the future will test our skills and ability to post-conflict countries. learn from the experiences of others. An effec- 13. The suffering endured by the families of tive transitional justice program cannot undo the victims must be addressed. This includes what has been done, but will surely mitigate issuing an apology by the transitional gov- some of the pain allowing Syrians to forge ernment, providing them with compensa- confidently into the future. PRISM tion, and establishing a national institution specialized in the field of the psychological and social rehabilitation of victims of tor- ture, prisoners of conscience, those subject to enforced disappearance, and victims of enforced disappearance who were released. Moreover, offering the families of enforced disappearance victims’ guidance and advice on how to follow the progress of their case at various levels, and printing and dissemi- nating publications specifically for that pur- pose. In fact, there has not been any guide for dealing with this issue for the families of missing individuals on which they can rely. 14. Determining the locations of detention facilities and secret prisons so they can be subject to legal observation and control. Also, prohibiting detentions from being conducted by the security intelligence agen- cies, which are numerous and difficult to subject to any form of control. In addition, holding the security agencies accountable if they are proven to have been involved in enforced disappearances.

Studies show that half of countries emer- geing from conflict return to conflict within five years. Because of the intensity and inti- macy of the violence in Syria, the post-conflict transition in Syria will undoubtedly be extremely tense and subject to repeated threats of the resumption of conflict. Finding the right balances between justice and reconcilia- tion, between compensation and retribution, and between atoning for the past and focusing

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Notes 11 George Emile Irani, “Apologies and Reconciliation: Middle East Rituals,” in Taking Wrongs Seriously, ed. Barkan and Karn; Abdel Hussein Shaaban, The Jurisprudence of Tolerance in 1 For current numbers of civilian victims of the Arab Islamic Thought: Culture and the State (Beirut: Syrian revolution, see Megan Price, Jeff Klingner, Anas Dar al-Nahar, 2005). Qtiesh, and Patrick Ball, “Full Updated Statistical 12 See Jacques Derrida et al., Tolerance and Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Reconciliation Policies Memory, translated by Urban Arab Republic,” Human Rights Data Analysis Group, Hassan (Casablanca: Toubkal, 2005), 7.37. commissioned by United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 13, 2013. 2 See Hatun Willakuy, Abbreviated Version of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Peru (Lima, 2004). 3 See USAID Fact Sheet, Syria – Complex Emergency, January 3, 2013, https://dec.usaid.gov/ dec/GetDoc.axd?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00Yj RmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=MzM3NDE x&pID=NTYw&attchmnt=VHJ1ZQ==&uSesDM=False &rIdx=NDM3MjM3&rCFU= 4 Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, 3 vols. (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995). 5 Alex Boraine, Janet Levy, and Ronel Scheffer, eds., Dealing with the Past (Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 1997); D. A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs :A Normative Framework,” Ethics & International Affairs 13 (1999): 43–61. 6 Mapping Accountability Efforts in Syria, Public International Law & Policy Group, February 2013, http://www.dchrs.org/ english/File/Reports/ mapping-accountability-efforts-in-syria.pdf 7 Robert I. Rotberg, “Apology, Truth Commissions, and Intrastate Conflict,” in Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation, edited by Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 33–48. 8 See International Center for Transitional Justice, Annual Report of the International Center for Transitional Justice, 2003/2004 (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2004). 9 For more on this, see Radwan Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria (I.B. Tauris, 2011). 10 Vamik D.Volkan, What Some Monuments Tell Us about Mourning and Forgiveness, Taking Wrongs Seriously Apologies and Reconciliation,Edited by Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, Stanford University Press ,2006,P.115-130.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 109 SANA News Agency

President Assad Presides Over Cabinet Meeting Memorandum for President Assad

BY TIM GRIMMETT, TODD HARROD AND BRYAN HURLEY

This article provides a Syrian regime perspective on the current state of the civil war, regional dynamics, and prospects for ending the civil war on terms it finds acceptable. It takes the form of a memorandum to President Bashar Assad. It is not meant as an endorsement of the regime or its tactics, but to provide an alternative view that captures the regime’s optic on the situation it faces.

Memorandum for President Assad From Syria’s Senior Advisory Council (SAC)1 Date: October 1, 2013 Subject: Tipping Point in Insurgency Masks Long Term Challenges

Mr. President,

With 2013 nearing an end and the September 2013 crisis with the U.S. contained you directed a strategic review of Syria’s current domestic and international position in order to frame upcom- ing deliberations on our strategy for 2014 and beyond that can lay the base for a long-term sta- bilization of the security situation in Syria. This memorandum summarizes where we stand on three crucial areas: the military’s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy to defeat the insurgency and improve the security situation; an assessment of the domestic political front; and international developments that shape the regional arena. It will conclude with brief observations on areas we can exploit in 2014 and long-term implications for Syria’s future. 2013 Was a Good Year

On the military front, the regime made great strides in stabilizing the deteriorating security situation we confronted at the start of 2013. By late 2012, the opposition appeared to have all

Tim Grimmett is a Senior Advisor for the Levant at Mission Essential.

Todd Harrod is the Director for Intelligence Solutions at Mission Essential. Bryan Hurley is the Director for Language and Intelligence Solutions at Mission Essential.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 111 GRIMMETT, HARROD & HURLEY the momentum with the insurgency’s growth But the key long-term military gain for in the countryside, the opposition’s sei- 2013 occurred in Homs, where we significantly zure of large parts of Aleppo city and attempts reduced the insurgency’s presence through our to replicate this tactic in Damascus. The efforts in the city and surrounding villages, regime’s fate appeared to hang in the balance. most notably during June’s operations in Nine months later, most of these trends Qusayr that drew the most attention due to have been reversed; the security situation in Hizballah’s intervention. Control of Homs is Damascus has stabilized and the Army has pivotal to our strategy of maintaining Syria’s launched counteroffensives to restore order in “spine”, the Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus Damascus’ suburbs and stem insurgent prog- axis. Homs is the geographic center of the ress in the south near . In the north, a spine, provides the link to the coastal heart- grinding stalemate persists in Aleppo city and land of the Alawi community and straddles a positional chess game has emerged over opposition supply lines to Lebanon. Aside towns and villages that control access to from Damascus, Homs is the key terrain in this Aleppo and our important military installa- fight. Lose Homs and we all recognize our tions there that provide a base for our opera- days are numbered. tions.

11 2 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT ASAD

On the domestic front, trend lines were key allies Russia and Iran. These same factors also largely positive. The opposition remains have resulted in policy paralysis in the West. politically incoherent and rife with emerging What is Working contradictions between forces on the ground, the external arm of the political opposition We believe key tenets of our strategy incor- and the opposition’s regional sponsors. The porate all aspects of Syria’s national power— emergence of Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) and other the military, control over our national narra- Islamic extremists as the key armed faction tive, and diplomacy—and they are working. and public face of the opposition, the The common view held in the West, that the increased role of foreign fighters, and Gulf sup- regime is alternatively on its last legs or simply port for the insurgents reinforces the Syrian shooting its way to victory underestimates our government’s narrative about the nature of the ability to conceptualize and implement a com- uprising and the public’s perception that there prehensive strategy. is no secular alternative to the regime. Strains The military aspect of our version of within the opposition have led to infighting COIN is unrecognizable to the population- between the Free Syria Army and JAN and centric COIN that dominates in the West, but these tensions are likely to heighten. To illus- it is instantly understood by Russia’s President trate how the lines between regional events Putin and those who have studied Russia’s war and domestic politics are often blurred, also in Chechnya over the past two decades. Our aiding us was the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) military, while committed to Syria’s defense, failures in governance in Egypt and the emer- suffers from the same challenges facing Russia gence of secular-religious fissures in Turkey at the time—a conscript army with severe lim- that serve to dilute MB cohesion against us. We itations on the tactical level that precluded a are at war with those who primarily identify “sophisticated” COIN approach, government themselves as Sunnis, and there are a lot of resource limitations to fund programs to them in Syria, but they are also at war with address economic grievances, and, if we can themselves. speak frankly, a corrupt and abusive police Internationally, the regionalization of the force not subject to the rule of law.2 conflict was most pronounced in 2013 and has Our military operations are designed to had unintended consequences for our foes that destroy the armed opposition and physically complicates their domestic politics. This has separate insurgents from the pro-opposition been most pronounced in Turkey where the populace. This is accomplished through the rise of Kurdish aspirations in Syria and the destruction of wide swaths of insurgent-con- emergence of Alevi political consciousness trolled towns and a forced population resettle- have dampened Erdogan’s ambitious agenda. ment that leaves behind only insurgents as In our view, the prospects of spreading insta- targets for further military operations. This bility via renewed Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Iraq, approach also serves as a deterrent for previ- the threat of renewed civil war in Lebanon, ously untouched towns and neighborhoods: and the rebound of Al Qaeda throughout the allow the insurgents in, or turn against the Middle East have worked in our favor with our regime by expelling its presence, and you will run the risk of having your homes destroyed.

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We continue to hold a decisive firepower period of political and military stalemate and advantage over the insurgents. Their capabili- the question now becomes how to position ties—in terms of size, organization and weap- the regime for the long term. There are three ons—are improving, but it will be years before factors to consider. the insurgents are our operational equals. First, the game changer in our current cri- Our public narrative has largely succeeded sis is for regional state sponsors of the insur- in maintaining the support of our base— gents to cease their support. In this regard urbanites, minorities, secularists and commit- Turkey and Saudi Arabia play critical roles as ted Arab nationalists. We are under no illu- conduits for aid and safe havens for the Syrian sions that we can sway our enemies to our insurgency. We judge that breaking up the side. Rather, our efforts to shape the regime state sponsor alliance arrayed against us is the narrative are aimed at our base and an increas- center of gravity for this conflict; without for- ing number of fence-sitters who see the con- eign support the insurgency will die. The pri- flict the same way we do—the opposition mary focus of our diplomacy, and that of our groups are Islamist terrorists (significantly for- allies, must be geared toward this goal. eign), abetting a pro-US/Israeli/Saudi takfiri At the same time, we recognize this may agenda, and ill-suited to lead Syria’s diverse take years to accomplish. The rapid regional- society. This has induced enough doubt in ization of the Syrian crisis complicates even- Syrian society, especially its minorities, to pre- tual resolution of the conflict by introducing vent a decisive shift away from the regime. The numerous state actors with competing agen- recent JAN attack on Ma’loulah, one of the das. This is similar to the challenge your father oldest sites in Christianity, will reinforce this faced in Lebanon in the 80s. It took a region- message. shaking event—Saddam Hussein’s invasion of At the international level, despite the Kuwait in 1990—to break that logjam. recent flurry over chemical weapon use, we The good news is both Turkey and Saudi have succeeded in maintaining crucial interna- Arabia are also increasingly divided societies tional alliances (Russia, Iran and Hizballah) as well. We have outlined Erdogan’s chal- and to a certain extent made progress with Iraq lenges above and we should not anticipate an because of increased Sunni-Shi’a tension there. end to his political career. But for our pur- Divisions have emerged in the Saudi-Turk- poses, Turkey’s ardor for deeper involvement Qatari regional alliance that dominated 2012 in Syria has waned and is likely to wane fur- with ripple effects that impacts their support ther. for specific factions within the Syrian opposi- With the world’s focus on Syria and tion. This is negatively affecting opposition Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s domestic challenges—a cohesion. generational transfer of power within the Royal Family, an increasingly young and restive pop- Bleak Prospects for Near-Term Resolution ulation, and the Arab Spring’s challenge to its role as leader of in the Middle Despite our successes in 2013, the near- East-- are overlooked. The latter point is espe- term prospects for ending Syria’s insurgency cially important; Saudi Arabia cannot afford to soon are grim. We are likely in a protracted stem the “Shi’a tide” only to be swept away by

11 4 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT ASAD a Muslim Brotherhood tsunami. In our view, delegation we will send to Geneva II will con- this Saudi sense of insecurity is reflected by its sist of regime Sunnis, non-Alawi minorities increased sectarian agitation in the region and and women armed with talking points about willingness to promote the military coup in the growing Islamist terrorist threat to a secu- Egypt that sent the MB back into hiding. lar Syria. Second, while the military’s cohesion Looking Ahead remains firm and we have mobilized signifi- cant sectors of Syrian society, we do not have With the military situation stabilized, the means to generate a military solution. To time is again on our side. The lessons we use the American construct, we can “”clear”, by learned during our involvement in Lebanon’s great effort and tremendous destruction, but civil war still hold true: some foes have to be we cannot “hold” everywhere and our depleted killed (Syrian and foreign Islamists), some co- resource base makes “build “ an impossibility. opted (Syrian Kurds and Arab Nationalists We are also sensitive to the political impact on against foreign intervention), and others our base of incurring high casualties. It is not divided and played off against each other (all that we are running out of manpower, it is that the above). we must be perceived as using it judiciously. A war of political and military attrition Aleppo is a case in point. Losing Aleppo in its exploits our strengths in military firepower and entirety would be a severe blow to the regime the political weaknesses of our opponents. It and must be prevented, but restoring the city also preserves our strength for the long haul. to our control is not worth the prospects of By playing for time we allow the contra- turning it into a Stalingrad that bleeds the dictions plaguing the opposition and their regime white. We counsel patience. regional sponsors to further weaken their Finally, the prospects for reconciliation efforts. The armed Islamist extremists will talks between the regime and opposition over overreach in their goal to impose an Islamic- the near term are equally dismal. Our posi- based government, creating a yawning gap tions are too far apart and neither is ready for between them and the exiled secular opposi- compromise due to the carnage both sides tion and their regional sponsors, armed mod- have inflicted. This SAC is divided over what erates, and a growing majority of Syrians who course to pursue at Geneva II. One side con- want an end to this crisis. tends that discussions over a “political transi- Nevertheless, an attrition strategy is not a tion”-- a phrase malleable enough to include passive strategy. Our response to the challenge our planned 2014 Presidential referendum that we face is being played out on multiple levels extends your term--- can be a net gain for the and requires a clear vision. regime. Others are less certain of joining an The last two years have eroded Syria’s international process that we do not fully con- social fabric. As a result, we are now as often trol. We do agree that Geneva II may create a stage as an actor in shaping regional events. further exploitable fissures in the opposition. The concept of Syria and what it means to be The late September announcement of a new Syrian has come under severe stress. We rec- Islamic block and its rejection of the National ognize Syria and the regime cannot be restored Coalition illustrate this opportunity. The to the way it was before March 2011.

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Nevertheless, the bottom line on our goals for the Kurdish areas out of necessity, but are wary political reconciliation remain unchanged: a of its long-term implications. controlled opening of the political system with The cost to rebuild Syria will be staggering no political party allowed to use religion as its and our limited budgets buffeted by compet- basis for organization; an empowered Prime ing demands for economic reconstruction and Minister responsible for local affairs; and a rebuilding a military that will view itself as President (you) with primacy over military and having saved Syria. Access to international foreign policy affairs and the power to dismiss funds will be curtailed by lingering regional a Prime Minister. This is a well-worn formula animosity, especially from Saudi Arabia and for the region. Western sanctions. A foreign policy pivot to Repairing Syria’s torn social fabric will not the East, in which the proposed Iran-Iraq-Syria just be a political exercise; it will be an eco- pipeline is just a first step, will need to be nomic and institution building one as well. It accelerated, but a host of secondary problems is bitterly ironic, but now in retrospect not sur- –an accelerated brain drain, refugee return, prising, that a main leg of the alliance that prolonged capital flight—will hamper our brought the Baath to power in the 1960s, efforts. Syria’s villages and rural poor, is now the base A foreign policy shift to the East may for the opposition. Our strategy since your dovetail with another larger shift as we rebuild assuming the presidency in 2000 was to build Syria. The challenges outlined above are enor- a regime-allied business class that would mous and the solution that enables us to simultaneously allow a degree of integration tackle them while ensuring control over the into the world economy, construct a modern outcomes is a return to state as the backbone for the long-term improvement in primary engine of economic growth and polit- Syria’s economy, and provide both you and the ical control. Our limited experiment in a pro- regime a firm base in what has historically West, neo-liberal free market has failed; a been a hostile Sunni-dominated urban elite. Syrian version of the Chinese state capitalism We allowed Ba’ath institutions—a key compo- model beckons. nent of the government’s presence in the coun- Syria would not have survived the last two tryside -- to further atrophy and a severe years without the military and security invest- drought in the east compounded the rural cri- ments in the state made over the last 43 years; sis. Institution building challenges will be a robust military and intelligence apparatus, exacerbated by basic security challenges. The buttressed by a strong air defense and chemical state’s ability to exert regime control in the arsenal has kept foreign intervention at bay hinterland has been severely eroded. With no during this uprising. However, the recent crisis political reconciliation in the offing, we are over chemical weapons illustrates that the very faced with the prospects of either hundreds of means that initially protected the regime from local bargains to reestablish a modicum of foreign intervention very nearly pushed events security or leaving swaths of Syria to local self- in that direction and risked broader conflict. rule as we gradually rebuild the state. Either If, over the long term, Syria must destroy solution risks a significant devolution of state this arsenal, we face a deepening of a strategic authority. We have accepted this situation in military dilemma that has confronted us since

11 6 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT ASAD the end of the Cold War and the 1990 Gulf eventual return of the Golan Heights . The insurgency has further eroded our the reach of your presidency. President Obama already aging conventional deterrent and the at his recent UN speech spoke of resolving the demise of our chemical arsenal will further Arab-Israel dispute in the narrowest terms—a imbalance the power relationship between us two state solution between Israelis and and our principal regional adversary, Israel. Palestinians. Pointedly absent was a reference This dilemma is not new; its roots prompted to occupied Syrian territory. With dim pros- our ill-fated covert nuclear program that the pects of an regional peace, your focus will be Israelis destroyed in 2007 and the embrace of navigating the competing demands of ending Hizballah as a strategic deterrent. The solution the Islamist insurgency, pursuing economic continues to elude us, but as a stopgap mea- reconstruction in a way that enhances regime sure the rapid expansion of a large conven- survival, preventing the reemergence of tional rocket and missile force and robust air another Saudi-inspired challenge to the regime defense purchase is likely the most economical (both in Syria and Lebanon), and checking and practical course. Israeli hegemonic ambitions. These are famil- The Arab regional scene is in turmoil with iar challenges and we have faced them before. major players (including Syria) consumed by internal turmoil. The weakness in the Arab Plan A is regime victory; there is no Plan B. regional system opens the door for non-Arab players—Israel, Turkey, Iran and Russia—to become more involved in the region. This is another case of challenges and opportunities for Syria. The primary challenge is always Notes Israel, and its interest is to weaken the Arab world further by reducing Hizballah’s military deterrence and the de facto partition of Syria. 1 A fictitious entity meant to represent a Yet two of the non-Arab players are our allies conglomeration of senior regime military and and that helps balances the equation. Syria’s political officials 2 Arab regional role will be shaped by our con- An analysis of Russian counterinsurgency strategy is discussed in The Insurgency in Chechnya tinued Cold War with Saudi Arabia, which is and North Caucasus; from Gazavat to Jihad, by entering its second decade, but showing few Robert Schaefer signs of abating as Riyadh pursues its sectar- ian-based agenda. Syria’s ability to resume “boxing above its weight” in regional affairs is captive to maintaining its regional allies while rebuilding state power. We close this section with some observa- tions about the United States. Relations with the U.S. are likely to be frozen for a long period, placing a U.S. role as a sponsor of Israeli-Syrian peace talks in doubt, and

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 11 7 JAMES GORDAN / WIKIMEDIA.ORG

At the , also known as the Great Mosque of Damascus Advice to Policy Makers Who Would Tackle Syria The Problem with Problem Solving

BY ROBERT RICIGLIANO AND KAREN GRATTAN

hile there is not much consensus on the specific way forward in Syria, there is one thing most do agree on; Syria is complex. It is complex in the familiar use of that term: Wcomplicated, intricate, and hard to understand. But it is also complex in the technical sense: an interrelated system of diverse components that interact with each other and their envi- ronment in ways that are dynamic and difficult to predict. This distinction and understanding the distinction are critical to the success of policy makers trying to grapple with Syria. As a whole, Syria along with the broadening regional conflict is a wicked problem for policy makers;2 presenting challenges similar to those that have frustrated efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), among others. These complexity related challenges include: the regularity of unintended negative conse- quences; situations where one party’s solution is another party’s problem; “fixes” that work in the short term but fail in the medium term; tactics that are successful in one place but are difficult to replicate; “zombie problems” that do not stay fixed; problems that resist a definitive definition; and the reality that new urgent issues constantly outstrip the amount of resources available to address them. Most importantly, and deeply characteristic of the wicked problem, is the require- ment for continuous and adaptive learning, as the “problem” is more deeply understood with every effort to develop or enact its solution. Success in Syria means that in addition to the content of any individual policy, plan, or deci- sion, policy makers need to change the process by which they engage with Syria and produce a series of decisions over time. The purpose of this article is not to advocate specific policy options. Rather, this piece will highlight four key practices that policy makers can use to maximize their

Robert Ricigliano is now director of UW-Milwaukee’s Institute of World Affairs and coordinator for the university’s peace studies program. Karen Grattan is a doctoral candidate at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.

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ability to generate effective policy for Syria (as Complexity is characterized by multiple, often well as other complex and dynamic environ- counter-intuitive, and constantly evolving ments). Explained in more detail below, these interrelationships between parts of the system. four practices include: A reductionist approach – pulling one factor out of its murky and hard to understand envi- 1. See in “3-D”; ronment – may make it easier to fix that par- 2. Engage Patterns, Not Problems; ticular piece (e.g., the corrupting influence of 3. Align Fast and Slow Variables; political “dead enders” in the post invasion 4. Fail Smart, Adapt Fast, and Iraq). However, it often makes it more difficult Leverage Success! to deal with the underlying problem (e.g., sta- bilizing a post-Saddam Iraq). See in “3-D” This leaves policy makers in a bind where The sheer volume of important informa- (a) seeing the full complexity of Syria is over- tion about Syria that an informed policy whelming (comprehensiveness undermining maker could usefully know is overwhelming, comprehensibility) and, (b) reducing Syria to such as political actors, dynamics among and seemingly manageable parts is often ineffective within rebel groups, clan rivalries, tensions or counter productive (achieving comprehen- among religious groups, environmental driv- sibility by sacrificing comprehensiveness). ers, regional influences, historical wounds, etc. The way out of this bind is to change how No one, not even those who have spent their we see complex systems like Syria, similar to whole lives in Syria, have a complete picture the way seeing a movie in 3-D produces a of why Syria is the way it is. richer picture than watching in just two dimen- And more information is not necessarily sions. The way to see a comprehensible, but better, as a truly comprehensive view of Syria sufficiently comprehensive picture of Syria is would soon become incomprehensible to our to use a different version of 3-D vision – one limited human brains. The traditional that honors the reality that complex social sys- approach to grappling with this level of com- tems are made up of three distinct but inter- plexity is to focus our vision by breaking the related dimensions: problem down into manageable chunks that will readily lend themselves to analysis and ■■ Structural dimension: all social systems most clearly point to a policy solution. For have institutions and infrastructures that are example, when viewed in isolation, purging meant to meet the basic human needs of members of the Baath party from the post- those resident in the system. These structures Saddam, transitional government in Iraq relate to governance, security, economy, seemed like an obvious fix to a broken system. human health (food security, public health); In retrospect, the consequences of this policy environment/natural resources, rule of law/ were disastrous as many correlate the rise in human rights, and civic health (media, edu- the insurgency with the rise in disgruntled and cation, civil society); newly out-of-work Baathists. ■■ Attitudinal dimension: widely held Moreover, this reductionist approach is beliefs and norms as well as intergroup rela- exactly what not to do in a complex system. tions that affect the level of cooperation

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between groups and within social structures. sub-set of behavioral factors, but it focuses Attitudinal factors include identity groups, on the critical role that key people play (e.g., social capital, core grievances, and inter- influencers, people who control resources, group dynamics; opinion leaders, etc.). These key people can ■■ Transactional dimension: the processes exist at the local, national or supra-national and skills used by key people to deal with level. conflict, solve problems, and manage key structural and attitudinal issues. This is a

KEY ISSUE Lack of consensus among rebel and opposition groups

Upstream Causes Downstream Causes

Structural: Structural:

■■ Weak organizational structures within ■■ No structure for future government; rebel groups; ■■ Large number of displaced and ■■ Historically divided civil society; refugees; ■■ Limited funding to rebels; ■■ Opposition leadership must perpetually ■■ Pervasive insecurity among rebel fundraise; cannot develop strategic plan. groups.

Attitudinal: Attitudinal:

■■ Deep suspicions between secular and ■■ War weariness, popular feeling of religious groups; hopelessness; ■■ History of tension and distrust between ■■ Growing rift between population and ethnic and religious groups in Syria; rebel/opposition groups; ■■ Resentment toward wealthy Syrians ■■ Lack of interest in engaging with large who benefit from the current govern- swaths of pro-government Syrians in a ment. negotiated solution.

Transactional: Transactional:

■■ No clear leader accepted by opposition ■■ Weak negotiating position vis-à-vis and rebel groups; Assad government; ■■ Meddling by outside states/actors; ■■ Infighting among rebel groups and ■■ Syrian government systematically elim- opposition politicians; inates political rivals. ■■ Ineffective opposition leadership.

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Instead of narrowing the field of vision identified above (as incomplete as this sample and breaking a problem down in order to find analysis is), but would do nothing to address a “fixable” piece, complex environments deeper attitudinal factors or other structural require that policy makers see any specific phe- and transactional factors. Second, and more nomenon as having an upstream of structural, importantly, taking a holistic perspective on a attitudinal, and transactional causes and a key issue, such as the lack of consensus among downstream of structural, attitudinal, and the armed and the political groups, sets the transactional impacts. stage for the next key step in managing com- Consider the fractures among Syrian plexity; identifying how these structural, atti- opposition groups: Policy makers should tudinal, and transactional factors are interre- develop several “upstream/downstream” struc- lated and form the building blocks of tural, attitudinal, and transactional (SAT) anal- persistent patterns of behavior that hold the yses for the key issues they confront in an envi- key to fostering change in Syria. ronment like Syria. One exercise that can start Engage Patterns, Not Problems this process is to ask, “What are the key chal- lenges to peace and security in Syria?” or A vexing characteristic of complex systems “What are the key enablers and key inhibitors is that systems are not broken, even if they pro- of peace in Syria?” For each of these key chal- duce outcomes that we dislike (e.g., violence, lenges or enablers/inhibitors of peace, it is poverty, oppression). In fact, systems contain helpful to do an upstream/downstream analy- ever-broadening webs of connected dynamics, sis such as the one above. Similarly, if one has many of which will work to maintain the sta- a potential solution or key action they think tus quo. Because of this, attempting to fix or will improve Syria, one should do a similar change individual pieces of the system usually analysis to test their thinking. has little impact on the underlying system For example, if one were considering itself. So, changing even a key piece of the con- whether to disarm all rebel fighters after a ces- text – such as replacing Saddam Hussein in sation of hostilities through a gun buy back Iraq or even Hosni Mubarak in Egypt – does program, what are all the upstream reasons not change the underlying system that pro- (structural, attitudinal, and transactional) peo- duced those leaders. Note how the crowds that ple have guns/want to hold onto their guns; filled Cairo’s Tahrir Square in 2011 to oust and what are all the potential downstream President Hosni Mubarak, looked eerily simi- impacts (both those we like and the ones we lar to the crowds assembled in Tahrir Square may not like). in 2013 to oust President Mohamed Morsi. The purpose of this analysis is twofold. The key is to identify and understand the First, this analysis helps policy makers resist underlying social patterns that produce the the temptation to grasp at a simple answer to problems that fix our attention (e.g., violence, such a complex issue, like assuming the solu- dictators, crises). Professor George Richardson tion to the lack of consensus among rebel and defines a systems approach this way: “A sys- opposition groups is to simply mediate an tems view stands back just far enough to delib- agreement. An agreement alone might address erately blur discrete events into patterns of one of the transactional or structural factors behavior.” It is these patterns that animate and

122 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL ADVICE TO POLICY MAKERS WHO WOULD TACKLE SYRIA propel a system and it is affecting these pat- answers to these questions, the next step is to terns that allows policy makers to have an start stringing these interrelated factors into a impact on how systems behave over time. For causal loop, such as the “Splits Among Syrian example, if policy makers want to see a future Rebel Groups” loop on the following page. Syria that is more stable, has greater levels of What pattern of behavior produces the participatory and accountable governance, and current lack of consensus among rebel and shows greater respect for human rights, then opposition groups in Syria? How are the what patterns of behavior affect the presence upstream and downstream SAT factors identi- of these factors, and how might they need to fied above related to each other (and to change to produce more desired outcomes? upstream and downstream factors associated Understanding key social patterns starts with other key challenges or enablers/inhibi- with doing the upstream/downstream SAT tors of peace, such as regional meddling, arms analysis as described above. After doing this flows, etc.)? analysis on several key issues, the analyst will The discipline of systems mapping pro- step back and ask two questions: (1) are there vides a useful way of conceiving of and visual- key structural, attitudinal or transactional fac- izing these patterns. For example, in relation tors that occur often or are given great impor- to the lack of consensus between Syrian rebel tance; and (2) what are the interrelationships and political opposition groups, a simple among these key SAT factors? Based on the wikimedia.org

“11th of February - A memorable day! Mubarak has resigned! The revolution has succeeded and for the first time in tens of years, Egypt sees hope again!” Fixes that work in the short term but fail in the medium term

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pattern might look like the following feedback Feedback loops are not themselves reality. loop: However, they are a way of improving how we In this loop (reading clockwise from the conceive of a dynamic context such as Syria top), as “arms flows to Islamist rebels” from seeing it as a series of discrete events to increases (as denoted by the “+” sign), then understanding Syria as a web of patterns or these groups have more relative success on the feedback loops. Further, we can identify the battlefield versus less well-armed, secular rebel interconnections between feedback loops and groups. In turn, this increases the clout of build a systems map of Syria. A full systems these groups and contributes to greater politi- map is a valuable tool for policy analysis, and cal splits between Islamist and secular groups.3 can be built up over time. For example, begin- As these splits increase, it decreases (as ning with the single feedback loop above and denoted by the “-”sign) the progress toward a working out from factors identified, an analyst negotiated agreement that would stop the might ask, what other forces affect the level of fighting. The lack of an agreement then splits between Islamist and secular opposition increases the degree of armed conflict which groups? What dynamics impact the level of fuels even more arms flows to the Islamist tension between these groups? What other rebel groups. This is a vicious (or reinforcing) impacts does the lack of progress toward a cycle because each time around the loop, we political settlement have? see more arms flows, greater splits, and more An analysis of key social patterns increases armed conflict. Likewise, loops can represent the chances of successful policy making in sev- dynamics that are virtuous (meaning the situ- eral ways. First, success in managing complex ation is getting better over time), as well as systems depends on the ability to engage, not stabilizing or stagnating dynamics, which pre- fix, these patterns. The general prescription for serve the status quo for better or worse. dealing with patterns or feedback loops is to

Splits Among Syrian Rebel Groups

Arms ows to Islamist rebels + + + +

Degree of armed con ict Relative battleeld success of Islamist vs. secular rebels + + – + Progress toward a negotiated solution Clout of Islamist Rebels – + + Splits: Islamist-Secular Rebels / Political Opposition

124 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL ADVICE TO POLICY MAKERS WHO WOULD TACKLE SYRIA strengthen stabilizing loops (ones that keep For example, if the “Splits Among Syrian things from getting worse) or virtuous cycles Rebels” loop, a vicious cycle, could be weak- (ones that make things better) and to weaken ened or interrupted, then the negative impact or disrupt stagnating loops (ones that keep a of this loop on other loops would also be bad situation from getting better) or vicious weakened (first ripple). As a result, a weak sta- cycles (ones that make things worse and worse bilizing loop may be strengthened and have a over time). Second, and more importantly, positive impact on the system (second ripple). affecting patterns can be the key to solving the In turn, this might cause another vicious cycle problem of strained or insufficient resources to switch over to becoming a virtuous cycle because they introduce the potential to find (third ripple). As a result of this positive chain high leverage strategies. Because complex sys- reaction, perhaps the initial vicious cycle, the tems are made up of multiple, interlocking “Rebel Splits” loop might be further weakened. dynamics patterns, change to any one of these One of the most effective ways to engage the patterns will have ripple effects on other pat- system is to build the linkages between dynam- terns in the system. Leverage occurs when an ics, especially between those that include fac- initial positive impact on part of a system is tors that change much more slowly and those amplified by the interconnectedness and that can be affected in the short term. inherent dynamism among the feedback loops Align Fast and Slow Variables which make up the system. There are indicators of potential leverage The fundamental impact of engaging pat- points that policy makers can use. Some pat- terns instead of trying to fix discrete problems terns will seem “frozen in time” while others is that it conforms to a basic truism about sys- are changing and evolving organically. These tems change: that systems change best, when areas, known as “factors in flux,” are potential systems change themselves. Working with and leverage points because policy makers can through systems is more effective than trying work to affect how the system is going to to impose change, but it also means that real respond to this naturally occurring change change can take longer. For example, deposing rather than try to create change from scratch (a Saddam in Iraq gave an initial perception of much more resource-intensive undertaking). “Mission Accomplished”, but real change in There are also “bright spots,” or islands of Iraq (e.g., a stable, democratic, and prosperous positive news amidst a sea of bad news. society) has proven much more elusive. Underlying bright spots are positive dynamics In reality, different parts of a system that could be strengthened. Lastly, there are change at different rates. For example, actions also dynamics that have both positive and directed at attitudinal factors, such as produc- negative impacts on the wider system. The ing a “democratic culture” or improving rela- potential for leverage here comes from the tions between Hutus and Tutsis, change slowly possibility of lessening the negative impact of (e.g., are slow variables). Actions aimed at the dynamic and increasing the likelihood that addressing structural factors, such as building the dynamic will have positive ripple effects a market economy, improving basic infrastruc- throughout the system. ture, or establishing a system for public health, may take years, but usually change faster than

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 125 RICIGLIANO AND GRATTAN attitudinal factors. Transactional approaches, conflict or dictatorship is a good example of such as improving relationships between key this tendency. Holding elections is a relatively leaders, negotiating an agreement, or conduct- fast variable (they can be organized in a period ing a dialogue, can happen in relatively short of months). In a stable democracy, elections time frames that are measured in weeks or are the transactional manifestation of both months (hence these are fast variables). legitimate institutions and the attitudes and A common pitfall for policy makers is to values of the citizens. The longer-term goal in address fast variables, perhaps because of the a place like DRC, Egypt, or Afghanistan, is to political pressure to show short-term results. build a stable and well-functioning state. This In the case of Syria, this often means increased requires several slow variables, such as the pledges of funding that solve the rebels’ short- building of democratic culture, legitimate and term budgetary issues but fail to help build effective state structures, and higher degrees of leadership and vision within the opposition. social capital in a currently divided society. The Unfortunately, actions aimed at affecting fast problem is that fast elections often have variables often undermine long-term success impacts that work against having a positive by making it more difficult to change slow impact on these slower variables. As we have variables. seen in several cases, election violence, allega- The common practice of holding quick tions of voter fraud or result rigging, and an elections as part of a transition from an armed increase in hate speech tend to exacerbate wikimedia.org

“Nasarwasalam, Iraq (Jan. 30,2005) - Iraqi citizens come out in masses to vote in the first ever “Free Elections” in Iraq. Security was provided by the Iraqi Security Force and the U.S. Marines. The election was boycotted by Sunnis”

126 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL ADVICE TO POLICY MAKERS WHO WOULD TACKLE SYRIA ethnic tensions, de-legitimize state structures, strategic goals such as national reconciliation, and build popular disillusionment with and even inhibit basic state functions. democracy. It is not that we should not address the For example in Syria, in a post-violence fast variables; it is that they must be under- situation, a major immediate problem is likely stood in the context of the broader system and to be the lack of a legitimate government. Fast its dynamics. Without such an understanding, elections might be seen as a near-term fix to efforts are bound to overlook important fac- this problem. However, Syria will undoubtedly tors that should be addressed simultaneously be similar to neighboring Lebanon or Iraq, to prevent or mitigate unintended negative whose political contours are largely defined by consequences. This tendency for policy makers the shape of its different ethnicities and reli- to affect fast variables in ways that work gious sects.4 This is an unstable system whose against a desired change in slow variables is viability relies on preventing deep-seated com- known as the classic “fix that fails.” munity grievances from spilling into outright Policies that generate better outcomes and confessional violence. Fast elections on the more lasting impacts are those that consider heels of a traumatic and divisive violent con- the interconnections between fast variables flict that increased levels of grievance and dis- and slow variables. Building and shaping the trust between these different communities may connectivity between fast and slow dynamics be the impetus to pre-election violence and/or early can both protect against the fix that fails post-election allegations of fraud (and hence as well as bolster or build momentum for an additional threat of violence). impacts on slower variables within the system. Further, pushing for a fast election in such To do this, policy makers can begin cataloging an environment may codify identity politics in important factors as fast or slow variables and Syria, preventing progress on long-term issues then consider the potential interconnections like national reconciliation. Moreover, holding between them, such as elections and identity an election that results in political parties built politics. The emerging practice of multistep, on ethno-sectarian lines may cement demo- staged processes for both increasing participa- graphic ratios between communities. In a sys- tion and inclusivity in political transitions tem that rewards power based on the relative while simultaneously undertaking governance size of one’s community, this means that rela- reform is an example of how transactional tive population size often forms the basis for efforts can be linked to efforts addressing the political power sharing. In Iraq, this relation- attitudinal and structural dimensions. ship is subtler. But in Lebanon, demographics In the SAT approach, attitudinal factors directly determine political power. This erodes are typically the most stable over time and basic state functions: Iraq has not held a cen- therefore the slowest variables when it comes sus in key cities, such as , in over half a to change. Further, attitudes tend to be buff- century. Lebanon has not held a countrywide ered within stabilizing dynamics that reinforce census in nearly 100 years. These are two them. Structural factors are less slow to change examples of how pushing a fast variable such than attitudes, but changes can still take a long as elections can work against long-term time and be impacted by many other dynamics within the system. Transactional factors are the

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most readily changed and can be leveraged in When dealing with complex contexts like powerful ways to affect broader and more last- Syria’s, success should not just – or even ing change. This is especially true when poli- mainly be – measured by the immediate abil- cies build the linkages between transactional ity to meet predetermined objectives. Indeed, interventions (such as a mediation process), many short-term successes are deceptively longer-term processes of change in social struc- malignant, as initial success can mask subtle ture and social attitudes. An alternative to signs of failure. Likewise, from the ashes of quick national elections is to start with locally apparent short-term failure can raise catalytic organized governance activity designed to change for the better. Critical to policy success build democratic systems from the ground up in these contexts is learning about the patterns and to build a democratic culture through and dynamics of the system in which analysts multiple, iterative experiences with participa- must be engaging and adapting in a timely tory governance. manner. This requires policymakers use a ver- Developing explicit hypotheses linking sion of “shorter product cycles” to organize efforts directed at fast variables to change in their policy apparatus so they can plan, act, slower variables forces policy makers to be learn, and adapt in weeks or months, and not more explicit about how short-term actions years. Planning and acting will be enhanced by might best lead to long-term goals. Instead, the first three practices described above. policy makers all too often have a vague strat- Real learning about the system and how egy that if “we do something good in the short best to engage with it can only be done by pol- term (like hold an election), it will necessarily icy makers who directly interact with the sys- lead to good in the long term.” In turn, the tem over time. Engaging the system of Syria in alternative of using iterative strategies that a way that enables learning and adaptation build over time provides more opportunities requires a good bit of humility and a lot of for course corrections, which is a critical part thoughtful preparation. Mapping the system is of the last policy making practice: fail smart only part of this process. As philosopher Alfred and adapt fast! Korzybski so famously noted, “the map is not the territory.” As such, policy practitioners Fail Smart, Adapt Fast, and Leverage Success! must be ever prepared to update or change their understanding of the system in which No policymaker ever sets out to fail in his they are operating. In turn, this requires a or her analysis or policy recommendations. learning infrastructure. What are the core Still, no matter how nuanced the analysis or assumptions about important social dynamics, well considered the approach, many policies possible high leverage activities, and the rela- fail. If failure is not unexpected, then certainly tionships between key fast variables and slow the practice should be to mitigate it, or even variables? What indicators will you use to test better, to fail smart. By failing smart we can these assumptions and how will you gather, minimize the costs of failure and maximize analyze, and feed this learning back into your the likelihood that we will learn key lessons policy making process? from the experience. One way to learn effectively about a com- plex system like Syria is to frame any policy

128 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL ADVICE TO POLICY MAKERS WHO WOULD TACKLE SYRIA approach as a hypothesis and fully explicate What pitfalls must we avoid? What do local what dynamics are expected to be impacted communities desire most from these councils? and in what ways. Similar to a logic model or Framing the system and developing a hypoth- theory of change, a systems hypothesis links esis for system engagement is essential, but policy to key factors and dynamics. It will continuous monitoring and sensing is equally depict upstream requirements or assumptions, important. In addition to evaluating the as well as downstream impacts including sec- approach on its face by asking – does assis- ond and third order effects. Having a hypoth- tance make the council more or less “success- esis for system engagement also means that the ful” – one must also understand the causes for markers or indicators for systems change are that success and how it can be applied else- identified and rigorously monitored. where. Continuous monitoring and sensing of the environment occurs so that hypotheses can be Maintaining a learning stance with regard to the confirmed or refuted. Maintaining a learning system also increases the likelihood that emergent stance with regard to the system also increases patterns and the opportunities and/or risks they the likelihood that emergent patterns and the present will be identified more quickly. opportunities and/or risks they present will be identified more quickly. One example applied to Syria would be This kind of learning infrastructure can developing a hypothesis for engaging the sys- maximize the potential to learn from experi- tem of local administrative councils, or gov- ence, but failing smart also requires that policy erning structures set up to administer local makers minimize the potential costs of failure. towns and city neighborhoods in the country’s Contrasted to policies that take a frontal opposition-held areas. Recent analyses of these approach (much bigger fixes), scaled efforts councils since November 2012 shows the wild- minimize risk (and cost of failure) and maxi- est discrepancies between “successful” govern- mize learning. One clear way to minimize the ing structures – those that are able to design cost of failure is to implement policy in strate- and implement basic service provision and gically placed parts of the system. Often assistance delivery programs – and “failures,” thought of as “piloting” an approach, the idea which often include areas in which councils of implementing a policy on a limited basis had existed, but whose collapse precipitated before rolling it out across the nation (e.g., the entry of Islamic extremist groups. working first with successful local councils One example of a systemic learning plan before trying to improve struggling ones else- for this environment would be to first work where) allows policy makers to test their key with “successful” local councils. A complex hypotheses (about critical dynamics and causal environment like Syria presents many relationship among factors) and to test their unknown challenges. However by expanding monitoring framework. the capability of already-successful councils, Engaging with the system on a smaller policy makers can analyze not only what works scale not only benefits overall learning, but in Syria, but how to work in the country. What scaled engagements can be leveraged by build- do these successful councils have in common? ing up connections between fast and slow

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 129 RICIGLIANO AND GRATTAN dynamics. For example, supporting successful Conclusion – Keep Your Eyes On The governing councils at a local level might allow Prize more time for stakeholder engagement and capacity building. It may also provide faster These four practices are each ways to help feedback loops between community concerns policy makers see and work with systems as a and concrete responses by local councils, means of improving our effectiveness. These which in turn can build more trust in new practices are also predicated on defining the social institutions. Programs implemented in ultimate success of policy in holistic terms – in this way can also build civil society and terms of how it positively impacts the evolu- increase dialogue such that intergroup trust tion of a social system. The goal of policy in and attitudes might improve. Syria is to produce a more peaceful Syria that Successful policies (or more likely success- improves the quality of life for all Syrians. ful adaptations) need to be leveraged across Success is not just defined in traditional, sec- the system – as opposed to being mechanically torally-bound ways, e.g., holding an election, replicated. A smaller scale, more precisely reducing battlefield casualties, increasing GDP designed and monitored project can provide a by a few percentage points, or reducing more nuanced explanation of why a particular extreme abuses of human rights. The prize is a policy worked, so that policy makers can sort better Syria. out which determinants of success are highly Success at the systemic level means that context dependent (and hence difficult to rep- we need to think about policy as being about licate) and which are more generalizable (thus engagement not intervention. Measuring the easier to replicate in other areas). success of an intervention implies that at some In general, the ability to fail smart and point things will be fixed, at least enough so maximize learning requires a shift in how fail- that we can go home. As the famed “Mission ure is understood, and this may require a Accomplished” photo after the invasion of Iraq change in organizational culture. In complex demonstrated, often these pronouncements of contexts, some significant degree of failure a successful intervention prove wrong. The should be seen as expected. Instead of being hard reality is that we cannot impose change an outcome to be avoided, negative or unex- on a system – even with the world’s largest pected results should be treated as a learning military and biggest economy. opportunity that can lead to more effective Measuring success in an engagement policy. An organizational culture that operates means that we are looking for signs that we are this way understands that to fail smart also on the right track and should continue down means that there must be a “safe fail.” Such the path (or have gotten off track and need to organizations assure learning by being trans- find our way back). An engagement implies parent and humble in the face of systemic that there is no “finished by” date because sys- complexity. Organizations structured for learn- tems are constantly evolving. We may be more ing support the emergence of teams including or less engaged, but the reality is, there is no participation that is self-selecting and cross- artificial end. disciplinary. They reward learning, even when This means that the problems in Syria it is predicated by failure. cannot be “solved” in the short-term. Neither

130 | FEATURES SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL ADVICE TO POLICY MAKERS WHO WOULD TACKLE SYRIA the removal of Assad, nor international control NOTES of his chemical arsenal will win the “prize” of transition to stability and peace. Each policy 1 Many of the ideas in this article are based on initiative is important, but the transition pro- Ricigliano, R. (2012), Making Peace Last: a toolbox cess will defy any single salutary initiative. for sustainable peacebuilding. Paradigm Publishers: Boulder, CO. How, then, will we know if we are being 2 Referring to the term coined in the 1973 successful? First, in addition to the immediate article by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, Dilemmas on the ground impact of any policy, we will be in a General Theory of Planning, Policy Sciences (4): more successful to the extent that we learn 155-169 that describes a certain class of problems and the nature of their solution. This class of effectively. If we arm the opposition, what did problems has 10 basic characteristics and are known they do with those arms and why? We need to as wicked problems. look at both the intended/predicted outcomes 3 Note: even if agreement is reached among the rebels, the presence of an agreement does not mean and those we did not predict or intend. What that these underlying dynamics will have ceased to impact did these arms transfers have on the exist. In fact, in many cases, it is the existence of these regime and why? What does this tell us about dynamics that drive the ultimate breakdown in many key patterns of behavior in Syria and how we peace agreements. 4 A similar phenomenon occurred in Syria on can engage with them more effectively? its first election after the French Mandate in 1947. Second, what impact are we having on fast Then, a minority government took power in an variables (e.g. negotiations, material support, election that largely broke on ethnic and sectarian casualties, etc.) and are they building toward lines. changes in slower variables (improved rela- tions among rebel groups, rebuilding infra- structure, building toward a culture of partici- patory and accountable governance, fostering respect for human rights, improving strained ethnic relations, etc.). Lastly, we should constantly strive to eval- uate the process by which we are engaging in Syria and using these four complexity prac- tices: that we are seeing any problem or poten- tial solution in “3-D;” that we are engaging important social patterns, not trying to artifi- cially fix problems; that we distinguish between fast and slow variables and are using fast variables to build toward longer-term goals; and lastly that we know how to fail smart, adapt fast, and leverage our successes. PRISM

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FEATURES | 131 Photo by James Gordon

Roadside mural of Bashar al-Assad on the Damascus/Aleppo highway. Traditional media in Syria have been tightly controlled by the regime Mapping the Information- Sharing Ecosytem of Syria

BY LARA SETRAKIAN AND ALEX ZERDEN

he duration and danger of covering the Syrian civil war has forced journalists to innovate how they capture, curate, and transmit news from the ground. Activists and Syrian citizens, T equipped with mobile phone devices and internet connectivity, have uploaded reams of user-generated content to YouTube and social media channels. In response to an ever more com- plex information environment, a team of journalists and technologists came together to create Syria Deeply, a single subject news outlet that generates focused coverage of the crisis. Still in its early days as an independent media platform, Syria Deeply employs a modular, dashboard design to capture traditional reporting, social media insight, and data visualization. In doing so, it brings together disparate streams of open source information. The end result is coverage with greater depth and context around an unfolding crisis. This article sketches out how the platform works and the value it provides in monitoring conflicts and complex issues. The Syrian crisis represents a news and information challenge that foreshadows future global conflicts. The lack of Western journalists deployed to cover the country, due to the physical dan- gers and financial constraints of the conflict, has resulted in a paucity of facts sourced by profes- sional media. This information gap has been filled by citizen journalists and media activists, creating reams of user-generated content on media sites like Facebook, Twitter, Skype and YouTube. The result is a detailed but flawed picture of events in theater. The complexity of global events and the hyper-connectivity of an online world pose chal- lenges and opportunities for professional newsgatherers. The proliferation of locally sourced content overwhelms traditional newsrooms. There are substantial new data streams to track – more voices that need to be listened to, accounted for, fact-checked, and understood. More detailed focus and specialized knowledge becomes a pre-requisite to effectively and accurately cover today’s complex stories. Whether we examine conflicts such as Syria’s, or global trends like food and energy security, global issues require consistent attention and a capacity for greater sense-making. One must make better use of all the information available.

Lara Setrakian is the Co-Founder and Managing Editor of Syria Deeply. Alex Zerden is an Advisor to Syria Deeply.

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Syria Deeply arose to meet that challenge. of the Middle East. Their use of the internet, Though barely one year old (founded in specifically social media tools like Facebook December 2012), the platform grew out of a and web broadcasting platforms like YouTube recognized need for more consistent reporting and Bambuser, has fundamentally reshaped on the Syrian conflict than was available in political life in the Arab world. The internet is mainstream media outlets. The platform func- a parallel press, dominated by young voices tions as a specialized, issue-specific news and inclusive of content and conversations source, benefiting from deep knowledge and heretofore shunned by an often state-con- earned insight on Syria. The dedication of trolled mainstream media. Syria Deeply’s experienced editorial leadership The Middle East’s transition to the inter- to covering one story in depth has combined net introduced unfamiliar paradigms in cap- the benefits of deep domain expertise and turing and conveying regional events to the focused attention to Syria’s dynamic informa- outside world. The “Green Movement” of pro- tion ecosystem. tests against former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2009 re-election The internet is a parallel press, dominated challenged the Islamic Republic and ushered by young voices and inclusive of content and in the tools of revolt we recognize today. conversations heretofore shunned by an often During that uprising, one of the authors state-controlled mainstream media. worked with sources inside Iran who used YouTube, Facebook, and email to convey what was happening around the country – far from the reach of any foreign news outlet. Syria Deeply benefits from the techno- Confidential sources would provide digital dis- logical innovations of social media and digital patches, which could be synthesized and storytelling, but is firmly rooted in the belief shared on Twitter, and occasionally included that the future of news lies in its past. In the in and radio reports for ABC News. spirit of traditional journalism, it pursues Despite overwhelming evidence that sug- newsgathering as a public service and a means gests a new era of information consumption, to provide the best and most complete infor- it is worth noting that the impact of technol- mation. That approach has yielded positive ogy on news coverage is not universally feedback not only from readers, but from sto- accepted as game-changing. Evgeny Morozov, rytellers, all of whom appreciate an unwaver- for example, has argued that social media can ing commitment to producing high-quality, cut both ways: it enables activists but at the fact-checked content from carefully vetted and same time leaves them vulnerable and exposed curated sources. to authority. Malcolm Gladwell has sparred with others over the true impact of technology The Rise of a New Media Middle East on political change in the Arab world, arguing Syria Deeply’s founding mirrors the rise of that the impact of Facebook and Twitter has new media in the Middle East. Arab millenni- been overplayed and cannot replace personal als, classically defined as those under the age contact. As journalists who have witnessed the of 30, comprise more than half the population impact of social media in accelerating Arab

134 | FROM THE FIELD SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL MAPPING THE INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM IN SYRIA political movements, Syria Deeply aligns with international audience. By starting at the root those who claim that internet technology has of the information chain, in Skype chat rooms, revolutionized society and its interaction with savvy newsgatherers can access information news. As Clay Shirky, a professor at New York hours or sometimes days before it emerges in University, wrote in the March/April 2011 edi- the mainstream press. tion of Foreign Affairs: With hundreds of thousands of citizen journalists in Syria, the challenge is to identify, Do social media allow insurgents to adopt vet, validate, and convey a carefully cultivated new strategies? And have those strategies stream of information that provides a clear ever been crucial? Here, the historical picture of the complex conflict. Syria Deeply record of the last decade is unambiguous: works to mix digital tools with the human ele- yes, and yes. ment to build an online situational awareness capacity whereby the most relevant informa- The Arab Spring has demonstrated that tion can rapidly be woven into a narrative whole political systems can be changed or about the conflict at large. With the growing overturned by the disruptive actions of less influence of “data journalism,” we may soon than 10 percent of their population. This 10 find a greater realm of tools available to auto- percent of the population was mobilized mate and curate these information streams. At online, spurred to protest offline, and then the moment, we believe the best results are returned online to self-report their protests in achieved by a dedicated team that covers the amateur videos and voices from the ground. story consistently and applies focus and rigor From open protests in Tehran to Cairo, to to information that emerges from traditional more subtle forms of dissent in Riyadh and sources and from users on the ground. Rabat, connectivity has unquestionably been Filling the “Information Gap” the catalyst. In the Syrian context, the tools are similar With unprecedented information-sharing to Iran’s Green Movement, with some new vectors, the Syrian conflict represents the grow- developments. The ground war in Syria leans ing divide between accessible news and what heavily on an information network built over gets reported. The information gap can be Skype, whose voice over internet protocol bridged by accommodating new forms of news (VOIP) technology serves as the frontline of while remaining true to time-tested journalis- Syria’s information war. As an alternate to tic standards, maintaining rigorously vetted government-monitored telephone and mobile and fact-checked sources. We see three chal- phone connections, Skype allows activists and lenges – or gaps – for news coverage of the rebel groups to use private chat rooms for Syria crisis: sharing information and posting real time First, the Syria crisis is a complex global battle updates. Many of these updates are issue in an under-resourced news environ- posted to activist accounts on Facebook, which ment. Similar past conflicts would have seen often sparks heated debate among Syrian more reporters dedicated to covering the latest users. Some of the information posted on developments. In Lebanon’s Civil War, major Facebook is shared on Twitter to reach a wider, networks and newspapers had full-time crews

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FROM THE FIELD | 135 SETRAKIAN AND ZERDEN and fully staffed bureaus continuously cover- Voisin in early 2013. CPJ’s latest report in ing the conflict. Today, a patchwork of occa- August 2013 suggests at least 14 journalists sional pieces from the theater provides only have gone missing in Syria, though they expect limited snapshots into what is happening on that number to be a significant underestimate. the ground. Exceptions exist, such as Nour Local knowledge, when well-utilized, Malas of the Wall Street Journaland Rania offers a crucial perspective and mitigates the Abuzeid, a regular contributor to the New operational risk of deploying foreign journal- Yorker and America. Their consistent ists. To this end, we have developed reporters reporting spans the life of the conflict, but who are based on the ground in Syria and are their coverage is the exception and no longer supported by a senior editor who rotates into the rule. opposition-held territory. We supplement this Second, the security situation for journal- physical presence with assistance from Syrians ists, both foreign and local, remains especially located elsewhere throughout the country. concerning. According to the Committee to While we temper our on-the-ground reporting Protect Journalists (CPJ), the 2012 death toll to protect our team and our sources, local in Syria for journalists was on par with Iraq in knowledge offers an important perspective to 2006 and 2007. Nearly thirty journalists were our audience. killed. The toll on journalists continues with Third, freelance foreign journalists have the death of French photographer Olivier attempted to fill the void left within this fluid SYRIAN OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY SANA

Syrians standing at the scene after a blast occurred in the Mazzeh al-Jabal district of the Syrian capital Damascus – no place for timid journalists

136 | FROM THE FIELD SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL MAPPING THE INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM IN SYRIA media environment. This development creates opposition captured infantry school near security and reporting accuracy concerns, espe- Aleppo. Having native Arabic fluency and cially as freelancer reporters often cover their familiarity with the area, he was able to pro- own expenses until a media outlet decides to vide striking insights into the composition and publish their content. Such an arrangement sensibilities of the fighters. often rewards less experienced journalists will- In another example, a group of fighters ing to take greater risks to develop a reputable were escorting journalists through the school byline. This arrangement endangers lives and grounds by attempting to maneuver some cars degrades the quality of coverage in Syria and through a narrow corridor. A young fighter, an elsewhere. While we may be seeing a change in auto-mechanic before the conflict, had an this trend - as several British outlets began uncanny confidence in judging the width refusing freelance submissions, including the needed to maneuver the vehicles without dam- Sunday Times, The Guardian, Observer and aging them on the compound walls. As our Independent - however, the perceived rewards editor observed, blue-collar workers like this will still likely outweigh the risks for many auto mechanic were increasingly forming the freelancers interested in covering the Syria con- core of the Syrian rebels. Middle-class profes- flict. sionals, such as doctors and lawyers, had These three challenges are naturally inter- mostly left Syria. This level of insight helps related: the greater the strain on traditional interested followers see the bigger picture of news outlets, the less they can steadily fund the conflict’s trajectory while understanding reporters to consistently cover key issues. the human elements that drive it. Often, freelance reporters fill this void, with This human element guides our focus on consequences in terms of content and, in con- amplifying civilian voices, often underreported flict zones like Syria, enormous risk. in a war zone where more concentrated atten- Syria Deeply’s position is to mitigate these tion is usually paid to powerful stakeholders challenges by developing relationships across like Islamist rebel groups and their rivals in the networks in the digital and physical domains. Syrian government. Yet the day-to-day dynam- We cultivate information exchange with activ- ics of survival will shape the future of Syrian ists and Syrian citizen journalists, who reach society. We summarized our findings in a out to us to share their perspectives. This com- Foreign Policy article in January 2013: bination of focused reporting using carefully “Chaos is tearing apart Syria’s social fab- developed sources through traditional and ric. We’ve written about how Syria’s young new media methods is not only the core of women face forced marriage for the sake of the Syria Deeply’s effort, but increasingly resem- bride price, their families desperate to live off bles the key for translating information into their dowry. Funerals, a solemn but sacred tra- reporting in the new media environment. dition in Aleppo, have devolved into a stock The human element of our coverage dumping of bodies, devoid of religious ritual. improves our ground knowledge. For instance, Profiteering has left citizens disgusted and dis- during January 2013, one of our senior editors trustful of each other as they witness price covered fighters with the Tawhid Brigade, a gauging of food and basic necessities ­the large FSA-affiliated militant group, at an haves ripping off the have­nots.”

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Accounting for the civilian story, the Yet phones and internet connections were impact of the conflict on everyday Syrian life, widely believed to be monitored by the gov- is an essential storyline. It provides us a sense ernment, a perception bolstered by Bashar al- of the Syria that will emerge from the rubble, Assad’s well-publicized former position as and it helps us build relationships - not only head of the Syrian Computer Society. predicated on the activities of fighters but also Furthermore, Rami Maklouf, Assad’s cousin the sentiments of civilians. tightly controls Syria’s telecommunications market; he is the largest single shareholder of Information Sharing Dynamics Inside Syria SyriaTel and also has an interest in its only competitor, MTN-Syria.1 Like most Arab countries before the 2011 This historical relationship to communi- revolutions, Syria’s information sharing cations technology is quite different from dynamics were limited and opaque as a func- many parts of the Arab world. According to tion of the reality of life under Ba’ath Party Freedom House, Syria had one of the least rule. A lack of economic development and developed telecommunications infrastructure heavy censorship slowed the spread and pen- in the Middle East at the outset of the 2011 etration of communications technology in revolution. When social media debuted in Syria. Syria, even to a small audience, it bridged a Until the early 1990’s, there were only two major connectivity gap, creating affinity groups television channels widely available, Syria 1 of like-minded activists who had never before and Syria 2, both of which were state owned realized they had allies around the country. It and operated. By 1993, satellite dishes were also connected Syrians at home to those in the available on the black market for the high diaspora, catalyzing what would become a key price of roughly $600-700 USD, but they were pipeline of support for the Syrian rebels. technically illegal. According to our senior edi- Today’s Information-Sharing Ecosystem tor, who grew up in Aleppo, intelligence offi- cers ran extortion rackets whereby they would Social media has been a key tool for activ- routinely go house to house removing receiv- ists in all countries involved in the Arab ers and fining residents, only to resell the Spring,2 as a means to circumvent authorities receivers for profit. and organize and mobilize dissent. Social In addition to satellite television, Syria movements coalesced online, becoming the was late to embrace cell phones and the inter- connective tissue that allowed protesters to net. A year after inheriting Syria from his father organize and publicize their demonstrations. in 2000, Bashar Assad reigned over a country Given the significant restrictions on freedom with one percent cell phone penetration rates of the press, the freedom of the digital domain and only one third of one percent with inter- was a quantum step in terms of greater organi- net access. By the end of 2011, according to zational capacity. Social media was used to Freedom House, cell phone penetration had circumvent authority, serving as an enabler in reached 63 percent of the population and countries with a previously weak capacity to internet use increased to 20 percent. organize. It brought down the transaction cost

138 | FROM THE FIELD SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL MAPPING THE INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM IN SYRIA for protest – one that had been prohibitively and videos of those protests soon surfaced on high for activists in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. YouTube. The organizers of what would In the case of Syria, the cost of dissent and become Shaam News Network, an anti-regime political association was even more extreme, outlet, began collecting videos of protests in and the impact of connective Syria and organized a countrywide network of even more marked. Facebook and YouTube photographers designed to give the world a had been blocked for years before the March view from inside Syria. It was dramatically dif- 2011 uprising, but the Syrian regime suddenly ferent from the Syrian government narrative, lifted this restriction in the heat of the represented by news outlets such as al‑Dounia Egyptian revolution. In what some see as a tac- News and the Syrian Arab News Agency tical ploy, the move gave Syria’s Mukhabarat – (SANA). In addition to presenting its own nar- the government intelligence service – greater rative of the crisis, the government severely freedom to monitor and penalize online activ- restricted foreign journalists from entering the ists on government networks. This temporarily country. But once they did, news media tech- exposed activists, who now access Facebook nology allowed these reporters greater freedom through a proxy server, which circumvents the than ever before. For instance, an American government block and masks their digital journalist working for Reuters, Suleiman movements. El-Khalidi, went to jail and reported about his It is worth noting that Facebook penetra- incarceration. The narrative/counter-narrative tion rates at the start of Syria’s uprising were information war continues in Syria today and not high. In Syria, they represented roughly poses a significant challenge to ground-truth- one percent of the population according to a ing news. 2010 School of Government report. This fact may explain three things: one, that When social media debuted in Syria, even to a Facebook alone was not the source of wide- small audience, it bridged a major connectivity spread influence; two, that a small number of gap, creating affinity groups of like-minded well-networked activists can start a monumen- activists who had never before realized they had tal information movement using Facebook allies around the country. and other digital tools; and three, that Facebook use has evolved and grown signifi- cantly over the course of the conflict. Now it is a forum for civic discourse, through popular Our experience is that the dominant infor- discussion pages and threads that tear down or mation dynamic within Syria is decidedly low- transcend long-standing taboos on political tech. Word of mouth is a primary vehicle, espe- dissent. cially in more remote parts of the country and The Syrian uprising did not begin online, areas where violence occurs frequently. We but it was accelerated through online plat- have repeatedly encountered “fog of war” chal- forms. The spark of the revolution was lit in lenges while reporting in Syria, cases in which Deraa on March 18, 2011, when mothers pro- some interviewees do not know with clarity tested the detention of their teenage sons for what is going on three or four towns away. To writing anti-Assad graffiti. Protests continued, combat this, rebel groups collect equipment to

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Word of mouth remains a primary method of transmitting news in Syria; in mosques, souks, and street bazaars communicate via radio, but even they may not equipment has limited bandwidth. Instead of know what is going on 15 to 20 kilometers using such equipment, those inside Syria who away from their location. receive enough money from other foreign gov- Despite this low-tech environment, satel- ernments and foreign activists buy more lite stations have popped up to beam stories expensive and capable devices, with a wider into pro-opposition communities, such as reach inside the country. Diesel generators are Syria al-Ghad and Aleppo News. National the preferred means for generating the electric- Public Radio’s Deborah Amos, a senior advisor ity to power such devices. to Syria Deeply, covered the use of Aleppo One private satellite internet provider News. This satellite channel broadcasts used in Syria is Tooway, a European company. YouTube videos and includes social network The receiver can download data at up to 20 updates as a ticker at the bottom of the screen. megabytes per second, a speed comparable to While the approach appears rudimentary, for high-speed service in the U.S. The service is people without a computer or internet, it is expensive, costing approximately $2,000 (U.S. their only way to get real time news about dollars) for the initial set-up, plus $200 per events unfolding inside Syria. month for a 50 gigabyte usage fee. This 50 Those with internet, such as the rebels and gigabyte allotment is often insufficient for activists, access information satellite internet uploading High-Definition (HD) video, so cards. U.S. distributed communications some users purchase two or more packages.

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One Syria Deeply reporter noted a recent rise activists will record a bombing or another inci- in Tooway satellites in early 2013, with five dent on video. They will then take it to Skype devices seen in three villages near Idlib. These and disseminate it to a select group of other devices were likely brought through Turkey, activists. Subsequently, they will upload it and though it is unclear who paid for such expen- share with a Facebook community group. sive equipment. Occasionally it will be shared on Twitter. We have found these activist groups to be The Syrian Information Ecosystem: Getting Ahead of the News Cycle well-organized to serve larger strategic organi- zational goals. They often try to build relation- By understanding the Syrian information ships with Arabic-language satellite channels ecosystem, Syria Deeply has been able to more such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, which both effectively monitor and package information have high viewership across the Arab world. In coming out of the country. Our reporting is this respect, the methods employed resemble founded on traditional methods: reaching very traditional mechanisms used to gain vis- trusted sources quickly with the right ques- ibility among large audiences. tions. But translating this process to the digital A profit motive may exist for some activ- domain requires fluency in social media com- ists and local journalists to cooperate with munication and the ability to regularly pulse pan-Arab and international media outlets. trusted online news sources. Fixers in places like Antakya, Turkey, have In the fall of 2012, Syria Deeply had been exclusive contracts with specific media organi- hearing multiple reports in social media about zations. Such non-competition agreements a breakthrough among the Syrian opposition have made it increasingly difficult for freelanc- groups – primarily through Skype chat rooms, ers and incoming news organizations to find but also on Twitter and Facebook. Combing sources in northern Syria. Arabic-language social media using vetted, On February 22, 2013, Syria Deeply pro- trustworthy contacts means that stories can be filed Mohamed Masalmeh, a reporter from captured 24-48 hours before they appear in Deraa who was killed on January 18, 2013. international news reports. The chatter we Mohamed originally reported for Sham News were hearing in social media quickly crystal- Network before taking a contract with ized around the emergence of , a Al-Jazeera. Other local journalists have respected Damascus businessman, whose plan received offers but want to remain indepen- to reorganize the Syrian opposition was dent. These journalists create and sell video embraced by the U.S. in October 2012. News packages, but are not beholden to any one spe- of his plan was being discussed in Arabic lan- cific media outlet. guage Facebook groups at least 48 hours Paradoxically, the evolution of informa- before Josh Rogin broke the story in his blog tion dissemination occurs in a relatively egali- on Foreign Policy. tarian manner. Everybody gets the information As this incident illustrates, much of the at almost the same time. People who are actu- information now coming out of Syria origi- ally in the Skype chat rooms get it first, but nates on Facebook and Skype through activists even something as simple as signing up for an on the ground. In the typical supply chain, activist Facebook page provides access to

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information that often precedes by two days deeper and better knowledge. To harness this what is reported on television and print. For capability, the Syria Deeply team has reviewed journalists, this provides a helpful service, gen- many web outlets and met with many activists. erating information hours before wire services Some activists will lie to bolster their own nar- like Reuters, Agence -Presse (AFP), and rative, as they may be desperate to advance the Associated Press (AP) are on the story. Even their cause or receive funding. Syria Deeply the New York Times now runs a curated takes this into account as we cultivate sources YouTube video feed with analysis. and consider their input. Moreover, acknowledging and reporting Accuracy and Reliability In The New Environment the Syrian government view allows us to pro- vide our readers a more complete rendering of Syria Deeply navigates an information- the conflict to make their own conclusions rich but analytically poor environment to about a given issue. We incorporate Syrian gov- report its stories. We employ tried and true ernment narratives through state-owned media methods of traditional journalism: building outlets, state press conferences, along with contacts, nurturing relationships, and develop- allied narratives from Russia and Iran. ing trust with our sources. However, unlike in Throughout the course of our reporting, we other contexts, we rarely, if ever, have a chance have to do an extremely diligent job of getting to meet those sources in person. As we advance this perspective. This approach also allows us digital newsgathering, new methods to vet to remain outcome neutral as to the events sources and fact check reports must be used to unfolding in Syria. ensure the accuracy of our reporting: Who Many start-up news outlets focusing on introduced us to this contact? Do they have the Syrian crisis pursue agendas to influence any other digital footprints we can verify for user opinions and attitudes. In contrast, Syria their identity? How accurate was their previous Deeply aspires to be a platform that rests on reporting? Over time, we have been able to an objective goal to increase understanding of answer these questions through a large net- the conflict, in a collaborative and intellectu- work of personal contacts and the ability to ally honest approximation of the truth. Our quickly review digital signatures of new con- readers recognize and appreciate our multi- tacts. This vetting process allows us to build leveled focus – from militant groups to civilian . stories. Our commitment to the Syria story Covering the entire story is a central aspect improves the quality of our network of like- of traditional journalism that provides our minded mission-driven individuals. This dif- readers with the necessary information to ferentiates Syria Deeply from other media out- make conclusions based on our reporting. It lets. We can better serve our users by staying also fits into our model to be outcome neutral. with the story over time and using the best of Other online and new media sources often technology in concert with traditional journal- shed this objectivity, endangering their report- ism that educates and informs its audience to ing and reporters. Syria Deeply is committed evaluate complex issues. The fact is that with to being an information platform, not an more content, there is an opportunity for advocacy organization.

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Conclusion: How “Deeply” Platforms Can expansion is already under consideration. Advance Conflict Monitoring Platforms on transnational issues such as Climate Change Deeply, Drug War Deeply, or Syria Deeply was founded to provide con- Malaria Deeply, are also under consideration. tent with context on the unfolding humanitar- Whatever the topic, the methodology and ian and political crisis in Syria and its spillover the value proposition remain the same. The effect in neighboring countries. We leverage combination of news, knowledge, and insight, digital tools, like real time Twitter feeds, delivered in an accessible format, can deliver a Google Hangout chats, and innovative data significant edge to the user – an open-source visualization techniques, with the time-tested opportunity to grasp and track what is going skills of traditional journalism. We then incor- on. Those who navigate issues through a porate a rigorous editorial review process with “Deeply” design can emerge with a more curated content, blending original reporting robust picture and more complete understand- from the ground with the best of the web to ing, for an enhanced ability to operate in an create a new user experience for complex for- ever more complex world. PRISM eign news issues and crises like Syria. This experiment has not only become an important source for understanding the Syrian conflict, but also represents a methodology for understanding complex issues using 21st cen- tury tools. It is meant to evolve with user feed- NOTES back and technological innovations. Rather than a traditional newspaper online, the Syria 1 For additional information on Syria’s cell Deeply platform is a dashboard for a range of phone penetration, see http://www.unhcr.org/ users to immerse themselves in the issues of refworld/pdfid/502a0c520.pdf along with the 2012 the conflict to leave with a fuller and more Freedom House “Freedom on the Net” report, http:// www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2012/ accurate view of the facts. Rather than a blog, syria Syria Deeply is a platform focused on growing 2 It is worth noting that many voices in the as a trusted destination, fusing the ease and region prefer the expression “Arab Awakening” over the term “Arab Spring,” considering the latter to be a accessibility of digital media with the rigor of sanguine misnomer. traditional news reporting. We remain com- mitted to the story, to cover the evolution of Syria’s conflict and eventual recovery. Syria Deeply is an innovative, replicable model for conflict monitoring and reporting, with myriad applications in the modern digital information environment. The model that Syria Deeply refines and iterates can be expanded to cover a range of global issues – imagine an Iran Deeply, Pakistan Deeply, Egypt Deeply, or Mali Deeply. Such an

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL FROM THE FIELD | 143 An Interview with Ambassador Frederic C. Hof

President Obama has announced a program of military support to the Syrian opposition, which may have been a great idea one year ago. Is it actually too late to support the opposition in Syria, and if not, how will it play out?

Hof: Whether or not it is too late to do anything in Syria is a very interesting analytical ques- tion. Unfortunately, it is not really the kind of question that can be the basis for policy in govern- ment. As things stand right now, with the regime provoking certain kinds of reactions in the opposition, Syria is on a one-way trip to state failure. The implications for 23 million people and all of the countries surrounding Syria are enormous and negative. Even if we wonder if things should have been done a year ago, we as a government are obliged to act and try to minimize the damage in Syria; to try to shape developments as best we can in spite of our skepticism.

Can you please elaborate the idea of state failure in Syria? What would that look like and what would be the implications in the region?

Hof: What it would look like is difficult to describe in detail; there are scenarios, potentially involving warlordism, with local leaders assuming almost feudal-like powers in certain localities. There is speculation of Syria actually being partitioned into several different statelets. It’s difficult to pinpoint an exact scenario, but it is pretty clear this is the path we’re on. Right now, Syria quite literally does not have a government whose rule extends over the entirety of the country. The consequences of this are very serious and we have a humanitarian catastrophe that is not likely to stop anytime soon.

What are the implications for stability in Iraq? Does the Kurdish angle, combined with the sectarian Sunni/Shi’a conflict spiking, present a risk of spillover? Do you think this potentially runs the risk of undermining the U.S. contributions to stability in Iraq?

Ambassador Hof is a senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Ambassador Hof served as the U.S. Special Advisor for Transition in Syria and previously served as the Special Coordinator for Regional Affairs in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. This interview was conducted on May 1, 2013.

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Hof: I think it runs the risks of undermin- Preserving that link to Hezbollah is a transcen- ing whatever progress was made to bring Iraq dent national security goal for Iran. There are back together. Iraqis themselves have a major plenty of Quds force people urging Nasrallah role to play in all of this. The dynamic between to put people into the fight. Iran’s best case Prime Minister Maliki and his opponents may scenario is keeping the regime in power, at not be entirely independent of developments least in Damascus and the Homs area, and in Syria. The implications for all of the neigh- putting the genie of protests back in the bottle. bors are very serious and one of the great iro- The second best scenario is basically collapse nies here is that elements that continue to do and a degree of chaos, but some ability to a tremendous amount of damage in Iraq are maintain a land link to Hezbollah in Lebanon among those whose presence in Iraq was facil- through the Homs area or perhaps through the itated and expedited by the Assad regime. Alawite area in the northwest region of Syria. These groups have now done a U-turn back The one thing I don’t think Iran is interested into Syria in an effort to eclipse and take over in – because I believe both Kofi Annan and the armed opposition. They are taking the sec- Lakhdar Brahimi tested this in good faith – is tarian bait that the regime has thrown out the idea that Iran could somehow be part of there as part of its own survival strategy. the solution, rather than part of the problem Sectarianism is probably the greatest danger to in terms of cooperating with a peaceful transi- Syria now, and obviously the implications are tion to a different kind of government away similar to places like Iraq or Lebanon – coun- from (Assad) family rule. I think the Iranians tries where even on the best of days, sectarian- have concluded accurately that any coherent ism and confessionalism are major challenges. replacement to the Assad regime would funda- mentally change Syria’s relationship both with Who would stand to win? Who gains by Iran and Hezbollah in ways that Tehran would Syria’s descent into further chaos? not like.

Hof: I suppose there are various local Is a possible “Plan “B for them to actors of one kind or another that could always continue supporting the Assad group as an find a way to capitalize, whether monetarily or insurgency in a post-Assad country? in some other way. I think Syria’s demise as a state might constitute an essential part of an Hof: Definitely and this is the way it is Iranian “Plan B” for the country (Iran’s “Plan going. In effect right now, Bashar al-Assad and A” for Syria is of course to preserve the Assad the combination of his security forces – loyal regime). President Bashar al-Assad’s father, military units, intelligence units, and militias Hafez al-Assad, was really the senior partner in trained by Hezbollah and Iran – are helping to the Syrian-Iranian relationship, in particular form the armed gangs known as shabiha. All when it was mostly focused on Saddam of these things combined have the effect of Hussein. Now you have Bashar al-Assad taking making Bashar al-Assad the strongest, most the role of junior partner to Tehran, and the coherent militia leader in the country right appearance and prominence of Hassan now. For 43 years, the Syrian government has Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, as well. been an instrument of the ruling family in

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 145 HOF which the family has occupied the presidency, Our impression from recent field and that is where all of the executive power has interviews inside Syria is that people don’t see resided in Syria. However, now we are at the an alternative to supporting Assad and they point where even the pretense of government aren’t happy to be put in this position. If they has disappeared and the prime minister is busy did have an alternative or if he didn’t seem to dodging car bombs. be delivering anything of value, they may be willing to jettison their support of him. Is that So it has devolved into a situation where accurate? Assad is the most-powerful feudal chief? Hof: My closest Syrian friends remain Hof: I think so and for the family itself to grudgingly supportive of the regime; these are play this role, it’s important that it holds on to people I have known for nearly fifty years. I got Damascus. Right now, Assad’s principal strat- started as an exchange student in Damascus egy is to bind the minorities, especially his when I was a teenager. People I have known own Alawite group, to him and to the survival from that time, like Christian families, are of his family. He is having some luck with that sticking with the regime – not because they because of the rise of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar like Bashar, nor because they have any illu- al-Sham and these other jihadist groups. Their sions about the incompetence, the corruption, rise is a gift to Assad, and their presence in the and the brutality of the regime. Half of their country is a lifeline to the regime. relatives are in the U.S., , France, or The Alawite community over the years, . There is a reason for that and yet starting with the French mandate, has been they look around at potential alternatives and quite militarized. are not seeing anything that gives them com- Even though it (the regime) is disorga- fort. I think this is going to be inevitably the nized, the one thing that Hafez al-Assad did case until an alternate government is estab- when he took power in 1970 was to make sure lished on Syrian territory. there were no rival power centers within the Alawite community. Everything Assad had Is the Syrian opposition, as it is currently gone through in the 1960s in his steady climb constituted, a viable alternative? to power taught him that this is the one thing you must nail down. You are always going to Hof: Not as currently constituted. The get opposition within the Sunnis. If the challenge for the U.S. and others right now is Christians aren’t happy, they’ll emigrate to the that we can’t just sit back, point fingers at the U.S. or Canada, but keeping the Alawite com- opposition and say, “How inadequate! Look at munity absolutely under the thumb is essen- their divisions,” and so forth. Once the deci- tial. sion was made in December 2012 to recognize Now if Bashar loses Damascus, I believe the opposition coalition as the legitimate rep- there will be people in that community, maybe resentatives of the Syrian people, we gave up military commanders, who will begin to look the option of being full-time skeptics and crit- at this family and say, “Aha! Are they really ics. Right now you have a spectacle of the protecting us or are they a liability?” mainstream opposition being largely divided

146 | INTERVIEW SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL HOF not only because of its own tendencies to all of this – the actual influence of Syrians who divide but because this is a country coming may be attracted to these groups. Because these out of a 50 year political coma. They are also groups have arms, , and military being divided by rivalries among key Arab experience, it’s possible that the actual Syrian states, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia in par- membership is having something of a leaven- ticular. This is a situation where the U.S., ing influence on how they operate inside Syria whose initial inclination was to let the local as contrasted to certain practices in Iraq actors take the lead on this, doesn’t want to get involved in everything around the world. Syria The narrative certainly has changed in the looks particularly like a bad hornets’ nest; last several months. The opposition seems to be however I think it has become clear that the increasingly dominated by jihadist or radical subcontracting of the Syrian revolution to oth- groups. Is there anything that the U.S. can do ers is not working. The U.S. really needs to to prevent a government or regime emerging out exert itself and this is one of the things that of this conflict that is jihadist, Salafist, and hos- U.S. Secretary of State Kerry is taking on, and tile to the U.S? it is one of the themes of this steady stream of visitors coming to Washington to visit Hof: I think the main thing to be done – President Obama. They are all saying that and assistance is a big part of this – is on the enough is enough and we need a unified effort military side. In order to establish direct rela- here. If we are going to make something of this tions with the Supreme Military Council’s opposition we have to vector assistance (Commander of the Free Syrian through it and to it. Army), the administration is in the process of twisting Saudi, Qatari, and Turkish arms, say- Over the last 18 months, we have seen ing that every last thing goes through this guy. civilian secular democracy activists get It is a similar situation with the Coalition sidelined and the political space for a strong, (Syrian Opposition Coalition); I think our secular opposition government become objective needs to be the establishment of an increasingly fragmented. Given the DNA of alternate government on Syrian territory, not Jabhat al-Nusra – its close affiliation to something that just consists of exiles that are Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) – it is strange to us currently based in Cairo. The opposition coali- how different they are from AQI. Al-Nusra is tion needs to work with the Supreme Military conducting social programming, charity work, Council and they need to work with the local political organizing, and they are not committees. There are lots of difficulties with targeting civilians in the same way that AQI establishing an alternate government in Syria did. It is almost as if they have learned from but at the end of the day, if you are looking to the mistakes of AQI. Are they some kind of throw a spanner into what seems to be the hybrid between AQI and Hezbollah? Are we natural course of things, this is the way to do looking at a different class of jihadists here? it. To be honest with you, I’m not sure to Hof: We may well be, and what has to be what extent the Jabhat al-Nusra domination, taken into account is actual Syrian input into in terms of the armed opposition, is real as

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 147 HOF opposed to information operations. But unless Can you give us some detail about how a and until we get behind an alternative that military operation would be organized? Our consists of credible people operating a decent understanding is that the regime is protecting program from a decent platform on Syrian ter- a north-south land corridor, making the ritory, to people like my Syrian friends, there central Homs-Hama area critically important. is not going to be a credible alternative worth The regime’s east-west air bridge coming in looking at. from Iran is also vital for the regime’s sustainment as is territorial control over That probably has some kind of Alawite portions of all the major cities. So the outlines component, right? of the strategy could be: 1) knock out the air bridge in an air operation; 2) deny some of Hof: It should. It needs to be a govern- the Syrian government’s control of the central ment based on certain standards, such as citi- Homs-Hama area; and, 3) help the opposition zenship, rule of law, and civil society. gain territorial control of major city centers Ultimately, it should be a government that like Aleppo. However, the starting point has to refuses to take this sectarian bait, which is be a viable political strategy; you can’t just increasingly difficult. I think all Arab leaders jump right into a military solution. Could you would recognize the truth of what I am saying react to that? about the necessity of having an on-the- ground alternative to family rule. The problem Hof: I think the greatest problem we’re for the U.S. is that getting behind this kind of facing right now – a problem that would inten- development requires a fundamental strategic sify were an alternate government established shift. We would most certainly need to get out on Syrian territory – is the regime terror cam- of the subcontracting business at that point. paign aimed at civilians. Its goal may be to We would be taking the lead in rounding up convince the civilians that the Free Syrian resources. It doesn’t mean that Syria suddenly Army is more trouble than it’s worth. This is a becomes the ward of the American taxpayer. classic tactic, but what it is doing is running up We’d be the ones with the tin cup out there, the body count and leaving people seriously meaning we would have to make some basic maimed. It is driving people towards the bor- decisions about defending the new govern- ders and into internal displacement, becoming ment that is established. Because what we see a real catastrophe. I think the objective you is a consistent pattern; whenever the regime have to aim for in a case like this, is to cer- loses a populated area to the opposition, that tainly have the effects of a no-fly zone because area – whether a residential neighborhood, you want the results of a no-fly zone. The ques- city, village, or town – gets subjected to all tion is, would you go about it tactically in a kinds of bombardment from various sources. way parallel to what we did in Iraq? There You can imagine what would happen if a gov- seems to be considerable Department of ernment was suddenly proclaimed. Defense resistance to that, which is under- standable. They have continuing responsibili- ties such as Afghanistan and a boatload of contingencies concerning Iran. They are not

148 | INTERVIEW SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL HOF looking for a particularly heavy lift in Syria. alternative is important, and as long as the One thing that perhaps ought to be looked at opposition is simply an opposition, it is not is the use of standoff weaponry to neutralize going to serve as an alternative. Moaz al- Syrian air, missile, and even artillery assets. Khatib, who recently resigned as head of the opposition coalition, wrote a beautiful letter What would be your strategy for building to the Christians of Syria; the problem is that a new viable Syrian government? Should the nobody paid attention to it. I was in the approach be focused on nation-building and Vatican some time ago and asked their chief institutional development as in Afghanistan or Syrian diplomat, “What do you think of should it have a different focus? Sheikh Khatib’s letter to the Christians?” His response was, “what letter?” This is always Hof: First of all, it is very important to going to be the problem: as long as an opposi- identify the proper people, platform, and pro- tion is an opposition, no matter what it says or gram. I think that the government is going to does, it is going to have a basic credibility need a great deal of technical and advisory deficit. That problem goes away if you have a assistance; this is something that the U.S. and government proclaimed on Syrian territory its European allies could certainly be involved that is actually recognized by the U.S. and with. I also think they are going to need a great other key countries as the Syrian government. deal of financial support. The Friends of the This is not going to be perfect, nor a Syrian people, now under the leadership of a Scandinavian model of functioning govern- Dutch diplomat, are in the process of trying to ment, but it could and must be good enough. put together a reconstruction fund, which is a financial tool we would want. I’m not sure that So we are dealing with multi-confessional I would categorize this as a nation-building rule of law. What are the other characteristics exercise in the sense of Afghanistan. that you could see as essential for that What you want to do is set up, on Syrian potential government? territory, a structure that has an opportunity to succeed in serving as an alternative to the Hof: To me the most essential part in Assad regime. Perhaps, along the line of the terms of any ideology is in the con- President’s objective, it can also serve as an text of national identity or the idea that, in interlocutor with that regime. Perhaps Assad terms of political identification, citizenship will decide at some point, whether on his own trumps everything else. The one thing I would or under Russian persuasion, to engage in a really regret seeing in Syria, unless it is the negotiations process consistent with what was only way that a tourniquet can be put on the agreed to by the P5 (permanent five members bleeding, is that the country devolves in the of the UN Security Council) in Geneva back in direction of a big Lebanon. This would be with June 2012. We’re not looking for perfection various functions assigned on the basis of con- here nor the ideal government structure, but fessional politics. I know there is a big debate something good enough. It is not as if Assad is over the extent to which national identity has doing any governing right now; there is no really taken root in Syria since its government in Syria. Getting this set up as an

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 149 HOF independence in 1946, as opposed to underly- return for the support we’re going to render for ing confessional tensions and so forth. this. I think acceptance of the notion of conti- nuity of state institutions to the extent possible What about the problem of purging? Do is something that we would insist on. you think as this plays out that there will have to be a purging of at least senior level officials What else would we insist on? from the Assad regime, and how far down would that go? Hof: I think the general nature of this gov- ernment’s program is to envision the future Hof: It’s hard to tell. I think the one prin- governance of Syria as a unified country. I ciple that the U.S. government has tried to don’t think we would get into the business of adhere to in all of this is that ultimately positively identifying people that ought to be accountability is in the hands of Syrians. I in the government. We are not going to say, know there have been some efforts within the “Ahmed so-and-so needs to be Minister of the opposition to try to answer that question pre- Economy.” I think we are going to insist on, cisely. without naming names, some figures who are How far down does it go? One can think obviously divisive and threatening in terms of notionally about the “family” and some sort their public profile who ought not to be play- of inner ring of enablers whose future partici- ing a role in this government. pation in the governance of Syria is absolutely inadmissible. Basically, it would be inadmis- Do you think we would insist on a regime sible under the terms of Geneva, given the fact based on representative democracy? that a nationally unified government would be created by mutual consent between the oppo- Hof: I think what we should insist on is sition and the government. I think one thing Syrian governance that moves seriously toward that does occur to the mainstream opposition the standard of government deriving its powers is that, to the maximum degree possible, the from the consent of the governed. There is a institutions of state should be preserved dur- history here; you have the word “democracy” ing a transition. As badly in need of reform that means something to us, but the way it has and rejuvenation as they may be, you don’t been applied to certain Middle Eastern politi- want to have the Iraqi-style army of the unem- cal situations by the West, particularly the U.S., ployed and disaffected. Now this is a matter of sometimes evokes a negative reaction. I hope debate in Syria, and this is going to be one of that the main import of the Arab Spring is that the real tension generators in any kind of a Arabs themselves, whether in Syria or else- transitional scheme because I am sure there is where, are finally coming to grips with the age- a large constituency in Syria for the “throw the old question of what really follows the bums out” approach, which is perfectly under- Ottoman Empire. This is in terms of a source standable. As we discuss with the opposition of political legitimacy and what follows the coalition the procedures for establishing a gov- Sultan and the Caliph. I think the answer is ernment on Syrian territory, there are some out there, but getting to the end result is not demands that we’re going to be making in going to be easy. The answer that is out there

150 | INTERVIEW SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL HOF is that rule must come from the consent of the out, there will be a significant portion of the governed. Some other approaches were tried, population, probably a majority, that will have such as colonial high commissioners, big Arab the view that he doesn’t have the right to serve leaders trying to capture the magic of Pan-Arab as President of the Republic. That is what we nationalism, and people that actually purport are talking about when we are talking about to know the will of God in contemporary legitimacy. political affairs, all of which I think are tran- sient. Has the State Department approached this particular conflict or crisis any differently than Is this the War of Ottoman Succession, you would have imagined 10 or 15 years ago? phase two? Hof: That’s a tough question. I think it Hof: It is! One of the things I remember was not commonly believed that the wheels from college is a professor who said that in would come off in Syria really to the extent major parts of the Middle East, especially the that they have. It was a little surprising at the Levant, the key question is what follows the beginning that Bashar al-Assad, a person who Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire’s pass- really understood the whole communications ing was, in historical terms, the blinking of the revolution – he was Chairman of the Syrian eye; 90 years ago – that is nothing. In that sys- Computer Society - would react to a peaceful tem, all political legitimacy flowed through the protest the way he did, in light of what he Sultan-Caliph. It was a 400-year experiment in knew about social media. I think the political Islam. The Sunnis were the big shots Department of State from the beginning, has of the empire, the Christians and Jews had offi- done a reasonably good job of teeing up cial protection while everybody else had no options and alternatives for the White House. status. In terms of that kind of process, the State Finding a more or less stable, permanent Department behaved now as it would have 10 replacement for that – does it necessarily or 20 years ago faced with a parallel crisis. I involve the redrawing of boundaries? This is don’t see any particularly startling new depar- the current fad and it’s a question of legiti- tures. macy. I suspect in the end Syria is probably going to continue to exist as a political entity With respect to former Secretary of State of some kind within its current boundaries. Clinton’s focus on the “three Ds”—defense, That is not going to be easy, and there are development, and diplomacy—planning and going to be a lot of challenges to that, but the executing jointly, have we achieved interagency real issue is going to be finding the source of collaboration for Syria? political legitimacy. I think even Assad’s friends and allies within Syria, many of whom Hof: I think the challenge for this admin- were western educated, would probably istration has not been physically located in the acknowledge privately that there is just no way Department of State in this respect. I think that Bashar can rule legitimately in this coun- every administration has its own methodology try. Even if he wins every battle from here on for managing the interagency. In a crisis like

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 151 HOF the Syrian crisis, it is much more than the Hof: No. I think the President’s inclina- Department of State. The DOD has enormous tion is to look at Syria through the prism of equities; the intelligence community is very Iraq. I think one of his guiding assumptions is, important in all of this, both analytically and “if I do anything in Syria beyond providing operationally; and the Treasury Department humanitarian assistance and technical assis- has played a big role in unfolding American tance to the opposition, I am going to be policy. How the White House manages this, sucked in just like the U.S. was sucked into how it sets up its national security system Iraq. And if you do one thing you wind up in under the Assistant to the President for the end, occupying the country.” This is the National Security Affairs, varies from adminis- slippery slope model. I think what has been tration to administration. I think for this counter-intuitive for him, but is nevertheless administration, it has been difficult and a real true, is that holding Syria at arm’s length challenge to come up with a system that reli- would seem on the surface a very risk-adverse, ably produces options and alternatives for conservative policy. Given what is happening presidential decisions. It is the president him- now, however, it is the most risky policy of all. self who sets the tone for all of this. Probably He may be slowly coming to that decision, but the best and most functional system we have it is counter-intuitive, especially when he has had in recent history is the one run by General people advising him to stay away from getting for President George H.W. involved. Unfortunately there is no staying Bush. That seems to be the model. Scowcroft away from it. One way or another, we are in was very systematic about getting the input of the middle of it. PRISM all the relevant actors and making sure that the president of the U.S. had all the information that he needed to make a decision. I think in this administration, there has been more of a tendency toward insularity by the president and a relatively small circle of advisors. It cer- tainly is not a system that General Scowcroft would recognize. I think if you are looking at ways that the U.S. government has handled this crisis and contrast it with other crises at different times, look at the National Security Staff that used to be referred to as the NSC staff. Take a look and see how that is run.

It sounds like the White House took away some very clear lessons from the Iraq experience. Do you think those were the right lessons?

152 | INTERVIEW SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL An Interview with Murhaf Jouejati

In your op-ed in Al-Monitor on September 2, you emphasize the merits of military intervention by the international community in Syria. Please tell us more about why and how you’d like to see the international community involved in a military engagement.

Jouejati: First, let me explain what I mean by a more vigorous engagement: what President Obama is proposing is that US engagement be limited in time and in scope, with no “boots on the ground.” I think everybody agrees with no boots on the ground; not only in terms of American public opinion and American policymakers, but Syrians and the Syrian opposition itself do not want any foreign boots on the ground. Syrian rebels believe they can do it themselves. But when Mr. Obama talks about a limited operation against Assad, he is saying publicly that all Assad needs to do is turn on the news and know a strike is coming. So all Assad needs to do is hunker down, absorb the blow, declare himself a victor, and continue in his murderous ways against the Syrian people. What I think the Syrian opposition would prefer by far is the kind of campaign that would degrade Assad’s ability to kill at will. What has been most successful in Assad’s killing machine has been the . Assad has been flying bombing , including against bakeries and people waiting in breadlines. He has also successfully used his surface-to-surface missiles. He is launching SCUD missiles into civilian neighborhoods. If the United States were to take these out, and, simultaneously, were to arm the moderate elements within the Free Syrian Army (FSA) that would then create a balance of power. Right now, there is a lopsided balance of power. Assad has the advantage, given assis- tance from Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia. Assad believes that it is still possible to crush the rebellion militarily, especially when the international community is reluctant and hesitant to get involved. When I talk of a more vigorous American engagement, I do not mean any boots on the ground, but I do mean a no-fly zone. I do mean a campaign that takes out his air force.

Murhaf Jouejati, Professor of Middle East Studies, National Defense University Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies is also Chairman of Syria’s “The Day After” organization. This interview was conducted on September 3, 2013, four days after U.S. President ’s speech on the U.S. response to chemical weapons attacks in Syria. A bill authorizing the use of force against the government of Syria, introduced by Senate Majority Leader on September 6, would not pass.

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 153 JOUEJATI

The boots on the ground would entirely boots on the ground. There is always the dan- be Syrian, provided that they are equipped. ger of miscalculations along the way, and this Because until now, the world has been saying, may take longer than I am claiming here. But “we will not arm you, Oh Syrians, nor will we again, I think these fears, or potential pitfalls defend you. Go out and die.” These conditions are, for the most part, justifications in order to are impossible. The Syrians can do it them- do as little as possible. selves, but they do need the assistance of the international community. But the interna- Given the chemical attack in the eastern tional community will not act without U.S. suburbs of Damascus on August 21, 2013 and leadership, and thus far, we have not seen that. the subsequent lack of international response, what do you think is the reaction within Please elaborate on the risks of Syrian communities who have been victims of international engagement in Syria. these attacks?

Jouejati: The international community Jouejati: Let me paraphrase a refugee that claims they fear that arms would fall into the I saw yesterday on TV--he was asking the wrong hands. However, I don’t buy this reporter whether America was drunk or on because relevant U.S. authorities have vetted drugs. Here is a chemical attack against a civil- the FSA. They know who the good guys are, ian population, and America, who is a guaran- who the bad guys are, and they have been sat- tor of international peace and security and a isfied with guarantees provided by the leader signatory to the convention banning chemical of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), weapons, is debating what to do. Expectations General Salim Idris. The radicals have shown of an intervention rose dramatically after the themselves to be far better-armed than those attack, when word spread that the Obama moderate elements that we need to support. I administration was going to employ force in think this fear is mostly used as a justification response. Expectations went through the roof by the international community to do little. until Saturday, August 31, 2013, when they The U.S. [is also worried that it] could be heard the announcement that the President sucked into the morass in Syria. Here, what was seeking congressional authorization looms very large, is the Iraqi shadow. However, before acting. As I wrote in my op-ed in I challenge the basic premise of this [fear]: Al-Monitor, congressional consultation has its Syria is not like Iraq. The difference between upsides and its downsides. I respect America’s the situation in Iraq and that in Syria is that democratic process, but in the Middle East, the the case in Iraq was an external invasion. In step back was taken as a major sign of weak- Syria, the populace of unarmed civilians is ness. In fact the Syrian media was referring to screaming for outside help. As a result, in Syria the decision as a “historic American retreat.” the degree of receptivity for the United States We should not brush this aside lightly; the will be different than it was in Iraq. I am no decision has very grave implications. Some of Ahmad Chalabi, and I am not pretending that Assad’s supporters were ready to jump ship the Americans will be received with roses. This because America was going to strike. Now they is one reason why most Syrians don’t want see this American weakness and there is really

154 | INTERVIEW SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL JOUEJATI no need for them to defect. And this is what shields, then you know that this announce- makes the Assad regime strong—the loyalists ment about the timing of an attack has con- who are fighting with him - the cronies, the crete consequences. barons, the generals - see a determined Hezbollah-Iranian-Russian effort on their One could argue that Assad’s defensive behalf contrasted against an America that is preparations for a U.S. strike would limit the seeking justifications to do as little as possible. Syrian government’s offensive ability to launch Given that situation, they are not going to more devastating attacks on civilian targets. jump ship. Please comment on the tradeoffs you believe Assad is making between defensive President Obama, speaking from the Rose preparations and offensive attacks against Garden on August 31, said that a military civilians within Syria. strike didn’t have to happen immediately. It could happen two weeks to one month after Jouejati: What we’ve seen from Saturday, the chemical weapons attack. Given that, he August 31, until today [September 3, 2013], is wanted to seek Congressional approval and both the hunkering down of the regime and have a rigorous debate in the United States simultaneously the continued attacks. On about what a military strike would mean for September 2, there were at least 29 sorties over U.S. policy in the Middle East. Do you the Damascus suburbs. And the town of disagree with his sense of timing? , right outside Damascus, has nearly been leveled. This is happening while the Jouejati: The evidence is not in what I regime is also hunkering down [and preparing think, it is in what happens. I speak to Syrians defensively for the attacks]. It is a large army on the ground every day. There are certain that Assad has so he can employ some of his neighborhoods in Damascus where tanks are forces to kill, and others to hunker down. going into private garages, the mukhabarat, the intelligence services, are identifying apart- We regularly hear about the tragedies of ments and houses that are empty and are relo- the past two and a half years in Syria, but do cating senior officers there. All this gives time you see any “bright spots” or positive news we for Assad to strengthen his defenses. And in should note? addition to strengthening his defenses, he is continuing on his killing spree in the hope that by the time of a military strike, he would Jouejati: It is very, very difficult to talk have [taken full control] of the Damascus sub- about anything that is bright in the last two urbs. So when one is in Washington, one finds and a half years. There is one very important the words about the timing of a strike in a day, element that I think has been missed by the in a week, in a month, in a year to be very Western media, and that is that Syrians have reasonable and rational. But, when you are in shed their fear. That is remarkable. I have lived Syria, and you see the redeployment of Assad’s in Syria for a long time, and I know the degree army, and the fact that prisoners are moved to of fear that the people have of the Assad targets that are likely to be hit as human regime. A fear that is not one or two or three

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 155 JOUEJATI years old but goes back to the early 1960s, Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Circassians, and with the takeover of the Ba’ath party in Syria. so on. We come from all political persuasions You have nearly half a century of accumulated on the ground, from the far left to the far right. fear by the citizenry and now they have shed TDA drew on all of us for a period of 6-7 it, now they are coming out, even at the price months to explore different issue areas: of their lives. There are a lot of very tragic sto- Transitional Justice, Security Sector Reform, ries throughout the two and a half years and, Economic Reform, Constitutional Reform, although there is increasing sectarianism, and Electoral Law Reform and the Rule of Law. The increasing militarization and so on, simultane- objective of these meetings was to come up ously, you have a lot of areas where there is an with a vision for a future Syria. And all these increased political awareness across sects that different people, from different walks of life, Syria will never go back again to dictatorship. from different political forces, agreed on the And we are seeing this, in those areas that are establishment of a civil and democratic state “liberated” and that are controlled by the in Syria in which the rule of law rules without extremists – Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al- discrimination over all of its citizenry. All of Sham and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria’s citizens would be equal before the law. Levant – where the citizenry there, as a result Under the TDA project, I personally of their freedom from the Assad regime, are focused on security sector reform. This group demonstrating against the strict rules of these pressed the need to have a civilian authority religious extremists. So there is an increased over the military. We need a military that is political consciousness. But other than that, I apolitical and whose function is the protection really do not see any bright spots whatsoever. of Syria’s territorial integrity and national sov- All I see is death and destruction. ereignty. The same is true of the police force. With regard to the intelligence services, we Looking toward the future and to an advocate their elimination as they are now. In eventual political transition, what do you the future, we suggest the establishment of think will happen to the Syrian military and new intelligence services that are apolitical, its intelligence apparatus after the conflict that answer to civilian authority and are over- ends? Specifically, please comment on how the seen by Parliament, together with the military future of the security sector will be affected and the police. The intelligence services that differently, depending on how the transition we would recommend for the future are mili- happens (i.e. with or without international tary intelligence for external threat assessment assistance). and an internal intelligence service to fight drug trafficking, white-collar crime, corruption, Jouejati: This leads me right into The Day etc. After Project (TDA) and I will distinguish Now, with regard to de-Ba’athification, we between the theoretical, the rosy, the practical, have tried to take several lessons from other and what may happen. TDA consists of 45 countries like Libya, Iraq, and others. From Syrian intellectuals who come from all walks Iraq we have taken a major lesson that we of economic life and represent all religious should not and will not “de-Ba’athify,” because and ethnic sects in Syria, including Kurds, when you “de-Ba’athify,” you paralyze state

156 | INTERVIEW SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL JOUEJATI institutions. That is because there are many Assad. So already there is a problem; the spon- Ba’athis--some of them are genuine in their sors don’t agree. You also have to get the two ideological purity, but others are opportunists conflicting parties to the table, and Assad is of and just need to get a better job. Regardless, if the view that he could crush this militarily, so you de-Ba’athify, you are going to paralyze the he is in no mood to negotiate with anyone and state. So there will be no de-Ba’athification. he is in no mood to share power with anyone. There will be intelligence services that are apo- If he does go to a potential Geneva conference, litical. A national police force committed to it is only to save the face of his Russian men- enforcement of the law. A law that is stipulated tors. But he will not negotiate in good faith. by Parliament, and an army that is also apo- The only way to have him negotiate in good litical and under civilian rule, and whose bud- faith is to level the playing field, that is, to get comes from Parliament. equalize the balance of power. This is theoretical; in reality, it’s not going to be that easy and that is because you are In the absence of a resolution, extreme going to have factionalism within the army. Islamic groups are taking over large swaths of You are going to have some factions that are territory, particularly in the areas that are going to want to be superior to other ones. held by the opposition. And they will certainly The idea of civilian authority over the military be spoilers in whatever develops next. How are so far is working with the Supreme Military the Assad regime and the opposition – the Council. But at the end of the day, if the mili- Etliaf- addressing the challenges posed by tary takes over power as a result of the Assad Islamic extremists’ influence? Can you tell us regimes collapse, it may well be that the mili- where these extremist groups are particularly tary would want to protect their interests and popular and where they are less popular? to dominate society. If Assad is overthrown with international assistance, I think there Jouejati: This may surprise you but the would be some oversight over this military, Assad regime has not carried out many battles which is a good thing. But the bad thing is, against the extremists thus far. The areas and we see it already today, that different states bombed by the regime are [mostly] under the are pushing their different agendas onto differ- control of the moderates. And that is because ent factions. And they are financing these dif- Assad has every interest in portraying this fight ferent factions, which exacerbates the divisions to the West as a battle against extremist terror- already existing in the opposition. ism and a battle between secularism and fun- Finally, what if Assad is ousted through a damentalism instead of a popular uprising negotiated outcome? The Geneva initiative against him. Let us not forget that al-Nusra is sounds very nice, but at the end of the day, it the product, first and foremost, of jihadis who is initiated by two sponsors who do not see were arrested by Syrian authorities during the eye-to-eye. The United States is of the under- war on Iraq. The Syrian government released standing that the outcome would be the estab- them under the guise of “presidential pardons” lishment of a transitional government with full specifically to justify that their fight was against executive authority, which means without terrorists. And later they were joined by jihadis Assad. The Russians understand it to be with that came from Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon,

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 157 JOUEJATI and then from Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and commits abuses and violations against human Chechnya. The extremists are getting stronger rights. The SMC distances itself from the activ- all the time. They were getting stronger in the ities of the extremists. However, these extrem- first six to seven months when this was an ists are militarily more powerful. The SMC unarmed protest against Assad. The interna- doesn’t necessarily want to pick a fight with tional community did not lift a finger to them directly, although many battles have defend the civilian population that was already already taken place. under brutal attack by the Assad regime. That vacuum was filled by these extremists People say that the extremists fighting in who became increasingly stronger, especially Syria are very well funded. However, the since the international community would not international community has provided help what was, or what became, the Free Syrian hundreds of millions of dollars through the Army, which consists of defectors from the secular opposition for life saving humanitarian Syrian army plus civilians that want to protect assistance and capacity building efforts for their families and homes. good governance. What are the relative Today, about 60-70% of Syrian territory is impacts of these funding flows on the capacity controlled by the opposition, but Assad con- and effectiveness of the recipients? trols around 70% of the population. Assad controls the major cities, whereas the opposi- Jouejati: The extremists receive money tion controls the provinces. I can tell you that from Sheikh A, Sheikh B, and Sheikh C, and I am hearing from inside that there is not a lot other wealthy individuals in Qatar and Saudi of happiness with these extremists because Arabia. The moderate opposition, however, is they are altering the way of life of Syrians who, receiving money for refugee relief. The United in their nature, are not extremists. Islam in States thus far has spent almost a billion dol- Syria is neither Salafi nor Wahabi. It is more lars for emergency relief. To the best of my like Turkish Islam, a moderate form of Islam, knowledge, extremely little has been allocated so there have been many demonstrations to military requirements, though cell phones, against the extremists. But at the same time, night vision equipment, and communications these extremists are disciplined, they are incor- equipment were also provided. Recently, the ruptible, and they are very good at providing Obama administration announced it was services: bread, water, health care, and so on. going to provide more than non-lethal assis- So the population tolerates them, uneasily tance. But Congress jumped in. Here we are though. now with the Free Syrian Army having received The Assad regime will not go to war very, very little, if anything, from the United against them, because it wants to show that States other than non-lethal assistance. Other this is a fight against terrorism. The Etilaf, and assistance has been provided from Saudi within it the SMC, has distanced itself from Arabia, Qatar, and from Turkey. But again, extremism and has condemned many of their these countries are helping those factions that acts. This goes back to the TDA in Transitional best suit their national agendas. However, Justice and the Rule of Law. We are in favor of Saudi Arabia recently took over the dominant prosecuting in a court of law anybody who role in assisting the Free Syrian Army.

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There is talk of creating a fund in which resentment with the secularists, like myself, all donors would channel their money to be within the opposition. In both Egypt and distributed by the SMC. If that happens, that Syria, secularists are very disorganized, because would be very good news because the money authoritarian governments long discriminated going to humanitarian relief is not supporting against secular, pro-democracy political par- the fight, whereas the jihadis are getting large ties. However, the Muslim Brotherhood is a amounts of money that they do not need to political party that dates back to the 1930s. account for. It’s just a question of channeling Although illegal and operating underground the funds effectively and where and how these since the 1960s, it is very disciplined, orga- funds are distributed. Right now, it’s mostly to nized, structured, and hierarchical. The secu- relief efforts and the SMC is getting very, very larists faced a very formidable opponent in the little. The newest president of the coalition, Muslim Brotherhood. Mr. Ahmed Jarba, has taken the task upon Secondly, bear in mind that Syrians have himself to try to acquire as much funding for been deprived of the art of politics for the past the SMC as possible. These funds would go 50 years. Now, they have been parachuted into toward the creation of a national army, whose a situation where they have to organize politi- tasks would be to bring down the Assad cally in order to save a country, which is no regime, but also to integrate some of the loose easy feat. Additionally, Syrian opposition lead- elements out there, and to defeat the extrem- ers are scattered all over the world--some ists. inside Syria, many in jails; other are outside Syria living in exile. So, organization is lacking. One of the biggest frustrations that the In addition to this, the opposition has international community has had with the been courted by many different states, each Etilaf, the Syrian Opposition Coalition, is that with its own interests and agenda. Turkey and it has been so divided. What are the driving Qatar support the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi forces behind those divisions and what possible Arabia, the U.A.E and Jordan are opposed to strategies can the Etilaf adopt to overcome them. As a result, funds are channeled to dif- them? ferent factions, which has exacerbated the divi- sions within an already-divided opposition. Jouejati: Originally, the Syrian National Enter the United States, who says to the Syrian Council (SNC), the opposition group estab- National Council, “you need to expand to lished before the current Coalition, was domi- include more political forces on the ground,” nated by the Muslim Brotherhood. We have a which it does. Now we have the Coalition, but dynamic here that is very similar to Egypt; the I think it is facing the same problems as the revolution against Mubarak was a young and former SNC, which is now embedded in the secular revolution, but the Muslim Coalition. In the Coalition, there is a lack of Brotherhood quickly jumped on its back and hierarchy, a lack of structure, a lack of disci- hijacked it. It’s really the same thing in Syria: pline, a lack of organization, a lack of know- it was a young and secular revolution and the how, and a lack of professionalism. Add onto Muslim Brotherhood jumped on the back of this the personal [ego] factor--the aggrandize- the SNC to dominate it. That created a lot of ment of this person or that person at the

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 159 JOUEJATI expense of this person or that person—and institutions and for people to understand their you start to see the formation of factions. As a tasks and their chain of command and to be result of this infighting and of the opposition’s disciplined enough to perform their functions. inability to get into Syria to act on the ground, Right now, there is a lot of overlap and a lot of the Syrian body politic is less enthusiastic wasted energy. If I had any advice for him, I about the opposition today than it was at the would say, “do not just lobby the Saudis, start. Americans and the French for support. Go to In addition, there are divisions between Syria’s liberated areas and build a solid, sus- opposition activists living inside Syria and tainable institution. Try not to depend on any those outside the country. It is a very artificial foreigners – you can do it yourself. If there is division, because many who are outside Syria outside assistance, that would be complemen- were very recently inside the country. This tary, but at the end of the day, you need to coalition is manned by representatives of local work in an institutional fashion to be effec- forces on the ground, like the Local tive.” Coordination Committees, the revolutionary committees, and the SMC, so they are repre- Surveys on the ground in Syria have sented in the Coalition. When the Coalition revealed Syrians’ impressions of the Etilaf. takes a position, it is as a result of a consensus Over time, their perceptions have become more of those representatives who are represented and more pessimistic. One of the frustrations on the ground. So, while I agree that the that Syrians note is that the Etilaf acts more Coalition is weak and divided, I would not go like a foreign ministry focused on external to the extent that the Western media has been affairs than it resembles a national, political portraying it. The opposition can, and should, opposition with an internal focus. Can you do a much better job though. react to that sentiment?

If you were to give Ahmed Jarba, the Jouejati: I don’t blame them because they current head of the Etilaf, one piece of advice are sitting inside Syria, experiencing a whole in overcoming some of these challenges that lot of violence, and when they turn on their you explained, what would that be? TV, they see a delegation of the Etilaf going to Paris, Istanbul, Washington or London. They Jouejati: A very short time ago I was with see the Etilaf more like a travel agency than a him and we spent a few days together during Foreign Ministry. I don’t blame them. Syrians the first meeting between the Coalition and need to see concrete results on the ground. But the United Nations Security Council, so I got what they don’t understand is, to have con- to know him. I was impressed by the fact that crete things on the ground, you do need to he was far more comfortable with Saudis, build institutions, and this is no small task. Qataris, and other Arabs than he was with Within the TDA, I am working hard as its Westerners, though one needs a balance. I was chairman. So people on the inside say, what very impressed with the fact that he is a good are you doing? You are going from one 5-star listener, he takes advice, and he understands hotel to another, because they haven’t yet his limits. But it is very difficult to build grasped the fruits of the labor. And I think this

160 | INTERVIEW SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL JOUEJATI is a normal phenomenon. Take any adminis- Tell me how you think this all ends. tration that comes to power, see the public opinion ratings with regards to how they view Jouejati: It all depends on what the President or the administration, and take Washington does right now. Washington is the the same survey three years later and you will key. It is really the key. If it provides the neces- find, almost inevitably, a drop. And this is not sary assistance to the moderate opposition and only in the United States; it is true across the if it engages seriously against the Assad regime, world. And it is again the same thing with the then the moderates within the opposition are Coalition, there is excitement at first, and then, in a position to come out of this with a Syria as time goes by, when they still don’t see much that is hopefully united. If, however, the on the ground, then their enthusiasm drops. United States simply does limited actions in So I don’t blame them that they are saying this order to show the international community in Syria. First, the coalition has not delivered that it has done something, then I think the satisfactorily, I admit that readily. But two, they extremists will be in a dominant position in do not know how much work is going into certain areas of Syria. I don’t think the Kurds this. would want to break away from Syria, but the already-existing fragmentation would certainly Do you think the Etilaf should build increase. I think the Alawis would want a cor- offices inside Syria? ner of their own. We are talking about the frag- mentation of Syria, and I think sectarianism Jouejati: The Etilaf should have a presence would increase. So everything, or most things, in Syria. The advantage is that you are together is a function of what Washington does, not in with the people and you show them that you six months or in a year, but right now. can have an alternative government to Assad. If Assad collapses, the sky is not going to fall What do you think the news headlines over the heads of Syrians. Show them that about Syria will be in early 2014? there is an alternative. On the negative side, this would be a great target for Assad’s forces. Jouejati: If things are as they are now, the If there was a government headquarters in any headlines will be about the deepened fissures one of the towns that have been liberated, in Syria and the consequences of deeper frag- before too long it’s going to be targeted by mentation. These divisions are spilling over SCUD missiles. But I do believe firmly in the into the rest of the region. Readers of these need for the Etilaf to have a presence on the headlines might say to himself, “if only we had ground and I can tell you that the Etilaf is now done something at the very beginning, we working on forming such a government. Its would have had a totally different picture headquarters may or may not be inside Syria now.“ PRISM but it will have people on the ground provid- ing basic services

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 161 An Interview with Osama Kadi

Tell us about your role within the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC).

Kadi: I am not a Coalition member, but I was nominated to head the Friends of Syria (FoS) platform addressing Economic Recovery and Development. I also lead the Syrian economic del- egation in all conferences and meetings with the FoS. I am the president of Syrian Economic (SETF), which is in charge of publishing the Economic Roadmap for a New Syria.1 In addition, I am the head of the Economic Section at the Syrian Expert House that published the Syria Transition Roadmap. This is an initiative of the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies (SCPSS), a think- affiliated with the Syrian opposition.

What is the greatest challenge facing the Syrian economy? Most immediately and in the longer term?

Kadi: Security comes first, and then the challenge of reconstruction and the return of refugees. After close to three years of revolution, it is vital to transition from a militarized society to a civil one. That will take funding, effort, and political will from an incoming technocrat-led transitional government.

What will be the economic policies of the SOC to address Syria’s economic challenges after the conflict?

Kadi: My main recommended economic policies for consideration by a post-conflict transi- tional government are the following: ■■ Continue paying employee wages in the public sector. ■■ Secure temporary housing for refugees until they can return to their homes. ■■ Provide the basic services of food, clothing, and medical care for all refugees. ■■ Secure protection for basic humanitarian needs and public utilities.

Dr. Osama Kadi is Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs in the Syrian Interim Government and CEO of Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU). This interview was conducted by email on September 10, 2013

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■■ Prepare for the restructuring of the pub- ■■ Work on raising the competence of the lic sector and the state’s administrative struc- Syrian labor force in various fields. ture. ■■ Work on acquiring frozen Syrian assets What do you believe are Syria’s greatest and funds from abroad. assets? ■■ Freeze and confiscate the Ba’ath Party’s movable and immovable assets. Kadi: Syria’s greatest assets include: ■■ Establish a committee to study the con- ■■ Human resources, including local and tracts made by the Assad regime with states Syrian expatriates; and international organizations. ■■ Syria’s geostrategic location, including ■■ Issue a decision to terminate all the con- its Mediterranean port at ; tracts made by the regime between March ■■ It’s pre-existing industrial capital; 2011 and the date on which the transitional ■■ Syrian investors, particularly from government is formed. abroad; and ■■ Start a Syrian support and reconstruc- ■■ It’s natural resources, such as rich farm- tion fund. land in the west and natural gas in the east. ■■ Enact a law to return all nationalized assets to their rightful owners. What has happened to them during the ■■ Change the current Syrian currency to war? seek stability (which may be impossible to achieve in the short term). Kadi: Syria’s human capital has been dec- ■■ Make an effort to lift the economic sanc- imated during the war. The atrocities of the tions against Syria. Assad regime diverted or destroyed most pro- ■■ Face an anticipated global inflation. fessional, trained human resources. For exam- ■■ Create an atmosphere to generate capital ple, most agricultural workers are now investment in Syria in a gradual and deliber- involved in the revolution, so they are either ate manner. fighters, captured and jailed, or dead. ■■ Protect the currency from collapse using The crisis also alienated a high percentage approaches such as continuing to pay pub- of industrialists, traders, and businessmen. lic-sector wages and securing the basic needs Because of the weakening centralized manage- of the citizenry. The role of the government ment of the country, we also lost control over should be to control the size of the collapse oil wells and other natural resources. by adjusting the currency cycle and carefully monitoring the release of hard currency into How can they be restored? the Syrian market before the Central Bank starts a forced corrective policy. Kadi: Syria needs a strong, technocratic ■■ Promote and activate economic relation- transitional government to uplift the country ships with neighboring countries and the and to recover its security by restructuring sta- rest of the world, especially Syria’s friends, bility and armed forces to form a new National in order to generate investments. Syrian Military. On the economic side, Syria needs to rebuild its infrastructure. It was

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 163 KADI considered weak before the revolution, and the The process of removing subsidies will massive level of destruction means exceptional provide substantial savings, which will in turn efforts must be quickly mobilized to enable help in rebuilding priority services and proj- displaced persons and refugees to live nor- ects. Furthermore, lifting subsidies and liberat- mally. Rebuilding trust in the Syrian economy ing the market from the state’s daily control should be on the top of the agenda of the tran- can be the key step on the path to transform- sitional government in cooperation with the ing Syria into a free economic system. The Syrian business community. citizens will be more independent if other measures of reform are taken, such as remov- One of Syria’s greatest problems before the ing certain tax breaks and voiding customs uprising was its unsustainable subsidies tariffs. Though critical, the subsidy removal program. How do you plan to address this process should be analyzed carefully before issue? being gradually implemented.

Kadi: We discussed this issue in the eco- How are Syrians earning a livelihood and nomic section of Syria Transition Roadmap. making money today? The government should deal with such a deli- cate issue by carefully taking into consider- Kadi: The public sector employs almost ation the world’s best practices to serve the one third of the Syrian labor force, and the Syrian people and to uplift the Syrian econ- regime is still paying salaries to most of them. omy. It should be dealt with as part of a com- Syrian remittances and support from relief plete economic package. organizations help Syrians survive during the The transformation of Syria’s economy to crisis. Syrian economic activity has declined to a free market economy will need to be a grad- less than one-third of its pre-war capacity. ual process because of the conflict’s severe Some Syrians are working in very basic ser- effects on the economy—the dramatic increase vices, such as running food stands, to make a in poverty, the complete halt of production, a living after having lost their jobs. double-digit unemployment rate, and the col- Unemployment has reached more than 70 per- lapse of the Syrian lira. This step is closely cent in Syria, many have lost their savings, and related to price liberalization, even though it many factories of Syrian industrialists have has its own policy. The state can abandon its been robbed, looted, and/or destroyed. policy of paying a percentage of the value of certain goods or services that are usually con- What new black markets have emerged? sidered a necessity for citizens, such as food- And how will SOC prevent corruption in the stuffs including flour, bread, sugar, and rice, in post-war environment? addition to fuel, electricity, water, and others. Eliminating subsidies on goods and services Kadi: We have to distinguish between two can be harmful to individuals, but it is in fact areas in Syria one: The semi-liberated areas a step that must be taken to build a strong (north and north eastern Syria, which counts economy. more than half the country’s land area), and

164 | INTERVIEW SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL KADI two: areas which are completely under regime Syrian expectations of any coming transitional control. government, because rebuilding trust in the In liberated areas there is no central Syrian economy and its currency after the administration. It is a stateless area, and there abnormal destruction of this prolonged crisis is a very open market with no control by any might take 5-10 years. government of any kind. However, in the other areas controlled by the Syrian government, What other country or countries provide there is a black market emerging because of economic models that we can use to the pressure of controlling the Syrian currency. understand Syria’s current economic situation? The Syrian Central Bank is keeping the Syrian What country or countries provide a model for Pound under its market price by jailing most Syria after its conflict subsides? workers in unauthorized currency exchanges. People will naturally look for a black market Kadi: Each country is unique. The ability in this field that can meet their demands for of Syrians to overcome the crisis and rebuild foreign currency that the government’s banks its economy is different than countries to cannot meet. which it is often compared, like Libya or Yugoslavia. It is neither Iraq nor Afghanistan, What can be done to reverse capital flight, nor any African countries that have undergone prevent potential , and protect internal conflicts. the Syrian currency? I am more optimistic. I believe Syrians will surprise the world if they are able to come Kadi: The Syrian Economic Task Force up with a technocratic transitional government published a detailed report about fiscal and that works day and night with full transpar- monetary policies in post-conflict Syria. It out- ency to uplift its economy within less than a lines an emergency plan for the first six decade. The Syrian economy will benefit from months, a mid-term plan, and long-term plan. studying successful economic development Most importantly, the transitional government cases, such as UAE, Turkey, and . should take important measures in its fiscal and monetary policies. For example, it should Syria will have a significant debt once the continue to pay public-sector wages and secure conflict subsides, and will likely need the basic needs of the citizenry. The role of the international assistance. Given that, what do government here should be to control the size you think of the turmoil in Egypt over of the collapse by adjusting the currency cycle accepting a loan from the IMF? and carefully managing the pumping of the hard currency into the Syrian market. Then, Kadi: We tried to avoid any borrowing in the Central Bank can start on a corrective pol- the SETF plans for economic reconstruction by icy. empowering the local and international pri- It is important that Syrians should under- vate sectors, and by receiving grants and assis- stand that getting the Syrian currency back to tance from allies. I expect that Syria might its normal price - as before March 2011 - will need financial support from the Friends of be very difficult. So any effort should manage

SYRIA SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEW | 165 KADI

Syria, because our foreign reserves have been Notes depleted by the Assad regime.

1 See here for the printed article: www. Please describe the regional economic syrianeconomic.org impact of the Syrian crisis.

Kadi: The spillover of the Syrian crisis has reached all neighboring countries including Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon. Millions of refugees went to these countries looking for safe havens for their families. That migration impacted their economies by increasing real estate prices and the cost of health care. It puts their economies at great risk, especially with the Syrian regime threat- ening instability through violence, such as the bombings in Tripoli, Lebanon and Reyhanli, Turkey.

What role do you foresee for the international community in post-conflict reconstruction in Syria?

Kadi: I believe that the coming transi- tional government will give priority to the real “friends” of Syria. It will favor Arab and inter- national companies that belong to those coun- tries and provide them with a good governance business climate. The business community will be welcomed in Syria, particularly to avoid borrowing to rebuild and reconstruct Syria. PRISM

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