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Islamist Reactions to the Biden Presidency in the Middle East

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Islamist Reactions to the Biden Presidency in the Middle East ISSUE BRIEF 04.13.21 Islamist Reactions to the Biden Presidency in the Middle East A.Kadir Yildirim, Ph.D., Fellow for the Middle East For Islamists, the Trump administration ISLAMIST GROUPS’ MESSAGING embodied the worst of American policy toward Islam, Muslims, and Muslim- ON BIDEN majority countries. The Muslim ban, The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been express support for Israeli policies in among the most enthusiastic about the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Biden administration. Ibrahim Munir, the embrace of Islamophobic discourse leave deputy supreme guide of the Brotherhood, little doubt that Muslims in general and welcomed the change in U.S. leadership Islamists in particular were discontented and called on the United States to “return with the Trump presidency. to the values of democracy and respect the How have Islamists—as the relentless will of nations.”1 self-proclaimed defenders of Islam and The Brotherhood’s interest in Biden is Muslims—reacted to the Biden presidency? firmly rooted in the group’s desire to see a Do Islamists’ ideological leanings dictate change in the Egyptian political landscape. their response to Biden in the form of a In particular, the Brotherhood hopes for warm welcome, or do their tangible and This is familiar terrain the Biden administration to gain greater for the Brotherhood. political interests shape their reactions? awareness of the ongoing repressive Statements by Islamist organizations or environment in Egypt and to pressure The group has always their leadership reveal that Islamists around Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to claimed to speak on the Middle East filter Biden’s electoral victory change his policy toward the Brotherhood behalf of the people through their organizational self-interests. and release Brotherhood prisoners. Munir, and represent their This type of response fits the mold of for example, stated that “it is time that the Islamists. Despite efforts to collectivize and new American administration review their will. The Brotherhood’s homogenize them (which makes it easier to policies toward supporting and backing opposition to secular understand them), Islamists are variegated. dictatorships, and the actions that these and, typically, While religion forms the backbone of their tyrannical regimes commit around the authoritarian political identity, it is far from being the world including crimes and violations lone pillar of their identities. They form their against the rights of the people.” governments is political ideology in response to ongoing This is familiar terrain for the grounded in the socio-political and religious conditions. Brotherhood. The group has always conviction that the Hence, even when religion constitutes claimed to speak on behalf of the people a central element of Islamist identity, it group stands for the and represent their will. The Brotherhood’s people’s will. shows variation in how Islam lives in opposition to secular and, typically, the imagination of the Islamist actors authoritarian governments is grounded in throughout the region. the conviction that the group stands for the people’s will. In a fashion similar to the RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 04.13.21 rhetoric used during the pre-Arab Spring attendees with their heads bowed when period, the Brotherhood uses “the people hearing the priest’s sermon with much and their free will” as the yardstick to respect and humility.”8 evaluate U.S. policy toward Egypt, where One of the Islamist groups who was establishing a strong relationship with “the most hurt by the Trump administration and ruling institutions of despotism” amounts its policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian to being “on the wrong side of history.”2 conflict was the Palestinian Hamas. The That the Brotherhood faced terrorist group viewed the Trump administration’s designation or bans in some Arab and actions toward Israel and Palestine, such European countries3 and that similar efforts as recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, took place in the U.S. Congress in recent moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to years4 deeply concerned the Brotherhood Jerusalem, and negotiating the “deal of the leadership. In this sense, avoiding a similar century,” as fundamental threats to the fate in the United States constitutes the Palestinian cause. Hamas’ public statement Brotherhood’s most important expectation on Biden’s inauguration expressed a call from the Biden administration.5 In fact, for Biden “to rectify the historic trajectory some supporters of the current Egyptian of U.S. policy biased against our Palestinian government falsely claim that U.S. people, bring security and stability to the President Biden supports the Brotherhood region, and end all decisions aimed at and will facilitate its resurgence in Egypt.6 liquidating the Palestinian cause.”9 Senior In Yemen, Ansar Allah, more commonly Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh criticized known as the Houthis, welcomed the Biden the Trump administration policy toward presidency. The war with Saudi Arabia Palestinians and claimed that while Trump constitutes the principal lens through which “sought to obliterate Palestine’s cause,” the Houthis assess U.S. policy toward Yemen. Jerusalem and Palestinians “will not go.”10 The former president of the Revolutionary In Lebanon, Hezbollah is more focused Council, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, on Trump’s election loss than what a Biden recognized the Democratic policy “to stop administration might promise. Hezbollah the aggression on Yemen” as vital to the was hurt by the maximum pressure group’s interests and expressed pleasure at campaign of the Trump administration Biden’s electoral victory. The group views toward Iran and its regional allies. American Democrats’ “friendship” with the Houthis sanctions against Gebran Bassil—the son- and the “deep” bond between the two in-law of the Lebanese president and a as keys to ending the Saudi-led military powerful Maronite politician—on charges campaign against the Houthis in Yemen.7 of ties to Hezbollah, drew Hezbollah’s ire. One Islamist group underscored Describing the Trump administration as Biden’s commitment to his Christian being “among the worst” administrations faith as the chief reason for welcoming in U.S. history, Hezbollah leader Hassan his administration. Given its status as a Nasrallah cautioned against Biden. With primarily religious organization—composed Israel as his main focus, Nasrallah of ulama (or Islamic scholars)—that lends expects no shift in American policy, support to an Islamist vision of society and which he characterized as pro-Israel.11 state, the International Union of Muslim The pro-Hezbollah Lebanese newspaper Scholars chose to focus on religion rather Al-Akhbar made a similar point by stating than politics to extend its support for that President Biden “appears bent on Biden. The Union’s secretary-general, Ali building on the legacy of his predecessor’s al-Qaradaghi, praised Biden’s “religious aggressive policies.”12 trait” and set him as an example to leaders Tunisia’s Ennahda is an Islamist of Muslim-majority countries: “In America, group that expressed early recognition President Biden begins his presidential of and unequivocal support for the Biden term with a church mass and swears on administration. Ennahda leader Rachid the Bible. The ceremony is interspersed Ghannouchi highlighted the significance of with priestly words and prayers. I saw the Biden’s victory for democracy worldwide 2 ISLAMIST REACTIONS TO THE BIDEN PRESIDENCY IN THE MIDDLE EAST by stating, “The success of the Democrats loss rather than Biden’s victory. Iran’s is a positive message for democracy in Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, called the world.”13 For Tunisia, in particular, the the presidential elections a “spectacle” country’s young democracy still needs and evidence of “the ugly face of liberal support for consolidation. For Ghannouchi, democracy” in the United States. Khamenei continued U.S. support as “a state policy, framed the election as a clear indication not a partisan policy” would be better for of “the definite political, civil, and moral Tunisia and the region.14 decline” of the American political system.18 In a break with most other Islamist Iranian President Hassan Rouhani groups, Turkey’s Justice and Development criticized Trump’s policy toward Iran by Party (AKP) was notably displeased with stating, “The U.S. presidential election the Biden victory. Turkish President and results show that a country constantly the leader of the ruling AKP, Recep Tayyip wielding threats, sanctions, and sticks and Erdogan, developed a strong personal taking a bullying tone with other nations relationship with former U.S. President must be pursuing a misled foreign policy.” In a break with most Trump. This personal relationship between In light of this, Rouhani encouraged the other Islamist groups, the two leaders, transactional in nature, Biden administration to heed the “message” allowed Erdogan to promote Turkish of the election and “translate this Turkey’s Justice and foreign policy objectives around the determination for change into their foreign Development Party region without strong opposition from policies and their ties with other countries (AKP) was notably the United States, including in Iraq, Libya, and states.”19 Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad displeased with the and the Eastern Mediterranean.15 The Zarif tweeted on November 8, 2020 that change in American leadership implies “Trump’s gone in 70 days” and cautioned Biden victory. Turkish greater checks on Erdogan’s ability to regional countries against “betting on President and the conduct foreign policy as he sees fit. outsiders to provide security.”20 leader of the ruling AKP, Likewise, the Biden administration signals Recep Tayyip Erdogan, greater emphasis on human rights and developed a strong democracy in its foreign policymaking; as IMPLICATIONS the state of Turkish democracy continues personal relationship to deteriorate, the state of human rights The variation in Islamist actors’ responses with former U.S. to the Biden presidency reflects their will become an increasingly important President Trump.
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