Égypte/Monde arabe

13 | 2015 Nouvelles luttes autour du genre en Egypte depuis 2011 New gender-related Struggles in since 2011

Leslie Piquemal (dir.)

Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ema/3492 DOI : 10.4000/ema.3492 ISSN : 2090-7273

Éditeur CEDEJ - Centre d’études et de documentation économiques juridiques et sociales

Édition imprimée Date de publication : 10 novembre 2015 ISBN : 9782905838865 ISSN : 1110-5097

Référence électronique Leslie Piquemal (dir.), Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015, « Nouvelles luttes autour du genre en Egypte depuis 2011 » [En ligne], mis en ligne le 10 novembre 2017, consulté le 24 septembre 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ema/3492 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ema.3492

Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 24 septembre 2020.

© Tous droits réservés 1

Depuis le soulèvement de 2011 en Égypte, les problématiques de genre ont émergé sous différentes formes dans le cadre des mouvements protestataires – révolutionnaires, réactionnaires – et plus largement, dans celui des transformations sociales se produisant autour et entre ces vagues de mobilisation. Alors que les relations entre citoyens et autorités étatiques ont été contestées, modifiées, puis repoussées dans une direction réactionnaire, comment les relations de genre ont-elles été contestées depuis 2011 ? Quels nouveaux imaginaires, quels nouveaux rôles et identités ont été revendiqués ? Quelles mobilisations se sont construites face à l’essor saisissant des violences sexistes dans l’espace public ? Quatre ans après le début de la période révolutionnaire, ce numéro d’Égypte/Monde arabe explore les nouvelles luttes liées au genre en Égypte au prisme de la sociologie, l’anthropologie et la science politique. Chercheuses, expertes et/ou activistes proposent ici un éventail de regards scientifiques et analytiques, et de témoignages militants sur ces combats et mutations, sur l’expérience gagnée et le terrain perdu, à partir d’enquêtes de terrain approfondies sur ces objets de recherche sensibles et parfois éphémères. Since the 2011 uprising in Egypt, gender issues have emerged in various forms within revolutionary or reactionary protest movements and more broadly, in the framework of the social transformations occurring in and around these waves of mobilization. As relationships between citizens and State authorities have been challenged, altered then pushed back in a reactionary direction, how have gender relationships been contested since 2011? What new imaginations of gender, which new roles and identities have been claimed? What mobilizations have developed to confront the shocking rise of gender-based violence in the politicized public sphere? Four years after the revolutionary period began, this issue of Égypte/Monde arabe explores new struggles related to gender in Egypt through the lenses of sociology, anthropology and political science. Scholars, experts and/or activists share with us a range of scientific and analytical perspectives, and insider accounts of these struggles and changes, of experience gained and ground lost, based on in-depth fieldwork on sensitive and sometimes transient research objects.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 2

SOMMAIRE

Introduction Leslie Piquemal

How can the domestication of women facilitate understanding of their plight in Egypt? Dalia AbdElhameed

El-Sissi’s Women? Shifting gender discourses and the limits of state feminism Hind Ahmed Zaki

Les « femmes de Sissi » ? Mutations des discours du genre et limites du féminisme d’État Hind Ahmed Zaki

Civic participation and gender institutional legacy since January 25, 2011 Marta Agosti

Ethnographie de la self-défense féminine dans le Caire révolutionnaire. Modalités de mise en récits de la violence des femmes Perrine Lachenal

Reconsidering de-politicization: HarassMap’s bystander approach and creating critical mass to combat in Egypt Angie Abdelmonem

Reconsidérer la dépolitisation : l’approche du témoin de HarassMap et la création d’une masse critique pour lutter contre le harcèlement sexuel en Égypte Angie Abdelmonem

Male voices in a social movement Sandra A. Fernandez

Perceptions and management of gender roles and dynamics inside OpAntiSH Intervention Teams in Cairo Leslie Piquemal

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 3

Introduction

Leslie Piquemal

Je remercie ici Bernard Rougier et Roman Stadnicki pour leur confiance et leurs conseils, Karine Bennafla pour son soutien et son aide en fin de parcours, ainsi que les nombreux/-ses collègues qui ont rendu possible la réalisation de ce numéro d’Égypte/Monde arabe en acceptant de faire des relectures de textes. Toute ma gratitude va également à Perrine Lachenal et Mathilde du Pradel pour leurs excellentes traductions de textes, ainsi qu’à Sandra Fernandez pour sa gracieuse contribution d’images de ses archives photographiques personnelles. Un grand merci enfin aux contributrices à ce numéro pour leurs efforts, ainsi que pour leurs patience et leur compréhension face aux contraintes des unes et des autres. I would like to convey my thanks to Bernard Rougier and Roman Stadnicki for their trust and their advice, to Karine Bennafla for her support and help at the end of the process, and to the many colleagues who made it possible to complete this issue of Égypte/Monde arabe by agreeing to review the texts. Mathilde du Pradel and Perrine Lachenal have my sincere gratitude for their excellent work translating texts, as does Sandra Fernandez for her generous contribution of images from her personal photographic archives. Finally, I would like to thank the contributors to this issue for their efforts, as well as for their patience and their understanding of the constraints faced by everyone involved.

1 Le soulèvement de janvier-février 2011, séisme dans l’histoire politique égyptienne, a ouvert la porte à un éventail de différentes évolutions des rapports de genre dans l’espace public, des regards portés sur ces derniers par différents groupes sociaux, et du cadrage des comportements genrés par rapport au politique. Ces années révolutionnaires et post-révolutionnaires, et leurs vagues successives de mobilisation/ démobilisation, ont été une période de luttes intenses autour des identités et des rapports de genre, entre le social, le culturel et le politique.

2 Avant 2011, pendant l’ère Moubarak, les limites imposées aux libertés publiques, en particulier la liberté d’association, d’expression et de rassemblement, prévenaient essentiellement toute perspective d’émergence de mobilisations de taille, à la fois féministes et indépendantes. Les droits des femmes étaient quasi-monopolisés comme enjeu social par le Conseil National des Femmes (Al-Maglis al-Qawmi li-l-Mar’a), sous l’impulsion de l’épouse du chef de l’État, Suzanne Moubarak (à côté d’une toute petite

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 4

poignée d’acteurs indépendants très isolés1). Après la participation importante des femmes aux mobilisations de janvier-février 2011 menant au renversement de Moubarak, les droits des femmes ont été menacés de différentes manières pendant les années suivantes, alors même que se multipliaient les initiatives indépendantes contre les violences sexistes et pour les droits des femmes. Depuis 2014, de nouvelles avancées juridiques ont été constatées, mais les mobilisations indépendantes sont de nouveau en danger, face aux efforts croissants des autorités pour mettre la société civile sous coupe réglée.2 3 La place Tahrir, au centre-ville du Caire, représentait l’épicentre d’une co- appropriation de l’espace public par les citoyens égyptiens, femmes et hommes début 2011, en tant qu’espace politique et espace de mobilisation sociale. Cette place a acquis un statut particulier associé à l’image des manifestants chrétiens ou musulmans et de différentes affiliations politiques s’unissant pour une même cause—et aussi celle d’hommes et de femmes affrontant ensemble l’ire du régime. Tahrir « est devenu un symbole de l’exercice d’une nouvelle forme de citoyenneté ne passant pas par l’intermédiaire de hiérarchies de genre »3 ; les citoyennes femmes pouvaient y jouer des rôles de leader dans la revendication, la mobilisation et l’occupation des lieux de manifestation, traditionnellement perçus comme masculins. Ce lieu symbolique a longtemps conservé une dimension utopique dans l’imaginaire collectif de beaucoup d’Égyptiens. D’après nombre de témoignages, les interactions entre manifestants en janvier-février 2011 s’y déroulaient effectivement sur un mode inhabituellement égalitaire, inspiré par le sentiment d’une même volonté collective citoyenne, et dans l’absence des pratiques de violence verbale et physique à caractère sexuel contre les femmes, ordinairement très fréquentes dans l’espace public du centre-ville. 4 Rétrospectivement, il semblerait que cette expérience vécue par beaucoup d’Égyptiens ait été limitée à une sorte de microcosme révolutionnaire, circonscrit dans l’espace et dans le temps. Le harcèlement et les agressions sexuelles contre des femmes continuaient comme à l’accoutumée à l’extérieur de cette zone, et elles ont d’ailleurs rapidement gagné la place Tahrir, dans différentes dynamiques politiques et sociales, après ce soulèvement initial de 18 jours. En outre, les revendications de ce moment révolutionnaire n’étaient pas articulées en termes de genre ; les droits des femmes étaient globalement absents des appels à manifester comme des slogans et banderoles ; l’absence de violence sexuelle verbale ou physique était apparemment le produit spontané des conditions régnant Place Tahrir pendant ces 18 jours, et non issue d’un effort délibéré. Cependant, la dimension visible de cette égalité lors de la mobilisation de janvier-février place Tahrir semble avoir eu un impact durable sur certains individus.4 5 Les identités et les rôles de genre, les représentations genrées des citoyens et de la citoyenneté ont été instrumentalisées de différentes manières dans les discours et stratégies politiques depuis 2011. Cela apparait déjà le 18 janvier 2011 dans l’appel à manifester par , activiste du mouvement du 6-Avril ; dans une vidéo mise en ligne sur son blog, elle a annoncé son intention d’aller manifester elle-même et a appelé ses concitoyens à la rejoindre de la manière suivante : « Montrez votre honneur et votre virilité et descendez place Tahrir le 25 janvier. Sinon, vous êtes un traître à la nation, comme la police et le Président… »5 Clairement, il ne s’agissait pas de proposer un discours féministe ou de déconstruire explicitement les paradigmes de genre dominants. Cependant, comme l’a souligné le chercheur Ahmed Kadry, en

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 5

affirmant qu’elle se rendrait seule sur la place Tahrir si personne ne la rejoignait et en donnant son numéro de téléphone personnel au grand public, Asmaa Mahfouz a effectivement défié les normes sociales dominantes régissant le comportement des femmes égyptiennes et indirectement proposé une nouvelle approche genrée à la mobilisation politique.6 6 Inversement, les autorités égyptiennes ont aussi fait appel à des représentations genrées de la citoyenneté dans un discours politique visant à décrédibiliser ou à contrer la mobilisation protestataire à diverses reprises depuis 2011. On retiendra notamment les propos d’un général à un journaliste de CNN sur la pratique des « tests de virginité » imposés par des médecins militaires à nombre de manifestantes détenues lors de la dispersion violente du sit-in de la place Tahrir le 9 mars 2011. Si ces « examens » équivalaient en fait à des agressions sexuelles servant à humilier et « briser » ces femmes, le Conseil Suprême des Forces Armées (CSFA) qui détenait le pouvoir exécutif transitionnel, a défendu cette pratique. « Ces filles détenues n’étaient pas comme ma fille ou la vôtre » a affirmé un général. « Elles passaient la nuit dans des tentes avec des manifestants hommes sur la place Tahrir (…) Nous ne voulions pas qu’elles disent que nous les avions agressées ou violées, donc nous voulions prouver qu’elles n’étaient déjà plus vierges. Et aucune d’entre elles ne l’était. »7 7 Cet exemple illustre bien la mentalité derrière l’approche employée par le CSFA et ses successeurs au sommet de l’État qui—bien plus souvent que les autorités égyptiennes d’avant 2011, si on recense les incidents et cas connus—ont fait usage de la violence sexuelle et sexiste et instrumentalisé les identités de genre, contre les hommes et les femmes tour à tour, en vue de juguler la dissidence. La chercheuse Mariz Tadros a estimé que « cet usage de la sexualité était politiquement motivé, planifié et orchestré de manière méthodique et cohérente » et a souligné les discours mettant en doute la ‘virilité’ des opposants politiques hommes et la ‘respectabilité’ (les bonnes mœurs) des opposantes femmes. Les pratiques de violence et d’humiliation sexuelles utilisées dans la sphère publique et/ou dans les lieux de détention faisaient partie d’un éventail de tactiques servant à briser les victimes en détruisant leur dignité et leur volonté de résistance physique et politique, à inspirer la peur et le sentiment d’impuissance chez d’autres, et à décourager en général la participation aux manifestations. Les agressions sexuelles collectives contre les femmes pendant les grands rassemblements place Tahrir, se multipliant à partir de 2012, tolérées et peut-être orchestrées en partie dans un premier temps,8 ont aussi servi à décrédibiliser les manifestations protestataires. En tous cas, après l’image positive des femmes participant aux mobilisations politiques de rue début 2011, c’est la représentation des espaces publics de manifestation comme des lieux dangereux qui est devenue de plus en plus visible dans les médias et l’opinion publique.9

8 Cependant, le caractère dramatique et particulièrement choquant des agressions sexuelles et viols collectifs place Tahrir entre 2012 et 2013 a fini par surmonter l’obstacle du tabou discursif sur la violence sexuelle ; les efforts des initiatives luttant contre ces agressions et des organisations de défense des droits de l’homme ont peu à peu eu raison du silence médiatique en 2013. Ce phénomène a paradoxalement eu une série d’« effets secondaires » positifs en déclenchant un éventail de nouvelles luttes liées au genre. En premier lieu, la création de plusieurs collectifs d’intervention directe contre les agressions collectives, dont deux font l’objet d’études dans ce numéro ; certains sont devenus des groupes organisés pratiquant aussi des efforts de prévention

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 6

et de sensibilisation publique à la pandémie du harcèlement sexuel « habituel », verbal et physique, des femmes dans la sphère publique égyptienne. Ces nouveaux acteurs s’ajoutant à une poignée d’ONG préexistantes, on a assisté à la naissance d’un mouvement de mobilisation sociale et sociopolitique d’ampleur, dans le cadre duquel une nouvelle conscience féministe est née chez nombre de citoyens, femmes et hommes, et qui a mené à une « révolution du paradigme de la mobilisation des femmes pour exiger leurs droits. La rue, et non pas la salle de conférence, est devenue l’espace principal de revendication. Elles ont légitimé leur revendications, non pas au nom des droits de l’homme et conventions internationales, mais au nom de leur participation à la Révolution du 25 janvier 2011 et ses objectifs de justice sociale et de liberté. »10

Inscription : « La voix des femmes c’est une révolution »

Ce poster a été créé par l’artiste de graffti El Zeft qui a participé à des initiatives contre les agressions sexuelles. El Zeft a fait don de cette image pour toute utilisation dans des manifestations, événements ou mobilisations contre le harcèlement ou les agressions sexuelles, à condition que ce soit toujours à usage non lucratif. Elle a été utilisée dans la manifestation de février 2013 place Talaat Harb, contre les agressions sexuelles collectives. L’image a été reproduite depuis à différents endroits, y compris dans des expositions en Europe. Writing: “Women’s voice is ”. This poster was created by graffti artist El Zeft who participated in anti- initiatives. He donated the design for use in any form of protest, event or mobilization against sexual harassment or sexual assault, as long as there was no proft involved. It was used on signs in the February 2013 Talaat Harb protest against mob sexual assault. The design has also been reproduced in many different places and exhibited in Europe.

9 Dans ce mouvement, on a souvent revendiqué comme figures féminines idéales Samîra Ibrâhîm, qui a osé intenter un procès au médecin militaire qui lui avait infligé un soi- disant « test de virginité » en détention11 et Hind Nâfe‘ ou Sitt al-banât, piétinée et mise à nu par des soldats dispersant un sit-in sur la place Tahrir, puis torturée en détention et qui, sur son lit d’hôpital, a refusé de saluer le maréchal Tantâwî du CSFA.12 On a ainsi assisté à une lutte pour défier les normes dominantes des identités de genre en

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 7

redéfinissant la respectabilité féminine en termes politiques, sur le modèle des activistes femmes révolutionnaires revendiquant leur droit à la participation politique dans l’espace public, et en rompant le tabou sur la discussion publique de la violence sexiste extrême contre les femmes. C’est en partie pour essayer d’endiguer la prolifération de cette violence que certaines survivantes ont pris la parole, contribuant à rompre le silence médiatique sur le sujet en témoignant à visage découvert dans des émissions télévisées en 201313 pour refuser la victimisation et la stigmatisation, et pour faire admettre aux médias et à l’opinion la réalité et l’ampleur du problème. Plus généralement, une réussite marquante du mouvement de lutte contre la violence sexiste a été l’affirmation d’un discours concurrent aux variantes nationalistes ou islamistes des discours rendant les victimes responsables de leur agression, et les stigmatisant en tant que corps dépositaires de l’honneur souillé de la nation. Dénonçant l’inaction des autorités qui les rendait au moins complices du phénomène, et appelant à la formulation d’une stratégie nationale contre toutes les formes de violence sexiste, le mouvement a peu à peu réussi à la recadrer comme une question touchant à l’intérêt général, comme problématique politique.

10 Le nouveau texte constitutionnel rédigé fin 2013 après la destitution du président Mohammad Morsi et soumis à référendum en janvier 2014, comporte un article engageant explicitement l’État égyptien à assurer l’égalité entre les sexes et la participation des femmes aux institutions gouvernementales.14 Surtout en juin 2014, après des années de lutte, une loi définissant et criminalisant le harcèlement sexuel verbal et physique en tant que tel, a enfin été promulguée. Auparavant, malgré l’omniprésence de ce problème dans l’espace public et son effet sur quasiment toutes les femmes égyptiennes,15 le droit égyptien (qui reflétait ainsi, en quelque sorte, l’attitude dominante dans la société, consistant à blâmer la victime ou trouver des excuses à l’agresseur) ne le reconnaissait pas en tant que tel. Il ne réprimait spécifiquement que la diffamation par les insultes, l’agression physique, l’atteinte à la pudeur (hatk ‘ird) et le viol (dont la définition était et reste trop étroite). En juin 2014, la circulation sur Internet d’une vidéo de femme victime d’une agression sexuelle collective place Tahrir, lors de la victoire électorale de ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sissi a catalysé la mise sur l’agenda gouvernemental de la violence sexiste extrême dans les grands rassemblements, à côté de sa version plus « banale », la violence verbale et physique du quotidien dans l’espace public. Avec la chute de ce tabou, la reconnaissance officielle du problème au sommet de l’exécutif, et l’annonce de l’élaboration d’une stratégie nationale pour combattre la violence contre les femmes, on commence à entrevoir le début de la fin du déni général du phénomène endémique de violence sexiste et sexuelle dans la sphère publique en Égypte.16 11 Cependant, ces avancées au niveau du cadre juridique en vigueur et de l’attitude gouvernementale semblent finalement remises en cause par le recul graduel des libertés d’expression et d’association depuis fin 2013. Différentes politiques ont été mises en place pour prendre le contrôle de la société civile en encadrant de plus en plus strictement les activités des acteurs sociaux ou politiques ayant une voix dissidente ou critique des autorités ou de leur performance,17 finissant aussi par affecter nombre de mobilisations contre la violence sexiste et pour les droits des femmes. Cette période a été celle de la remontée en puissance du Conseil National des Femmes, très proche des autorités et dont la présidente Mervat al-Tallâwî a présidé à la rédaction d’une loi répressive d’encadrement des ONG lorsqu’elle était Ministre de la Solidarité sociale

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 8

sous Moubarak. Le Conseil est chargé de la rédaction de la stratégie nationale pour combattre la violence contre les femmes, dont le processus a déjà été critiqué par différents acteurs indépendants en raison de son manque de transparence et son caractère peu inclusif. Aujourd’hui « réhabilité comme voix officielle de la question des femmes, après avoir été marginalisé sous le CSFA puis Morsy »,18 le CNF est peu apprécié par les ONG et collectifs indépendants luttant contre la violence sexiste et pour les droits des femmes. Une manifestation prévue en juin 2014 a été boycottée par plusieurs de ces acteurs lorsqu’ils ont appris la participation centrale du CNF à l’événement, retenant son attitude passée de déni et/ou d’instrumentalisation politique des agressions sexuelles collectives place Tahrir en 2012-13. Le jour de cet événement, deux manifestants portant des pancartes condamnant la violence sexuelle commise par les services de sécurité ont été arrêtés par la police et détenus plusieurs heures. 12 En 2015, il semblerait finalement que les politiques du gouvernement de ‘Abd al-Fattâh al-Sîsi aient été pensées, moins en vue de libérer les femmes égyptiennes, de les défendre ou d’en faire des citoyennes égales en droits aux Égyptiens, que de les gagner à la cause du régime, de les coopter dans le cadre d’un nouveau contrat sociopolitique patriarcal. En effet, ce sont plutôt les voix des Égyptiennes pro-militaires qui ont été mises en avant, alors que les dissidentes et activistes—islamistes ou laïques—critiques du régime ou de ses politiques, semblent bien moins méritantes de la protection de l’État, et font généralement l’objet de violences sexistes, de torture et d’abus divers et variés lorsqu’elles sont détenues.19 13 Cependant, les luttes liées au genre continuent et persistent sous différentes formes, des efforts et volontés individuelles aux ONG et collectifs de sensibilisation et de lutte contre diverses formes de violences sexiste et/ou liée au genre. Ce numéro d’Égypte/ Monde arabe traite donc de différents aspects des nouvelles luttes liées au genre en Égypte depuis 2011. On y notera la combinaison de textes scientifiques de facture plus « classique » avec des contributions plus militantes, entre le témoignage et l’analyse, et ajoutant parfois des recommandations pour la poursuite de la lutte. Cette orientation du numéro reflète la nature mixte—entre recherche, activisme et expertise dans le secteur non-gouvernemental ou en organisation internationale—du travail de nombre de chercheuses s’intéressant aux combats pour les droits des femmes et/ou aux violences sexistes. Elle reflète aussi le fait que l’attention scientifique, experte et militante portée à ces combats vient presque exclusivement de femmes. Ce choix éditorial résulte aussi de la nécessité de continuer20 à donner voix aux rares travaux réalisés entre 2011 et 2015 à partir d’enquêtes de terrain approfondies en Égypte, malgré des conditions difficiles, et sur des objets de recherche parfois sensibles et éphémères. Ceci traduit enfin la volonté constante d’Égypte/Monde arabe de produire une connaissance scientifique de qualité, transdisciplinaire sur ces objets de recherche, face à l’apparition récurrente des approches orientalisantes au problème de la violence contre les femmes dans le monde arabe21 et de son traitement sensationnaliste (voire à coloration islamophobe ou raciste) dans certains médias.22 14 Nous présentons une ouverture large du sujet en la contribution à la fois factuelle et militante de Dalia Abd el Hameed, militante et spécialiste de la recherche et du plaidoyer sur les problématiques du genre et de la santé en ONG de défense des droits humains. Elle y examine une cause centrale du « gender paradox » égyptien : malgré des progrès considérables au niveau éducatif et sanitaire, on continue à y observer un niveau médiocre de participation féminine au marché du travail et en politique. Dalia

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 9

Abd el Hameed souligne la persistance de rapports hommes-femmes fortement inégalitaires dans la sphère privée, liés au « culte de la domesticité » associé aux femmes ; cette tendance issue de l’approche déséquilibrée du « féminisme d’État » à l’époque nassérienne a perduré jusqu’à ce jour, avec un soutien important de l’opinion publique. Seules les ONG indépendantes et les nouvelles mobilisations féministes post-2011 se sont attaquées aux symptômes de ce phénomène et à ses conséquences inquiétantes : la multiplication des violences sexistes contre les femmes dans l’espace public, issue de l’extension des rapports de domination genrée de la sphère privée, vers la rue. Grâce à ces nouveaux acteurs féministes, une « masse critique » consciente de ce problème au sein des milieux politisés, fonctionne comme groupe de pression contribuant à rectifier le discours public à ce sujet. L’étape suivante devra être la sensibilisation de ces milieux aux problématiques de genre dans la sphère privée, recommande l’auteure. 15 Ensuite, la doctorante Hind Ahmad Zaki apporte une contribution significative à la compréhension du soutien au président Abd al-Fattâh al-Sîsi au sein de l’opinion publique égyptienne, par son analyse des mutations des discours sur le genre et des limites du féminisme d’État, au regard de la notion des « femmes de Sissi », en vogue depuis 2013. Cette représentation simpliste des femmes égyptiennes en bloc comme partisanes du maréchal-président cache en fait une multitude de revendications adressées à l’État et de lectures des droits des femmes. Déconstruisant cette notion, Hind Ahmad Zaki y apporte l’éclairage politico-historique des différents imaginaires genrés de l’État-nation et des femmes égyptiennes au vingtième siècle, ainsi que de leurs expressions politiques, puis de l’amorce d’une nouvelle représentation « révolutionnaire » des Égyptiennes en 2011 et après. Ces imaginaires nous permettent de décrypter le mythe médiatique des « femmes de Sissi » comme tentative de construction d’une nouvelle forme discursive du féminisme d’État qui apporte finalement peu de gains tangibles aux Égyptiennes, en cette période de forte polarisation politique et identitaire. 16 Marta Agosti, doctorante et experte en développement international nous livre une étude des modalités changeantes de l’engagement civique des citoyennes et citoyens ordinaires égyptiens depuis 2011, à la fois dans et en-dehors des cadres associatifs ou institutionnels, pour le changement social et spécifiquement pour les droits des femmes. Explorant l’articulation du féminisme du quotidien (everyday feminism), ce texte souligne l’importance de la participation de la jeunesse dans ce non-mouvement organique et capable de gérer positivement la diversité, et ce faisant, dans la remise en cause des anciennes représentations de l’État-nation. Ainsi, Marta Agosti apporte une réponse importante à la question de ce qu’est devenue la jeunesse égyptienne qui semblait tant investie dans la recherche du changement en 2011 : elle continue tant bien que mal à s’engager dans la sphère publique, malgré les limitations et les obstacles liés aux structures persistantes de l’ancien régime. A travers ces dernières, les acteurs étatiques s’efforcent, avec une certaine efficacité, de contenir ce non-mouvement et de circonscrire l’engagement civique des Égyptien(ne)s dans la sphère publique à leur seul paradigme. 17 Après ce premier volet consacré aux niveaux « macro » d’analyse, nous nous intéressons à un angle plus étroit, à commencer par le chapitre de la jeune docteure en anthropologie Perrine Lachenal sur les pratiques et les discours de participantes aux cours d’auto-défense réservés aux femmes. Son étude ethnographique de ces éléments

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 10

distingue différentes modalités de « mise en récit » de la violence physique mise au féminin et de sa légitimité, éclairant le cadrage qui donne sens et intelligibilité à cette pratique pour ses acteurs mais la circonscrit également, et limite le potentiel subversif de ces transgressions des modèles dominants des identités de genre. Soulignant la détermination de ces récits par les positionnements sociaux différents de leurs narratrices dans les rapports de pouvoir, Perrine Lachenal met en exergue la limitation du champ des possibles pour chacune en matière de légitimation de la violence féminine, mais aussi leurs manières d’utiliser et de détourner les normes sociales. Au prisme de ces mises en récit des pratiques de l’auto-défense féminine, elle révèle des glissements et transformations des dynamiques de genre dans la société égyptienne en phase révolutionnaire. 18 Doctorante en anthropologie, Angie Abdelmonem nous présente la première de trois études de cas sur de nouveaux acteurs associatifs dans le champ de la lutte contre les violences sexistes dans l’espace public. Elle traite ici d’une question soulevée par certains de leurs détracteurs : la dépolitisation du problème du harcèlement sexuel ou plus largement, de la violence sexiste dans la sphère publique, par certains mouvements traitant de cette question au niveau communautaire. Analysant l’approche de l’ONG HarassMap qui s’attaque à l’effet du spectateur ou effet du témoin23 contribuant à rendre passifs les passants spectateurs d’un acte de harcèlement sexuel, Angie Abdelmonem explore ses efforts pour faire évoluer les normes de genre dominantes afin qu’émergent des publics locaux socialement responsables, et pouvant constituer une masse critique susceptible de pousser pour le changement politique et légal au niveau étatique. Elle appelle à repenser le politique et la politisation pour une meilleure lecture des efforts militants pour transformer les représentations et les pratiques du public, visant à construire un changement par le bas susceptible de forcer la mise sur agenda d’une problématique comme le harcèlement sexuel de rue, par le gouvernement. 19 La doctorante Sandra Fernandez nous propose un regard ethnographique à l’intérieur d’un mouvement de lutte contre le harcèlement sexuel dans la sphère publique en Égypte, par la sensibilisation et l’intervention non-violente. Cette contribution explore le rôle des volontaires hommes du mouvement à travers le prisme de la voix masculine, soutenant la voix féminine et se distinguant des autres postures masculines dans les rues du Caire. L’auteure introduit le cadrage du terme taharrush (« harcèlement ») et son emploi par le mouvement dans le cadre d’une lutte genrée pour l’espace public. Elle utilise les récits de membres des équipes d’intervention pour situer et comprendre les types de masculinité en jeu dans ce contexte, ainsi que le sens qui y est donné à l’exercice de la voix. A travers la narration, Sandra Fernandez nous permet de comprendre, au niveau anthropologique, en quoi le mouvement est devenu un laboratoire de reformulation des idées de masculinité et de féminité, ensuite mises en œuvre pendant les campagnes de sensibilisation et les rondes des équipes d’intervention. 20 Enfin, ma propre contribution invite le lecteur à l’intérieur d’un autre collectif, OpAntiSH (Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault ou al-Quwwa dedd al-Taharrush)— pratiquant cette fois uniquement l’intervention directe contre les agressions sexuelles collectives à l’encontre des femmes sur la place Tahrir pendant les grands rassemblements à caractère politique. Parmi les groupes agissant sur ce terrain, OpAntiSH—fondé par des activistes d’orientation clairement féministe—était le seul à

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 11

toujours intégrer délibérément ses volontaires hommes et femmes dans toutes ses équipes. Ceci a soulevé une série de problématiques liées au genre au sein des équipes d’intervention, que ce texte explore à travers les récits des volontaires sur le sens donné à la mixité des équipes ; sur les différentes représentations des rôles genrés à l’intérieur des équipes ; et sur la gestion et la négociation des dynamiques de genre dans ce contexte. Cette contribution, volontairement très empirique, apporte un regard singulier à l’intérieur de l’expérience vécue d’un collectif féministe qui s’est avéré éphémère, donc ne sera plus accessible à la recherche à moins qu’il ne redevienne actif. 21 En conclusion, ce numéro d’Égypte/Monde arabe apporte à la fois un regard d’ensemble macrosociologique et politique, et un éventail d’études de cas ethnographiques, microsociologiques et sociopolitiques des nouvelles luttes liées au genre en Égypte depuis 2011. Cette exploration de mobilisations et de registres d’action en période révolutionnaire et postrévolutionnaire, se veut à la fois scientifique et militante. Si certains objets de recherche ne pourront plus faire l’objet d’enquêtes de terrain, on peut espérer néanmoins que ces nouvelles luttes liées au genre survivront aux pressions sur l’espace public et se développeront, passant par de multiples mutations qui pourraient faire l’objet d’un second volet d’études à l’avenir.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Al Jazeera, « New law to end sexual harassment in Egypt », 12 juin 2014, http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/new-law-end-sexual-harassment- egypt-2014612101924323684.html Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Amin, Shahira. « Egyptian general admits ‘virginity checks’ conducted on protesters », CNN, 31 mai 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/05/30/egypt.virginity.tests/ Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Elsadda, Hoda. « Women’s rights activism in post-Jan25 Egypt : Combating the shadow of the first lady syndrome in the Arab world », Middle East Law and Governance, vol. 3 n° 84, 2011.

Elsadda, Hoda. « Article 11 : feminists negotiating power in Egypt », OpenDemocracy, 2015. Disponible sur https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/women-and-arab-spring Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Fanous, Angelina. « The Place Women Go to Get Raped », Vice, 13 août 2013, http:// www.vice.com/read/the-place-women-go-to-get-raped-012378-v20n8 Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), « Hypocrisie au sommet de l’État : les violences sexuelles commises par les forces de l’ordre en Égypte », mai 2015, https:// www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/egypte_rapport_francais.pdf.

Kandiyoti, Deniz. « Disquiet and despair : the gender sub-texts of the ‘’ », OpenDemocracy, 26 juin 2012, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/disquiet- and-despair-gender-sub-texts-of-arab-spring Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 12

Marroushi, Nadine. « The struggles - and hopes - of Hend Nafea », Middle East Eye, 9 février 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/struggles-and-hopes-hind-nafia-1025966697 Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Mohsen, Habiba. « What made her go there ? Samira Ibrahim and Egypt’s virginity test trial », Al- Jazeera English, 16 mars 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ 2012/03/2012316133129201850.html Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Omran, Ragia. Interview par Al-Jazeera English pour l’émission « Talk to - Ragia Omran : Abused in Egypt », 30 mars 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v =X1VVDEAlMX8 Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Pratt, Nicola. « Gendered paradoxes of Egypt’s transition », Open Democracy, 2 fév. 2015, https:// www.opendemocracy.net/5050/nicola-pratt/gendered-paradoxes-of-egypt %E2 %80 %99s- transition Consulté le 3 fév. 2015.

Saleh, Heba « Tahrir sexual assault victims speak out », Financial Times, 8 fév. 2013, http:// www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e347c9a4-712a-11e2-9b5c-00144feab49a.html#axzz3go5rBsy9 Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Seikaly, Sherene, « The Meaning of Revolution : On Samira Ibrahim », Jadaliyya, 28 janvier 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9814/the-meaning-of-revolution_on-samira-ibrahim Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

Tadros, Mariz « Politically Motivated Sexual Assault and the Law in Violent Transitions : A Case Study From Egypt », Institute of Development Studies, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/ bitstream/handle/123456789/2950/ER8%20final%20online.pdf? sequence=1&utm_source=idswebsite&utm_medium=download&utm_campaign=opendocs Consulté le 20 sept. 2015

UN Women, HarassMap et al. Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt. 2013, http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DOKUMENTE/English_Documents/Sexual- Harassment-Study-Egypt-Final-EN.pdf Consulté le 20 sept. 2015.

’Estibaha(t) al-Nisa] ” ةحابتسا ءاسنلا - لاجملا يف- ماعلا- - “ .Zaki, Hind Ahmad et Abd elHameed, Dalia fe-l-Majal al-‘Amm], article en deux parties, Jadaliyya, 8-10 jan. 2014. Disponible sur http:// //:http ءاسنلاet ةحابتسا - لاجملا يف- ماعلا- - www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/15925/1- anglaise ءاسنلاTraduction) . ةحابتسا - لاجملا يف- ماعلا- - www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/15944/2- de la première partie disponible également sur Jadaliyya, voir http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/ index/18455/women-as-fair-game-in-the-public-sphere_a-critical) Consultés le 20 sept. 2015.

NOTES

1. L’ONG HarassMap (http://harassmap.org/en/who-we-are/how-and-why-we-began/), créée en 2010 et Nazra pour les Etudes féministes (http://nazra.org/en/about-us), créée en 2005 figurent parmi les rares acteurs indépendants existant avant 2011. 2. Nicola Pratt, « Gendered paradoxes of Egypt’s transition », 2015, p. 3. 3. Mariz Tadros, « Politically Motivated Sexual Assault and the Law in Violent Transitions : A Case Study From Egypt », 2013, p. 8. 4. Je fais ici référence à de très nombreux cas individuels, personnellement rencontrés entre 2011 et 2014.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 13

5. Asmaa Mahfouz, vidéo datée du 18 janvier 2011 (téléchargée et remise en ligne par un autre utilisateur de Youtube, avec des sous-titres anglais). Disponible sur http://www.youtube.com/ watch ?v =SgjIgMdsEuk 6. Ahmed Kadry, « Gender and : contesting the state and imagining a new nation », 2014, p. 3 7. , « Egyptian general admits ‘virginity checks’ conducted on protesters », CNN, 31 mai 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/05/30/egypt.virginity.tests/index.html 8. Malgré des signes répétés de coordination entre nombre d’agresseurs, au moins jusqu’en juillet 2013, la nature chaotique de ces agressions, toujours dans l’obscurité et dans une foule compacte, n’a jamais permis d’établir avec certitude l’identité des attaquants et, le cas échéant, de ceux qui les auraient poussés à agir. Elles ont eu lieu sous la présidence du CSFA, de Morsi et d’al-Sîsi. Des faits mesurables existent cependant, permettant d’affirmer la complicité d’acteurs divers et variés entre 2012 et 2013 : l’absence quasi-totale de forces de police place Tahrir et aux alentours sur une très longue période, même lorsque les manifestations n’étaient pas contre le ministère de l’Intérieur en tant que tel ; le manque de coopération et de soutien des forces de l’ordre et des hôpitaux publics avec les survivantes ; le long déni partisan, gouvernemental et institutionnel de la réalité, de la nature et des proportions du problème ; le caractère sensationnaliste et/ou misogyne de beaucoup de la couverture médiatique du problème, lorsqu’il n’était pas passé sous silence ; l’instrumentalisation de cette violence par diverses forces politiques pour essayer de discréditer leurs rivaux ; etc. Pour plus d’informations et de contexte, voir l’interview de l’avocate spécialiste des droits de l’homme Ragia Omran pour Al-Jazeera, « Talk to Al Jazeera - Ragia Omran : Abused in Egypt », 30 mars 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch ? v =X1VVDEAlMX8. Il faut relever aussi la culpabilité opportuniste et la complicité de nombreux Égyptiens se trouvant là et se joignant aux agresseurs initiaux, ou observant l’agression sans chercher à intervenir. Enfin, vers la mi-2013, les volontaires de collectifs anti-agression présents sur le terrain ont presque tous témoigné de leur impression (ou pour certains, leur conviction) qu’au fil du temps, de plus en plus d’agressions leur paraissaient spontanées, sans la moindre coordination. On peut en conclure une forte présomption qu’étant donné l’impunité totale des agresseurs jusqu’en juin 2014, une prolifération du phénomène a eu lieu suite la circulation de bouche à oreille, à travers le Grand Caire, de l’information que sur la place Tahrir c’était « quartier libre » pour harceler et agresser des femmes. 9. Mariz Tadros, « Politically Motivated Sexual Assault and the Law in Violent Transitions : A Case Study From Egypt », 2013, p. 28. Dans la sphère publique on compte le viol (souvent par l’usage des mains et d’objets), les agressions sexuelles, la mise à nu ; dans les lieux de détention on peut y ajouter la torture à caractère sexuel. Depuis 2013, la violence sexuelle et sexiste en détention semble en forte croissance, et ce dans le cadre d’une tendance de généralisation des abus de pouvoir, des humiliations et de la torture dans les lieux de détention, signalée par quasiment toutes les organisations non gouvernementales de défense des droits de l’homme indépendantes, égyptiennes ou internationales. 10. Nicola Pratt, « Gendered paradoxes of Egypt’s transition », 2015, p. 3. 11. Sur ce procès, voir Habiba Mohsen, « What made her go there ? Samira Ibrahim and Egypt’s virginity test trial », Al-Jazeera, 16 mars 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/ 2012/03/2012316133129201850.html ou Sherene Seikaly, « The Meaning of Revolution: On Samira Ibrahim », Jadaliyya, 28 janvier 2013, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9814/the-meaning- of-revolution_on-samira-ibrahim. 12. Hind Nâfe‘ a aussi été surnommée en anglais « the blue bra girl » (« la fille au soutien-gorge bleu ») parce que les soldats qui l’ont battue sur la place Tahrir (sans se savoir filmés de loin) en décembre 2011 ont arraché son ‘abâya (longue robe) noire ; la caméra a alors saisi l’image de Hind piétinée sous les bottes et gisant entre eux inconsciente, à demi-nue, en soutien-gorge bleu et en jean. Le surnom sitt al-banât (traduisible approximativement par « la grande dame parmi les

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 14

filles ») lui a été donné en signe de respect, contre le discours insultant tenu dans les médias à son égard. Après sa sortie d’hôpital, Hind a rejoint un mouvement de lutte contre la torture. En 2015, elle a été condamnée par contumace à une peine de prison à vie pour son activisme. Pour plus d’informations, voir Nadine Marroushi, « The struggles - and hopes - of Hend Nafea », Middle East Eye, 9 février 2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/struggles-and-hopes-hind- nafia-1025966697. 13. Les cas les plus connus sont ceux de Hânia Muhîb et Yasmîn al-Baramâwî. Un extrait sous- titré en anglais de l’interview de Hânia Muhîb sur la chaine Al-Nahâr est disponible ici https:// www.youtube.com/watch ?v =1CGVbhDdK1M ; voir Heba Saleh, « Tahrir sexual assault victims speak out », Financial Times, 8 fév. 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ e347c9a4-712a-11e2-9b5c-00144feab49a.html#axzz3go5rBsy9 ou Angelina Fanous, “The Place Women Go to Get Raped”, Vice, 13 août 2013, http://www.vice.com/read/the-place-women-go- to-get-raped-012378-v20n8/page/0. 14. Elsadda, Hoda. « Article 11 : feminists negotiating power in Egypt », 2015. 15. Plusieurs études le confirment. Par exemple : UN Women, « Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt », 2014, p. 6, http://harassmap.org/en/wp-content/ uploads/2014/02/287_Summaryreport_eng_low-1.pdf. 16. Al Jazeera, « New law to end sexual harassment in Egypt », 12 juin 2014, http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/new-law-end-sexual-harassment- egypt-2014612101924323684.html 17. On retiendra notamment la remise en cause répétée de la légitimité des ONG indépendantes de défense des droits de l’homme en raison de leur statut juridique ambigu, et des sources non égyptiennes de leurs financements—aspect qui fait l’objet d’une longue enquête juridique datant de 2011 et poursuivie depuis 2014 contre les ONG indépendantes égyptiennes. De multiples autres moyens de pression ont été employés contre ces dernières (voir par exemple POMED, « Under Threat : Egypt’s Systematic Campaign against NGOs », mars 2015, http://pomed.org/pomed- events/egypts-ongoing-campaign-against-civil-society/ Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, « Freedom of Association in Egypt. Submission to the 20th session of UPR (Oct.-Nov 2014) », 15 mars 2014, http://www.cihrs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ Freedom.of_.association.in_.Egypt_.UPR_.HRC_.EN_.pdf ; Human Rights Watch, « Egypt : Renewed Crackdown on Independent Groups. Government Investigating Human Rights Workers », 15 juin 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/15/egypt-renewed-crackdown- independent-groups). 18. Nicola Pratt, « Gendered paradoxes of Egypt’s transition », 2015, p. 3. 19. Voir FIDH, « Hypocrisie au sommet de l’Etat : les violences sexuelles commises par les forces de l’ordre en Égypte », mai 2015, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/egypte_rapport_francais.pdf. 20. Plusieurs textes sur l’Égypte figurant dans un numéro précédent d’Égypte/Monde arabe intitulé « Gouvernance locale dans le monde arabe et en Méditerranée : Quel rôle pour les femmes ? » (3 ème série | n° 9, 2012), http://ema.revues.org/2962 21. Voir l’analyse de Alaa Shehabi, « A problematic discourse : who speaks for Arab women ? », OpenDemocracy, 17 déc. 2012, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/alaa-shehabi/problematic- discourse-who-speaks-for-arab-women ; le texte de Mona el Tahawy, « Why Do They Hate Us ? The real war on women is in the Middle East », Foreign Policy, 23 avril 2012, http:// foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/23/why-do-they-hate-us/ a notamment été critiqué sur ce plan. 22. Parmi de nombreux exemples : Daily Mail online, « ’Please God, make it stop !’ British female journalist, 21, describes horrific sexual assault in Egypt’s Tahrir Square after election result », 27 juin 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2165445/British-journalist-Natasha- Smith-22-recalls-horrific-sexual-assault--Tahrir-Square.html#ixzz3kK0PrDFB.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 15

23. L’« effet du témoin » désigne la tendance à se tenir à l’écart et s’abstenir d’aider une personne en détresse, lorsque d’autres personnes sont présentes, pour différentes raisons bien explorées par la recherche socio-psychologique.

AUTEUR

LESLIE PIQUEMAL

Leslie Piquemal is a former academic, now working in the field of human rights advocacy. She earned a PhD in Middle Eastern Politics from the Paris Institute of Politics Studies (IEP Paris - Sciences Po) in 2012. As a doctoral and post-doctoral researcher, she was affiliated to the CEDEJ in Cairo, where she lived for 10 years. After her PhD she returned to Sociology to conduct fieldwork about the new collectives fighting gender-based violence in the public sphere in Cairo. Leslie Piquemal is the author of a PhD thesis about the Egyptian ’s political project at the end of the Mubarak era, as well as a number of academic articles.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 16

How can the domestication of women facilitate understanding of their plight in Egypt? En quoi la « domestification » des femmes éclaire-t-elle leur situation en Égypte ?

Dalia AbdElhameed

1 This paper addresses the question of discrepancies between the enhancement of women’s educational indicators, life expectancy and fertility rates on one hand, and the shamefully low percentages of female employment and political representation in Egypt, on the other hand. I will emphasize the role of domesticity and unequal relationships in the private sphere, and retrace the roots of these phenomena and their past evolution. The paper ends with the conclusion that the struggle for women’s rights in Egypt must address the “cult of domesticity” attached to women, if we hope to achieve a real and fundamental change in gender power dynamics.

The gender paradox

2 In 2004, the World Bank issued a report entitled “Gender and Development in Middle East and North Africa: Women in the Public Sphere.” It discussed a peculiar phenomenon related to this region: great advances in the indicators related to women’s education, fertility and life expectancy are coupled with unequal participation of women in the labor force and their even lower representation on the political level. The report mentioned, for example, that women’s average number of years of schooling in the Middle East and North Africa increased from 0.5 in 1960 to 4.5 in 1999. Low female participation in the labor market was described as a missed opportunity for these countries; the report called this phenomenon “the gender paradox”. The social and economic reasons cited as reasons for this phenomenon were the centrality of the family, the imagined role of men as breadwinners, the modesty imposed on women and more importantly, the imbalance between men and women in the private sphere.1 The last reason is a key factor in understanding this contradiction in women’s conditions in

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 17

the MENA region, and more specifically in Egypt; it remains relevant after the issuing of this report. It is not a novel development and the next section will reveal how over the years, this inequality has not only been rooted in the social level, but also institutionalized by the State.2

Historical overview: the pre- and post-Nasserite eras

3 The discourse of early male champions of women’s rights in the beginning of the twentieth century, such as Qasem Amin, was centered on advocating for women’s education in order to make them better mothers. This domestic shadow has always haunted women’s struggles; scholars have consistently highlighted the failure of early Egyptian feminists – and other feminists in the region – to win the battles of the private sphere. Even in the late twentieth century, when intellectual production of feminist knowledge was booming and accelerating through women’s journals and magazines, and the importance of women’s education and work was being stressed, there were also articles on how women should clean their houses, and be good wives and mothers.3 No matter what gains they were making, whether it was the right to education, the right to vote or the right to participate in public life, all the issues related to the private sphere remained untouched and harder to address. Changing personal status laws, and asserting rights to abortion and bodily autonomy were a taboo.

4 During the Nasserite era, the State introduced a very perplexing discourse toward women. On the one hand, the regime wanted to depict women as symbols of modernity; the State expanded female education, women gained the right to vote and to run for public office, and they participated heavily in the labor force. The discourse of championing women was omnipresent, and they were incorporated in the national postcolonial discourse as political subjects. Yet on the other hand, the State continued to use the cultural discourse of women and the private sphere. To solve the population problem, the State used a modernist discourse to publicize family planning campaigns and to convince people to opt for smaller families, but when it came to personal status law, which is based on Islamic law, feminists failed miserably to effect change. According to Bier4, this failure was not due to the discourse the feminist movement then used, but to the “normative gender policy” adopted by the State, especially in the realm of the family. 5 Here, Bier invokes a very important point about the separation between secular and religious/Islamic discourses dealing with women’s issues. What should be stressed here is how different discourses have been used and enforced to fulfill the State’s and/or society’s expectations of women. Thus, the State’s adherence to shari‘a in personal status law is not a form of religiosity as much as it is a tool to maintain specific norms and protect men’s gains. Secular feminists argue that selective emphasis on Islamic law was only used with regard to women’s rights, and was barely used at all with regard to economic policies, for example. This selective emphasis also treated women’s struggles in the region as totally isolated from the broader globalized context and other social struggles. 6 However, what distinguished the Nasserite era is what Mervat Hatem calls “State feminism,”5 by which the State monopolized discourse in the name of women and their rights. This had a great influence on the feminist movement which had previously materialized in civil society organizations and publishing projects only; with this

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 18

containment attempt, other feminist voices were muffled and the State’s voice alone dominated the scene. The shrinking public space for women in terms of organization and freedom of expression was part of the shrinking political space on all levels, with the abolition of political parties and crackdown on political dissent. We must bear in mind that despite the autocratic regime, the strong Nasserist State delivered tangible changes in women’s lives, especially in education and employment. 7 This was mirrored both on the levels of the State and of society. It was not just the valorization and the prioritization of female reproductive roles and home chores. More importantly, this tendency to domesticate women was gradually constituted by State discourse, in which it appeared through the years, under different political regimes. In the 1971 Constitution, article 11 stressed the State’s responsibility to advance women’s role in public life in a manner that would allow them to keep a balance between their public engagement and domestic responsibilities. This is an acknowledgement by the State that women are domestic individuals, and that housework and raising children are solely women’s responsibility. Furthermore, it suggests that women’s presence in the public sphere is an exceptional state, which must be excused and justified.

Changes in conditions for women and the NGOs’ struggles

8 Intriguingly, that constitutional article survived all subsequent constitutional amendments and found its way into the new Constitutions that have been articulated since then. This just might reassure us on how the State is dealing with the question of women.

9 What happened when the State let go of the issue? Who then ended up owning public space? 10 Modernization efforts were translated into high rates of female school enrollment in Egypt. Women made significant strides forward, specifically in higher education and university degrees, but all of this could be understood through the State’s strong grip on society. Once these institutional guarantees for women’s participation faded away and the State’s grip loosened, a sudden decrease in female participation in the labor force was noticeable. This is also partially attributed to the retreat of the public sector starting in the 1970s and to intense waves of privatization during the 1990s. The private sector has usually been more reluctant to recruit women because private employers think recruiting women is a threat to productivity, since women take maternity leave and childcare-related leave. So in other words, women’s reproductive role is a disincentive to hiring them in the private sector. In addition, young women, and specifically those from lower social classes, prefer to work in the public sector even if those jobs are not easily attainable or the contracts are temporary. As Ghada Barsoum found in her ethnographic fieldwork on female labor participation during the first decade of the new Millennium, women prefer government posts since they provide much better maternity care system and relatively better work conditions. This compares favorably to the private sector, in which women suffer from unequal pay, excessive workloads and long working hours, not to mention the constant threat of sexual harassment in the workplace which is much more widespread in the private sector.6 Moreover, the Demographic and Health Survey suggests that after marriage, women are pressured to have children early: 39% of women who have ever been

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 19

married think it is appropriate to use a family planning method after having their first child, while only 2% believe it is appropriate for women to use contraception before their first pregnancy.7 This pressure to have a first child right after marriage definitely affects women’s opportunities in the labor market and hinders them in the accumulation of work experience, compared to their male counterparts. 11 On the political level, the State has always reserved all cabinet posts, and positions of power – such as that of governor – for men. An insignificant number of women have been appointed at high levels, always to specific ministerial portfolios, to the extent that ministries such as the Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs or the Ministry of Social Solidarity are relatively feminized. No woman was ever appointed to a key ministerial position in Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Defense and Finance. Even in the early days after the January 2011 revolution, the new draft Constitution initially only recognized men’s right to run for President. This was later changed in the formal draft put to a referendum in March 2011, to allow both men and women to run. 12 This male monopoly on higher positions is orchestrated by the State, but also embraced and praised by the general public. On March 8, 2011, feminist organizations and individuals organized a march from the Press Syndicate to Tahrir Square on International Women’s Day. I attended this march; the focus was mostly on the demand for prioritizing women’s rights after the revolution and for gender equality, specifically after women’s massive participation in the uprising. As the march reached Tahrir Square, groups of men started to attack the men and women in the march claiming that they were devilish women supported by gay men, that women do not have the right to run for President, and they should stay at home and stick to their jobs as mothers and housewives. These men even kept pointing to a fully veiled woman, saying she is the model of the Egyptian woman; she is the figure of the martyr’s mother. So to these men, the only role allowed for women in this revolution is to be mothers; martyrdom is for men. 13 With the development of the Egyptian State, the feminist movement has also evolved toward a state of NGO-ization. The term, coined by Islah Jad8, denotes the huge tendency within the movement to form NGOs during the 1980s and 1990s, and how became the dominant trend, instead of it being a grassroots movement, connected to people as a social movement should be. Jad criticized these NGOs for isolating women’s issues in women’s organizations and, thus doing, decontextualizing women’s rights from the bigger picture of the struggle, leading to what he described as a failure to mobilize or organize and to the limitation of activities to advocacy or education. One might agree with some of Jad’s critique, especially the temporality of some NGOs’ projects, but it should not be generalized. Moreover, we should not discredit women’s and feminist NGOs or consider their roles were minor just because they were functioning under authoritarian regimes. 14 In Egypt specifically, feminist and women’s NGOs managed to address many sensitive issues that had remained out of reach until then. It was the women’s rights and feminist organizations who first engaged with problems occurring in the private sphere. The long-term struggles of NGOs played a pivotal role in changing the personal status law in 2000 to include khol’a, winning women the right to initiate a divorce if they return their dowries, wedding gifts and give up all material claims on their husbands.9 And all this happened when the political scene was very weak under

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 20

Mubarak’s authoritarian rule and the state of emergency. It is a debatable gain, but it definitely is a gain – and in a very thorny area. 15 The battle for the criminalization of female circumcision is another example of the successes of NGOs. In 2004, NGOs won another battle for the amendment of the nationality law. The law was changed to allow Egyptian women who are married to non-, to transmit their nationality to their children.10 After years of fighting embedded norms and being accused of adopting a Western agenda, and being spies and agents of the West, these NGOs managed to force the Egyptian government to amend the law to criminalize female circumcision in 2008. NGOs like the New Woman Foundation and El-Nadim were among the first to discuss issues of , incest and marital . Specifically, these two organizations were among the first to conduct studies on this overlooked issue. Moreover, El-Nadim provided access to shelters, psychological support and rehabilitation for survivors of domestic violence. A few years ago, El-Nadim proposed a comprehensive draft law to combat domestic violence from a feminist and rights-based approach. Unfortunately, the text never made its way through Parliament to become law.11

The extension of violence from the private sphere to the public sphere

16 In the years preceding the January 25, 2011 uprising, levels of in the public sphere increased exponentially. This phenomenon was first detected during the Eid festivities in 2005 and 2006. Groups of young men were seen encircling young girls and women in the street, and starting to forcefully strip them, grope their genitalia, and sexually harass and assault them. This was very soon after the May 25, 2005 State attacks on female political dissidents protesting against constitutional amendments during the Mubarak era. That day, the authorities hired thugs to attack and sexually assault female protesters. Many incidents of collective and State- sponsored violence have occurred since then. The severity of these attacks and incidents has further intensified since the January 25, 2011 uprising; female protesters have repeatedly been subjected to a barbaric form of mob sexual assaults by groups of men, which have reached the extent of knife .12 Another significant development is the practice of so-called “virginity testing,” in which the army subjected a number of women who had been arrested during the forcible dispersal of a March 2011 sit-in in Tahrir Square, to forced virginity tests. To defend this action and justify these procedures, an army officer declared to CNN that “The girls who were detained were not like your daughter or mine. These were girls who had camped out in tents with male protesters in Tahrir Square.”13 The mere presence of these women in the street was reason enough to cast doubt upon their morality. Similar discourse was used during the Ultras (organized football fans) sit-in protest of April 2012, in the vicinity of the Cabinet building: the football fans rejected the presence of women in the sit-in at night, saying it would make it easier for the media to defame the whole struggle, alleging boys and girls were spending the night together in tents, having sexual intercourse.

17 Social scientists and gender specialists have long contemplated the root causes of these social ills. The next section will review some of the reasons they have considered.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 21

Domestication of public space

18 This is based on the assumption that in States like Egypt where the State is not able to penetrate or alter social norms or power dynamics in society14, norms of the private sphere spontaneously make their way to the public sphere, so the same power relationships are transferred to it, even though the lived realities in the public sphere may be otherwise.15 Describing Egypt as a “weak state” does not nullify the authoritarian character of the ruling regime. This domestication allows men of whatever age or class to sexually harass women even if they look wealthier, more educated, or better-connected than them. This phenomenon of domestication might also explain a very common scene on Egyptian streets: that of a man beating a woman in broad daylight, with no apparent reason, and if anyone wishes to intervene, people prevent them from doing so by saying the woman is the attacker’s wife. This translates to him having the right to discipline her physically.

19 The explanation from the field of gender studies also resonates with Asef Bayat’s explanation of the transformation of the public sphere in cities like Cairo, Tehran, Jakarta and others. In these neo-liberal cities, people extend their private lives to the urban street.16Asef Bayat has primarily focused on persons who are outside institutional umbrellas like housewives, street vendors and street children. Yet his analysis in terms of cities being turned inside out, could inspire us to reflect more about the consequences of this domestication of the public sphere—in other words, how the values of the private sphere are exported to the street, so the city becomes a home and citizenship is dissolved, while the superiority of men is maintained, as it is within the family. 20 Salwa Ismail cites failed hegemonic masculinity17 as a reason for lower-class men’s persistent view of women as inferior, as well as their patrolling of women and denial of any public role to them. Salwa Ismail captures feelings such as the frustrations men experience in Egypt due to their inability to play the role of sole breadwinner, and their crushing sense of inferiority to police officers, in what she calls “injured masculinity”.18 The concepts Ismail uses to interpret lower-class men’s perceptions of women and their value are not limited to this class, since many of these perceptions prevail across classes. This does not mean dismissal of class as a category of analysis; it is an attempt to understand men’s perceptions of women’s entitlements in Egypt, especially now that media outlets tend to spread reductionist discourses justifying violence against women and disbelief in gender equality by presenting them as endemic to the lower classes. Ismail’s contention might invite us to adopt a broader apprehension of hegemonic masculinity in Egypt, not limited to a specific class but actually transmitted to others, leading to the prevalence of the notion that women are not entitled to pursue a career or earn a living, even when they still earn less than their male partners. 21 This historical review reaffirms the fact that women do not own public space in Egypt, and more importantly, that this mirrors the power dynamics in the private sphere. Women do have the right to go to school, to work, to run errands but they are not widely recognized as having the right to occupy street corners as men do. Hence, women’s presence in public space places them in a state of exceptionality which always has to be justified: “I am going to school,” “I am picking up my children,” “I am doing the grocery shopping,” etc. Women do not have the “right to loiter,” as Indian scholars put it.19

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 22

22 Some believe the unprecedented levels of violence against women during the Egyptian revolution have been an expected backlash to the unprecedented participation of women in the public sphere. Yet more importantly, the revolution also represented a unique moment in the struggle for women’s rights. First of all, we should view women’s right to participate in shaping the future of their country through protests, strikes and the uprising as the most precious political right since it is related to grassroots activism and not merely something bestowed upon them by the State, that could easily be demolished. Women have also organized themselves, along with groups of men, to resist the they face in the public space. The emergence of these groups has been the real manifestation of the revolution within the domain of women’s rights. These groups have tried to replace the absent security forces by volunteering to get women out of the “circles of hell” of mob sexual assault. Many of them have also engaged in awareness-raising activities and worked on sexual violence in other sites like the subway, schools or universities. Their groundbreaking work, along with the long struggle of women’s rights NGOs, has helped articulate a revolutionary discourse that contributed to ending the long-standing practice of denial on the part of both the State and society, especially concerning sexual violence issues. 23 Their work has also been relatively helpful in invalidating the prevailing habit of blaming victims of sexual violence, since many survivors of these attacks have talked to the media shamelessly, expressing the idea that it is perpetrators who should be ashamed, not survivors. Moreover, these struggles have facilitated the realization of a long-awaited change in the laws related to sexual violence. The modification of this legal framework is partial, yet it has been celebrated as a step forward and an example of bottom-up change. 24 In the aftermath of the June 30, 2013 events, militarization and the shrinking of public space for activism have limited the ability of these groups to flourish and form a nucleus for a real grassroots movement. This has also restricted their potential for revolutionizing the feminist consciousness. 25 Nevertheless, there have been gains that are difficult to roll back. Most importantly, the activism of women’s rights groups and collectives resisting sexual violence has imposed a minimum level of political correctness on the mobilized critical mass who have participated actively in the revolution, and who are still active in social media circles. This critical mass would now criticize any reactionary discourse regarding women that may appear in the media or in any other institutions. In other words, they now play the role of a pressure group responsible for adjusting discourse, a role that had always been played, less successfully, by feminist and women’s rights NGOs in the past. This change was evidenced in the public denunciation of a statement by Cairo University President Gaber Nassar. Following a mob sexual harassment incident on the university campus in March 2014, Nassar announced the university would investigate the incident and punish those who were found to be in the wrong, whether it was the girl or the perpetrators. Angry reactions to this statement from broad circles of activists and different groups obliged the University President to apologize for presenting the victim as possibly responsible for her assault. Similar incidents have echoed this example, confirming there has been a paradigm shift in the gender consciousness of the broader revolutionary groups.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 23

Conclusion

26 Throughout the history of feminist struggle in Egypt, issues pertaining to the private sphere remained relatively deprioritized, while the battles for other rights were dominant instead; this has been the case from the right to vote to the recent battles against sexual violence against women in the public sphere. Even when women’s issues within the private sphere have been picked up, the struggles over them have been much harder and the victories smaller and less effective. One example of this is the fight to criminalize female circumcision and the attempts to criminalize domestic violence.

27 The priority in the next phase should be further sensitizing this critical mass to gender and women’s issues, especially regarding their value systems related to the private sphere. The young men and women in this critical mass might not adopt a fully progressive perception of women’s rights, but at least they are willing to question their convictions. Deeply-rooted gender stereotypes, especially those related to the private sphere, need to be shaken if we are to pursue a real change in women’s conditions of life in Egypt. Meaningful progress in this regard and the achievement of substantive equality will entail moving beyond the conditional rights to education and to work, to a more comprehensive, deeper belief in all of women’s rights, and ending the conditionality according to which women may work only if they have already succeeded as housewives. The problem with this “cult of domesticity” is that it is used to discredit women’s professional and political entitlements by only valorizing their domestic and reproductive role. Enhancing gender equality in the public sphere cannot be achieved without tackling inequality rooted in the private sphere, so that we will no longer turn on the radio on any given day and find a debate on women’s right to work and how this would affect them as mothers and their relationships with their husbands as the sole breadwinners.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Al-Awan. 2008, “Personal Status Law in Egypt: Between Taa and Khula”, Al-Awan, Available at: http://www.alawan.org/article3456.html

Barsoum G. 2010, “When There is ‘No Respect’ at Work: Job Quality Issues for ’s Private Sector”, OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development vol. 1 no. 1, pp 67-80.

Biat, A. 2013, Life as Politics; How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press,

Bier, L. 2011, Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press,

El-Zanaty, F and Way, A. 2009, Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 2008. Cairo: Ministry of Health, El- Zanaty and Associates and Macro International

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 24

Hatem, M. 1992, “Economic and Political Liberation and the Demise of State Feminism”, International Journal of Middle East Studies vol. 24 no. 2, pp 231-251.

Ismail, S. 2006, Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters: Encountering Everyday state, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.

Jad, I. 2004, “The NGO-isation of Arab Women’s Movement”, Available at: http:// graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/developpement/shared/developpement/ cours/E739/Islah JadNGOization.pdf

Khan S., Ranade S. & Phadke S. 2009, “Why Loiter? Radical Possibilities for Gendered Dissent” p. 185-203, in Butcher M. & Velayutham S. (eds.) Dissent and Cultural Resistance in Asia Cities, NY: Routledge

Langohr, V. 2013. “This is Our Square: Fighting Sexual Assaults at Cairo Protests”, Middle East Research and Information Project. Available at: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer268/our-square

El-Sadda, H. 2014, “The new Feminist Mobilization in its National and Regional Applications”, Arab Reform Initiative. Paper no longer available online.

Scott J. & Keates D. 2004, Going Public: Feminism and the Shifting Boundaries of Private Sphere, Illinois: University of Illinois Press

World Bank. 2004, MENA Development Report: Gender and Development in the Middle East and North Africa: Women in Public Sphere.

State Information Service (SIS), 2013, The Legislative Support for Women. Available at: http:// www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=4483#.VClJn3KHbFY

Zaki H. & Abd el-hameed D. 2014. “Woman as Fair Game in the Public Space: a Critical Introduction for Understanding Sexual Violence and Methods of Resistance”, Jadaliyya. Available at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18455/women-as-fair-game-in-the-public-sphere_a- critical

NOTES

1. World Bank, 2004, p.1, 6, 28, 55, 94, 95 2. I use female labor force participation as a manifestation of women’s role in public life for several reasons. First, women are involved in the informal economy but this should not be equated with formal participation in the labor force, due to the problems of the precarity of informal labor in Egypt and of extremely low wages earned by women in particular, in this field. Second, formal labor participation necessarily requires female presence and activity in the public sphere, whereas informal sector work may be done within the domestic sphere; this is crucial if we are to understand women’s presence in the public sphere and account for it. Finally, female labor participation is a reflection of female advancement into decision-making positions, and consequently, reaching the formulation and designing of laws and policies that influence women’s lives. 3. El_Sadda, 2014, p. 4, 6, 7 4. Bier, 2011, p.7 5. Hatem, 1992, p.231 6. Barsoum, 2010, p.78, 79 7. EDHS, 2008, p.68, 69 8. Jad, 2004.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 25

9. Al Awan, 2008 10. SIS, 2013. 11. El-Nadim’s draft law on domestic violence is available here: http://alnadeem.org/files/ draft_law_violence_against_women_ar.pdf 12. Zaki & Abd El-Hameed, 2014 13. Langohr, 2013. 14. Zaki & Abd El-Hameed, 2014 15. Scott & Keates, 2004. 16. Bayat, 2013, p.13. 17. Hegemonic masculinity is the concept of male dominance and women’s subordination, based on the male breadwinner role and the female reproductive and sexual role. 18. Ismail, 2006, p.96, 97, 108, 109, 120. 19. Rande, Khan & Phadke, 2009

ABSTRACTS

This paper attempts to address an apparent contradiction relative to the condition of women in Egypt. Health and education indicators for women have shown continuous progress in past decades. Yet over the same period, their lived realities have been marked by a clear deterioration in terms of employment prospects, political representation and participation, as well as their right to be free from violence in both public and private spheres. This article sheds light on the causes of this paradox, which lie in the emphasis of values connected to the cult of domesticity for women in the post-colonial state of Egypt. I will retrace the roots of this domestication, fostered by the State and celebrated by society, to the Nasserist era. These values were maintained under the different political regimes that followed, and met with an ongoing struggle from feminists and activists who resist these values. This paper situates the relatively recent upsurge in sexual violence against women in the public sphere as a reflection and extension of the gender-based violence that takes place in the private sphere. It concludes with some prescriptive observations on how to resist that cult of domesticity in our work and activism.

Cet article traite d’une apparente contradiction liée à la condition des femmes en Égypte. Dans les domaines de la santé et de l’éducation, les indicateurs révèlent des progrès constants pour les femmes au fil de ces dernières décennies. Pourtant sur la même période, leurs réalités vécues ont été caractérisées par une détérioration claire des perspectives de travail salarié, ainsi que de la représentation et la participation politique et du droit à une vie libre de violence dans les sphères publique et privée. Il s’agira donc ici d’éclairer les causes de ce paradoxe, qui sont à chercher dans l’insistance sur des valeurs liées au culte de la domesticité pour les femmes en Égypte postcoloniale. Je retracerai les racines de cette « domestification » étayée par l’État et applaudie par la société, à l’ère nassérienne. Sous les différents régimes qui ont suivi, ces valeurs ont été maintenues face à la résistance continue des féministes et activistes qui y sont opposé-e-s. Cette contribution situe la montée relativement récente de la violence sexuelle à l’encontre des femmes dans l’espace public comme un reflet et une extension de la violence sexiste qui a lieu dans la sphère privée. Elle conclut, enfin, sur des recommandations pour la poursuite de la résistance à ce culte de la domesticité dans nos vies professionnelles et militantes.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 26

INDEX

Mots-clés: Égypte, femmes, domestification, féminisme, violence Keywords: Egypt, women, domestication, deminism, violence

AUTHOR

DALIA ABDELHAMEED

Dalia AbdElhameed is the head of the gender program at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). Her current mandate includes supervising work on sexual and reproductive health and rights, documenting sexism in public spaces, as well as other issues related to gender mainstreaming in EIPR programs. She previously worked in the Right to Health program in the same organization, where her mandate included national and international advocacy for sexual and reproductive health rights. Dalia is also a co-founder of Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH), a grassroots initiative that resists mob sexual assaults in Cairo during mass protests. She is a Sociology & Anthropology graduate of the American University in Cairo’s MA program; her thesis was focused on “Organized Football Fandom in Egypt: the Ultras and the Construction of the Subject.” Dalia is a co-author of a number of human and women’s rights reports, in addition to opinion and analytical pieces in Jadaliyya and other publications.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 27

El-Sissi’s Women? Shifting gender discourses and the limits of state feminism Les « femmes de Sissi » ? Mutations des discours du genre et limites du féminisme d’État

Hind Ahmed Zaki

1 On the eve of Egypt’s 2014 presidential election, queues of voters stood patiently under May’s burning sun, waiting to cast their votes. Among those waiting, the high presence of women was quite remarkable and remarked upon.1 During the first day of the election, videos of Egyptian women from all walks of life dancing in celebration at the polls circulated widely on social media.2

2 Such expressions of support came as the last in a series of media portrayals designed to evoke the “gendered” factor in the June 30th revolution/coup. Women’s supposed infatuation with the military-backed candidate, Abd El-Fattah El-Sissi was repeatedly commented on, and slightly made fun of, by local and international media. Such images of women’s jubilation came at a time when the idea that women played a massive role in toppling the rule of Muslim Brotherhood was gaining a great deal of ground. 3 Less than a fortnight later, a video of a woman being sexually assaulted by a group of men at the inaugural celebrations for Egypt’s new President, surfaced online. Graphic footage, apparently filmed using a mobile phone, shows a mob of men surrounding the young woman, who was stripped of her clothes and badly bruised. The video circulated widely on social media websites.3 While women’s rights activists had been regularly reporting such brutal attacks against women in the public sphere since 2012, this was the first time the state took real measures to deal with such crimes. Seven arrests were made in relation to the incident.4 Moreover, Egypt’s new president Abdel Fattah El-Sissi visited one of the survivors of the harrowing attacks, presented her with a large bouquet of flowers, and apologized to her in person.5 4 These two strikingly opposed images of women celebrated, venerated, and then sexually violated in the midst of national celebrations, point to an important question

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 28

that lies at the heart of any discussion on women and the state in Egypt: What are the limits of state feminism in a time when debates on women’s presence and roles in the public sphere seem to echo wider political debates centering on Egypt’s identity and future? The answer to this question is far from simple. Apprehending the limits of state requires a historical and political understanding of the project itself. It also requires comprehension of the lopsided nature of the process of modernizing the postcolonial Egyptian state. While national imaginations of Egypt as a woman and of the nation as a family have been a constant staple of since the late nineteenth century, this same nationalism rested on gendered assumptions that are far from simple.6 In this article, I will attempt to unpack those gendered assumptions, and demonstrate how those imaginings and their political manifestations, have developed in the period following the Arab spring. I will argue that this post-June 30th, 2013 edition of gendered nationalist discourse is nevertheless unique in many ways, rendering it a new and problematic edition of Egyptian state feminism. While it assumes many of the characteristic of earlier statist discourses on women in Egypt, mainly their centering on identity debates, this new state feminism is more grounded in concrete political realities. Furthermore, it is shaped by different strands of women’s mobilization, some of which are radically opposed to historically constructed notions of the proper place of women in the nation. However, this new type of state feminism is problematic on a number of fronts, and has become increasingly so following Egypt’s June 30th, 2013 coup, as I will explain. 5 Contradictory understandings of women’s presence in the public arena emerged following the 2011 uprising. On the one hand, the politicization of women’s bodies, a result of both the revolutionary and the anti-revolutionary waves of mobilization that have swept the country over the past four years, highlights the instrumental use of women as political symbols. On the other hand, the active and increased participation of women in all the events of the past turbulent three years suggests the emergence of a different type of agency, accompanied by several alternative gender discourses in Egypt. The eruption of the issue of violence against women stands out in particular here. While this could be partly explained by an actual increase in the intensity and level of violence against women, it could also be traced to the emergence of an active consciousness among women regarding the extent of the problem, as well as a willingness on their part to do something about it. Thus, both the discursive and the practical parameters of the debate on women’s bodies in the public space have significantly departed from the hitherto-accepted categories of meaning and action that it had long occupied. This in turn, has paved the way for the emergence of a plethora of gendered frames and symbols that defy easy categorization. 6 In this article, I attempt to unpack these different old and new discourses on women by analyzing in depth the media discourse on women’s unanimous support for military rule as the only alternative to the Islamic rule that was bound to decrease the scope of rights enjoyed by Egyptian women. In order to achieve that, I attempt to deconstruct the myth of “El-Sissi’s women” through analyzing images of women as political actors in the media. I argue that the politicization of the images of women, dancing in front of polling stations in the last presidential election, or going on record to express their support for El-Sissi as their favorite presidential candidate, represents an attempt to construct a new discursive form of state feminism, one that utilizes women and their issues to serve political purposes while giving them little in return. But this discourse itself is far from simple. On the contrary, I will argue that women’s support for El-Sissi

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 29

represents multiple claims and understandings of women’s rights, as well as different strategic claims on the state at a time when the battle over the cultural meanings of women’s rights acquires broader political significance in the midst of the unprecedented political polarization that characterizes Egypt’s failed democratic transition. 7 This article is divided into three main parts. In the first, I analyze what I identify as the historical predicament of state feminism in Egypt, and how the latest developments fit into this analysis. In the second part, I outline how the gendered discourses and practices of both the nationalist statist project, and the Islamic project sought to utilize women as political symbols. This, in turn, has led to the constant framing of debates on women in Egypt in terms of identity politics and discussions of authenticity. I further elaborate on this point by critically analyzing the media portrayals of two distinct but interrelated phenomena: the women who publically supported El-Sissi’s candidacy and his rise to power following June 30th, 2013 and the popular assumption that Egyptian women en masse are in support of his leadership. By representing those images of supposedly authentic Egyptian women in action, and by juxtaposing them with the Islamists’ notions of Egyptian womanhood as culturally authentic, I aim to show the extent to which discussions of women’s status on a national level tend to be trapped in an identity debate that avoids the political side of the issue, and aims to prevent constructive debates on the real conditions of women in Egypt. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the reasons behind the rise of El-Sissi’s women as a phenomenon and how this relates to other competing discourses on women’s rights in contemporary Egypt.

State feminism in Egypt: roots and realities

8 In her book Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the state in Nassser’s Egypt, historian Laura Bier argues that the gendered and political orders that were put in place by the governing elites in the period following nominal independence from Britain in 1923, underwent major changes in the wake of the 1952 coup d’état.7 While the newly-established regime in Egypt owed many of its ideas on wider social reforms to earlier social engineering attempts begun in the 1920s and 1930s, it signaled a new beginning on several important fronts. First, instead of merely relying on charitable initiatives by the upper class, the language of social reform entered the phase of scientific planning by a strong central government.8 This development paved the way for the state’s monopoly over important social issues, both discursively and institutionally, including the women’s question.

9 Second, the discursive and ideological foundations of what later became the Nasserist state came to be closely tied to a clear demarcation of the public and private domains. More importantly, the new state feminism effectively sought to silence a vibrant and rich debate on the women’s question that had taken place in the interwar period. This debate shows that different ideals of national womanhood existed and were in competition.9 While discussions in the 1920s, until the 1950s, centered on how increased opportunities for work and education for women would influence their traditional roles as caretakers, mothers and housewives, and on how such changes would affect the laws governing intimate relations between men and women within the marriage institution, a different discourse arose from the 1960’s onward. This new

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 30

discourse was centered mostly on women’s roles as employed workers and as citizens in a new type of public space. Issues like marriage, divorce and custody of children were regulated and reformed only in a piecemeal manner by the state, and debates on women’s status in the private realm became almost nonexistent.10 One important indicator of this can be found in the fact that not a single attempt to reform Egypt’s personal status laws was made in the 1950s or 1960s. In fact no such attempt was made until 1979, when ill-fated law number 44/1979, popularly known as “Jihan’s law”, was ruled unconstitutional by Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court.11 Egypt’s rulers from Nasser to Sadat, to Mubarak simply shied away from directly addressing the stark gender inequality codified in Egypt’s personal status laws, which date back to the 1920s. 12 These conflicting tendencies have resulted in the current contradictory situation in which Egyptian women find themselves to this day: while official state discourse encourages – at least theoretically – the attainment of more public rights (to education, work, and political participation), women are still confronted with serious forms of gender inequality within the private domain of the home and family. 10 This legacy, a product of Nasser’s state and reproduced in slightly different forms during the presidencies of Sadat and Mubarak, has had far-reaching consequences. The private sphere remains an uncontested stronghold of patriarchy. Furthermore, while the state’s propaganda has continued to emphasize the role played by women in the workplace, nevertheless, it has always sought to stress that a woman’s place is first and foremost at home. This fact was enshrined in Egypt’s 1971 Constitution, particularly in article eleven that read as follows: “The State shall guarantee harmonization between the duties of woman towards the family and her work in the society, ensuring her equality status with man in fields of political, social, cultural and economic life without violation of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence”.13 11 Article eleven deserves special attention because it perfectly sums up the contradictions inherent in the state’s feminist project in Egypt. The fact that the constitution emphasizes a woman’s duties towards her family, as well as the state’s role in helping women to reconcile this duty with her role in the public sphere, proves that the state’s vision of feminism is deeply influenced by a belief in the sanctity of the family, and in women’s traditional roles in it according to certain interpretations of Islamic Shari’a. Significantly, the same constitutional text appeared again in article ten of the short-lived 2012 constitution, and yet again as article eleven in the current 2014 constitution.14 One important difference in the 2014 edition is the recognition of the state’s responsibility to end all forms of violence against women. However, it remains unclear how this relates to the reconciliation of women’s duties in the public and private spheres, and what kind of measures the state will actually implement to ensure that.

12 The above account of the history of state feminism in Egypt highlights three important aspects. First, state feminist solutions to the problem of how best to ensure the incorporation of women into public life has led to a new envisioning of the home (private), and of the workplace and the street (public), as gendered spaces. Second, these new imaginings, as expressed in official government discourse, were often contradictory, as they sought to balance gender relations without actually confronting the root causes of gender inequality in the private sphere of the home. Third, as a consequence of the previous two aspects, this unresolved contradiction has led to the rise of a social discourse, often sanctioned by the state, on how women should behave

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 31

once they find themselves crossing the boundaries between the private and the public. These have included prescriptions on the ways women should carry themselves, how they should deal with men, and what they should wear.15 The idea that the public space was gendered, and that it was male, became the dominant logic advocated by society and uncontested by the state. This marked Egyptian state feminism as an enigma, for it empowered women to enter public space, yet did not provide the necessary conditions under which their presence could eventually lead to substantive improvements in their status.

Nationalist versus Islamic women: identity wars

13 One important point of contention between those supporting the July 3rd, 2013 coup, and those against it, centers on the position of women and how Egypt’s short-lived Islamist government under President , sought to roll back the legal gains that Egyptian women had made in the past decades. Supporters of the July 3rd coup often singled out women (along with Egypt’s Coptic minority) as groups that stood to lose most if the Islamists remained in power. The actions undertaken by the Muslim Brotherhood-led government seemed to lend strength to this argument. The 2012 constitution lacked any mention of gender equality, referring vaguely instead to “equality and equal opportunities for all citizens, men and women.”16 While this was seen by some as implicitly referring to legal equality between the sexes, many women’s rights advocates saw it as the worst Constitution in Egypt’s history regarding gender quality, since it was literally silent on the issue. Public debates on the 2012 Constitution and whether it represented a continuation or a break from earlier constitutional traditions in Egypt, echoed earlier debates on women’s status stretching all the way back from the 1920s and 1930s. According to historians writing on this topic, debates on state feminism in Egypt culminated in a conservative approach to the question of women’s presence in the public space, and in a continuous avoidance of the thorny issue of the state’s responsibility in promoting gender equality in the private sphere.

14 But parallel to this project, there emerged another one; that of turning the gender question into a nationalist one. This was achieved through the dual tactic of promoting one model of womanhood as ideal, and by representing the nation itself as a woman. In her book, Egypt as Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics, Beth Baron discusses at length the historically rich process through which Egyptians, influenced by Western nationalist traditions, portrayed Egypt as a woman in national iconography, vernacular language and popular culture.17 The genealogy of such representations tying women to the state, while not exclusive to Egypt, seems to stretch continuously from the 1920s until the 25th of January, 2011 and the 30 th of June, 2013 . References to Egypt as “Bahya” (a woman’s name meaning the beautiful one ) and “Omm El Donia” (“mother of the world”) denote an ongoing fascination with the image of Egypt as a woman. 15 This particular model of ideal Egyptian womanhood, closely tied to representations of the nation itself as a woman, arose in opposition to the two contrasting, Islamist and conservative models. The latter two, that reflect opposing visions of the nation and its women, along with the national model of womanhood explained above, continue to influence the parameters of national discourse on women’s status, as well as its limits.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 32

16 The first model is the one promoted by the Islamists. It is based on an ideal of womanhood as ascribed by the tenets of Islamic Shari’ a. While the logic of state feminism in Egypt rests on a public/private duality that values women’s participation in public life on the one hand, and stresses their central role as mothers and wives on the other, imaginings of ideal womanhood inspired by the Islamic revival in Egypt are focused on a rejection of the logic of equality itself as a foreign element of Western origin.18 While such attitudes toward gender equality date back to the early writings of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and ideologues, they were very much still alive and a part of recent debates following the election of Mohamed Morsi as President in 2012. One incident that highlighted this clearly was the statement issued by the Muslim Brotherhood in early 2013, in response to a declaration by the General Assembly of the United Nations, on violence against women.19 Muslim Brotherhood members expressed objections to this statement that formally laid out their views on women’s rights for the first time since their ascent to power in June 2012. They included a rejection of the idea of partnership between men and women, advocating instead the Islamic notion of “guardianship” of men over women. Furthermore, the statement mentioned that wives have no right to file legal charges against their husbands for rape, and that husbands should not be subject to the punishments meted out for the rape of a stranger. This statement proved to many that the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance on women had remained more or less the same as in the past, despite previous allegations by some of its members that MB views had changed.20 17 The second new model is more recent, and is yet to be fully articulated. But it has already informed and inspireed the more recent forms of women’s mobilization that have taken place in the past four years since the January 25th, 2011 revolution. This new imagery, while similar to that of the ideal nationalist model of Egyptian womanhood articulated above, nevertheless attempts to push the boundaries of women’s participation to the fullest, and in the process, manages to question the very paradigm of the nationalist gender discourse. One important way this is done is through an active engagement in the issue of women’s bodies in public space. Such an engagement, while breaking a long-standing taboo on the growing problem of sexual violence in the public sphere, has managed to destabilize the iconic model of national womanhood, and its claims on public space in particular. The challenge presented by such a new wave of “revolutionary feminism” to the older, deeply rooted gender discourses in Egypt has been far from simple. While this challenge seems to be waning now, it has left its mark on the dominant discourses on women in the public sphere in a number of interesting ways. I shall return to this issue in the concluding section.

El-Sissi’s women: False generalizations?

18 Egypt’s two uprisings (January 25th, 2011 and June 30th, 2013) threw into sharp relief all the dynamics summarized above. The official gender discourse of the state came under attack following the overthrow of Mubarak. State feminism, relegated in the popular imagination to the personality cult surrounding Suzanne Mubarak, was vilified as being elitist and far removed from the real occupations of Egyptian women. This continued to be the case under the short-lived government of Morsi, where an anti-feminist discourse prevailed and extended beyond the NCW and state feminism to independent forms of mobilization. The Muslim Brotherhood’s attack on women’s rights was

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 33

integral to their new vision of the state and society, and part of a wider campaign to take over the state’s institutions.

19 As a result of the Brotherhood’s campaign against women’s rights, a new popular discourse articulating the resilience of women in the face of increasing attempts by the Brotherhood to restrict their rights, began to rise. In the lead-up to June 30th, 2013, the media in Egypt began to continuously attack what they perceived as the threat against women coming from the MB, and celebrate the resistance of Egyptian women to this adversary. This discourse began to gain momentum in the midst of the mobilization efforts against Muslim Brotherhood rule. 20 Normative visions of women’s liberation from Islamic rule, a discursive logic that was only prevalent among secularly-inclined intellectuals, has become more popular and tied to hegemonic visions of state control, which in effect denotes military control. What is questionable about this new gender discourse is the extent to which such support is real or manufactured, or both. An answer to this can be distilled from analyzing and comparing two distinct but interrelated phenomena: the discourse of women who publically supported El-Sissi’s candidacy and his rise to power following June 30th, 2013, as well as the more general assumption that Egyptian women en masse support his leadership, much more than men. While these two aspects promoted by popular media are not the same, they nevertheless feed into a common broader narrative on gender in post-June 30th Egypt. 21 A number of questions arise here: Who are El-Sissi’s women? And to what extent do the media representations of those women reflect the real reasons behind their own choices in aligning with the military against the Muslim Brotherhood? Or have their experiences been reconfigured and reproduced in a hegemonic discourse that is politically motivated? Understanding the phenomena of El-Sissi’s women requires a critical examination of who these women are, and the reasons why they are being represented as the quintessential Egyptian women. It also requires analysis of how the state-controlled media, as part of its propaganda against Muslim brotherhood rule, incorporated women in a hegemonic discourse seeking to recreate what could be termed a “new hegemonic interpretation of women’s lived experiences”.21 22 The emergence of the collective figure of Egyptian women unanimously supporting the military in the run-up to June 30th, 2013, involved images of women from all classes and areas of Egypt. The idea of presenting women from all walks of life, seemingly united in their view of the dangers that the Muslim Brotherhood represented to all women in Egypt, began to appear as a common feature of both televised and online media outlets. The diversity of those women’s experiences and the different reasons why they might have chosen to side with the military were intentionally blurred. 23 In the months preceding June 30th, a particular type of women became advocates of this view. This set of women represented a familiar type: those who stood to lose the most from the dismantling of the model of state feminism that existed under Mubarak. Tahani El Gebali, serving as a Supreme Constitutional Court judge, was one of the best- known figures of this group. A regular guest in the media at the time, and an articulate speaker, El Gebali provided the necessary legal and political cover for constructing a hegemonic discourse on why the Brotherhood’s rule was bad for women. In addition, figures like El Gebali managed to link gendered critiques of the Brotherhood to visions of a promised authoritarian rule that would save the day by restoring Egypt’s own version of modernity, complete with the public/private division of gender roles,

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 34

against another threatening gender regime promoted by the Islamists. Invoking the Nasserist era’s promise of women’s liberation as part and parcel of the nation’s liberation from Islamic rule, figures like El Gebali created a discourse focused on the need to return to the state’s legacy of protective feminism.22 These arguments were mostly constructed around the dangers inherent in the 2012 Constitution, how it failed women, and why women needed to mobilize en masse against it. 24 Other independent female figures, leftists or Nasserists, who also envisioned Islamic rule as the major threat facing women in Egypt, joined state feminists in their support for the military, albeit less explicitly. One such figure is Shahinda Maklad, a veteran activist for peasant rights, and a product of the Nasserist era’s state feminism and the new opportunities for education that it opened to women. Maklad became a central figure of in a drama of contesting gender discourses. During a demonstration against President Morsi in the area around the presidential palace in November 2012, Maklad was attacked by a male member of the MB’s Freedom and Justice party who, symbolically enough, put his hand over her mouth to silence her chanting. The video of the incident went viral and constituted a galvanizing tool to mobilize Egyptians against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in the months that followed.23 Maklad was later interviewed by numerous T.V. channels, further giving voice to a new discourse of gendered opposition to the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. 25 But El-Sissi’s women are not only state feminists or notable female public figures. Those portrayed by the media as El-Sissi’s women also come from more common lower-class backgrounds and have only been made famous by virtue of their praise of the leader. 26 Some of those women have become celebrities overnight for vilifying the Muslim Brotherhood online. Countless videos of simple Egyptian women speaking about El- Sissi’s virility, strength and his other admirable masculine traits, began circulating in the period following the 2013 coup.24 While popular discussions of El-Sissi’s female supporters have seemed to center specifically on his “masculine appeal”, one dimension that has seemed missing from this debate is the extent of many Egyptian women’s sense of vulnerability following the increased wave of sexual violence in Egypt in the past three years. One recurrent reason often put forward by women from all walks of life for their support to El-Sissi seems to hinge on the revival of the protective role of the state in relation to women. As mentioned in the first section, state feminist solutions to the problem of how best to ensure the incorporation of women into public life had more recently failed in providing women with a safe public space. This had left women grappling with a paradox that remains true to this day: the public sphere might be the only space where women feel that they have any chance of realizing equality. Since gender inequality in the private space remains uncontested, women’s participation in the public sphere, through paid work and political participation at all levels, remains the only sphere of gender contestation in Egypt. To many ordinary Egyptian women from all walks of life, remaining part of public space continues to be the goal of mainstream feminism, just as it was during the Nasserist era. This logic, albeit less emphasized by hegemonic media discussions of El-Sissi’s women, was nevertheless expressed both explicitly and implicitly by many of those women.25 27 These larger groups of women who have found El-Sissi appealing as a protector are also able to legitimately express those views, mainly because of the deep-seated conservative discourse of this new brand of state feminism. In this sense, this new gendered discourse does not depart much from the contradictions of earlier state

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 35

feminist projects in Egypt. On the other hand, notable public female figures like El- Gebali, Maklad and others who have chosen to support El-Sissi might have different motives than common women. For state feminists, support from the state, even if it is only nominal, remains their only viable option given the attacks on their very existence following January 25th, 2011. However, it remains clear that women’s support for military rule and for El-Sissi is neither a universal phenomenon, nor is it motivated by the same reasons or guided by the same logic. On the contrary, El-Sissi’s women represent diverse individual subjectivities and conflicting constituencies that express numerous, competing gender discourses. Moreover, they also represent only one of many emerging gender discourses that might actually depart significantly from both the historical model of state feminism in Egypt, and its two alternatives: Islamic feminism and revolutionary feminism.

Conclusion

28 In Egypt, a new popular discourse, expressed in vernacular forms of language, in the media and in the writings of intellectuals and political analysts, stresses the support of “Egyptian women” as a uniform category, for the Egyptian military in their war against Islamist terrorism. The portrayal of Egyptian women’s universal infatuation with the military General-turned-President overlooks the diversity of reasons for which many women supported the military overthrow of the Brotherhood. It also overlooks the intentional ways in which the idea of universal support was manufactured for political reasons. While the ruling military regime did actively promote this image and encourage its circulation in the media, it is also the result of the self-promoting efforts of certain statist female figures, both in the government and outside it, who simply saw themselves as representative of certain interests that would have been hurt, had the Muslim Brotherhood continued to rule.

29 One source of the manufacturing this image of Egyptian women as one unified group might be found in the attempts by notable state feminists to revive a legacy of state feminism that had undergone serious questioning following the January 25th, 2011 revolution. In this sense, El-Sissi’s women as an ideological construction, might reflect these state feminists’ bid to regain a position that they have lost. Another reason might lie in the increasing challenge that the state faces in combating sexual violence in the public sphere, a challenge that the state institutions have failed to meet in any successful way so far. Promoting El-Sissi as the great savior of women might also serve to lessen public fears about a phenomenon that has seemed to be slipping out of control and that threatens women’s presence in the public sphere. In addition, the emerging, diverse gender discourses that stress women’s support for the new military state as unanimous and uncontested, might also be motivated by an attempt to erase a rich three-year history of independent gender-based mobilization, especially around the issue of gender violence in the public sphere. Although independent mobilization attempts were weakened in the period following June 30th, 2013, they have nevertheless managed to challenge deep-seated patriarchal notions on women’s roles in public space. Independent activists, groups and organizations greatly troubled those notions by introducing the concept of “body politics” to mainstream national discourses on women. Furthermore, such activism has resulted in significant changes in the national

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 36

discourse on sexual violence, prompting for the first time, official state recognition of the extent of this problem. 30 Thus, understanding the phenomena of El-Sissi’s women requires in turn, an understanding of the challenges that state feminist projects in Egypt have faced over the past four years. Ironically, El-Sissi’s women, as subjects and as ideological and politically-motivated constructions, might be the product of a backlash against women by all parties and at the same time, a result of the revival in gender discourse in Egypt after 2011. It remains to be seen, however, whether any of the emerging discourses on women in Egypt can free itself from the trappings of identity politics that have impeded the possibilities of independent mobilization for a long time, as well as the emergence of a political discourse on women’s rights that is grounded in the reality of women’s experiences, and not in their supposed political or cultural identities. Could such an understanding of women’s rights emerge in Egypt, given the latest political developments? As Egypt’s ruling military regime turns into an outright dictatorship with thousands arrested and jailed, separating women’s rights from politics at large is becoming more difficult. As independent women’s voices become silenced, and the country sinks more into the grip of military dictatorship, Egyptian feminism seems to be sliding more and more into the trappings of an endless identity debate. This debate conceals state paternalism and its direct role in women’s oppression by highlighting its protective role toward women, and by precluding the emergence of new forms of activism that could bridge the fault lines of identity and reclaim a space for the diverse experiences of women that have emerged over the past four years.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Badran, Margot. 2009. Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.

Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bier, Laura. 2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

El-Shakry, Omnia. 2007. The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kholoussy, Hanan.2010. For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mahmoud, Sabaa. 2004. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 37

Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. Colonizing Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rofel, Lisa. 1999. Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Online Articles

Eric Cunningham“, In Egypt, presidential contender Abdel Fatah al-Sissi appeals to women voters”, Washington Post at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-egypt-presidential- contender-abdel-fattah-al-sissi-appeals-to-women-voters/2014/05/25/eb880eb0-99cd-44d9- ac0e-98e077d2ff33_story.html . Accessed on 9/8/2014

Sara Abdel Rahim, “Sissi, the candidate for Egyptian women? ”, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy’s at: http://timep.org/commentary/sisi-candidate-for-egyptian-women. Accessed on 9/9/2014.

“Egypt’s Sissi faces challenge over ’sexual terror’”, The Times of Israel: http:// www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sisi-faces-challenge-over-sexual-terror. Accessed on 11/9/2014.

Patrick Kingsley “Seven arrested for sexually assaulting student during Tahrir Celebrations”, The Guardian at : http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/seven-arrest-sexual-assault- student-tahrir-square-sisi-inauguration. Accessed on 9/8/2014

Mada Masr “Sissi visits Tahrir Square mob sexual assault victim in hospital” at: http:// www.madamasr.com/content/sisi-visits-tahrir-square-mob-sexual-assault-victim-hospital. Accessed on 15/9/2014

Khafagy, Fatma. 8-14 March 2007. “Commentary: A look at the women’s machinery”. Al-Ahram Weekly online at: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/835/sc14.htm. Accessed on 20/9/2014.

Muslim Brotherhood statement on the UN declaration on violence against women, Ikwan online at: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30731 Accessed on 9/9/2014

CBC’s report on January 8th 2013 at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/former-top-court-judge- challenges-egypt-s-new-constitution-1.1390698 Accessed on 9/8/2014

Dalia Rabie “Sisi and his women: The military candidate appeals to women without offering them much in return”, at http://www.madamasr.com/content/sisi-and-his-women Accessed on 9/11/2014

The United Commission of the Status of Women fifty seventh session, General Assembly Declaration at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/ CSW57_Agreed_Conclusions_%28CSW_report_excerpt%29.pdf Accessed on 9/8/2014

YouTube Videos https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlfVyq5Y_ek Accessed on 9/9/2014 (no longer online)

/https://www.youtube.com ةديس صقرت مامأ عارتق ةنجل ل دعبا اهتيوصت معنب روتسدلل )14/01/2014 ( watch?v=yEL8kz4EiUU Accessed on 9/9/2014 ريرقت يران ةانق ةريزجلانم صقر ءاسن نع يسيسلا تاباختنلا يف بعشلاو يرصملا يلع هينغا https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkM6C52gI-w Accessed on يرشب ربخ 2014 ) 28/05/2014 ( 9/10/2014

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 38

NOTES

1. For examples of such coverage see: The Washington Post report by Eric Cunningham: “In Egypt, presidential contender Abdel Fatah al-Sissi appeals to women voters” at http:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-egypt-presidential-contender-abdel-fattah-al-sissi-appeals- to-women-voters/2014/05/25/eb880eb0-99cd-44d9-ac0e-98e077d2ff33_story.html and the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy’s report by Sara Abdel Rahim: "Sissi, the candidate for Egyptian women?" At http://timep.org/commentary/sisi-candidate-for-egyptian-women 2. For examples of such videos, please see the following links: https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=wlfVyq5Y_ek ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEL8kz4EiUU ; https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=gkM6C52gI-w 3. For more details of the incident see: "Egypt's Sissi faces challenge over 'sexual terror'", The Times of Israel: http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sisi-faces-challenge-over-sexual-terror 4. For more details on the events of the inauguration on June the 8th 2014 see: Patrick Kingsley: “Seven arrested for sexually assaulting student during Tahrir Celebrations" http:// www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/seven-arrest-sexual-assault-student-tahrir-square- sisi-inauguration 5. For details about El-Sissi’s visit and the reactions to it, see Mada Masr’s report: http:// www.madamasr.com/content/sisi-visits-tahrir-square-mob-sexual-assault-victim-hospital 6. Baron: 2005. 7. Bier: 2011, p.37. 8. For more on this argument and on critiques of centralized planning see: Bier: 2011 and Mitchell: 1991. 9. El-Shakry, Omnia.2007. The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 10. Badran, Margot. 2009. Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. Oxford: One world Publications, Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, and Kholoussy, Hanan.2010. For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press, and Bier, Laura. 2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 11. Bier: 2011. 12. Kholoussy: 2010. 13. Egypt’s 1971 Constitution, article 11. 14. Egypt’s 2012 Constitution, article 10 and Egypt’s 2014 Constitution, article 11. 15. For more on the origins of state feminism in Egypt under Nasser, see: Bier, Laura.2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 16. Egypt 2012 Constitution, preamble. 17. Baron,Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. 18. Mahmoud, Sabaa. 2004. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 19. For the full text of this declaration see: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/csw57/ CSW57_Agreed_Conclusions_%28CSW_report_excerpt%29.pdf 20. For more on the Muslim Brotherhood statement on the UN declaration on violence against women, see: http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30731 21. Rofel, Lisa. 1999. Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 39

22. For more on El-Gibali critiques of Egypt’s 2012 constitution, see: CBS’s report on January 8 th 2013: http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/former-top-court-judge-challenges-egypt-s-new- constitution-1.1390698 23. For the video of Shahinda Makled’s incident and an interview with her: https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-MsqcaH9UA 24. For a detailed discussion on El-Sissi’s masculine appeal to women: http:// www.madamasr.com/content/sisi-and-his-women 25. For examples of this particular discourse, see this video of women explaining why they are demonstrating against the Muslim Brotherhood’s constitution, see: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=dqQr0IF-y_Y

ABSTRACTS

In the wake of the overthrow of former President Morsi amid massive demonstrations through June and July 2013, a specific new gender discourse began emerging in Egypt. Focusing on the high levels of participation of women from all wakes of life in the demonstrations against Islamist rule in Egypt, this new popular discourse is articulated in vernacular forms of expression, in the media, or in the writings of intellectuals and political analysts. It stresses the supposedly unanimous and uncontested support of “Egyptian women” as a uniform category, to the Egyptian military in their war against Islamic terrorism and to the military State, as well as their purportedly universal infatuation with President Abd el-Fattah el-Sissi. This indicates the rise of a new discursive form of State feminism, one that seeks to erase a rich four-year history of diverse gender-based mobilization. This article deconstructs the myth of “El-Sissi’s women” in reference to particular models of gendered imaginations of the nation-State and Egyptian women in the twentieth century, as well as their political expressions – and to the emerging “revolutionary” representation of women since 2011. These images and narratives allow us to decode the media-borne myth of “El-Sissi’s women” and analyze it as an attempt to construct a new and disturbing discursive form of State feminism. The politicization of women’s images – dancing in front of ballot boxes in the 2014 presidential elections or expressing support for their favorite candidate El-Sissi in videos – is part of this emerging discursive attempt to mask the multitude of claims women address to the State and of readings of women’s rights. By constructing the image of “Egyptian women” as a unified category and silencing alternative and independent voices, this new State feminism instrumentalizes women and their issues for political purposes in this period of sharp political and identity-based polarization, while giving them little in return.

Suite au renversement de l’ancien président Morsi lors d’énormes manifestations en juin-juillet 2013, un nouveau discours spécifique sur le genre a commencé à apparaitre en Égypte. Centré sur le haut niveau de participation des femmes de toutes origines sociales à ces manifestations, ce nouveau discours à succès est articulé dans la langue vernaculaire, dans les médias, dans les écrits d’intellectuels et d’analystes politiques. Il met l’accent sur un soutien présumé unanime et incontesté des « femmes égyptiennes », comme catégorie uniforme, pour l’armée égyptienne dans sa guerre contre le terrorisme islamiste et pour l’État militaire, ainsi que sur leur engouement supposé universel, pour le Président Abd al-Fattâh al-Sissi. Cela indique la montée

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 40

en puissance d’une nouvelle forme discursive de féminisme d’État, cherchant à effacer une histoire riche et diverse de quatre ans de mobilisations liées au genre. Cette contribution déconstruit le mythe des « femmes d’al-Sissi » en référence à des modèles spécifiques d’imaginaires genrés de l’État-nation et des femmes égyptiennes au vingtième siècle, ainsi qu’à leurs expressions politiques—ainsi qu’aux représentations « révolutionnaires » émergentes des femmes depuis 2011. Ces images et ces récits nous permettent de décoder le mythe des « femmes d’al-Sissi » porté par les médias, et de l’analyser en tant que volonté de construire une forme discursive aussi nouvelle que troublante, du féminisme d’État. La politisation des images de femmes, dansant devant les urnes lors de la présidentielle de 2014 ou exprimant leur soutien à leur candidat favori, al-Sissi, dans des vidéos, fait partie de cette tentative discursive de masquer la multitude de revendications adressées par les femmes à l’État et, et de lectures des droits des femmes. En construisant l’image des « femmes égyptiennes » comme catégorie unique et en réduisant au silence les voix alternatives et indépendantes, ce nouveau féminisme d’État instrumentalise les femmes et leurs problématiques à des fins politiques, en cette période de vive polarisation politique et identitaire, tout en ne leur donnant que très peu en retour.

INDEX

Keywords: Egypt, women, feminism, El-Sissi, state feminism Mots-clés: Egypte, femmes, féminisme, féminisme d'État, El-Sissi

AUTHOR

HIND AHMED ZAKI

Hind Ahmed Zaki is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. She holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Washington and a B.A in Political Science from Cairo University. She is a Comparative Law and Social Studies (CLASS) fellow at the University of Washington and a graduate student instructor who teaches courses on Middle East Politics and Governance, Gender and Public Law. In her dissertation, Hind aims to develop a clearer understanding of the phenomenon of sexual violence and its manifestations in Tunisia and Egypt, and to highlight the central turning points in the creation of what could be termed a “culture of sexual violence” at the intersection of the state and society. She analyses how sexual violence became politicized in the wake of the Arab spring last four years in both states, and how it played out in formal and informal political processes including the Truth and Dignity Committee in Tunisia, and the mass sexual assaults in Tahrir Square. In addition to her academic work, Hind served as consultant to a number of local women’s rights organizations in Egypt. She was recognized as a “Woman of Courage” by the UW Women’s Center for her advocacy of human rights and gender justice. She publishes in both English and on issues of women’s rights and gender inequality, particularly in North Africa and the Middle [email protected]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 41

Les « femmes de Sissi » ? Mutations des discours du genre et limites du féminisme d’État El-Sissi’s Women? Shifting gender discourses and the limits of state feminism

Hind Ahmed Zaki Traduction : Perrine Lachenal

1 Égypte, mai 2014 : en cette veille d’élection présidentielle, à l’entrée des bureaux de vote, des files de personnes attendent, patiemment et sous le soleil, que leur tour arrive. Beaucoup de femmes sont présentes parmi elles, ainsi qu’aiment à le mentionner les médias1. Dès le premier jour du scrutin, des vidéos circulent d’ailleurs sur les réseaux sociaux, montrant des Égyptiennes issues de toutes les classes sociales, faisant la fête et dansant devant les bureaux de vote2. Le soutien visible des femmes pour le candidat de l’armée, Abd El-Fattah El-Sissi, est alors largement commenté dans la presse, voire même légèrement tourné en dérision par certains observateurs locaux et internationaux. Ces images de jubilation féminine circulent en Égypte au moment où l’idée commence à se répandre que les femmes égyptiennes ont joué un rôle déterminant dans la chute des Frères musulmans. Elles viennent ainsi alimenter les interprétations en termes de genre, déjà relayées médiatiquement aussi, de la journée du 30 juin – celle de la « révolution » pour certains, celle du « coup d’État » pour d’autres.

2 Moins d’une quinzaine de jours plus tard, une autre vidéo circule sur internet, tournée lors des rassemblements célébrant l’élection du nouveau président égyptien. Il ne s’agit pas cette fois de scènes de liesse mais bien de violence. Les images, apparemment filmées à l’aide d’un téléphone portable, montrent un groupe d’hommes entourant une jeune femme dont les habits déchirés couvrent mal le corps dénudé et marqué par des contusions visibles. Cette vidéo circule en quelques jours de manière virale3. Et alors que, depuis 2012, les organisations de défense des droits des femmes ne cessent de donner l’alerte – en vain – sur de telles agressions de femmes dans l’espace public égyptien, c’est à ce moment-là, en 2014, que des mesures sont prises pour la première

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 42

fois au niveau gouvernemental. Sept personnes sont arrêtées4 et le Président en personne apparait, en train de rendre visite à une des victimes de ces attaques, un bouquet de fleurs à la main, pour lui présenter des excuses5. 3 Ces deux types de représentations des femmes égyptiennes dans des moments de liesse nationale – à la fois mises en valeur et sexuellement violentées – soulèvent plusieurs interrogations. Quelles sont les limites du féminisme d’ État, lorsque les débats sur la présence et le rôle des femmes dans l’espace public sont traversés par d’autres débats politiques plus larges sur l’identité et l’avenir de l’Égypte ? Les réponses à ces questions ne sont pas simples. Comprendre les limites du féminisme d’État en Égypte exige en effet de mener une enquête historique et politique, ainsi qu’une étude de la nature ambivalente du processus de modernisation du pays durant la période postcoloniale. Les enjeux de genre qui travaillent le mouvement nationaliste égyptien méritent une attention particulière : depuis la fin du dix-neuvième siècle, ce dernier s’articule en effet à des figures féminines représentant l’Égypte, et particulièrement au registre maternel, pour évoquer la nation6. 4 Cet article souhaite présenter la manière dont les imaginaires nationalistes genrés, et leurs traductions politiques, se sont manifestés en Égypte dans la période qui a succédé aux « printemps arabes ». Il s’agit de montrer que le discours nationaliste qui s’est développé dans l’Égypte de l’après-30 juin 2013, demeure singulier à plusieurs égards, relevant d’une forme inédite de féminisme d’État. Cette dernière, alors même qu’elle comporte nombre d’éléments communs avec les précédents discours portant sur les femmes en Égypte, semble s’ancrer davantage dans le concret de la politique. Il est par ailleurs structuré par les diverses composantes des mouvements de femmes égyptiennes, dont certaines sont radicalement opposées aux notions historiquement constituées de ce qu’est la place des femmes au sein de la nation. Ce type de féminisme étatique, tel qu’il émerge en Égypte depuis 2011, se révèle éminemment problématique, et l’est devenu plus encore à la suite du coup d’État du 30 juin. 5 Depuis janvier 2011, des réactions et des interprétations divergentes émergent, relativement à la présence des Égyptiennes dans l’espace public. On assiste d’un côté à la politisation des corps des femmes et à leur instrumentalisation en tant que symboles politiques, observables sur les scènes révolutionnaires et contre-révolutionnaires. De l’autre, on assiste à la célébration de la participation des femmes, suggérant qu’un type nouveau de capacité d’agir – agency – au féminin est en train d’émerger, s’accompagnant d’un ensemble de discours alternatifs portant sur le genre en Égypte. La manière novatrice de prendre en compte la problématique des violences sexuelles pourra être appréhendée au regard de ces nouveaux discours : elle n’est pas uniquement liée à l’élévation du nombre et de la gravité des agressions contre les femmes, mais également à la prise de conscience par les Égyptiennes de l’ampleur du phénomène et à leur volonté d’agir pour résoudre le problème. Depuis 2011, les arguments avancés au sein du débat sur les femmes dans l’espace public se distinguent des précédents, à la fois de manière pratique et discursive, et mobilisent des catégories discursives nouvelles. 6 Cet article cherche à distinguer les anciennes représentations du genre de celles qui ont émergé récemment. Il repose sur une analyse fine des discours médiatiques relatifs au supposé soutien unanime des Égyptiennes pour les militaires, présentés comme le seul recours face à la menace de dégradation de leurs droits incarnée par les Frères musulmans. Je souhaite déconstruire le mythe des « femmes de Sissi » en montrant que

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 43

l’usage stratégique des images de ces dernières, dansant devant les bureaux de vote ou affichant publiquement leur soutien durant l’élection présidentielle, participe à l’émergence d’une nouvelle forme de féminisme d’État. Celle-ci repose sur une instrumentalisation politiques des femmes – et des problématiques qui leur sont liées – sans pour autant qu’elles n’y gagnent quoi que ce soit en retour. Il faut souligner par ailleurs que le soutien des femmes à Sissi est loin d’être univoque et traduit une diversité de revendications et de représentations des « droits des femmes ». Diverses revendications stratégiques auprès de l’État s’articulent sur ce thème, au moment où la lutte autour du sens culturel donné aux droits des femmes acquiert une signification politique plus large, dans le contexte de la polarisation politique sans précédent qui caractérise une transition politique dans l’impasse en Égypte. 7 Ce texte s’organise en trois parties. Tout d’abord, je présenterai les fondements historiques du féminisme d’État en Égypte, et comment les récents évènements leur ont fait écho. Dans une seconde partie, je soulignerai que les projets nationalistes et islamiques ont en commun d’utiliser les femmes – discursivement et pratiquement – comme des instruments politiques ; ceci a contribué à cantonner progressivement le débat sur les femmes égyptiennes à des questions d’authenticité. La discussion du statut des femmes en Égypte semble aujourd’hui dans l’impasse, immobilisées dans une rhétorique identitaire qui tient à distance la dimension éminemment politique de la question et obère tout débat constructif. Je discuterai de ce point en analysant les représentations médiatiques de deux phénomènes distincts : d’un côté, le cas des femmes qui ont affiché publiquement leur soutien à Sissi et à sa candidature, et de l’autre, l’acception populaire selon laquelle les femmes égyptiennes supportaient massivement son arrivée au pouvoir. Je terminerai en identifiant certains des enjeux stratégiques qui se dissimulent derrière le phénomène des femmes de Sissi.

Le féminisme d’État en Égypte depuis ses fondements

8 Dans son livre Revolutionary Womanhood : Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt, l'historienne Laura Bier explique que les ordres sexués et politiques instaurés par les élites dirigeantes à la suite de l'indépendance nominale de l’ Égypte vis-à-vis de la Grande-Bretagne en 1923, subissent ensuite des changements majeurs à la suite du coup d'État de 19527. Le régime qui est alors établi en Égypte puise dans l'ensemble des réformes sociales entamées dans les années 1920 et 1930, mais introduit aussi des changements importants sur plusieurs fronts. Au lieu de se reposer sur les initiatives de bienfaisance organisées par la haute société égyptienne, les réformes sociales entrent par exemple dans une phase de planification et de rationalisation, sous le contrôle d’un gouvernement central fort, ceci menant à un monopole étatique – à la fois discursif et institutionnel – sur certaines questions sociales, et notamment celles relatives aux femmes8. La construction des bases idéologiques de ce qui allait devenir l'État nassérien s’articule alors progressivement à une délimitation claire des domaines public et privé. Surtout, le nouveau féminisme d'État qui émerge s’emploie à faire taire les débats alors foisonnants sur la question féminine, qui avaient vu le jour dans la période de l'entre- deux guerres. Ces débats illustraient bien l’existence et la concurrence de différents points de vue sur les idéaux nationaux relatifs au genre.9

9 Entre les années 1920 et 1950, les discussions se concentraient sur la façon dont l’amélioration de l’accès au travail et à l'éducation pour les femmes allait influencer

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 44

leurs rôles traditionnels de mère et de femme au foyer. Il était aussi question de la manière dont ces changements allaient affecter l’institution du mariage et les relations intimes entre hommes et femmes en son sein. C’est un tout autre discours qui émerge dans les années 1960. Ce dernier se focalise sur les femmes en tant que travailleuses et citoyennes, actrices d’un espace public en reconfiguration. Des questions telles que le mariage, le divorce ou la garde des enfants sont alors traitées de manière fragmentaire, par des règlementations ou des réformes ponctuelles, rendant invisible tout débat sur le statut des femmes dans la sphère privée10. Pas une seule tentative de réforme des lois régissant le statut personnel n'est menée dans les années 1950 ou 1960. En réalité, rien n’est tenté jusqu'en 1979, lorsque la loi 44/1979, plus communément appelée « la loi de Jihân », est jugée inconstitutionnelle par la Cour Suprême Constitutionnelle égyptienne11. Sous Nasser, Sadate, et jusqu'à Moubarak, les dirigeants politiques de l’Égypte ont tout simplement répugné à affronter la question de l'inégalité entre les sexes, codifiée dans les lois remontant aux années 1920 et régissant le statut personnel12. Ces tendances contradictoires ont donné naissance à une situation ambivalente, toujours visible aujourd’hui en Égypte : alors même que le discours officiel encourage, au moins théoriquement, la mise en œuvre d’avantage de droits publics – éducation, travail et participation politique – pour les femmes, ces dernières sont confrontées à de graves formes d’inégalité dans le domaine privé de la maison et de la famille. Cet héritage direct de l’ère nassérienne, globalement reconduit sous les présidences de Sadate et Moubarak, a ainsi eu des manifestations à long terme : en Égypte, la sphère privée reste un bastion incontesté du patriarcat. Si les discours officiels ont insisté sur l’importance du rôle des femmes dans le monde professionnel, ils ont néanmoins toujours cherché à souligner que leur place était d'abord, et avant tout, à la maison. Ce principe est d’ailleurs consacré dans la Constitution égyptienne de 1971, notamment à travers l'article 11 : « L'État doit garantir l'harmonisation des devoirs de la femme envers la famille et le travail dans la société, assurer son statut égal avec l'homme dans les domaines de la vie politique, sociale, culturelle et économique, sans atteinte aux règles de la jurisprudence islamique ». 10 Cet article 11 mérite une attention particulière parce qu’il résume parfaitement les contradictions inhérentes au projet porté par le féminisme d’État en Égypte. Cet accent mis sur les devoirs familiaux des femmes, et sur la responsabilité de l'État d’aider les femmes à les concilier avec leurs rôles publics, montre que les représentations étatiques du féminisme sont profondément influencées par la croyance en la sacralité de la famille et des rôles familiaux traditionnels des femmes, en accord avec certaines interprétations de la charî‘a islamique. De manière significative, cet extrait est repris à l'article 10 de la Constitution - de courte durée - de 2012, et à l'article 11 de la constitution de 2014. Dans ce dernier texte, une différence de taille apparait dans la reconnaissance de la responsabilité de l'État de mettre fin à toutes les formes de violence contre les femmes. Cependant rien n’est précisé quant aux mesures à prendre pour y parvenir, ni le lien entre cet objectif et celui de concilier les devoirs des femmes dans les sphères publiques et privées.

11 Cette esquisse historique du féminisme d'État en Égypte met ainsi en évidence trois aspects fondamentaux. Tout d'abord, les réponses apportées par le féminisme étatique à la question de l'intégration des femmes dans la vie publique ont conduit à des représentations de la maison (le privé), et du lieu de travail et de la rue (le public), comme des espaces genrés. Deuxièmement, ces nouvelles représentations étaient

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 45

présentées comme contradictoires, telles qu'elles étaient exprimées dans les discours gouvernementaux, qui cherchaient à équilibrer les relations de genre sans se confronter aux causes profondes de l'inégalité entre les sexes, au cœur du privé. Comme conséquence des deux points précédents, cette contradiction a conduit à l'émergence d'un discours social, relayé par l'État, sur la façon dont les femmes devaient se comporter lorsqu’elles traversaient les frontières séparant le privé du public. Celui-ci incluait des prescriptions sur les manières dont elles devaient se comporter, traiter avec les hommes et se vêtir13. L'idée selon laquelle l'espace public est un espace sexué, et qu'il est de sexe masculin, est ainsi devenue la logique sociale dominante en Égypte, attestée par l'État. Cela a rendu le féminisme d'État ambivalent et peu lisible : il a encouragé les femmes à entrer dans l'espace public sans pour autant permettre que leur présence ne puisse conduire à des améliorations substantielles de leur statut.

Nationalistes ou islamiques ? Femmes et conflits d’identité

12 Un point des points majeurs de discorde entre ceux qui ont soutenu le coup d’État du 3 juillet 2013, et ceux qui s'y sont opposés, est lié au statut des femmes et aux manières dont le président Mohammad Morsi, pendant son court mandat, avait cherché à faire reculer les droits gagnés par les Égyptiennes au cours des décennies précédentes. Les partisans de son renversement en juillet 2013 maintiennent souvent que les femmes – avec la minorité copte – constituaient un des groupes qui aurait eu le plus à perdre si les islamistes étaient restés au pouvoir. Les actions entreprises par le gouvernement des Frères musulmans semblaient d’ailleurs prêter crédit à cet argument. Par exemple, la Constitution de 2012 ne mentionnait pas le principe de l'égalité entre les sexes, mais évoquait vaguement en préambule « l'égalité des chances pour tous les citoyens, hommes et femmes ». Et bien que cette phrase ait été lue par certains comme une référence implicite à l’égalité de droits entre les sexes, les défenseurs des droits des femmes contestaient ce texte comme étant la pire constitution de l'histoire de l'Égypte, silencieuse sur le principe de l’égalité juridique. Le débat public portant alors sur la Constitution de 2012 – si elle se posait en continuité ou en rupture vis-à-vis des normes constitutionnelles égyptiennes – rappelait étrangement les termes de débats prolongés, lancés dans les années 1920 et 1930, relatifs au statut des femmes. Selon les historiens, les débats sur le féminisme d'État égyptien de cette période se caractérisaient en effet par une prise en compte timide de la question de la présence des femmes dans l'espace public, et par un évitement de l'épineuse responsabilité de l'État dans la promotion de l'égalité entre les sexes dans la sphère privée. En parallèle à ces frilosités officielles, la dimension genrée était paradoxalement surinvestie publiquement par le projet nationaliste. Cet investissement était visible à travers la promotion d’un modèle féminin idéal, articulé à des représentations de la nation égyptienne en tant que femme. Dans son livre Egypt as a Woman : Nationalism, Gender and Politics, Beth Baron discute longuement ce processus historique à travers lequel les Égyptiens, influencés par les traditions nationalistes occidentales, se sont mis à représenter l'Égypte comme une femme à la fois dans l'iconographie nationale, dans le langage commun et dans la culture populaire14. La généalogie de telles représentations, liant femmes et État, sans être exclusive à l'Égypte, semble s’étirer depuis les années 1920 jusqu'aux

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 46

« révolutions » du 25 janvier 2011 et du 30 juin 2013. Les références à l'Égypte sous le nom de « Bahiya » – prénom féminin qui signifie « La belle » – et « Omm El Donia » – la mère du monde – indiquent que la fascination pour une Égypte-femme demeure bien effective depuis 2011. Ce singulier modèle révolutionnaire d’un idéal féminin, étroitement lié à des représentations genrées de la nation égyptienne, s’oppose frontalement aux modèles islamistes et conservateurs qui coexistent avec lui. Ces derniers, véhiculant des visions différentes de la nation et des Égyptiennes, continuent à modeler et à contraindre le discours national portant sur le statut des femmes.

13 Le premier modèle, promu par les islamistes, se base sur un idéal de la féminité ancré dans les principes de la charî‘a islamique. Alors que le féminisme d'État repose en Égypte sur la binarité public/privé, valorisant la participation des femmes dans la vie publique d'une part et soulignant leurs fonctions centrales de mères et d’épouses d’autre part, les imaginaires islamiques de l’idéal féminin s’ancrent sur le rejet du principe même d’égalité entre les sexes, vu comme une importation occidentale15. Ces postures hostiles remontent certes aux premiers écrits des dirigeants et des idéologues des Frères musulmans, mais sont aussi bien présentes au cœur des débats suivant l'élection de Mohammad Morsi en 2012. Le communiqué publié par les Frères musulmans, début 2013, en réponse à une déclaration de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur la violence contre les femmes, l’illustre clairement16. Les Frères y exprimaient leurs objections, affichant ainsi officiellement leur point de vue relatif aux droits des femmes, et ce, pour la première fois depuis leur arrivée au pouvoir, en juin 2012. Ils rejetaient par exemple l'idée d'un partenariat entre les hommes et les femmes, préconisant plutôt la notion islamique de « tutelle » exercée par les hommes sur les femmes. Leur communiqué mentionnait également que les femmes ne possèdent nullement le droit de déposer plainte contre leurs maris pour viol, et que cet acte n’expose pas le mari à la même peine que pour le viol d'une autre femme. Cette déclaration publique a montré que la position de la confrérie vis-à-vis des femmes était restée plus ou moins la même que dans le passé, même si certains de ses membres avaient maintenu que celle-ci avait changé17. 14 Plus récent et pas encore entièrement articulé, le second modèle a déjà influencé et inspiré les modalités de mobilisation des femmes qui ont eu lieu ces quatre dernières années, à l’issue de la révolution du 25 janvier 2011. Bien que similaires à celles du modèle nationaliste, les représentations de genre qu’il véhicule repoussent plus loin encore les limites de la participation des femmes, impliquant une remise en question du paradigme même sur lequel reposent les discours nationalistes sur le genre. Cette transformation est visible à travers la volonté croissante d’engager le débat sur la question des corps des femmes dans l'espace public égyptien. E le tabou ancien sur l’augmentation des violences sexuelles dans la sphère publique, cet engagement discursif a déstabilisé le modèle classique de la féminité à l’égyptienne, et sa revendication d’un certain mode d’emploi de l'espace public. Cette nouvelle vague incarnée par ce qu’on pourrait appeler un « féminisme révolutionnaire » lance un défi de taille aux formes plus anciennes de discours sur le genre, historiquement enracinées en Égypte. Bien que ce défi semble moins crucial aujourd'hui, il a laissé sa marque sur les discours dominants relatifs aux femmes dans l’espace public, et ce, de plusieurs façons. Je reviendrai sur ce point dans les conclusions de cet article.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 47

Les femmes de Sissi ou la généralisation à l’œuvre

15 En Égypte, les deux principaux soulèvements – celui du 25 janvier 2011 et du 30 juin 2013 – mettent clairement en relief les dynamiques précédemment décrites. Suite à l’éviction de Moubarak, le discours officiel tenu par l’État sur le genre est en effet la cible de toutes les attaques. On a reproché au féminisme d’État, confondu dans les représentations publiques avec le culte de la personnalité de Suzanne Moubarak, d’être élitiste et éloigné des réelles préoccupations des femmes égyptiennes. Ce désaveu vis-à- vis de la question des femmes s’est poursuivi sous la courte présidence de Morsi, pendant laquelle dominait un discours antiféministe, s’étendant au-delà du très officiel Conseil national des femmes (National Council for Women) et du féminisme d’État, pour s’attaquer aussi aux formes indépendantes de mobilisation. Le rejet des droits des femmes par les Frères musulmans faisait en effet partie intégrante de leur vision de la société, ainsi que de leur campagne de prise de contrôle des institutions de l’État. Face à cette propagande frériste, un nouveau discours a commencé à circuler publiquement, autour de l’émergence d’une supposée résilience des femmes face aux tentatives répétées des Frères musulmans de réduire leurs droits. Jusqu’au 30 juin 2013, les médias égyptiens n’ont ainsi eu de cesse de dénoncer la menace, incarnée par les Frères musulmans, sur les femmes égyptiennes et de célébrer les efforts de résistance de ces dernières. Ce type de discours a commencé à prendre de l’ampleur lors de l’intensification de la mobilisation contre le gouvernement des Frères musulmans. La représentation normative d’une libération des femmes de l’emprise du gouvernement islamiste – logique discursive prévalente jusque-là dans les seuls milieux intellectuels laïcs – a gagné en popularité et mise en relation avec la représentation hégémonique d’un contrôle de l’État sur la société, qui signifie en pratique le contrôle de l’armée sur la société.

16 Il convient alors de poser la question de la réalité du soutien populaire à de discours : est-il réel, fabriqué de toutes pièces, ou entre les deux ? Pour le comprendre, il s’agit d’analyser et de comparer deux phénomènes largement relayés médiatiquement : la vague de femmes qui ont soutenu publiquement la candidature de Sissi, puis son ascension au pouvoir suite au 30 juin 2013, et l'hypothèse répandue selon laquelle les Égyptiennes soutenaient, bien plus que les hommes, le leadership militaire. Ces deux aspects, bien que distincts, sont interdépendants et nourrissent un récit commun portant sur le genre dans l’Égypte post-30 juin 2013. 17 Qui sont donc les femmes de Sissi ? Dans quelle mesure les représentations médiatiques qui s’y rapportent reflètent-elles, ou non, leurs véritables raisons de s’aligner sur les militaires contre les Frères musulmans ? Leurs expériences sont-elles systématiquement reformulées et instrumentalisées politiquement afin de servir une pensée dominante ? Le discours incarné par les femmes de Sissi , publiquement représentées comme la quintessence des femmes égyptiennes, semble en effet intégré au cœur d’un discours autoritaire, servant une propagande officielle et médiatique contre les Frères musulmans, mettant ainsi en pratique une « nouvelle interprétation hégémonique des expériences vécues par les femmes »18. 18 La figure collective de ces partisanes de l'armée, qui émerge dans la période précédant le 30 juin 2013, repose sur des images de femmes égyptiennes issues de toutes les classes sociales et les régions de l'Égypte. Le fait de mettre en scène des femmes, venant de tous les horizons sociaux et unies dans leur perception du danger que représentent

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 48

les Frères musulmans, devient une stratégie commune aux médias télévisés et en ligne. La diversité des expériences de ces femmes et les raisons différentes pour lesquelles elles pourraient avoir choisi de se ranger du côté des militaires sont alors intentionnellement floutées. 19 Dans les mois précédant le 30 juin 2013, certains visages se distinguent parmi l’ensemble des femmes de Sissi. Il s’agit des visages — familiers pour la plupart — de celles qui avaient le plus à perdre avec le démantèlement du modèle de féminisme d'État qui existait sous Moubarak. Tahani El Gebali, juge de la Cour Suprême Constitutionnelle, est l’une d’entre elles. Habile oratrice régulièrement invitée dans les médias, El Gebali a offert un vernis juridique et politique au discours dominant, relayant l’idée que le régime des Frères musulmans ne promettait rien de bon aux femmes. Elle est parvenue, avec d’autres figures comparables, à faire un lien entre les critiques apportées au programme des Frères musulmans et des espoirs d’autoritarisme. Le régime autoritaire qu’elle appelle de ses vœux porte en lui la promesse d’anéantir la menace islamiste, formulée alors en termes de genre, et de rétablir une juste version de la modernité à l’égyptienne, reposant sur la stricte division public/privé des rôles sexués. Invoquant l'ère nassérienne, et ses projets de libération des femmes comme outils d’une libération nationale vis-à-vis du joug islamique, des figures comme El Gebali ont insisté sur la nécessité de restaurer l'héritage étatique d’un féminisme protecteur19. Cet argument était notamment avancé dans les débats autour de la Constitution de 2012 et du fait qu’elle était un échec pour les femmes, insistant alors sur l’indispensable mobilisation de toutes les Égyptiennes contre le texte. 20 D’autres figures féminines, indépendantes, ont rejoint les rangs des féministes étatiques dans leur soutien à l'armée, quoique moins explicitement. Il s’agit pour la plupart de femmes de gauche ou nassériennes, selon lesquelles la charî‘a constituait une menace majeure pour les Égyptiennes. Shahinda Maklad, militante de longue date pour les droits des paysans – et produit du féminisme d’État de l'époque nassérienne et des accès à l’éducation qu'il a offert aux femmes – est l’une d’entre elle. Elle est même devenue une des figures théâtrales au centre de la contestation des discours de genre émanant du gouvernement. Lors d'une manifestation contre le président Morsi, aux alentours du palais présidentiel en novembre 2012, Maklad est attaquée par un membre du parti frériste Liberté et Justice, qui pose significativement sa main sur sa bouche afin de la faire taire. La vidéo de l'incident circule de manière virale et constitue, dans les mois qui suivent, un support de choix pour mobiliser les Égyptiennes contre les Frères musulmans20. Maklad fut par ailleurs invitée par de nombreuses chaînes de télévision, apportant sa voix à un discours d’opposition aux Frères – basé sur des considérations de genre. 21 Les femmes de Sissi ne se résument toutefois pas aux partisanes officielles d’un féminisme d’État et à quelques personnalités publiques. Celles qui sont dépeintes médiatiquement en tant que femmes de Sissi sont aussi des femmes ordinaires, issues de classes sociales moyennes ou modestes. C’est l’intensité des louanges qu’elles adressent au nouveau leader qui les rend populaires, et certaines d’entre elles deviennent même des célébrités pour avoir vilipendé en ligne, et avec énergie, les Frères musulmans. D'innombrables vidéos circulent dans la période suivant le coup d'État de 2013, dans lesquelles des femmes célèbrent la virilité de Sissi, sa force et autres de ses atours masculins21. Les représentations populaires de Sissi semblent ainsi se focaliser sur son

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 49

charme viril. Cette lecture passe pourtant sous silence une dimension fondamentale de l’adhésion féminine au régime militaire : le sentiment de vulnérabilité de nombreuses femmes, lié à l’aggravation des violences sexuelles en Égypte durant les trois années qui précédent le coup d’ État. En effet, les femmes justifient leur soutien à Sissi par leur souhait de voir restauré le rôle protecteur de l’État. Comme on l’a vu, les solutions apportées jusqu’alors par l’État pour favoriser l'intégration des Égyptiennes à la vie publique se sont avérées inefficaces face au besoin d’un espace public sûr pour les femmes. Cet échec laisse les femmes aux prises avec un paradoxe : l’espace public si dangereux constitue un des rares lieux où elles entrevoient une possibilité de réaliser l'égalité entre les sexes en Égypte. Puisque l'inégalité structure l'espace privé de manière incontestée, l’intégration des femmes à la sphère publique – via le travail rémunéré et la participation politique au sens large – demeure le seul domaine où il est possible de contester l’inégalité. Ainsi, pour un grand nombre d’Égyptiennes, l’accès à l'espace public doit demeurer l’objectif prioritaire du féminisme mainstream, tout comme cela était le cas à l'époque nassérienne. Ce raisonnement, quoique peu mis en avant par les médias dominants à propos des femmes de Sissi, est exprimé par beaucoup de ces femmes, plus ou moins explicitement22. 22 Ces femmes, qui ont trouvé en la personne de Sissi un protecteur potentiel, peuvent légitimement et publiquement exprimer leurs points de vue grâce au discours profondément conservateur porté par ce féminisme d'État en construction. En ce sens, ce nouveau discours genré s’éloigne peu des contradictions qui travaillent historiquement le féminisme d’État en Égypte. Toutefois, les quelques personnalités publiques qui soutiennent Sissi, comme El-Gebali ou Maklad, ont sans doute des motivations bien à elles, différentes de celles des femmes « ordinaires ». Pour ces féministes, le soutien officiel de l'État—fût-il nominal—demeure leur seul recours, alors que les attaques à leur encontre ne cessent depuis le 25 janvier 2011. 23 Ainsi, il est clair que le soutien des femmes égyptiennes au régime militaire et à la personne de Sissi ne constitue pas un phénomène généralisé ; il n’obéit pas toujours aux mêmes logiques ni aux mêmes motivations. Au contraire, les femmes de Sissi recouvrent une diversité de subjectivités individuelles et des groupes d’intérêts divergents, à l’origine de discours variés et concurrents sur le genre. Enfin, la notion des femmes de Sissi ne représente qu’un seul type de discours parmi beaucoup d’autres discours émergents sur le genre, lesquels peuvent s’éloigner significativement du modèle historique du féminisme d'État ou de ses deux alternatives, le féminisme islamique et le féminisme révolutionnaire.

Conclusion

24 En Égypte, un nouveau discours en vogue – exprimé dans des formes vernaculaires de langage, dans les médias, et dans les écrits d’intellectuels et d’analystes politiques – souligne le soutien accordé à l’armée par les « femmes égyptiennes » en tant que catégorie homogène, notamment dans la guerre contre le terrorisme islamiste. La description de l'engouement des Égyptiennes pour le maréchal-devenu-président gomme la diversité des raisons pour lesquelles nombre d’entre elles ont soutenu le renversement des Frères musulmans. Ce narratif masque aussi la fabrication de l’idée d’un soutien universel des femmes au Président à des fins de calcul politique. Si le régime militaire a promu ces représentations généralisantes et encouragé leur

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 50

diffusion dans les médias, celles-ci ont aussi été relayées grâce aux efforts d’autopromotion de certaines personnalités féminines étatistes, à la fois à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur du gouvernement, personnalités censées représenter des intérêts qui auraient été menacés par la continuation du mandat de Mohammad Morsi.

25 L’élaboration de cette image de femmes égyptiennes comme groupe unifié, est en partie le fruit des tentatives de certaines figures féministes d’ État qui souhaitent raviver l’héritage d’un féminisme d'État sérieusement remis en cause après la révolution du 25 janvier 2011. En ce sens, les femmes de Sissi comme construction idéologique, pourrait être le reflet des efforts de ces féministes étatiques pour reconquérir une position qu’elles avaient perdue. Une autre raison pourrait être liée au problème grandissant des violences sexuelles auquel l’État égyptien doit faire face, un défi que les institutions étatiques n’ont jamais relevé jusqu'ici. Faire la promotion de Sissi comme grand sauveur des femmes pourrait ainsi servir à apaiser les craintes vis-à-vis d'un phénomène qui échappe à tout contrôle et qui met directement en péril la présence des femmes dans l’espace public. L’éventail des récents discours sur le genre qui présentent le soutien des femmes au nouveau régime militaire comme unanime et incontesté, pourrait aussi être motivé par la volonté d'effacer l’histoire riche des trois dernières années marquées par des mobilisations indépendantes contre les violences sexistes dans la sphère publique. Bien que ces nouvelles initiatives et dynamiques aient été affaiblies après le 30 juin 2013, elles ont néanmoins réussi à ébranler certaines représentations patriarcales très ancrées sur le rôle des femmes dans l’espace public. Les activistes, organisations et groupes indépendants impliqués dans ce renouveau militant ont en effet jeté un sérieux trouble au cœur des discours nationaux mainstream sur les femmes, en y introduisant le concept de « politique du corps » (body politics). En outre, ce nouvel activisme a entraîné des changements significatifs dans le discours gouvernemental sur les violences sexuelles, en incitant l'État à reconnaitre officiellement l'ampleur du problème pour la première fois. 26 Comprendre le phénomène des femmes de Sissi dans sa globalité et dans sa complexité exige donc de tenir compte des défis auxquels les projets étatiques féministes ont fait face au cours des quatre dernières années en Égypte. Comble de l’ironie, les femmes de Sissi, à la fois sujets et constructions idéologiques et politiques, pourraient ainsi être les produits d’un large sursaut réactionnaire (backlash) hostile aux femmes, suite au renouveau des discours sur le genre depuis 2011. 27 Il reste à voir, cependant, si certains des discours émergents sur les femmes en Égypte parviendront à se libérer du piège identitaire, qui a longtemps entravé les mobilisations indépendantes dans la sphère politique, ainsi que l’apparition d'un discours politique sur les droits des femmes fondé sur la réalité de leurs expériences, et non pas sur leurs identités supposées, politiques ou culturelles. Mais une telle appréhension des droits des femmes peut-elle émerger, étant donné l’actuelle situation politique égyptienne ? Alors que le régime militaire en place se transforme en une véritable dictature, avec l’arrestation et l’incarcération de milliers de personnes, traiter la question des droits des femmes séparément de celle de la politique en général semble de plus en plus difficile. À mesure que certaines voix indépendantes de femmes sont réduites au silence, et que le pays s’enfonce dans une dictature militaire, le féminisme égyptien semble glisser toujours plus loin dans un débat sans fin sur l'identité. Derrière ce débat se cache un paternalisme d’État, complice direct de l’oppression des femmes, par son insistance sur son rôle de protecteur vis-à-vis d’elles. Cette posture prévient

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 51

ainsi l'émergence de nouvelles formes d’activisme, lesquels pourraient pourtant combler les clivages identitaires et reconquérir un espace pour la multitude des expériences féminines ayant émergé au cours des quatre dernières années en Égypte.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Badran, Margot. 2009. Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.

Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bier, Laura. 2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

El-Shakry, Omnia. 2007. The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kholoussy, Hanan.2010. For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mahmoud, Sabaa. 2004. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. Colonizing Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rofel, Lisa. 1999. Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Khafagy, Fatma. 8-14 March 2007. “Commentary: A look at the women’s machinery”. Al-Ahram Weekly, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/835/sc14.htm. Consulté le 20/9/2014.

NOTES

1. Par exemple, voir « In Egypt, presidential contender Abdel Fatah al-Sissi appeals to women voters », The Washington Post, 25 juin 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-egypt- presidential-contender-abdel-fattah-al-sissi-appeals-to-women-voters/2014/05/25/ eb880eb0-99cd-44d9-ac0e-98e077d2ff33_story.html et Timothy Kaldas, « Sissi, the candidate for Egyptian women? », Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 23 mai 2015, http://timep.org/ commentary/sisi-candidate-for-egyptian-women (consultés le 17/09/15). 2. Beaucoup de telles vidéos sont présentes sur Youtube ; par exemple https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEL8kz4EiUU (consulté le 17/09/15). 3. « Egypt's Sissi faces challenge over 'sexual terror'», The Times of Israel, 10 juin 2014, http:// www.timesofisrael.com/egypts-sisi-faces-challenge-over-sexual-terror/ (consulté le 17/09/15). 4. « Seven arrested for sexually assaulting student during Tahrir Celebrations », The Guardian, 10 juin 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/09/seven-arrest-sexual-assault- student-tahrir-square-sisi-inauguration (consulté le 17/09/15).

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 52

5. Voir Mada Masr, « Sisi visits Tahrir Square mob sexual assault victim in hospital », 11 juin 2014, http://www.madamasr.com/news/sisi-visits-tahrir-square-mob-sexual-assault-victim- hospital (consulté le 17/09/15). 6. Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. 7. Bier, Laura.2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 37. 8. Bier, Laura.2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Mitchell, Timothy.1991. Colonizing Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 9. El-Shakry, Omnia.2007. The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 10. Badran, Margot. 2009. Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. Oxford: One world Publications, Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, and Kholoussy, Hanan.2010. For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press, and Bier, Laura.2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 11. Bier, Laura.2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. 12. Kholoussy, Hanan.2010. For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern Egypt 13. A propos du féminisme d’État sous Nasser : Bier, Laura.2011. Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity and the State in Nasser’s Egypt. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 14. Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt As A Woman: Nationalism, Gender and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. 15. Mahmoud, Sabaa. 2004. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 16. Le texte intégral de cette déclaration est visible sur : http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ csw/csw57/CSW57_Agreed_Conclusions_%28CSW_report_excerpt%29.pdf 17. Pour en savoir plus sur les positionnements des Frères musulmans vis-à-vis de la déclaration onusienne contre les violences faites aux femmes, voir cette déclaration sur leur site anglophone : http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30731 (consulté le 17/09/15) 18. Rofel, Lisa. 1999. Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China After Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press. 19. Critiques de Gebali sur la constitution de 2012: CBC, 8 janvier 2013: http://www.cbc.ca/news/ world/former-top-court-judge-challenges-egypt-s-new-constitution-1.1390698 20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-MsqcaH9UA (consulté le 17/09/15) 21. Dalia Rabie, « Sisi and his women », MadaMasr, 25 mai 2014 http://www.madamasr.com/ content/sisi-and-his-women (consulté le 17/09/15) 22. Cette vidéo montre des femmes expliquant pourquoi elles manifestent contre les Frères musulmans : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqQr0IF-y_Y (consulté le 17/09/15)

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 53

RÉSUMÉS

Suite au renversement de l’ancien président Morsi lors d’énormes manifestations en juin-juillet 2013, un nouveau discours spécifique sur le genre a commencé à apparaitre en Égypte. Centré sur le haut niveau de participation des femmes de toutes origines sociales à ces manifestations, ce nouveau discours à succès est articulé dans la langue vernaculaire, dans les médias, dans les écrits d’intellectuels et d’analystes politiques. Il met l’accent sur un soutien présumé unanime et incontesté des « femmes égyptiennes », comme catégorie uniforme, pour l’armée égyptienne dans sa guerre contre le terrorisme islamiste et pour l’État militaire, ainsi que sur leur engouement supposé universel, pour le Président Abd al-Fattâh al-Sissi. Cela indique la montée en puissance d’une nouvelle forme discursive de féminisme d’État, cherchant à effacer une histoire riche et diverse de quatre ans de mobilisations liées au genre. Cette contribution déconstruit le mythe des « femmes d’al-Sissi » en référence à des modèles spécifiques d’imaginaires genrés de l’État-nation et des femmes égyptiennes au vingtième siècle, ainsi qu’à leurs expressions politiques—ainsi qu’aux représentations « révolutionnaires » émergentes des femmes depuis 2011. Ces images et ces récits nous permettent de décoder le mythe des « femmes d’al-Sissi » porté par les médias, et de l’analyser en tant que volonté de construire une forme discursive aussi nouvelle que troublante, du féminisme d’État. La politisation des images de femmes, dansant devant les urnes lors de la présidentielle de 2014 ou exprimant leur soutien à leur candidat favori, al-Sissi, dans des vidéos, fait partie de cette tentative discursive de masquer la multitude de revendications adressées par les femmes à l’État et, et de lectures des droits des femmes. En construisant l’image des « femmes égyptiennes » comme catégorie unique et en réduisant au silence les voix alternatives et indépendantes, ce nouveau féminisme d’État instrumentalise les femmes et leurs problématiques à des fins politiques, en cette période de vive polarisation politique et identitaire, tout en ne leur donnant que très peu en retour.

In the wake of the overthrow of former President Morsi amid massive demonstrations through June and July 2013, a specific new gender discourse began emerging in Egypt. Focusing on the high levels of participation of women from all wakes of life in the demonstrations against Islamist rule in Egypt, this new popular discourse is articulated in vernacular forms of expression, in the media, or in the writings of intellectuals and political analysts. It stresses the supposedly unanimous and uncontested support of “Egyptian women” as a uniform category, to the Egyptian military in their war against Islamic terrorism and to the military State, as well as their purportedly universal infatuation with President Abd el-Fattah el-Sissi. This indicates the rise of a new discursive form of State feminism, one that seeks to erase a rich four-year history of diverse gender-based mobilization. This article deconstructs the myth of “El-Sissi’s women” in reference to particular models of gendered imaginations of the nation-State and Egyptian women in the twentieth century, as well as their political expressions – and to the emerging “revolutionary” representation of women since 2011. These images and narratives allow us to decode the media-borne myth of “El-Sissi’s women” and analyze it as an attempt to construct a new and disturbing discursive form of State feminism. The politicization of women’s images – dancing in front of ballot boxes in the 2014 presidential elections or expressing support for their favorite candidate El-Sissi in videos – is part of this emerging discursive attempt to mask the multitude of claims women address to the State and of readings of women’s rights. By constructing the image of “Egyptian women” as a unified category and silencing alternative and independent voices, this new State feminism instrumentalizes women and their issues for

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 54

political purposes in this period of sharp political and identity-based polarization, while giving them little in return.

INDEX

Keywords : Egypt, women, feminism, El-Sissi, state feminism Mots-clés : Egypte, femmes, féminisme, féminisme d'État, El-Sissi

AUTEURS

HIND AHMED ZAKI

Hind Ahmed Zaki is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. She holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Washington and a B.A in Political Science from Cairo University. She is a Comparative Law and Social Studies (CLASS) fellow at the University of Washington and a graduate student instructor who teaches courses on Middle East Politics and Governance, Gender and Public Law. In her dissertation, Hind aims to develop a clearer understanding of the phenomenon of sexual violence and its manifestations in Tunisia and Egypt, and to highlight the central turning points in the creation of what could be termed a “culture of sexual violence” at the intersection of the state and society. She analyses how sexual violence became politicized in the wake of the Arab spring last four years in both states, and how it played out in formal and informal political processes including the Truth and Dignity Committee in Tunisia, and the mass sexual assaults in Tahrir Square. In addition to her academic work, Hind served as consultant to a number of local women’s rights organizations in Egypt. She was recognized as a “Woman of Courage” by the UW Women’s Center for her advocacy of human rights and gender justice. She publishes in both English and Arabic on issues of women’s rights and gender inequality, particularly in North Africa and the Middle [email protected]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 55

Civic participation and gender institutional legacy since January 25, 2011 La participation civique et l’héritage institutionnel du genre depuis le 25 janvier 2011

Marta Agosti

Civic engagement of young people in Egypt is very weak in terms of participation in groups or organised activities and voluntary work. Their social networks are limited to few friends and family, and these networks decline as young people age. However, young people are aware of Egypt’s social problem and rated highly issues such as poverty reduction, economic growth, and health and education reform. Nonetheless, they do not invest time to learn more about the social and political issues from the available media.1 1 SYPE’s final report was distributed at the beginning of January 20112. In the light of historical events that happened, rather than a weak and disengaged approach to civic participation, this quote reveals the discomfort and rejection that young people felt toward the institutions that were supposed to represent them. A month later, these same young men and women were on the frontlines among those who shook the status quo in the country and who overthrew Mubarak, ending his thirty-year rule.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 56

At an awareness-raising event about sexual harassment on Dec. 5, 2014 in Cairo

Credit: Sandra Fernandez

2 Different analyses have pointed out the structural, socio-economic and political problems that prompted the 2011 uprising. Neoliberal policies, structural adjustment plans, youth unemployment, corruption and nepotism are unquestionably deeply rooted in the genesis of this critical event 3. However, this analysis from the sky 4 has neglected the involvement of “ordinary people” as dynamic actors of change. As Bayat5 explains, the nuances and manoeuvres of the ordinary people have often been forgotten by social movement theorists and by political science analysts. Usually portrayed as politically passive recipients, ordinary citizens have gained a place as a unit of analysis after the multiple popular uprisings—in Egypt but also in the whole region; this has made the significance of their daily activities very apparent. However, the articulation of these activities in movements that can potentially gain leverage had to confront pre-existing and stagnant state institutions that carried on with different power dynamics and narratives that ordinary citizens had to contest.

3 This paper looks at the controversies that arise when ordinary citizens involved in peaceful civic engagement and activism during the uprising intersect with social institutions in the specific domain of the women’s movement(s). This aims at exploring the articulation of everyday feminism6 to argue the importance of organic non- movements investing in social change. Civic engagement as latest developments have demonstrated, has become a great area of concern for the regime’s plans of restoration. As such, it deserves a closer look. For this purpose, the paper addresses these questions for the period between 2011 and 20147.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 57

The 8th of March: International Women’s Day

4 Women’s participation in the uprising is undeniable8; their capacity to react and organise was demonstrated during the 10.000 women’s march against military violence9 in response to the brutal episode known as the Blue Bra10 in the non-Arab media. Yet the events that took place during the celebrations of International Women’s Day in 2011 exemplified many of the historical controversies that characterised the women’s movement(s) in Mubarak’s time. At the peak of civic and peaceful mobilisations, the first time International Women’s Day was celebrated, free of old regime tactics and manoeuvres, it was a fiasco. Based on my own observation, among around 200 participants in Tahrir Square, there were young women and men familiar with NGO work, some informal initiatives, well-known figures from the women’s movement, some UN officials, a few National Council for Women officials, a few journalists. In addition, for the first time since the beginning of the uprising, a noticeable amount of Western women were also present and could be easily spotted among the few people attending the celebrations.

5 According to different participants, preparation for the celebrations was rushed, which could have been merely a consequence of the turbulent days that preceded, which did not leave much scope for organisation. However, the usual display of slogans and petitions, announcement of the meeting point, and the event did not gather popular support; neither did they meet with spontaneous adherence at a moment when it seemed easy to find. As Sally Zohney, a young woman activist, explained: “a task force prepared for the International Women’s day, we were alongside other groups, planning for this, very informal… it was very poorly organised… it went very wrong, people got beaten and chased.”11 As the Square at that time was always full, tension grew slowly, a group gathered next to where we were standing and the participants were first chased and later dispersed. As in a subsequent discussion of why it went wrong, Zohny pointed at controversies previously recorded and noted that the emergent informal groups were in the process of understanding, deconstructing, fighting and rebuilding themselves in different forms: There was no collective voice of what this day is for [...] We looked very upper class, a lot of people didn’t speak Arabic, a lot of foreigners, less Egyptians, for the mass streets this is something they didn’t want. Who knew of international days back then? Media was all over the place. […] It was accused of being something that was international, non-Egyptian. I remember very well, there was this woman in complete veil that they were carrying on their shoulders, and they were saying “this is an Egyptian woman, you are not Egyptian women.” They weren’t against the demands as much as they were against the image.12 6 This episode illustrates many of the particular controversies in the articulation of women’s rights demands. The mix of informal groups and old actors in the women’s movement(s) reflected on the lack of coordination and leadership, which was translated into a fragmented message. This fragmentation hampered mobilization of potential adherents, which was also reinforced by the idea that the women’s movement(s) was/were something alien to the popular masses. Also, the presence of noticeable foreigners on an international day evoked an uncomfortable relationship with what it is considered as the Other, and a way to denounce an event seen as not emanating from Egyptians’ own culture. This explained the need to reclaim the image that the media present at the scene would use to portray what a real “Egyptian woman’

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 58

is. As a result, although many demands made in Tahrir Square in January-February 2011 involved issues that deeply affect women’s rights, and although men and women showed inclusive and egalitarian practices, principles and desires in the Square, many informal groups and secular13 activists were reluctant to join demonstrations specifically for women’s rights. The popular blog The Arabist rightly asked: “Where were the opposition parties? Why wasn’t this publicised by the Kullena Khaled Said group?”14

7 These controversies have previously been highlighted by different academics in different forms. Badran15 referred to gender activism as “invisible” due to the controversies, stereotypes and misconceptions generated by the adherence to feminism in the public arena. Ahmed also relates to this idea arguing that “questions of fusion and encoding have been critical for women”16 which has deep implications for women’s empowerment and the avenues available for their civic engagement until today. 8 Since the strict anti-protest law was passed,17 familiar forms of street activism such as strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins have almost disappeared. According to several sources, the number of persons detained from July 3, 2013 to May 2014 exceeded 41,00018; women detainees are no exception and their numbers increase day by day. The cases of imprisoned human rights defenders Yara Sallam and Mahienour al-Massry among many others, were –and still are – of current concern for national and international human rights organisations19. The intense crackdown on political dissidents has provoked a strategic – and perhaps only temporary – withdrawal from the streets. However, the original demands and principles of the uprising are still very relevant and present in citizens’ everyday lives, as none have been the subject of a serious and inclusive national debate. 9 Political activism was – and still is – the most present and visual image of the uprising; however, the involvement of these same activists and many other citizens in community and social initiatives should not be underestimated. This involvement existed previously and kept growing in the years after the uprising. For instance, Osman20 pointed out how young people used to participate in cultural activities as their main realm of expression and engagement. Moreover, by the end of 2008 the Ministry of Trade was processing more than 2000 company registrations per week, in addition to the fact that by the mid-2000s, for the first time since decolonization, more Egyptians were employed in the private sector than the public sector21. Many of these newly created companies had a social and/or non-profit component. Since the NGO law implemented during Mubarak’s rule imposed heavy State controls and constraining bureaucratic processes on NGOs registered as such, many of these initiatives registered as private businesses, law firms, etc. or did not register at all. This reveals a great expansion of the “private” domain (outside the hands of the State) to answer the expectations and aspirations of young entrepreneurs who come on board with a different ethical and moral landscape. This landscape is clearly aligned with the principles that young men and women reclaimed in Tahrir. 10 This entrepreneurial boom, which includes social entrepreneurship, was – and still is – accompanied by a general inclination to avoid contact with the State and a strong sense of suffering, which has been repeatedly recorded.22 Furthermore, in the months following the uprising, young citizens and organisations were very active in their attempts to collaborate with such initiatives to mobilise the increasing demand for volunteering. I can recall how just some months after the Uprising, one development partner I was working closely with at that time, gathered more than 200 small NGOs

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 59

and community associations in one meeting to discuss partner agreements and collaborations. Also, on the celebration of “Youth Day”, for example, which was organised by different UN agencies at al-Sawy Culture Wheel in 2012, more than 1.000 volunteer applications were collected in one day. 11 On the other hand, civic engagement initiatives were also present and took part in the media revolution that was recruiting newcomers every second. From March 2008 to July 2012, Egyptian Facebook users increased by 372% (from 822,560 to 3,581,460)23. Ranging from waste collection to fundraising and activities to reclaim public space through art exhibitions, cinema screenings, talks, lectures, book launches, concerts, sports activities, organized tours around the city, theatre, etc. were organised through Facebook, bypassing State clearance or registration. Since January 25, 2011 the number of cultural, sports, business and community participation initiatives that reclaim ownership over citizenship have involved as many citizens as the numbers that we saw in Tahrir Square. 12 Therefore, rather than announcing the end of the uprising, as some academics have done24, this article suggests that the battlefield has shifted to the domain of social or community activism(s). This explains the government’s plans for screening, controlling, codifying and instrumentalising old and new social initiatives of different natures.25 It also sheds light on the security apparatus’ close monitoring and heavy repression of the receipt of foreign aid, registrations with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, as well as the activities of law firms, research centres, clinics, etc. and of course individuals since the ultimatum for NGOs to register was announced26.

Feminism and the ordinary citizen

13 Feminists’ values, along with many other preoccupations, certainly form a part of “the emergence of a youth culture with intrinsic ties to an electronic and mediated world”27 that has citizenship as its battlefield. It claims an alternative habitus that is intended to be diverse, and inclusive of all the marginalities found in the Square. What are the chances that this youth culture may be expanded and consolidated?

14 Analysis of the engagement of young women with the uprising can be analysed from two different angles. The first focuses on the involvement of young women as political and social activists for different causes, which may explain bloggers’ specialisations (for example, see and on the issue of military trials) and the reluctance of many activists to be identified with specific initiatives that may carry political connotations in an attempt to remain organic and inclusive. As a senior UN staff person, who was looking for strategies to engage with them, put it: The Uprising gave room and ways for movements that are young, that were not represented, that were not by-products of the system, and that ask for things that were not elitist. They ask for very legitimate demands, that were a taboo to ask for in the past and that is mainly the set of rights in general.28 15 The second angle is that of specific youth claims – including those of young women - with regard to “how youth are (in behaviours [and principles], outfits, ways of speaking, and moving around within private and public spaces).”29 This depicts the collective existence of a non-movement in daily contestation and conquest of an alternative and marginal presence, and the intersection of this presence with political

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 60

and social activism. Yet its intangible outcome is the reclaiming of values and principles of citizenship. In Bayat’s words, this account[s] for an everyday feminism that may rarely employ organisation and networking, mobilising strategies, street marches, picketing, strikes or disruption, and yet is able to extend [women’s] choices.30 16 My understanding is that while an everyday feminism is present at the genesis of secular revolutionary demands, in both young women and men activists, the traditional political articulation of these demands has not gained endorsement. This feminism has also been unable to establish solid networks and alliances with other movements, such as political parties, trade unions or human rights organisations, capable of mobilising support and influencing the public. On the other hand, young social and political activists are leaning more towards organic and inclusive initiatives that not only share their political views but also claim a specific habitus31 underpinned by their condition of marginality, both within city dwellers and within youth. As a consequence, women’s rights activists may have felt divided between a long-established structure that does not represent them and an organic movement that could potentially dilute their particular claims32. Mariam Kirollos (human rights’ activist and co-founder of Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault) expressed this dilemma in an interview at the Global Uprising Conference: I always believed and dreamt of a strong feminist movement in Egypt that fights everything that we are against; fights capitalism, patriarchy, racisms, nationalism, homophobia, the long list of things that we are against. The Egyptian revolution continues, and without women and the resistance I do not think the revolution will mean anything. And honestly what keeps me so positive are Egyptian women, basically, and how they are resisting so much because no one recognises how hard it is. Their very own presence in a demonstration is a form of resistance, they [the State] have been trying so hard to marginalise us and they know that if they stop them [women] from going to protests, next day they will stop them from walking on the streets, the next time they will stop them from working… we keep on resisting.33 17 What I find enlightening in this statement is the use of an inclusive we to address a long list of claims that include a different set of values within a feminist movement. This goes beyond the traditional Egyptian claims of the “women’s movement” and directly challenges the constituency imposed by old state narrative. She is not addressing women’s participation in a nation-building capacity by asking for quotas, education, and any other field in a vertical structure; she is addressing participation by presence and resistance, which implies a horizontal integration that demands a very inclusive movement – pertaining to women as much as to men – capable of addressing all these questions. Therefore, what kind of a political structure could actually articulate these claims and values?

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 61

At an awareness-raising event about sexual harassment on Dec. 5, 2014 in Cairo

Credit: Sandra Fernandez

18 When the SYPE inferred that “only 4.9% of Egyptian young people are members of a group or organization – almost twice as many males (6.4%) as females (3.4%) are members”34 – as one way to measure civic participation, they were taking for granted that the current set of organisations and social institutions were inclusive of youth values. On the other hand, little attention was paid to questions pertaining to values and principles: “only 1.4% think that values definitely exist in society [and] the wealthiest 40% also have the highest percentage who believe that social values are absent”35. Although the questions raised by the survey did produce data, in my view this data was the reflection of youth’s alienation from social institutions, rather than lack of will or interest in civic engagement; it depicted a youth that had shifted and created different spaces of participation. Implicitly, the youth were being analysed as “agencies in the process of being”36, so they themselves were the ones subject to change in order to integrate the social structures. SYPE’s analysis neglects their involvement as part and a consequence of the social and political constitution of a society 37. The picture drawn by SYPE would have been quite different if they had taken issues pertaining to the political and social agency of youth into consideration, in phrasing their survey questions. Essentially, did young people believe that social institutions shared their values? And if not, where were they expressing those values?

The legacy of the politics of gender

19 On the other hand, feminism, the traditional source of women’s movements, had been marginalised for a long time by State-controlled machinery that monopolises Egyptian women’s representation in the national and international arena38 and heavily impacts access to funding. The State-gender machinery, under the influence of the First Lady,

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 62

crystallised into two institutions in the Mubarak era: the National Council for Women (NCW), founded in 2000 and the National Council for Motherhood and Childhood

20 However, this bizarre situation did lead to some good, yet controversial results. As had previously happened under Sadat – what became infamously known as “Jehan’s Laws” – the specific reforms carried out under “Suzanne’s Laws” had also started to lead to a backlash39 by the end of 2011. Additionally, during the “Jehan” and “Suzanne” periods, Egypt ratified major inter(NCCM), founded in 1988. national treaties protecting women and children’s rights, although with serious reservations: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990. After Mubarak’s departure, the Alliance of Women’s Organisations40 demanded the NCW be replaced with a democratic transparent body; this later became a demand for an independent body outside State control41. 21 In February 2012, Mervat al-Tallawy became Head of the National Council for Women. She was a former diplomat (1991-1997) and Minister of Social Affairs under Mubarak (1997-1999), and had sponsored Law 153 (1999) which, according to Human Rights Watch, was the law that initiated the Ministry of Social Solidarity’s micro-management of NGO operations42. With this manoeuvre the same gender machinery – embedded within a nation-building narrative – was renovated, continuing through Morsi’s presidency (from 30 June 2012 to 3 July 2013), and regaining its previous position under the current government. Historically, the first efforts to articulate an independent feminist movement were initially hampered by Nasser. Even though he claimed to build “the State that finally granted women full political rights”, he “withdrew the freedom to organise politically”43. The feminist movement was then co-opted by Sadat and Mubarak, who imposed gender machinery that preserved State ownership of the women’s agenda. 22 As a result, the dynamics of cohabitation between independent and State institutions have remained very complex. Recent developments pertaining to the issue of sexual harassment provide evidence of this. First, independent NGOs have been working on anti-sexual harassment campaigns since 200544. Many successful initiatives have taken off strongly since 2011, documenting harassment, mobilising citizens on the streets and on social media against it, in addition to assisting survivors of sexual assaults. This has led to an increase in open, public debates. A tipping point was reached during the celebrations for the inauguration of Egypt’s new President Abd al Fattah al-Sisi (June 7-8, 2014) when brutal episodes of sexual violence took place. Though numerous similar violent incidents had taken place in previous years, it was only when the media exposed blatant visual evidence of a case happening during the official celebrations, that State officials, led by the President himself, reacted strongly for the first time, making a point of visiting one of the victims45. A new law criminalizing sexual harassment was passed and implemented, and several perpetrators of assault were given life sentences46. In this process, independent NGOs made a coordinated statement condemning the assaults and announced a protest47 on June 14 that had online support of 198,000, plus 25,900 “joining the event” on Facebook (numbers that can only shed some light on people’s intention of participating, since the demonstration was only attended by a small number). When NCW announced its participation, most of the independent NGOs withdrew from the march and organised a press conference instead48. The message from these independent groups was strong: “First verdict in

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 63

cases of mob-sexual assault and in Tahrir Square is no end to the story; all previous crimes of sexual violence must be investigated”49. As Dr Magda Adly from the NGO al-Nadeem Centre explained during the press conference, attacks happen with the Ministry of Interior’s complete awareness and they never gave a statement addressing the issue, nor did the National Council for Women50. The press conference was clear on the State’s complicity in the incidents of mob-sexual harassment, mob assaults and gang rape that had occurred during demonstrations in previous years. At the same time, all this revealed the polemics about collaborating with State bodies. As Mr. Mostafa Mahmoud, a lawyer working for the feminist NGO Nazra, put it: “If the State wants to care, it has clear mechanisms and legislative mechanisms [to do so].”51 23 The environment of fear generated by the new anti-protest law (passed in November 2013)52 has played a significantly negative role in the dynamic between the State and activists, as permits are now required to organise advocacy events, which can only be secured with the participation of a State institution, such as the NCW. Furthermore, activists who were operating in Tahrir Square with different purposes and who had been very consistent in raising evidence are now threatened. Still, the controversy of collaborating with the State is no less profound for some of the more consolidated NGOs that have long-standing collaborative relations with State institutions. As a women’s rights lawyer involved in the anti-sexual harassment campaign put it: “independent NGOs should keep putting pressure on government institutions, however we need to invest in this political momentum to offer the know-how”. Yet when I asked which institutions are working on the implementation and reinforcement of the law, the answer was: “nobody”,53 indicating a lack of institutional commitment. 24 This example helps to clarify the dynamics of co-optation and rebranding of the efforts of civil society associations and initiatives, by State institutions, which reveals how much the latter’s desire to seek social justice is in doubt. The gains achieved over this period thanks to the efforts of a vast network of activists, putting their mental and physical health at risk to advocate for legislation explicitly banning harassment and assault and for the prosecution of perpetrators, have simply been minimised. Instead, State institutions jumped in with their political propaganda when public opinion demanded action, but later abandoned the issue without achieving substantial results. This was highlighted at the independent NGOs’ press conference on June 15, 2014 where they stated that over 500 cases of sexual violence in the public sphere had been recorded and reported54, dating back to June 2012, yet the State had failed to react until June 2014. 25 This historical intertwining of gender issues with “national machinery” has provoked an uncomfortable cohabitation between State institutions and women’s rights activists. It is currently being reshuffled, but the outlook now seems bleak, in view of the new NGO law the government is implementing. As my interview with a senior UN staff person confirmed: The 2013 Coup – and that’s my own understanding – has reinstated the deep State, including the government entities working on gender and the big NGOs monopolising gender issues that were operating during the Mubarak times and before. From 2010 to 2013, you have the movements talking about all kinds of rights. From 2013 to now you have the Mervat(s) Tallawy(s), the Hoda(s) Badran(s), the Egyptian Feminist Union, not only the NCW, but you have these big tycoons that are monopolizing the scene again. And the scene is now characterised not only by trends and issues discussed from a gender perspective but also as a generational issue. Those big names are not leaving room to new cattle [sic] to come on board.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 64

Their way of dealing with things is mono track and very elitist, the same that the Mubarak era was operating with no interest at all to engage in a dialogue […] There is no dialogue, because the old guards of the civil society are not speaking to the new generation of civil society. There is big resentment towards the movements that emerged from Tahrir Square.55 26 Some authors, such as Korany and El-Mahdi56 go as far as stating that the women’s movement in Egypt was orphaned when the State assumed its leadership, which in their view, may explain “why protesters have chosen to deny the gender dimension in which injustice occurs, framing women’s rights in apolitical terms”57. Badran58 also argues that throughout the century, women have placed their feminism within the nationalist context and within the framework of Islam. Through the argument and action they have defended the nation against foreign occupation and economic, political, and cultural imperialism. However, patriarchy has had the temerity to label feminism in Egypt as Western, ipso facto un-Islamic, to discredit feminism by undermining its national and cultural-cum-religious legitimacy59. 27 As a result, State institutions accommodate their narrative under a light, friendly, Islamic discourse that proactively avoids public references to feminist values and principles. On the contrary, it was not rare to see explicit feminist jargon being used by young women activists participating in initiatives emerging from Tahrir Square.

28 I believe that as a consequence, feminism has been disconnected from the State-led women’s movement and become a feature in the activities of this wave of marginal young secular activists who want feminism’s principles to be lived, not enchained in institutions and laws. By doing so, they are directly challenging the constituency of State-led women’s movements (which includes its affiliated NGOs). Is there any reconciliation possible? Could this organic approach be sustained or will it require a political structure in order to prevail?

Organic movement(s) and “women’s rights” political structure: the controversies

29 The historian Sorbera has put forward the four most common challenges that must be overcome for a real shift in gender politics to take place. The Egyptian women’s movement(s) will have to address the historical gap between women’s participation and institutional representation; the lack of an intersectional approach capable of mobilising and consolidating a grassroots movement; the absence of a unified leadership; and tensions in intergenerational communication60.

30 Though I agree these are real challenges and that addressing them could lead to an increased unity of the different women’s movement(s) in Egypt, I would argue that these elements need to be carried further to better understand the movements’ complexities. First, the organic nature of this feminism is an intricate and indivisible value that accompanies other sets of values expressed in the emergence of this specific youth culture that has gained visibility with the 2011 uprising. In this sense, adhering to a political structure that does not combine all these values may undermine the political and social agency of their potential adherents.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 65

At an awareness-raising event about sexual harassment on Dec. 5, 2014 in Cairo

Credit: Sandra Fernandez

31 Secondly, it is important to acknowledge the complex structure and power relations within which the women’s movement(s) has to operate and the difficulties that institutions and individuals alike, face if they attempt to change this structure. The same UN official, when asked how they could support these new young movements, clearly explained the strong structure that backs the regime’s agenda: I’m engaging with movements through individuals, and through their own networks, because I cannot continue to work in a traditional way in a very untraditional setting, by doing so I will would continue de facto to marginalise youth and marginalise movements if I insist on working with a registered NGO and through the NCW.61 32 Regarding the power relations, the official added: There is a big amount of bullying and the bullying is not only at the local level. They [the government] are very firm and very strong in what they want and they bully their way through. They have a very good lobbying mechanism inside the UN corridors in New York. For example, we have a monthly mechanism since 30th of June called the Inter Agency Task Force on Egypt. The Secretary General chairs it, they meet once a month, […] [attended by] the Department of Political Affairs, the Secretariat and the members of the country agencies chaired by the Resident Coordinator in Egypt. Video conference. And this is where analyses are shared, Egypt right away managed to implant Egyptians representing every single agency in that mechanism […] all of a sudden you have people sitting there, giving inputs that are in line with the government’s interpretation of things and preventing any other analysis that would come up. So if someone says anything that it is controversial for the government, it is directly reported to the Egyptian government.62

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 66

33 This is a particularly important point, since National Councils and consolidated NGOs’ budgets for running programs are heavily dependent on international funding, so both independent and governmental institutions working on gender and youth issues compete for the same funds. However, State institutions manage to hamper independent organisations’ access to funds through strict regulation and power relations. Additionally, this dynamic of bullying does not foster a cooperative environment in which to articulate an intersectional approach. In my view, movements and initiatives that would like to cooperate together to develop an intersectional approach will not only require networking downward to grassroots organizations, and horizontally between movements, but also networking upward to conquer their legitimate space at the international level. In this regard, networking up will provoke a strong confrontation with the government as explained above, but the other two directions are not exempt of controversies either.

34 First, as the manager of a well-established NGO which has worked in deprived areas for the past twenty years, explained to me, strong financing and reporting regulations really hamper development programming, as there are a number of “layers” between donors and recipients of development aid, including State Security control. This, in his view, leads to a feeling of mistrust that hampers the achievement of tangible results. Also, State Security presence has strong consequences, since it forces government involvement at every level. We always work with local officials from the ground, why? Because we know that we are in a very strict monitoring security system that means that if we are working […] where there are many members of the Muslim Brotherhood we have to be very clear, the vision of all the activities has to be very clear. This is why it is very important for us to have direct contacts with the officials. You cannot avoid doing that, even if – and we encountered a lot of that – people [officials] are not very collaborative. Not very courageous people.63 35 This exemplified the need for professionalization of these new movements to deal with all these layers of bureaucracy to access funds; this is very much at odds with their nature and organic foundation. At the same time, this raises questions about how to deal with security matters in deprived areas in which coordination with the State is required.

36 Secondly, horizontal networking will mean reaching other movements, whose ideological position may be very challenging, as for instance conservative religious groups. How will this organic approach deal with such an emotional controversy that is loaded with its own history of mistrust, greatly deepened during Morsi’s presidency? In this sense, building alliances without compromising the organic soul of the movement and adhering to a unified leadership seem to be a hard task. 37 Finally, regarding Sorbera’s64 last remark, the intergenerational communication challenge has many roots, but a very important one is that of the dissonant dissident voices – that happen to be young. These voices are challenging the constituency of national structures that operated under Mubarak and have now been reshuffled, challenging their traditional sphere of influence. Older generations in positions of power proactively undermine the category of “youth” to dismiss the idea of a factual dialogue that includes young people in a co-shared responsibility framework. As an Army General brutally stated in 2012:

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 67

we will discipline those kids of Tahrir… We thought we were protecting a revolution, but it turns out that we are protecting nothing but a bunch of non- virgin girls and homosexual kids65 38 Moreover, a closer look at what constitutes “youth” as a category may reveal some surprises, since it will rarely correspond to the strict statistical classification by age (15 to 24 years old) often used by the State. This classification neglects the strong ties of young people with older generations non-aligned with the State or elders who, consequently, are also being silenced by the shadow of “youth” that is wrongly being labelled as “arrogant, disobedient and impolite”66, as the same women’s rights lawyer put it. Through my own research I have come across young women and men engaged in different activities who often seek advice from older generations, and who use the structures that they created in the past to support new activities. In this sense, these connections are giving continuity and visibility to generations of opposition activists, who may not always be in the Square but definitively exist and have a deep footprint in the current oppositional wave. As an example we can take the picture that Gigi Ibrahim took of Nawal al-Saadawi in another women’s march organised on April 20, 2012. Her writings have come to the frontline by the hand of her young readers merging both times in a single space and putting the discredited label of “youth” very much in question. As Bourdieu reminded us “classification by age (but also sex and of course class…) always means imposing limits and producing an order to which each person must keep”67.

Conclusions

39 The dynamics observed in Tahrir Square and during subsequent events could lead one to think that since women’s issues were strongly embedded in a political machinery, many activists perceived prioritising women’s rights as divisive. On the contrary, secular activists chose to build on their features as disenfranchised and unrepresented citizens, which combined the ideals of feminism and at the same time, generated inclusive dynamics. This inclusive approach also worked to attract other segments of society who were feeling/being marginalised. In this sense, feminism became a feature of the marginal and was disentangled from its traditional niche; however, how feminism will be translated into practical terms by these new young movements, remains unknown.

40 At the same time this paper has argued that, in parallel to political activism, there is a strong burst of citizenship initiatives that are challenging traditional spheres of power linked to the State, with particular attention to the women’s rights State machinery and its links to development actors, since they are the main funders. These spheres of power are proactively tailoring regulations affecting the public sphere to marginalise and punish private initiatives through legal procedures, a discourse of stigmatisation and fear, and repression. However, this organic non-movement(s) has proven to be capable of combining the expectations of many groups, and as such, it/they represent(s) a threat to the restoration of the status quo. In this regard, the expansion of the youth culture results in the expansion of its political structure and potential leverage, since their paths cross in multiple areas.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 68

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ADDIN ZOTERO_BIBL {"custom":[]} CSL_BIBLIOGRAPHY Abbink, Jon. “Being Young in Africa: The Politics of Despair and Renewal” in Vanguard or Vandals: Youth, Politics, and Conflict in Africa. African Dynamics 4. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1992.

Ahram Online. “Full English Translation of Egypt’s New Protest Law.” November 25, 2013. http:// english.ahram.org.eg/News/87375.aspx.

Ahram Online. “Life Sentences for Sexual Assaults at El-Sisi Celebration,” July 16, 2014. http:// english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/106389/Egypt/Politics-/Life-sentences-for-sexual- assaults-at-ElSisi-celeb.aspx.

Al-Ali,Nadje. Secularism, Gender and the State in the Middle East. The Egyptian Women’s Movement. Cambridge: 2000.

Ali, Amro. “Run Mahienour Run,” Mada Masr, June 22, 2014. http://www.madamasr.com/ content/run-mahienour-run [Accessed August 26, 2014].

Amnesty International. “Urgent Action--Activists Remanded in Jail, Trial in September," July 9, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE12/040/2014/en/82a4b3c0-555b-4bbe- b6ed-a396ae202b31/mde120402014en.pdf.

Badran, Margot. Feminism in Islam: Secular and Religious Convergences. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009.

Bayat, Asef. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2010.

Bayat, Asef. “The Arab Spring and Its Surprises.” Development and Change 44, no. 3 (2013): 587–601. doi:10.1111/dech.12030.

Bourdieu, Pierre. “Outline of a Theory of Practice.” Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology 16. Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Bourdieu, Pierre. Sociology in Question. London: SAGE, 1993.

Comaroff, John. “Reflections on Youth: From the Past to the Post Colony” in Makers & Breakers: Children & Youth in Postcolonial Africa. Oxford : 2005.

Das, Veena. Critical Events: An Anthropological Perspective on Contemporary India. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Dawood, Aliaa. “Backlash against ‘Suzanne Mubarak Laws’ Was Inevitable," Egypt Independent, http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/backlash-against-%E2%80%98suzanne-mubarak- laws%E2%80%99-was-inevitable Accessed Sept. 19, 2015

Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights. “Proposed Government Law Makes NGOs Subordinate to Security and Ministry Control.” Press release. July 9, 2014. http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/ 2014/07/09/2154.

Elbadawi, Hanan. “Yara Sallam: A Prisoner of Passion and Human Rights, ” Mada Masr, June 25, 2014. http://www.madamasr.com/content/yara-sallam-prisoner-passion-and-human-rights.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 69

El-Ghobashy, Mona, and Adam Sabra. “Egypt After Raba’a: An Interview with Adam Sabra and Mona El Ghobashy” by Vomena on SoundCloud. August 2014. https://soundcloud.com/ vomekpfa-1/egypt-after-rabaa-an-interview-with-adam-sabra-and-mona-el-ghobashy.

Elyachar, Julia. Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo. Politics, History, and Culture. Durham, NC: London: Duke University Press, 2005.

Ennew, Jeremy. “Future Generations and Global Standards: Children's Rights at the Start of the Millenium” in Exotic No More: Anthropology on the Front Lines. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

FIDH, “Egypt: New Measures to Further Obstruct NGOs’ Work.” July 23, 2014, http:// www.fidh.org/en/north-africa-middle-east/egypt/15808-egypt-new-measures-to-further- obstruct-ngos-work Accessed August 26, 2014.

Hafez, Sherine. “No Longer a Bargain: Women, Masculinity, and the Egyptian Uprising.” American Ethnologist 39, no. 1 (2012): 37–42. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1425.2011.01344.x.

Hatem, Mervat. “Gender and Revolution in Egypt.” Middle East Research and Information Project no. 261 (2011).

Herrera, Linda. “Egypt’s Revolution 2.0: The Facebook Factor”, in The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? London: Pluto, 2012.

Human Rights Watch. “Egypt: Draft Law Would Effectively Ban Protests.” October 30, 2013. http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/30/egypt-draft-law-would-effectively-ban-protests.

Human Rights Watch. “Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000.” http://www.hrw.org/legacy/ wr2k/Mena-03.htm, 2000.

Ismail, Salwa. Political Life in Cairo’s New Quarters: Encountering the Everyday State. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006.

Ismail, Salwa. “The Egyptian Revolution against the Police.” Social Research 79, no. 2 (summer 2012): 435–62.

Kingsley, Patrick. “Egypt’s Interim President Signs ‘Anti-Protest Law.’” The Guardian, November 24, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/egypt-interim- president-anti-protest-law.

Kirollos, Mariam. “Fighting Sexual Assault in Egypt: An Interview with Mariam Kirollos.” 2013. http://vimeo.com/85054274.

Korany, Bahgat, and Rabab El-Mahdi. “The Protesting Middle East” in Arab Spring in Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012.

Lindsey, Ursula. “International Women’s Day in Cairo.” The Arabist. http://arabist.net/blog/ 2011/3/8/international-womens-day-in-cairo.html [Accessed September 7, 2014].

Mada Masr. “Civil Society Law One More Link on Chain to Shackle Dissent in Egypt.” http:// www.madamasr.com/content/civil-society-law-one-more-link-chain-shackle-dissent-egypt [Accessed August 16, 2014].

Mada Masr. “Sisi Visits Tahrir Square Mob Sexual Assault Victim in Hospital.” http:// www.madamasr.com/content/sisi-visits-tahrir-square-mob-sexual-assault-victim-hospital [Accessed September 5, 2014].

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 70

Mada Masr. “With Latest Crackdown, State Dissolves 380 NGOs in Just 2 Months.” http:// www.madamasr.com/news/latest-crackdown-state-dissolves-380-ngos-just-2-months [Accessed March 19, 2015].

Middle East Monitor. “Egypt: More than 41,000 Detainees since Sisi-Led Military Coup.” Middle East Monitor. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/11713-egypt-more-than-41000- detainees-since-sisi-led-military-coup [Accessed June 3, 2014].

Nazra for Feminist Studies, “First Verdict in Cases of Mob-Sexual Assault and Gang Rape in Tahrir Square Is No End to the Story.” July 19, 2014. http://nazra.org/en/2014/07/first-verdict-cases- mob-sexual-assault-and-gang-rape-tahrir-square-no-end-story.

Nazra . تاونس رشع للخ ةلودلا فقاومو يسنجلا فنعلا | يفحص رمتؤم .Nazra for Feminist Studies for Feminist Studies, 2014.

NWRC. “On International Women’s Day, Egyptian Women Demand Revolutionary Role.” New Woman Foundation. http://nwrcegypt.org/en/?p=3432 [Accessed September 7, 2014].

OpenDemocracy. “Statement from the Coalition of Women’s NGO’s in Egypt.” OpenDemocracy. http://www.opendemocracy.net/statement-from-coalition-of-womens-ngos-in-egypt Accessed October 8, 2013.

Osman, Tarek. “Young Egyptians: Their Society and Future.” Social Research 79, no. 2 (summer 2012): 299–322.

Reem, Leila. “Controversy over ‘Suzanne’s Laws’.” Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line, May 2011. http:// weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1046/eg14.htm.

Rizzo, Helen, Anne M Price, and Katherine Meyer. “Targeting Cultural Change in Repressive Environments: The Campaign against Sexual Harassment in Egypt.” ECWR Studies. Cairo, 2009. http://ecwronline.org/pdf/studies/AntiHarassment_for_ECWR.pdf.

RT. “Shocking Video: ‘Blue Bra’ Girl Brutally Beaten by Egypt Military.” YouTube, December 18, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mnFVYewkWEY.

Shukrallah, Salma. “10,000 Egyptian Women March against Military Violence and Rule.” Ahram Online, Dec. 10, 2011. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/29824/Egypt/Politics-/,- Egyptian-women-march-against-military-violence-a.aspx [Accessed September 4, 2015].

Singerman, Diane. “Introduction: The Contested City” in Cairo Contested: Governance, Urban Space, and Global Modernity. 1st pbk. ed. Cairo ; New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2011.

Sorbera, Lucia. Informal Power in the Greater Middle East: Hidden Geographies. Edited by Luca Anceschi, Gennaro Gervasio, and Andrea Teti. London ; New York, 2014.

SYPE. “Survey of Young People in Egypt.” Population Council, 2010. http://www.popcouncil.org/ pdfs/2010PGY_SYPEFinalReport.pdf.

Winegar, Jessica. “The Privilege of Revolution: Gender, Class, Space, and Affect in Egypt.” American Ethnologist 39, no. 1 (2012): 67–70. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1425.2011.01349.x.

NOTES

1. Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) 2010, p.145 2. The Population Council conducted the Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE) in collaboration with the Egyptian Cabinet, Information and Decision Support Centre. The Ford Foundation; the Canadian International Development Agency; UNFPA; UNICEF; the World Bank; the Embassy of

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 71

the Netherlands; UNDP; UNIFEM; and the Swedish International Development Agency supported the survey. 3. See Das, Critical Events. Veena Das defines a critical event as “an event par excellence because it instituted a new modality of historical action which was not inscribed in the inventory of that situation” (p. 5) 4. See Singerman 2011, p.11. Singerman points out how traditional analyses of neoliberal policies that mainly focus on power structures, tend to neglect individuals’ relational forces as a successful form of resistance. 5. Bayat 2010. 6. Ibid, p.33. 7. Efforts to regulate and punish civic engagement happening outside State control have dramatically increased since November 2014, date of the ultimatum for groups carrying out activities classified by the government as falling under the Ministry of Social Solidarity’s mandate. Therefore, this paper differentiates between two phases, before and after the NGO ultimatum, and focuses on the first one. 8. See Hafez 2012, p.38 and Winegar 2012. 9. See Shukrallah, “10,000 Egyptian Women March against Military Violence and Rule”, Ahram Online. 10. RT, “Shocking Video: ‘Blue Bra’ Girl Brutally Beaten by Egypt Military.” 11. Interview. 12. Ibid. 13. Regarding the term secular, I refer to Al-Ali (2000) who elaborates about the multiplicity of secular activists, who are in favour of separation between politics and religion, but can differ greatly on other issues. 14. For more details on this event, see: Lindsey, “International Women’s Day in Cairo”; NWRC, “On International Women’s Day, Egyptian Women Demand Revolutionary Role.” 15. Badran 2009. 16. Ahmed 1992, p. 129. 17. See AhramOnline, “Full English Translation of Egypt’s New Protest Law”; Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Draft Law Would Effectively Ban Protests.” 18. Middle East Monitor, May 2014. 19. See Elbadawi, “Yara Sallam”; Ali, “Run Mahienour Run”; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action--Activists Remanded in Jail, Trial in September.” 20. Osman 2012. 21. Ibid, p. 316. 22. See Elyachar 2005; Hafez 2012; Ismail 2006; Ismail 2012. 23. Herrera, 2012. 24. El-Ghobashy and Sabra, “Egypt After Raba’a: An Interview with Adam Sabra and Mona El Ghobashy”. 25. For more information on the content of the law and the reaction from CSO, see: Mada Masr, “Civil Society Law One More Link on Chain to Shackle Dissent in Egypt”; FIDH, “Egypt: New Measures to Further Obstruct NGOs’ Work”; EIPR, “Proposed Government Law Makes NGOs Subordinate to Security and Ministry Control.” 26. For more details see MadaMasr, “With Latest Crackdown, State Dissolves 380 NGOs in Just 2 Months” and EIPR, “Proposed Government Law Makes NGOs Subordinate to Security and Ministry Control.” 27. Abbink 2004, p. 17. 28. Interview. Some interviews have been anonymized, upon request of the relevant interviewees. 29. Bayat 2010, p. 111.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 72

30. Ibid, p. 87. 31. Bourdieu 1977. 32. A third angle of analysis – that ought to be contemplated – has become very relevant since the start of Sisi’s presidency: the emotional fatigue that can be experienced after several years of confrontation, loss, and exposure to violence. In my recent interviews, this has been expressed in the need to withdraw, reflect on lived experiences and mourn. 33. Kirollos, “Fighting Sexual Assault in Egypt.” 34. SYPE 2010, p. 134. 35. Ibid, p. 143. 36. Ennew 2002. 37. See Comaroff 2005. 38. Hatem 2011, p. 37. 39. See Dawood, “Backlash against ‘Suzanne Mubarak Laws’ Was Inevitable”; and Reem, “Controversy over ‘Suzanne’s Laws’.” 40. OpenDemocracy, “Statement from the Coalition of Women’s NGO’s in Egypt.” 41. See Hatem 2011, p. 38. 42. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000.” 43. Badran, Feminism in Islam, p. 129. 44. Rizzo, Price and Meyer, 2009. 45. MadaMasr, “Sisi Visits Tahrir Square Mob Sexual Assault Victim in Hospital.” 46. AhramOnline, “Life Sentences for Sexual Assaults at El-Sisi Celebration.” رصم باصتغا ءاسن ةثراك ضفرل نيلزان :See the Facebook event: Walk Like An Egyptian Woman .47 عراوشلا يف تاونس رشع ةلودلال فقاومولخ يسنجلا فنعلا | يفحص رمتؤم :See the Facebook event .48 49. Nazra for Feminist Studies 2014. 50. Nazra. Author's own audio recording from June 15, 2014. 51. Ibid. 52. Kingsley, “Egypt’s Interim President Adly Mansour Signs ‘Anti-Protest Law’”; AhramOnline, “Full English Translation of Egypt’s New Protest Law.” 53. Interview. Also, it is worthwhile to note here that the question of sexual harassment and assault in Egypt in the public sphere, since incidents were first documented in 2005 (the first recorded incident was in the 1990s), demands a separate paper per se, since the dynamics involved touch upon multi-layered structures of power, gender relations and the State. The complex relationships between State institutions and independent activists is similar when we refer to other topics; however, due to the actuality and importance of sexual harassment and assault, I chose to briefly showcase these dynamics through this example. 54. Nazra, “First Verdict in Cases of Mob-Sexual Assault and Gang Rape in Tahrir Square Is No End to the Story.” 55. Interview. 56. Korany and El-Mahdi 2012. 57. Ibid., p. 172–174. 58. Badran 2009. 59. Ibid., p. 135. 60. Sorbera 2014. 61. Interview. 62. Ibid. 63. Interview. 64. Sorbera 2014. 65. Abdel Latif in Bayat, p. 424. 66. Interview.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 73

67. Bourdieu 1993, p. 94.

ABSTRACTS

Civic engagement has become a threat to the current state of affairs since Egypt’s 2014 presidential elections. The blooming of motivated and active organisations, informal groups and social entrepreneurs had definitely not been foreseen in the Mubarak era, and is still rarely accounted for in current political analysis. The daily ordinary practice of mundane people, not always linked to consolidated NGOs, development organisations or state institutions, has given birth to a very organic non-movement that has proven its ability to deal with diversity (in the many possible combinations of class, religion, gender and age) for the betterment of their communities in successful ways. Youth participation and young women’s involvement has been important in challenging the previous nation-State narrative and in the genesis of this movement. Nonetheless, youth engagement and their potential have seriously been constrained by stagnant old regime structures, difficulties in accessing funds, bureaucracy and heavy repression. All of these were elements manufactured and controlled by Mubarak’s regime, that have found continuity in the current State committed to restoring the status quo ante, prioritising security over rights, and not allowing civil engagement outside its strict paradigms. As such, the public sphere has been assimilated as the exclusive domain of the State/Government. This paper will address the particularities of this organic non-movement with regards to young women’s civic engagement in addition to the specific constraints that derive from its interaction with gender politics, with a particular focus on conventional forms of advocacy by state institutions and consolidated NGOs, and their links to international funding.

Depuis l’élection présidentielle de 2014, l’engagement civique des citoyens est devenu une menace au statu quo en Égypte. La prolifération d’organisations motivées et actives, de collectifs informels et d’entrepreneurs sociaux n’avait clairement pas été anticipée sous Moubarak, et reste rarement expliquée ou prise en compte dans l’analyse politique actuelle. Les pratiques au quotidien de personnes ordinaires, pas toujours liées à des organisations non-gouvernementales consolidées, ont organiquement donné naissance à un non-mouvement avec une capacité prouvée à gérer la diversité (dans les nombreuses combinaisons possibles de classe, de confession, de genre et d’âge) avec succès pour l’avancement de leurs communautés. La participation des jeunes et des jeunes femmes a joué un rôle clé dans la remise en question de l’ancien récit sur l’Etat- nation et la genèse du mouvement. Cependant, l’engagement des jeunes et leur potentiel a été sérieusement restreint par les structures stagnantes de l’ancien régime, les difficultés d’accès aux financements, la bureaucratie et une forte répression. Tous ces éléments, produits et contrôlés par le régime de Moubarak, ont trouvé une continuité dans l’État d’aujourd’hui, engagé dans la restauration du statu quo ante, donnant la priorité à la sécurité avant les droits humains, et interdisant l’engagement civique à l’extérieur de ses paradigmes rigides. La sphère publique a donc été assimilée au domaine exclusif de l’État et du gouvernement. Cette contribution traite des particularités de ce non-mouvement organique par rapport à l’engagement civique des jeunes femmes, ainsi que des contraintes spécifiques dérivées de son interaction avec la politique du genre. Elle y accorde une attention particulière aux formes conventionnelles de plaidoyer par les institutions étatiques et ONG consolidées, ainsi que leurs liens au financements internationaux.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 74

INDEX

Mots-clés: Égypte, participation civique, femmes, engagement civique, politique du genre, civisme Keywords: Egypt, civic participation, women, civic engagement, gender politics

AUTHOR

MARTA AGOSTI

PhD Candidate in Social Anthropology – SOAS University of London Marta Agosti is a multilingual international development worker and researcher with over ten years of experience working for the UNFPA and various NGOs in the Arab world. Having earned an MA in Development Studies and another in Anthropological Research Methods, she is currently continuing her studies as a PhD candidate in Social Anthropology at SOAS-University of London and is a Research Fellow at the Cynthia Nelson Institute for Gender and Women’s Studies at the American University in Cairo. Her research interest revolves around the interaction of political and social institutions with ordinary young women and men involved in the articulation of movements and initiatives for social change. [email protected]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 75

Ethnographie de la self-défense féminine dans le Caire révolutionnaire. Modalités de mise en récits de la violence des femmes Ethnography of feminine self-defense in revolutionary Cairo. Creating narratives of women’s violence

Perrine Lachenal

1 Lorsque j’ai commencé ma thèse d’anthropologie, en octobre 2010, je comptais me concentrer sur la manière dont les cours de self-défense féminine organisés au Caire offraient des occasions de reformulations, à travers un engagement singulier des corps féminins, des attributions de genre et des définitions des catégories sexuées. Je ne soupçonnais pas alors l’ampleur du soulèvement qui allait, trois mois plus tard, transformer radicalement la situation politique et sociale en Égypte. Je me suis finalement rendue compte, au fil de mes séjours sur le terrain, que l’objet d’étude choisi – la self-défense féminine – constituait un excellent point d’observation de la société égyptienne révolutionnaire. Les manières de faire et de dire cette pratique – qui impliquent des représentations spécifiques du genre, de la violence et de la légitime défense – ne sont en effet pas fixes et muent sans cesse depuis le début de la révolution. Ces mutations informent sur la société égyptienne contemporaine et les dynamiques sociales, politiques et genrées qui la travaillent.

2 Le développement des cours de self-défense destinés aux femmes dans la ville du Caire, au milieu des années 2000, fait initialement partie des propositions portées par le milieu associatif et sportif pour répondre au « harcèlement sexuel » – taharruch ginsî. Celui-ci est construit, dans ces mêmes années, comme « maladie » nationale et problème public. Avec la période révolutionnaire, qui s’accompagne d’une montée d’un sentiment d’insécurité inédit, le champ égyptien des pratiques de défense s’est transformé progressivement, entraînant notamment une augmentation des offres de cours de self-défense féminine, particulièrement dans les quartiers socialement

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 76

privilégiés de la ville. En 2011 et 2012, j’ai fréquenté régulièrement certains de ces cours, au Caire, en situation d’observation participante. J’ai suivi près de soixante entraînements, dispersés sur une quinzaine de lieux, et ai réalisé quinze entretiens auprès de professeurs, trente auprès de pratiquantes. 3 Cette contribution souhaite se concentrer sur les enjeux d’énonciation de la violence féminine et des légitimités hiérarchisées qui lui sont relatives, tels qu’ils me sont apparus sur mon terrain de recherche. Quels sont les cadres rendant intelligible l’usage de la violence par les femmes ? Comment se définissent les modalités « normales » d’avènement et de représentation de cette violence ? Les commentaires relatifs à la violence tenus par les actrices et acteurs de mon terrain, pratiquantes et professeurs de self-défense, seront envisagés comme des discours travaillés par des enjeux de pouvoir, informant sur les ordres sociaux et sexués, ainsi que sur certaines recompositions du système du genre qu’a entraîné la période révolutionnaire égyptienne.

Violence des femmes : violence populaire ?

4 Le récit le plus saillant, dans les paroles de mes interlocutrices – dont je rappelle qu’elles sont issues de classes sociales privilégiées – est celui qui associe l’usage de la violence aux classes populaires. Il s’agit d’ailleurs, comme le montrent certaines productions cinématographiques, d’une représentation commune de la violence des femmes en Égypte. Les manières de distinguer les usages légitimes et illégitimes de la violence révèlent ici un effort de positionnement social – la violence féminine est rejetée systématiquement du côté de l’« autre » – impliquant un rapport hiérarchique.

5 Si l’acquisition de techniques de combat est valorisée en cours de self-défense, la mise en pratique se voit immédiatement renvoyée du côté des classes populaires. La nuance est importante : pour les pratiquantes, c’est la possibilité de la violence et non pas la violence elle-même qui est perçue comme positive et potentiellement émancipatrice. « Se sentir capable » d’être violente n’est pas, à leurs dires, la même chose que de l’être. C’est la menace, et non pas la réalisation de ce que celle-ci annonce, qui sert ici d’outil au renversement de la situation de domination : être en position de force implique d’être en mesure de faire craindre l’irruption de sa propre violence et le gain de pouvoir, induit par la pratique de la self-défense féminine, est celui de cette potentialité nouvelle. Les pratiquantes valorisent ainsi plus la possibilité de combattre que le combat en lui-même et associent l’usage féminin de la force physique à des figures dévalorisées vis-à-vis desquelles elles cherchent à se distinguer. L’image donnée des femmes populaires, à qui l’usage de la violence est communément attribué, s’articule à des représentations spécifiques de leur corporalité. Une des responsables d’UN-Women au Caire me donne son point de vue sur la capacité des femmes à réagir physiquement : « Ce que j’en sais de ma vision générale, c’est que les femmes des classes les plus pauvres de la société, (…) et bien elles se défendent. Je le vois dans les films, elles attrapent le balai et frappent le gars ! Tu vois, la femme est généralement assez grosse et elle frappe. Généralement les hommes ont peur d’elle parce qu’ils voient qu’elle est grosse et qu’elle a une grosse voix ». 6 Le témoignage de Mona va dans le même sens : « Les femmes des quartiers populaires sont énormes et leurs maris sont tout maigres à côté d’elles. C’est leurs maris qui ont peur d’elles car elles mènent la loi à

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 77

la maison. J’ai lu dans un article qui tournait sur Facebook que l’Égypte était un pays où il y a beaucoup d’hommes battus par leurs femmes ». 7 Ces deux extraits montrent que les corps ainsi que les caractéristiques projetées sur eux - leur volume, leur masse, leurs capacités - se trouvent au cœur des représentations du social et des positions attribuées à chacun et chacune. Les femmes populaires se voient décrites à travers leur corporalité à la fois comme figures disciplinaires et figures à discipliner1.

8 Le fantasme de la violence féminine populaire est également visible dans les discours médiatiques de l’insécurité urbaine comme l’illustre un reportage sensationnaliste portant sur les femmes de la « balṭaga »2, décrites comme sans pitié avec des « cœurs » qualifiés de « forts » (bi-qalb gāmid) et de « morts » (qalbuhum mayyet). Une des plus importantes affaires criminelles du vingtième siècle égyptien est d’ailleurs le fait de femmes : en mai 1920 à Alexandrie, deux sœurs - Raya et Sakina - furent condamnées à mort pour avoir enlevé et tué dix-sept femmes. La gigantesque couverture médiatique de l’évènement insistait sur les origines sociales des deux tueuses dont on précisait qu’elles étaient opposées à celles de leurs victimes, cultivant une représentation monstrueuse d’une violence populaire menaçant les classes bourgeoises.

Violence féminine et conjugalité, l’impossible négociation

9 Le fait de faire de la self-défense peut être formulé par mes interlocutrices comme potentiellement problématique vis-à-vis de leur présence sur le marché matrimonial. La vie de couple semble en effet reposer sur un consensus, relatif aux rôles adoptés par chacun, dans lequel il est communément admis que l’homme est celui qui pourvoit aux besoins de sa femme et la protège. L’anthropologue Suad Joseph évoque la fonction protectrice des hommes vis-à-vis de femmes comme au fondement de la « communauté » que représentent par exemple le quartier et la famille3. Cette relation de protecteur à protégée m’est présentée par mes interlocutrices comme constitutive de la relation amoureuse et conjugale et sa remise en question, notamment à travers l’expérience de la self-défense, doit rester partielle. Le témoignage de Sarah est à ce titre éloquent : « Les filles ont peur de ne pas pouvoir trouver un mari si elles paraissent trop fortes. Les hommes veulent pouvoir être là pour protéger les femmes alors si les femmes sont déjà fortes, il y a le risque qu’ils se sentent inutiles. Les filles ont peur de ça car c’est quelque chose de très important de trouver un mari ! ». 10 La force féminine effraierait ainsi les hommes, les privant de leur fonction de protecteurs et de fait, les rendant « inutiles » ; il s’agit en quelque sorte de protéger le rôle de protecteur. Ces propos rappellent ceux de Yasmine m’expliquant que son mari avait refusé qu’elle aille manifester car, impliqué dans les comités populaires de leur quartier, il ne voulait pas se retrouver à faire le guet devant une maison vide : « il m’a dit : « je garde la maison et pendant ce temps toi, tu vas à Tahrir ? Ça n’a aucun sens, il faut que tu restes à la maison ! » ». La violence féminine est ainsi subordonnée à la violence masculine, conditionnée par la présence et le consentement des hommes : une violence sous tutelle en quelque sorte.

11 Dans les paroles des pratiquantes et des professeurs, le savoir-faire technique doit s’associer à un savoir-faire social. Pour Moustafa par exemple, le déploiement de

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 78

techniques de défense par une femme est conditionné par l’absence d’homme à ses côtés ; les femmes apprennent à se défendre « au cas où ». Amânî m’explique dans le même ordre d’idée que si elle n’est pas allée sur la place Tahrir en janvier 2011, c’est parce qu’elle ne voulait pas faire « perdre de temps » aux hommes manifestant en les adjoignant, par sa seule présence, à la protéger. Dans une vidéo désormais célèbre, Asma Mahfouz appelle « ceux qui se considèrent comme des hommes » à aller manifester le 25 janvier 2011 les rappelant à leur devoir de la protéger, elle, et toutes les autres filles mobilisées. Les femmes jouent ici en quelque sorte un rôle d’intermédiaire entre différentes catégories d’hommes, agresseurs et protecteurs. Le fait que des femmes s’engagent dans des affrontements est ici utilisé afin de signifier aux hommes qu’ils manquent à leurs devoirs et de les inciter à participer, comme pour restaurer un honneur viril. 12 Les femmes mariées et mères de famille rencontrées sur mon terrain se distinguent de mes autres interlocutrices à travers leurs manières de qualifier leurs propres aptitudes au combat. Le fait de ne plus avoir à trouver de partenaire semble changer la donne quant à la manière de se formuler en non-conformité vis-à-vis des normes féminines. La conjugalité ne constitue tout de même pas, pour les pratiquantes mariées, le cadre d’expression privilégiée pour évoquer leur goût du combat et les rares fois où il est question de la figure du mari, c’est pour signifier sa déstabilisation ou son désintérêt vis-à-vis de la pratique de la self-défense. Hana lie par exemple explicitement son divorce à son engagement dans le combat : « Maintenant je suis libre ! J’ai 45 ans et personne ne contrôle ma vie » ; il faut apparemment choisir entre pratique martiale et statut marital. C’est en fait dans le registre de la maternité que ces femmes se permettent d’exprimer de manière positive leurs dispositions non-conventionnelles, la présence d’enfants offrant un cadre rendant possibles certaines expérimentations dans les manières d’être et de se dire mère. Je pense à Hana m’expliquant en riant qu’aucun de ses trois fils n’a accepté de faire des arts martiaux – « pour eux, le combat c’est le truc de maman ! » – ou à Mina regardant avec le sourire sa fille faire une prise à son fils à la fin d’un de nos cours : « elle me voit m’entraîner à la maison et elle essaie de m’imiter ». La figure de la mère combattante, lionne protégeant ses petits, constitue une autre illustration de la valorisation sous conditions, car maternelle, de la violence féminine. Cette figure de la maternité est par exemple évoquée par Shayma lorsque qu’elle raconte au groupe sa fierté ressentie la veille en regardant à la télévision un film américain relatant l’histoire d’une femme cherchant à retrouver son fils enlevé : « elle se battait tout le temps et faisait plein de mouvements que nous avons appris. C’était fou, je me disais elle va faire comme ça et elle faisait comme ça ! Et elle est comme nous, c’est une mère ! ». L’expression de la violence féminine est ici phagocytée dans le cadre familial : la maternité, plus que la conjugalité, offre un registre acceptable pour dire la possibilité de l’avènement de cette violence.

Une violence masculinisante : la puissance des femmes en question

13 L’autre danger pointé du doigt par les pratiquantes de self-défense engagées sur le marché matrimonial relève de la question de la « féminité » : l’acquisition par de jeunes femmes de dispositions considérées comme constitutives du masculin, relatives à l’usage de la violence, impliquerait une possible et risquée masculinisation. C’est ici

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 79

l’usage de la violence qui est directement ciblé, ainsi que la potentielle transformation des corps qu’il implique. Si la puissance physique peut être recherchée, c’est à la condition de demeurer dissimulée sous peine de prendre le risque d’effrayer de potentiels prétendants. Sarah raconte à propos de sa pratique intensive de l’aïkido : « Il y a des gens qui ne comprennent pas comment une fille peut faire ce choix, ils me disent que ce n’est pas féminin, que je vais devenir un homme, musclée et tout, et que personne ne voudra se marier avec moi ». 14 Mona précise quant à elle vouloir « être forte mais sans devenir un homme » ; la crainte d’un glissement – celui d’une femme se transformant en homme – est explicitement formulée. Les perceptions du genre s’organisent ici autour d’un jeu d’inversion dans lequel une femme qui perdrait ce qui la caractérise, ici la douceur et la féminité, ne deviendrait pas du non-féminin mais du masculin.

Cours gratuit de self-défense organisé par des professeurs d'aïkido, au Parc Orman (le Caire), 9 nov. 2012

Photo : Perrine Lachenal

15 La négociation relative à la puissance et à la violence des femmes se joue donc au niveau des corps et pour certaines pratiquantes, l’apprentissage de techniques associées aux hommes s’accompagne d’un travail de féminisation de l’apparence, comme pour « compenser »4. Il s’agit d’éloigner le spectre de la masculinisation et le risque de faire littéralement « mauvais genre » à une période particulièrement décisive pour les jeunes femmes célibataires qu’elles sont. Ce travail de féminisation s’articule à la fois autour du rejet des muscles et de l’adhésion au projet de minceur, marqueur de féminité autant que d’appartenance de classe. Des enjeux de distinction sociale se nichent dans ces considérations relatives au poids. Luc Boltanski invite justement à penser ce qui fait modèle pour le corps - sa forme, sa texture, sa couleur, son volume - en termes de positionnement social5.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 80

Séduire : l’enjeu de la sexualisation des corps

16 Il arrive toutefois que les aptitudes au combat des jeunes femmes, perçues comme transgressives et potentiellement masculinisantes, soient appréhendées comme des qualités pouvant être recherchées par les hommes. L’article sur les femmes policières au Moyen-Orient, publié dans un magazine trouvé dans une salle de musculation du Caire, met en exergue la phrase suivante : « Les hommes préfèrent ce genre de femmes » (al-rigāl yufaḍdalūn hadhā-l-nū‘ min al-nisā’) (23 avril 2011)6. Dans le même registre, Yasser, professeur de self-défense, avait mis en ligne sur sa page Facebook la vidéo d’une femme affrontant simultanément, et avec succès, dix attaquants ; il y avait accolé le commentaire suivant : « j’aimerais me marier avec elle ! ». L’usage de la violence par les femmes est ici rendu acceptable parce qu’encadré par des discours désamorçant le potentiel subversif de la pratique en l’intégrant dans le projet conjugal ; la transgression se voit attribuée une dimension esthétique.

17 La production télévisuelle et cinématographique joue un grand rôle dans la diffusion de ce type de représentations spectaculaires et esthétisées de la violence des femmes. Le clip de la chanson « Khāf minnī », qui signifie « Crains-moi », de la chanteuse égyptienne Simone, sorti en 2014, ne pourrait offrir meilleure illustration7 : on y voit Simone, défenseuse des femmes harcelées et bafouées, terrassant les uns après les autres, à coups de pieds et de poings, une quinzaine d’hommes. Cette valorisation par l’image a des conséquences ambivalentes : d’un côté, elle participe à augmenter l’acceptabilité sociale de la violence féminine, en en banalisant et esthétisant les représentations8 mais de l’autre, elle la vide de sa portée contestataire en la marchandisant9. Cette marchandisation des corps féminins combattants peut par ailleurs s’accompagner de leur sexualisation à l’image d’une Lara Croft en petite tenue. Je pense ici à un vidéoclip libanais qui détournait explicitement le langage visuel de la révolution et sur lequel j’étais tombée dans un café de Dokki10. Il s’agissait de la chanson « Khalās » – qui signifie « assez » – du chanteur Sijal Hachem mettant en scène des hommes révoltés, keffiehs palestiniens autour du cou, manifestant contre la vénalité des femmes. Dans le clip, les protestataires font face à une force antiémeute composée de policières courtement vêtues, en bas résilles et talons aiguilles. Le chanteur se retrouve dans un poste de police, forcé de signer un document sous la contrainte du décolleté de sa tortionnaire. La mise en scène est troublante pour qui sait la réalité de la torture policière, et sa systématique dimension sexuelle, dans les postes de police.

Une ressource révolutionnaire

18 Le contexte révolutionnaire a favorisé l’émergence et la diffusion d’un autre récit de la violence, vue comme possible ressource féminine, alors conjoncturelle et exceptionnelle. Ce récit se décline selon des configurations plurielles, liées pour certaines à un sentiment d’insécurité, qui pouvait préexister par ailleurs à la période révolutionnaire, et pour d’autres à l’importance des basculements politiques en train de s’opérer.

19 Activiste des premières heures, Radwa m’explique en entretien son implication au sein des affrontements de 2011 en cherchant à justifier le fait qu’elle-même ait lancé des pavés sur les policiers, refusant de rester en arrière avec les femmes : « Les femmes se battent depuis toujours aux côtés des hommes ! Regarde toutes les femmes qui ont

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 81

combattu aux côtés du prophète Mohamed ». L’histoire d’Umm Amara, figure combattante dont la geste est célébrée dans le Coran, m’est alors contée par Radwa, de la même façon qu’elle l’est par Fâdy et Shayma à propos de l’usage de la violence par des femmes : Umm Amara faisait partie des proches du prophète, présente lors de la bataille d’Uhud qui eut lieu en 625. Initialement en charge avec les autres femmes du ravitaillement des combattants, Umm Amara se saisit d’une épée et part combattre lorsqu’elle s’aperçoit que la situation devient critique pour ses alliés ; elle sera blessée au combat. Le recours aux armes par une femme, tel qu’il est envisagé à travers cette histoire, est justifié par le devoir de participer à un combat et à la défense d’une cause collective : la violence est ainsi considérée comme une ressource exceptionnellement féminine, héroïque, et subordonnée alors à la grandeur de l’enjeu de la victoire. La noblesse de la cause révolutionnaire neutralise de la même manière la différence sexuée des manifestants des premières lignes. Fatma raconte : « J’ai participé aux batailles (rue Mohammed Mahmoud). Je ne me suis pas posé la question, je crois que cette fois on n’avait pas le choix. Il fallait y aller, c’était une question de vie ou de mort ! C’est sûr que les manifestants n’avaient pas le choix, il y a des institutions à détruire et cela ne peut se faire sans violence. Nous devions être violents ! » 20 Dominique Godineau, historienne de la Révolution Française, donne à voir une semblable représentation de la participation des femmes à la lutte contre la monarchie dont on salue à l’époque le caractère exceptionnel ; les « périodes de troubles » sont selon elle « propices à une redistribution des cartes » et à « l’expérimentation d’autres possibles »11. Ce récit de la violence des femmes demeure toutefois de l’ordre du « carnavalesque » dans le sens où la transgression doit demeurer provisoire et où le retour à l’ordre passera par un retour à l’ordre des sexes12.

Atelier informel sur l’autodéfense dans le cadre d’un événement de sensibilisation contre le harcèlement sexuel au Caire, le 5 février 2015

Photo prise par Sandra Fernandez

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 82

21 Au-delà de l’importance de la cause révolutionnaire, c’est aussi l’intensité du sentiment d’insécurité qui m’est présentée par certaines de mes interlocutrices comme autorisant certains franchissements, l’usage de la violence étant alors justifié par l’urgence sécuritaire. Hana, professeure de self-défense, me racontait en riant sa sortie remarquée dans sa cage d’escalier, son sabre d’aïkido à la main, alors qu’elle avait entendu du bruit en pleine nuit au début de l’année 2011 : elle avait eu du mal à cacher son arme derrière son dos une fois qu’elle s’était trouvée face à un voisin ayant oublié ses clés et qui cherchait à forcer sa porte. Une telle justification – la peur comme moteur de la transgression – est également visible dans les paroles des pratiquantes du prestigieux club suisse. L’appartenance à une classe sociale privilégiée se traduit pour elles en termes émotionnels : la période révolutionnaire est associée à un sentiment d’insécurité grandissant, présenté comme motivation première à faire de la self- défense. En partageant anxiété et gants de boxe, les pratiquantes confirment qu’elles appartiennent au même groupe social, singulièrement affecté par les désordres révolutionnaires. La transgression de genre, ainsi que les modalités sous lesquelles elle s’expérimente, s’intègrent alors dans un projet de conformité sociale13.

22 L’accroissement de la demande sécuritaire de la part des classes sociales privilégiées du Caire induit ainsi des formes d’engagement inédites des corps féminins. Outre la multiplication des offres de cours de self-défense dans les beaux quartiers, ce phénomène est observable à travers le développement de projets, menés depuis récemment en Égypte, et impliquant des agents de sécurité femmes. Lors de ma visite au sein du groupe Falcon Group International, la plus grande entreprise de sécurité privée en Égypte, l’assistant du directeur « Marketing et Stratégie » m’expliquait la part de marché qui s’était ouverte à eux, notamment auprès de riches touristes saoudiennes, dès qu’ils avaient été en mesure de proposer les services de femmes gardes du corps. Ces dernières, pour la plupart des sportives de haut-niveau dont la formation a été complétée par des officiers de police ou des militaires, ont fait l’objet d’un intérêt médiatique international. Dans le même registre, l’intégration progressive de femmes dans la police égyptienne s’est faite ces dernières années à travers des domaines d’action spécifiques comme celui de la police touristique et de la lutte contre le terrorisme. La présence des femmes était alors motivée par la nécessité de procéder à des inspections – fouilles de sac et fouilles aux corps – auprès de femmes, par exemple à l’entrée des centres commerciaux, sites touristiques, hôtels ou aéroports. Je me souviens également de mon entrée sur la place Tahrir alors encerclée de barrières, en juillet 2011, lorsque j’avais dû me mettre dans une file afin que je sois, ainsi que mes affaires, fouillée par une femme : les occupants de la place voulaient s’assurer qu’aucune arme ne circulait. 23 Ces différents cas – compagnies de sécurité privées, police touristique ou service d’ordre informel – révèlent que l’accès des femmes aux instances chargées du maintien de l’ordre en Égypte présente une certaine ambivalence : à chaque fois, le franchissement est encadré par un désir sécuritaire impliquant un plus grand contrôle des corps, notamment féminins. Ce constat rappelle celui de Beth Baron et de Khaled Fahmy à propos de la création des premières écoles de sages-femmes en Égypte14 : sous couvert d’un projet de formation émancipateur, les sages-femmes avaient été chargées du contrôle de la mobilité et des corps des femmes à travers celui de leur virginité, devenues implicitement des agents de régulation de l’État et des garantes de son pouvoir15.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 83

Conclusion

24 Violence populaire, monstrueuse, sous-tutelle, masculinisante, spectaculaire ou encore « révolutionnaire » : les paroles des pratiquantes et professeurs de self-défense laissent apparaître en creux différents récits qui ont en commun de rendre intelligible la violence des femmes, tout en la contraignant et en phagocytant le potentiel subversif. La transgression impliquée par l’usage de la violence par les femmes, envisagée à travers la pratique de la self-défense féminine, est ainsi strictement encadrée et rendue inoffensive. La position sociale, l’appartenance sexuée et la situation matrimoniale déterminent pour chaque personne le champ des possibles et des impossibles en matière de violence, confirmant que l’ordre social est imbriqué dans celui des sexes. L’identification de ces récits, et de la manière dont ils se traduisent à travers des référents locaux, a permis de nourrir une réflexion plus large sur les représentations de la violence des femmes en Égypte.

25 Penser la violence des femmes, à partir de mon terrain égyptien, a permis d’interroger la dimension sexuée des processus d’étiquetage qui participent à définir, pour chaque personne, le champ des possibles et des impossibles formes d’agir. Les modalités d’énonciation de la violence se révèlent socialement situées : elles renseignent sur la manière dont les individus mobilisent les normes et informent sur leurs positions dans les rapports de pouvoir. Je rejoins à ce titre Coline Cardi et Geneviève Pruvost16 qui invitent les sciences sociales à renouveler leurs approches de la violence et à développer une posture qu’elles qualifient de « queer ». L’analyse, en cessant de se focaliser sur la dualité des sexes des personnes auteures et victimes de violence, permettrait de rendre saillantes d’autres lignes de partage, distinguant notamment les groupes sociaux pourvus et dépourvus de cette capacité d’agir. Il faut ainsi s’employer à restituer aux rapports de pouvoir toute leur complexité, en ne les réduisant pas à un seul critère comme le sexe. C’est ce qu’affirme également Béatrice Hibou lorsqu’elle déplore la nature quelque peu exaltée des travaux scientifiques portant sur les « arts de la résistance » des dominés, empressés de conférer une portée politique à des expériences en réalité beaucoup plus ambiguës17. Les expériences de la révolution, telles qu’elles m’ont été racontées par les personnes rencontrées au cours de ma recherche, traduisent bien cette ambigüité.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Baron Beth, 2006, « Women, honour, and the state : Evidence from Egypt », Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 42, n° 1, p. 1-20.

Boltanski Luc, 1971, « Les usages sociaux du corps », Les Annales, Économies, sociétés, civilisations, vol. 26, p. 205-233.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 84

Cardi Coline et Pruvost Geneviève, 2012, « Introduction générale », Penser la violence des femmes, Paris, La Découverte, p. 13-64.

Dauphin Cécile et Farge Arlette, 1997, De la violence et des femmes, Paris, Albin Michel.

Dufournaud Nicole, 2012, « Femmes en armes au 16ème siècle », Penser la violence des femmes, C. Cardi et G. Pruvost (éds), Paris, La Découverte, p. 75-84.

Fahmy Khaled, 1998, « Women, Medicine, and Power in Nineteenth-Century Egypt », Remaking Women. Feminism and modernity in the Middle East, L. Abu-Lughod éd., Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 35-72.

Godineau Dominique, 2012, « Violences politiques. Introduction », Penser la violence des femmes, C. Cardi et G. Pruvost (éds), Paris, La Decouverte,́ p. 67-74.

Hibou Béatrice, 2011, Anatomie politique de la domination, Paris, La Decouverte.́

Joseph Suad, 1994, « Brother/Sister Relationships : Connectivity, Love, and Power in the Reproduction of Patriarchy in Lebanon », American Ethnologist, vol. 21, n° 1, p. 50-73.

McCaughey Martha et King Neal éd., 2001, Reel Knockouts : Violent Women in the Movies, Austin, University of Texas Press.

Mennesson Christine et Clément Jean-Paul, 2009, « Boxer comme un homme, être une femme ». Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n° 179, p. 76-91.

Le Renard Amélie, 2012, « Les buya. Subversion des normes de genre en Arabie Saoudite », Jeunesses arabes, L. Bonnefoy et M. Catusse (éds), La Decouverte,́ p. 68-77.

NOTES

1. Boltanski, 1971 ; Cardi et Pruvost, 2012. 2. « La balṭaga au féminin » (al-balṭaga al-nisā’iyya), CBC Egypt, émission « Les femmes ne savent pas mentir » (al-sittāt mā ya‘arafūch yekdhebū), 4 décembre 2011, www.youtube.com/watch? v=oZqFKaj5v_U. 3. Suad, 1994, p. 66. 4. Mennesson et Clément, 2009. 5. Boltanski, 1971, p. 232. 6. « Les hommes préfèrent ce genre de femmes ! » (al-rigāl yufadḍalūn hadhā-l-nū‘ min al-nisā’), Sayyidati, 23 avril 2011, 1572, 46-50. 7. Clip visible sur Youtube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlLeuSnMbls. 8. McCaughey et King, 2001. 9. Amélie Le Renard (2012) illustre bien cette ambivalence – transgression versus marchandisation – à travers sa recherche menée en Arabie Saoudite à propos des « buya ». Le néologisme vient du mot anglais « boy » auquel on a ajouté le suffixe arabe de féminisation « a » et qualifie une jeune femme habillée à la manière d’un homme. Ce style vestimentaire androgyne a notamment été diffusé et promu à travers quelques séries américaines et turques dont raffole la jeunesse saoudienne. La valeur marchande de la « mode » autorise ici des franchissements inédits – cadre d’expression de l’homosexualité pour certaines jeunes femmes – en même temps qu’elle en appauvrit le potentiel transgressif. 10. Le vidéoclip en question est visible sur YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=77hQD6NEKp8. 11. Dufournaud, 2012, p. 74. 12. Cardi et Pruvost, 2012.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 85

13. Le danger perçu envers le monopole du pouvoir et des privilèges autorise ici la contestation de certaines assignations. Une configuration semblable est décrite vis-à-vis de la société féodale du quinzième siècle : les dames, nommées les « seigneures », étaient invitées à apprendre à utiliser les canons et à diriger des actions militaires au cas où leurs maris quitteraient le château ; leur rang social primant alors sur leur appartenance de sexe (Dufournaud, 2012). 14. Beth Baron, 2006 et Khaled Fahmy, 1998. 15. En 1832, la première école de sages-femmes est créée au Caire, saluée en Europe comme une lueur de « modernité » au cœur de l’obscurantisme musulman. Il s’agit en fait d’enrayer en urgence les épidémies de variole et de syphilis qui déciment les troupes égyptiennes et les écoles militaires, en lien avec le développement de la prostitution. C’est ainsi que les épouses des militaires, ainsi que les prostituées, doivent être surveillées et sensibilisées pour enrayer durablement la contagion. La raison première de la fondation de l’école repose donc dans la préservation de la force armée masculine ainsi que sa moralité, l’éducation des femmes permise ne constituant qu’une conséquence indirecte du projet. Ces premières générations de sages- femmes auront également en charge, employées dans les postes de police, de vérifier la virginité des jeunes femmes de retour de fugue. Elles participent ainsi au contrôle de la sexualité féminine, projet implicite de l’État égyptien qui tente de se légitimer et de rivaliser avec les autres pouvoirs, tribaux ou religieux notamment, en se présentant comme le gardien de la famille et en faisant sienne la question de l’honneur familial (Baron, 2006). 16. Coline Cardi et Geneviève Pruvost, 2012. 17. Béatrice Hibou, 2011.

RÉSUMÉS

A partir d’un travail ethnographique mené au Caire dans les cours de self-défense destinés aux femmes, cette contribution se concentre sur les enjeux d’énonciation de la violence féminine et des légitimités différenciées et hiérarchisées qui lui sont relatives. Les commentaires relatifs à la violence tenus par les actrices et acteurs de mon terrain, qui s’emploient à lui donner cadre et à en définir les modalités « normales » d’avènement, seront envisagés comme des discours travaillés par des enjeux de pouvoir, informant sur les ordres sociaux et sexués ainsi que sur certaines recompositions du système du genre qu’a entraîné la période révolutionnaire. Quels sont les cadres rendant intelligible l’usage de la violence par les femmes ? Comment se définissent les modalités acceptables d’avènement et de représentation de cette violence au féminin ? Différentes modalités de « mises en récits » seront ainsi identifiées. Violence populaire, monstrueuse, sous-tutelle, masculinisante, spectaculaire ou encore « révolutionnaire » : les paroles des pratiquantes et professeurs de self-défense laissent apparaître en creux différents récits qui ont en commun de rendre intelligible la violence des femmes, tout en la contraignant. La position sociale, l’appartenance sexuée et la situation matrimoniale déterminent pour chaque personne le champ des possibles et des impossibles en matière de violence, confirmant que l’ordre social est imbriqué dans celui des sexes. L’identification de ces récits, et de la manière dont ils se traduisent à travers des référents locaux, permet de nourrir une réflexion plus large portant sur les représentations de la violence des femmes en Égypte.

Based on ethnographical work in Cairo in women’s self-defense classes, this paper focuses on the stakes involved in discourse about feminine violence, as well as the differentiated and

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 86

hierarchically-ordered forms of legitimacy connected to it. The male and female protagonists in my field frame this violence discursively, defining its “normal” mode of occurrence. Their comments on the subject will be treated here as discourses shaped in part by power issues, and which shed light on social and gendered orders, as well as on certain shifts within the gender system, connected to the revolutionary period. What frameworks make women’s use of violence intelligible? How are the acceptable modes of its occurrence and representation defined? Different modes of narration (« mise en récit » -- see Cardi & Pruvost, 2011) will be identified. Working-class violence, monstrous violence, violence under supervision, masculinizing violence, spectacular violence or “revolutionary” violence are among the narratives drawn out from the speech of self-defense students and teachers; these narratives make women’s violence intelligible but also constrain it. For each person, social position, sex and marital status determine the scope of possible and impossible violence, confirming that the social order is inextricably tied into the gendered order. The identification of these narratives and how they are translated through local referents, allows us to consider broader inquiry into representations of women’s violence in Egypt.

INDEX

Mots-clés : Égypte, femmes, féminisme, violence, self-défense, sport Keywords : Egypt, women, feminism, violence, self-defense, sport

AUTEUR

PERRINE LACHENAL

Perrine Lachenal est docteure en anthropologie, affiliée à l’IDEMEC (UMR 7307) à l’Université Aix-Marseille. Ses axes de recherche sont les recompositions contemporaines du pouvoir dans l’Egypte révolutionnaire, à travers l’observation des corps et la mobilisation du genre. Sa thèse, réalisée dans ce laboratoire sous la direction de Laurence Hérault, porte sur la pratique de la self- défense féminine comme l’objet ethnographique au travers duquel elle interroge cette période historique. Parmi ses dernières publications : « Martyrs ou voyous ? Mise en récits et mise en images de la révolution égyptienne », Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 2015, numéro thématique « Le religieux à l’épreuve des révoltes dans le monde arabe » ; « Beauty, the Beast and the Baseball Bat. Ethnography of Self-Defense Courses for Upper-Class Women in Revolutionary Cairo [Égypte] », Comparative Sociology, 13, 2014 : 58-77 ; « Être une fille autrement ? Self-défense féminine au Caire », Jeunesses Arabes. Loisirs, culture et politique, L. Bonnefoy, F. Burgat, M. Catusse (dir.), La Découverte, 2013 : [email protected]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 87

Reconsidering de-politicization: HarassMap’s bystander approach and creating critical mass to combat sexual harassment in Egypt Reconsidérer la dépolitisation : l’approche du témoin de HarassMap et la création d’une masse critique pour lutter contre le harcèlement sexuel en Égypte

Angie Abdelmonem

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Material presented in this article is based on the author's doctoral dissertation research project, supported by the (US) National Science Foundation under grant number 1357477.

1 Since the overthrow of in February 2011, the phenomenon of public sexual harassment in Egypt has received increasing attention. As early as 2008, the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR), one of the first advocacy NGOs to specifically campaign against public sexual harassment, issued a report in which 83% of Egyptian and 98% of foreign women surveyed had experienced sexual harassment.1 ECWR’s campaign, “Making Our Streets Safe for Everyone”, framed sexual harassment as a largely social/cultural and psychological problem and made use of innovative community-oriented and technological techniques for raising public awareness.2 However, critics of ECWR’s campaign argued the focus on the social and cultural reasons for sexual harassment resulted in social or cultural (and not political or economic) interventions that effectively depoliticized the problem.3 Salient features of this critique posited that ECWR disconnected everyday sexual harassment from state sponsored sexual violence by focusing on anonymous street harassment targeting

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 88

“men with bad cultural attitudes”, and that they did not address structural gender inequalities.4

2 Following the Revolution, UN Women conducted a new study in 2013, showing public sexual harassment, particularly in the street and on transportation, to be almost universally experienced with 99% of their study sample reporting to have been sexually harassed.5Almost half of UN Women’s study sample indicated that sexual harassment increased following the Revolution, though it is unclear how respondents arrived at this conclusion. It is probable that the Revolution helped to raise public awareness of sexual harassment, resulting in a higher level of reporting. More importantly, the Revolution presented a unique opportunity for the rise of numerous community-based anti-sexual harassment initiatives that aimed at reshaping historic social norms and behaviors around public sexual harassment6. Such initiatives made strategic decisions in avoiding political engagements to combat sexual harassment. 3 Engaging with critiques of anti-sexual harassment activism, this paper explores whether community-oriented approaches both before and after the Revolution have depoliticized the problem of sexual harassment. It confronts claims that the anti-sexual harassment efforts of ECWR were depoliticizing, and argues more broadly that interventions seeking to change sociocultural norms and behaviors are more political than critics might claim. This analysis is premised on the need to reconsider what constitutes the “political” and the meaning of depoliticization. To do so, it highlights the “diversity of participatory modalities that have the potential to mobilize the moral registers of the ordinary”; that is, interventions focused on the “ordinary”, that redefine the nature of social practice and responsibility, and that incite people to action can be political.7 Critiques of anti-sexual harassment activism rest on a particular fissure between culture and politics, where social/cultural negotiations are not often viewed as inherently political acts.8 Concomitantly, the political sphere is not seen as the “institutional crystallization…of something that happens elsewhere, in multiple local sites of contestation, such as workplaces, families, associational groups, and institutions…”9 This paper argues that community-based activism focused on redefining cultural norms of sexual harassment is a political process that does not ignore structural gender discrimination and that has intended long term political and legal effects.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 89

“The harasser is a criminal”

The harasser is a“) " شرحتملا مرجم " This Image is from HarassMap’s summer 2015 campaign criminal”) and is an example of reaching out to bystanders. The campaign was designed not only to inform people about the new law criminalizing sexual harassment, but to also give people tips with respect to how they can help in ways that do not necessarily require them to go straight to the police, since that can be a problem.

4 The independent initiative HarassMap serves as the primary case study in this paper given the philosophically developed nature of its strategic approach. Through street and community activism that engages bystanders, HarassMap employs strategies that seek to both challenge and refashion long-held norms that make sexual harassment socially acceptable. This includes disrupting patriarchal (binary) gender norms and encouraging intra-community social responsibility. Through the negotiation of new norms and building a socially responsible public concerned with the welfare of community members and that will speak up against sexual harassment, HarassMap aims to generate a critical mass that will eventually demand political and legal change from state institutions. In the following discussion, theories of norm change, bystander publics, and critical mass are drawn on to explore the political nature of HarassMap’s community activism, as well as its attempt to transform the level of state/legal engagement on the problem of public sexual harassment. It should be noted here that this paper does not examine HarassMap’s effectiveness in achieving this, only the political nature of this attempt. Moreover, entities like HarassMap do not have an explicit agenda of change within the political sphere, yet they have argued that political change can only be sustainably achieved if people themselves view sexual harassment differently.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 90

Critiques of anti-sexual harassment activism

5 Tadros argued that sexual harassment in Egypt is comprised of both socially and politically motivated forms.10 Socially motivated sexual harassment includes everyday street harassment that commonly involves comments, ogling, and touching, among other acts.11 Politically motivated sexual harassment, on the other hand, largely occurs within the context of protest, involves groups of men harassing women, and is believed by many activists to be instigated and paid for by the state to drive women out of the public space.12 For Tadros, it was critical to make this distinction visible, in order to avoid public confusion and make it clear that the state was itself a transgressor of women’s bodily integrity and that it was firmly implicated in gendering respectability. 13 Both forms of sexual harassment have been evident in Egypt since 2005, if not before. The Black Wednesday incident of that year marks one of the first sexual harassment cases that activists cite where the Egyptian state hired baltagiyya (thugs) to harass female activists protesting the constitutional referendum outside of the Press Syndicate. In 2006, the mass street sexual harassment incident in the Downtown area during the Eid holiday highlighted sexual harassment as a growing social problem.14

6 In this period, ECWR formed its campaign to define and combat street sexual harassment. According to Rizzo et al.,15 ECWR was unique because of its creative community-based techniques, involving awareness days that utilized art and music, organizing volunteer activities, and collaborating with the corporate sector for pro bono services in its fight against sexual harassment. ECWR’s approach emphasized “the importance of addressing a culture that tolerated sexual harassment.”16 Yet the campaign was criticized for not situating sexual harassment within the larger system of gender violence that included government repression and state-perpetrated sexual violence.17 Abu Lughod argued that this social/cultural approach, embedded in transnational development spheres and capitalist enterprise, helped to create victimized women and culturally bad men. For Amar, through their fixation on the “libidinal perversion of working class boys” and “time bomb masculinity”, ECWR was complicit in depoliticizing sexual harassment by not challenging the state’s use of sexual violence and torture, instead demanding increased interventions by the brutal security state to protect women in public.18 However, ECWR’s choice to work at the community-level was made within the context of state repression of civil society, where NGOs were silenced, restrained and co-opted by the state in Egypt’s corporatist climate.19 ECWR activists invested in the anti-sexual harassment campaign were concerned about the effectiveness of political advocacy within a political structure that only disenfranchised NGOs. 7 Between 2010 and 2012, immediately prior to and following the 2011 Revolution, there was an increase in the number of independent initiatives that arose to combat sexual harassment. Here, the pre-Revolutionary corporatist political environment, marked by fluctuations in state repression and inclusion of oppositional forces in the political process, was temporarily disrupted by the ensuing political instability of the Revolution.20 ElSayed and Rizzo argued that women’s activism in this period was still excluded from the political process, their demands for greater equality ignored, and that tensions between secular and religious forces over the nature of women’s rights all generated a distinct set of political constraints, but contributed to a unique opportunity for community-based initiatives. What became apparent throughout the

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 91

years of protest, from 2011-2014, was the overt targeting of women at protest sites.21 Activists at this time were vehement in their condemnation of the state for conducting virginity tests on female protestors, as well as what they believed were state actors hiring baltigiyya to attack women at protests, although there has since been some nuanced recognition that the mass assaults and rapes in Tahrir were comprised of a mix of state hired thugs and opportunists.22 In this context, initiatives quickly arose to assist the victims, or survivors, of such protest violence, including Operations Anti- Sexual Harassment (OpAntish) and Tahrir Bodyguard. Consisting of a large volunteer corps of activists and concerned members of the public, these initiatives were short- lived, emerging in response to the urgency of the situation for women in Tahrir. Both initiatives found it difficult to translate their work to non-Revolutionary protest settings and other forms of non-protest related activism. 8 Other independent initiatives that arose at this time, such as HarassMap, Imprint Movement (Harakaṭ Bassma), and Anti-Sexual Harassment Movement (Ḍed el-Taharush), concentrated their efforts on changing social perceptions and behaviors within communities rather than on lobbying political officials. At the same time, a number of advocacy NGOs incorporated sexual harassment within their overall agendas of combatting gender violence. For example, Nazra for Feminist Studies began advocating with state authorities to establish a national strategy to combat all forms of sexual violence, including sexual harassment.23 However, Fatma Khafagy, the Ombudsman from the National Council for Women (NCW), voiced her disappointment that anti- sexual harassment activists still largely presented the problem as a cultural issue, outside of the political, economic and sociological contexts within which it is embedded.24 From her perspective, ending sexual harassment required a more holistic and scientific understanding of its underlying facets, which she argued to be absent in the current work of anti-sexual harassment NGOs and initiatives. Tadros also raised concerns that social interventions focusing on “society” or “youth”, without the concomitant political analysis, reproduced patriarchal practices, such as protecting women by restricting their access to the public space.25 Recent analysis by Skalli, though, noted that post-Revolutionary youth initiatives were actively involved in disrupting gendered norms, suggesting that they have not been ignoring structural gender inequality.26 9 There can be no doubt that understanding the relationship between socially-motivated street sexual harassment and politically-motivated state sexual violence since the Revolution is of vital import. The Revolution witnessed an escalation in the violent nature, if not the actual numbers, of documented sexual harassment and assault events, particularly in the context of protest. Not only is the Egyptian government believed to have orchestrated much of the Tahrir mob sexual violence to curtail women’s public participation, the state is seen as having created an atmosphere of impunity for those who harass on a daily basis in the streets given inadequate and cumbersome legal structures and lax enforcement practices. Yet, a growing literature has also demonstrated that sexual harassment is a large-scale daily occurrence with a base in unequal gender norms that are reproduced at the everyday level.27 Tadros argued that politically motivated assaults and everyday sexual harassment exist within the same system of power, violence and social norms that condone assault.28 While socially motivated and politically motivated sexual harassment may be distinct aspects of sexual harassment, they are similar, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing expressions of discriminatory gendered norms that disadvantage women in the public space. As

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 92

facets of this larger system of gender-based violence, both state sponsored and everyday forms of sexual harassment highlight the integrated nature of sociocultural and political spheres. Anti-sexual harassment interventions, therefore, take place within this single, socially and politically integrated system of gender-based violence and their work impacts both the social and political realms.

Norms, bystanders and critical mass: theoretical considerations

10 Finnemore and Sikkink define norms “… as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”, which are both regulative and evaluative, encompassing behavior and values.29 Theories of norm change frequently center on the top-down, or trickle-down, flow of transnational ethics to states and local populations, i.e. the adoption of, and adherence to, international conventions and the codification of rights- based principles into local constitutional and legalistic frameworks.30 Civil society plays a significant role in the internalization, or socialization, process of norms. As norm entrepreneurs they help to create, frame, and spread new norms by convincing people of their rightness, and serve as pressure groups working in conjunction with other local, regional and international organizations to compel state adherence to these norms.31 This includes refashioning problematic norms through framing practices that either draw on or directly challenge long-standing/old/deep-rooted norms and values, or some hybrid mix of the two.32 Negotiating new norms and redefining social behaviors and values is an inherently political process as “… meanings are always constitutive of processes that seek to redefine social power.”33 Yet, it is often institutionalization that is viewed as a key facet of how norms are woven into the sociopolitical context.

11 Anti-sexual harassment activists working at community level question the extent to which politico-legal instruments alone can reshape social norms among the public/ society.34 An account of a sexual harassment incident witnessed by the HarassMap Community Outreach Director, Hussein el-Shafei, serves as an important example of what activists see as the insufficiency of the law in deterring sexual harassment. While traveling by microbus from to Cairo, a woman vehemently accused a man sitting behind her of sexually harassing her. The microbus stopped while passengers attempted to calm the woman and urge her to let it go, asserting their desire to get home. The woman demanded the man be forced off but he loudly declared that he would not leave. When the bus took off with the man still aboard, the woman made a phone call that passengers could hear where she insisted the police be waiting at their arrival point to arrest the man. At this point, the man shouted to be let off the bus, yelling that the woman “would send him to hell.” The passengers all agreed it would be better for him to run off into the desert than be arrested. To el-Shafei, aside from showing no concern for the woman, passengers did not see sexual harassment as a crime and definitely not something worth being arrested and prosecuted for. Despite the existence of laws forbidding “indecent assault”, HarassMap activists argue that people do not see sexual harassment as problematic, or as a punishable offense. According to al-Shafei, “people don’t want to stop harassing, they just don’t want to get caught.”35

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 93

12 Efforts focused on bystander behavior, such as the bus passengers in the above example, are critical for anti-sexual harassment initiatives. Social-psychological research has extensively explored the phenomenon commonly known as the “bystander effect”, or standing on the sidelines and failing to assist someone in need when others are around.36 Numerous reasons exist to explain the bystander effect, including inhibition, fear of embarrassment, diffusing responsibility to others in the crowd, the high cost of intervention, lack of competence to intervene, and social control from the crowd itself.37 Despite this, research has shown that bystanders may speak up when witnessing the breaking of a norm if they feel personally invested in the norm.38 Sexual violence research has also highlighted the importance of bystander behavior in changing larger community norms.39 Moreover, social activists may take their cues from the responses of observant or watchful bystanders – bystander reactions may direct social interventions.40 The concept of “bystander public” is significant here. It is composed of non-adherents to a movement or an issue, or “distal spectators” that may bear witness and respond to political or social movement issues, and may become movement beneficiaries and adherents.41 13 Bystander publics are those segments of the public that social movements seek to mobilize for their cause. These are individuals with some level of social and political consciousness, and though they are generally non-engaged, they may emerge as observers and commentators to the breakdown – and restoration – of public order.42 Their reactions can quickly politicize an issue/event, or even influence the behavior of law enforcement entities.43 Bystander publics are also necessary in the refashioning of dominant social norms. For new norms to take hold a critical mass of support is required; once a tipping point is reached, institutionalization through legal codification is possible.44 Critical mass has been defined as “a loose metaphorical way to refer to the idea that some threshold of participants or actions has to be crossed before a social movement ‘explodes’ into being.”45 Literature on critical mass often does not examine the grassroots origins of new norms. However, we can still note bystander publics’ meaningful role in facilitating the emergence of new sociopolitical or cultural norms, and as integral features of the critical mass of support that may result from this. Bystander reactions are dialectically shaped by social activism and politico-legal practices, which shape them in return.

HarassMap: background and mission

14 In late October 2010, just three months prior to the Revolution, HarassMap launched operations by going live with their Ushahidi-powered, online crowd-mapping platform. Three of HarassMap’s four co-founders were previously employed by the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR), and had started and managed the latter’s campaign “Making our streets safe for everyone.” ECWR’s strengths included strategies common among advocacy NGOs at the time, such as lobbying, conducting training workshops, engaging in research, writing reports, and providing legal services to women in need. In the early days of the “Making our streets safe for everyone” campaign, it differed from the rest of ECWR’s work by relying on volunteers and utilizing community-based techniques to engage the public, which the program managers felt was a missing component in civil society work in Egypt.46 As the program developed, was funded and

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 94

took on professional staff, program activities fell more in line with the typical advocacy work that was common practice among advocacy NGOs.

15 HarassMap’s co-founders carried this community-focus over to their new initiative. The societal element was essential to the activism the co-founders wanted to carry out. Much of the attention that HarassMap received from Western media and the international development community has lauded their unique crowd-mapping approach to make visible the everyday problem of sexual harassment. However, according to Co-Founder and Executive Director of HarassMap, Rebecca Chiao, the technological piece was considered “a bonus” to the offline work they wanted to do in neighborhoods, to change societal attitudes around sexual harassment.47 Political and legal advocacy on gender-based violence, which included the growing problem of public sexual harassment, was already occurring with a number of NGOs, such as El- Nadim Center, a pioneer for their work on torture and sexual and domestic violence. In late 2008, 16 NGOs formed the Taskforce for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence coordinated by the New Women Foundation; part of its mission was drafting and advocating for amendments to penal code articles centered on gender-based violence.48 Within this context, HarassMap’s co-founders considered a focus on community and social perceptions another vital step toward changing the larger sociopolitical climate. 16 For HarassMap activists, the fundamental reason street sexual harassment exists is the large-scale social tolerance of the practice. HarassMap argues that people ultimately allow the practice of sexual harassment to continue by failing to speak up and intervene on behalf of the harassed when they see it occur. Their primary mission, therefore, centers on reshaping bystander beliefs and behaviors to encourage people to see sexual harassment as a crime and to speak up and provide support and assistance to those who are harassed in public. Underpinning this focus on bystander beliefs and behaviors is concern that political and legal structures alone are not sufficient to change societal norms that make sexual harassment an acceptable practice. Enforcement of the law in sexual harassment cases was, and still is, seen as highly problematic. The 2008 ECWR study (the first published on the phenomenon in Egypt) indicated that 97% of Egyptian and 87% of foreign women surveyed did not report sexual harassment to the police.49 This was reconfirmed by the 2014 HarassMap study that showed only 2% of their study sample reported sexual harassment to the police.50 ECWR’s study highlighted that police tended to mock women filing reports, that women did not believe the police would help them, and that foreign women identified police officers themselves as harassers. HarassMap’s study also highlighted a common preference for alternative, anonymous reporting methods, rather than going to the police, as the latter did not treat the issue seriously. According to Chiao, effective enforcement of the law depends on the police believing something wrong has been done. Here she claimed that belief in the wrongness of certain actions stems from social roots, and that police officers themselves are no different from other members of their society. They do not always know the law or believe in it.51

Creating new social norms

17 Part of HarassMap’s approach to encouraging bystanders to speak up involves constructing and promoting new norms regarding sexual harassment. This includes 1) reconceptualizing sexual harassment, taharrush, so that non-physical acts, such as

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 95

comments and staring, are viewed as forms of violence and violations of women’s personal space, i.e. trying to move away from the related concept of muʿaksa (flirtation/ teasing); 2) undermining common stereotypes inherent in the rationales that minimize or justify sexual harassment, and engaging with people to help them see sexual violence in new ways, 3) challenging victim-blaming through positive rhetoric that promotes the strength of those who experience sexual harassment, as well as confronting the binary system of gender that disadvantages women and limits their public participation, 4) promoting the view/framing of everyday sexual harassment as a crime with social and legal ramifications, including inciting new forms of social pressure to deter sexual harassment, and 5) urging all individuals to speak up or intervene against sexual harassment of themselves or others, which may include encouraging people to file a police report, developing sexual harassment policies within organizations, and promoting speaking up as “cool.”

18 In part, the work of promoting new norms involves extensive messaging campaigns that are frequently deployed through HarassMap’s social media sites, primarily Facebook and Twitter, with some engagement on Tumblr. Since 2012, HarassMap has engaged in a number of major campaigns, including “byitharrasḥ lih?” (Why does he harass, referred to by HarassMap activists as “Debunking Myths”), “salahha fi dimaghak” (Fix it in your head/Get it right), “mesh sakta” (I won’t be silent), as well as a more recent campaign linked to International End Sexual Harassment Week, called “di mesh mu’aksa, da taharrush” (This is not flirtation, it’s sexual harassment). The “byitharrasḥ lih” campaign argued that reasons people often give for sexual harassment, including poverty, illiteracy, delayed marriage, sexual frustration, the breakdown of security, and women’s clothes, bodies and public presence, were nothing more than myths. For example, in one campaign message, HarassMap directly confronted a frequent economic rationale given for why men harass, asking “If the reason for sexual harassment is poverty, then why do company directors harass women?” Similarly, they sought to undermine a related notion that the lack of jobs leads to the inability for young men to marry, thus creating pent-up sexual frustration in men that contributes to sexual harassment, stating “If the reason for sexual harassment is delayed marriage, then why do fathers harass women?”

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 96

“Fix it in your head”

This image addresses the issue of people connecting women’s style of dress in public to sexual harassment. It is an example of how HarassMap seeks to shift social norms with respect to victim- Fix it in your head”) campaign from Nov-Dec 2013. This“) " اهحلص كغامد يف " blaming. It was part of the was part a the “16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence” initiative, run jointly by HarassMap, Nazra for Feminist Studies, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Tahrir Bodyguard.

19 In late 2013, the joint campaign “Ṣallahhạ fi dimaghak”,organized with Nazra for Feminist Studies, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and Tahrir Bodyguard, aimed at solidifying differing concepts of sexual violence and challenging gender inequality. The campaign differentiated between the often-conflated terms taharrusḥ ginsy (sexual harassment), ʿetidaʾ ginsy (sexual assault), and ightiṣab (rape).52 A workshop organized by HarassMap during the campaign, “The Gender Box”, was designed to engage people on cultural stereotypes around femininity and masculinity, and the violence both women and men experience for non-conformity. The “mesh sakta” campaign was the first to target women. Comprised of a series of posters, photos and videos offering positive feedback and reinforcing the idea of speaking up, the campaign provided tips and advice for how to confront sexual harassment through a crowd- sourced method where interested individuals publicly shared their ideas with each other. Lastly, the most recent campaign, “di mesh mu’aksa, da taharrush”, continues the work of defining taharrush as everyday street sexual harassment, which includes verbal harassment, and distinguishing this from wanted/consensual flirtation. As part of this, campaign messages highlight the kinds of comments that women hear, in everyday vernacular, as sexually harassing, such as “makina”, literally translating to machine and meaning slut. The goal of the campaign is getting anyone who hears such comments to speak up, whether victims or bystanders.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 97

“Not keeping silent”

Not keeping silent”) campaign, which was“) " ةتكاس شم " This image is from HarassMap’s spring 2014 specifcally aimed at women. However, part of its goal was not only to help empower women, but also to provide tips to everyone about how to step in to offer assistance. This image reflects HarassMap's fundamental mission of ending the acceptability of sexual harassment by asking people (bystanders) to speak up when they see sexual harassment happen.

20 Additionally, getting bystanders to see everyday sexual harassment as a crime has been important in also encouraging them to speak up against the problem. In particular, contrasting the active response of bystanders in cases of with the lack of response to sexual harassment is a prevalent framing technique. Through campaign messaging, they associate bodily violations with property theft. For example, in one campaign poster from Ṣallahhạ fi dimaghak, HarassMap (and their campaign partners) noted “He who pickpockets/steals your wallet is a criminal” and “He who pickpockets/steals your body and rapes your smile is a criminal.”

Bystander intervention and creating critical mass

21 Despite fears that anti-sexual harassment work creates unruly men in need of control and/or reform, the target of HarassMap interventions is usually not men who harass or even women who may be victims/survivors of sexual harassment. In order to end the social acceptability of sexual harassment, HarassMap’s philosophical position is that all members of society need to take on personal responsibility for speaking up against the practice, especially those on the sidelines who ignore or watch sexual harassment incidents but do nothing. To HarassMap, getting everyone to believe that sexual harassment is a crime and to overcome their fear and bias would be a critical norm change that would make them willing to take a stand, speak up against harassers and offer support to those who are sexually harassed.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 98

22 The primary goal of HarassMap’s Community Outreach unit is to facilitate the establishment of a disciplinary ethic and sense of moral responsibility by encouraging bystanders to intervene, help their community members in need, and not stand for criminal behavior in their neighborhoods. Twice a year, HarassMap trains a corps of “captains” that lead local teams of volunteers in their neighborhoods to conduct monthly street outreach campaigns. Monthly mobile trainings of all volunteers are also undertaken across all . Volunteers are recruited through social media, and volunteer teams utilize social media when conducting their own community outreach efforts by posting photos and messages from the street. Through community outreach efforts, bystanders are transformed into movement adherents and they encourage other bystanders to do the same. Minimally, volunteers seek to convince bystanders to voice their dissent or outrage at public breaches of social values around women’s bodily integrity. Captains and volunteers are trained on issues of gender inequality and violence and effective responses to gendered stereotypes often given by community members. Furthermore, volunteers are trained to engage the public on norms around sexual harassment but to avoid confrontational or argumentative styles, keep conversations from diverging into victim-blaming, and to end conversations by eliciting agreement from bystanders that they will not remain silent and will speak up when they witness sexual harassment occurring. 23 Two new related programs, Safe Schools and Universities (SSU) and Safe Areas (SA), further widen the scope of combatting the bystander effect on a larger scale. The SSU and SA programs work to engage individuals from a young age on bodily integrity and harassing behaviors, as well as to encourage businesses and other public entities to develop zero tolerance policies and due process against sexual harassment. Safe Area program strategies include working with small businesses on a street–by-street basis to build support networks among business owners to both prevent backlashes from those who harass, as well as to serve as positive role models to other businesses to institute anti-sexual harassment policies. A recent messaging campaign tied to SSU, “ ‘ayizeen siyasa gowa al-gam‘a” (We want a policy in the university), calls on Egyptian universities to develop such policies.53 24 It is important to note that HarassMap’s crowd-mapping platform, for which it gained international attention, is a critical space and tool for changing social perceptions. An interactive online platform that brings together GIS and SMS technology, it gives people the ability to anonymously report and map their stories online or via text message, which then become publically viewable via Google Maps on HarassMap’s website. Skalli noted that this online tool was intended to provide a safe space for women to tell their story without shame or reprisal.54 The idea of safety is important given the lack of support from law enforcement for those who attempt to file reports through official channels. In this situation, Young states that the map serves as an alternative documentation tool, “allowing victims to bypass institutional constraints… that may prevent them from reporting.”55 The map also gives individuals the ability to directly challenge victim-blaming rhetoric, and to speak up about their fears, frustrations and anger at their harasser, at society for normalizing the practice of sexual harassment, and at the lack of effective legal remedies. 25 Recent criticism of bystander intervention argues that it does not solve the underlying problem of sexual violence. Elk and Devereaux noted that there is inherent danger to the bystander in asking them to intervene in cases of sexual violence, like rape, and

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 99

that bystanders, like victims, do not receive adequate support.56 They state that this only shifts where victim-blaming rhetoric is directed, i.e. at bystanders that fail to provide assistance when needed. In their estimation, bystander interventions appear to be nothing more than another form of vigilantism, which they claim is a feature of the “carceral” state, singularly designed to punish, rather than rehabilitate, offenders. “Even where bystander intervention is successful, disrupting one assault is not the same as ending violence. It’s not even violence prevention” (Elk & Devereaux 2014). Ultimately, they argue bystander interventions don’t force people to look at themselves and address the violence they are capable of committing. 26 Such arguments elide the complexities around social movement messaging and bystander behavior. They do not clarify what constitutes bystander interventions. There is a sense that physical intervention is required, yet other forms of intervention that are equally as helpful or lifesaving, and do not lead bystanders to put their bodies in harm’s way, are not discussed. Moreover, bystanders in Egypt are not necessarily averse to intervening physically if they feel it is warranted by the situation. This is the case with theft, where it is popularly known and regularly witnessed by many, that whole neighborhoods will rally to catch a thief, with young men often forming small ad hoc posses and wielding sticks, iron bars, and chains, to do so.57 27 HarassMap’s rhetoric of bystander intervention implicitly accepts that within a group of bystanders there will be harassers. To avoid accusatory rhetoric that blames particular groups of people for sexual harassment, their discourse instead centers on the need to recognize that each individual has a responsibility to all other members in their community. Rather than shifting blame, this message is subtly refashioning the nature of social responsibility by asking people to reconsider their own inherent biases that keep them silent or that prevent them from seeing the basic humanity of the victims of sexual violence. The problem of viewing bystander approaches as a practice that shifts victim-blaming and that does not address an individual’s inner potential for violence, is that it draws on a particularly Western-inspired binary of the individual versus the community. Notions of individual responsibility only promote the need for people to control themselves and divorce them from any responsibility to the community in which they belong. For this reason, promoting community responsibility is often viewed as ineffective and as another form of hegemony. 28 Building a critical mass of bystander publics represents HarassMap’s ultimate goal to end the social acceptability of sexual harassment in Egypt. At the heart of this, attempts at social change involve building enough ground level support so that new norms and behaviors introduced by the initiatives will take hold on an individual-by- individual basis and eventually become ordinary among the wider public. Once this occurs and enough individuals either believe or practice the new norms promoted by HarassMap and other similar initiatives, a tipping point will be reached. Here, when enough people are unsatisfied with social, political or legal practices that do not align with new norms, they will then demand change. This critical mass is seen as essential for bringing about political and legal change since HarassMap activists argue that the government has no incentive to change, despite the hard work of formal civil society entities. Here, a critical mass that supports new normative practices has the ability to threaten the legitimacy of the government. It is assumed 1) that the state will adhere to the social will of the people and encode new norms in political and legal instruments,

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 100

and 2) that state officials are themselves members of society, and will adopt the new norms within their own system of values.

Conclusion

29 This paper has argued for the need to rethink the political and depoliticization with respect to the social/cultural interventions of anti-sexual harassment activism in Egypt. Such interventions do not directly challenge or advocate for change with the state yet they are still political processes that seek to transform the nature of public beliefs and practice, as well as state engagement on the problem of sexual harassment. The relationship of socially – and politically –motivated sexual harassment, in terms of causal factors and shared norms that make sexual harassment acceptable and reinforce patriarchal practices, underscore the integrated nature of the social and political spheres. Given this integrated nature of the social and political, interventions that center on reshaping social and cultural norms undoubtedly impact political practice. HarassMap’s approach in changing social norms, encouraging bystanders to speak up, and generating a critical mass does not depoliticize the problem of sexual harassment, in the sense that the ultimate goal of their activism is to force the state to ensure an environment where its citizens feel safe from public violence. HarassMap activists are attempting to achieve this through a ground-up approach that fundamentally refashions the norms underpinning the current sociopolitical system in which sexual harassment is tolerated, not seen as a crime, and where no one is held accountable for it (even the state). Here, political change and a more concerned state response is an after-effect of HarassMap’s community activism – it results when the public itself speaks up and demands that the State enact equitable laws and actively enforce them, so that public space is free from sexual violence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABU LUGHOD, Lila. 2013. Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

ABU LUGHOD, Lila. 2011. The Active Social Life of “Muslim Women’s Rights”: A Plea for Ethnography and Polemic, With Cases from Egypt and Palestine. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 6(1): 1-45.

ABDELRAHMAN, Maha. 2004. Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

AHMAD, Tania. 2014. Socialities of Indignation: Denouncing Party Politics in Karachi. Cultural Anthropology, 29(2): 411-432.

AHMAD-ZAKI, Hind & ABD ALHAMID, Dalia. 2014. Women as Fair Game in the Public Sphere: A Critical Introduction for Understanding Sexual Violence and Methods of Resistance. Jadaliyya, July 9, 2014. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18455/women-as-fair-game-in-the-public- sphere_a-critical.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 101

ALVAREZ, Sonia E., DAGNINO, Evelina, and ESCOBAR, Arturo. 1998. Introduction: The Cultural and the Political in Latin American Social Movements. In Cultures of Politics and Politics of Cultures: Re- Visioning Latin American Social Movements, (eds.) Sonia Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar. Boulder: Westview Press.

AMAR, Paul. 2011. Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out? International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13(3): 299-328.

BIANCHI, Robert. 1989. Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth Century Egypt. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BRAUN, Robert & KOOPMANS, Paul. 2014. Watch the Crowd: Bystander Responses, Trickle Down Politics, and Xenophobic Mobilization. Comparative Political Studies, 47(4): 631-658.

BRAUN, Robert & KOOPMANS, Paul. 2012. “Bystander Responses and Xenophobic Mobilization”, Discussion Paper. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung. http://www.econstor.eu/ handle/10419/68460.

CHEKROUN, Peggy & BRAUER, Markus. 2002. The Bystander Effect and Social Control Behavior: The Effect of the Presence of Others on People’s Reactions to Norm Violations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32: 853-867.

DARLEY, J.M. & LATANE, B. 1968. Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8: 377-383.

EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS. 2009. Sexual Harassment in the Arab Region: Cultural Gaps and Legal Challenges. ECWR Report, (ed.) Nehad Abul Komsan. Print.

EL-DEEB, Bouthaina. 2013. Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt. UN Women, http://harassmap.org/en/wp-content/uploads/ 2014/02/287_Summaryreport_eng_low-1.pdf.

ELK, Lauren Chief & DEVEREAUX, Shaadi. 2014. “The Failure of Bystander Intervention.” New Inquiry, 12-23-2014. Last accessed 4-1-2015. http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/failure-of-bystander- intervention/.

ELSAYED, Heba & RIZZO, Helen. 2014. Media, Political Opportunity and the Anti-Sexual Harassment Campaign in the Post-2011 Egypt. Unpublished manuscript.

FAHMY, Amel, ABDELMONEM, Angie, HAMDY, Enas, BADR, Ahmed & HASSAN, Rasha. 2014. “Toward a Safer City: Sexual Harassment in : Effectiveness of Crowdsourced Data.” HarassMap Report (full report), http://harassmap.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Towards-A-Safer- City_full-report.pdf.

FEREE, Myra Marx. 2003. Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the and Germany. American Journal of Sociology, 109(2): 304-344.

FIDH, Nazra for Feminist Studies, New Women Foundation and Uprising of Women in the Arab World. 2014. “Egypt Keeping Women Out: Sexual Violence Against Women in the Public Space.” http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/egypt_women_final_english.pdf.

FINNEMORE, Martha. 1996. Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism. International Organization, 50(2): 325-347.

FINNEMORE, Martha & SIKKINK, Kathryn. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization, 52(4): 887-917.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 102

HAFEZ, Sherine. 2014. The Revolution Shall Not Pass Through Women’s Bodies: Egypt, Uprising and Gender Politics. The Journal of North African Studies, 19(2): 172-185.

HASSAN, Rasha, SHOUKRY, Aliyaa & ABUL KOMSAN, Nehad. 2008. “Clouds in Egypt’s Sky: Sexual Harassment: From Verbal Harassment to Rape.” ECWR Report, http://egypt.unfpa.org/Images/ Publication/2010_03/6eeeb05a-3040-42d2-9e1c-2bd2e1ac8cac.pdf.

LANGOHR, Vickie. 2014. New President, Old Pattern of Sexual Violence in Egypt. Middle East Report, July 7. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070714.

LANGOHR, Vickie. 2013. “This is Our Square”: Fighting Sexual Assault at Cairo Protests. Middle East Report, 238 (Fall): 18-35.

LEVITT, Peggy & Merry, Sally. 2009. Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s Right in Peru, China, India and the United States. Global Networks, 9(4): 441-461.

MCCARTHY, John D. & ZALD, Mayer N. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6): 1212-1241.

MERRY, Sally Engle. 2006. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

MICHAEL, Maggie. 2013. “Mob Kills Alleged Thief in Egypt Vigilante Attack.” AP, Yahoo News, 3-21-2013. Last accessed 4-1-2015. http://news.yahoo.com/mob-kills-alleged-thief-egypt- vigilante-attack-200620533.html.

Nazra for Feminist Studies. 2014. Concept Paper: Different Practices of Sexual Violence Against Women (English). http://nazra.org/en/2014/02/concept-paper-different-practices-sexual- violence-against-women.

RISSE, Thomas & SIKKINK, Kathryn. 1999. The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices. In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

RIZZO, Helen, PRICE, Anne M., & MEYER, Katherine. 2012. Anti-Sexual Harassment Campaign in Egypt. Mobilization: An International Journal, 17(4): 457-475.

RIZZO, Helen, PRICE, Anne M., & MEYER, Katherine. 2008. “Targeting Cultural Change in Repressive Environments: The Campaign Against Sexual Harassment in Egypt.” ECWR Report, http:// ecwronline.org/pdf/studies/AntiHarassment_for_ECWR.pdf.

ROGERS, Everett M. 1983. The Diffusion of Innovation. New York: The Free Press.

RUBIN, Jeffrey W. 1996. “Decentering the Regime: Culture and Regional Politics in Mexico.” Latin American Research Review, 31(3): 85-126.

SCOTT, Robet. 2000. The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms. Virginia Law Review, 86(8): 1603-1647.

SKALLI, Loubna Hanna. 2014. Young Women and Social Media Against Sexual Harassment. JOURNAL of North African Studies, 19(2): 244-258.

SNOW, David A., ZURCHER , Louis A., & Peters, Robert. 1981. Victory Celebrations as a Theater: A Dramaturgical Approach to Crowd Behavior. Symbolic Interaction, 4(1): 21-42.

SWIDLER, Ann. 1995. “Cultural Power and Social Movements.” In Social Movements and Culture, (eds.) Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 103

TADROS, Mariz. 2014. Reclaiming the Streets for Women’s Dignity: Effective Initiatives in the Struggle Against Gender-Based Violence in Between Egypt’s Two Revolutions.

TADROS, Mariz. 2013a. “Whose Shame Is It? The Politics of Sexual Assault in Morsi’s Egypt.” Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Afrique Du Nord Tunis, http://tn.boell.org/downloads/MarizTadros.pdf.

TADROS, Mariz. 2013b. Politically Motivated Sexual Assault and the Law in Violent Transitions: A Case Study From Egypt. Institute of Development Studies, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/ bitstream/handle/123456789/2950/ER8%20final%20online.pdf? sequence=1&utm_source=idswebsite&utm_medium=download&utm_campaign=opendocs.

THORNBERG, Robert. 2007. A Classmate in Distress: School Children as Bystanders and Their Reasons for How They Act. Social Psychology of Education, 10: 5-28.

Wikipedia. Critical Mass (Sociodynamics) entry, last accessed August 5, 2014. http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_mass_(sociodynamics).

YOUNG, Chelsea. 2014. HarassMap: Using Crowdsourcing Data to Map Sexual Harassment in Egypt. Technology Innovation Management Review, http://timreview.ca/sites/default/files/ article_PDF/Young_TIMReview_March2014.pdf.

ZWINGEL, Susanne. 2012. How Do Norms Travel: Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational Perspective. International Studies Quarterly, 56: 115-129.

NOTES

1. Hassan et al. 2008. 2. ECWR 2009; Rizzo et al. 2008 & 2012. 3. Tadros 2013a. Tadros’s argument did not mention ECWR, per se, but social interventions more generally. Her analysis examined how personal political sentiments impacted perceptions of sexual harassment, and raised concerns that the lack of clear boundaries between politically motivated and everyday forms of sexual harassment created the kind of confusion that allowed for the reproduction of politically motivated sexual harassment. 4. Abu Lughod 2011, p. 14 & 2013, p. 156. 5. El-Deeb 2013. 6. ElSayed & Rizzo 2014, unpublished manuscript. 7. Ahmad 2014, p.427. Ahmad’s analysis centers on public responses to the 2007 protests that resulted in violent conflict between government and opposition forces in Karachi, Pakistan. Rather than participate in protest and conflict, she argued that a portion of the Karachi population voluntarily chose domestic confinement. This domestic confinement, she argued, represented a form of political engagement. 8. Alvarez et al. 1998; Rubin 1996; Swidler 1995. 9. Rubin 1996, p. 89, citing Foucault 1990, pp. 93-96. 10. Tadros 2013a&b & 2014. 11. Hassan et al. 2008; El Deeb 2013; Fahmy et al. 2014. 12. Langohr 2013 & 2014; Tadros 2013b; Ahmed-Zaki & Abd Alhamid 2014. 13. Amar 2011. 14. Rizzo et al. 2012b. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid, p. 467. 17. Abu Lughod 2010, p. 14. 18. Amar 2011, p. 314-316.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 104

19. Abdelrahman 2004; Bianchi 1989. 20. Elsayed & Rizzo 2014, unpublished manuscript. 21. Langohr 2013; Hafez 2014. 22. Interview 2014, Amal ElMohandes from Nazra for Feminist Studies; Personal conversations 2014 with Hussein el-Shafei and Noora Flinkman from HarassMap. 23. Langohr 2014; Interview 2014, Farah Shash from El-Nadim. 24. Interview June 2014. 25. Tadros 2013a, p. 6. 26. Skalli 2014. 27. Ilahi 2008; Peoples 2008; Rizzo et al. 2012a&b. 28. Tadros 2014:10. 29. Finnemore 1996, p 891. 30. Zwingel 2012. 31. Acharya 2004; Risse & Sikkink 1999. 32. Feree 2003; Levitt & Merry 2009. 33. Alvarez et al. 1998, p. 7. 34. Scott 2000. Scott underscores the complexity of the law in shaping public behaviors, noting that people maintain a hierarchy of norms or values that not only guide their personal observance of the law but also how they police each other in adhering to the law. 35. Personal conversation, August 2014. 36. Chekroun & Brauer 2002. 37. Darley & Latane 1968; Thornberg 2007. 38. Chekroun & Brauer 2012. 39. Banyard et al. 2004. 40. Braun & Koopman 2012 & 2014. 41. McCarthy & Zald 1977; Snow et al. 1981. 42. Snow et al. 1981. 43. Ibid. 44. Finnemore & Sikkink 1998. 45. Oliver et al. 1985. 46. Rizzo et al. 2012a&b. 47. Interview, March 2014. 48. FIDH 2014. 49. Hassan et al. 2008. 50. Fahmy et al. 2014. 51. Interview, March 2012. 52. Nazra 2014. 53. In 2014, Cairo University received national and international media attention for a sexual harassment incident against a young woman that entered the College of Law and subsequently removed her outer abaya, while still remaining fully clothed and in hijab. Following the incident, a group of faculty members, working with anti-sexual harassment initiatives, devised an anti- sexual harassment policy. 54. Skalli 2014, p. 251. 55. Young 2014, p. 6. 56. Elk & Devereaux 2014. 57. Michael 2013. AP reported story of a Delta town where villagers lynched a man for stealing a car. The story is an extreme example of how community members intervene against cases of theft, though the focus on the lynching in the AP story was intended to signify the increasing lawlessness in the post-revolutionary period. Such responses are not typical of interventions against theft.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 105

ABSTRACTS

This paper argues that the community-based work of anti-sexual harassment initiatives represents a political process toward ending sexual harassment in Egypt. Since the Egyptian Revolution, community-based initiatives have employed strategies to transform social perceptions and behaviors regarding public sexual harassment. The strategies of these new initiatives, like HarassMap, include conducting street outreach campaigns and employing technological platforms to reframe the nature of social responsibility and to disrupt gendered stereotypes. Yet, a number of scholars have challenged this community-based anti-harassment work, particularly the early work of the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR), for avoiding political engagement and failing to address structural gender inequalities. Drawing on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) argument regarding norm emergence, this paper maintains that anti-sexual harassment initiatives, like HarassMap, employ an approach to social change that aims to build a critical mass around new social norms. By undermining patriarchal norms that blame victims and encouraging people to intervene against public sexual harassment, HarassMap is creating a new vision of social responsibility. When a tipping point is reached, HarassMap activists believe that public outcry will then force political and legal reform from the state to protect women in public space. Such community-based approaches are political but the reform entities like HarassMap seek results only when there is enough public will for change.

Cet article explique en quoi le travail réalisé au niveau communautaire par les initiatives anti- harcèlement sexuel représente un processus politique pour venir à bout du harcèlement en Egypte. Depuis la révolution égyptienne, les initiatives d’orientation communautaire ont employé des stratégies visant à transformer les perceptions sociales et les comportements liés au harcèlement sexuel dans l’espace public. Ces stratégies, comme celles de HarassMap, comprennent la conduite de campagnes de sensibilisation au niveau de la rue et l’emploi de plateformes technologiques pour recadrer la notion de responsabilité sociale et bousculer les stéréotypes de genre. Pourtant, nombre de chercheurs ont remis en question ce travail— particulièrement les activités plus anciennes du Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR)— estimant qu’il représente un évitement de l’engagement politique et ne se confronte pas aux inégalités structurelles de genre. Cet article utilisera l’argument de Finnemore et Sikkink (1998) sur l’émergence des normes pour soutenir que les initiatives anti-harcèlement sexuel comme HarassMap envisagent le changement social à travers la construction d’une masse critique autour de nouvelles normes sociales. En minant les normes patriarcales rejetant la faute sur les victimes, et en encourageant le public à intervenir contre le harcèlement dans la sphère publique, HarassMap crée une nouvelle représentation de la responsabilité sociale. Quand un seuil critique est atteint, les activistes de HarassMap sont d’avis qu’une revendication publique émergera pour forcer des réformes étatiques, juridiques et politiques, pour protéger les femmes dans l’espace public. De telles approches axées sur le niveau communautaire sont politiques, mais les groupes réformistes comme HarassMap ne recherchent de tels résultats que lorsqu’il existera suffisamment de volonté publique de changement.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Égypte, femmes, harcèlement sexuel, violence, résistance Keywords: Egypt, women, sexual harassment, violence, resistance

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 106

AUTHOR

ANGIE ABDELMONEM

Angie Abdelmonem is currently a doctoral candidate in Anthropology in the School of Human Evolution and Social Change at Arizona State University. Her research specialization is in NGOs, social movements, development, and gender-based violence. Her dissertation research examines the role of civil society entities and independent initiatives in combatting street sexual harassment. She spent a year interning with the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR) between 2005-2006, assisting with projects on sexual harassment, FGM, and attaining consultative status with the UN. Between 2013-2014, she spent the year conducting participant observation with HarassMap, as well as observing and interviewing activists at a number of other NGOs and independent initiatives working against sexual harassment, including Ḍed el- Taharrush, Harakaṭ Bassma, Shoft Taharrush, and Nazra for Feminist Studies. In 2015-2017, she will participate in a funded, joint project examining the intersection of mass media, public gender-based violence, and respectability politics. Publications: “Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment: A Longitudinal Assessment of El-Taharrush El-Ginsy in Arabic Online Forums and Anti-Sexual Harassment Activism.” Kohl: Journal of Gender and Body Research, 2015; Fahmy, Amel, Abdelmonem, Angie, Hamdy, Enas, Badr, Ahmed & Hassan, Rasha. 2014. “Toward a Safer City: Sexual Harassment in Greater Cairo: Effectiveness of Crowdsourced Data.” HarassMap Report (full English report), http://harassmap.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Towards-A-Safer- City_full-report.pdf. [email protected]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 107

Reconsidérer la dépolitisation : l’approche du témoin de HarassMap et la création d’une masse critique pour lutter contre le harcèlement sexuel en Égypte Reconsidering de-politicization: HarassMap’s bystander approach and creating critical mass to combat sexual harassment in Egypt

Angie Abdelmonem Traduction : Mathilde du Pradel

NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR

L’approche du témoin ou du spectateur, bystander approach en anglais, est une des approches liées à la prévention des violences sexuelles, qui encourage les individus à s’approprier le problème du harcèlement sexuel et à intervenir et s’exprimer lorsqu’ils sont témoins de harcèlement physique ou verbal. (Note du traducteur)

NOTE DE L'AUTEUR

Les informations sur lesquelles cet article est basé sont issues des recherches doctorales de l’auteure, pour lesquelles elle a bénéficié de la bourse n° 1357477 de la National Science Foundation (USA).

1 Depuis le renversement de Hosni Moubarak en février 2011, le phénomène du harcèlement sexuel dans les lieux publics fait l’objet d’une attention grandissante. Dès 2008, le Centre Égyptien pour les Droits des Femmes (CEDF), une des premières ONG à

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 108

faire spécifiquement campagne contre le harcèlement sexuel dans les lieux publics, publiait un rapport selon lequel 83 % des Égyptiennes et 98 % des étrangères enquêtées déclaraient avoir subi des actes de harcèlement sexuel1. La campagne du CEDF, « Rendre nos rues sûres pour tout le monde », définissait le harcèlement sexuel comme un problème en grande partie culturel, social et psychologique et utilisait des techniques axées sur la communauté2, ainsi que des moyens technologiques novateurs afin d’accroître la sensibilisation de l’opinion publique à cette question3. Cependant, les détracteurs de cette campagne soutenaient que l’accent placé sur les causes sociales et culturelles du harcèlement sexuel ne conduisait qu’à des interventions sociales et culturelles, et non politiques ou économiques, dépolitisant ainsi le problème4. Les principaux aspects de cette critique reprochaient ainsi au CEDF le fait qu’il déconnectait le harcèlement sexuel quotidien de la violence sexuelle orchestrée par l’État en se concentrant sur le harcèlement de rue anonyme ciblant des « hommes dotés d’une mauvaise mentalité culturelle », et qu’il ne s’intéressait pas aux inégalités structurelles entre les sexes5.

2 Après la révolution, une nouvelle étude a été réalisée par UN Women6 en 2013. Celle-ci montre que le harcèlement sexuel dans les lieux publics, en particulier dans les rues et les transports, touche pratiquement toutes les femmes, 99 % des enquêtées de l’échantillon ayant déclaré avoir été harcelées sexuellement.7 Presque la moitié de l’échantillon indique que le harcèlement sexuel a augmenté après la révolution, bien que la manière dont les répondantes parviennent à cette conclusion ne soit pas très claire. Il est probable que la révolution ait contribué à accroître la sensibilisation de l’opinion publique au harcèlement sexuel, entraînant le signalement d’un plus grand nombre de cas. De façon plus importante encore, la révolution a offert une occasion unique permettant l’essor de nombreuses initiatives communautaires de lutte contre le harcèlement sexuel ayant pour but le remodelage des normes sociales historiques et des comportements en matière de harcèlement sexuel.8 De telles initiatives ont fait le choix stratégique d’éviter les engagements politiques pour combattre le harcèlement. 3 S’intéressant aux arguments des détracteurs du militantisme anti-harcèlement sexuel, cet article vise à déterminer si les approches axées sur la communauté avant et après la révolution ont effectivement dépolitisé le problème du harcèlement sexuel. Il réfute les affirmations selon lesquelles les efforts de lutte contre le harcèlement du CEDF ont eu un effet de dépolitisation, et défend plus généralement l’idée que ces interventions visant à changer les normes et les comportements socioculturels sont plus politiques que leurs détracteurs ne veulent bien l’affirmer. Cette analyse est fondée sur la nécessité de reconsidérer ce qui est politique et le sens du concept de dépolitisation. Pour ce faire, elle souligne la « diversité des modalités de participation ayant le potentiel de mobiliser les registres moraux ordinaires », c’est-à-dire les interventions centrées sur « l’ordinaire » qui redéfinissent la nature des pratiques et des responsabilités sociales et incitent les gens à des actions qui peuvent être politiques9. Les détracteurs du militantisme anti-harcèlement se fondent sur une division particulière entre culture et politique, d’après laquelle les négociations sociales et culturelles sont rarement considérées comme des actes intrinsèquement politiques10. Parallèlement, ils ne considèrent pas la sphère politique comme « la cristallisation institutionnelle […] de quelque chose qui se produit ailleurs, dans de multiples sites de contestation locaux, tels que le lieu de travail, les association et les institutions »11. Cet article affirme que le militantisme communautaire concentré sur la redéfinition de

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 109

normes culturelles relatives au harcèlement sexuel est un processus politique qui n’ignore pas les discriminations structurelles entre les sexes et dont les effets recherchés à long terme sont politiques et légaux.

Le harceleur est un criminel

Le harceleur est un criminel ») menée par ») " شرحتملا مرجم " Cette image provident de la campagne HarassMap en été 2015; c’est un exemple de leur travail de sensibilisation des spectateurs/témoins du harcèlement sexuel. La campagne a été conçue pour informer le public au sujet de la nouvelle loi criminalisant le harcèlement, mais aussi pour leur donner des conseils sur comment se rendre utiles en de telles situations sans nécessairement aller voir la police en premier lieu, ce qui peut être problématique.

4 L’initiative indépendante HarassMap est la principale étude de cas présentée dans cet article, étant donné le développement philosophique avancé de son approche stratégique. Par le biais d’un militantisme de rue et axé sur la communauté, cherchant à mobiliser des témoins, HarassMap fait usage de stratégies qui visent à remettre en cause et à remodeler les normes traditionnelles qui rendent le harcèlement sexuel socialement acceptable. Cela implique de bouleverser les normes de genre patriarcales (binaires), ainsi que d’encourager à la prise de responsabilité sociale au niveau intracommunautaire. Au travers de la négociation de nouvelles normes et de la construction d’un public socialement responsable, s’intéressant au bien-être des membres de la communauté et prêt à s’exprimer contre le harcèlement, HarassMap cherche à créer une masse critique qui finira par réclamer un changement politique et légal de la part des institutions étatiques. La discussion suivante prend pour point de départ les théories du changement des normes, le concept de public témoin et celui de masse critique, afin d’étudier la nature politique du militantisme communautaire de HarassMap, ainsi que la tentative de l’association d’agir sur le niveau d’engagement légal et étatique contre le harcèlement sexuel dans les lieux publics. Il convient cependant de noter ici que cet article ne traite pas la question de l’efficacité de l’action

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 110

de HarassMap en la matière, mais seulement de la nature politique de cette tentative. Par ailleurs, des organismes tels que HarassMap n’ont pas de programme de changement explicite au sein de la sphère politique, mais défendent cependant le fait que le changement politique ne peut être durablement établi que si la population elle- même perçoit le harcèlement différemment.

Les détracteurs du militantisme anti-harcèlement

5 Tadros défend l’idée que le harcèlement en Égypte prend deux formes : l’une politiquement motivée, l’autre socialement motivée12. Le harcèlement sexuel socialement motivé relève du harcèlement de rue quotidien, qui prend généralement la forme de commentaires, de regards insistants, d’attouchements et d’autres gestes13. Le harcèlement politiquement motivé se produit en revanche largement dans le cadre de manifestations, et implique des groupes d’hommes harcelant les femmes. Selon beaucoup de militants, il est orchestré et financé par l’État dans le but d’évincer les femmes de l’espace public14. Pour Tadros, il était essentiel de faire apparaître cette distinction, afin d’éviter la confusion dans l’opinion publique et de faire la lumière sur le fait que l’État lui-même transgresse l’intégrité physique des femmes et se trouve fermement impliqué dans la définition sexiste de la notion de respectabilité15. Ces deux formes de harcèlement sont manifestes en Égypte depuis 2005, sinon avant. L’incident du Mercredi Noir de cette année-là est cité par les militants comme l’un des premiers cas de harcèlement sexuel, lors duquel des baltagiyya (voyous) ont été engagés par l’État égyptien pour harceler les femmes militantes contestant le référendum constitutionnel devant le syndicat des journalistes. Le cas de harcèlement de masse dans les rues du centre-ville du Caire lors des congés de l’Aïd en 2006 a mis en évidence l’importance croissante du problème du harcèlement sexuel16.

6 Durant cette période, le CEDF a constitué sa campagne pour définir et combattre le harcèlement sexuel dans les rues. Selon Rizzo et al.17, le CEDF était unique du fait de ses techniques communautaires créatives, comprenant notamment des journées de sensibilisation utilisant l’art et la musique, l’organisation d’activités bénévoles et la coopération avec le secteur des entreprises privées afin d’obtenir des services gratuits (pro bono) pour lutter contre le harcèlement sexuel. L’approche du CEDF insistait sur « l’importance de s’attaquer à une culture tolérant le harcèlement sexuel »18. La campagne s’est pourtant vue reprocher de ne pas situer le harcèlement sexuel dans le système plus large de violence à caractère sexiste incluant la répression et la violence sexuelle perpétrées par l’État.19 Abu Lughod affirmait ainsi que cette approche sociale et culturelle, ancrée dans les sphères du développement transnational et de l’entreprise capitaliste, contribuait à créer des femmes victimisées et des hommes culturellement mauvais. Pour Amar, au travers de leur fixation sur « la perversion libidinale des garçons de la classe ouvrière » et « les dangers de la masculinité », le CEDF s’est rendu complice de dépolitisation du harcèlement sexuel, en ne contestant pas l’usage par l’État de la violence sexuelle et de la torture et en réclamant au contraire un surcroit d’interventions du brutal État sécuritaire pour protéger les femmes dans les espaces publics.20 Cependant, le choix du CEDF de travailler au niveau communautaire a été fait dans un contexte de répression étatique contre la société civile, les ONG étant contraintes au silence, limitées et cooptées par l’État dans un climat corporatiste21. Les militants du CEDF investis dans la campagne anti-harcèlement sexuel s’interrogeaient

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 111

sur l’efficacité d’une action de plaidoyer politique au sein d’une structure politique privant les ONG de leurs droits. 7 Entre 2010 et 2012, immédiatement avant et à la suite de la révolution de 2011, le nombre d’initiatives nées afin de lutter contre le harcèlement sexuel a augmenté. L’environnement politique corporatiste prérévolutionnaire, marqué par des fluctuations dans la répression étatique et l’inclusion de forces politiques d’opposition dans le processus politique, a été temporairement perturbé par l’instabilité politique ayant suivi la révolution.22 ElSayed et Rizzo affirment que le militantisme des femmes durant cette période était encore exclu du processus politique, leurs demandes pour plus d’égalité ignorées, et que les tensions entre forces laïques et religieuses concernant la nature des droits des femmes ont produit un ensemble distinct de contraintes politiques mais ont contribué à créer une opportunité unique pour les initiatives communautaires. Au cours des années de contestation, entre 2011 et 2014, le ciblage délibéré des femmes sur les lieux de manifestation est devenu évident.23 Les militants étaient alors véhéments dans leur condamnation de la conduite par l’État de tests de virginité sur des manifestantes, ainsi que dans leur condamnation d’acteurs étatiques suspectés d’engager des baltagiyya pour attaquer les femmes lors de manifestations, bien qu’il ait été depuis reconnu de façon nuancée que les agressions de masse et les viols à Tahrir aient été commis par un mélange de voyous embauchés par l’État et d’opportunistes.24 Dans ce contexte, plusieurs initiatives sont rapidement nées pour assister les victimes ou les survivantes ayant subi des violences lors de manifestations, parmi lesquelles Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH) et Tahrir Bodyguards. Composées d’une large base de militants bénévoles et de citoyens préoccupés par le problème, ces initiatives ont été de courte durée, ayant émergé en réponse à l’urgence de la situation des femmes place Tahrir. Il a ensuite été difficile pour ces deux initiatives d’adapter leur travail à des cadres de manifestation non- révolutionnaires et à d’autres formes de militantisme, différentes de la seule manifestation. 8 D’autres initiatives indépendantes créées à cette époque, à l’image de HarassMap, du Mouvement Empreinte (Harakat Bassma, Imprint Movement) et du Mouvement anti- harcèlement sexuel (Ded el-Taharush), ont concentré leurs efforts sur la modification des perceptions sociales et des comportements au sein des communautés plutôt que sur le lobbying auprès des responsables politiques. Parallèlement, un certain nombre d’ONG militantes ont intégré le harcèlement sexuel à leurs programmes de lutte contre la violence à l’égard des femmes. L’organisation Nazra pour les études féministes (Nazra for Feminist Studies) a par exemple commencé à promouvoir auprès des autorités étatiques l’établissement d’une stratégie nationale pour lutter contre toutes les formes de violence sexuelle, harcèlement sexuel inclus.25 Fatma Khafagy, la médiatrice du Conseil National pour les Femmes (National Council for Women) a cependant exprimé sa déception quant au fait que les militants anti-harcèlement continuaient à présenter largement le problème comme d’ordre culturel, en dehors du contexte politique, économique et sociologique dans lequel il est ancré.26 De son point de vue, mettre un terme au harcèlement social requiert une compréhension plus holistique et scientifique de ses différents aspects sous-jacents, qu’elle estime totalement absente du travail actuel des ONG et des initiatives anti-harcèlement. Tadros soulève également un problème concernant le fait que les interventions sociales centrées sur la « société » ou la « jeunesse », sans analyse politique concomitante, reproduisent des pratiques patriarcales, à l’image de la protection des femmes par le biais d’une limitation de leur

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 112

accès à l’espace public.27 Des analyses récentes par Skalli notent cependant que les initiatives de jeunesse post-révolutionnaires ont été activement impliquées dans le bouleversement des normes de genre, ce qui suggère qu’elles n’ignorent en réalité pas les inégalités structurelles entre les sexes.28 9 Il ne fait pas de doute que la compréhension de la relation entre harcèlement sexuel de rue socialement motivé et violence sexuelle d’État politiquement motivée depuis la révolution est d’une importance cruciale. La révolution a été témoin d’une escalade de la violence, sinon du nombre réel de cas, en matière de harcèlement sexuel et d’agressions, en particulier dans le cadre de manifestations. Non seulement le gouvernement égyptien est suspecté d’avoir orchestré une grande partie des violences sexuelles collectives de Tahrir pour limiter la participation publique des femmes, mais l’État est aussi perçu comme le créateur d’une atmosphère d’impunité pour ceux qui pratiquent le harcèlement de façon quotidienne dans les rues, du fait de structures légales inadéquates et lourdes ainsi que de pratiques laxistes en matière d’application des lois. Néanmoins, une littérature de plus en plus abondante sur le sujet montre aussi que le harcèlement sexuel est une occurrence quotidienne à grande échelle fondée sur des normes différenciées selon le sexe et inégalitaires, perpétuées dans la vie de tous les jours.29 Selon Tadros, les agressions politiquement motivées et le harcèlement sexuel quotidien coexistent au sein du même système de pouvoir, de violence et de normes sociales qui tolèrent l’agression.30 Alors que le harcèlement politiquement motivé et le harcèlement socialement motivé peuvent être considérés comme deux aspects distincts du harcèlement sexuel, ils sont en fait similaires, se recoupent et sont deux expressions se renforçant mutuellement de normes sexistes discriminatoires qui désavantagent les femmes dans l’espace public. En tant que facettes de ce système de violence sexiste, les formes encouragées par l’État et les formes quotidiennes de harcèlement sexuel soulignent l’intégration des sphères socioculturelle et politique. Les interventions anti-harcèlement sexuel sont, par conséquent, exercées au sein de ce système unique, politiquement et socialement intégré de violence sexiste ; leur travail a une incidence à la fois dans le domaine social et dans le domaine politique.

Normes, témoins et masse critique : considérations théoriques

10 Finnemore et Sikkink définissent les normes « comme des critères de comportement appropriés pour des acteurs avec une identité donnée », soit des critères à la fois régulateurs et d’évaluation, englobant des comportements et des valeurs.31 Les théories du changement des normes sont souvent centrées sur le flux descendant, ou en cascade, des codes éthiques transnationaux vers les États et les populations locales, c’est-à-dire l’adoption de et l’adhésion à des conventions internationales et la codification de principes axés sur les droits dans les constitutions locales et les cadres législatifs.32 La société civile joue un rôle significatif en ce qui concerne le processus d’internalisation ou de socialisation des normes. Les entrepreneurs de normes33 contribuent à créer, à encadrer et à diffuser de nouvelles normes en convaincant les gens de leur bien-fondé, et servent de groupes de pression travaillant en coordination avec d’autres organisations locales, régionales et internationales pour contraindre l’adhésion des États à ces normes. Ceci inclut le remodelage de normes problématiques au travers de pratiques d’encadrement qui peuvent s’appuyer sur les normes anciennes

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 113

et enracinées, ou bien les contester directement, ou encore former un mélange hybride des deux.34 La négociation de nouvelles normes et la redéfinition de comportements sociaux et de valeurs est un processus intrinsèquement politique, étant donné que « les significations sont toujours constitutives de processus qui cherchent à redéfinir le pouvoir social ».35 Pourtant, c’est souvent l’institutionnalisation qui est perçue comme le moyen-clé par lequel les normes sont incorporées au contexte socio-politique.

11 Les militants anti-harcèlement sexuel travaillant au niveau communautaire mettent en doute la mesure dans laquelle les instruments politico-légaux seuls peuvent remodeler les normes sociales au sein de l’opinion publique et de la société. Le récit d’un cas de harcèlement sexuel dont a été témoin Hussein al-Shafe‘i, directeur de l’unité d’intervention communautaire36 de HarassMap, constitue un exemple important de l’insuffisance du caractère dissuasif de la loi selon les militants : lors d’un trajet en minibus entre Alexandrie et le Caire, une femme a accusé de façon véhémente l’un des passagers assis derrière elle de la harceler sexuellement. Le minibus s’est arrêté alors que les passagers tentaient de calmer la femme, la pressant de laisser passer l’affaire et faisant valoir leur souhait de pouvoir rentrer chez eux. Celle-ci a demandé que l’homme soit forcé à descendre du véhicule, tandis que lui a affirmé haut et fort qu’il ne partirait pas. Le bus est reparti, l’homme étant toujours à bord. La femme a alors passé un coup de téléphone que tous les autres passagers ont pu entendre, insistant sur le fait que la police les attendrait à leur arrivée pour arrêter le harceleur. L’homme s’est soudain mis à crier en demandant au chauffeur de bus de le laisser sortir, hurlant que la femme « allait l’envoyer en enfer ». Les passagers ont tous été d’accord sur le fait qu’il valait mieux qu’il s’enfuie dans le désert plutôt qu’il soit arrêté. Pour al-Shafe‘i, au-delà du fait de ne montrer aucune préoccupation pour la femme harcelée, les passagers n’ont pas considéré le harcèlement sexuel comme un crime, et certainement pas comme un acte méritant une arrestation et des poursuites judiciaires. Malgré l’existence de lois interdisant les attentats à la pudeur, les militants de HarassMap affirment que les gens ne considèrent pas le harcèlement sexuel comme problématique, ou comme une infraction punissable. D’après el-Shafei, « les gens ne veulent mettre un terme au harcèlement, ils veulent simplement éviter de se faire prendre ».37 12 Les efforts centrés sur le comportement des témoins, à l’image des passagers du bus dans l’exemple susmentionné, sont essentiels pour les initiatives de lutte contre le harcèlement. La recherche socio-psychologique a analysé de façon approfondie le phénomène communément connu sous le nom d’« effet du témoin », c’est-à-dire le fait de se tenir à l’écart et de s’abstenir d’apporter une aide à une personne en détresse, lorsque d’autres personnes sont présentes.38 Il existe de nombreuses raisons permettant d’expliquer l’effet du témoin, dont l’inhibition, la peur de l’embarras, un processus de diffusion de la responsabilité qui se met en place au sein de la foule des témoins assistant à la situation, le coût élevé de l’intervention, le manque de compétences appropriées pour intervenir et le contrôle social exercé par la foule elle- même.39 Malgré cela, des recherches ont montré que des témoins peuvent s’exprimer lors qu’ils assistent à la transgression d’une norme s’ils se sentent personnellement concernés par celle-ci.40 La recherche sur la violence sexuelle a aussi souligné l’importance du comportement des témoins dans le changement des normes de la communauté en général.41 Par ailleurs, les militants sociaux peuvent s’inspirer des réactions des observateurs ou des témoins vigilants. Autrement dit, ces réactions peuvent guider l’intervention sociale.42 Le concept de « public témoin » est ici

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 114

significatif. Ce public se compose d’individus qui n’adhèrent pas à un mouvement ou ne se sentent pas concernés par un problème, ou encore de « spectateurs distaux », qui pourraient cependant apporter un témoignage et réagir à des problèmes liés à un mouvement social ou politique, et pourraient ainsi devenir des adhérents au mouvement, ou des bénéficiaires de celui-ci.43 13 Les publics témoins sont ces segments du public que les mouvements sociaux cherchent à mobiliser pour leur cause. Ce sont des individus disposant d’une certain niveau de conscience sociale et politique, et qui, bien qu’ils ne soient généralement pas engagés, peuvent émerger en tant qu’observateurs et commentateurs en cas de rupture, mais aussi de restauration, de l’ordre public.44 Leurs réactions peuvent permettre la politisation rapide d’une question ou d’un événement, voire même influencer le fonctionnement des organes en charge de l’application des lois.45 Les publics témoins sont aussi nécessaires pour remodeler les normes sociales dominantes. L’établissement de nouvelles normes requiert une masse critique d’appui. Une fois qu’un point de basculement est atteint, l’institutionnalisation par le biais d’une codification légale devient possible.46 La masse critique se définit comme une « façon métaphorique souple de se référer à l’idée qu’un certain seuil de participants ou d’actions doit être dépassé avant qu’un mouvement social ne prenne vie »47. La littérature concernant la masse critique examine rarement la question des origines communautaires des nouvelles normes. Cependant, nous pouvons tout de même noter le rôle significatif des publics témoins dans la facilitation de l’émergence de nouvelles normes socio-politiques et culturelles, et en tant que partie intégrante de la masse critique d’appui qui peut en résulter. Les réactions des témoins sont façonnées de façon dialectique par le militantisme social et les pratiques politico-légales, et inversement.

HarassMap : origines et mission

14 À la fin du mois d’octobre 2010, trois mois seulement avant la révolution, HarassMap a débuté ses opérations en lançant sa plateforme de crowd-mapping 48 en ligne, hébergée par le site Ushashidi. Trois des cofondateurs de HarassMap avaient précédemment travaillé pour le CEDF, et avaient notamment lancé et géré la campagne « Rendre nos rues sûres pour tout le monde ». Le point fort du CEDF était l’usage de stratégies répandues au sein des ONG de sensibilisation et de plaidoyer à l’époque, à l’image du lobbying, de l’organisation d’ateliers de formation, d’activités de recherche, de l’écriture de rapports et de la fourniture de services juridiques pour des femmes dans le besoin. Au départ, la campagne « Rendre nos rues sûres pour tout le monde » différa du travail habituel du CEDF, en s’appuyant sur des bénévoles et en utilisant des techniques communautaires visant à obtenir l’appui du public, éléments perçus par les responsables de la campagne comme manquant au travail de la société civile en Égypte. 49 Au fur et à mesure du développement du programme, de l’augmentation de son financement et de l’embauche de personnel professionnel, les activités organisées sont redevenues plus conformes au travail de sensibilisation traditionnel commun aux ONG.

15 Les cofondateurs de HarassMap ont repris cette orientation vers la communauté dans le cadre de leur nouvelle initiative. L’élément sociétal était en effet essentiel au militantisme que les cofondateurs souhaitaient alors mettre en œuvre. Une grande partie de l’attention reçue par HarassMap de la part des médias occidentaux et des acteurs du développement international a été consacrée au crowd-mapping, applaudi et

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 115

salué en tant qu’approche unique permettant de rendre visible le phénomène du harcèlement quotidien. Cependant, selon Rebecca Chiao, cofondatrice et directrice exécutive de HarassMap, l’élément technologique n’était envisagé que comme un « bonus » en plus du travail de terrain qu’ils voulaient effectuer dans les voisinages et les quartiers afin de transformer les mentalités de la société concernant le harcèlement.50 Des activités de sensibilisation politique et légale sur la question de la violence sexiste, dont le problème croissant du harcèlement sexuel, étaient déjà conduites par plusieurs ONG, à l’image du Centre El-Nadim et de son travail pionnier sur la torture et la violence sexuelle et domestique. A la fin de l’année 2008, 16 ONG ont formé le Groupe de travail pour l’interdiction de la violence sexuelle, coordonné par l’organisation New Woman Foundation. L’une de ses missions consistait à rédiger et promouvoir des amendements au code pénal relatifs à la violence sexiste.51 Dans ce contexte, se concentrer sur la communauté et les perceptions sociales était pour les fondateurs de HarassMap une étape indispensable afin de transformer le climat sociopolitique général. 16 Pour les militants de HarassMap, la raison fondamentale pour laquelle le harcèlement sexuel existe est la tolérance sociale massive le concernant. Ils estiment que ce sont en fin de compte les gens qui permettent le harcèlement en ne s’exprimant pas et en n’intervenant pas en faveur de la victime lorsqu’ils sont témoins d’un incident. Leur mission première vise donc à remodeler les convictions et les comportements des témoins afin d’encourager les gens à percevoir le harcèlement comme un crime, à s’exprimer contre et à soutenir et aider les victimes de harcèlement en public. Le fait de se concentrer ainsi sur les convictions et les comportements des témoins est sous- tendu par l’idée que les structures politiques et légales seules ne sont pas suffisantes pour transformer les normes sociétales qui font du harcèlement une pratique acceptable. L’application de la loi aux cas de harcèlement sexuel a été et reste perçue comme hautement problématique. L’étude du CEDF de 2008 (la première publiée sur le phénomène en Égypte) indique que 97 % des Égyptiennes et 87 % des femmes étrangères enquêtées n’ont pas signalé à la police le harcèlement dont elles ont été victimes.52 Ceci a été confirmé à nouveau par l’étude de HarassMap de 2014, qui montre que seulement 2 % des femmes de l’échantillon ont signalé à la police les cas de harcèlement qu’elles ont subis53. L’étude du CEDF mettait notamment en évidence le fait que la police avait tendance à se moquer des femmes déposant plainte, que les femmes ne pensaient pas que la police pouvait les aider, et que les femmes étrangères considéraient les officiers de police eux-mêmes comme des harceleurs. De même, l’étude de HarassMap soulignait une préférence commune pour des méthodes alternatives et anonymes de signalement plutôt que le recours à la police, qui ne prenait pas le problème au sérieux. Selon Chiao, l’application effective de la loi dépend du fait que la police croie ou non qu’un acte répréhensible a été commis. Elle affirme ici que la croyance en la répréhensibilité de certaines actions est issue de racines sociales, et que les officiers de police eux-mêmes ne sont pas différents des autres membres de la société. Ils ne connaissent pas toujours la loi, ou ne sont pas toujours convaincus de son bien-fondé.54

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 116

Créer de nouvelles normes sociales

17 Une partie de l’approche de HarassMap visant à encourager les témoins à s’exprimer implique la construction et la promotion de nouvelles normes concernant le harcèlement sexuel. Ceci inclut : Reconceptualiser le harcèlement sexuel, taharrush, afin que les actes non-physiques tels que les commentaires ou les regards, soient également perçus comme des formes de violence et de violation de l’espace personnel propres aux femmes. Autrement dit, il s’agit de s’éloigner du concept apparenté de muʿâksa (drague, séduction) ; Affaiblir les stéréotypes répandus inhérents aux logiques de minimisation ou de justification du harcèlement sexuel, et interagir avec les gens pour leur permettre de percevoir la violence sexuelle différemment ; Remettre en cause la stigmatisation des victimes, par le biais d’une rhétorique positive mettant en avant la force de celles qui subissent des cas de harcèlement, et s’opposer au système de genre binaire qui désavantage les femmes et limite leur participation publique ; Promouvoir la perception et la définition du harcèlement sexuel quotidien comme un crime ayant des répercussions légales et sociales, et en particulier, inciter à de nouvelles formes de pression sociale pour prévenir le harcèlement sexuel ; Exhorter les individus à s’exprimer et à intervenir contre le harcèlement, qu’ils en soient victimes ou témoins, ce qui peut impliquer l’encouragement à porter plainte, le développement de politiques relatives au harcèlement sexuel au sein des organisations, et la promotion de l’intervention et de l’expression contre le harcèlement comme des actes « cools ». 18 Une partie du travail de promotion de nouvelles normes consiste en campagnes d’information approfondies fréquemment déployées par HarassMap sur les réseaux sociaux, notamment Facebook et Twitter, ainsi que Tumblr dans une moindre mesure. Depuis 2012, HarassMap s’est lancé dans plusieurs grandes campagnes, dont « byitharrach lih ? » (Pourquoi harcèle-t-il ?, campagne que les militants de HarassMap désignent par « Briser les mythes »), « salahha fi dimâghak » (Règle le problème dans ta tête), « mesh sâkta » (Je ne me tais pas), ainsi qu’une campagne plus récente liée à la Semaine internationale de lutte contre le harcèlement de rue, intitulée « di mesh mu‘âksa, da taharruch » (Ce n’est pas de la drague, c’est du harcèlement). La campagne « byitharrash lih ? » avançait que les raisons souvent données par les gens pour expliquer le harcèlement sexuel, dont la pauvreté, l’illettrisme, le retard dans l’âge du mariage, la frustration sexuelle, l’insécurité ou encore les vêtements portés par les femmes, leur corps et leur présence en public, ne sont en réalité que des mythes. A travers l’un des messages de la campagne, HarassMap contredisait par exemple directement une justification économique fréquemment donnée pour expliquer le harcèlement, demandant ainsi « si la cause du harcèlement sexuel est la pauvreté, alors pourquoi les chefs d’entreprise harcèlent-ils les femmes ? ». L’organisation a aussi cherché à saper l’idée apparentée selon laquelle l’absence de travail conduit à l’impossibilité pour les jeunes hommes de se marier, créant ainsi chez eux une frustration sexuelle refoulée qui cause le harcèlement sexuel, en demandant : « si la cause du harcèlement sexuel est le mariage tardif, alors pourquoi les pères de famille harcèlent-ils les femmes ? ».

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 117

Corrige ça dans ta tête

Cette image s’attaque à la tendance du public égyptien à faire un lien entre le style vestimentaire des femmes dans l’espace public, et le harcèlement sexuel ; elle illustre l’approche de HarassMap dans ses efforts pour influencer les normes sociales de rejet de la faute sur les victimes du harcèlement. ,Corrige ça dans ta tête »), de nov.-déc. 2013 ») " اهحلص كغامد يف " L’image est extraite de la campagne organisée dans le cadre de l’initiative « 16 jours d’activisme contre les violences sexistes » menée conjointement par HarassMap, Nazra for Feminist Studies, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights et Tahrir Bodyguard.

19 A la fin de l’année 2013, la campagne conjointe « salahha fi dimâghak », organisée avec Nazra pour les études féministes, l’Initiative égyptienne pour les droits personnels (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights) et Tahrir Bodyguards, visait à consolider différentes définitions de la violence sexuelle et à remettre en question l’inégalité entre les sexes. La campagne distinguait notamment les termes souvent confondus de taharrusḥ ginsy (harcèlement sexuel), ʿitidâʾ ginsy (agression sexuelle) et ightiṣâb (viol). 55 Un atelier organisé par HarassMap lors de la campagne, « la boîte des stéréotypes sexuels » (The Gender Box) avait pour objectif de sensibiliser les gens aux stéréotypes culturels relatifs à la masculinité et la féminité, et à la violence dont hommes et femmes peuvent faire l’objet en cas de non-conformité. La campagne « mesh sâkta » était la première à cibler les femmes. Composée d’une série d’affiches, de photos et de vidéos contenant des commentaires positifs et insistant sur le fait de s’exprimer contre le harcèlement, la campagne donnait des indications et des conseils sur la manière de faire face au harcèlement, par le biais d’une méthode collective permettant aux personnes intéressés de partager publiquement leur idées avec d’autres. Enfin, la campagne la plus récente, « di mesh mu‘âksa, da taharruch » poursuit le travail de définition du taharruch en tant que harcèlement sexuel de rue quotidien, y compris verbal, et de distinction entre celui-ci et le flirt consenti et consensuel. Dans ce cadre, les messages de la campagne mettent en évidence les types de commentaire que les femmes entendent, en langue usuelle quotidienne, et qui relèvent du harcèlement sexuel, tel que « makana », littéralement traduit par « machine » et signifiant « salope ».

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 118

Le but de la campagne est d’amener toute personne, victime ou témoin, entendant de tels commentaires, à s’exprimer.

Je ne garde pas le silence

Je ne garde pas le silence »), du ») " ةتكاس شم " Cette image provient de la campagne de HarassMap printemps 2014, qui ciblait spécifquement les femmes victimes de harcèlement. Cependant, l’objectif ne se limitait pas à favoriser l’auto-affrmation de ces dernières; il s’agissait aussi de donner des conseils au public sur comment intervenir pour assister les personnes harcelées. Cette image reflète la mission fondamentale de HarassMap, qui est de contribuer à mettre fn à l’acceptabilité du harcèlement sexuel en demandant au public témoin/spectateur de prendre la parole.

20 En outre, faire percevoir le harcèlement sexuel quotidien aux témoins comme un crime est important en ce qu’il permet de les encourager à s’exprimer contre le problème en général. En particulier, opposer les réactions actives des témoins dans des cas de vol à l’absence de réactions au harcèlement sexuel, est un procédé très répandu. Au travers de ses messages de campagne, HarassMap associe violations physiques et vols de biens matériels. Sur l’une des affiches de la campagne « salahha fi dimâghak », HarassMap et ses partenaires avaient par exemple écrit : « Celui qui vole ton portefeuille est un criminel » et « Celui qui vole ton corps et viole ton sourire est un criminel ».

L’intervention des témoins et la création d’une masse critique

21 En dépit des peurs selon lesquelles le travail de lutte contre le harcèlement sexuel engendrerait des hommes indisciplinés nécessitant d’être contrôlés ou de se réformer, les cibles des interventions de HarassMap ne sont généralement pas les harceleurs ou les femmes victimes de harcèlement sexuel. Afin de mettre un terme à l’acceptabilité sociale du harcèlement sexuel, la position philosophique de HarassMap est que tous les membres de la société doivent prendre la responsabilité personnelle de s’exprimer contre cette pratique, en particulier ceux qui se tiennent à l’écart et ignorent ou

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 119

assistent à des cas de harcèlement sexuel sans rien faire. Pour HarassMap, parvenir à convaincre les gens que le harcèlement sexuel est un crime et à leur faire surmonter leurs peurs ou leurs préjugés représenterait un changement de norme crucial qui les rendrait disposés à prendre position, à s’exprimer contre les harceleurs et à offrir leur soutien aux victimes de harcèlement.

22 Le but premier de l’Unité d‘intervention communautaire de HarassMap est de faciliter l’établissement d’une éthique disciplinaire et d’un sens de la responsabilité morale afin d’encourager les témoins à intervenir, à aider les membres de leur communauté dans le besoin et à ne pas tolérer de comportements criminels dans leur quartier. Deux fois par an, HarassMap forme une brigade de « capitaines » qui dirigent des équipes locales de bénévoles dans leurs quartiers afin de mener des campagnes de sensibilisation sur le terrain, dans les rues. Des formations mobiles mensuelles de tous les bénévoles sont aussi organisées dans tous les gouvernorats d’Égypte. Les bénévoles sont recrutés par le biais des réseaux sociaux, et les équipes de bénévoles utilisent également les réseaux sociaux lorsqu’elles mettent en œuvre leurs propres efforts de sensibilisation des communautés, en postant des photos et des messages depuis la rue. Au travers de ces efforts de sensibilisation de la communauté, les témoins se transforment en adhérents au mouvement et encouragent d’autres témoins à faire de même. Au minimum, les bénévoles cherchent à convaincre les témoins d’exprimer leur désaccord ou leur indignation lorsque les valeurs sociales relatives à l’intégrité physique des femmes font publiquement l’objet de violations. Les capitaines et les bénévoles sont formés sur les questions d’inégalité entre les sexes, de violence. Ils apprennent aussi des réponses efficaces aux stéréotypes sexistes souvent avancés par les membres de la communauté. Les bénévoles sont de plus formés à faire débattre les gens sur les normes relatives au harcèlement sexuel, tout en évitant l’agressivité et l’ergoterie et en empêchant les conversations de diverger vers la stigmatisation des victimes, ainsi qu’à conclure les conversations en obtenant la confirmation des témoins qu’ils ne resteront plus silencieux et s’exprimeront lorsqu’ils verront un cas de harcèlement se produire. 23 Deux nouveaux programmes apparentés, Écoles et Universités Sûres (EUS) et Zones sûres (ZS)56, ont encore élargi le champ de la lutte contre l’effet du témoin à plus grande échelle. Les programmes EUS et ZS cherchent à sensibiliser les individus dès leur plus jeune âge aux questions d’intégrité physique et de comportements constitutifs du harcèlement, ainsi qu’à encourager les entreprises et autres entités publiques à développer des politiques de tolérance zéro et des procédures officielles contre le harcèlement sexuel. La stratégie du programme Zone sûres prévoit un travail avec les petits commerces, en procédant rue par rue afin de construire des réseaux de soutien parmi les propriétaires de commerces, à la fois afin d’empêcher les réactions violentes des harceleurs et de servir de modèle positif à suivre pour que d’autres commerces établissent des politiques anti-harcèlement sexuel. Une campagne d’information récente liée au programme EUS, « ‘âyzîn siyâsa gowa al-gâm‘a » (Nous voulons une politique à l’université), a appelé les universités égyptiennes à développer de telles politiques.57 24 Il est important de noter que la plateforme de crowd-mapping de HarassMap, qui a retenu l’attention de la communauté internationale, constitue à la fois un espace et un outil essentiels pour transformer les perceptions sociales. Plateforme interactive en ligne qui allie SIG et SMS, elle fournit aux gens la possibilité de signaler anonymement des cas de harcèlement et de cartographier leurs témoignages en ligne ou par le biais de

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 120

SMS. Ceux-ci deviennent ensuite visibles de façon publique via Google Maps sur le site internet de HarassMap. Skalli mentionne que cet outil en ligne a pour objectif de fournir un espace sûr permettant aux femmes de raconter leur histoire sans honte et sans représailles.58 L’idée de sécurité est importante étant donné le manque de soutien des organismes en charge de l’application de la loi à celles qui tentent de porter plainte par le biais des voies officielles. Dans ces circonstances, Young précise que la carte sert d’outil de documentation alternatif, « permettant aux victimes de contourner les contraintes institutionnelles […] qui peuvent les empêcher de signaler un incident »59. La carte donne aussi aux individus la possibilité de récuser directement les discours de stigmatisation des victimes, et de s’exprimer à propos de leurs peurs, leurs frustrations et leur colère contre leur harceleur, contre la société qui normalise la pratique du harcèlement sexuel, et contre le manque de recours légaux efficaces. 25 Une critique récente de l’approche du témoin défend l’idée qu’elle ne résout pas le problème sous-jacent de la violence sexuelle. Elk et Devereaux notent que le fait de demander aux témoins d’intervenir en cas de violence sexuelle, comme le viol, crée pour eux un danger inhérent et que les témoins, comme les victimes, ne reçoivent pas le soutien approprié.60 Ils indiquent que cela ne fait que modifier la cible des discours de stigmatisation des victimes, dont les témoins qui échouent à fournir une assistance en cas de besoin se mettent également à faire l’objet. Selon eux, l’approche du témoin semble n’être rien de plus qu’une autre forme de vigilantisme, qu’ils affirment être une caractéristique de l’État « carcéral », élaborée dans le but de punir et non de réhabiliter les délinquants. « Même lorsque l’intervention d’un témoin est réussie, interrompre une agression n’est pas la même chose que mettre un terme à la violence. Il ne s’agit même pas de prévention de la violence » (Elk & Devereaux 2014). Enfin, ils soutiennent que l’approche du témoin n’oblige aucunement les individus à l’introspection et à s’intéresser à la violence qu’ils sont eux-mêmes capables de commettre. 26 De tels arguments éludent la complexité qui entoure les campagnes d’information des mouvements sociaux et la question du comportement des témoins. Ils n’expliquent en quoi consiste l’approche du témoin. L’impression dominante est que l’intervention physique est requise, mais d’autres formes d’interventions, tout aussi utiles et salutaires, et ne conduisant pas les témoins à se mettre en danger, ne sont pas évoquées. De plus, les témoins en Égypte ne sont pas nécessairement opposés à l’intervention physique s’ils considèrent qu’elle est justifiée par la situation. C’est le cas avec le vol, au sujet duquel il est connu et fréquent que des voisinages entiers se rassemblent pour attraper un voleur, de jeunes hommes formant souvent des factions ad hoc et se munissant de bâtons, de barres de fers et de chaines pour ce faire.61 27 La rhétorique de HarassMap sur l’intervention des témoins accepte de façon implicite que parmi le groupe de témoins, il pourra y avoir des harceleurs. Pour éviter une rhétorique accusatrice qui blâmerait un groupe particulier de gens pour le harcèlement sexuel, leur discours est plutôt centré sur le besoin de reconnaître que chaque individu a une responsabilité envers les autres membres de sa communauté. Plutôt que de déplacer le blâme, ce message remodèle subtilement la nature de la responsabilité sociale en demandant aux gens de reconsidérer leurs propres biais les poussant à garder le silence ou les empêchant de voir l’humanité fondamentale des victimes de violence sexuelle. Voir l’approche du témoin comme une pratique qui déplace la stigmatisation de la victime et qui ignore la question du potentiel violent des individus est problématique, en ce que cela repose sur une approche binaire particulière

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 121

d’inspiration occidentale qui oppose l’individu et la communauté. La notion de responsabilité individuelle promeut seulement le besoin pour les gens de se contrôler et les dissocie de toute responsabilité envers la communauté à laquelle ils appartiennent. Pour cette raison, promouvoir la responsabilité communautaire est souvent perçu comme inefficace ainsi que comme une forme d’hégémonie. 28 Construire une masse critique de publics témoins représente le but ultime de HarassMap afin de mettre un terme à l’acceptabilité sociale du harcèlement sexuel en Égypte. Au cœur de cela, les efforts entrepris pour parvenir au changement social supposent la construction de soutiens sur le terrain afin de que de nouvelles normes et comportements introduits par les initiatives prennent racine, individu par individu, et deviennent finalement ordinaires au sein de l’opinion publique. Une fois que cela se produit et que suffisamment d’individus sont convaincus de ou mettent en pratique les nouvelles normes promues par HarassMap et d’autres initiatives similaires, un point de basculement est alors atteint. Ici, lorsque suffisamment de gens seront devenus insatisfaits des pratiques sociales, politiques ou légales ne correspondant pas aux nouvelles normes, ceux-ci se mettront alors à réclamer un changement. Cette masse critique est perçue comme essentielle pour amener un changement politique et légal puisque les militants de HarassMap affirment que le gouvernement n’a aucune incitation au changement, malgré le travail important des entités officielles de la société civile. Une masse critique soutenant de nouvelles pratiques normatives a ici la possibilité de menacer la légitimité du gouvernement. Il est supposé premièrement que l’État adhérera à la volonté sociale du peuple et intégrera les nouvelles normes à des instruments politiques et légaux, et deuxièmement que les représentants de l’État sont eux-mêmes des membres de la société, et adopteront ces nouvelles normes dans leur propre système de valeurs.

Conclusion

29 Cet article a défendu le besoin de repenser le politique et la dépolitisation en ce qui concerne les interventions sociales et culturelles du militantisme anti-harcèlement sexuel en Égypte. De telles interventions ne plaident pas directement pour le changement auprès de l’État mais constituent bien des processus politiques cherchant à transformer la nature des convictions et des pratiques des gens, ainsi que l’engagement de l’État contre le problème du harcèlement sexuel. La relation entre harcèlement sexuel politiquement motivé et socialement motivé, en terme de facteurs causaux et de normes communes rendant le harcèlement sexuel socialement acceptable et renforçant les pratiques patriarcales, souligne l’intégration des sphères politique et sociale. Étant donné cette intégration, les interventions centrées sur le remodelage des normes sociales et culturelles ont un impact indéniable sur la pratique politique. L’approche de HarassMap en matière de changement des normes sociales, d’encouragement des témoins à s’exprimer et de création d’une masse critique, ne dépolitise pas le problème du harcèlement sexuel, au sens où le but ultime de leur militantisme est de forcer l’État à garantir un environnement dans lequel les citoyens se sentent protégés de la violence publique. Les militants de HarassMap tentent de parvenir à ce résultat par le biais d’une approche de terrain qui remodèle les normes sous-tendant le système sociopolitique actuel au sein duquel le harcèlement sexuel est toléré, n’est pas considéré comme un crime, et pour lequel personne n’est tenu de rendre des comptes (pas même l’État). Le

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 122

changement politique et une réaction plus impliquée de l’État sont ici une suite du militantisme de HarassMap à l’échelle de la communauté : ils se produisent lorsque le public lui-même s’exprime et réclame de l’État qu’il adopte des lois équitables et qu’il les applique activement, afin que l’espace public devienne libre de toute violence sexuelle.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

ABU LUGHOD, Lila. 2013. Do Muslim Women Need Saving? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

ABU LUGHOD, Lila. 2011. The Active Social Life of “Muslim Women’s Rights”: A Plea for Ethnography and Polemic, With Cases from Egypt and Palestine. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 6(1): 1-45.

ABDELRAHMAN, Maha. 2004. Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

AHMAD, Tania. 2014. Socialities of Indignation: Denouncing Party Politics in Karachi. Cultural Anthropology, 29(2): 411-432.

AHMAD-ZAKI, Hind & ABD ALHAMID, Dalia. 2014. Women as Fair Game in the Public Sphere: A Critical Introduction for Understanding Sexual Violence and Methods of Resistance. Jadaliyya, July 9, 2014. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18455/women-as-fair-game-in-the-public- sphere_a-critical.

ALVAREZ, Sonia E., DAGNINO, Evelina, and ESCOBAR, Arturo. 1998. Introduction: The Cultural and the Political in Latin American Social Movements. In Cultures of Politics and Politics of Cultures: Re- Visioning Latin American Social Movements, (eds.) Sonia Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, et Arturo Escobar. Boulder: Westview Press.

AMAR, Paul. 2011. Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out? International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13(3): 299-328.

BIANCHI, Robert. 1989. Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth Century Egypt. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

BRAUN, Robert & KOOPMANS, Paul. 2014. Watch the Crowd: Bystander Responses, Trickle Down Politics, and Xenophobic Mobilization. Comparative Political Studies, 47(4) : 631-658.

BRAUN, Robert & KOOPMANS, Paul. 2012. “Bystander Responses and Xenophobic Mobilization,” Document de réflexion, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung. http:// www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/68460.

CHEKROUN, Peggy & BRAUER, Markus. 2002. The Bystander Effect and Social Control Behavior: The Effect of the Presence of Others on People’s Reactions to Norm Violations. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32: 853-867.

DARLEY, J.M. & LATANE, B. 1968. Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8: 377-383.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 123

EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS. 2009. Sexual Harassment in the Arab Region: Cultural Gaps and Legal Challenges. ECWR Report, (ed.) Nehad Abul Komsan. Print.

EL-DEEB, Bouthaina. 2013. Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt. UN Women, http://harassmap.org/en/wp-content/uploads/ 2014/02/287_Summaryreport_eng_low-1.pdf.

ELK, Lauren Chief & DEVEREAUX, Shaadi. 2014. “The Failure of Bystander Intervention.” New Inquiry, 12-23-2014. Consulté le 01-04-2015. http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/failure-of- bystander-intervention/.

ELSAYED, Heba & RIZZO, Helen. 2014. Media, Political Opportunity and the Anti-Sexual Harassment Campaign in the Post-2011 Egypt. Manuscrit non publié.

FAHMY, Amel, ABDELMONEM, Angie, HAMDY, Enas, BADR, Ahmed & HASSAN, Rasha. 2014. “Toward a Safer City: Sexual Harassment in Greater Cairo: Effectiveness of Crowdsourced Data.” Rapport de HarassMap (rapport complet), http://harassmap.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Towards- A-Safer-City_full-report.pdf.

FEREE, Myra Marx. 2003. Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the United States and Germany. American Journal of Sociology, 109(2): 304-344.

FIDH, Nazra for Feminist Studies, New Women Foundation and Uprising of Women in the Arab World. 2014. “Egypt Keeping Women Out: Sexual Violence Against Women in the Public Space.” http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/egypt_women_final_english.pdf.

FINNEMORE, Martha. 1996. Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism. International Organization, 50(2): 325-347.

FINNEMORE, Martha & SIKKINK, Kathryn. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization, 52(4): 887-917.

HAFEZ, Sherine. 2014. The Revolution Shall Not Pass Through Women’s Bodies: Egypt, Uprising and Gender Politics. The Journal of North African Studies, 19(2): 172-185.

HASSAN, Rasha, SHOUKRY, Aliyaa & ABUL KOMSAN, Nehad. 2008. “Clouds in Egypt’s Sky: Sexual Harassment: From Verbal Harassment to Rape.” ECWR Report, http://egypt.unfpa.org/Images/ Publication/2010_03/6eeeb05a-3040-42d2-9e1c-2bd2e1ac8cac.pdf.

LANGOHR, Vickie. 2014. New President, Old Pattern of Sexual Violence in Egypt. Middle East Report, July 7. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070714.

LANGOHR, Vickie. 2013. “This is Our Square”: Fighting Sexual Assault at Cairo Protests. Middle East Report, 238 (Fall): 18-35.

LEVITT, Peggy & Merry, Sally. 2009. Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s Right in Peru, China, India and the United States. Global Networks, 9(4): 441-461.

MCCARTHY, John D. & ZALD, Mayer N. 1977. Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6): 1212-1241.

MERRY, Sally Engle. 2006. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

MICHAEL, Maggie. 2013. “Mob Kills Alleged Thief in Egypt Vigilante Attack.” AP, Yahoo News, 3-21-2013. Consulté le 01-04-2015. http://news.yahoo.com/mob-kills-alleged-thief-egypt- vigilante-attack-200620533.html.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 124

Nazra for Feminist Studies. 2014. Concept Paper: Different Practices of Sexual Violence Against Women (English). http://nazra.org/en/2014/02/concept-paper-different-practices-sexual- violence-against-women.

RISSE, Thomas & SIKKINK, Kathryn. 1999. The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices. In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp et Kathryn Sikkink (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

RIZZO, Helen, PRICE, Anne M., & MEYER, Katherine. 2012. Anti-Sexual Harassment Campaign in Egypt. Mobilization: An International Journal, 17(4): 457-475.

RIZZO, Helen, PRICE, Anne M., & MEYER, Katherine. 2008. “Targeting Cultural Change in Repressive Environments: The Campaign Against Sexual Harassment in Egypt.” Rapport du CEDF http:// ecwronline.org/pdf/studies/AntiHarassment_for_ECWR.pdf.

ROGERS, Everett M. 1983. The Diffusion of Innovation. New York: The Free Press.

RUBIN, Jeffrey W. 1996. “Decentering the Regime: Culture and Regional Politics in Mexico.” Latin American Research Review, 31(3): 85-126.

SCOTT, Robet. 2000. The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms. Virginia Law Review, 86(8): 1603-1647.

SKALLI, Loubna Hanna. 2014. Young Women and Social Media Against Sexual Harassment. JOURNAL of North African Studies, 19(2): 244-258.

SNOW, David A., ZURCHER , Louis A., & Peters, Robert. 1981. Victory Celebrations as a Theater: A Dramaturgical Approach to Crowd Behavior. Symbolic Interaction, 4(1): 21-42.

SWIDLER, Ann. 1995. “Cultural Power and Social Movements.” In Social Movements and Culture, (eds.) Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

TADROS, Mariz. 2014. Reclaiming the Streets for Women’s Dignity: Effective Initiatives in the Struggle Against Gender-Based Violence in Between Egypt’s Two Revolutions.

TADROS, Mariz. 2013a. “Whose Shame Is It? The Politics of Sexual Assault in Morsi’s Egypt.” Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Afrique Du Nord Tunis, http://tn.boell.org/downloads/MarizTadros.pdf.

TADROS, Mariz. 2013b. Politically Motivated Sexual Assault and the Law in Violent Transitions: A Case Study From Egypt. Institute of Development Studies, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/ bitstream/handle/123456789/2950/ER8%20final%20online.pdf? sequence=1&utm_source=idswebsite&utm_medium=download&utm_campaign=opendocs.

THORNBERG, Robert. 2007. A Classmate in Distress: School Children as Bystanders and Their Reasons for How They Act. Social Psychology of Education, 10: 5-28.

Wikipedia. Critical Mass (Sociodynamics) entry, last accessed August 5, 2014. http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_mass_(sociodynamics).

YOUNG, Chelsea. 2014. HarassMap: Using Crowdsourcing Data to Map Sexual Harassment in Egypt. Technology Innovation Management Review, http://timreview.ca/sites/default/files/ article_PDF/Young_TIMReview_March2014.pdf.

ZWINGEL, Susanne. 2012. How Do Norms Travel: Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational Perspective. International Studies Quarterly, 56 : 115-129.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 125

NOTES

1. Hassan et al. 2008. 2. NDT : axé sur la communauté ou communautaire, community-based en anglais, est utilisé dans cet article pour décrire une activité qui est organisée et se déroule au niveau local, qui prend la communauté, par opposition aux institutions et à l’État notamment, pour cible et pour agent de changement à la fois. 3. ECWR 2009; Rizzo et al. 2008 & 2012. 4. Tadros 2013a. L’argument de Tadros ne mentionne pas directement le CEDF, mais les interventions sociales de façon plus générale. Son analyse examine la manière dont les sentiments politiques personnels influencent les perceptions liées au harcèlement sexuel et soulève le problème de l’absence de limites claires entre harcèlement politiquement motivé et formes quotidiennes de harcèlement sexuel, qui crée une forme de confusion permettant la reproduction du harcèlement politiquement motivé. 5. Abu Lughod 2011, p. 14 & 2013, p. 156. 6. NDT : Agence des Nations-Unies pour l’égalité des sexes et l’autonomisation des femmes. 7. El-Deeb 2013. 8. ElSayed & Rizzo 2014, manuscrit non publié. 9. Ahmad 2014, p.427. L’analyse d’Ahmad est centrée sur les réactions publiques aux manifestations de 2007 qui ont conduit à un conflit violent entre le gouvernement et l’opposition à Karachi au Pakistan. Elle défend l’idée que, plutôt que de prendre part aux manifestations et au conflit, une partie de la population de Karachi a volontairement choisi de rester enfermée chez elle. Selon elle, cet enfermement représente une forme d’engagement politique. 10. Alvarez et al. 1998; Rubin 1996; Swidler 1995. 11. Rubin 1996, p. 89, citant Foucault 1990, pp. 93-96. 12. Tadros 2013a&b & 2014. 13. Hassan et al. 2008; El Deeb 2013; Fahmy et al. 2014. 14. Langohr 2013 & 2014; Tadros 2013b; Ahmed-Zaki & Abd Alhamid 2014. 15. Amar 2011. 16. Rizzo et al. 2012b. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid, p. 467. 19. Abu Lughod 2010, p. 14. 20. Amar 2011, p. 314-316. 21. Abdelrahman 2004; Bianchi 1989. 22. Elsayed & Rizzo 2014, manuscrit non-publié. 23. Langohr 2013; Hafez 2014. 24. Interview 2014, Amal ElMohandes de l’ONG Nazra for Feminist Studies; conversations personnelles de 2014 avec Hussein el-Shafei et Noora Flinkman de HarassMap. 25. Langohr 2014; Interview 2014, Farah Shash de l’organisation El-Nadim. 26. Interview de juin 2014. 27. Tadros 2013a, p. 6. 28. Skalli 2014. 29. Ilahi 2008; Peoples 2008; Rizzo et al. 2012a&b. 30. Tadros 2014, p. 10. 31. Finnemore 1996, p 891. 32. Zwingel 2012. 33. NDT : les entrepreneurs de normes (norm entrepreneurs) regroupent tous les acteurs quels qu’ils soient – individus, entreprises, ONG, États, organisations multilatérales – qui promeuvent délibérément et activement la diffusion d’une ou de plusieurs normes.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 126

34. Feree 2003; Levitt & Merry 2009. 35. Alvarez et al. 1998, p. 7. 36. Community Outreach Director. 37. Conversation personnelle, août 2014. 38. Chekroun & Brauer 2002. 39. Darley & Latane 1968; Thornberg 2007. 40. Braun & Koopman 2012 & 2014. 41. Banyard et al. 2004. 42. Braun & Koopman 2012 & 2014. 43. McCarthy & Zald 1977; Snow et al. 1981. 44. Snow et al. 1981. 45. Ibid. 46. Finnemore & Sikkink 1998. 47. Oliver et al. 1985. 48. NDT : le crowd-mapping consiste à cartographier et à centraliser numériquement des incidents ou des événements signalés par des témoins, ou bien des victimes. 49. Rizzo et al. 2012a&b 50. Interview, Mars 2014 51. FIDH 2014 52. Hassan et al. 2008. 53. Fahmy et al. 2014. 54. Interview, Mars 2012. 55. Nazra 2014. 56. Safe Schools and Universities et Safe Areas. 57. En 2014, l’Université du Caire a attiré l’attention des communautés nationale et internationale, du fait d’un cas de harcèlement contre une jeune femme ayant enlevé son abaya après être entrée à la faculté de droit, tout en restant entièrement couverte et voilée. A la suite de l’incident, des professeurs, en coopération avec des initiatives de lutte contre le harcèlement, ont élaboré une politique anti-harcèlement sexuel. 58. Skalli 2014, p. 251. 59. Young 2014, p. 6. 60. Elk & Devereaux 2014. 61. Michael 2013. L’agence Associated Press (AP) a raconté l’histoire d’une ville du Delta où les habitants ont lynché un homme pour avoir volé une voiture. Cette histoire est un exemple extrême de la manière dont les membres de la communauté peuvent intervenir en cas de vol, bien que l’angle de l’article de AP sur le lynchage ait visé à souligner l’anarchie croissante de la période post-révolutionnaire. De telles réactions sont typiques des interventions en cas de vol.

RÉSUMÉS

Cet article explique en quoi le travail réalisé au niveau communautaire par les initiatives anti- harcèlement sexuel représente un processus politique pour venir à bout du harcèlement en Egypte. Depuis la révolution égyptienne, les initiatives d’orientation communautaire ont employé des stratégies visant à transformer les perceptions sociales et les comportements liés au

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 127

harcèlement sexuel dans l’espace public. Ces stratégies, comme celles de HarassMap, comprennent la conduite de campagnes de sensibilisation au niveau de la rue et l’emploi de plateformes technologiques pour recadrer la notion de responsabilité sociale et bousculer les stéréotypes de genre. Pourtant, nombre de chercheurs ont remis en question ce travail— particulièrement les activités plus anciennes du Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR)— estimant qu’il représente un évitement de l’engagement politique et ne se confronte pas aux inégalités structurelles de genre. Cet article utilisera l’argument de Finnemore et Sikkink (1998) sur l’émergence des normes pour soutenir que les initiatives anti-harcèlement sexuel comme HarassMap envisagent le changement social à travers la construction d’une masse critique autour de nouvelles normes sociales. En minant les normes patriarcales rejetant la faute sur les victimes, et en encourageant le public à intervenir contre le harcèlement dans la sphère publique, HarassMap crée une nouvelle représentation de la responsabilité sociale. Quand un seuil critique est atteint, les activistes de HarassMap sont d’avis qu’une revendication publique émergera pour forcer des réformes étatiques, juridiques et politiques, pour protéger les femmes dans l’espace public. De telles approches axées sur le niveau communautaire sont politiques, mais les groupes réformistes comme HarassMap ne recherchent de tels résultats que lorsqu’il existera suffisamment de volonté publique de changement.

This paper argues that the community-based work of anti-sexual harassment initiatives represents a political process toward ending sexual harassment in Egypt. Since the Egyptian Revolution, community-based initiatives have employed strategies to transform social perceptions and behaviors regarding public sexual harassment. The strategies of these new initiatives, like HarassMap, include conducting street outreach campaigns and employing technological platforms to reframe the nature of social responsibility and to disrupt gendered stereotypes. Yet, a number of scholars have challenged this community-based anti-harassment work, particularly the early work of the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights (ECWR), for avoiding political engagement and failing to address structural gender inequalities. Drawing on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) argument regarding norm emergence, this paper maintains that anti-sexual harassment initiatives, like HarassMap, employ an approach to social change that aims to build a critical mass around new social norms. By undermining patriarchal norms that blame victims and encouraging people to intervene against public sexual harassment, HarassMap is creating a new vision of social responsibility. When a tipping point is reached, HarassMap activists believe that public outcry will then force political and legal reform from the state to protect women in public space. Such community-based approaches are political but the reform entities like HarassMap seek results only when there is enough public will for change.

INDEX

Mots-clés : Égypte, femmes, harcèlement sexuel, violence, résistance, harassmap Keywords : Egypt, women, sexual harassment, violence, resistance, harassmap, bystander approach

AUTEURS

ANGIE ABDELMONEM

Angie Abdelmonem est actuellement doctorante en anthropologie à l’École de l’Evolution Humaine et du Changement Social (School of Human Evolution and Social Change) à l’Université d’État de l’Arizona. Sa spécialisation porte sur les ONG, les mouvements sociaux, le

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 128

développement et la violence sexiste. Sa thèse examine le rôle des entités de la société civile et des initiatives indépendantes en matière de lutte contre le harcèlement sexuel de rue. En 2005-2006, elle a effectué un stage d’un an au sein du Centre Égyptien pour les Droits des Femmes (Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights), travaillant sur des projets relatifs au harcèlement sexuel, aux mutilations génitales féminines et à l’obtention du statut consultatif auprès des Nations Unies. Entre 2013 et 2014, elle a passé l’année à effectuer un travail d’observation participante au sein de HarassMap, ainsi qu’à observer et interviewer des militants de plusieurs autres ONG et initiatives indépendantes luttant contre le harcèlement sexuel, dont Ḍed el-Taharrush, Harakaṭ Bassma, Shoft Taharrush, and Nazra pour les études féministes (Nazra for Feminist Studies). Depuis 2015 et jusqu’à 2017, elle participe à un projet conjoint financé qui examine l’intersection entre médias de masse, violence sexiste publique et politiques de respectabilité. Publications: ABDELMONEM, Angie. 2015. “Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment: A Longitudinal Assessment of El-Taharrush El-Ginsy in Arabic Online Forums and Anti-Sexual Harassment Activism.” Kohl: Journal of Gender and Body Research. FAHMY, Amel, ABDELMONEM, Angie, HAMDY, Enas, BADR, Ahmed & HASSAN, Rasha. 2014. “Toward a Safer City: Sexual Harassment in Greater Cairo: Effectiveness of Crowdsourced Data.” HarassMap Report (rapport complet en anglais), http://harassmap.org/en/ wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Towards-A-Safer-City_full-report.pdf. [email protected]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 129

Male voices in a Cairo social movement Voix masculines dans un mouvement social au Caire

Sandra A. Fernandez

1 In the winter of 2012 I began to work with an anti-sexual harassment movement based in Cairo. Their original mission was to tackle any and all social issues based upon popular demand. This movement was founded in the summer of 2012 in response to the dramatic increase in gender-based violence, the creation of platforms from which to openly address the issue, and the simple fact that more people were willing and able to publically discuss sexual harassment and violence.1 Beginning as a group of friends that welcomed all and made a point of being apolitical and nonreligious, the movement has expanded and currently works on a multitude of projects across Cairo. To address the problem of sexual harassment, more commonly referred to as al-taharrush al-ginsy -movement deploys two specific methods: dialogue and non شرحتلاthe يسنجلا,() violent intervention. Part of these practices involves engaging men (as well as women) in the process of creating solutions rather than simply targeting them as the cause of the problem. The use of dialogue is put into practice during regular awareness-raising campaigns across the city, while both the use of dialogue and non-violent intervention practices are visible during the deployment of patrols. Born out of necessity during the political turmoil following 2011, patrols were organised to stop attacks on women and if necessary, to rescue them, but are now mainly deployed during Eid festivals in the Downtown area. Patrol members intervene in instances of sexual harassment as well as sexual violence, but when talking about situations and incidents, the most commonly used term is al-taharrush al-ginsy or taharrush, which was originally used to mean “sexual abuse” but is currently understood as “sexual harassment”.2

2 The focus of this paper will be the work done by men of this movement in terms of masculine vocality. I intend to explore the role of the male voice in this movement as a supporter of the female voice and in contrast to other masculine positions performed both within the movement and on the streets of Cairo. This is especially important because part of the struggle to end taharrush is a gendered struggle for public space.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 130

Public space becomes the stage on which political identities and citizenship are shaped and reshaped, and on which voice is as powerful as action. To clarify, “support” does not mean male presence in order to socially validate, or approve of, what their female counterparts are doing; ending taharrush is a shared goal. I do not wish to draw attention away from the myriad of women’s movements and groups at work in Cairo, but to use the stories of men at work in similar areas to draw attention to the fact that taharrush is an issue of concern to both men and women. Because my research is still in progress, the group I work with will not be identified by name. 3 This paper begins by briefly exploring the use of the term taharrush. It clarifies the definition used and disseminated by the movement, thus establishing its use throughout this paper. This is followed by the use of stories from the informal teams of 2012 as a framing device for understanding the types of masculinity at play and what exercising one’s voice means in this particular context. Finally, training sessions for patrol/intervention teams demonstrate the role of the male voice within the movement and the organisation of formal and regular patrols as spaces that reconfigure ideas of masculinity. There is a controversy surrounding the use of the word “victim” when referring to casualties of taharrush and rape because its use dehumanises the persons involved and strips them of their agency by labelling them forever helpless. Members of different movements I have encountered, have actively avoided using the word. In an attempt to dislodge this idea I will refer to women in jeopardy as “cases”. This word carries its own inadequacies, but it will at least contribute to the process of moving away from a term that seems to permanently lock individuals in a specific state.

Eh al-taharrush? What is taharrush?

4 “There is a difference between when someone looks at you like this...” Fawzia3 paused to look around the room, ensuring that each person saw the blank expression on her face. “... And someone who looks at you like this.” The trainer’s facial expression changed to take on an obscene gaze, a half-smile, half-smirk with eyes that beckon and almost wink. Some men in the group made clicking noises with their mouths but everyone in the room recognised that look.

5 Fawzia, had been explaining what taharrush was to a group gathered in preparation for an upcoming Eid event. Her voice was very firm but kind, and while she allowed for the pursuit of secondary lines of questioning, she was always able to return the groups focus to the point at hand. Run by the movement, the goal of this gathering was to train volunteers to participate in the two aspects of the Eid event: raising awareness and patrolling the streets. Raising awareness consists of engaging passersby in dialogue to impart information on taharrush, the laws regarding it and to elicit opinions while having people think alongside volunteers concerning how taharrush negatively impacts Egyptian society. Patrols or intervention teams, consist of groups of men who walk the streets in lines looking for instances or potential instances of taharrush. Once one is identified, men act quickly to protect the “case”, secure the harasser, and aid in filing a police report if requested. 6 Fawzia began by asking the group what they thought al-taharrush al-ginsy was. The first man offered a definition of any instance of touching, or use of hands. Another man suggested looks. Once people ceased to offer suggestions Fawzia explained that

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 131

anything that makes someone afraid of another person can be taharrush. She had written people’s contributions on a flip chart and once the conversation died down she brought up the definition of taharrush on the projection screen behind her. As the group took notes she read aloud: Taharrush is any speech or action that is unwelcomed by another person and of a sexual nature, and infringes on the individual’s privacy or body or makes them feel lack of respect, trauma, insult, fear or exploitation. شرحتلا يسنجلا لوق وايا وه ةعيبط تاذ لعف بحرم ريغ / ةيسنجوو ىدتعيهب و ىلع ةيصوصخ درفلا هدسج وا هرعشي وا مارتح مدعب همدصلال وا ا فوخلا ةناه وا ل ا وا ل غتسللا وا

,”or “ unwelcomed ” بحرم ريغ هب “ Fawzia made the point of stressing the phrase 7 drumming into participants’ heads the idea that it is an action or sound that the intended recipient does not agree to. She then went on to explain that one could not talk to people on the street about what taharrush was and what to look for without knowing for themselves what it was and the types of taharrush that existed.

8 The issue of taharrush is one that is problematic in both terminology and definition. Abd Alhamid and Zaki have argued the English term “sexual harassment” does not accurately describe the range of vocal and physical assaults women and the men helping them experience, but the term is prevalent in common speech, as well as in NGO reports, including the one issued by Harassmap and UN Women.4 Kreil gives a very thorough explanation of different terminologies used and their English counterparts, but here I will address the issues surrounding definition.5 People who attended the training session were very aware of how subjective the above definition could be and even raised the question of misuse. At one point a group member suggested that is a form of taharrush. Fawziah admitted this is a subject to be careful ( ةسكاعم ) mu’aksa about but at the same time agreed it could be taharrush.6 She also described it as “haga or normal chatter that Egyptians regularly engage in. The group ((” ةجاح ةشود dowsha was asked to pay attention to the context of the exchange. The problem of a lack of collective understanding of what taharrush is, can be addressed in part by the involvement of witnesses and encouraging passers-by not to remain silent if they see someone being harassed. 9 In total participants of this training session were taught 14 types of taharrush: looks ةيهجولا ,(تاريبعتلا ) facial expressions ةصحفتملا,( ةرظنلا دسجلل ) that scrutinize the body ( عبتتلا هقح وا ملا ل ) stalking ,( تاقيلعت ) comments ,( تاءادنلا ) catcalling روصلا ةيسنجلاsexual photos ( ),taharrush , ةوعدلا ةسراممل سنجلا )) sexual invitations , تاملاكملا هيفتاهلا ) sexual phone calls ,( شرحتلا تنريتنيلا يف ) via the internet ىراتلا ) flashing ,( سمللا ) touching ,( مامتهلا بوغرملا ريغ هيف ) unwanted attention ,( )and finally group or masstaharrush ,( ديدهتلا بيهرتلا وأ ) threats or intimidation ,( types). These of taharrush correspond with the range of the شرحتلا يسنجلا ىعامجلا most recent laws. These are the acts and utterances that awareness campaigns focus on, and patrols look out for (except for internet and phone calls). These are what men in this movement combat with their voices and bodies. The key remains that such occurrences are unwelcomed, unwanted and visibly demonstrated as so.

The experience of intervention

10 Taharrush is widely perceived to be a women’s issue, which is part of the reason why this group engages men they encounter (and not just women) in the street in dialogue,

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 132

to get them involved in addressing taharrush in their local community. Their repeated presence in the same parts of town and maintaining contact with people met on previous occasions, constitutes a repetition which is vital to the internalisation of the message. This becomes part of both parties’ listening practice, as explained by Hirschkind, and has an impact on moral conduct.7 The repeated presence of patrols (also known as intervention teams) has a similar effect supported by a certain type of physical presence. When forming the lines for a patrol (explained later), men are told it is very important to move through the crowds in silence and with serious facial expressions. One cannot wave to one’s friends from the line, for example. While the first publically discussed occurrences of taharrush and mass sexual violence occurred in 2005 and 2006, the socio-political events of 2011 created a surge in debate and created the space within civil society for more groups to actively tackle the situation.8 More recently, the stripping and rape of a woman during the celebration of President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi’s inauguration resulted in a demonstration against the normalisation of such events incorporating slogans such as “Don’t tell me what to wear, teach them not to rape”.9 Men I have worked with in the movement (including Khaled who is introduced later) have told me it is perceived as “feminine” to work against harassment (returning to the argument that it is a “women’s issue”) or indicative of a personal experience of harassment, assault or attack. The majority however, have not been physically violated or verbally assaulted, but instead, have witnessed others (often friends) being attacked, motivating them to join movements. Many join because they feel personally motivated to pursue the cause, in spite of these negative associations. Many then become active in intervention teams charged with halting assault, rescuing “cases”, and aiding in the filing of police reports. Unfortunately it is not uncommon for men coming to the aid of women being assaulted, to also come under attack.

11 When people are asked about the intervention experience, the refrain from people (mostly men) across movements is the same: why should we talk about our experiences and trauma when women go through so much worse? They feel that what they experience in rescuing women from attack, and in many cases witnessing the results of their failure to do so, is not worth the attention that could be focused on the cases themselves. What some may not realise is their speech and use of voice can serve as a form of awareness-raising. Their voices are heard on the streets and sometimes on television, radio and internet (members of the movement have given television and radio interviews, many of which can be found on Youtube) and their actions (also a form of voice) seen and others are inspired to follow suit or at least, to cease to do harm. Numerous volunteers to the movement admitted to becoming volunteers after being inspired and motivated by Khaled, Ismail and others. 12 I met with Khaled, Ali and Salma, with whom I had worked previously in the movement, in a very old and very well-known cafe in . The location had been selected for its quietness, but even indoors one could hear the honking of cars, shouting of street vendors and pedestrian conversation. It also held a special place in the group’s collective memory: it was the location of their operational headquarters during their first outing in 2012. The clinking of tea cups and the beeping of Samsung mobiles contributed to the existing din. The space itself was conducive to echoes as it was more of a cafeteria than cafe in addition to having a high ceiling and being bordered by large windows. Middle-aged waiters walked back and forth seemingly searching for customers in need or at least staying within earshot. I had asked them to

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 133

tell me stories of the work they had done as part of the intervention team. As Khaled, Salma, and Ali recounted their stories, their voices lowered and became very stern and serious; their earlier exchanges were peppered with jokes as if shaking off the weight of what they were reliving. Eventually the jokes stopped. 13 Khaled, Ali and Salma had been working against sexual harassment for at least a year. Khaled is in his early 30s and heads a company with his childhood friend. He began working in intervention in 2012, along with Ismail. They were later joined by Ali who at the time was a university student (he graduated in summer 2014 with a degree in Engineering) in his early 20s. Salma is in her mid-20s and at the time, was working on her Master’s degree. She is also involved in a number of volunteer initiatives across the spectrum of development. 14 Ali and Khaled began by explaining how they came together as a group to patrol the streets and stop harassers; the movement itself did not yet exist. Ali asked Khaled “Do you remember that day?” which allowed me to share in the memory. It began with an invitation to protect the women participating in the anti-sexual harassment stand in June, 2012. Starting from another part of town, a friend had brought a group of women together to demonstrate against the assaults perpetrated by men several days earlier.10 Within the exchange that forms the retelling of this story, the men endeavoured to lay out details in chronological order. They explained that friends gathered and donned brightly coloured vests to form a protective ring around women while they demonstrated in Tahrir Square. They had also come armed with spare clothing in case women were physically assaulted. Supposedly members of other movements were present. After about an hour the group wanted to move to a secondary location. Initially patrol members disagreed with this move, fearing loss of control of the space, but eventually they acquiesced. En route to the second location the group was caught in a location where the power had been cut and by this point it was after dark. Things took a terrible turn. Unknown men began winking at women, progressing to catcalls and attempts to touch and grab. Khaled and Ali admitted they were not prepared for this advance; each one sought a specific woman to protect and remove from the situation as quickly as possible. In order to protect the circle of defence (between harassers and women) Ali felt forced to hit a harasser in order to keep him at bay. Khaled supported Ali’s description of the situation him by explaining that if that man had broken the line of defence, the situation would have unravelled much faster. One woman hit her harasser and when her brother (or friend, they were not sure) came to her defence, he was mistaken for the harasser and beaten, which allowed the harasser to carry on his actions. On that day 3 or 4 women were taken away by harassers though the rest of the women were accompanied to safety. The story ended here for the storytellers; they did not witness what happened next. Later they had heard men had taken women to a nearby restaurant and used scissors to remove their clothing (a technique also used on men defending them). They said no one was raped that day, but it remains a disaster to them, one that strengthened their resolve to organise and coordinate their protection efforts. In the aftermath they were all upset that they were not able to safeguard all present that day. 15 What we see demonstrated in this story is an aggressive negotiation of public space: older forms of gendered identities coming into conflict with newer identities expressing themselves both vocally and through physical presence (demonstrations, counter-demonstrations and walking in the street). In order to come into their own,

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 134

these newer expressions of identity must be negotiated between the individual, others and the government, partially through exploration of one’s voice.11 These encounters become a form of discussion or argument in which men and women are arguing for the right to share public space and men representing traditional forms of masculinity are responding with a resounding “no”.12 The identities of those pushing for space may be expressed as more fluid masculine and feminine types establishing themselves in the common space where various discourses are played out. There, they are met with resistance by older, more traditional views of gender roles or hegemonic masculine types.13 This does not necessarily involve the intervention of baltagiya.14 While the notion of baltagiya as perceived perpetrators and or instigators of group sexual violence persists, it is mainly associated with the events starting in February 2011.15 Nonetheless, on that particular day there could very well have been baltagiya amongst the harassers Khaled and Ali faced, given the political atmosphere of the time. 16 It is the “everyday” Egyptian who commits taharrush irrespective of social class (either on the part of the actor or the target).16 A common story told amongst movement members is one where a woman was groped from the window of a Mercedes.17 To this end there has been debate amongst NGOs, organisations and movements over how to engage men in reducing and ultimately eliminating taharrush. Many endeavour to avoid calling on men to defend women, thus equally avoiding the implication that women are not capable of protecting themselves. Instead, whole communities are called upon to actively watch out for and stop men who leer at women, or call out to them, or attempt to touch them in an unwelcome way.18 My point is that men in patrols do not deny a woman’s ability to protect herself, but men see themselves as helping women to aggressively (when necessary) carve out their space in the public sphere, an act that makes them politically engaged in reshaping their social environment (similar to Hirschkind’s politically active citizens).19 17 The motivation and strength of feeling on the part of Ali, Salma, Khaled and their friends gave rise to the movement, the campaigns and awareness-raising events, and the metro patrols; since their first ’outing’ the men claim to have seen much worse. Khaled told me they would spend seven hours at a time in the metro, removing men from women-only cars. They did this in conjunction with the metro police and with their permission (a nod towards Abdallah’s powerful or State-sanctioned masculinity).20 Movement members would wait for the metro cars to arrive and without entering them, check for the presence of men. Once if men were found there, they were ejected from the car. This patrol occurred during the Eid al Fitr festival holiday of 2012 and increased the movement’s following. 18 Then came an awareness-raising event on Talaat Harb square, during the following Eid al-Adha, 2012. Ali had not yet officially joined the movement but he saw an event organised on Facebook and decided to attend. The storytellers reminisced about beginning with a simple banner and a few pieces of wood for a booth which they set up in the middle of Talaat Harb square in the morning. When more members arrived later that day they were divided into groups and began to move about the streets looking for signs of impending taharrush. Something as simple as a look was considered a potential danger. They then approached the harasser and explained that their actions were unacceptable, and if they continued they would be taken to the police. Three days yielded positive results: 3 mass assaults were halted and 80 individual cases stopped (this included unwelcomed looks/stares and commentary in addition to unwelcome

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 135

physical contact). At the time there were more than 130 volunteers covering the whole area of and Square, while women in particular manned an area designated as the control booth, where updates were posted on social media and distress calls were taken and routed to patrollers. 19 In another instance Khaled described how women were plucked by men from crowds while other men coordinated to protect the perpetrator as he whisked the women away to a dark corner or side street. These men formed circles around the harasser as a shield, which mirrors the techniques used by intervention teams to protect. Khaled said this was the worst thing he had witnessed; men arming themselves and organising themselves with the intent of doing physical and psychological harm. He warned me of specific small side streets in the downtown area to which women are taken. These experiences allowed for one of the men to devise a plan that came to be part of how patrols and intervention teams are currently coordinated (detailed further on). Since 2011, there has been a backlash against the progression of women’s rights. This manifests itself in part in the form of increased attacks on women in the public sphere. As Abdallah and Rizzo argue, men are pushing to restore what they see as the natural order by reasserting the patriarchal bargain and restricting women to the private sphere.21 20 In the centre of all of this, both (figuratively and literally) stands the woman. According to Khaled, even when approached by intervention teams, women do not trust anyone because many men have pretended to rescue them just in order to harass them. Often they scream and yell even while being moved to safety. In Tahrir Square, at the height of the period when Intervention teams were needed, they said, there was a lot of noise and shouting in general, and as a result everyone else had to shout to communicate. Here we see sound as an additional barrier, almost equally as powerful as the push and pull of the crowd. According to Khaled, men in the crowd carried sticks, knives and once a man was armed with a “sword”. Ali stressed the importance of showing courage: it was imperative they kept moving to get to the women. This offers a window into understanding how masculinity represented by these men as courage is traditionally considered a masculine trait.22 They described instances where they have had boiling water thrown on them by men who had set up makeshift tea stands, in one case to break the circle of defence and allow harassers through. This one action took the situation from one under the patrol’s control, to one where the harassers gained the upper hand and the woman was completely stripped of clothing. Because they did not know who was there to help and who was there to harass, they chose to hoist the woman over the wall of a nearby building with help from its security staff, who ensured she reached the other side, where she was taken to safety by car. 21 In their dialogue Khaled raised the issue of what happens when there are multiple cases in distress at once. In these unfortunate instances, they have had to make their way toward the nearest case in an attempt to rescue her. In one instance there was a mother and two daughters who were in jeopardy. The team had chosen to surround the mother first as she was the most at risk, but one man went to one of the daughters. They then had the idea of bringing one daughter to the other to maximise protection, but by this point it was too late. Khaled asked me if I knew what he was talking about. Salma asked if he meant this woman had been harassed; he clarified she had been raped. On the day of former president Morsi’s ouster, Khaled claims teams in Tahrir Square witnessed more than 100 cases of rape.23

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 136

22 Ali and Khaled brought up a story of a woman being raped and then having a knife inserted inside her. They wondered why after performing such a violation, a further trespass could be committed and came to the conclusion that the goal is to cause real and lasting pain. They said it was revenge; the goal was to humiliate. Salma speculated that rather than asking “Why?” people were asking “Why not?” It was about breaking you, Salma, Khaled and Ali said. After so many experiences (many of which he chooses not to talk about and all of which he wishes he could forget) Khaled still hears screaming, even when he is on his own and in a silent place. These voices have been internalised, becoming more personal; in turn they motivate these men to act. At the same time this is indicative of an emotional response to trauma, considered feminine. Both men have been offered counselling through another organisation but they have refused. There is still a stigma around therapy. 23 The struggle inherent in these narratives and their emotional fallout warrant a brief note on power struggles. The exercising of one’s voice is heavily influenced by social positionality and Bakhtin stresses the importance of acknowledging intersectionality with reference to a given context.24 The people with whom I have worked thus far have never discussed class or identified themselves as being of a given social class; while it may be easy to assess their social positioning it would also be presumptuous. It is preferable to avoid the trope of “the privileged speaking for the underprivileged”. This paper does acknowledge a multi-layered, multi-fronted struggle to be heard, and for space in the public arena.

Training

24 A month before meeting with the members of the intervention team, I entered the movement headquarters, having been allowed to attend a training session for intervention teams or patrols. As the movement maintained a “men only” policy for intervention teams, women did not normally attend trainings. In reality “headquarters” was a flat in a noisy section of Cairo whose rooms had been repurposed for meetings and storage. The flat was rented by an organisation who allowed this movement to use it for meetings and training sessions. Ismail, the trainer, had already begun the session by the time I arrived. His voice was high in pitch but low in tone, strong but somewhat raspy. He stood to the side of a white board that had been mounted on an easel which already had a diagram of the formation the group of men always took when on patrol. With 14 of us crowded into a secondary room of the headquarters amongst the desks and shelves mostly covered in small posters, books and miscellaneous, there was a sense of something ominous; men were being prepared for the worst. Once again however, everyone was able to maintain a certain joviality, making jokes as Ismail described the area around Talaat Harb, Tahrir, marked the trajectory of the lines of men who were to patrol the area and talked about shopkeepers who were ’friendly to the cause’.

25 Ismail is nearing his mid-20s and like many others, his life has seen a dramatic change as a result of the events of 2011. The spirit of cooperation and community he witnessed in Tahrir Square inspired him to volunteer, demonstrate and eventually to devise plans and training courses for intervention teams. With a background in martial arts, business management and human resources, he was well suited to the task of

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 137

developing the structure adopted by the movement. Originally working in Nasr City, Ismail gave up his job in order to further contribute to the movement and develop it. 26 Ismail mapped out scenarios of assault using well-known sections of the area around Tahrir Square as the backdrop, and explained in diagrammatic form the strategy for moving quickly through the crowd to encircle and protect the given “case”. He stressed the point that once the crowd became aware something was going on, many people would rush towards the scene, some to find out exactly what was happening, some to help and others to hinder. It was vital not to lose focus. Each position in the circle had a number associated with a specific role at a given time. There was a man assigned to approach the harasser with two others as back-up, and one man assigned to take the woman to safety. The goal was to be quick and regimented, and Ismail would later compare this to army formations. Traditionally, the military is viewed, both socially and with regard to nation-building, as a symbol of masculine strength.25 Ismail then detailed how these regimented lines, through knowledge of where a man was meant to stand as determined by his given number, became the circle which blocked harassers forcefully but not violently. Once the circle was formed, men locked arms to form a barrier. Ismail placed emphasis on being clearly marked as part of the patrol/ intervention team (hence the use of coloured vests); people needed to know that you were there to help. He also stressed the importance of mobility. The whole line of men needs to be able to move through the crowd to the scene as quickly as possible. As he spoke, men in the room offered words of support and complimented him on the soundness of the strategies before them. 27 Once everything was explained, we moved out to the foyer in order to practice. Ismail had already demonstrated multiple times how easy it would be for someone to approach you from behind and bring you to the ground before you knew what had happened. He explained to us how an assailant need not use much force, but simply target specific points of the body to knock someone off balance. To make sure everyone was prepared Ismail simulated modes of attack in crowds to ensure team members did not lose formation and did not lose sight of the “case”. His skill in disarming teammates in drills made one happy he had chosen to combat rather than perpetrate attacks. It can be argued that these practices take “already approved” masculine traits and redirect them. Men who are already part of the movement and volunteers have their ideas of masculinity reinforced in a way that does not require targeting women as an antithesis or a source of their emasculation.26 This masculine identity is a new one containing traces of the old. 28 A year later we stood in the same flat with almost the same number of men. This time, training had run for three nights in order to accommodate the large number of volunteers with varying schedules. Instead of the side room, we sat in a forward room that had been designated the meeting room. Once lined with metal chairs, the back half of the room had bean bag chairs of various shapes and sizes and a carpet and coffee table in the centre. As always, Ismail greeted each person by name and when making introductions described when and how he had met those he knew from before. Fawzia was also present as co-runner of the Eid event with two other men who were not present that night. Ismail had since reduced his level of participation in the movement to what he called a “consultancy role”. 29 As with the previous sessions Ismail began by explaining what the movement did and its personal history but because this particular evening was solely patrol training there

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 138

was no explanation of taharrush. He recounted the story of the first patrol which was not under the name of the movement, saying they learned a valuable lesson the hard way. This time the men, none of whom I had met before or seen at previous trainings, sat in silence. Ismail explained that we needed to raise awareness alongside patrols in order to resolve the issue of taharrush. In any given situation there are four parties: 1) the harasser 2) the harassed 3) bystanders or society and 4) the State. If the four do not work together, Ismail said, taharrush will continue. He was reinforcing the importance of communication, regular dialogue and the role of men as participants in a wider society. Women, Ismail said, need to know that not all men are harassers and men need to know they are not alone and have a support network (through society and the police). Furthermore, taharrush has to be acknowledged and people brought together to solve/address the issue. As he spoke, one could hear music booming from the speakers of a nearby restaurant and the intermittent popping of firecrackers as the as the last day of Ramadan had already come to a close. 30 After a while Fawzia brought in a white board for Ismail to use. The board was already covered with the signature circles denoting people in patrol formation. Instead of 3 rows of 8, the board had 2 rows, and in the top left corner, a spoke-like drawing signifying the Talaat Harb Square as it appears on a map. Ismail began explaining the layout of Talaat Harb, the central point of this year’s event, while drawing a larger version of Talaat Harb lower on the white board. As with last year, he demonstrated the simple techniques that could be used to take a person off their feet and organised the men into rows to practice. Instead of moving into the hallway like the previous year, men were arranged in the room and Ismail directed them while standing on a chair. For the first time in the movement’s history, women had joined the training sessions for patrols and tonight, Fawzia was asked to join the line to complete the 2 rows of 8. Ismail reminded the group that it is extremely important that the man approaching the ’case’ says, “I am from the movement and I am here to help you” before doing anything else. At the same time, the leader put his arm around the harasser’s neck and talked to him, while two others held him so that he could be led away to the police. These are clear- cut demonstrations of the movement’s use of dialogue and practice of non-violence at work, which feeds into newer ideas of performing masculinity while maintaining the sense of strength associated with more traditional forms. As previously mentioned, this is fluid, a space where ideas of what makes a man can overlap and intersect without threatening others being threatened. 31 There is a debate among movement members around the idea of all-male intervention teams. While this is the first year that women are invited to participate in patrol training, they still do not go out with men on patrol. The argument is made that women in intervention teams automatically become targets and are therefore the weak links in a physical chain of volunteers that needs to remain strong to protect the women in jeopardy. It is argued that men would then have to rescue their female counterparts instead of focusing on their original target. At the same time, the argument returns to the implied idea of men as deliverers of freedom and agency, to the assumption that women are simply not strong enough to protect themselves. However, the men I have spoken to admit that even a man who is targeted by a mob would not be able to defend himself, and ask how a woman would be able to do so. This argument is problematic in two ways: it highlights the point that no one person alone can defend themselves successfully against a mob, rendering the original argument ineffective, but then argues for the supposed inherent weakness of women, reinforcing the dominant gender

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 139

dynamic in place. Thus, is it not possible for women to find ways to defend themselves when they are part of the protection ring? Originally, other volunteer groups had used intervention teams that incorporated both men and women successfully, making the argument for male-only interventions teams harder to sustain. For example, one movement (no longer in existence) deployed all mixed-gender intervention teams, raising a further question of how to successfully tackle this very gendered issue without returning to traditional gender roles and tropes. These debates and questions remain amongst groups still at work, but without clear cut answers. 32 “Sexual harassment is not about sex. It is about violence”, Ismail explained to me in a definitive yet soft tone. Almost a month had passed since that first session in headquarters and we now sat in a cafe located in a quieter part of central Cairo. The cafe itself was also quiet and sparsely populated with the multiple televisions set to music television channels muted. It seemed to have been designed to give one a sense of being outside while inside, large windows and light, cushioned, wooden furniture with appropriate ventilation for sheesha smokers. We sat with another mutual friend, Ahmad, each of us nursing our caffeinated beverage of choice while Ahmad checked his phone at regular intervals. Ismail went on to tell me that the term “sexual harassment” 27 is completely wrong and feeds into the common misunderstanding that women want and enjoy harassment, that there is flattery to be found in it for women and a reassurance for men that one is indeed a “man”. He was worried that by using the term “sexual harassment” we continue to place emphasis on the wrong points and send the wrong message. This returns us to the story of the woman who had been raped, including with a knife. It would seem Ali, Khaled and Ismail agree that a form of self- assertion is behind these transgressions. One could argue that this stems from a particular need to prove one’s masculinity in a space perceived as rapidly robbing men of perceived masculine markers, but that would be over-simplifying and to a certain extent, dehumanising the situation.28 In fact, that there are multiple masculinities at play, both in terms of perceived harassers and the men in the movement, and that said masculinities are not necessarily divided along those lines. According to Mostafa Abdallah’s notion of “damaged masculinity”, for example, it is possible to argue that men join patrols in part to reaffirm their masculinity.29 Khaled once told me in a separate interview that part of the reason patrols were important to him was because they served as an opportunity to physically combat taharrush. When part of the formation, men are publically seen as actively contributing to society in a way that, while not specifically defined in traditional Egyptian ideas of gender roles, still looks “manly”. At the same time this action absorbs and nullifies the idea that fighting taharrush is ’feminine’. However, Ismail’s original assertion that space and terminology are still gendered is problematic, but remains valid.

Conclusion

33 The goal of this paper was to explore the role of the male voice in combating taharrush and the forging of newer masculinities in the process of supporting women engaged in the fight. It is agreed that the use of the term taharrush is problematic, but it persists as a vernacular for the myriad of acts and vocal intrusions experienced on (and now beyond) the streets of Cairo. The men portrayed in this paper represent an experiment in masculine identity; they work with women to redraw the boundaries of acceptability

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 140

within public space but also the lines of social identity. They do not wish to become the focus of attention or to draw attention away from the issue at hand, but their presence does not go unnoticed and as such warrants discussion. In their accounts we see both personal struggle, and a struggle to end taharrush as a barrier and “punishment” for women who dare to cross certain boundaries.30 Devotion to a cause has led to the creation of the movement but also to a safe space in which to continue the experiment. The movement later becomes a sort of laboratory where ideas of both masculinity and femininity are reshaped and developed, to be performed and defended either during awareness campaigns or patrols. Men find newer ways to display and perform their gendered identity in a manner that can be seen as socially productive. At the same time the formation of the patrol is reminiscent of army formations which reflect the traditional masculine role of the protector. However, these patrols incorporate dialogue when dealing with both the case and the harasser. On the street men and women engage in negotiations that range from civility to violence as part of expressing their long-term presence. What remains to be seen is how the men engaging in these newer masculinities keep the ground they are fighting to gain within Egyptian society, as part of aiding women to establish themselves as actors in public space.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abd Alhamid, Dalia & Zaki, Hind Ahmad, “Women as fair game in the public sphere: a critical introduction for understanding sexual violence and methods of resistance,” Jadaliyya, 9 July 2014, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18455/women-as-fair-game-in-the-public-sphere_a- critical [Accessed 12 July 2014].

Abdallah, Abdelhalim H., “Anti-harassment group praises new harassment law,” Daily News Egypt, 6 June 2014, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/06/06/anti-harassment-group-praises-new- harassment-law/ [Accessed 6 June 2014].

Abdallah, Mostafa, 2014, “Masculinity on shifting grounds: emasculation and the rise of the Islamist political scene in post-Mubarak Egypt”, Cairo Papers in Social Science, 33: 1, 53-73.

Amar, Paul, 2011, “Turning gendered politics of the security state inside out? Charging the police with sexual harassment in Egypt”, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13:3, 299-328.

Baron, Beth, 2007. Egypt as a Woman. Nationalism, Gender, and Politics. University of California Press.

Ghannam, Farha, 2013, Live and Die like a Man: Gender Dynamics in Urban Egypt. Stanford University Press.

Giullianotti, Richard, 2005, “Towards a critical anthropology of voice: the politics and poets of popular culture, Scotland and football”, Critique of Anthropology 25: 4, 339 - 359

The Guardian/Associated Press, “Egyptian women protesters sexually assaulted in Tahrir square,” 9 June 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/09/egyptian-women- protesters-sexually-assaulted [Accessed 31st July 2015].

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 141

Harassmap report: Fahmy, Amel, Abdemonem, Engie, Hamdy, Enas & Badr, Ahmed, 2014, “Towards a Safer City. Sexual harassment in Greater Cairo: Effectiveness of Crowdsourced Data”, http://harassmap.org/en/resource-center/research-studies/ [Accessed 25 March 2015].

Hirschkind, Charles, 2006, The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jacob, Wilson, 2014, “Revolutionary Mankind: Egypt and the Time of al-Futuwwa”, Cairo Papers in Social Science 33:1, 32-52

Kingsley, Patrick, “80 sexual assaults in one day – the other story of Tahrir Square,” The Guardian, 5 July 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/05/egypt-women-rape-sexual-assault- tahrir-square [Accessed 31 July 2015].

Kreil, Aymon, 2012, Du rapport au dire: sexe, amour et discours d’expertise au Caire, doctoral thesis, EHESS/University of Neuchatel.

Mukherji, Anahita, “Don’t Tell Me How to Dress, Tell Them Not to Rape”, The Times of India, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Dont-tell-me-how-to-dress-tell-them-not-to- rape/articleshow/13008664.cms [Accessed 20 Sept. 2015].

Rizzo, Helen, 2014, “The Role of Women’s Rights Organisations in Promoting Masculine Responsibility: the Anti-Sexual Harassment Campaign in Egypt”, Cairo Papers in Social Science 33:1, 109-129.

Rose, Aaron T., “Demonstrators rally against sexual harassment”, 15 June 2014, Daily News Egypt, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/06/15/demonstrators-rally-against-sexual- harassment-2/ [Accessed 6 June 2014].

RT, “Mob Assaults Egyptian Women Protesting Harassment, Elbaradei Apologizes”, 9 June 2012, http://www.rt.com/news/egypt-assault-apologies-elbaradei-471/ [Accessed 31 July 2015].

Springer, Simon, 2010, “Public Space as Emancipation: Meditations on Anarchism, Radical Democracy, Neoliberalism and Violence”, Antipode 43, 525-562.

UN Women Report, 2013, “Study on ways and methods to eliminate sexual harassment in Egypt,” available for download on http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DOKUMENTE/ English_Documents/Sexual-Harassment-Study-Egypt-Final-EN.pdf.

NOTES

1. Abd Alhamid & Zaki: 2014. 2. See Kreil: 2012, p. 168. 3. All individual names have been changed in this article. 4. Fahmy et al. (Harassmap/UN Women), "Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt", 2014. 5. 2012. 6. Mu'aksa is considered a form of flirtatious exchange. For further explanation, see Kreil: 2012. 7. Hirschkind: 2006. 8. Abd Alhamid & Zaki: 2014, Fahmy et al (Harassmap): 2014, Rizzo: 2014. 9. Examples of such slogans have been seen in demonstrations in both India ( http:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Dont-tell-me-how-to-dress-tell-them-not-to-rape/ articleshow/13008664.cms) and Egypt (http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/06/15/ demonstrators-rally-sexual-harassment-2/).

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 142

10. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/09/egyptian-women-protesters-sexually- assaulted, http://www.rt.com/news/egypt-assault-apologies-elbaradei-471/. 11. Giullianotti: 2005. 12. Giullianotti: 2005, Hirschkind: 2006. 13. Rizzo: 2014. 14. Baltagiya (plural) have drawn media attention in recent years as perpetrators of State- sanctioned violence. Viewed as a 'type' of criminal (along with al-futuwwat and al-barmagiya) by Egyptian police in the 1930s (Jacob:2014), al-baltagiya more recently became a term often used to describe plainclothes police or police associates who were sent to attack and assault protestors (Amar: 2011). Defined in English as "thugs" or "gangsters", al-baltagiya represent a specific masculine image associated with extreme violence (Jacob: 2014). 15. Amar: 2011 (IFJP). 16. Abd Alhamid & Zaki: 2014. 17. There is a lot to be said about the specific role of class in these exchanges and the work being done but it needs to be addressed in another paper. 18. Rizzo: 2014. 19. Hirschkind: 2006. 20. Abdallah: 2014. 21. Abdallah: 2014 p. 63, Rizzo: 2014 p. 119. 22. Ghannam: 2013. 23. I cannot personally contest or confirm this figure put forward by Khaled, as I was not present that night. An article by the Guardian states that there were 80 confirmed cases of sexual assault on the day of Morsi's ouster (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/05/egypt-women- rape-sexual-assault-tahrir-square). It is commonly known that the majority of sexual assault and rape cases go unreported in Egypt; most women do not file police reports following such assaults. Therefore, there are usually no State-confirmed figures from this period; the only available figures come from confirmed counts by volunteer groups. The groups on the ground at that period, together with the one discussed in this paper, announced confirmed totals of mass taharrush and mass sexual assault cases in the same range as Khaled’s observation. 24. Giullianotti: 2005. 25. Baron: 2007. 26. Abdallah: 2014. 27. This exchange occurred in English, hence the use of the term “sexual harassment”. 28. Abdallah: 2014. 29. 2014 30. Abdallah: 2014.

ABSTRACTS

This ethnographical study explores the role of the male voice inside a volunteer movement fighting al-taharrush al-ginsy (sometimes translated as “sexual harassment”) in the public sphere in Egypt, through dialogue-based awareness-raising activities and non-violent direct intervention. The movement treats the phenomenon of taharrush as a continuum of verbal and physical violence, defined as “any speech or action that is unwelcomed by another person and of

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 143

a sexual nature, and infringes on the individual’s privacy or body or makes them feel lack of respect, trauma, insult, fear or exploitation.” This group has specifically sought to incorporate men into actively addressing taharrush, and changing how other men think about inter-gender interactions. Thus, masculine vocality plays a key part within the movement’s gendered struggle for public space, both as a support to the female voice and as a new and distinctive type of male voice, standing out from other masculine positions performed on the street. Through volunteers’ narratives, this paper analyses how the movement has become a laboratory in which new models of gender identity are elaborated, then are performed in a socially constructive way in the street through the struggle against taharrush and the negotiation of women’s share of public space.

Cette étude ethnographique explore le rôle de la voix masculine à l’intérieur d’un mouvement de bénévoles luttant contre al-taharruch al-ginsy (parfois traduit comme « harcèlement sexuel ») dans l’espace public en Égypte, à travers des activités de sensibilisation basées sur le dialogue et l’intervention directe non-violente. Le mouvement entrevoit le phénomène de taharruch comme un continuum de violence verbale et physique, défini comme « toute parole ou action de nature sexuelle, dirigée vers une personne pour laquelle elle n’est pas la bienvenue, et violant psychologiquement ou physiquement l’intimité ou de la personne ou leur donnant un sentiment d’irrespect, de traumatisme, d’offense, de peur ou d’exploitation. » Ce collectif a spécifiquement cherché à incorporer les hommes dans ses efforts pour activement contre le taharruch et pour changer les représentations des relations entre les genres chez les autres hommes. Ainsi, la vocalité masculine joue un rôle clé dans la lutte genrée de ce mouvement pour l’espace public, à la fois comme soutien à la voix féminine et comme type nouveau et spécifique de voix masculine, se distinguant d’autres postures masculines qui se jouent dans la rue. À travers les récits des volontaires, cette contribution analyse comment et en quoi le mouvement est devenu un laboratoire dans lequel de nouveaux modèles d’identité de genre sont élaborés, puis mis en œuvre dans la rue d’une manière socialement constructive, à travers la lutte contre le taharruch et la négociation pour la part des femmes de l’espace public.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Égypte, genre, femmes, hommes, mouvement social Keywords: Egypt, gender, women, men, social mouvement

AUTHOR

SANDRA A. FERNANDEZ

Sandra Fernandez is a PhD candidate in Social Anthropology at the University of St Andrews, Scotland. She holds an MA in Sociology/Anthropology from the American University in Cairo. She is currently doing fieldwork in Cairo, Egypt. [email protected]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 144

Perceptions and management of gender roles and dynamics inside OpAntiSH Intervention Teams in Cairo Perception et gestion des rôles et dynamiques de genre dans les équipes d’intervention de OpAntiSH, au Caire

Leslie Piquemal

1 Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault (known as OpAntiSH or al-Quwwa dedd al- taharrush)1 is a collective founded in November 2012 to fight the growing phenomenon of extremely violent mass sexual assaults against women during large gatherings in or around Tahrir Square, in central Cairo.2 Human rights groups and activists have reported them repeatedly during large political gatherings in this area since 2011. In fact, such cases had sporadically occurred in different crowd contexts (protests, football games, holiday crowds, concerts) in the public sphere since the mid-2000s in Egypt. Perpetrators – mostly all male – have included police or military forces, “ baltageyya” (“thugs,” civilians serving as police auxiliaries), young boys on the street, or men and youths attending a cultural or political event.3 The mob assaults in Tahrir Square since 2011 have ranged from mass groping to the stripping and gang rape of women using hands, and occasionally blunt or sharp objects as well.

2 This type of assault has rarely been reported to the police or media by survivors, most expecting they would be blamed to some extent by relatives or peers, and would not receive support. The frequency and severity of these attacks has tended to be minimized – not least through the use of the same term taharrush (harassment) for sexual assault and rape (individual or collective) in the public sphere as well4 – or denied. State authorities long avoided acknowledging this phenomenon. More recently, they have sometimes noted its occurrence, often while blaming women for attending mass gatherings in areas known to be dangerous. Security forces have tended to be uncooperative toward survivors (when they were not actually perpetrators or complicit

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 145

in such crimes). The mainstream media provided very little coverage, and virtually none of good quality until after 2011.5 This social environment has facilitated the escalation of endemic sexual harassment to paroxysms of mass violence in specific public locations6 due to victim-blaming and impunity of perpetrators, as well as minimization and excusing of harassment and assault7 in the street, workplace and public transportation. Frank discussion of this phenomenon’s more violent aspects as a social problem long remained relatively taboo for anyone other than rights activists.8 3 In 2012, several volunteer groups were created to confront the growing wave of mass sexual assaults and rapes in Tahrir Square during large political gatherings and/or to engage the public in order to raise awareness of the problem of street harassment and assault. This movement has been quite diverse in terms of discourse, methods of organization, levels of feminist consciousness, and intervention methods on the ground. Groups also differ “in the extent to which their feminist and revolutionary consciousness overlap, and in their conceptions of how to solve the problem”9 of mass sexual assaults.

This is sexual harassment/assault. We will resist

This is sexual“) ” ءادتعل يعامجلاا اذه وه .. انحا مواقنه “ Screenshot from the OpAntiSH video harassment/assault. We will resist”), uploaded Feb. 1, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=KZyo74ESr2s. The footage was recorded from a building overlooking Tahrir Square. OpAntiSH Intervention volunteers are wearing white T-shirts with red logos.

4 The collectives with a focus on direct intervention to stop these assaults initially elected to form all-male teams of volunteers, assuming the risk of sexual assault would be too high for female volunteers – except for Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/ Assault (OpAntiSH). The activists and human rights workers who first formed this collective can be described as feminists – whether or not they identified explicitly as such – since they consider women’s rights a high priority within their political struggle and believe in full equality of rights for men and women. It was created with support from some of Egypt’s most feminist women’s rights and human rights NGOs10 and differed from other groups on “how to minimize the danger [to volunteers] without enabling the patriarchal conception that women in public space need ‘protection’ ”11 from men. OpAntiSH’s position was to reject the representation of men as “protectors”

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 146

and to encourage female volunteers to participate as equals in the entire process of rescuing mob assault survivors, including Intervention. This approach was at odds with dominant social models of gender roles, as it involved women volunteers taking significant physical risks for the sake of saving others. Yet OpAntiSH volunteers were also members of society, often affected in some way by patriarchal conceptions of gender roles. This paper addresses female volunteers’ motivations for joining OpAntiSH Intervention teams, how male and female teammates have perceived their roles, and how they have viewed and managed issues connected to having mixed-gender teams.12

5 A more empirical approach will be followed, so as to give more of a voice to the actors themselves. There is a dearth of scholarship on OpAntiSH and other recent mobilizations for emergency intervention to fight cases of mass sexual assault in political gatherings in Egypt. Access to these new groups in a time of crisis in Egypt has been difficult; then, the cases in Tahrir Square have waned since mass protests and gatherings have become rare there; finally, police control of the area has become very tight, so informal groups have had difficulty accessing it. OpAntiSH and some others have become mostly inactive on the ground, making it difficult for any new fieldwork to be carried out on those collectives. Research in this field has focused on the question of women and the revolution, the problem of sexual harassment, the multiplication of mob sexual assault cases, State feminism versus grassroots initiatives… However, some gaps in this new field of sociological and political knowledge remain difficult to fill, in particular – due to access issues – the micro-sociological or ethnographical study of informal groups fighting gender-based violence in the public sphere. Except for the Gulabi Gang in India,13 few such informal collectives involving women in the developing world have been studied in depth. Among such Egyptian initiatives, which appeared in a politically volatile context, some have proved rather ephemeral; it is possible that no further scholarship may be produced at all, particularly on the groups which are no longer active. Therefore, this paper will focus primarily on addressing this gap in the literature through an essentially empirical case study of the functioning of OpAntiSH in Egypt. 6 This analysis is based on participant observation within OpAntiSH between December 2012 and January 2014, and on semi-structured interviews with Intervention volunteers. It seemed unwise and unproductive for the group for me to consider changing my mode of participation as a volunteer (which predated the research specifically about intervention team dynamics) in hopes of gather more data about intervention team dynamics through direct participant observation in their work in Tahrir Square. The very dangerous situation on the ground did not allow for untrained observers to accompany teams at work: I would have had to become a fully active team member. But my initial choice to join other teams14 than Intervention had been based on careful assessment of my abilities, which had not changed since then. Hence, my approach posed no major issues of personal safety for me to consider in carrying out the research; but it also precluded my conducting participant observation inside Intervention teams at work in Tahrir Square, except as they waited on the sidelines on quieter nights. Thus, much of the material used here comes from individual volunteers’ accounts of how they perceived and experienced Intervention, in addition to the knowledge of the collective provided by my own observations inside OpAntiSH and on the periphery of intervention activities.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 147

7 Naturally the question of the reflexive dimension in my approach to the work had to be considered. However, it was less an issue of my gender identity15 as it was about my belonging to the group in which I was studying perceptions and dynamics of gender: I had to contend with the issue of my own identification with my object of study. Taking part in OpAntiSH activity in such a time of crisis as 2012-13 tended to produce a high degree of emotional involvement; many had a strong feeling of belonging and loyalty to the collective. It required an effort to distance myself emotionally while analyzing data or writing. However, this aspect of researcher subjectivity was also difficult to avoid, since my access to information was largely contingent upon my status as a member of the collective, which facilitated a rapport of trust with Intervention volunteers I interviewed. The emotional and psychological cost of the experiences they had had, made most of them reluctant to be interviewed, which might involve reliving what they preferred to forget. Their trust in me as a member of OpAntiSH allowed me to reassure them I would not ask questions in a sensationalistic, tabloid-journalist style they might dread. Also, our shared membership in the group meant a sort of guarantee I was committed to certain ethical norms and would not misquote them, or identify them and report their statements to the mainstream media, for instance. In short, it seems unlikely a scholar from outside the group would have managed to collect as much data in this way, particularly through in-depth interviews. 8 Restrictions connected to availability, confidentiality and consent did not permit the constitution of a representative sample of the limited population of Intervention volunteers, though a range of individuals with different profiles and views were interviewed. Aside from points noted by all or most interviewees, the observations made in this paper about details of team dynamics are not to be taken as definitive and universally valid. The volunteers in a team were not always all the same; several Intervention teams could be on the ground at the same time, leading to further differences connected to individual and team variations. In such a chaotic context as Intervention in cases of mob sexual assault, perceptions of gender roles and dynamics must necessarily be subjective – collected individual accounts and interpretations are, no doubt, the most likely to shed light on practices and representations. 9 In short, several dimensions of reflexivity had to be taken into consideration at all times during the research process: mine as well as and the interviewees’ about themselves and about each other. But in spite of the ethical/methodological questions this raised, the dearth of thorough research about anti-mob sexual assault collectives in Egypt and the absence of any scholarship at all on the aspect I was focused on – and how unlikely it seemed anyone from outside the collective might be able to study it – convinced me the potential value of my work would outweigh the drawbacks.

Why women joined OpAntiSH Intervention teams: gender identity and agency

10 Female members of OpAntiSH’s Intervention teams expressed different motivations for their decision to volunteer for this task. Many saw the mob sexual assaults in Tahrir Square as part of the phenomenon of sexual harassment – albeit pushed to its extreme – and this phenomenon “is our issue, it’s the cause of every girl who goes through this.” 16 Being exposed to “ordinary” street harassment in their daily lives and resisting it

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 148

meant they already felt affected by this phenomenon and involved in the fight against it.

11 One volunteer described the authorities’ attitude toward the attacks as a presage of further escalation: some victim-blaming statements by government bodies17 encouraged attackers to commit such crimes again. To her, what already constituted a form of collective punishment of women, a symbolic attack on them as subjects in the public sphere, and the embodiment of misogyny in society, “could possibly get worse, maybe like witch burnings in public squares.”18 Thus, some framed their decision to join OpAntiSH intervention teams as a response to a phenomenon experienced as a symbolic “eradication of who I am from public space,”19 as one put it – a personal attack. This aspect was felt more clearly and acutely by those who had already survived mass sexual assault, knew a survivor or had witnessed a case. They expressed a feeling of identification with survivors and connected it to the perception that what was occurring with increasing frequency and violence in Tahrir Square represented a direct, immediate, systematic threat to themselves and to all women. Defending women under attack in Tahrir Square was meant as a form of collective self-defense. 12 Some also described the Tahrir attacks as a particular kind of gender-based violence in the public sphere, specifically in the framework of the Egyptian revolution (as a long- term process)20: As a matter of principle, that shouldn’t be happening. I also felt they [attackers] were trying to push women out of the revolution in general. I felt it was metaphorical: they wanted to us out of the Square and off the street altogether. So I felt [joining OpAntiSH] was an important battle on the revolutionary level, and also on a human level.21 13 Female volunteers who saw the mob assaults as a social and symbolic attack on Egyptian women as persons and also a political attack on them as free political agents, an attempt to drive them out of the public sphere, described a particular sense of urgency22 about actively resisting what they perceived as an attack on several aspects of their identity as women, citizens and revolutionaries. To one, resisting personally was the only option: “It was important from the very beginning to have women in Intervention [teams] because this is our war and no one is going to fight it for us. If we let men fight it for us, then we’ll be kicked out of everything pretty soon.”23 Several women explained it seemed counter-intuitive to retreat from Tahrir Square and have all-male teams resist these attacks in their stead.

14 Others saw their decision to join OpAntiSH as a choice among several options. Aware of other groups fighting the assaults in Tahrir, they chose OpAntiSH because it did not orient new volunteers toward either Intervention or Safety teams based on gender. The sense of gender equality felt liberating to some: “making sure there is no patriarchy, no one trying to protect you, no one telling you what to do… is amazing.”24 For a few, it was about more than empowerment and freedom of choice, though. One recounted having initially put pressure on herself to prove a point about gender equality, then gradually changing her mind: At the beginning, I was in an Intervention team just to prove to myself that I can do it, just like a man... What’s wrong with girls being in the Intervention team, anyway? […] Now I’m easier on myself, I don’t have to be in the street to prove I’m just like a man and I can do it too. I can choose to be in the street, I can choose to be in the safe house, I can choose to be in my house and not show up at all.25

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 149

15 Several women mentioned breaking the fear of sexual assault as a factor that motivated them to join Intervention. Volunteering was a way of refusing to “always be the object of other people’s actions” and of feeling stronger, feeling they were “able to take control of the situation”, reclaiming their sense of agency against the menace of sexual violence, as well as intimidation and objectification in general in their daily lives.26 It was understandable, a volunteer explained, for women to fear the risks involved in Intervention more than men because they were targeted sexually in Tahrir Square, in addition to the risk of non-sexual violence male volunteers faced too.27 Sexual assault and rape is one of the ultimate threats women are brought up to dread, in Egypt as in many other countries, due to the social construction of femininity, self-worth and social standing as tied to women’s sexual status and reputation. So “we have to overcome [this fear] … We are threatened with this all the time, and if we don’t break [this fear] inside ourselves,” a volunteer explained, “if we are unable to face it, nothing will change.”28

Men, women and the issue of female volunteers in Intervention

16 Women’s participation in OpAntiSH Intervention teams has been the subject of some controversy between volunteers on various occasions. Calls for volunteers on social media did not identify the collective as explicitly “feminist” (though no patriarchal discourse was used).29 Among the male volunteers who attended open meetings, some joined OpAntiSH rather than other collectives because they liked its egalitarian approach and saw the active involvement of women in their own defense as a positive step.30 But many joined simply because they were shocked at the graphic details of the sexual violence in Tahrir Square, and saw it as inhumane. In fact, some found it particularly detestable because it was violence against women as weaker beings in need of protection from men, the stronger, braver, more capable sex. A female teammate described their approach to volunteering thus: They are machos (zukouriyyeen). I’d notice they think we are girls so we are weaker, they think they are physically stronger so they are better, they think they are men so they know what they’re doing – they’ve been in a lot of fights so they know what they’re doing… It’s machismo. It’s a social thing.31 17 For these men, volunteering in Intervention could be qualified as a traditionally “virtuous” act because it involved carrying out the social duty of protecting (and saving) women32: “the fact that what they do is saving girls – for some people this is very satisfying, this part about proving their masculinity”, remarked Noha.33 Thus, some male volunteers joined OpAntiSH based on a reading of the crisis situation and of the nature of Intervention through the lens of what may be called hegemonic masculinity, “the pattern of practice… that allows men’s domination over women to continue.”34

18 Many of them were initially surprised to see women in Intervention. Team leaders and more experienced volunteers indicated they often managed such reactions by explaining that once the team reached a woman being assaulted, the female volunteers’ presence was necessary to quickly gain her trust and cooperation with maneuvers to get her out. This tactical argument was initially more efficient in getting reticent men to participate in a mixed-gender team, than an argument based on the principle that

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 150

every adult can and may take this risk, and that male teammates are not responsible by default for protecting female volunteers. Other men agreed with the latter argument and criticized their more conservative peers: These male volunteers who disagree [with women’ participation in Intervention] at the beginning… think they’re arguing for this position because as men, they’re caring toward women. They don’t know they’re in the wrong place, because the organizers of OpAntiSH are feminists. […] They should know they’re not here to defend women ‘because they’re weaker than us’, because they’re ‘not men’.35 19 The fact that some male volunteers initially accepted their female teammates’ presence primarily as a matter of tactical necessity, could sometimes be a source of complications36; some tensions connected to gender dynamics appeared within teams. Several volunteers underlined the effects of stress and pressure on the ground37 in Tahrir Square in revealing such tensions. Male volunteers sincerely embracing egalitarian principles about women’s ability to resist sexual violence themselves, could still find it difficult to resist the urge to act as protectors.38

20 Faced with a male teammate panicking and trying to push them back from the crowd, some female teammates felt they had to assert themselves forcefully, shouting or pushing teammates so as to be let through into the crowd.39 Many described male volunteers’ acceptance of women’s participation in Intervention as an ongoing process. 40 In general, Intervention team members agreed that female volunteers found they had to demonstrate their abilities to their male counterparts, but their opinions varied on how far this process had progressed. Some felt women had to “prove themselves constantly” as capable in order to take part 41; others thought that by late 2013 they had done so sufficiently.42 21 Women’s representations of gender roles, identities and dynamics within Intervention often evolved as well. One female volunteer assumed at the start that women were to join Safety teams and that Intervention teams would be all-male, then later decided “to try Intervention herself” and realized she “saw a lot of girls really fitting in the Intervention team even though they’re not guys.”43 The OpAntiSH experience led her to question her initial assumptions about gender roles and to reflect on how her representations of action had been shaped by patterns of previously internalized “sex segregation” (as she called it). 22 Passant explained that having women in Intervention was initially “an uncomfortable thought” to her; she had felt conflicted though she supported it in principle, because […] women are at such high risk being on the team – [I asked myself] is there another way? Should there be another way? What does it mean when you go into [the crowd]… and one of your team gets grabbed and taken away?... I felt, as important as it was to have women there, it was also a liability.44 23 She recalled that when she became more physically fit, she felt stronger and joined Intervention after all, “because there were not enough women on the team”; eventually, she managed to deal with fears for other women. Her account shed light on the interplay of physicality and self-confidence, and the difficulty of managing tensions between egalitarian principles and fear for others. It also underlines how even feminists may struggle with stereotypes related to gender.45 Passant and others noted team-building and shared experience showed them how each volunteer’s attitude and ability to cope could make more of a difference than their physical and gender characteristics per se 46, and to appreciate the importance of individualized interaction

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 151

with peers. One woman explained how she realized she herself made assumptions based on gender stereotypes: On the 25th (of January, 2013), when we had to run to a house (with a survivor, for shelter from the mob) …one of the guys with us was crying his eyes out… I asked him, “Are you OK? ” He said, “No, I’m crying because of everything I’m seeing!” I immediately responded – I was so stupid – “It’s OK, you can go back downstairs (to Tahrir Square).” And he said, “No, I’m crying because I don’t want to go downstairs! I don’t want to go back out!”… I’d made the same mistake. I’d assumed that because he was a man, he’d want to go back out there. But in fact he was crying because it was all very traumatizing for him.... I said, “Don’t, don’t go back there.”47 24 Not all female volunteers’ views on gender roles evolved in the same way, however. All interviewees noted the importance of having female volunteers interact directly with a woman under mass sexual assault. But not all women expressed the same degree of interest in playing other roles in the team, or felt hostile to certain functions within the teams being determined by gender48, even though they all stated women should have the right to participate in Intervention if they wish.

A Safe Square for All

OpAntiSH volunteers at Tahrir Square, spreading information about mob sexual assault and hotlines, A Safe“) " ناديم نمآ عيمجلل " in the late afternoon on a protest day in winter 2013. Their T-shirts read Square for All”)

Performing gender, coping strategies and the negotiation of gender roles

25 Many volunteers explained the process of women proving themselves to teammates was not as much about physical might as it was about courage, enduring acute pressure, and self-control – one of the traits most frequently noted by volunteers as a

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 152

strength of female team members.49 Leila, one of the first Intervention team members, underlined the analogy with proving oneself in the context of clashes between protesters and police: “it’s exactly like you have to prove yourself on the front lines: standing there a bit longer after they start the tear gas, to show that you can stand this, so people will take you seriously.” To her, some female volunteers’ demonstrating their abilities then allowed others to have more leeway to join Intervention more easily.50 She and others (male and female) mentioned their hope of one day training enough volunteers to form an all-female team, alongside the mixed-gender ones: this would conclusively demonstrate women’s ability to fight the battle themselves.

26 Many accounts showed awareness of gender roles and dynamics being negotiated between men and women in Intervention teams in a number of ways which varied from team to team, in addition to their evolution over time. Some noted some female teammates were treated differently than others, due to logical variables such as motivation, experience and past behavior.51 But some observed that some male volunteers still treated some female teammates differently and “relied on them more” if they “looked fit, look masculine”, but tried to send others who appeared more “girly and feminine” to sit upstairs in a building with mass assault survivors. If “a girl looks visibly scared, it’s easy for them to control her role”, Dina added.52 27 Some women responded to this by adapting their attitude and body language. Female volunteers “have to be stronger. Their body posture has to change, they have to stand up straight, to look sharp, to seem hot-tempered.” Dina considered this change was “connected to something they have inside themselves already and want to let out. It’s not something foreign to them.”53 In this sense, changes in women volunteers’ attitude and manner would have been an expression of a different side of their personality, which was usually repressed in everyday life so as to conform to dominant social norms. 28 Another volunteer gave a different reading of her adjustments of body language and attitude. She associated these with a “disguise” she assumed during particularly difficult crisis periods for OpAntiSH by wearing masculine-looking clothes, so as to conceal her body shape and pass for a man as often as possible. She described these shifts in body language, attitude and dress as […] one of the tricks I’d play on myself and on others… which is kind of like a bluff, basically. I’m returning to Tahrir Square to make a statement, to say that women are going to take up the fight (against sexual violence), but at the same time I’m actually disguised as a man. It’s ridiculous.54 29 She called this “manning up,” in order to minimize harm done to her by men in the crowd during the intervention process by disguising her gender identity. This performance was also to facilitate bonding with male teammates, which was important for the team to function well in a dangerous context. Men, she explained, “are not used to bonding with women in these situations”, but rather with other men; her acting and looking more masculine made it easier to build a comfortable rapport with them.55

30 These women agreed that female volunteers’ adapted performance of gender during Intervention was intended for male teammates as well as the crowd. Inside teams, gender roles were something of “a game both sides (men and women) were playing” on some level. One volunteer remarked he sometimes noted similar changes in some of his male peers’ demeanor and interpreted this as both men and women performing a more ostensibly “masculine” version of masculinity during Intervention.56 In fact, it is likely

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 153

that these adjustments were also connected to the demographic many of them come from: urban, educated middle-class/upper-middle-class Egyptians aged 18 to 35 with an interest in socio-political issues, who are willing to face physical danger – in other words, the stereotypical “revolutionary” demographic: Our volunteers mostly come from the revolution: they are pro-revolution people who have been in clashes and all that. So this culture affects them. And we can’t deny the revolution is building a kind of macho image, that of a hero who’s always on the front line, never gets tired and knows how to use every kind of weapon –how to make a Molotov, how to use a flare, how to throw rocks, things like that. And this image affects OpAntiSH.57 31 In other words OpAntiSH volunteers, like others, have probably been influenced by this “revolutionary mystique” to some extent. Performing gender differently in a high- stress environment, as a coping strategy, could understandably be connected to such positive images that could make one feel stronger, more competent and self-assured.

Dissent, learning and creating a sphere of gender equality

32 Naturally, these gender dynamics are to be understood within the framework of the OpAntiSH social circle in general, and could be specific to it. For male volunteers, expressing admiration for female teammates during a meeting did not necessarily mean their viewpoint on gender roles in general had changed. It did not predict whether or not the admiration would wear off58 or what they thought of other women outside this context59: [A male volunteer] is not going to change in one day… It would be a problem if he started dealing with the women in his life the same way... I believe he would still go home and be really protective of his sister, his mother or his girlfriend.60 33 Several women emphasized the effect of peer pressure on male volunteers’ behavior, explaining that deep down, some continued to believe women’s presence in Intervention was a liability61: There’s so much pressure in the group… Because it’s so explicit, the guys… don’t act patriarchal when we’re around. …But I don’t know if that means that their viewpoint has changed, not all of them. …Others are just working in a mixed-gender team because of the pressure for it to just be this way. They have to. It’s very clear from the start that girls will be there, and if you don’t like that, OpAntiSH is not where you belong.62 34 This pressure in favor of the gender equality principle in Intervention discouraged them from voicing dissent to it. Thus, the process of assertion and enforcement of OpAntiSH’s norms allowed it to create a social sphere in which the dominant gender norms and roles in Egyptian society did not hold true: This is something good, for us to create a space in which equality is the norm and voicing something against it, is something you have to think twice about – at a time when society is the complete opposite: voicing equality is something you cannot even think about because it will get you into a fight.63 35 Leila acknowledged this involved some degree of confrontation, but saw it as a necessary part of the process of creating a progressive social sphere that was a “safe and free space” for women’s priorities in the fight against sexual and gender-based violence. In fact, power is inevitably a factor on some level in group dynamics; “there

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 154

are norms and standards; if you break them, you’re out. You can be made an outcast or we can have a fight… Part of OpAntiSH is creating this space in which the norm is respecting women, not saying homophobic things…”64 The “alienation” of some male volunteers one woman mentioned65 was presumably connected to their feeling of disempowerment as individuals influenced by dominant, patriarchal role models, but whose views were treated as deviant inside the collective.

36 As OpAntiSH integrated new volunteers, some fit in easily while others were encountering new behavioral norms. Some of those conformed superficially,66 others more significantly, re-examining their initial views; all interviewees noted a number of initially skeptical male volunteers changed their minds to some extent. Describing female teammates’ abilities, they used vocabulary typically associated with hegemonic masculinity; many explained this experience showed them the boundaries between gender roles could be more fluid than they had thought. All those interviewed who did not initially define themselves as feminists, mentioned having given thought to how gender identities are defined. Many noted an improved understanding of how sexual harassment and assault function in the public sphere, and of a connection between these issues and dominant models of gender. One reported rethinking his views on gender entirely: I saw there were some girls [in our team] who worked better than ten guys put together. I started to think about it differently: why am I judging people based on gender? Eventually I became so convinced [gender stereotypes are wrong] that when I was put in charge of Intervention teams’ training sessions, … I’d tell them “No, there have to be girls on the teams. ” When some people opposed this, I got angry and forgot I used to be like them.67 37 His case cannot be considered representative of the majority of male volunteers. Nonetheless, “despite the persistence of some reactionary discourse… the experience forced participants to engage with many difficult issues related to men’s conceptions of their own roles and those of women,” noted researchers Dalia ‘Abd al-Hameed and Hind Ahmed Zaki.68

38 Several volunteers noted that male teammates whose approach to gender roles ostensibly changed within the OpAntiSH social sphere, could revert to some version of their initial attitudes outside it. Yet not all such changes in manner were perceived negatively by female peers who were also their friends: It’s nice, with Ahmad, that when we’re in OpAntiSH there’s that egalitarian side, but when we’re walking in Tahrir on a non-OpAntiSH day, that [idea he should protect women] is back... I know he doesn’t totally “get it”, although at the same time, I don’t totally “get it” either… So I’m fine with it. But it’s nice that in that [OpAntiSH] space I can suspend my disbelief, and he can suspend that disbelief and we can have a very equal kind of dynamic. And we can revert back later, or not, but we have that space.69 39 This provides a reminder of how deliberately individuals can modulate their performance of gender, and of the complexity of gender identity. Ultimately, as Passant noted above, she and Ahmad now “have that space” that OpAntiSH has created. Even if the collective were never to function again, volunteers have been introduced to a form of collective action integrating men and women equally and challenging patriarchal definitions of gender roles. That cannot be undone.

*

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 155

40 Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault was created to fight sexual violence and defend women’s right to political expression in the public sphere, without reinforcing the patriarchal concept of women needing “protection” from men. OpAntiSH’s encouragement of female volunteers to participate in the entire process of rescuing mob assault survivors was one of various factors that motivated women to volunteer for Intervention. Though many male volunteers were initially skeptical about mixed- gender teams, some changed their minds to various degrees; although some gender- related differentiation persisted, volunteers’ views of gender roles evolved continuously, as women “proved themselves” to their peers, and gender dynamics within teams were negotiated in various ways.

41 OpAntiSH’s purpose and the way it functioned fostered debate about women’s participation, which “also generated a fundamental consciousness of the values of feminist solidarity, and about women’s responsibility for one another and their recognition of it.”70 Though it did not direct explicitly feminist rhetoric to the public, the group introduced some of its members to feminist ideas through the way it functioned. “We are proving the power of women”71, one observed. As volunteers contested traditional gender roles, the group’s activity helped its members question some of their previous assumptions and gain awareness of gender relationships in the public sphere in general. As Leila and others remarked, part of OpAntiSH’s importance lies in how it generated a social sphere in which egalitarian gender norms were asserted and enforced through explanation, negotiation and practice; it has been “an exceptional experience of building something on the ground that is feminist in Egypt.” 72

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amar, Paul. “Turning the Gendered Politics of the Security State Inside Out? ” International Feminist Journal of Politics 13(3), p. 299-328

Amnesty International, “Egypt: Gender-based violence against women around Tahrir Square”, (doc. Index Number: MDE 12/009/2013), Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ MDE12/009/2013/en. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Amnesty International. “Egypt Law-makers Blame Women Victims for Sexual Violence”, Public Statement (Index: MDE 12/010/2013), Feb. 13, 2013, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ MDE12/010/2013/en/8a596aea-4950-4313-9b44-0ee1dd3815b7/mde120102013en.html. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Connell, R. W. (1987) Gender and Power. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin

Connell, R. W. & Messerschmidt, James W. “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept”. Gender and Society 19:6 (Dec. 2005), p.829-859.

Dutta, Debolina & Sircar, Oishik. “India’s Winter of Discontent: Some Feminist Dilemmas in the Wake of a Rape”. Feminist Studies 39 (1 20), 2013, p.293-306

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 156

Egypt Independent, “Shura Council committee says female protesters should take responsibility, if harassed,” Egypt Independent, Feb. 11, 2013. http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/shura- council-committee-says-female-protesters-should-take-responsibility-if-harassed. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

El-Sadda. H. “Women’s rights activism in post-Jan25 Egypt: Combating the Shadow of the First Lady Syndrome in the Arab World. Middle East Law and Governance 3, p.84–93, 2011

Gupta, Amith. “Orientalist Feminism Rears Its Head in India”. Jadaliyya, Jan. 2, 2013, http:// www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9371/orientalist-feminism-rears-its-head-in-india, [Accessed May 3, 2015]

Hafez, Sherine. “The Revolution Shall Not Pass Through Women’s Bodies: Egypt, Uprising and Gender Politics”. The Journal of North African Studies, 19(2): 172-185, 2014

Hatem, Mervat. “Gender and Revolution in Egypt”. Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) 261, 2011, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer261/gender-revolution-egypt. [Accessed May 3, 2015]

Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Epidemic of Sexual Violence”, Public Statement and video, July 3, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/03/egypt-epidemic-sexual-violence. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Human Rights Watch, “Égypte : Agressions sexuelles sur la place Tahrir” (video), July 12, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgQlltQ58FY. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Kadry, Ahmed. “Gender and Tahrir Square: contesting the state and imagining a new nation”. Journal for Cultural Research, 2014. Available online at http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/14797585.2014.982922 [Accessed Dec. 21, 2014]

Kirollos, Mariam. “Sexual Violence in Egypt: Myths and Realities” Jadaliyya. July 16, 2013, http:// www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13007/sexual-violence-in-egypt_myths-and-realities-. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Krishnan, Kavita. “Sexual Violence in India – A Conversation Between Kavita Krishnan and Brinda Gangopadhya Lundmark,” undated interview, http://www.hystericalfeminisms.com/ sexual-violence-in-india/. [Accessed May 3, 2015]

Langohr, Vickie. “This Is Our Square. Fighting Sexual Assault at Cairo Protests”. Middle East Report 268, fall 2013. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer268/our-square. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Langohr, Vickie. “New President, Old Pattern of Sexual Violence in Egypt”. Middle East Report, July 7, 2014. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070714

Morsi, Maya. “Egyptian women and the 25th of January Revolution: presence and absence”. The Journal of North African Studies 19(2), p.211-229, 2014

Mukherji, Anahita. “Don’t tell me how to dress, tell them not to rape”. The Times of India, May 5, 2012, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Dont-tell-me-how-to-dress-tell-them-not- to-rape/articleshow/13008664.cms. [Accessed May 3, 2015]

ةقرو فقوم لوح فنعلا يسنجلا ءاسنلا دض باصتغل عافتراوا ت دعم ل “ .Nazra for Feminist Studies يعامجلا ناديمب ريرحتلا قطانملاو ةطيحملا “ ” ) Position Paper on Sexual Violence against Women and High Rates of Mass Rape in Tahrir Square in the Surrounding Areas”), Feb. 4, 2013, http:// nazra.org/node/196. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 157

Nazra for Feminist Studies. “Concept Paper: Different Practices of Sexual Violence Against Women” (English), 2014. http://nazra.org/en/2014/02/concept-paper-different-practices- sexual-violence-against-women

Nazra for Feminist Studies. “First Verdict in Cases of Mob-Sexual Assault and Gang Rape in Tahrir Square Is No End to the Story”. July 19, 2014. http://nazra.org/en/2014/07/first-verdict-cases- mob-sexual-assault-and-gang-rape-tahrir-square-no-end-story. [Accessed May 3, 2015]

This is“) ” ءادتعل يعامجلاا اذه وه .. انحا مواقنه “ ,Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault Sexual Assault. We Will Resist” – video in Arabic with English subtitles), Feb. 1, 2013, http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=KZyo74ESr2s. [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Pratt, Nicola. “Gendered paradoxes of Egypt’s transition”. Open Democracy, 2 Feb. 2015, https:// www.opendemocracy.net/5050/nicola-pratt/gendered-paradoxes-of-egypt%E2%80%99s- transition [Accessed 3 Feb. 2015]

Skalli, Loubna Hanna. 2014. “Young Women and Social Media Against Sexual Harassment”. Journal of North African Studies, 19(2): 244-258.

Tadros, Mariz. 2014. “Reclaiming the Streets for Women’s Dignity: Effective Initiatives in the Struggle Against Gender-Based Violence in Between Egypt’s Two Revolutions”. Institute of Development Studies Evidence Report no.48, http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/ 123456789/3384/ER48.pdf;jsessionid=AA65EDA53D53E69A8D82D853B99176D2?sequence=1 [Accessed 3 Feb. 2015]

Tadros, Mariz. 2013a. “Whose Shame Is It? The Politics of Sexual Assault in Morsi’s Egypt”. Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Afrique Du Nord Tunis, http://tn.boell.org/downloads/MarizTadros.pdf. [Accessed 3 Feb. 2015]

Tadros, Mariz. 2013b. “Politically Motivated Sexual Assault and the Law in Violent Transitions: A Case Study From Egypt”. Institute of Development Studies, Evidence Report no. 8, http:// opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/2950/ER8%20final%20online.pdf? sequence=1&utm_source=idswebsite&utm_medium=download&utm_campaign=opendocs [Accessed 3 Feb. 2015]

Tadros, Mariz. “Understanding Politically Motivated Sexual Assault in Protest Spaces: Evidence from Egypt (March 2011 to June 2013)”. Social & Legal Studies 1–18, 2015

UN Women, HarassMap et al. “Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt”. 2013. http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/DOKUMENTE/English_Documents/ Sexual-Harassment-Study-Egypt-Final-EN.pdf [Accessed May 3, 2015]

Winegar, Jessica. “The privilege of revolution: Gender, class, space, and affect in Egypt”. American Ethnologist 39 (1): 67-70, February 2012

’Estibaha(t) al-Nisa) ةحابتسا ءاسنلا - لاجملا يف- ماعلا- - “ .Zaki, Hind Ahmad & Abd elHameed, Dalia fi-l-Majal al-‘Amm), 2-part article, Jan. 8-10, 2014, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/ /and http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/15944 ةحابتسا ءاسنلا - لاجملا يف- ماعلا- - 1- /15925 Accessed Aug. 26, 2014] Note: the first part is available in] . ةحابتسا ءاسنلا - لاجملا يف- ماعلا- - 2- English translation: “Women As Fair Game in the Public Sphere: A Critical Introduction for Understanding Sexual Violence and Methods of Resistance”, Jadaliyya, July 9, 2014, http:// www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/18455/women-as-fair-game-in-the-public-sphere_a-critical [Accessed Aug. 26, 2014]

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 158

NOTES

1. https://www.facebook.com/opantish. 2. For more information, refer to OpAntiSH, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch’s reports and videos listed in the “References” section of this article. The introductory chapter of this journal issue provides additional information on gender-based violence in the public sphere in Egypt since 2011. 3. State-sponsored actors have been perpetrators or passively complicit in several confirmed cases since the mid-2000s; sexual violence was clearly used as a political instrument against women protestors on some occasions, to disperse them and deter them from mobilizing and protesting again, most notoriously in the “Black Wednesday” case of 2005. However, individual citizens have also apparently groped and assaulted women spontaneously in large festive gatherings during the 2000s. Since 2011, gender-based violence in the public sphere has been used by security forces or civilians acting upon instructions from some influential party associated to the authorities, as one of a range of tools to break, humiliate and punish protestors. In Tahrir Square, sexual violence against women has been used to this end, as well as to terrorize and intimidate female protestors and evict them from the public sphere of protest, with a view to weakening mobilization and possibly discrediting a protest movement. Scholar Mariz Tadros (2013, 2014, 2015) in particular researched this practice in spite of the difficulty of collecting hard evidence against perpetrators. However, civilian bystanders undoubtedly have joined in mob sexual assaults there, when they did not actually begin them themselves. The longer these crimes continued unpunished, the more Tahrir became notorious in Greater Cairo as a place where they could be committed with impunity. Ultimately, a continuum of violent practice has emerged in Tahrir Square with various combinations of civilian perpetrators, State negligence and/or complicity, and State-orchestrated violence. Zaki & Abd elHameed (2014) give one of the most thorough overviews of the phenomenon, its causes and dynamics. 4. The use and misuse of terminology is part of the phenomena of minimization of gender-based violence and victim-blaming. The term taḥarrush gamāʿy (literally “collective harassment”) has become the commonest one for mass sexual assault of women. 5. In addition to condoning or minimizing sexual assault, some media discourse features hate speech against women (see AP, “Egyptian clerics’ fatwas encourage sexual assaults, murder”, Feb. 7, 2013). 6. Nazra for Feminist Studies, “Position Paper on Sexual Violence against Women…”, Feb. 4, 2013 7. Rape and indecent assault (ḥatk ʿirḍ) are forbidden by law in Egypt but until 2014, sexual harassment was not criminalized. Furthermore, only forcible penile penetration of a woman is legally classified as rape – a much narrower definition than that of international human rights standards. 8. Kirollos, 2013. 9. Zaki & Abd elHameed, 2014. 10. The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights ( http://eipr.org/en) and Nazra for Feminist Studies (http://nazra.org/). 11. Langohr, 2013. 12. I will mostly use the past tense in the rest of this paper because OpAntiSH became inactive in 2014 due to changing circumstances and issues connected to access to Tahrir Square, although the collective has not been dissolved. 13. The Gulabi Gang are a movement of Indian women activists; it started as a group of women noted for their pink (gulabi) saris who confronted oppressive and physically abusive men in Bundelkhand, Uttar Pradesh. It grew quickly and has become active across North India. See http://www.gulabigang.in/

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 159

14. I was a Safety team volunteer from late November 2012 till early July 2013, then joined the Core group (coordinators). 15. I researched views of the identity and roles of both genders, as well as their interactions. Ultimately, a majority of scholars in my position would also identify as either male or female; this aspect of subjectivity would have been difficult to avoid for most. 16. Samia, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. All interviewees’ names have been changed. 17. Egypt Independent, Feb. 11, 2013. 18. Passant, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 19. Ibid. 20. Hala, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 21. Noha, interview, Dec. 1, 2013. 22. Mona, interview, Dec. 29, 2013. 23. Leila, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 24. Noha, interview, Dec. 1, 2013. 25. Manal, interview, Aug. 25, 2013. 26. Dina, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 27. In fact, some male volunteers also reported they had been groped and harassed at times during Intervention. However, none of them expressed belief or fear they might be subjected to mob sexual assault and rape themselves; they underlined these practices specifically targeted women. While we cannot exclude the possibility the crime could be perpetrated against men, volunteers apparently perceived this risk as (either mostly or exclusively, depending on the person) one that concerned women. 28. Leila, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 29. This http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0OID6QvoSw is an OpAntiSH call for volunteers in Arabic (accessed Aug. 26, 2014). 30. Islam, interview, July 30, 2013; Ammar, interview, Aug. 15, 2013; Sherif, interview, Aug. 3, 2013; and others. 31. Dina, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 32. Of course, a few male volunteers had different or additional motivations. 33. Noha, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 34. Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832. 35. Shady, interview, Dec. 10, 2013. 36. Manal, interview, Aug. 25, 2013. 37. Dina, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 38. Nader, interview, Aug. 20, 2013. 39. Samia, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 40. Ibid. 41. Abu-l-Hassan, conversation, Nov. 6, 2013. 42. Passant, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 43. Noha, interview, Dec. 1, 2013. 44. Passant, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 45. Ibid. 46. Dina, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 47. Manal, interview, Aug. 25, 2013. 48. Hala, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 49. Noha, interview, Dec. 1, 2013; Dina, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 50. Leila, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 51. Mona, interview, Dec. 9, 2013. 52. Dina, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 53. Ibid.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 160

54. Leila, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 55. Ibid. 56. Abu-l-Hassan, conversation, Nov. 6, 2013. 57. Leila, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 58. Dina, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 59. Shady, interview, Dec. 10, 2013. 60. Mona, interview, Dec. 9, 2013. 61. Manal, interview, Aug. 25, 2013. 62. Noha, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 63. Leila, interview, Dec. 5, 2013. 64. Ibid. 65. Shady, interview, Dec. 10, 2013; Passant, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 66. Manal, interview, Aug. 25, 2013. 67. Mukhtar, interview, July 30, 2013. 68. Zaki & Abd elHameed, 2014. 69. Passant, interview, Nov. 20, 2013. 70. Zaki & Abd elHameed, 2014. 71. Mona, interview, Dec. 9, 2013. 72. Leila, interview, Dec. 5, 2013.

ABSTRACTS

A number of anti-sexual harassment and anti-sexual violence initiatives were formed by Egyptian citizens after 2011 to confront the rising tide of gender-based violence against women in the public sphere. Among those focused on direct intervention in cases of mob sexual assault in mass gatherings in Tahrir Square (Cairo), Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/Assault (OpAntiSH) was the only one that always integrated male and female volunteers in all teams, including Intervention. This study of the management and perceptions of gender dynamics by volunteers inside OpAntiSH’s Intervention teams in 2012-2014, is based on micro-sociological analysis of the data gathered through participant observation and semi-structured interviews during this period. This paper first addresses women volunteers’ motivations – based on their own narratives – for joining Intervention teams, a choice that could be viewed as counter intuitive or frowned upon in Egyptian society, in which the dominant model of gender roles remains quite close to the model of hegemonic masculinity. Many framed this choice within an identity-based reading of the phenomenon of mass sexual assaults as attacks on all women as political agents in the public sphere, and their response as a means of resistance and reclaiming agency. Women’s presence in Intervention teams was initially an issue for many volunteers, who developed certain techniques and coping strategies to manage it. These included specific ways of performing gender within the group that differed from their practices in other contexts, and various approaches to the negotiation of gender roles within teams. Intervention involved a broader learning process about gender for some volunteers, whose view of women’s presence in teams evolved, though it remained somewhat of an issue for other “silent dissenters” of sorts. Ultimately, the particularity of the OpAntiSH experience is connected to the creation of a social sphere of gender equality and

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015 161

solidarity, geared toward the joining of forces between men and woman as equals, to fight mass sexual violence in the public sphere, within a very non-egalitarian society.

Nombre d’initiatives contre le harcèlement et la violence sexuelle ont été formées par des citoyens égyptiens depuis 2011 pour faire face à la montée de la violence sexiste contre les femmes dans la sphère publique. Parmi les groupes spécialistes de l’intervention directe contre les agressions sexuelles collectives place Tahrir (le Caire), Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment/ Assault (OpAntiSH) était le seul qui a toujours intégré les bénévoles hommes et femmes dans toutes ses équipes, y compris celles d’intervention. Cette étude de la gestion et la perception des dynamiques de genre par les volontaires des équipes d’intervention en 2012-14 est basée sur l’analyse microsociologique des données rassemblées à travers l’observation participante et des entretiens semi-directifs durant cette période. Cette contribution traite d’abord des motivations des bénévoles femmes — selon leurs récits — pour leur engagement des équipes d’intervention, un choix qui peut être perçu comme contre- intuitif ou mal considéré dans la société égyptienne, dans laquelle le modèle dominant des rôles de genre reste très proche du modèle de la masculinité hégémonique. Beaucoup d’entre elles ont cadré ce choix dans une lecture identitaire du phénomène des agressions sexuelles collectives comme visant l’ensemble de femmes comme sujets politiques dans l’espace public, et de leur engagement comme moyen de résistance et de regain de capacité d’action (agency). Leur présence dans les équipes d’intervention était d’abord un problème pour beaucoup de volontaires, qui ont développé des techniques et stratégies d’adaptation pour le gérer. Parmi ces dernières, on relève des manières spécifiques de pratiquer le genre au sein du groupe, et une variété d’approches à la négociation des rôles de genre dans les équipes. Plus largement l’intervention comprenait un processus d’apprentissage sur le genre pour certains volontaires, dont le point de vue sur la présence des femmes a évolué — bien que cela soit resté problématique pour d’autres, dissidents silencieux. En fin de compte, la particularité de l’expérience d’OpAntiSH est liée à la création d’une sphère sociale où règnent l’égalité de genre et la solidarité, tournée vers l’union des forces des hommes en femmes en tant qu’égaux, pour lutter contre la violence sexuelle de masse dans l’espace public — et ce dans une société très inégalitaire.

INDEX

Mots-clés: Égypte, femmes, genre, harcèlement sexuel, égalité, violence sexuelle, rôles de genre Keywords: Egypt, women, gender, sexual harassment, gender equality, sexual violence, gender roles

AUTHOR

LESLIE PIQUEMAL

Leslie Piquemal is a former academic, now working in the field of human rights advocacy. She earned a PhD in Middle Eastern Politics from the Paris Institute of Politics Studies (IEP Paris - Sciences Po) in 2012. As a doctoral and post-doctoral researcher, she was affiliated to the CEDEJ in Cairo, where she lived for 10 years. After her PhD she returned to Sociology to conduct fieldwork about the new collectives fighting gender-based violence in the public sphere in Cairo. Leslie Piquemal is the author of a PhD thesis about the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s political project at the end of the Mubarak era, as well as a number of academic articles.

Égypte/Monde arabe, 13 | 2015