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Bulletin De Liaison Et D'information INSTITUT KUDE RPARD IS E Bulletin de liaison et d’information n°332 novembre 2012 La publication de ce Bulletin bénéficie de subventions du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères (DGCID) et du Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD) ————— Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro : France: 6 € — Etranger : 7,5 € Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France : 60 € — Etranger : 75 € Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 13 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél. : 01- 48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01- 48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: [email protected] Bulletin de liaison et d’information de l’Institut kurde de Paris N° 332 novembre 2012 • KURDISTAN D’IRAK : FORCES « DIJLA » CONTRE « HAMRIN », KURDES ET IRAKIENS AU BORD DE LA GUERRE • SYRIE : VERS UNE FORCE MILITAIRE UNIFIÉE DES KURDES ? • TURQUIE : DÉCISION DE JUSTICE STUPÉFIANTE DANS L’AFFAIRE PINAR SELEK • CULTURE : MORT DE SHOKROLLAH BABAN • CINEMA : TROIS FILMS KURDES À L’AFFICHE CULTURE KURDISTAN D’IRAK : FORCES « DIJLA » CONTRE « HEMRIN », KURDES ET IRAKIENS AU BORD DE LA GUERRE peine le conflit sur les région est sous la responsabilité pas reconnaître les forces Dijla ni hydrocarbures tempo - des Conseils provinciaux et les croire à leur succès opérationnel. rairement apaisé, c’est mouvements des forces Dijla À au sujet des régions déstabiliseront la sécurité de Loin de baisser le ton, Maliki a kurdes séparées du cette région et en bouleverseront envenimé la polémique en lan - Gouvernement Régional du la réalité politique. » çant, le 6 novembre, dans un Kurdistan, dont le statut aurait entretien télévisé : « Kirkuk est dû être réglé par référendum en L’été dernier, le Premier Ministre une province irakienne et 2007, qu’un bras-de-fer a été de Nuri Maliki a en effet décidé l’armée irakienne, en accord avec nouveau entamé entre Erbil et d’unifier les forces du ministère la Constitution, peut aller à Bagdad. de l’Intérieur (dont il assure le Kirkouk, Erbil, Salah ad-Din et contrôle) avec les forces de police Suleïmanieh. » Or, la constitu - Début novembre, les autorités de de Kirkouk et de la Diyala, sous tion kurde énonce que les la Région du Kurdistan ont pro - le Commandement militaire des Peshmergas sont les seules forces testé contre la venue forces Dijla (le Tigre). armées du Kurdistan et jamais d’Abdulamir Zaidi, comman - La Diyala englobant plusieurs un soldat irakien n’a, depuis dant des forces armées ira - régions à majorité kurde récla - 1991 (hormis une brève incur - kiennes Dijla, à Qaratepe, un dis - mées par le GRK, en plus de sion à Erbil en 1996), mis le pied trict dont les Peshmergas kurdes Kirkouk, les Kurdes avaient dans une des trois provinces du assurent la sécurité. Leurs pro - dénoncé cette unification des Gouvernement Régional Kurde. testations ont été relayées par forces comme une tentative ira - Dans la foulée, le Premier des membres du Parlement ira - kienne d’assurer une mainmise Ministre a accusé les Kurdes de kien, notamment par Shwan solide sur la province, au mépris s’être procuré les armes de « Taha, de la Commission Sécurité de l’article 140 de la constitution l’ancienne armée irakienne », au Parlement, qui y voient une « irakienne. Le gouverneur de la parlant de chars d’assaut, violation de la Constitution ira - province de Kirkouk, le kurde d’artillerie et de lance-roquettes kienne. La sécurité de chaque Najmaddin Karim, a déclaré ne se trouvant aux mains des • 2 • Bulletin de liaison et d’information n° 332 • novembre 2012 Kurdes, tandis que l’armée ira - Kirkouk, après que le 6 novembre, kurde : « Le commandement des kienne, n’aurait, selon lui, que « le ministre des Peshmergas, Jaafar forces Dijla veut faire d’une pier - des armes légères ». Nouri Maliki al-Sheikh Mustafa et son adjoint, re deux coups : affronter indirec - affirme en détenir des preuves Anwar al-Haj Othman, ont rencon - tement le GRK, prendre l’entier écrites, notamment les copies des tré, à Kirkouk, les responsables contrôle des territoires disputés contrats de transaction. kurdes de la sécurité de la provin - et intimider certains Arabes de la ce, pour discuter de la formation province.» Ahmed Askari Jabbar Yawar, le secrétaire géné - des forces Hamrin, de leur com - évoque un « agenda secret » de ral du ministère des Forces de mandement et leur logistique : Ces ces forces, celui de « chasser la défense kurdes (Peshmargas), a forces seront sous le commande - sécurité kurde et les Peshmergas nié ces allégations de même ment du ministre des Peshmergas de Kirkouk ». qu’un prétendu contrat d’arme - ainsi que de son adjoint, les ment avec Israël, et a appelé le Asayish de l’UPK relèveront de la Dans la Diyala, l’arrivée de ces gouvernement central à « respec - responsabilité du gouverneur de bataillons est loin de faire l’una - ter la constitution » en armant et Kirkouk, le Dr. Najmaddin Karim, nimité et Talib Muhammad finançant les troupes des un Kurde proche de Jalal Talabani Hassan, qui préside le Conseil Peshmergas. L’entretien des et les policiers de celle du directeur provincial, reconnaît que la forces kurdes est en effet un général de la police de Kirkouk, situation sécuritaire dans la pro - point de litige aussi ancien que Jamal Tahir. vince était meilleure avant leur celui de la loi sur le pétrole et la arrivée. Il a aussi fait état de répartition du budget fédéral, C'est qu'à Kirkouk, les forces confidences de la part des offi - mais on imagine mal qu’en ces Dijla ne semblent guère en impo - ciers de Dijla, qui lui auraient moments de tension, où des ser aux Kurdes, même si son avoué n’avoir aucun pouvoir affrontements entre soldats ira - commandement a, dès son arri - d’action réel : « Nous recevons kiens et Peshmergas ont éclaté, vée dans la Diyala, ordonné aux des ordres de Bagdad mais nous Bagdad alloue un budget pour forces de cette province, ainsi ne les exécutons pas. » l’armement des Kurdes. Le qu’aux forces de Kirkouk et de Premier Ministre irakien a récla - Salahaddin de ne plus faire un Les affrontements sanglants que mé, au contraire, que les mouvement « sans son l’on craignait ne se sont pas fait Peshmergas soient sous com - ordre». Mais Halo Najat, le chef attendre : le 16 novembre, une mandement irakien, c’est-à-dire de la sécurité (PDK) de Kirkouk personne était tuée et 13 autres dirigé par Nouri Maliki lui- affirme qu'« ils ne verront jamais blessées dans un accrochage même, puisque, depuis les der - le jour où les Peshmergas, la entre les troupes irakiennes et nières législatives, il n’a toujours sécurité et la police travailleront des forces de l’UPK qui gar - pas désigné de ministre de la sous leurs ordres. C’est le début daient une maison appartenant à Défense, pas plus que de d’une nouvelle confrontation un responsable du parti à Tuz l’Intérieur, et dirige ainsi directe - entre Bagdad et la Région du Khormato, une localité habitée ment toutes les forces de sécurité Kurdistan. » par des Kurdes, des Turkmènes et de défense du pays. et des Arabes, actuellement dans Ahmed Askari, qui préside le la province de Salahaddin et qui Mais sans attendre l’aval et les Comité de la Sécurité du Conseil appartenait, avant le redécoupa - dinars de Bagdad, la formation de provincial de Kirkouk, est lui ge des districts et provinces par bataillons kurdes « Hamrin » (du aussi certain qu’une « nouvelle Saddam, au gouvernorat de nom de montagnes de la région) a ère de confrontation » s’ouvre et Kirkouk. été annoncée, en riposte à celle des que l’Irak s’éloigne de plus en forces Dijla, afin d’assurer la « plus des objectifs qu’il s’était Dès le lendemain, Massoud défense de Kirkouk ». Selon le jour - donné à sa libération, ceux de Barzani ordonnait aux nal kurde Awene, le Parti démo - rompre avec la politique de Peshmergas « de faire preuve de cratique du Kurdistan (PDK) de l’ancien régime du Baath. Dans retenue face aux provocations, Massoud Barzani, le président du un entretien au journal Rudaw, il mais aussi d'être prêts à faire Kurdistan et l’Union Patriotique compare même les forces Dijla face à tout acte d'agression, en se du Kurdistan (UPK) de Jalal au commandement de Ali tenant en état de grande alerte Talabani, le président de l’Irak, se Hassan Majid (Ali le Chimique, ». De son côté, le lieutenant- sont ainsi accordés sur un com - responsable des opérations Anfal général Abdulamir al-Zaidi, à la mandement militaire conjoint de au Kurdistan) à qui son cousin tête des forces Dijla, déclarait à Peshmergas (militaires), d’Asayish Saddam avait laissé carte l’AFP qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’un (Renseignements) et de policiers de blanche pour régler la question incident « visant les n° 332 • novembre 2012 Bulletin de liaison et d’information • 3• Peshmergas» mais de l’arresta - Barzani et le PDK. Nous avons irakiens auraient pris position à tion d’une personne accusée de eu, parfois, des points de vue dif - 80 km de Kirkouk et des dizaines meurtre et de kidnapping. férent, mais dans des questions d’autres se seraient déployés vitales telles que l’article 140 et le dans les monts Hemrin. Des Cette tension croissante inquiète problème de Kirkouk, les Peshmergas ont été envoyés le 21 les États-Unis qui ont offert, membres du PDK soutiennent dans le district kurde de selon une source diplomatique Talabani et l’UPK .» Khanaqin, afin de prévenir toute kurde citée dans un quotidien incursion irakienne.
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