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Country of Origin Information Report Syria June 2021

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Country of origin information report Syria

June 2021

Page 1 of 102

Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021

Publication details

City

The Hague

Assembled by

Country of Origin Information Reports Section (DAF/AB)
Disclaimer: The Dutch version of this report is leading. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands cannot be held accountable for misinterpretations based on the English version of the report.

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Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021

Table of contents

Publication details............................................................................................2 Table of contents..........................................................................................3 Introduction....................................................................................................5

1

1.1

Political and security situation .................................................................... 6

Political and administrative developments...........................................................6 Government-held areas....................................................................................6 Areas not under government control................................................................11 COVID-19.....................................................................................................13 Armed groups ...............................................................................................13 Government forces ........................................................................................14 Security services in areas under Syrian government control................................14 Security services in areas under the control of other groups ...............................16 IS................................................................................................................17 The security situation.....................................................................................17 North-west (Tartous, Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo)......................................................21 North-east (Raqqa, Hasaka, Deir ez-Zor)..........................................................25 Central (Hama, Homs, Damascus, Rif Dimashq) ................................................27 South-west (Quneitra, Daraa, Sweida).............................................................28 Reconciliation agreements ..............................................................................31 Civilian casualties..........................................................................................32 Freedom of movement...................................................................................33 Military service..............................................................................................36 Legislation and regulations regarding military service.........................................37 Reservists.....................................................................................................38 Length of and discharge from military service ...................................................39 Conscripts from former opposition territory and conscripts who left Syria illegally..39 Deferral and exemptions ................................................................................40 Buyout options..............................................................................................41 Evasion of military service and desertion..........................................................41 SDF .............................................................................................................42 Recruitment of minors....................................................................................43
1.1.1 1.1.2 1.1.3 1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.3 1.3.1 1.3.2 1.3.3 1.3.4 1.3.5 1.3.6 1.3.7 1.4 1.4.1 1.4.2 1.4.3 1.4.4 1.4.5 1.4.6 1.4.7 1.4.8 1.5

2

2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.3

Identity, nationality and documents.......................................................... 46

Identification obligation and identifying documents............................................46 Documents ...................................................................................................47 The passport.................................................................................................47 Identity cards ...............................................................................................48 Personal status .............................................................................................48 Document fraud ............................................................................................52 Nationality....................................................................................................53

3

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3

Human rights............................................................................................. 55

Introduction..................................................................................................55 Judicial process.............................................................................................55 Compliance and violations ..............................................................................58 Freedom of expression...................................................................................59 Freedom of religion and belief.........................................................................61 Arrests, custody and detentions ......................................................................62

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3.3.4 3.3.5 3.3.6 3.3.7 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2 3.4.3 3.4.4 3.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.7 3.4.8 3.4.9 3.4.10
Disappearances and abductions.......................................................................66 Maltreatment and torture ...............................................................................70 Extrajudicial executions and killings.................................................................71 The death penalty..........................................................................................74 Position of specific groups...............................................................................74 General........................................................................................................74 Members of opposition parties/political activists ................................................75 Journalists and human rights activists..............................................................76 Health workers and members of the civil defence ..............................................78 Palestinians in Syria.......................................................................................79 Stateless Kurds.............................................................................................80 Conscripts, conscientious objectors and deserters..............................................80 LGBT ...........................................................................................................81 Women ........................................................................................................82 Minors, including unaccompanied minors..........................................................84

  • 4
  • Refugees and internally displaced persons................................................ 87

Internally displaced persons............................................................................87 Refugees......................................................................................................88 Repatriation..................................................................................................88 UNHCR’s position...........................................................................................95
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3.1

5

5.1 5.2

Annexes..................................................................................................... 96

Sources consulted .........................................................................................96 Map of Syria ...............................................................................................102

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Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021

Introduction

This country of origin information report is based on the questions and points of focus in the Terms of Reference (ToR) drawn up by the Ministry of Justice and Security. The ToR for this report was adopted on 14 December 2020. An anonymised version of it, together with the country of origin information report, is available on the website of the Dutch Government. This country of origin information report describes the situation in Syria insofar as this is important for the assessment of asylum applications from persons originating from this country, and for decisionmaking regarding the repatriation of rejected Syrian asylum seekers. It is an update of the country of origin information report of May 2020 and supplements the thematic country of origin information report on documents in Syria of December 2019 regarding certain points.1 The report covers the period from June 2020 to April 2021. Developments of relevance for answering the questions asked in the ToR have been taken into account in outline up to the date of publication.

This report is a factual, neutral and objective representation of the findings for the period under consideration and does not offer any policy recommendations. This country of origin information report does not pretend to be exhaustive with regard to separate security incidents and human rights violations; the incidents mentioned are cited for the purpose of substantiating a more general picture. In relation to the topics dealt with in the official country of origin information report, the situation in Syria, can, however, differ from place to place and evolves very rapidly. The report was created on the basis of public and confidential sources, using carefully selected, analysed and verified information. Information from a number of sources has been used, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), specialist literature, media reporting, and (where applicable) relevant governmental agencies. Unless stated otherwise or when the facts are generally undisputed, the passages in this country of origin information report are based on multiple sources. The public sources that were consulted are listed in the appendices. Some of the confidential information used was obtained through interviews and correspondence with sources who indicated that they wished to remain confidential. Confidential information originating from the diplomatic mission(s) of the Netherlands was also used. The information obtained on a confidential basis has chiefly been used to support and supplement the content based on public information. The confidential sources are

designated as ‘confidential source’ in the footnotes and provided with a date.

There is no uniform transliteration of Arabic terms in Latin script. Since terms and concepts in Arabic are spelled in different ways in Latin script, it has been decided to use the most common variant of each term in this report. Alternative spellings are mentioned in the notes.

Chapter one deals with the political developments and the security situation during the reporting period. The second chapter concerns documents. The third chapter deals with the human rights situation and examines the at-risk groups. The fourth chapter covers the repatriation of displaced persons and refugees. The fifth chapter consists of appendices.

1

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of origin report on Syria, 15 May 2020, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/ambtsberichten/2020/05/15/algemeen-ambtsbericht-syrie-van-mei-2020; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thematic country of origin information report on Syria, Documents, 6 December 2019, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/ambtsberichten/2019/12/06/thematisch-ambtsbericht-over-documenten- in-syrie

Page 5 of 102

  • 1
  • Political and security situation

The conflict in Syria has lasted for more than ten years now. It began in March 2011 as a peaceful protest against the Syrian government, which was followed by repression and armed resistance against the government. Foreign powers have gradually become indirectly or directly involved in the conflict. For more information on the background and course of the conflict, see the report published on 20 January 2021 by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. The report analyses developments from the start of the conflict in March 2011 to 24 December 2020.2

  • 1.1
  • Political and administrative developments

The United Nations Special Representative reported to the Security Council on 20 January 2021 that there had been no significant political developments in the previous ten months that delivered real changes or a vision for the future for Syrian citizens. Other than discussion about the constitution, there is no political dialogue between Syrians about a political solution to the conflict.3

Constitutional Committee

After the third meeting at the end of August 2020, the fourth meeting of the

Constitutional Committee’s working group was held in early December 2020. The

aim of the Committee, which is composed of members of the opposition, the government and civil society, is to draw up a proposal for a new constitution. The outcome of the fourth meeting included a date and an agenda proposal for a fifth meeting, to be held on 25 January 2021, with the aim of discussing the basic principles of the new constitution.4 Afterwards, the United Nations (UN) Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, reported that no progress had been made.5

  • 1.1.1
  • Government-held areas

Government-held territory remained roughly the same during this reporting period as it was in May 2020, the end of the previous reporting period. The Syrian

government controlled all the country’s territory with the exception of the north-

west and north-east, although in practice control was limited in some areas, for example in the provinces of Daraa and Deir ez-Zor.6 See 1.3 for more details. In May 2020, several sources reported that oligarch Rami Makhlouf had fallen out of favour with President Bashar al-Assad. There was open conflict between them.

2

UNCOI, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/46/54,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquirySyria.aspx.

3

UN special envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pederson, Briefing to Security Council, 20 January 2021, https://specialenvoysyria.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2021-01- 20_secco_un_special_envoy_for_syria_mr._geir_o._pedersen_briefing_as_delivered_.pdf. The Special Representative stated, among other things, that eight out of ten people in Syria live below the poverty line and that the World Food Programme estimates that 9.3 million inhabitants are food insecure. The trend is fairly negative due to the effects of ten years of conflict, the global economic consequences of the pandemic, the consequences for Syria of the crisis in Lebanon and domestic factors such as the war economy, corruption and mismanagement, as well as external factors; TV channel Arte produced a visual encapsulation of ten years of conflict in Syria in which it summarised the background to and development of the conflict. https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/091146-030-A/syria- a-decade-of-war/.

4

UNSG, Note to Correspondents: Transcript of Media Briefing by Mr. Geir O. Pedersen, UN Special Envoy for Syria, Upon Conclusion of the Fourth Convening of the Small Body of the Constitutional Committee, 4 December 2020;

Enab Baladi, Four rounds of Syria’s Constitutional Committee stand still on a narrow common ground, 10 December

2020, https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2020/12/four-rounds-of-syrias-constitutional-committee-stand-still- on-a-narrow-common-ground/#ixzz6gcIIoGTy.

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