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Policy Notes July 2021 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY JULY 2021 POLICY NOTES NO. 108 Deals, Drones, and National Will The New Era in Turkish Power Projection Rich Outzen he Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) attracted much attention in 2020 for its devastating employment of unmanned aerial vehicles during combat in TSyria, Libya, and the Caucasus. UAVs (drones) were just one dimension of Turkish regional interventions, but they were particularly potent symbols in an age of ubiquitous cameras and Internet connections.1 A number of analysts have assessed the tactical and operational impact of Turkish drones.2 Yet the Turkish drone program is just part of a revamped national approach to power Photo: Yasin Bulbul/ projection in neighboring regions—an approach with economic, diplomatic, Presidential Palace/Handout strategic, and reputational effects, as well as implications on the battlefield. via REUTERS An expanded network of Turkish military agreements and overseas basing, the maturation of partner and proxy relationships, the expansion of the defense industry beyond UAVs, military doctrine to integrate new sensors RICH OUTZEN DEALS, DRONES, AND NATIONAL WILL and weapons, and—perhaps most critically—the development of risk-tolerant political will in foreign Abbreviations affairs have enabled Turkey to become a formidable hard-power player in the Middle East, North Africa, GNA Government of National Accord (Libya) the Caucasus, and the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Scholarly analysis is therefore needed that LNA Libyan National Army both contextualizes new capabilities for Western audiences and assesses the role and impact of these MIT Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (Turkey’s developments for the coming years. Signaling larger National Intelligence Organization) change within the Turkish military, drones represent a technical leap wrapped in a “revolution in military PKK Kurdistan Workers Party (Turkey) affairs” embedded in a regional realignment. RMA revolution in military affairs This study presents an overview of Turkish power projection capabilities beginning in 2011 and TAF Turkish Armed Forces extending over the current decade, and examines their impact on regional security balances at present UAV unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) and in the future. The study reviews existing data and literature related to Turkish power projection, lays out YPG People’s Defense Units (Syria) several short case studies, and incorporates interviews with security and policy experts familiar with Turkey Eager to prevent new massacres, refugee flows, and the region. It starts with a review of Turkish mili- and border-area control by Iran-supported forces, tary engagements during 2020, assesses the drivers of Turkey responded with increased support to the Turkey’s bid for strategic independence and the means rebels and, ultimately, direct military defense against employed to achieve it, then finishes with an analysis the combined attacking force of the Syrian regime, of implications for the coming decade. Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Unlike previous Turkish operations in Syria (Euphrates Shield in 2016, Olive Branch in 2018, Peace Spring in 2019), the Idlib operation was fought against a combined-arms A Watershed Year for opponent—the Syrian Arab Army, backed by Iranian militias and Russian and Syrian airpower—rather Turkish Power Projection than irregular forces. In 2020, the TAF was committed to no fewer than Regime forces had been grinding down their Syrian four major overseas military campaigns—three opposition counterparts for months in Idlib as the sequential and one sustained. Each case illustrated Turks tried to slow or deter the offensive by main- unique geopolitical incentive dynamics and common taining fortified observation posts. On February Turkish strategy and modalities. 27, 2020, Russian and Syrian aircraft struck a TAF convoy in southern Idlib, killing thirty-four Turkish soldiers, the largest Turkish loss of military life in February–March 2020: an overseas engagement since 1974. The TAF in Operation Spring Shield (Idlib) response launched Operation Spring Shield, a week- long counterattack incorporating drones, artillery, After consolidating control of Greater Damascus and rocketfire, and precision strike from air and ground southwest Syria in 2018, the Assad regime in late platforms. Unlike operations against the scarce 2019 launched its “Dawn of Idlib” operations to seize and elusive targets of the Turkey-based Kurdistan the last remaining bastion of opposition control. Workers Party (PKK), the Turks’ drone-driven assault 2 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY RICH OUTZEN DEALS, DRONES, AND NATIONAL WILL in Spring Shield faced a target-rich environment. electronic warfare, and own-drone or counter-drone Turkish intelligence and observation systems rapidly capabilities may fare better than the Syrians did, but identified targets and passed them to precision-strike Spring Shield demonstrated that for now the TAF platforms. Those platforms proceeded to destroy “drone blitz” represented an asymmetric advantage.6 numerous Russian-made Syrian military vehicles and fixed sites, removing the advantage that had enabled Bashar al-Assad’s forces to drive back the armed April–June 2020: opposition. Spring Shield successfully stabilized the Operation Peace Storm (Libya) Syrian opposition’s defenses and inflicted serious losses on regime forces—by Ankara’s estimate, 2 Libya’s decade of intermittent civil war following jets, 2 drones, 8 helicopters, 135 tanks, and 10 air the 2011 death of Muammar Qadhafi entered a defense systems, along with 2,557 personnel killed or new phase in 2019 when Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who seriously wounded. Dozens of Hezbollah fighters were leads the eastern-based Libyan National Army 3 also reportedly killed by the TAF. (LNA), launched an offensive to seize western Libya and Tripoli, supported to varying degrees by the Turkey defied a tenet of Western air doctrine by United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Russia, and France. conducting massed and coordinated drone strikes Ankara had important commercial and cultural without gaining air superiority over Idlib, but it ties to Libya and sought to preserve its future role 4 achieved tactical success at an acceptable cost. there through a negotiated settlement that protected Syrian air defenses, utilizing Russian equipment, groups with connections to Turkey. After months of had been considered formidable, if vulnerable to watching the UN-recognized Government of National the world’s top air forces; even the U.S. military Accord (GNA) lose ground to General Haftar’s force, portrayed their defeat as a daunting, high-resource including newly arrived Russian mercenaries, 5 task. Instead of fully suppressing enemy air Turkey intervened to prevent the GNA’s collapse. defenses through an extended air campaign, Turkish Following negotiations in November 2019, Turkey drones destroyed individual Syrian point air defense sent weapons, advisors, combat support forces, air systems, either preemptively or when activated, defenses, and naval units to bolster GNA defenses. enabling further drone strikes. Although Syrian In April 2020, the GNA launched a counteroffensive, air defenses downed some Turkish drones, Syrian which by June 2020 had driven Haftar’s forces from forces suffered far greater losses. In the future, the outskirts of Tripoli back to Sirte, leading to a new more sophisticated armies with layered air defense, equilibrium and renewed negotiations. Russian-made SA-22 Pantsir air defense system captured by GNA forces after Turkish drone strikes in Libya. A Turkish drone strike in Idlib. Source: video capture from Anadolu Agency/Reuters Marketplace POLICY NOTE 108 3 RICH OUTZEN DEALS, DRONES, AND NATIONAL WILL During the two months of Operation Peace Storm, tanks, one hundred armored personnel carriers the TAF employed naval power, air defense, logistical and infantry fighting vehicles, dozens of air defense support, intelligence, and the same combination systems, and more than four thousand personnel.8 of radars, drones, precision strike, and electronic Russian advisors had trained Armenian forces since warfare deployed in Idlib. The LNA’s losses likely Soviet times, providing operating doctrine and an included at least one hundred military vehicles, one integrated air defense system. As drones of Turkish thousand personnel, and the entirety of its previous and Israeli manufacture pierced the air defense year’s gains.7 The LNA suffered severe shortcomings, umbrella, Armenian forces proved highly vulnerable of course: older Russian weapons and vehicles, to detection and destruction. limited air defense of its own, and reliance on a few roads in the open desert. This was a deeply flawed opponent and a target-rich environment. Once again, January–December 2020: a Turkey-supported force proved able to turn the Operation Claw (Northern Iraq) tables on an offensive by an attacker with exploitable weaknesses. The three previous campaigns ran concurrently with intensified operations against the PKK in northern Iraq. The TAF has conducted episodic operations September–November 2020: in northern Iraq for decades and maintained small Operation Iron Fist (Nagorno-Karabakh) bases to monitor PKK movement. After 2015, the TAF adopted a new strategy, based on continuous The second Nagorno-Karabakh war, lasting from operations to interdict PKK training, supply, and September through November 2020, was a six-week operational movement, especially in the sensitive offensive by Azerbaijan to regain territories
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