Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

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Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society Conflict Research Programme Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society Sohaib al-Zoabi April 2020 2 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society 1. Executive Summary 2015 had taken control of the majority of Deraa is known to be the cradle of the the two southern provinces of Deraa and Syrian uprising of 2011. There were many Quneitra. The situation remained largely reasons for the province’s increased unchanged until the De-escalation popular resentment against the political Agreement of May 2017, which led to a regime in Syria, including the regime’s relative decrease in the intensity of hardline security policies; its monopoly of violence, and included all southern areas. the public sphere in the interest of a tight However, the situation shifted rapidly once circle of local middlemen directly linked again at the end of June 2018, when the with the security apparatus; the continued Syrian regime, backed by the Russian tightening of the margin of basic freedoms; forces, began a brutal military campaign and the uneven development between against Deraa. This campaign ended in Deraa’s rural and urban areas. what is known as the Deraa Reconciliation The protest movement in the Deraa Agreement of June 2018, between the province is distinct given the role played by opposition forces and the regime, carried Deraa city in the uprising, which preceded out under the direct oversight of Russia. the involvement of the surrounding rural This agreement stipulated return of the areas. whole southern area to regime control, with the integration of opposition military The peaceful nature of the uprising in factions into the Russian-backed Fifth Deraa helped to strengthen of the civil Corps. However, within the first year of this aspect of the movement, and rendered it agreement, it became clear that many of more effective in the province as a whole. these points were not adhered to, putting The number of organisations in southern into question the ostensible state of Syria was at least 38 in 2015, increasing to stability. The Syrian authorities did not around 50 organisations by the middle of abide by its commitments, either on the 2018. Many local councils were also security or civilian level, and in particular in formed, helping to fill the governance gap relation to regularisation of state and in the province resulting from the Syrian service provision. regime’s gradual withdrawal in 2012. Furthermore, the central government’s In general, the local stakeholders, whether refusal to coordinate with the local local councils or civil society organisations, governance bodies in the opposition-held were not able to develop an effective areas dampened any hopes of reaching economic or administrative system. real and tangible stability in many Instead, they mainly relied on the financial governance sectors. These included issues and technical support provided by pertaining to civil registries, such as birth, international donor bodies. marriage and death certificates, as well as In the period between 2012 and 2015, the those pertaining to property rights. All such province witnessed a number of battles documents issued by the directorates and between the Syrian military forces and the local councils in opposition-held areas opposition forces, which by the end of were not officially recognised. 3 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society The challenges described above make it tribal powers during the period of armed difficult to predict how civil society work in conflict. the Deraa province will develop in the Southern Syria has long had fertile land coming period. However, looking at various and a large store of wheat,1 which made indicators from the province, it appears the area vulnerable to invasion. This was that there will be little space for non-relief- particularly the case during the period of based organisations to operate (this the Crusades, contributing to an increased includes legal and rights-based Christian population in the area. During organisations, and those working in Islam’s expansion in the Levant region, violations documentation, advocacy for many Christian families converted to Islam; victims, and those working in governance, the Masalimah family, for example, one of administrative and institutional the biggest Sunni families currently in the development, and peace building). Most of southern Horan region, had been Christian these organisations will be forced before converting to Islam.2 underground, and will have to coordinate The Horan region continued to play an with civil society groups present in important economic role during the northern Syria, or non-governmental Ottoman period; the district of Muzayrib organisations working in neighbouring became a key meeting point for pilgrims, countries. and with the Hijaz railroad passing through 2. Historical Overview the province, it came to be one of the key centres for commercial exchange. During 2.1 Prior to the Emergence of the Syrian State that period, the province’s centre changed several times, from Muzayrib to al-Shaykh In order to understand the reality and Saad, then to al-Shaykh Maskeen, and implications of the conflict in southern finally to the city of Deraa. The conflict Syria since the 2011 uprising, it is between the province’s cities and rural important to look back at the historical areas is thought to have begun with the context behind the emergence of identity population expansion that took place politics particular to the region. This way, during that time, given the move of the we will be able to build up a clearer picture province centre from the rural areas to an of the political, cultural and social urban one, sparking conflict over power character of this region, which is typified by and trade. complex familial and tribal dynamics. It will During the French Mandate period, the also help in explaining some of the social region played a significant role in the Great phenomena particular to southern Syria, Syrian Revolt (1925-1927).3 This was such as the relatively low sectarian tension manifested in the battles of Khirbet in comparison with other Syrian provinces, Ghazaleh and al-Musayfrah, in coordination and the emergence of new familial and 1 Horan Foundation, tārīkh ḥorān. 2016. 3 Ali Abdallah, durūs min ath-thawra as-sūrīyah al-kubrah. al- http://ahlhoran.org/ar/?p=15703 Modon. 2015. دروس-من-الثورة-/Michel Lequien, Oriens Christianus, Paris 1740, Vol.II, Coll. 859 https://www.almodon.com/opinion/2015/3/17 2 السورية-الكبرى 4 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society with anti-Mandate forces in the and facilities/businesses. Such neighbouring province of Sweida, despite disruption did not significantly affect Deraa province, whose economy relied the historical sectarian-linked tension on agriculture. between the Druze-majority Sweida, and 2. Giving a greater political role to the the Sunni-majority Deraa. region, which had been hitherto politically marginalised, by raising the 2.2 Al-Ba‘ath Party Rule share allocated to workers and farmers For the first four decades of the Ba‘athist in Parliament to 50% of all MPs, and giving leading roles in the party and state, the Al-Ba‘ath Party was state to a number of individuals from constitutionally designated ‘The leading the south. One such individual was party in state and society’, and enjoyed Farouq al-Shara‘, who occupied a relatively wide popularity in the south, with number of positions, most prominently many of Deraa province’s residents joining foreign minister and vice president. Another was Rustum al-Ghazali, who the party’s ranks. The widespread protest occupied several positions in the movements against the party’s policies security apparatus in both Syria and and their hegemony over all areas of the Lebanon. Alongside this, the network of state, which began at the start of the clientelist relationships pertaining to the Party was strengthened, pushing many 1970s and were suppressed militarily at people from the southern provinces to the start of the 1980s, did not gain join institutions supporting the Party, significant popular support in Deraa, in such as the Revolutionary Youth Union comparison to provinces such as Aleppo, and other unions, such as the Workers’ Union and the General Women’s Union. Hama and Damascus. 3. The location of the province, bordering A number of factors contributed to the both Occupied Palestine and Jordan, Ba‘ath Party’s popularity in Deraa province contributed to the increased interest of during that period. The most significant of the Party in the area, particularly these are outlined below: against the backdrop of the Syrian- Israeli conflict. 1. The socialist economic policies of the Ba‘ath Party, which focused on 2.3 March 2011 to August 2018 supporting farmers and the agricultural sector in Syria’s rural areas, which made up approximately 80% of the area On 18 March 2011, the Syrian uprising of Deraa province. The party began by began in Deraa. A group of youth from forming farmers’ cooperatives, Deraa city left al-Abbas Mosque, and extension units and implementing headed for al-Omari Mosque, where the agricultural reforms. Meanwhile, the country’s major commercial and largest protest against the ruling system industrial cities, such as those of thus far was held. The trigger for popular Damascus and Aleppo, were protests in Deraa city is attributed to the damaged/disrupted by the detention of a number of children by Syria’s implementation of nationalisation security forces a month earlier on 27 policies, extending to private factories February 2011.4 Protests began to spread 4 SyriaUntold, Daraa: Land of Grain. The story of the city of Daraa in the Syrian revolution. 2016. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=405572856233290 5 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society in other villages and cities across the 2.3.1 Peaceful Protests province, as a result of the severe security The protest movement in the Deraa clampdown pursued by the Syrian province is distinct given the role played by government, with the continued detention Deraa city in the uprising, which preceded and killing of protestors.
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