Conflict Research Programme Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

Sohaib al-Zoabi

April 2020 2 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

1. Executive Summary 2015 had taken control of the majority of Deraa is known to be the cradle of the the two southern provinces of Deraa and Syrian uprising of 2011. There were many Quneitra. The situation remained largely reasons for the province’s increased unchanged until the De-escalation popular resentment against the political Agreement of May 2017, which led to a regime in Syria, including the regime’s relative decrease in the intensity of hardline security policies; its monopoly of violence, and included all southern areas. the public sphere in the interest of a tight However, the situation shifted rapidly once circle of local middlemen directly linked again at the end of June 2018, when the with the security apparatus; the continued Syrian regime, backed by the Russian tightening of the margin of basic freedoms; forces, began a brutal military campaign and the uneven development between against Deraa. This campaign ended in Deraa’s rural and urban areas. what is known as the Deraa Reconciliation The protest movement in the Deraa Agreement of June 2018, between the province is distinct given the role played by opposition forces and the regime, carried Deraa city in the uprising, which preceded out under the direct oversight of Russia. the involvement of the surrounding rural This agreement stipulated return of the areas. whole southern area to regime control, with the integration of opposition military The peaceful nature of the uprising in factions into the Russian-backed Fifth Deraa helped to strengthen of the civil Corps. However, within the first year of this aspect of the movement, and rendered it agreement, it became clear that many of more effective in the province as a whole. these points were not adhered to, putting The number of organisations in southern into question the ostensible state of Syria was at least 38 in 2015, increasing to stability. The Syrian authorities did not around 50 organisations by the middle of abide by its commitments, either on the 2018. Many local councils were also security or civilian level, and in particular in formed, helping to fill the governance gap relation to regularisation of state and in the province resulting from the Syrian service provision. regime’s gradual withdrawal in 2012. Furthermore, the central government’s In general, the local stakeholders, whether refusal to coordinate with the local local councils or civil society organisations, governance bodies in the opposition-held were not able to develop an effective areas dampened any hopes of reaching economic or administrative system. real and tangible stability in many Instead, they mainly relied on the financial governance sectors. These included issues and technical support provided by pertaining to civil registries, such as birth, international donor bodies. marriage and death certificates, as well as In the period between 2012 and 2015, the those pertaining to property rights. All such province witnessed a number of battles documents issued by the directorates and between the Syrian military forces and the local councils in opposition-held areas opposition forces, which by the end of were not officially recognised. 3 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

The challenges described above make it tribal powers during the period of armed difficult to predict how civil society work in conflict. the Deraa province will develop in the Southern Syria has long had fertile land coming period. However, looking at various and a large store of wheat,1 which made indicators from the province, it appears the area vulnerable to invasion. This was that there will be little space for non-relief- particularly the case during the period of based organisations to operate (this the Crusades, contributing to an increased includes legal and rights-based Christian population in the area. During organisations, and those working in Islam’s expansion in the Levant region, violations documentation, advocacy for many Christian families converted to Islam; victims, and those working in governance, the Masalimah family, for example, one of administrative and institutional the biggest Sunni families currently in the development, and peace building). Most of southern Horan region, had been Christian these organisations will be forced before converting to Islam.2 underground, and will have to coordinate The Horan region continued to play an with civil society groups present in important economic role during the northern Syria, or non-governmental Ottoman period; the district of Muzayrib organisations working in neighbouring became a key meeting point for pilgrims, countries. and with the Hijaz railroad passing through

2. Historical Overview the province, it came to be one of the key centres for commercial exchange. During 2.1 Prior to the Emergence of the Syrian State that period, the province’s centre changed several times, from Muzayrib to al-Shaykh In order to understand the reality and Saad, then to al-Shaykh Maskeen, and implications of the conflict in southern finally to the city of Deraa. The conflict Syria since the 2011 uprising, it is between the province’s cities and rural important to look back at the historical areas is thought to have begun with the context behind the emergence of identity population expansion that took place politics particular to the region. This way, during that time, given the move of the we will be able to build up a clearer picture province centre from the rural areas to an of the political, cultural and social urban one, sparking conflict over power character of this region, which is typified by and trade. complex familial and tribal dynamics. It will During the French Mandate period, the also help in explaining some of the social region played a significant role in the Great phenomena particular to southern Syria, Syrian Revolt (1925-1927).3 This was such as the relatively low sectarian tension manifested in the battles of Khirbet in comparison with other Syrian provinces, Ghazaleh and al-Musayfrah, in coordination and the emergence of new familial and

1 Horan Foundation, tārīkh ḥorān. 2016. 3 Ali Abdallah, durūs min ath-thawra as-sūrīyah al-kubrah. al- http://ahlhoran.org/ar/?p=15703 Modon. 2015. دروس-من-الثورة-/Michel Lequien, Oriens Christianus, Paris 1740, Vol.II, Coll. 859 https://www.almodon.com/opinion/2015/3/17 2 السورية-الكبرى 4 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

with anti-Mandate forces in the and facilities/businesses. Such neighbouring province of Sweida, despite disruption did not significantly affect Deraa province, whose economy relied the historical sectarian-linked tension on agriculture. between the Druze-majority Sweida, and 2. Giving a greater political role to the the Sunni-majority Deraa. region, which had been hitherto politically marginalised, by raising the 2.2 Al-Ba‘ath Party Rule share allocated to workers and farmers For the first four decades of the Ba‘athist in Parliament to 50% of all MPs, and giving leading roles in the party and state, the Al-Ba‘ath Party was state to a number of individuals from constitutionally designated ‘The leading the south. One such individual was party in state and society’, and enjoyed Farouq al-Shara‘, who occupied a relatively wide popularity in the south, with number of positions, most prominently many of Deraa province’s residents joining foreign minister and vice president. Another was Rustum al-Ghazali, who the party’s ranks. The widespread protest occupied several positions in the movements against the party’s policies security apparatus in both Syria and and their hegemony over all areas of the Lebanon. Alongside this, the network of state, which began at the start of the clientelist relationships pertaining to the Party was strengthened, pushing many 1970s and were suppressed militarily at people from the southern provinces to the start of the 1980s, did not gain join institutions supporting the Party, significant popular support in Deraa, in such as the Revolutionary Youth Union comparison to provinces such as Aleppo, and other unions, such as the Workers’ Union and the General Women’s Union. Hama and Damascus. 3. The location of the province, bordering A number of factors contributed to the both Occupied Palestine and Jordan, Ba‘ath Party’s popularity in Deraa province contributed to the increased interest of during that period. The most significant of the Party in the area, particularly these are outlined below: against the backdrop of the Syrian- Israeli conflict. 1. The socialist economic policies of the Ba‘ath Party, which focused on 2.3 March 2011 to August 2018 supporting farmers and the agricultural sector in Syria’s rural areas, which made up approximately 80% of the area On 18 March 2011, the Syrian uprising of Deraa province. The party began by began in Deraa. A group of youth from forming farmers’ cooperatives, Deraa city left al-Abbas Mosque, and extension units and implementing headed for al-Omari Mosque, where the agricultural reforms. Meanwhile, the country’s major commercial and largest protest against the ruling system industrial cities, such as those of thus far was held. The trigger for popular Damascus and Aleppo, were protests in Deraa city is attributed to the damaged/disrupted by the detention of a number of children by Syria’s implementation of nationalisation security forces a month earlier on 27 policies, extending to private factories February 2011.4 Protests began to spread

4 SyriaUntold, Daraa: Land of Grain. The story of the city of Daraa in the Syrian revolution. 2016. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=405572856233290 5 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

in other villages and cities across the 2.3.1 Peaceful Protests province, as a result of the severe security The protest movement in the Deraa clampdown pursued by the Syrian province is distinct given the role played by government, with the continued detention Deraa city in the uprising, which preceded and killing of protestors. the involvement of the surrounding rural There were many reasons for the areas. This is in contrast to the majority of increased popular resentment against the Syrian provinces, where the protests were ruling system in Syria, including the led from the countryside. regime’s hardline security policies; its The protests in the Deraa province monopoly of the public sphere in the remained peaceful up until the beginning of interest of a tight circle of local middlemen November 2011, and armed conflict directly linked with the security apparatus; erupted in the area later than in several the continued tightening of the margin of other provinces. We can link this delay in basic freedoms; and the uneven militarisation to two main factors, outlined development between Syria’s provinces below: and cities. These were compounded by the 1. The leadership of the movement by general economic deterioration in the university-educated urban youth. country, unmistakably affecting Deraa, and Despite the fact that the province is Syria’s devastating drought of 2006-2011, primarily led by family groups, many of these families were committed to which created an economic crisis among a neutrality at the start of protest population which relied primarily on movement, out of fear of the security agriculture. The negative economic forces. This left the space open for approach taken by the regime also severely young people to lead the protests in the area. affected Deraa’s population, particularly in 2. The emergence of a number of local the suspension of agricultural subsidies by leaders who were unaffiliated with 5 the government. As well as this, the political authority, who were highly inequitable agricultural and real-estate influential in the local community. Such policies in the province contributed to the individuals included Ma‘an al-‘Awdat, stoppage or obstruction of buying and who was a leading figure in the peaceful movement, and who was selling agricultural land for Deraa’s assassinated by the Syrian security population; the regime stipulated the forces in August 2011. Another was obtaining of prior security approval by the Ahmad al-Siasina, the sheikh of al- security apparatus, with Deraa’s border Omari Mosque in Deraa city. These leaders endeavoured to prevent the location given as a pretext. This led to the spread of militarisation, as far as was restriction of agricultural and commercial possible, and to focus on peaceful activity in the area. protest.6 The peaceful nature of the uprising in Deraa helped to strengthen of the civil

5 Shamel Azmeh, The Uprising of the Marginalised: A Socio- 6 An interview conducted by the author with M. Abazeed, a local Economic Perspective of the Syrian Uprising, LSE Middle East activist from Deraa Province. 2019 Centre paper series (6), Middle East Centre, London 2014 6 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

aspect of the movement, and rendered it military service in the Republican Guard, is more effective in the province as a whole. considered the first defector of the The protestors and activists, particularly uprising, having refused to open fire on the the young people among them, formed residents of Harasta in rural Damascus on local coordination groups; these became 23 April 2011. First Lieutenant Abdel one of the most important sources of Razzaq Tlas, who defected on 27 April information and documentation of 2011 from the 15th Brigade near the city of violations by the Syrian authorities, Ankhal in Deraa’s western countryside, is alongside their role in civil and relief meanwhile considered the first officer to activity. defect, thereafter moving to his hometown, Between the end of 2011 and the the city of Rastan in Homs. Defections beginning of 2012, many non- continued from the officer ranks of the governmental organisations and local Syrian army from then onwards, including initiatives emerged, such as Ghosn Lieutenant Ahmad Khalaf in June 2011, Zeitoun, Horan Foundation and the Public and Lieutenant Khaldoun Zeineddine from Authority for Civil Defence. The number of Sweida city in July 2011, who started the organisations in southern Syria was at Sultan Basha al-Atrash Battalion and least 38 in 2015,7 increasing to around 50 fought against the regime in Deraa in the organisations by the middle of 2018. Many area of Lajat.8 local councils were also formed, helping to Against the backdrop of these defections, fill the governance gap in the province and the steady growth of the armed resulting from the Syrian regime’s gradual movement, the number of armed factions withdrawal in 2012. These councils began in Deraa began to rise considerably, such to provide a number of basic services, such as the Talha bin al-Zubeir Battalion, the al- as water, electricity, education, roads and Omari Battalion, the Yarmouk Martyrs the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. Battalion, the 18th Brigade and the Mu‘taz Army.9 The protest movement continued to

2.3.2 Militarisation grow, and the increase in the number of Deraa’s popular uprising, which began factions originating in Deraa gave rise to an peacefully, rapidly slid into armed struggle increase in violence employed by the with, firstly, the regime’s increasingly brutal Syrian regime in the province. This military and security response, including exacerbated further with the besiegement intensified campaigns of detention and of Deraa city on May 4 2011; the siege torture against peaceful protestors, and, imposed by the Syrian security forces cut secondly, the rise in defections from Syrian off electricity, water, communications and army ranks. Walid al-Qash‘ami, a conscript medicine from the city, while a security from the town of Abta‘ in Deraa clampdown led to the detention of countryside who was carrying out his

7 Citizens for Syria, Syrian Civil society Organisations: Reality 8 SyriaInside, dar‘a ḥakāyat ath-thawrah. 2017. درعا-حكاية-ثورة-من-السلمية-_and Challenges. 2017. http://www.syriainside.com/articles/118 إلى-الواقع-الحالي _https://citizensforsyria.org/OrgLiterature/Syrian_CSOs_Reality and_challenges_2017-CfS_EN.pdf 9 Ibid 7 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

thousands of individuals.10 However, the situation shifted rapidly once At the end of 2012, jihadist groups began again at the end of June 2018, when the to emerge in Syria, such as the Al-Qaeda- Syrian regime, backed by the Russian affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. While the forces, began a brutal military campaign numbers of fighters in the ranks of these against Deraa. This campaign ended in a groups saw a considerable increase in the number of local agreements between the northern parts of Syria, their initial opposition and the regime, carried out presence in Deraa was limited to a small under the direct oversight of Russia. These number of fighters, who were primarily agreements stipulated return of the whole focused in the southern countryside of the southern area to regime control, with the province, near the Jordanian border. In the integration of opposition military factions middle of 2013, with the intensification of into the Russian-backed Fifth Corps. conflict and armed violence in the area, the Despite the state of relative peace that numbers of fighters in the ranks of these prevailed during this period, especially with militant Islamist groups in the Deraa the increased direct Russian presence via province began to increase. Some came the Russia military police, there continued from the southern areas of the Damascus to be sporadic protests, and some military province, others from Jordan, while many action against the Syrian Army’s notorious joined these groups from southern Syria Fourth Division, owing to the continuation itself. Their control of the Nassib crossing of looting, theft, detention, and attacks on 13 with Jordan, as well as their control of a civilians by this Division. number of granaries and olive presses in

the province, gave these groups significant 3. The 2018 Agreement economic power. In June 2018, as mentioned above, a brutal campaign was launched on southern Syria In the period between 2012 and 2015, the by government forces and their allies, province witnessed a number of battles which ended in the near-total control of the between the Syrian military forces and the provinces of Deraa and Quneitra by the opposition forces, which by the end of Syrian government, and caused a number 2015 had taken control of the majority of of structural changes to the conflict, both the two southern provinces of Deraa and on the civilian and military level.14 The Quneitra.11 The situation remained largely military campaign conducted by the Syrian unchanged until the De-escalation regime forced the opposition factions into Agreement of May 2017, which led to a negotiations with them, particularly relative decrease in the intensity of regarding the displacement of over violence, and included all southern areas.12

10 The New Arab, Dar‘a … ḥakāyat muḥāfiẓah ash‘al aṭfāluh ath- 13 Abdullah Al-Jabassin, From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation thawrah as-sūrīyah. 2017. Era in Daraa, Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of Rebel Behaviour During Negotiations, Working Paper, EUI درعا-حكاية-محافظة-/https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2017/3/18 RSCAS, 2019/06, Middle East Directions (MED), Wartime and أشعل-أطفالها-الثورة-السورية 11 Al-Jazeera, Tawzī‘ manāṭiq as-sayṭarah fī sūriyah. 2016. Post-Conflict in Syria International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s 14 توزيع-مناطق-/https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/2/27 -Return to the South. 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle السيطرة-في-سوريا 12 Abdullah Almoussa, De-escalation Agreements at the Brink of east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/196-lessons- Failure. Atlantic Council. 2018. syrian-states-return-south 8 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

300,000 people in the space of just two Aleppo countryside in northern Syria. weeks at the beginning of June as a direct 8. Securing of crossings by Syrian result of their campaign.15 These government forces, under the oversight of the Russian police. negotiations between the conflicting

parties ended in agreements on a number 9. Entry of Syrian government institutions to carry out all service provision for of key areas, known as the ‘Deraa citizens: water, electricity, gas, Agreement’. The following outlines the healthcare, education, renovation, and most important points of this Agreement: the restoration of roads. 1. ‘Regularisation’ of security status for 10. Handing over heavy- and medium- individuals who choose reconciliation grade weapons of those who refuse (over displacement). This regularisation reconciliation, and their departure to the covers all dissidents and civilians who north, keeping light-grade weapons and hand over their weapons, with the four magazines only. guarantee they will not be 11. Inclusion of those residing outside Syria prosecuted/pursued by the security who wish to return to Deraa in the services, on the condition that they do regularisation process, within a set time not conduct any actions against the limit, with the option for proxies to hand state or security services. in the request for status regularisation 2. Regularisation of legal status for on their behalf.16 dissident officers and volunteers, and However, within the first year of this their discharge from service without Agreement, it became clear that many of compensation. these points were not adhered to, putting 3. Regularisation of legal status for dissident conscripts; they must re-enlist into question the ostensible state of in military service within six months, stability. The Syrian authorities did not and are allowed to leave the country abide by its commitments, either on the after completing their service. security or civilian level, in particular in 4. Allowing members of armed groups to relation to regularisation of state and join the Syrian Army’s ranks, after their service provision. The security-related status has been regularised, upon presenting requests to volunteer or be issues, in the period after the Agreement, contracted by the army. can be summarised in five major trends: 5. Entry of Russian police forces and 1. Detentions: The 2018 Aagreement Syrian internal security forces to carry stipulated that residents of Deraa who out security management of the area. wanted to stay would not be pursued by 6. Returning the army to the barracks in the security branches. Despite this, the the southern areas, as long as they are Syrian forces conducted extensive not stationed near the neighbouring campaigns of house raids and arrests. border areas with the Golan, on the 692 detainees were documented, Israeli border, which is under the control among whom were 29 women, from of UNDOF peacekeeping forces. the area, and the majority of whom carried the required regularisation 7. Departure of civilians and soldiers who cards. Among them too were refuse reconciliation, and the terms of individuals who had previously worked the agreement, to the areas of Idlib and

15 UN News, 235 alf nāziḥ fī dar‘ā ma‘ istimrār al-a‘māl al- 16 Arabi21, naṣṣ ittifāq la faṣīl mu‘āriḍ ma‘ rūsiyā bi-dar‘ā. 2018. عربي21-تحصل-على-نص-اتفاق-/qitālīyah fī ‘addat manāṭiq ḥawl sūriyah. 2018. https://arabi21.com/story/1105974 لفصيل-معارض-مع-روسيا-بدرعا https://news.un.org/ar/story/2018/07/1012842 9 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

in the local councils and in such as Deraa city, and villages and humanitarian aid,17 during the first eight towns of the western countryside months after the start of the including the town of Tafas, there Agreement. This crackdown carried on remained a clear armed presence of sporadically in the area, and has Syrian opposition factions. Moreover, continued up to the time of writing. the Syrian regime forces themselves 2. Assassinations: Over the course of were fragmented, with some loyal to around one year, 112 assassination Iran, such as the Fourth Division, one of attempts were documents, resulting in the most powerful divisions of the the deaths of 51 people, the majority of Syrian army in the south, and others whom were opposition figures directly loyal to Russia, such as the Fifth linked to the negotiations and Legion, which came to comprise regularisation dossier with the Syrian individuals and leaders who had authorities. Identifying those previously fought under the banner of responsible for these assassinations is the opposition’s Free Syrian Army. This difficult; some believe that members of had the potential to give rise to an military factions opposed to the aggravation of these divisions between regularisation agreement were behind these different forces, and in turn these attacks, while others blame the making a flare up in the south 21 Syrian security apparatus and various increasingly likely. army divisions, including the Fourth 5. Mandatory conscription: The Division. This latter argument attributes government forces imposed mandatory the assassinations to the wish of these conscription on young men from the divisions to maintain chaos in the area, area following the end of the and therefore continue to illegitimately regularisation period, set in the 2018 benefit from the war economy.18 agreement at six months. Many 3. Declaration of popular resistance: At the conscripts were sent to fight in the Idlib end of 2018, protests emerged in Deraa province, and with the deaths of around calling for popular resistance against 30 fighters from Deraa in the battles of the Syrian regime.19 While this northern Syria, the security situation in resistance movement was not an the south worsened, with the fury of the organised effort and did not extend families over the issue of mandatory further than individual actions, the mere conscription. fact of its existence, and the targeting of a number of regime checkpoints, rendered the sustainability of stability a cause for concern, particularly in light of the sensitivity of Deraa’s geographic 20 location. 4. Lack of clarity over the form and nature of the de facto military authorities: Despite the fact that southern Syria was under the control of Syrian governmental forces, in some areas,

17 An interview conducted by the author with O. Mohammad, 20 Syria TV. 2019. Director of the Documentation Office of the free Horan https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r0yxPwdFdmg Institution. 2019. 21 Abdullah Al-Jabassini, From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation Era in Daraa Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of Rebel 19 Popular Resistance in Deraa, official Facebook page. Behavior During Negotiation, Working Paper, EUI RSCAS, -Middle East Directions (MED), Wartime and Post ,06/2019 المقاومة-الشعبية-في-درعا-/https://www.facebook.com 2015821478721778/ Conflict in Syria 10 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

4. Governance Systems in the Deraa harmful competition over regional Province administration, specifically between civil society organisations and local councils in Prior to March 2011, the governance southern Syrian; this competition system in the south was limited to the manifested itself around the form and government’s role, with no tangible role nature of administration, and the quality of afford to non-governmental bodies such as services being provided. Military forces civil society organisations and trade also directly intervened as one of the unions. These were not allowed to function actors of governance, even extending to except according to very stringent some of the armed factions which were restrictions, and were only able to perform granted administration of certain service a charitable role. The role of local families, sectors, and the enforcement of their own which make up one of the most significant governance system.22 dynamics and social drivers in the Deraa From the end of 2012, when opposition province, was also weak, and was co-opted control extended over large parts of the by the regime’s political and security Deraa province, the majority of governance system, with heads of families systems in place were characterised by incorporated into networks of local weak coordination and cooperation intermediaries directly linked to this mechanisms. This was exacerbated by the system. official government bodies refusing all Following the start of the March 2011 communication and coordination uprising, however, the forms of governance mechanisms with their quasi-governmental adopted were hugely expanded, given the counterparts, such as the councils and plethora of political and armed actors in directorates operating in opposition- the growing conflict. These included both controlled areas. official governmental bodies and quasi- For example, before Deraa’s 2018 governmental bodies, the latter agreement was signed, the health represented in the local councils and directorate in Syria’s opposition-held areas technical directorates in opposition- shared all essential medical data with its controlled parts of Syria, as well as civil counterparts in the central government, society organisations and local initiatives. with the consideration that health Such bodies played a fundamental role in operations should remain outside the filling the governance and service gap political sphere.23 However, the Syrian which emerged in many areas which were government did not in turn, for example, no longer under central government recognise the examinations and control. certificates issued by the educational This diversity in the way local governance directorate operating in opposition-held was administered in Syria led to a state of areas.

22 Graduate Institute Geneva, Syrian Civil Society Cooperation, 23 An interview conducted by the author with Z. Zoabi, a Challenges and Opportunities In- and Post-Conflict Implications member of a Syrian medical organisation. 2019 2016 11 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

The central government’s refusal to while the security situation meant it coordinate with the local governance was a logistical challenge to carry out team capacity building, given the bodies in the opposition-held areas difficulty of individuals entering and dampened any hopes of reaching real and leaving the area to attend required tangible stability in many governance trainings. sectors. These included issues pertaining Overall, there were three main bodies to civil registries, such as birth, marriage charged with service provision and and death certificates, as well as those governance in opposition-held areas: 1) pertaining to property rights. All such provincial councils and local councils, 2) documents issued by the directorates and civil alliances and, 3) military forces. local councils in opposition-held areas At the start, military forces did not play a were not officially recognised, even after major role in service provision and civil the Deraa Agreement was signed in June administration in Deraa, in comparison 2018. with other provinces. This was primarily 4.1 Stakeholders in Opposition-Held Areas because of the availability of competent and capable civil bodies, both economically While local councils and civil society and administratively; the role of the armed organisations played a key role in forces being focused on military affairs; opposition-held areas, and made and the power of the locally influential significant attempts to fill the growing families and popular base, which governance gap, their management was supported civil society organisations and often disordered and chaotic. There are the councils, as opposed to military several reasons for this, and the most formations. significant of these are outlined below: Despite this, military bodies did have some 1. The multitude of stakeholders administrative role, particularly in the responsible for the service control of the Nassib crossing on the administration, such as organisations, border with Jordan.24 Their control of councils, local initiatives and military forces, as well as such government-run wheat granaries and olive presses is also institutions operating in opposition-held noteworthy, given that these two goods are areas. economically important – particularly in 2. The absence of a central leadership, or relation to their export to neighbouring even a high-level coordination body, areas. keeping together these different stakeholders. The process of governing provinces in 3. The security situation, and the Syrian opposition-held areas was primarily in the governmental forces seeking to hands of provincial councils and local separate the eastern countryside from councils, with technical support provided the western countryside, preventing by the opposition’s various directorates, them from connecting geographically. This prevented any kind of coordination, such as the health and education

المعارضة-/Al-Jazeera, Al-mu‘āriḍah as-sūrīyah tusayṭir ‘ala ma‘bar naṣīb https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2015/4/2 24 السورية-تسيطر-على-معبر-نصيب .al-ḥudūdī. 2015 12 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

directorates. According to many of Deraa’s 1. Providing funding proposals and needs residents, the governing of the province by assessments to Syrian civil society organisations, affording these local residents had positive results, since organisations positions of power; in they could more easily communicate with certain cases, they came to be the local communities, and had wide bodies with the greatest influence over knowledge of the area and local needs. the decisions of local councils. Despite these positives, the experience 2. A supervisory role over funding policies, overall was not as successful as was which was itself limited because of the lack of financial potential and of internal expected. Although the administrative administrative capacities.27 structure of the councils was run While the provincial councils sought to according to a clear hierarchy (the highest provide licenses to civil society being the Ministry of Local Administration, organisations, with the aim of controlling followed by the Province Council, ending the presence and working mechanisms of with the Local Council),25 this structure did these organisations, these licenses did not not end up being effective. In spite of this have any real benefits. Moreover, the chain seemingly hierarchical coordination, the of relationships within the non- reality was that each local council had its governmental organisations and local own different formation mechanism, with councils grew to resemble those of state some using elections, and others institutions, in terms of patronage, hiring employing a selection process utilising relatives, and uneven development political, tribal and military forces. The between neighbouring towns and villages. paucity of financial potential and funding opportunities also meant that the extent to Gender equality, or the lack thereof, is which they could carry out interventions considered among the chief shortcomings and effective service provision was highly within these organisations and local limited.26 councils, with a clear absence of women in management posts. The majority of In general, the local stakeholders, whether women-centred projects focused local councils or civil society organisations, essentially on women being craftspeople were not able to develop an effective only, this becoming clear from the number economic or administrative system. of embroidery projects through which the Instead, they mainly relied on the financial organisations targeted women, without and technical support provided by really thinking about creating projects international donor bodies. The councils which could empower women politically, were not able to play a significant role economically, and in terms of governance. either in terms of organisation or in terms of administration, restricting the role of the local councils to the following:

25 Circular No. 22, Ministry of Local Administration, Relief and 27 An interview conducted by the author with Z. Zoabi, a Refugee Affairs, 31/07/2017. member of a Syrian medical organisation. 2019. 26 An interview conducted by the author with J. O. a humanitarian worker in an INGO working in Deraa. 2019. 13 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

4.2 Governance Recommendations in Deraa 5. Recognition of documents issued by Province quasi-governmental bodies: It is necessary to create a mechanism for 1. Decentralisation: The employees of recognising certificates and documents every major sector, such as education, issued by quasi-governmental bodies, health, agriculture, urban and in order to avoid major problems investment development, should work related to education and family matters, through a decentralised approach at such as the documenting of births and the province level, within a wide margin deaths. of independence from central governance. This relates specifically to 5. Civil Society the management of local resources (human and material); the management 5.1 Overview of Civil Society in the Deraa of local revenues; and the distribution Province of roles and powers between the province and administrative units, as is The number of civil society organisations appropriate for the local community. has significantly increased since the start 2. Advancement of development projects, of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, with as well as that of the private and this being particularly evident in the areas investment sector. of southern Syria. This is the result of the 3. Self-governing of the province and its military power shifts in the south, and the villages: This is with the aim of reducing resultant fragility of Syrian governmental communal tension, protecting against corruption, and reducing patronage and control; the significant funding clientelism as far as possible. With the opportunities due to donor focus on governance of the province and its supporting areas of southern Syrian; the administrative units being carried out enormous humanitarian needs resulting by members of the local community from the war; and the inclination/trend of itself, applying societal pressure on those in charge would become easier. the majority of peaceful activists to civil This is particularly true of the southern [society] work, particularly after the Syrian communities, which have strong proliferation of armed factions in the south. tribal and familial ties, which could thus become a means of societal According to a study carried out by the accountability. organisation IMPACT, southern Syria 4. Reducing restrictions on civil society witnessed the emergence of over 50 non- organisations: Given the current governmental organisations between 2011 situation, such restrictions end up being and 2018, with the majority founded harmful to all, particularly given the fact that these organisations were able to between 2013 and 2015. These meet the majority of local community organisations were active in a number of needs over the last seven years. It is fields, including education, health and also crucial to benefit from their relief, alongside organisations specialised experience and impartiality during the in working with youth, women or children.28 state-building process. These organisations came to rank among the biggest players in terms of governance

28 Citizens for Syria, Syrian Civil society Organisations: Reality and Challenges. 2017. 14 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

and service provision, even assuming the 5.2 The Future of Civil Society Organisations role of the state in many areas. in the Deraa Province Organisations such as Ghosn Zeitoun, for After the breakdown of the 2017 De- example, assumed responsibility for escalation Agreement and the Syrian education in large parts of the province; the government forces’ recapture of southern Public Authority for Civil Defence, Syria, the number of operational meanwhile, oversaw the provision of basic organisations went down from 50 to 10, services such as electricity, water and specifically during the first six months after infrastructure. Other organisations, the June 2018 Agreement was signed. meanwhile, such as Farah Organisation, Most of the organisations which remained worked specifically in the field of were branches of organisations in governance, and conducted capacity government-controlled areas which had building for those working within the local previously obtained licenses; the Syrian councils.29 government prohibited the operation of all Such organisations also played a major organisations which had worked in role in reducing conflict and contributing to southern Syria that were established after the peacebuilding process, through their March 2011. consensus-building role in many parts of After the June 2018 Agreement, which led southern Syria. The organisations to the forced displacement of many operating in southern Syria had wide- residents of southern Syria to the north, ranging relationships with other some activists displaced from the Deraa stakeholders, such as governmental and province tried to re-activate their work in quasi-governmental bodies. They also had the areas of Idlib and northern Aleppo. strong coordination capacities, and were However, this was limited to providing able to coordinate with various UN relief services to those displaced from agencies operating in southern Syria from Deraa, and organising IDP camps for them. Jordan. Finally, they had a distinct role in Despite this, during the few months reducing the economic and social burdens following the June 2018 Agreement, there for communities in southern Syria. were some exceptions within the province, However, the Syrian government’s which cannot be generalised to civil society recapture of southern Syria in June 2018 work in southern Syria as a whole. For led to the closure of the majority of these example, a few Syrian organisations civil society organisations, either by the operating specifically in the field of relief direct order of the regime’s security were able to gain licenses from the Syrian apparatus, or by the organisation itself, out authorities, under new names, some of of fear of pursuit and detention by the them even run by those known to be on the security services. side of the opposition. One possible reason for this is the Syrian government’s need for service providers, given that it does not

29 Farah Organisation, Education Governance Programme in Southern of Syria. 2018. 15 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

have the financial and administrative licenses from the Ministry of Social Affairs, capacities itself to meet the growing needs with new names and new teams. of the local communities in southern Syria. Moreover, given the precariousness of the 5.3 Civil Society Recommendations in Deraa Province security situation in southern Syria, all parties have been obliged to consider 1. Imposing specific conditions on the working with civil society organisations, funding of Syria’s reconstruction by the which are better placed to communicate international community: This is with with local communities and reduce the aim of putting pressure on the Syrian government to widen the margin potential future conflict. Lastly, the of civil society work in the areas of its relationship between civil society control; offering legal guarantees to organisations and the private sector helped protect civil society workers and to sustain civil society work, with many activists; and working towards private companies utilising their licenses to mechanisms for monitoring the extent to which civil society in Syria is able to facilitate the work of humanitarian function freely. organisations. 2. Reducing political and ideological The challenges described above make it polarisation of Syrian civil society difficult to predict how civil society work in organisations: It should be necessary for civil society alliances, to begin the Deraa province will develop in the building relationships with Syrian coming period. However, looking at various organisations spanning different indicators from the province, it appears political affiliations, in order to enhance that there will be little space for non-relief- the sustainability of civil society work in Syria. based organisations to operate (this

includes legal and rights-based 3. Advocating on the protection of humanitarian workers: It is crucial that organisations, and those working in advocacy organisations apply violations documentation, advocacy for sustained pressure on international victims, and those working in governance, bodies and Syrian governmental bodies administrative and institutional to guarantee the protection of humanitarian workers, and the development, and peace building). Most of continuation of their work. these organisations will be forced 4. Self-funding for the Syrian non- underground, and will have to coordinate governmental organisations and local with civil society groups present in initiatives: The development of self- northern Syria, or non-governmental funding mechanisms would serve to organisations working in neighbouring reduce the excessive dependence on international donors, as would the countries. development of revenue-raising In terms of charitable relief organisations, it projects. appears that these will be allowed to work 5. Increasing civil society’s role in in the province, as long as they are designing and monitoring the development and reconstruction efforts: branches of other charitable organisations It is important to advocate for the licensed in Damascus prior to March 2011. inclusion of Syrian civil society as a Otherwise, they will have to apply for new major player in the reconstruction 16 Deraa Province: Conflict Dynamics and the Role of Civil Society

process. Since they are the most impartial actors in the Syrian conflict, their direct involvement would guarantee, to a significant extent, that the reconstruction period would not become politicised.

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