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Algemeen Ambtsbericht Syrië Juni 2021

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Algemeen Ambtsbericht Syrië Juni 2021 Algemeen Ambtsbericht Syrië juni 2021 Pagina 1 van 112 Algemeen Ambtsbericht Syrië | juni 2021 Colofon Plaats Den Haag Opgesteld door Afdeling Ambtsberichten (DAF/AB) Pagina 2 van 112 Algemeen Ambtsbericht Syrië | juni 2021 Inhoudsopgave Colofon ....................................................................................................... 2 Inhoudsopgave ............................................................................................. 3 Inleiding ...................................................................................................... 5 1 Politieke en veiligheidssituatie .................................................................... 7 1.1 Politieke en bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen ........................................................... 7 1.1.1 Regeringsgebied ........................................................................................... 7 1.1.2 Gebieden niet onder regeringscontrole. ........................................................... 12 1.1.3 Covid-19 .................................................................................................... 15 1.2 Gewapende actoren ..................................................................................... 15 1.2.1 Regeringsstrijdkrachten ................................................................................ 16 1.2.2 Veiligheidsdiensten in gebieden onder controle van de Syrische regering .............. 16 1.2.3 Veiligheidsdiensten in gebieden onder controle van andere actoren ..................... 18 1.2.4 IS .............................................................................................................. 19 1.3 Veiligheidssituatie ........................................................................................ 20 1.3.1 Noordwesten (Tartous, Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo) .................................................. 24 1.3.2 Noordoosten (Raqqa, Hasaka, Deir ez-Zor) ...................................................... 28 1.3.3 Centraal (Hama, Homs, Damascus, Rif Dimasq) ............................................... 31 1.3.4 Zuidwesten (Quneitra, Daraa, Sweida) ............................................................ 32 1.3.5 Verzoeningsovereenkomsten ......................................................................... 35 1.3.6 Burgerslachtoffers ........................................................................................ 36 1.3.7 Bewegingsvrijheid ........................................................................................ 38 1.4 Militaire dienst ............................................................................................. 40 1.4.1 Wet- en regelgeving met betrekking tot militaire dienstplicht ............................. 41 1.4.2 Reservisten ................................................................................................. 42 1.4.3 Duur van en ontslag uit militaire dienst ........................................................... 44 1.4.4 Dienstplichtigen afkomstig uit voorheen oppositiegebied en illegaal uit Syrië vertrokken dienstplichtigen ........................................................................... 44 1.4.5 Uitstel en vrijstellingen ................................................................................. 45 1.4.6 Afkoop ....................................................................................................... 46 1.4.7 Ontduiking dienstplicht en desertie ................................................................. 47 1.4.8 SDF ........................................................................................................... 48 1.5 Rekrutering minderjarigen ............................................................................. 49 2 Identiteit, nationaliteit en documenten ..................................................... 51 2.1 Identificatieplicht en identificerende documenten .............................................. 51 2.2 Documenten ............................................................................................... 52 2.2.1 Paspoort ..................................................................................................... 52 2.2.2 Identiteitskaarten ........................................................................................ 53 2.2.3 Burgerlijke stand ......................................................................................... 54 2.2.4 Documentfraude .......................................................................................... 58 2.3 Nationaliteit ................................................................................................ 59 3 Mensenrechten .......................................................................................... 61 3.1 Inleiding ..................................................................................................... 61 3.2 Rechtsgang ................................................................................................. 61 3.3 Naleving en schending .................................................................................. 64 3.3.1 Vrijheid van meningsuiting ............................................................................ 66 3.3.2 Vrijheid van godsdienst en levensovertuiging ................................................... 68 Pagina 3 van 112 3.3.3 Arrestaties, bewaring en detenties .................................................................. 69 3.3.4 Verdwijningen en ontvoeringen ...................................................................... 73 3.3.5 Mishandeling en foltering .............................................................................. 77 3.3.6 Buitengerechtelijke executies en moorden ....................................................... 79 3.3.7 Doodstraf ................................................................................................... 81 3.4 Positie van specifieke groepen ....................................................................... 82 3.4.1 Algemeen ................................................................................................... 82 3.4.2 Leden van oppositiepartijen/ politieke activisten ............................................... 83 3.4.3 Journalisten en mensenrechtenactivisten ......................................................... 84 3.4.4 Gezondheidswerkers en leden van de burgerbescherming .................................. 86 3.4.5 Palestijnen in Syrië ...................................................................................... 87 3.4.6 (Staatloze) Koerden ..................................................................................... 88 3.4.7 Dienstplichtigen, dienstweigeraars en deserteurs .............................................. 89 3.4.8 LHBT .......................................................................................................... 89 3.4.9 Vrouwen ..................................................................................................... 91 3.4.10 (Alleenstaande) minderjarigen ....................................................................... 93 4 Vluchtelingen en binnenlands ontheemden ............................................... 96 4.1 Binnenlands ontheemden .............................................................................. 96 4.2 Vluchtelingen .............................................................................................. 97 4.3 Terugkeer ................................................................................................... 97 4.3.1 Standpunt UNHCR ...................................................................................... 104 5 Bijlagen ................................................................................................... 106 5.1 Geraadpleegde bronnen .............................................................................. 106 5.2 Kaart van Syrië ......................................................................................... 112 Pagina 4 van 112 Algemeen Ambtsbericht Syrië | juni 2021 Inleiding Dit ambtsbericht is opgesteld aan de hand van de in de door het ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid opgestelde Terms of Reference (ToR) gestelde vragen en genoemde aandachtspunten. De ToR voor het onderhavige ambtsbericht is vastgesteld op 14 december 2020. Een geanonimiseerde versie van deze ToR is tezamen met het ambtsbericht gepubliceerd op de website van de rijksoverheid. In dit algemeen ambtsbericht wordt de situatie in Syrië beschreven voor zover deze van belang is voor de beoordeling van asielaanvragen van personen die afkomstig zijn uit dit land en voor de besluitvorming over terugkeer van afgewezen Syrische asielzoekers. Dit ambtsbericht is een actualisering van het algemeen ambtsbericht van mei 2020 en vult op sommige punten het thematisch ambtsbericht van december 2019 over documenten in Syrië aan.1 De verslagperiode beslaat de periode juni 2020 tot en met april 2021. Relevante ontwikkelingen van belang voor de beantwoording van de gestelde TOR-vragen worden op hoofdlijnen meegenomen tot aan de publicatiedatum. Dit ambtsbericht betreft een feitelijke, neutrale en objectieve weergave van de bevindingen gedurende de onderzochte periode en biedt geen beleidsaanbevelingen. Het ambtsbericht pretendeert niet volledig te zijn wat betreft afzonderlijke veiligheidsincidenten en mensenrechtenschendingen; de specifiek genoemde incidenten zijn aangehaald ter onderbouwing van een meer algemeen beeld. De situatie in Syrië met betrekking tot de in het ambtsbericht behandelde
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