DOCSLIB.ORG

The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration THE SYRIAN CRISIS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION A Conference Report by Rice University’s Baker Institute Center for the Middle East February 2017 © 2017 by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, papers are reviewed by outside experts before they are released. However, the research and views expressed in this paper are those of the individual researcher(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Conference Report “The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration” The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration In December 2016, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy hosted a panel of leading Syria experts to discuss the Syrian civil war and US policy options: Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian Ambassador Ryan Crocker Ambassador Robert Ford Randa Slim, Ph.D. Joshua Landis, Ph.D. Charles Lister Andrew Tabler The following report summarizes some of the proposals made during the deliberations. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of every participant or of the Baker Institute. 2 The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration Executive Summary The Syrian crisis has had important impacts on US national security interests. Since 2011, the war in Syria has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions, and spurred crises that have affected the international community. A complex web of actors on the ground and internationally has prolonged the conflict and severely challenged policymakers. The Trump administration will have to address this issue—defining US core interests and principles and formulating specific policies to achieve them. In Syria, US interests can be defined as: 1) counterterrorism, 2) restoring stability, and 3) refugee relief. In pursuing these aims, the US relationship with international actors will be important. But while the US notionally shares some security interests with Russia, Iran, and Syria in regard to counterterrorism, the limitations of these states as potential partners are very significant. A key first step for the Trump administration should be to reengage with traditional regional partners with which relationships have weakened in recent years. The administration’s foreign policy message must be that the US is back to listen to our strategic partners’ concerns and interests, to engage with the region, and to take a fresh look at ongoing problems with a renewed commitment to collaborate with partners to achieve security, stability, and good governance. The US relationship with Turkey will be important, especially in clarifying the Kurdish issue. US policy toward Iran will also play a role in how strategic partnerships are rebuilt. While US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement would bring little benefit and could have negative effects, tougher US policies on Iran outside of the agreement might reassure allies. In negotiations, the US must consider the limitations that come with attempting to decentralize the Syrian government and calling for Bashar al-Assad to step down. The US could accept a straw man option in which the Assad regime remains as part of a longer term transition, and attempt to play a role in the negotiation and rebuilding processes, setting standards for Assad to meet on key issues. And while a grand bargain will be difficult to achieve, the prospects for multiple packages of smaller, dynamic negotiations and agreements may have a better chance for success. An important point of leverage for the US and its partners is their collective capacity to provide financial and developmental support for Syrian reconstruction, as well as their established relationships with opposition groups. However, any support to rebuild Syria would not be possible without obtaining serious concessions from the Syrian regime and its allies, lest the US be perceived as footing the bill to support the political gains of Assad, Iran, and Russia. Finally, the US must take a hard look at immediate and long-term strategy toward the Middle East while being mindful of history. Since the conflict began, 11 million people have been displaced in one of the largest diasporas in world history. Failure to find sustainable solutions to the refugee issue in neighboring countries will breed radicalism in the future and have destabilizing effects regionally and globally. In the longer term, the reabsorption of refugees and rebuilding of Syria will be critical to stability and security. The United States and its partners must also address the region’s failures in governance and socioeconomic development, while avoiding the pitfalls that accompany nation building. 3 The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration Introduction Since 2011, the war in Syria has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions, and spurred crises that have affected the international community. Fueled by longstanding domestic grievances and substantial outside intervention, Syria’s civil war has become regional—pitting states and their proxies against each other, vying to tip the regional balance in their own favor at a time of almost unprecedented weakness in the Middle East state system. The result on the ground is incredibly complex and brutal, with no party strong enough to take hold of the country. Developments in Syria in 2017, influenced in part by President Donald Trump’s decisions, will shape the regional order for decades and affect millions of lives. After six years of conflict, the prospect of an end to the fighting and a peaceful transition and settlement is highly problematic. The Syrian military and its allies control the major cities and a western third of the country (excluding Idlib province), and lack the capacity to regain the eastern portions of the state. Syrian opposition groups and the Kurds control much of northern and central Syria. The Islamic State’s territorial control is declining, but it is still present in the central and eastern portions of the state. Syria’s opposition groups are not monolithic; they are composed of numerous factions of varying interests and ideology that compete for power and territory. Further, the viability of most groups is dependent on the support of outside benefactors whose influence over their proxies can be limited. US strategy toward Syria has been opaque, at least partially due to the Syrian crisis’ complexity and the foreign policy framework under which the Obama administration operated. The Obama administration supported political transition away from the Assad regime and aided opposition groups, but limited direct US involvement because of its strong concern of overreach or conflict with other actors. Concurrently, the Obama administration in 2014 began countering the Islamic State through airstrikes and support for groups combatting ISIS, at least theoretically working at a common cause with the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. President Trump has made clear that his priority for Syria is to defeat the Islamic State, potentially through increased cooperation with Russia and a reevaluation of US support for the Syrian opposition. A strategy following these tenets requires an accurate understanding of the facts on the ground, the international dynamics at work, and the long-term prospects and implications of the crisis. 4 The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration On the Ground In the months ahead, developments in Syria will depend heavily on the capacity and will of the Syrian regime to regain and hold territory, as well as the actions of the regime’s backers. After retaking Aleppo, loyalist forces have gained momentum, but limited capacity will hinder the regime’s progress as it seeks to take key areas around Damascus and northern Syria. Armed opposition groups have been dealt a serious blow and are consolidating in key territories, notably Idlib province. US- and Turkish-backed forces are competing for territory in northern Syria. The strength of all parties is considerably influenced by support and decisions of outside actors, and will be central during the next year of the conflict. Finally, actions on the ground will be partially shaped by decisions made between outside powers, particularly through discussions in Astana and Geneva. Actors and Benefactors By early 2017, it seems likely that there will be four major combatant coalitions in Syria: 1) Assad loyalist forces, backed by Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia; 2) the Syrian Democratic Forces, aligned with the US and Gulf States; 3) “Euphrates Shield” forces aligned with Turkey; and 4) a loose coalition of opposition forces, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and others, which control Idlib, western Aleppo, northern Hama, northern Homs, and other strategic territories. The Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey strongly opposes, controls a significant portion of northern Syria and is largely aligned with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). These groups are in addition to the Islamic State and other jihadist militant groups fighting the regime and secular forces. In the months ahead, combat could go in a number of directions, largely shaped by the decisions of the Assad regime and agreements among outside actors. The Assad regime views the rebel coalitions as a more
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Offensive Against the Syrian City of Manbij May Be the Beginning of a Campaign to Liberate the Area Near the Syrian-Turkish Border from ISIS
    June 23, 2016 Offensive against the Syrian City of Manbij May Be the Beginning of a Campaign to Liberate the Area near the Syrian-Turkish Border from ISIS Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters at the western entrance to the city of Manbij (Fars, June 18, 2016). Overview 1. On May 31, 2016, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-dominated military alliance supported by the United States, initiated a campaign to liberate the northern Syrian city of Manbij from ISIS. Manbij lies west of the Euphrates, about 35 kilometers (about 22 miles) south of the Syrian-Turkish border. In the three weeks since the offensive began, the SDF forces, which number several thousand, captured the rural regions around Manbij, encircled the city and invaded it. According to reports, on June 19, 2016, an SDF force entered Manbij and occupied one of the key squares at the western entrance to the city. 2. The declared objective of the ground offensive is to occupy Manbij. However, the objective of the entire campaign may be to liberate the cities of Manbij, Jarabulus, Al-Bab and Al-Rai, which lie to the west of the Euphrates and are ISIS strongholds near the Turkish border. For ISIS, the loss of the area is liable to be a severe blow to its logistic links between the outside world and the centers of its control in eastern Syria (Al-Raqqah), Iraq (Mosul). Moreover, the loss of the region will further 112-16 112-16 2 2 weaken ISIS's standing in northern Syria and strengthen the military-political position and image of the Kurdish forces leading the anti-ISIS ground offensive.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Behind the Scud Scare? Posted by Joshua Landis Thursday, April 15, 2010 - 2:18 PM
    What is behind the Scud scare? Posted By Joshua Landis Thursday, April 15, 2010 - 2:18 PM Joshua Landis is the director of the Center for Middle East Studies and associate professor at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of the blog Syria Comment. Reports in U.S. and Israeli papers on Wednesday, alleging that Syria delivered Scud missiles to Hezbollah, has set off a firestorm about the limits of engagement and the danger posed by Syria and nonstate actors in the region. Yet the ensuing debate has ignored the broader context of which this episode is but a symptom: namely, that the continued lack of resolution to the decades-long conflict between Syria and Israel has been allowed to fester. This new development could not have been better timed to throw a monkey wrench into Washington's engagement process with Syria and President Barack Obama's efforts to reanimate the stalled peace process in the region. Robert S. Ford, the first ambassador named to Damascus in five years, is in the midst of his confirmation process. A key committee in the Senate has recommended his confirmation, but the ultimate vote among the full Senate has yet to take place. There are many who would like to stop it, not the least because Obama seems ready to push forward efforts to resolve the long-festering Arab -Israeli conflict. On Tuesday, he declared that solving the dispute was a "vital national security interest of the United States" because it is "costing us significantly in terms of both blood and treasure." In the short term, the White House's desire to help broker a Middle East peace means getting an ambassador back to Damascus and engaging with Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • Of Iraq's Kirkuk
    INSTITUT KURDDE PARIS E Information and liaison bulletin N° 392 NOVEMBER 2017 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Ministry of Culture This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Misen en page et maquette : Ṣerefettin ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: bulletin@fikp.org Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 392 November 2017 • ROJAVA: PREPARING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE • TURKEY: THE REPRESSION EXPANDS TO LIBER- AL CIRCLES; THE VIOLENCE IS INCREASING • IRAQI KURDISTAN: UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEMANDS FROM BAGHDAD, ARABISATION OF KIRKUK RESTARTED ROJAVA: PREPARING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. broad the “World Day for beginning to return to Raqqa, liber- the 17th with a suicide attack on a Kobani” was celebrated ated on 17th October. Regarding checkpoint that caused at least 35 on 1st November largely Deir Ezzor, the SDF fighters from victims in the Northeast of Deir as a symbol of this Syrian the “Jezirah Storm” operation, Ezzor Province, between the hydro- A Kurdish town’s unremit- launched on 9th September, liberated carbon fields of Conoco and Jafra. It ting resistance to the attack 7 villages near the town and about was, nevertheless, not able to pre- launched by ISIS in 2014 with fifteen km from the Iraqi borders, vent the SDF from reaching the Iraqi Turkish connivance.
    [Show full text]
  • Religion, Refugees, and Migration
    FOR MORE INFORMATION BUTLER UNIVERSITY SEMINAR on RELIGION and GLOBAL AFFAIRS presents WWW.BUTLER.EDU/CFV 317-940-8253 The Seminar on Religion and Global Affairs is a program of the Center for Faith and Vocation at Butler University, promoting understanding of interfaith and intercultural relations through the discussion of religious issues in global perspectives. We wish to thank our internal partners, including Global and Historical Studies for their Sponsored by the sponsorship as well as the Desmond Tutu Center for Peace, Reconciliation, and Global Justice CENTER for FAITH and VOCATION and the Philosophy, Religion, and Classics Department for the partnerships. We are also thankful to our community partners for their collaboration, including the Center for Interfaith Cooperation, the Immigrant Welcome Center, and Catholic Charities Indianapolis FOUR PUBLIC SEMINARS Refugee and Immigrant Services. For parking on Butler University’s campus, patrons September 19, October 17, should park in the Sunset Avenue Parking Garage. Fees can be found at butler.edu/parking. January 23, and February 27 PARTNERING EVENTS: INDY FESTIVAL of FAITHS— SACRED MIGRATIONS Sunday, October 15, 1:00-5:00 PM, Veteran’s Memorial Plaza For accessibility information or to request disability-related accommodations, please visit WELCOMING STRANGERS, FINDING www.butler.edu/event-accommodations. BROTHERS and SISTERS Each seminar meets from 7:00 to 9:00 PM Monday, February 19, 7:00 PM, at the Schrott Center for the Arts, Butler Arts Center. Eidson-Duckwall Recital Hall,
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Military Intervention in Syria. Its Operation Plan, Objectives, And
    Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Russia’s Military Intervention in Syria WP Its Operation Plan, Objectives, and Consequences for the West’s Policies Markus Kaim and Oliver Tamminga S The deployment and use of Russian air forces in Syria could be a turning-point for Presi- dent Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Since the start of the Russian air strikes on 30 September 2015, discussion has been rife in the media and in political circles as to what intentions Russia might be pursuing with its intervention in Syria. However, if one takes into ac- count the force package deployed to Syria, the manner in which the Russian air forces have proceeded, and the Kremlin’s official statements after the Assad visit to Moscow, the main features of an operation plan quickly emerge. It has repercussions far beyond Syria. On 30 September 2015, the Russian mili- Lebanese Hezbollah, even though these tary embarked on a series of operations actors are pursuing different interests. in Syria that had been prepared from the beginning of September onwards with the establishment of a base south of Latakia Russia’s military capacity in Syria and the deployment of the relevant forces. In the past few weeks, Russia has been However, the military and political aims increasing its deployment of military forces of the Russian government, as well as the to the air base near Latakia, in the north- motives behind the military intervention, west of Syria. are still unclear. The marines, T-90 tanks, combat vehicles The Russian government has never and artillery deployed there mainly serve hidden its willingness to act against all to protect the air base from attacks by IS forces fighting the Damascus regime.
    [Show full text]
  • From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations — Aron Lund
    7/2019 From Cold War to Civil War: 75 Years of Russian-Syrian Relations — Aron Lund PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE Abstract The Russian-Syrian relationship turns 75 in 2019. The Soviet Union had already emerged as Syria’s main military backer in the 1950s, well before the Baath Party coup of 1963, and it maintained a close if sometimes tense partnership with President Hafez al-Assad (1970–2000). However, ties loosened fast once the Cold War ended. It was only when both Moscow and Damascus separately began to drift back into conflict with the United States in the mid-00s that the relationship was revived. Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Russia has stood by Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime against a host of foreign and domestic enemies, most notably through its aerial intervention of 2015. Buoyed by Russian and Iranian support, the Syrian president and his supporters now control most of the population and all the major cities, although the government struggles to keep afloat economically. About one-third of the country remains under the control of Turkish-backed Sunni factions or US-backed Kurds, but deals imposed by external actors, chief among them Russia, prevent either side from moving against the other. Unless or until the foreign actors pull out, Syria is likely to remain as a half-active, half-frozen conflict, with Russia operating as the chief arbiter of its internal tensions – or trying to. This report is a companion piece to UI Paper 2/2019, Russia in the Middle East, which looks at Russia’s involvement with the Middle East more generally and discusses the regional impact of the Syria intervention.1 The present paper seeks to focus on the Russian-Syrian relationship itself through a largely chronological description of its evolution up to the present day, with additional thematically organised material on Russia’s current role in Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Publication
    Viewpoints No. 99 Mission Impossible? Triangulating U.S.- Turkish Relations with Syria’s Kurds Amberin Zaman Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center; Columnist, Diken.com.tr and Al-Monitor Pulse of the Middle East April 2016 The United States is trying to address Turkish concerns over its alliance with a Syrian Kurdish militia against the Islamic State. Striking a balance between a key NATO ally and a non-state actor is growing more and more difficult. Middle East Program ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ On April 7 Syrian opposition rebels backed by airpower from the U.S.-led Coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS) declared that they had wrested Al Rai, a strategic hub on the Turkish border from the jihadists. They hailed their victory as the harbinger of a new era of rebel cooperation with the United States against ISIS in the 98-kilometer strip of territory bordering Turkey that remains under the jihadists’ control. Their euphoria proved short-lived: On April 11 it emerged that ISIS had regained control of Al Rai and the rest of the areas the rebels had conquered in the past week. Details of what happened remain sketchy because poor weather conditions marred visibility. But it was still enough for Coalition officials to describe the reversal as a “total collapse.” The Al Rai fiasco is more than just a battleground defeat against the jihadists. It’s a further example of how Turkey’s conflicting goals with Washington are hampering the campaign against ISIS. For more than 18 months the Coalition has been striving to uproot ISIS from the 98- kilometer chunk of the Syrian-Turkish border that is generically referred to the “Manbij Pocket” or the Marea-Jarabulus line.
    [Show full text]
  • Implementing Stability in Iraq and Syria 3
    Hoover Institution Working Group on Military History A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY ON THE DEFEAT OF ISIS Implementing Stability in Iraq and Syria MAX BOOT Military History The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) first captured American attention in January 2014 when its militants burst out of Syria to seize the Iraqi city of Fallujah, which US soldiers and marines had fought so hard to free in 2004. Just a few days later ISIS captured the Syrian city of Raqqa, which became its capital. At this point President Obama was still deriding it as the “JV team,” hardly comparable to the varsity squad, al-Qaeda. It became harder to dismiss ISIS when in June 2014 it conquered Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, and proclaimed an Islamic State under its “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. With ISIS executing American hostages, threatening to massacre Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar, and even threatening to invade the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, President Obama finally authorized air strikes against ISIS beginning in early August 2014. This was soon followed by the dispatch of American troops to Iraq and then to Syria to serve as advisers and support personnel to anti-ISIS forces. By the end of September 2016, there were more than five thousand US troops in Iraq and three hundred in Syria.1 At least those are the official figures; the Pentagon also sends an unknown number of personnel, numbering as many as a few thousand, to Iraq on temporary deployments that don’t count against the official troop number. The administration has also been cagey about what mission the troops are performing; although they are receiving combat pay and even firing artillery rounds at the enemy, there are said to be no “boots on the ground.” The administration is more eager to tout all of the bombs dropped on ISIS; the Defense Department informs us, with impressive exactitude, that “as of 4:59 p.m.
    [Show full text]
  • The Syrian Civil War a New Stage, but Is It the Final One?
    THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR A NEW STAGE, BUT IS IT THE FINAL ONE? ROBERT S. FORD APRIL 2019 POLICY PAPER 2019-8 CONTENTS * SUMMARY * 1 INTRODUCTION * 3 BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT, 2011-14 * 4 DYNAMICS OF THE WAR, 2015-18 * 11 FAILED NEGOTIATIONS * 14 BRINGING THE CONFLICT TO A CLOSE * 18 CONCLUSION © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 SUMMARY Eight years on, the Syrian civil war is finally winding down. The government of Bashar al-Assad has largely won, but the cost has been steep. The economy is shattered, there are more than 5 million Syrian refugees abroad, and the government lacks the resources to rebuild. Any chance that the Syrian opposition could compel the regime to negotiate a national unity government that limited or ended Assad’s role collapsed with the entry of the Russian military in mid- 2015 and the Obama administration’s decision not to counter-escalate. The country remains divided into three zones, each in the hands of a different group and supported by foreign forces. The first, under government control with backing from Iran and Russia, encompasses much of the country, and all of its major cities. The second, in the east, is in the hands of a Kurdish-Arab force backed by the U.S. The third, in the northwest, is under Turkish control, with a mix of opposition forces dominated by Islamic extremists. The Syrian government will not accept partition and is ultimately likely to reassert its control in the eastern and northwestern zones.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of Foreign Involvement Within the Syria Conflict. - Why Had the United States and Russia a Foreign Interest in Syria
    Bachelor thesis An analysis of foreign involvement within the Syria conflict. - Why had the United States and Russia a foreign interest in Syria. Author: Emelie Pettersson Supervisor: Anders Persson Examiner: Martin Nilsson Term: Ht19 Subject: Political Science Level: Bachelor Thesis Course code: 2SK31E 2 Abstract This study offers an alternative analysis of the current literature regarding foreign involvement in the Syria civil war. The initials briefly describe the current situation in Syria, international relations and why the conflict is interesting to analyse from a scientific standpoint. The relevant actors and theoretical construction are also introduced. In the previous research chapter, the current research is presented concerning the global superpowers as well as the interventions that have taken place in Syria. In the theory chapter realism and liberalism are presented, and a number of important factors are discussed. In the result, the decisions and events that have taken place during the conflict in Syria is analysed through the lens of previous named theories. The actors studied are the USA and Russia. There are both realistic and liberalist elements in the decisions made by the actors. The final part of the essay discusses the result. The underlying interest of the players largely determines which decision is ultimately taken. Moreover, there are underlying tones of realism even in clearly liberalistic decisions. Key words International Relations, International politics, IR Realism, IR Liberalism, foreign policy, foreign intervention, Syria civil war, Russia foreign policy, US foreign policy. 3 Table of Content 1. Introduction ............................................................................................ 6 1.1. Aim, problem statement and limitations. ............................................. 7 1.1.1. Limitations ......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Losing Their Last Refuge: Inside Idlib's Humanitarian Nightmare
    Losing Their Last Refuge INSIDE IDLIB’S HUMANITARIAN NIGHTMARE Sahar Atrache FIELD REPORT | SEPTEMBER 2019 Cover Photo: Displaced Syrians are pictured at a camp in Kafr Lusin near the border with Turkey in Idlib province in northwestern Syria. Photo Credit: AAREF WATAD/AFP/Getty Images. Contents 4 Summary and Recommendations 8 Background 9 THE LAST RESORT “Back to the Stone Age:” Living Conditions for Idlib’s IDPs Heightened Vulnerabilities Communal Tensions 17 THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE UNDER DURESS Operational Challenges Idlib’s Complex Context Ankara’s Mixed Role 26 Conclusion SUMMARY As President Bashar al-Assad and his allies retook a large swath of Syrian territory over the last few years, rebel-held Idlib province and its surroundings in northwest Syria became the refuge of last resort for nearly 3 million people. Now the Syrian regime, backed by Russia, has launched a brutal offensive to recapture this last opposition stronghold in what could prove to be one of the bloodiest chapters of the Syrian war. This attack had been forestalled in September 2018 by a deal reached in Sochi, Russia between Russia and Turkey. It stipulated the withdrawal of opposition armed groups, including Hay’at Tahrir as-Sham (HTS)—a former al-Qaeda affiliate—from a 12-mile demilitarized zone along the front lines, and the opening of two major HTS-controlled routes—the M4 and M5 highways that cross Idlib—to traffic and trade. In the event, HTS refused to withdraw and instead reasserted its dominance over much of the northwest. By late April 2019, the Sochi deal had collapsed in the face of the Syrian regime’s military escalation, supported by Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • SMA Reach-Back 13 January 2017
    13 January 2017 SMA Reach-back 13 January 2017 Question (R3 QL7): How does Da'esh's transition to insurgency manifest itself in Syria; which other jihadist groups might offer the potential for merger and which areas of ungoverned space are most likely to offer conditions conducive for Da'esh to maintain some form of organizational structure and military effectiveness? Contributors: Dr. Joshua Landis (University of Oklahoma); Vern Liebl (Center for Advanced Operational Culture, USMC); Dr. Sabrina Pagano (NSI, Inc.); Mubin Shaikh (University of Liverpool) Executive Summary Dr. Sabrina Pagano, NSI Da’esh Transition in Syria The contributors varied in their discussions of what a Da’esh transition—or the future of Syria more broadly—would look like. Drawing on work by Gelvin, Pagano suggests that three scenarios are most likely for Da’esh’s transition in Syria. These include the complete destruction and disappearance of the group and its ideology; transition into an insurgent group capable of conducting limited operations in Syria and/or inspiring attacks abroad; or disintegration into a loose collection of former fighters and free agents conducting attacks, in some cases without organizational support. Finally, University of Oklahoma ME expert, Dr. Joshua Landis, indicated that while it is difficult to generalize, the extreme factionalization that characterized Syria prior to Da’esh’s involvement would likely come back into play. As such, we may expect a revived emphasis on the clan or tribe, with ongoing resistance to central government. Landis continued by suggesting that sufficient weakening of Da’esh will eventually enable the Syrian government led by Assad to regain broad control.
    [Show full text]