THE SYRIAN CRISIS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION A Conference Report by Rice University’s Baker Institute Center for the Middle East February 2017 © 2017 by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, papers are reviewed by outside experts before they are released. However, the research and views expressed in this paper are those of the individual researcher(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Conference Report “The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration” The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration In December 2016, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy hosted a panel of leading Syria experts to discuss the Syrian civil war and US policy options: Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian Ambassador Ryan Crocker Ambassador Robert Ford Randa Slim, Ph.D. Joshua Landis, Ph.D. Charles Lister Andrew Tabler The following report summarizes some of the proposals made during the deliberations. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of every participant or of the Baker Institute. 2 The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration Executive Summary The Syrian crisis has had important impacts on US national security interests. Since 2011, the war in Syria has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions, and spurred crises that have affected the international community. A complex web of actors on the ground and internationally has prolonged the conflict and severely challenged policymakers. The Trump administration will have to address this issue—defining US core interests and principles and formulating specific policies to achieve them. In Syria, US interests can be defined as: 1) counterterrorism, 2) restoring stability, and 3) refugee relief. In pursuing these aims, the US relationship with international actors will be important. But while the US notionally shares some security interests with Russia, Iran, and Syria in regard to counterterrorism, the limitations of these states as potential partners are very significant. A key first step for the Trump administration should be to reengage with traditional regional partners with which relationships have weakened in recent years. The administration’s foreign policy message must be that the US is back to listen to our strategic partners’ concerns and interests, to engage with the region, and to take a fresh look at ongoing problems with a renewed commitment to collaborate with partners to achieve security, stability, and good governance. The US relationship with Turkey will be important, especially in clarifying the Kurdish issue. US policy toward Iran will also play a role in how strategic partnerships are rebuilt. While US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement would bring little benefit and could have negative effects, tougher US policies on Iran outside of the agreement might reassure allies. In negotiations, the US must consider the limitations that come with attempting to decentralize the Syrian government and calling for Bashar al-Assad to step down. The US could accept a straw man option in which the Assad regime remains as part of a longer term transition, and attempt to play a role in the negotiation and rebuilding processes, setting standards for Assad to meet on key issues. And while a grand bargain will be difficult to achieve, the prospects for multiple packages of smaller, dynamic negotiations and agreements may have a better chance for success. An important point of leverage for the US and its partners is their collective capacity to provide financial and developmental support for Syrian reconstruction, as well as their established relationships with opposition groups. However, any support to rebuild Syria would not be possible without obtaining serious concessions from the Syrian regime and its allies, lest the US be perceived as footing the bill to support the political gains of Assad, Iran, and Russia. Finally, the US must take a hard look at immediate and long-term strategy toward the Middle East while being mindful of history. Since the conflict began, 11 million people have been displaced in one of the largest diasporas in world history. Failure to find sustainable solutions to the refugee issue in neighboring countries will breed radicalism in the future and have destabilizing effects regionally and globally. In the longer term, the reabsorption of refugees and rebuilding of Syria will be critical to stability and security. The United States and its partners must also address the region’s failures in governance and socioeconomic development, while avoiding the pitfalls that accompany nation building. 3 The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration Introduction Since 2011, the war in Syria has killed hundreds of thousands, displaced millions, and spurred crises that have affected the international community. Fueled by longstanding domestic grievances and substantial outside intervention, Syria’s civil war has become regional—pitting states and their proxies against each other, vying to tip the regional balance in their own favor at a time of almost unprecedented weakness in the Middle East state system. The result on the ground is incredibly complex and brutal, with no party strong enough to take hold of the country. Developments in Syria in 2017, influenced in part by President Donald Trump’s decisions, will shape the regional order for decades and affect millions of lives. After six years of conflict, the prospect of an end to the fighting and a peaceful transition and settlement is highly problematic. The Syrian military and its allies control the major cities and a western third of the country (excluding Idlib province), and lack the capacity to regain the eastern portions of the state. Syrian opposition groups and the Kurds control much of northern and central Syria. The Islamic State’s territorial control is declining, but it is still present in the central and eastern portions of the state. Syria’s opposition groups are not monolithic; they are composed of numerous factions of varying interests and ideology that compete for power and territory. Further, the viability of most groups is dependent on the support of outside benefactors whose influence over their proxies can be limited. US strategy toward Syria has been opaque, at least partially due to the Syrian crisis’ complexity and the foreign policy framework under which the Obama administration operated. The Obama administration supported political transition away from the Assad regime and aided opposition groups, but limited direct US involvement because of its strong concern of overreach or conflict with other actors. Concurrently, the Obama administration in 2014 began countering the Islamic State through airstrikes and support for groups combatting ISIS, at least theoretically working at a common cause with the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. President Trump has made clear that his priority for Syria is to defeat the Islamic State, potentially through increased cooperation with Russia and a reevaluation of US support for the Syrian opposition. A strategy following these tenets requires an accurate understanding of the facts on the ground, the international dynamics at work, and the long-term prospects and implications of the crisis. 4 The Syrian Crisis: Policy Options for the Trump Administration On the Ground In the months ahead, developments in Syria will depend heavily on the capacity and will of the Syrian regime to regain and hold territory, as well as the actions of the regime’s backers. After retaking Aleppo, loyalist forces have gained momentum, but limited capacity will hinder the regime’s progress as it seeks to take key areas around Damascus and northern Syria. Armed opposition groups have been dealt a serious blow and are consolidating in key territories, notably Idlib province. US- and Turkish-backed forces are competing for territory in northern Syria. The strength of all parties is considerably influenced by support and decisions of outside actors, and will be central during the next year of the conflict. Finally, actions on the ground will be partially shaped by decisions made between outside powers, particularly through discussions in Astana and Geneva. Actors and Benefactors By early 2017, it seems likely that there will be four major combatant coalitions in Syria: 1) Assad loyalist forces, backed by Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia; 2) the Syrian Democratic Forces, aligned with the US and Gulf States; 3) “Euphrates Shield” forces aligned with Turkey; and 4) a loose coalition of opposition forces, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and others, which control Idlib, western Aleppo, northern Hama, northern Homs, and other strategic territories. The Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey strongly opposes, controls a significant portion of northern Syria and is largely aligned with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). These groups are in addition to the Islamic State and other jihadist militant groups fighting the regime and secular forces. In the months ahead, combat could go in a number of directions, largely shaped by the decisions of the Assad regime and agreements among outside actors. The Assad regime views the rebel coalitions as a more