Shifting Gears: Hts’S Evolving Use of Svbieds During the Idlib Offensive of 2019-20

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Shifting Gears: Hts’S Evolving Use of Svbieds During the Idlib Offensive of 2019-20 SHIFTING GEARS: HTS’S EVOLVING USE OF SVBIEDS DURING THE IDLIB OFFENSIVE OF 2019-20 HUGO KAAMAN OCTOBER 2020 POLICY PAPER CONTENTS SUMMARY Since May 2019, a series of Syrian loyalist offensives backed by the Russian * 1 BACKGROUND air force has gradually encroached upon the country’s northwestern Idlib Province, home to the last major pocket of opposition-held territory. As the chief rebel group in control of Idlib, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has * 5 THE 2019 OFFENSIVE employed dozens of suicide car bombs as part of its continued defense of the area. Formally known as suicide vehicle-born improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs), these weapons have been a cornerstone of the group’s * 13 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, — and by extension, the entire opposition’s — military strategy since early stages of the war, when rebel forces began capturing and holding territory. AND PROCEDURES In an attempt to further understand this strategy and how it has evolved over time, this case study seeks to compare and contrast HTS’s past and current use of SVBIEDs, with a heavy focus on the latter. It will also examine * 19 CONCLUSION HTS’s evolving SVBIED design, paying particular attention to technical innovations such as environment-specific paint schemes, drone support teams, tablets with target coordinates, and live camera feeds, as well as * 20 ENDNOTES upgraded main charges. MAP OF HTS SVBIED ATTACKS, 2019-20 Cover photo: An up-armored SVBIED based on a pick-up truck used by HTS against a Syrian loyalist position near Abu Dali/Mushayrifa in eastern Hama on Oct. 8, 2017. Contents photo: Members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham block demonstrators from approaching the Bab al-Hawa crossing between Turkey and Syria’s northwestern Idlib province during a protest against the Syrian regime and Russia on September 20, 2019. (Photo by OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP via Getty Images) BACKGROUND use of SVBIEDs can be roughly divided As the opposition started capturing and eventually making SVBIEDs based on BMP- into three phases, each reflecting specific controlling territory in 2013, they gradually 1 variants the most commonly used type. In armed conflicts, the balance of power is operational environments. began confronting the Syrian Army in a With the rear doors and hatch typically often skewed one way. This is particularly more conventional manner, employing welded shut, the encased BMP-1 hull When HTS first emerged as a serious actor true when it comes to civil wars, where tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces would also amplify the blast wave upon in Syria in 2012, it operated under the name numerically inferior breakaway factions recently added to their arsenal as a result detonation, rendering it a superior shell of Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN).4 Beginning in late are pitted against the state and all that it of their territorial expansion.9 In this new vehicle in all aspects but speed. 2011, the group initiated a campaign of encompasses: a standing army, artillery, “conventional” operational environment, SVBIED attacks against both high-profile tanks, and most crucially, an air force. JaN was forced to modify their SVBIEDs state targets in major urban centers and This disparity of arms, manpower, and to use them efficiently. The clear frontlines checkpoints and outposts of the Syrian technology means that non-state actors that came with directly controlling territory Army in the countryside.5 The SVBIEDs are generally at a disadvantage when negated the stealth factor of covert used in this first phase were “covert” in fighting against the state. To overcome SVBIEDs, forcing the group to adapt its use nature, in that they utilized civilian vehicles these challenges, nascent insurgencies of this weapon. Soon, they began using up- with unmodified exteriors or seized army consistently opt for guerrilla warfare armored SVBIEDs with steel plates welded vehicles, in an attempt to avoid detection through ambushes, sabotage, hit-and-run to the front of the vehicles, transitioning and blend in with their operational attacks, and raids, all of which normally into the second phase of SVBIED use.10 surroundings.6 Covert SVBIEDs are the most allow smaller units to avoid confronting An SVBIED based on a BMP-1 used by JaN commonly used type of SVBIED and they the might of the state head on. While these against a Syrian loyalist target in Daraa on June have been employed in many parts of the 27, 2013. methods of attack may wear down regular world by a multitude of non-state actors, armed forces over time, they are employed both past and present.7 The use of this from a position of inferior military strength. As fighting progressed across the country, it type of SVBIED was logical for a group that One of the only weapons with the ability became increasingly conventional in nature. lacked territorial control, and allowed JaN to bridge the gap in military capabilities Between 2013 and 2015, JaN completely to both terrorize government-controlled between non-state and state actors is the switched from using covert to up-armored areas and knock out isolated checkpoints suicide car bomb. Sometimes referred to SVBIEDs, as they began fielding them in and outposts by approaching their desired as “the poor man’s air force,”1 it constitutes overt confrontations with loyalist forces. targets unnoticed before detonating large The group also began jerry-rigging the single most powerful weapon at the An up-armored SVBIED based on a flatbed truck Used as “shock and awe” weapons meant 8 disposal of most non-state actors. quantities of explosives. used by JaN against a Syrian loyalist target in to soften up positions before combined Damascus on Feb. 6, 2013. infantry and armored vehicle assaults, The use of SVBIEDs has been a cornerstone the group had in effect transformed the of the wider Syrian opposition’s military SVBIEDs out of captured armored vehicles, SVBIED into a conventional weapon.12 This strategy since the beginning of the Syrian mostly variants of the Soviet-made BMP- wholesale progression from using covert civil war in 2011.2 Throughout the conflict, 1 armored personnel carrier. With its to up-armored SVBIEDs is rare among HTS has remained the most prolific user of tracks and large rear troop compartment groups that employ SVBIEDs, although ISIS SVBIEDs among all the disparate opposition it was a natural choice, especially for made a similar transition as they rampaged factions. However, its use of this powerful targets requiring off-road capabilities. The across Iraq and Syria in 2013-14.13 weapon has changed dramatically over comparatively reserved use of SVBIEDs time and evolved in a continuous attempt by JaN (in contrast to that of ISIS)11 meant Beginning in 2015, JaN narrowed the to adapt to changing circumstances and that the group employed fewer but larger geographical focus of its attacks to greater 3 A JaN covert SVBIED based on a flatbed truck conditions on the ground. The group’s used in early December 2012. SVBIEDs against carefully chosen targets, Idlib Province in northwest Syria, where a 1 2 coordinated and prolonged offensive by the However, HTS lost scores of these armored years. Beginning in early 2017, loyalist group and its opposition allies commenced vehicles throughout the years — in forces began amassing their troops around in the spring.14 With the help of more than a combat and as a result of using them as these small pockets, either capturing them dozen up-armored SVBIEDs (eight of which SVBIEDs — eventually depleting its stocks militarily or forcing surrender agreements.26 were based on BMP-1s), they were able to considerably. With mounting territorial By July 2018, the wider opposition had lost capture Idlib city and successfully expel losses, the group began shifting toward control of most of the isolated enclaves, loyalist forces from the entire province in using up-armored SVBIEDs based on pick- including Wadi Barada,27 Zabadani, up trucks in early 2017.23 less than two months — an unprecedented Madaya,28 Qaboun, Barzeh, Tishreen,29 15 victory. eastern Qalamoun,30 northern Homs,31 32 33 However, this success led directly to An up-armored BMP-1 SVBIED used by Jabhat southern Damascus, eastern Ghouta, as Fateh al-Sham in western Aleppo city on Oct. 28, well as the entire southern Daraa Province.34 the Russian intervention in the conflict 2016. 16 in late 2015, which would again tip the Following the recapture of Abu Duhur balance of power massively in favor of the Smaller in size and with fewer resources airbase in February 2018 by loyalist forces, government. This led to the third phase compared to ISIS, HTS and its predecessor they managed to completely expel the of JaN’s use of SVBIEDs, characterized groups have always been more conservative opposition from eastern Hama Province by a decline in offensive efficacy. In 2016, in their use of SVBIEDs. As was mentioned as well — further encroaching upon HTS’s JaN and the rebels would fight a number previously, this comparatively restrained core territory in Idlib Province. After HTS of crucial battles against loyalist forces approach routinely pushed the group to An up-armored SVBIED based on a pick-up truck carried out an up-armored SVBIED attack over the strategic city of Aleppo, where used against a Syrian loyalist position near Abu opt for using fewer but larger armored Dali/Mushayrifa in eastern Hama on Oct. 8, 2017. against a Syrian loyalist position near Abu the group employed more than two dozen vehicles (e.g. the BMP-1) as SVBIED shells Duhur airbase on Feb. 7, 2018, an extended up-armored SVBIEDs (of which at least a in the more “conventional” battles taking Later in the year, a multi-pronged offensive hiatus would ensue.
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