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132484385.Pdf MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOIMIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA Diplomityö Kapteeni Valtteri Riehunkangas Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 58 Maasotalinja Heinäkuu 2017 MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Kurssi Linja Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 58 Maasotalinja Tekijä Kapteeni Valtteri Riehunkangas Tutkielman nimi VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOI- MIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA Oppiaine johon työ liittyy Säilytyspaikka Operaatiotaito ja taktiikka MPKK:n kurssikirjasto Aika Heinäkuu 2017 Tekstisivuja 137 Liitesivuja 132 TIIVISTELMÄ Venäjä suoritti lokakuussa 2015 sotilaallisen intervention Syyriaan. Venäjä tukee Presi- dentti Bašar al-Assadin hallintoa taistelussa kapinallisia ja Isisiä vastaan. Vuoden 2008 Georgian sodan jälkeen Venäjän asevoimissa aloitettiin reformi sen suorituskyvyn paran- tamiseksi. Syyrian intervention aikaan useat näistä uusista suorituskyvyistä ovat käytössä. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää Venäjän ilmavoimien kyky tukea maaoperaatiota. Tutkimus toteutettiin tapaustutkimuksena. Tapauksina työssä olivat kolme Syyrian halli- tuksen toteuttamaa operaatiota, joita Venäjä suorituskyvyillään tuki. Venäjän interventiosta ei ollut saatavilla opinnäytetöitä tai kirjallisuutta. Tästä johtuen tutkimuksessa käytettiin lähdemateriaalina sosiaaliseen mediaan tuotettua aineistoa sekä uutisartikkeleita. Koska sosiaalisen median käyttäjien luotettavuutta oli vaikea arvioida, tutkimuksessa käytettiin videoiden ja kuvien geopaikannusta (geolocation, geolokaatio), joka mahdollisti taistelui- den tarkan kuvauksen ja ilma-aseen vaikutuksien analysoinnin. Työssä havaittiin, että modernisoinnista huolimatta vanhempien lentorunkojen (MI-24, SU- 25, SU-24) kyky maakomponentin tukemiseen on edelleen heikko. Sen sijaan uusien suori- tuskykyjen (SU-34, MI-28, Forpost, Zala, Orlan-10) kyky hallituksen maakomponentin (SAA) tukemiseen on hyvä. Operaation alussa Venäjä suuntasi tuli-iskun kiinteitä maaleja vastaan. Tällä pyrittiin lamauttamaan kapinallisten (FSA) komentopaikat, varastot ja koulu- tuskeskukset. Tuli-iskulla ei ollut ratkaisevaa merkitystä FSA:n taisteluun, koska heidän joukkonsa olivat jo valmiiksi perustettuina taistelualueella. Tuli-iskuvaiheessa FSA:n tais- teluvoimaa pommitettiin vain vähän. Venäjän havaittiin kykenevän johtamaan ilmakompo- nenttiaan keskusjohtoisesti ja alueellisesti sekä paikallisesti. Alueellinen tai paikallinen johtamistapa lisäsi kykyä SAA:n tukemiseen. Lennokit mahdollistivat hyvän valvontaky- vyn hyökkäävän kärjen alueella, mutta niillä ei kyetty kompensoimaan SAA:n pientä vah- vuutta sivustoilla tai selustassa. Venäjä kykeni tukemaan maakomponenttia hyökkäystaiste- lussa, mutta puolustustaistelua se ei kyennyt tukemaan vaikuttamisen syklin (24h) vuoksi. Tärkeimpänä maakomponenttia tukevana elementtinä oli epäsuora tuli. Kärjen tukemisessa keskeisimmiksi elementeiksi havaittiin taktinen lennokki sekä ilmatulenjohtaja. Kapinallisten keskeisimmäksi taisteluvälineeksi havaittiin panssarintorjuntaohjukset. Venä- jän suorituskyvyt mahdollistivat SAA:n siirtymisen kaukotaistelutaktiikkaan, jossa puolus- taja tuhotaan ylivoimaisella tulenkäytöllä. Kaukotaistelutaktiikka vei panssaroidulta halli- tuksen joukolta liikekyvyn ja -halun. Puolustaja ei sitoutunut taistelemaan SAA:n kärkeä vastaan, vaan väisti pois tulenkäytön alta ja suoritti järjestelmällisesti vastahyökkäyksiä hallituksen joukkojen avoimiin sivustoihin. Vaikka Venäjän tukema hallituksen joukko kykeni voittamaan yksittäisiä taisteluita, ei se saavuttanut alueellista tai edes paikallista ratkaisua missään vaiheessa. Teknisesti ylivoimainen, mutta miesvahvuudeltaan alivoimai- nen SAA ei kyennyt missään lyömään kapinallisia lopullisesti. AVAINSANAT Syyria, Venäjä, geopaikannus, geolokaatio, TVM, eristäminen, lähitulituki, tuli-isku VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOIMIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA SISÄLLYS 1. JOHDANTO .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Aihealueen esittely ........................................................................................................... 1 1.2. Tutkimustilanne ............................................................................................................... 4 1.3. Tutkimustehtävä ............................................................................................................... 5 1.4. Rajaukset .......................................................................................................................... 7 1.5. Menetelmät ....................................................................................................................... 8 2. CASE 1, POHJOIS-HAMAN HYÖKKÄYSOPERAATIO 30.9.–12.10.2015 ............. 14 2.1. Toimintaympäristö ja osapuolet ..................................................................................... 14 2.1.1. Syyrian hallituksen joukot ja tavoitteet .......................................................................... 15 2.1.2. Kapinallisten joukot ....................................................................................................... 17 2.2. Syyrian hallituksen operaation toteutus sekä Venäjän tuki operaatioalueittain ............. 19 2.2.1. Tuli-isku 30.9.–7.10.2015 .............................................................................................. 20 2.2.2. Kafr Nabudahin alueen taistelu ...................................................................................... 21 2.2.3. Kafr Zita–al-Lataminah–Morek-alueen taistelut............................................................ 26 2.2.4. Ma’an–Atshan–Sukayk-alueen taistelut......................................................................... 28 2.3. Johtopäätökset Venäjän tuen vaikutuksesta kapinallisiin sekä hallituksen joukkojen taisteluun .................................................................................................................................... 33 2.3.1. Tuli-isku ......................................................................................................................... 33 2.3.2. Lennokkitoiminta ........................................................................................................... 34 2.3.3. Helikopteritoiminta ........................................................................................................ 35 2.3.4. Rynnäkkökonetoiminta .................................................................................................. 37 2.3.5. Johtaminen ..................................................................................................................... 39 2.3.6. Hallituksen operaatioiden arviointi ................................................................................ 40 3. CASE 2, AL-GHABIN TASANGON JA SALMAN OPERAATIO 7.10.–6.10.2015 . 43 3.1. Toimintaympäristö ja osapuolet ..................................................................................... 43 3.1.1. Syyrian hallituksen joukot ja tavoitteet .......................................................................... 44 3.1.2. Kapinallisten joukot alueella .......................................................................................... 49 3.2. Syyrian hallituksen operaation toteutus ja Venäjän tuki alueittain ................................ 51 3.2.1. Venäjän neuvonantajat, alueelle ryhmitetyt Venäjän maakomponentin epäsuoran tulen yksiköt ja tuli-isku ...................................................................................................................... 51 3.2.2. Khirbat al-Naqus–Mansoura-alueen taistelu .................................................................. 53 3.2.3. Nabi Yonis–Jubb al-Ahmar- ja Joureen–Sirmanyah-alueiden operaatio ....................... 59 3.2.4. Durin–Salma-alueen operaatio ....................................................................................... 72 3.3. Johtopäätökset Venäjän tuen vaikutuksesta kapinallisiin ja hallituksen joukkojen taisteluun .................................................................................................................................... 81 3.3.1. Tuli-isku ja Venäjän neuvonantajat ............................................................................... 81 3.3.2. Lennokkitoiminta ........................................................................................................... 81 3.3.3. Helikopteritoiminta ........................................................................................................ 83 3.3.4. Rynnäkkökonetoiminta .................................................................................................. 84 3.3.5. Johtaminen ..................................................................................................................... 85 3.3.6. Hallituksen operaatioiden arviointi ................................................................................ 86 4. CASE 3, PALMYRAN OPERAATIO 4.3.–31.3.2016 ................................................. 88 4.1. Toimintaympäristö ja osapuolet ..................................................................................... 88 4.1.1. Syyrian hallituksen joukot ja tavoitteet .......................................................................... 89 4.1.2. Isisin joukot alueella ...................................................................................................... 92 4.2. Syyrian hallituksen operaation toteutus ja Venäjän tuki ...............................................
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