Syria Playing into their hands Regime and international roles in fuelling violence and fundamentalism in the Syrian war DAVID KEEN Syria Playing into their hands Regime and international roles in fuelling violence and fundamentalism in the Syrian war DAVID KEEN About the author David Keen is a political economist and Professor of Conflict Studies at the London School of Economics (LSE), where he has worked since 1997. He is the author of several books on conflict and related problems, includingUseful Enemies, Complex Emergencies, Endless War? and The Benefits of Famine. Saferworld published a discussion paper by Professor Keen in 2015 entitled Dilemmas of counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding, on which this paper builds. Acknowledgements This discussion paper was commissioned as part of Saferworld’s work to challenge counterproductive responses to crises and critical threats and promote peacebuilding options. It has been managed and edited by Larry Attree and Jordan Street for Saferworld. Very valuable comments and advice, on all or parts of the text, were additionally provided by Rana Khalaf, Henry Smith, Fawaz Gerges, Rajesh Venugopal, Stuart Gordon, Paul Kingston, Sune Haugbolle, Leonie Northedge, Shelagh Daley and David Alpher. Any errors are solely the responsibility of the author. The author is grateful to Mary Kaldor at LSE for supporting the fieldwork component of this research, funded by the European Research Council. I am particularly grateful to Ali Ali for his guidance and inside knowledge during fieldwork on the Turkey-Syria border and for subsequent comments. Some people have helped greatly with this report who cannot be individually acknowledged for security reasons and my sincere gratitude extends to them. I would also like to thank all the Syrians we spoke with for their kindness and patience. Finally, I would like to thank my wonderful wife Vivian Lee for her help with research in Turkey and Calais, and for her love and encouragement throughout the writing process. © Saferworld, October 2017. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material included in this publication. Contents Executive Summary i Foreword xiii 1. Introduction 1 2. A fractured rebellion: the war system and its functions for non-regime groups 5 2.1 Underlying grievances 5 2.2 The fragmentation and weakening of the rebellion 8 2.3 ISIS, al-Nusra and the promise of ‘protection’ 17 3. Regime survival: the war system and its functions for regime actors 24 3.1 Behaviours that boosted armed rebellion – and fundamentalist elements within it 24 3.2 The functions of regime support to armed rebellion and fundamentalism 44 4. International interventions and the war system 52 4.1 Western military intervention against ISIS 52 4.2 Russia’s intervention and the escalating assault on Aleppo: a permissive 60 environment 4.3 The Kurds and Turkey 80 4.4 Resource scarcity: aid, sanctions and the ‘war on terror’ 88 5. Conclusion 111 Addressing the complex causes of violence: beyond a ‘war on terror’ 5.1 Four main themes 114 5.2 Four main recommendations 125 Bibliography 142 Abbreviations AOG armed opposition groups MSF Médecins Sans Frontières AQI Al-Qaeda in Iraq NDF National Defence Forces CoH Cessation of Hostilities NGO non-governmental CTL counterterrorism legislation organisations ECHO European Community NORIA Network of Researchers in Humanitarian Office International Affairs ESCWA Economic and Social NPR National Public Radio Commission for Western NSAG Non-state armed groups Asia OCHA (United Nations) Office for FSA Free Syrian Army the Coordination of HPG Humanitarian Policy Group Humanitarian Affairs HTS Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (an ODI Overseas Development amalgam of JFS and several Institute other groups) PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party ICG International Crisis Group PYD (Kurdish) Democratic Union IDP internally displaced persons Party IHL international humanitarian SAA Syrian Army law SDF Syrian Democratic Forces INGO international non- SILF Syrian Islamic Liberation governmental organisations Front ISG Inter-sector group SMC Supreme Military Council ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the SRF Syrian Revolutionaries Levant Front ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria TOW tube-launched, optically ISSG International Syria Support tracked, wire-guided Group (missile) JFS Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (Jabhat UNHCR United Nations High al-Nusra before July 2016) Commissioner for Refugees JIC Joint Implementation Center UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of JIG Joint Implementation Group Humanitarian Affairs JTIC Jane’s Terrorism and WoS Whole of Syria Insurgency Centre YPG People’s Protection Units LSE London School of Economics (the military wing of the MDG Millennium Development PYD) Goals i Executive Summary The complexity of Syria’s conflict has made the war especially difficult to resolve. This study highlights important neglected aspects of the war and their implications for international interventions. It provides an explanation for the longevity of the Assad regime, as well as for the significant gains made by HTS/Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS (recently reversed in the case of ISIS). The war as a system of power, profit and protection This war is not simply a contest between two or more sides, but an evolving system of profit, power and protection in which ‘winning’ is one among many goals. The political manipulation of disorder has been a key part of this, and the Assad regime has endured not simply despite the war but also, to a significant extent,because of it. Viewing the war as a system reveals significant failings in international engagement. Many of these stem from an attempt to see – and tackle – the war through the lens of a ‘global war on terror’. Regime and rebel actors have reaped significant economic benefits from the war. This war economy has flourished both within government- and rebel- held areas, has involved significant exploitation, and has created important economic incentives for continuing the war. As the war economy became more voracious, civilians increasingly looked for some kind of remedy – and opportunities for violent jihadist groups to offer their own versions of ‘protection’ also increased. The trajectory of the war has been significantly shaped by the fragmentation and weakness of the rebellion. One cause of this fragmentation was that, for many rebels, war became a business. ii SYRIA: PLAYING INTO THEIR HANDS A second has been divergence in the agendas of the rebels’ external supporters. While opposing Assad, countries supporting the rebels have had their own distinct strategic interests in Syria. Support from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey for a variety of groups undermined opposition coherence, and Western governments, for the most part, chose not to give large-scale support to the Free Syrian Army. Meanwhile, more fundamentalist groups – especially al-Nusra – grew stronger militarily, drawing on substantial external funding and supply lines from Iraq, as well as on the lucrative war economy. Al-Nusra and especially ISIS alienated many Syrians with cruel behaviour and rigid ideologies. However, while ‘brainwashing’ and intimidation played a significant role (most notably for ISIS), these militant groups were also able to attract followers – for example, by providing goods, services, salaries, a form of governance, and varying degrees of ‘protection’ from violence – not just their own but also that of the regime. The regime’s role in nurturing violence and fundamentalism “Assad used to say, ‘If I go, then sectarianism will take over.’ He used this to stay in power. There’s a degree of truth in this [claim] n o w.” Kurdish activist One might expect an incumbent regime to try to prevent an armed rebellion, keep it small, defeat it quickly and oppose any extreme elements with particular vigour. But the Syrian regime’s actions departed from these assumptions, boosting armed rebellion and/or violent fundamentalist elements in at least nine ways: 1. Before the war, the regime facilitated a flow ofjihadis from Syria into Iraq, in part as an attempt to increase leverage over the US government; this process drew on – and helped to strengthen – links between the Assad regime and fundamentalist elements within Syria, and these links were again to become significant in the Syrian war. 2. During the war, regime attacks on civilians – and widespread abuse such as torture and arbitrary imprisonment – helped both to provoke and to expand the armed rebellion. 3. The regime stirred sectarian sentiment through selective attacks and use of divisive language. 4. The regime selectively released violent fundamentalists from Syrian prisons. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY iii 5. The regime actively colluded with terror attacks, making the threat of terrorism seem greater than it initially was. 6. At times, the regime cooperated economically with rebel groups. 7. Regime actors engaged in a range of predatory behaviours that predictably lost ‘hearts and minds’, sometimes to the advantage of rebel groups. 8. The regime promoted scarcity in rebel areas – not least through blocking international relief operations – radicalising public opinion and strengthening anti-Western groups at the expense of less militant elements. 9. The regime offered partial immunity from its own attacks to ISIS in