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Former Warsaw Pact Ammunition Handbook, Vol 3

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Former Warsaw Pact Ammunition Handbook, Vol 3 NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence FORMER WARSAW PACT AMMUNITION HANDBOOK VOLUME 3 Air Forces Ammunition Aerial projectiles, bombs, rockets and missiles TRENČÍN 2019 Slovak Republic For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence FORMER WARSAW PACT AMMUNITION HANDBOOK VOLUME 3 Air Forces Ammunition Aerial projectiles, bombs, rockets and missiles For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence The NATO Explosive Ordnance Centre of Excellence (NATO EOD COE) supports the efforts of the Alliance in the areas of training and education, information sharing, doctrine development and concepts validation. Published by NATO EOD Centre of Excellence Ivana Olbrachta 5, 911 01,Trenčín, Slovak Republic Tel. + 421 960 333 502, Fax + 421 960 333 504 www.eodcoe.org Former Warsaw Pact Ammunition Handbook VOL 3 – Edition II. ISBN 978-80-89261-81-9 © EOD Centre of Excellence. All rights reserved 2019 No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner without the written permission of the publisher, except in the case brief quotations embodied in articles and reviews. For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence Foreword Even though in areas of current NATO operations the insurgency is vastly using the Home Made Explosive as the main charge for emplaced IEDs, our EOD troops have to cope with the use of the conventional munition in any form and size all around the world. To assist in saving EOD Operators’ lives and to improve their effectiveness at munition disposal, it is essential to possess the adequate level of experience and knowledge about the respective type of munition. The identified information gap on conventional munition produced in the past in Former Warsaw Pact countries has led the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence to develop a product enabling mitigation of this shortfall. You are about to start using the NATO EOD Centre of Excellence’s Handbook on Former Warsaw Pact Ammunition that is meant to effectively assist NATO and Partner Nations' Staff Officers and NCOs at the battalion and brigade levels by providing a ready reference and guidance for Munition Technicians, EOD Troops and Combat Engineers dealing with the conventional munition. Its aim is simply to assist in understanding of the construction of this type of munition and its safe disposal. The leading handbook motive is a large number of this munition kind still used all around the world. This edition is not to be considered as a final product. My team will improve its content by adding more information to the next issue to better support our EOD troops' daily endeavour. Special thanks I would like especially to thank the SME´s who have made a significant contribution to the development of this handbook: COL (ret) Milan GABRIŠ LTC (ret) Ján ŠTRBA, Ph.D. (Faculty of Special Technology, A. Dubček University of Trenčín, Slovakia) Douglas K. LOADER, (Counter Terrorism and Technology Centre, DRDC, Suffield Research Centre, Canada) Director, NATO EOD Centre of Excellence For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence Foreword (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence Table of contents TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 0-1 CHAPTER 1 1-1 AERIAL AMMUNITION GENERALLY 0101. CHARACTERISTICS 1-1 0102. MAIN PURPOSE AMMUNITION 1-1 0103. SUPPORTING AND AUXULIARY AERIAL AMMUNITION 1-2 0104. AERIAL FUSES 1-2 0105. PYROTECHNIC COMPOSITION 1-3 0106. CLASSIFICATION OF AERIAL AMMUNITION 1-5 CHAPTER 2 AERIAL GUN AMMUNITION 2-1 0201. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 2-1 0202. CLASSIFICATION OF AERIAL GUN AMMUNITION 2-1 0203. MAIN PURPOSE AERIAL GUN AMMUNITION 2-2 0204. SUPPORT AERIAL GUN AMMUNITION 2-6 0205. AUXILIARY AERIAL GUN AMMUNITION 2-8 CHAPTER 3 AERIAL BOMBS 3-1 0301. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 3-1 0302. CONSTRUCTION OF AERIAL BOMBS 3-2 0303. GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF AERIAL BOMBS 3-3 MAIN PURPOSE BOMBS 3-5 0304. GENERAL DESCRIPTION 3-5 0305. HIGH EXPLOSIVE - DEMOLITION BOMBS 3-5 0306. FRAGMENTATION BOMBS 3-9 0307. FRAGMENTATION-HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS 3-10 0308. ARMOUR PIERCING AND CONCRETE PIERRCING BOMBS 3-11 0309. ANTI-TANK AERIAL BOMBS 3-12 0310. INCENDIARY BOMBS AND TANKS 3-14 0311. CLUSTER BOMB UNIT 3-16 0312. CHEMICAL AERIAL BOMBS 3-18 0313. GUIDED AERIAL BOMBS 3-19 SUPPORTING BOMBS 3-21 0314. ILLUMINATING BOMBS 3-21 0315. PHOTOFLASH BOMBS 3-22 0316. ORIENTATION-SIGNALLING BOMBS 3-22 0317. SMOKE BOMBS 3-23 0318. PROPAGANDA BOMBS 3-23 i For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence Table of contents 3-24 AUXILIARY BOMBS 0319. PRACTICE BOMBS 3-24 0320. IMITATING BOMBS 3-24 CHAPTER 4 AERIAL ROCKETS AND MISSILES 4-1 0401. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 4-1 0402. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 4-2 UNGUIDED ROCKET 4-6 0403. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS, DESIGNATION AND 4-6 CLASSIFICATION OF UNGUIDED ROCKET COMBAT PART OF UNGUIDED ROCKET 4-8 0404. HIGH EXPLOSIVE (HE) WARHEAD 4-9 0405. FRAGMENTATION WARHEAD 4-10 0406. HIGH EXPLOSIVE/FRAGMENTATION WAR HEAD 4-10 0407. WARHEAD WITH SHAPED CHARGE OR SHAPED 4-10 CHARGE/FRAGMENTATION 0408. ILLUMINATING WARHEAD 4-11 0409. ORIENTATION-SIGNALLING WARHEAD 4-12 0410. JAMMING WARHEAD 4-12 MAIN TYPES OF FWP UNGUIDED ROCKETS 4-13 0411. UNGUIDED AIR ROCKET FIRST GENERATION 4-13 0412. UNGUIDED AERIAL ROCKET SECOND GENERATION 4-14 FAMILY S-5 0413. UNGUIDED AERIAL ROCKET SECOND GENERATION 4-17 FAMILY S-8 0414. UNGUIDED AERIAL ROCKETS SECOND GENERATION 4-22 FAMILY S-13 0415. HEAVY UNGUIDED AERIAL ROCKET FAMILY S-24 4-24 0416. HEAVY UNGUIDED AERIAL ROCKET FAMILY S-25 4-24 AERIAL GUIDED MISSILES 4-27 0417. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS, DESIGNATION AND 4-27 CLASSIFICATION OF GUIDED MISSILES GUIDED MISSILES WARHEADS 4-33 0418. WARHEADS AND INITIATING MECHANISM OF GUIDED 4-33 MISSILES 0419. FRAGMENTATION AND HIGH EXPLOSIVE BLAST 4-33 FRAGMENTATION WARHEAD 0420. HEAT BLAST FRAGMENTATION AND APHE BLAST 4-35 ii For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence Table of contents FRAGMENTATION WARHEAD 0421. HIGH EXPLOSIVE CONTINUOUS ROD WARHEAD 4-36 MAIN TYPES OF AIR TO AIR GUIDED MISSILES 4-38 0422. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY RS-1; RS-2 4-38 0423. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-3 4-40 0424. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-8 4-43 0425. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-4 4-44 0426. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-23 and R-24 4-45 0427. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-27 4-47 0428. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-40 4-49 0429. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-60 4-51 0430. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-73 4-52 0431. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY R-33 4-54 MAIN TYPES OF AIR TO SURFACE GUIDED MISSILES 4-56 0432. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-20 4-56 0433. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-22 4-57 0434. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-66; Kh-23 4-58 0435. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-25 4-60 0436. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-28 4-62 0437. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-29 4-64 0438. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-31 4-66 0439. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-58 4-67 0440. GUIDED MISSILES FAMILY Kh-59 4-68 CHAPTER 5 MARKING AND COLOUR OF AERIAL AMMUNITION 5-1 0501. MARKING AND COLOUR OF USSR AERIAL SHELLS 5-1 0502. MARKING OF USSR AERIAL BOMBS 5-2 0503. MARKING OF USSR AERIAL UNGUIDED ROCKET 5-7 0504. MARKING OF USSR AERIAL GUIDED ROCKET 5-9 ANNEX A: REFERENCES ANNEX B: ANNEX B: RUSSIAN ABBREVIATION ANNEX C: TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF THE SELECTED FWP AERIAL AMMUNITION ANNEX D: USSIAN AMMUNITION FILLER CODES ANNEX E: AERIAL AMMUNITION LEXICON iii For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence Table of contents (INTENTIONALLY BLANK) iv For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence Introduction INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The information and guidance contained within will help EOD staff officers and EOD operators to handle munitions safely. It is designed to provide an overall view of Former Warsaw Pact (FWP) aerial munition construction. This will increase their knowledge and assist in positively identifying munition and safely disposing of unexploded ordnance, abandoned munition and stockpiles. It does not address the specifics of flight characteristics, ballistics, guidance, homing, and control systems. It is mainly focused on the explosive elements such as warheads and propelling systems. The main hazard from these munitions is the destructive effect of warheads, which can cause appreciable harm to the personnel, object or material. However, in some cases, abandoned missiles for example, even the fuel or propellant can a pose serious hazard. Due to these facts, military EOD personnel must have a deep knowledge about the design, construction, operational principles and safety disposal procedures before conducting render safe procedures. 1.2 Scope This handbook is the third volume of the set. The first volume contains general information about FWP explosives, and information about hand grenades, artillery munition and mines and charges. The second volume deals with rocket and missiles, artillery rocket and light antitank weapons. This third volume discusses the construction, classification, identification and marking of aerial projectiles, bombs, rockets and missiles used in the FWP. The handbook is not a comprehensive manual, but it does provide useful data about key hazardous points of the munitions. 1.3 Terms and definitions The background of military terms, definitions and classification used in this publication is based on the conceptual apparatus and terminology used in the FWP, of course definitions of physical, chemical and mechanical processes do not recognize borders and therefore contain formal differences only. 1.4 Distribution and using This handbook is published as loose-leaf bound printed copies. Persons having no further use for printed copies of the document are requested to return them to the editor of this document.
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