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(CUWS) Outreach Journal #1115 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal Issue No. 1115, 16 May 2014 Welcome to the CUWS Outreach Journal! As part of the CUWS’ mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved. FEATURE ITEM: “Biological Defense: DOD Has Strengthened Coordination on Medical Countermeasures but Can Improve Its Process for Threat Prioritization.” GAO-14-442 Report; published: May 15, 2014. Report publicly released: May 15, 2014; 55 pages. http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663212.pdf DOD has made progress in researching, developing, and making available medical countermeasures against biological threat agents, but does not use its established process for annually updating its list of threat priorities. DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is researching, is developing, or has obtained Food and Drug Administration approval for countermeasures that address 10 of the 19 biological threat agents DOD has identified as threats to the warfighter. Of DOD's 43 candidates for medical countermeasures, 13 use technologies that may allow them to respond to various emerging or genetically modified biological threat agents. However, DOD does not use its established process to annually update its list of biological threat priorities. DOD Directive 6205.3, DOD Immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense, establishes roles and responsibilities and an annual process for updating DOD's biological threat list. GAO found that the list has not been updated annually and, when it was updated in 2001 and 2012, DOD did not receive input from key stakeholders. By not following its established process for annually updating its biological threat list, DOD cannot ensure that its investments—and those of its partners—are applied toward responding to the most-serious and likely biological threats. Outreach Journal Feedback or sign-up request: [email protected] Return to Top U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. US Starts Countrywide Nuclear Drill after Similar War Games in Russia U.S. ARMS CONTROL 1. Gottemoeller Warns Against Stopping Nuclear Security Work in Russia 2. Ukraine Crisis Stirs Fears of New Nuclear Arms Race HOMELAND SECURITY/THE AMERICAS 1. No U.N. Agreement on Proposals for NPT Review 2. City Council OKs ‘Level 4’ Infection Research at BU Biolab ASIA/PACIFIC 1. 'NK Ready to Launch Nuclear Missile' 2. Experts Detail Suspicions About Mysterious Defense Site in Myanmar 3. N. Korea Says Will Continue Nuke Weapons Program Issue No.1115, 16 May 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama 4. China Cannot Afford to Lose an Inch of its Territory: General EUROPE/RUSSIA 1. Russia to Refit 2 Sierra-Class Nuclear Subs 2. Russian Navy to Resume Testing in Bulava Missile Program 3. All Russian Missile Divisions to Receive Yars Simulators This Year MIDDLE EAST 1. Iran Missile Power Limit, Stupid Idea: Leader 2. IAEA Seeks Detonator Clarification from Iran: Sources 3. Exclusive: U.N. Experts' Report Shows Iran's Deceptive Procurement Tactics 4. Iran Continues Operations at Military Site: Report 5. France Accuses Syrian Regime of Multiple Chlorine Gas Attacks 6. Iran’s Defense Issues Not on Agenda of Nuclear Talks: Zarif 7. Iran, Six Powers Begin Drafting Text on Nuclear Deal 8. Iran's Deputy Chief Negotiator: Vienna Talks Reigned by Good Will 9. Confidential UN Report: Iran's Ballistic Missile Work Complicating Nuclear Talks 10. US Concerned by Lack of Progress at Iran Nuclear Talks 11. Hagel Says US Won’t Let Iran Build Nuclear Weapon INDIA/PAKISTAN 1. India Tests 3,000 km Range N-Missile in Secret 2. Developments in India Forced Pakistan to Increase Dependence on Nuclear Deterrence COMMENTARY 1. Ukraine Dilemma: U.S. Can't Prevent Russian Expansion without Better Missile Defenses 2. Tactical Arms Race between India and Pakistan Raises the Prospect of a Nuclear Dispute 3. Why a Nuclear Test May Not Be Imminent: Update on North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site 4. SSBNs and Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age RT (Russia Today) – Moscow, Russia US Starts Countrywide Nuclear Drill after Similar War Games in Russia May 12, 2014 The US Strategic Command, the agency responsible for country’s nuclear arsenal, will hold large-scale war games this week that will include 10 B-52 Stratofortresses and up to six B-2 Spirit bombers, along with other military and government agencies. The Boeing B-52 Stratofortress is a long-range, subsonic, jet-powered strategic bomber built to carry nuclear weapons. The Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, also known as the Stealth Bomber, is an American strategic bomber, designed for penetrating dense anti-aircraft defenses that can drop up to sixteen 1,100 kg B83 nuclear bombs. The exercise will be conducted from May 12-16 and is set “to deter and detect strategic attacks against the US and its allies,” the Strategic Command said in a statement. “This exercise provides unique training opportunities to incorporate the most current technology and techniques in support of our mission. Continued focus and investment in our strategic capabilities allow US Stratcom to deter, dissuade, and defeat current and future threats to the U.S. and our allies.” said Admiral Cecil Haney, head of Strategic Command. Issue No.1115, 16 May 2014 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies | Maxwell AFB, Alabama http://cpc.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7226 2 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama StratCom is the US’s nuclear command and is responsible for space operations, global strike, global missile defense; and global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and combating weapons of mass destruction. Though the timing of the exercise was declared as “unrelated to real-world events,” it does come on the heels of the recent war games in Russia. Announced in November 2013, military drills on countering nuclear strikes were overseen by President Vladimir Putin ahead of the May 9 celebrations dedicated to victory in World War II Contrary to the openness of the Russian war games, the US Strategic Command released very few details about the upcoming exercise. Relations between Moscow and Washington have worsened significantly over the situation in Ukraine. The US continues to endorse and support a military operation by Kiev’s coup-installed government against federalization supporters in the southeast of the country. Last week, NATO said it may permanently station additional troops in Eastern Europe as a defensive measure against Moscow. Russia views this recent buildup of NATO forces as a provocation and counterproductive in the struggle to deescalate tensions in Ukraine. http://rt.com/usa/158352-usstratcom-nuclear-wargames-nato/ Return to Top National Journal – Washington, D.C. Gottemoeller Warns Against Stopping Nuclear Security Work in Russia By Douglas P. Guarino May 12, 2014 The State Department's top arms control official is stressing that it is in the best interests of the United States to continue doing nuclear security work in Russia -- even as the Ukraine crisis rages. The Republican-led House Armed Services Committee last week approved legislative language that would prevent the U.S. Energy Department from using fiscal 2015 funds "for any contract, cooperation, or transfer of technology" between the United States and Russia until the crisis has been resolved. The panel included the language in its version of the annual defense authorization bill, which it passed last week. Undersecretary of State Rose Gottemoeller suggested on Friday that such a prohibition would be tantamount to shooting "ourselves in the foot," however. "At the heart of our rationale for continuing this work" is that it is "manifestly in the national interest of the United States to continue … minimizing the danger that fissile materials [could] fall into the hands of terrorists." Fissile materials are those that could be used to make an atomic bomb. Ukrainian authorities just last week announced the seizure of radioactive material they feared could have been used to make a radiological weapon. "We acknowledge and are gravely concerned with the crisis in Ukraine -- there's no question about it," Gottemoeller said in response to a question from Global Security Newswire. "But we shouldn't shoot ourselves in the foot in terms
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