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USAF Coutnerproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal #968 Issue No. 968, 03 January 2012 Articles & Other Documents: Featured Article: India to Achieve N-Arm Triad in February 1. China Urges Stability in Strait of Hormuz 2. U.S. in No Position to Prevent Hormuz Strait Closure: IRGC Deputy Commander 3. 'Iran May Resume Talks with P5+1' 4. First Nuclear Fuel Rod Tested in Iran 5. Iranian Lawmaker Says Iran to Block Strait of Hormuz if Threatened 6. Iran Claims It Can Hit 'Any Target, Any Time' 7. Syria Sought Nuclear Know-How from Pakistan's Khan in 1980, 2002 8. France Says Iran Developing Nuclear Arms 9. Iran Warning to U.S. Warship Sends Tensions Soaring 10. North Korea Warns the World: No Change in Policy under Kim Jong-un 11. North Korea Says Names Kim Jong-un Top Military Commander 12. South Korea's Lee Calls on North to End Nuclear Activities 13. NKorea Holds Rally, Shows Young Kim Meeting Troops 14. Declare N-Doctrine: India to Pak 15. Russia Hands Over Nerpa to India: Report 16. Pakistan, India Swap Lists of Nuclear Sites 17. India to Achieve N-Arm Triad in February 18. Russia Submerges Nuclear Submarine to Douse Blaze 19. Repairs of Fire-Damaged Nuclear Sub to Take at Least One Year 20. Submarine’s Torpedo Compartment Was on Fire 21. Bulava Approved for Service 22. Iran's Nuclear Issue Escalates, but Unlikely into Conflict 23. Iran and the Strait 24. Analysis: N.Korea's Missile-Maker Seen in Key Role in New Regime 25. Military Action Isn’t the Only Solution to Iran 26. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons 27. 81.7% Say NK Will Keep Nukes 28. For Nukes, another Lost Year Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved. Issue No. 968, 03 January 2012 The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved. United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 Reuters U.S. China Urges Stability in Strait of Hormuz Thursday, December 29, 2011 BEIJING (Reuters) - China urged peace and stability on Thursday after Tehran threatened to punish proposed Western sanctions by choking off oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz, but declined to make any other comment about the crisis. The foreign ministry's terse, one sentence public response to Tehran's threats over the world's most important oil route reflects China's sensitivities about its close business links with Iran. "China hopes that peace and stability can be maintained in the strait," ministry spokesman Hong Lei told a briefing in answer to a question about escalating tensions that have pushed up oil prices. He did not answer a question about whether China had had any contact with Tehran or other governments about the threat. China's official Xinhua news agency said in a commentary speculation about war with Iran over the past few years had ended up simply amounting to "crying wolf." "To avoid the real arrival of the wolf, all sides should show greater sincerity and flexibility," it wrote. China has long defended its oil and trade ties with Iran as legitimate, and criticized unilateral sanctions that could stymie those ties. Iran's threat to block crude shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial passage for Middle Eastern suppliers, followed the European Union's decision to tighten sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, as well as accompanying moves by the United States to tighten unilateral sanctions. China has driven global oil demand growth for a decade and has increasingly relied on shipments from the Middle East, where Iran and rival Saudi Arabia compete for the market. China bought 547,000 barrels per day of crude from Iran through to October this year, up from 426,000 barrels per day for all of 2010. Only Saudi Arabia and Angola sell more than Iran to China. International tensions with Iran have increased since a report by the United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency in November concluded Tehran appears to have worked on designing a nuclear weapon and may still be pursuing research to that end. Iran denies this and says it is developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iran has expanded its nuclear activities despite four rounds of U.N. sanctions since 2006 over its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment and give access to U.N. nuclear inspectors. As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China has the power to veto resolutions mandating such sanctions. But Beijing has instead voted for them, while working to ensure its oil and trade ties are not threatened. China, however, has also criticized the United States and European Union for imposing their own separate sanctions on Iran, and said they should not take steps reaching beyond the U.N. resolutions. Reporting by Chris Buckley; Writing by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Paul Tait http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/29/us-china-iran-idUSTRE7BS08E20111229 (Return to Articles and Documents List) Tehran Times – Iran Issue No. 968, 03 January 2012 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 U.S. in No Position to Prevent Hormuz Strait Closure: IRGC Deputy Commander Saturday, December 31, 2011 TEHRAN – The deputy commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Brigadier General Hossein Salami, said on Thursday that the United States is in no position to prevent Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz if Tehran deems it necessary. Salami made the remarks in response to the warning issued by the U.S. Fifth Fleet on December 28, in which it said that it would not allow any disruption of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. “Anyone who threatens to disrupt freedom of navigation in an international strait is clearly outside the community of nations; any disruption will not be tolerated,” the Bahrain-based fleet said in an e-mail, according to Reuters. The warning came a day after the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, in an interview with Press TV said, “Closing the Strait of Hormuz for Iran's armed forces is really easy ... or as Iranians say it will be easier than drinking a glass of water.” “But right now, we don't need to shut it as we have the Sea of Oman under control and we can control the transit,” said Sayyari, who is leading 10 days of war games in the strait, which began on December 24. Salami said, “The Americans are in no position to either allow or not allow us (to close the strait). The history of the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. has shown that.” “In the event that Iran’s vital interests are threatened in any way, we will use threat against threat and will not stop implementing our strategies,” he added. Iran will not ask for any country’s permission to employ its defensive strategies, he said, adding, “The Islamic Republic of Iran, over the past 33 years, has showed that it has successfully implemented its measures despite the U.S. interference.” He also said, “We will act more determinedly and strongly than ever to implement defensive strategies to defend the vital values of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” http://www.tehrantimes.com/politics/94016--us-in-no-position-to-prevent-hormuz-strait-closure-irgc-deputy- commander- (Return to Articles and Documents List) Press TV – Iran 'Iran May Resume Talks with P5+1' Saturday, December 31, 2011 The Iranian envoy to Germany says a new round of nuclear talks between Iran and the world's six major powers will resume after all its conditions are agreed upon by both sides. In a Saturday interview, Alireza Sheikh-Attar said the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Saeed Jalili would soon write a letter to EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton to determine the modality for the future talks. He added that the Iran- P5+1 meeting would be scheduled after Jalili sends a letter to Ashton. Iran and the P5+1 -- Britain , China, France, Russia, and the United States plus Germany -- held two rounds of multifaceted talks in Geneva in December 2010 and in the Turkish city of Istanbul last January. Issue No. 968, 03 January 2012 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 Tehran says it is ready to continue talks based on common ground, adding, however, that it has no intention of backing down from its nuclear rights.
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