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The Future of the Russian Military Russia’S Ground Combat Capabilities and Implications for U.S.-Russia Competition Appendixes

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The Future of the Russian Military Russia’S Ground Combat Capabilities and Implications for U.S.-Russia Competition Appendixes ARROYO CENTER The Future of the Russian Military Russia’s Ground Combat Capabilities and Implications for U.S.-Russia Competition Appendixes Andrew Radin, Lynn E. Davis, Edward Geist, Eugeniu Han, Dara Massicot, Matthew Povlock, Clint Reach, Scott Boston, Samuel Charap, William Mackenzie, Katya Migacheva, Trevor Johnston, Austin Long Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3099 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This document presents the results of a project titled U.S.-Russia Long Term Competition, spon- sored by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to help the U.S. Army understand the shifting relative capabilities of the U.S. and Russian militaries of the next twenty years. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this docu- ment is HQD167556. This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army. RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guid- ance set forth in DoD Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Com- mittee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of DoD or the U.S. government. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. iii Contents Preface .......................................................................................................... iii Figures ...........................................................................................................ix Tables ............................................................................................................xi Summary ...................................................................................................... xiii Acknowledgments ........................................................................................... xix Abbreviations ................................................................................................. xxi APPENDIX A Societal Support................................................................................................ 1 Overview ......................................................................................................... 1 Recent History and Trends .................................................................................... 2 Outlook ......................................................................................................... 17 APPENDIX B Russian Defense Spending .................................................................................. 19 Recent History and Trends ................................................................................... 19 Outlook .........................................................................................................32 Methodology for Estimating Russia’s State Defense Order ...............................................36 APPENDIX C Demographics .................................................................................................37 Recent History .................................................................................................37 Explanatory Variables ..........................................................................................39 Outlook .........................................................................................................46 Implications for Other Factors ............................................................................... 51 APPENDIX D Military Personnel Policy ...................................................................................53 Recent History and Trends ...................................................................................54 Reserves and Mobilization ....................................................................................58 Explanatory Variables ..........................................................................................59 Outlook .........................................................................................................65 APPENDIX E Maneuver Ground Forces ...................................................................................69 Recent History .................................................................................................70 v vi The Future of the Russian Military Current Systems ................................................................................................ 74 Personnel and Training ........................................................................................79 Estimated Resources ...........................................................................................79 Defense Industrial Trends .....................................................................................80 Outlook .........................................................................................................85 APPENDIX F Indirect Fires ..................................................................................................89 Recent History .................................................................................................89 Current Systems ................................................................................................91 Personnel and Training ...................................................................................... 100 Estimation of Resources Spent on Indirect Fires ......................................................... 101 Defense Industrial Trends and Challenges ................................................................ 102 Outlook ....................................................................................................... 108 APPENDIX G Long-Range Strike ...........................................................................................111 Recent History ................................................................................................111 Current Systems ...............................................................................................115 Personnel and Training ...................................................................................... 122 Estimation of Resources Spent on Strike Systems ........................................................ 123 Defense Industrial Trends and Challenges ................................................................ 124 Outlook ....................................................................................................... 137 APPENDIX H Rapidly Deployable Forces ................................................................................ 139 Overview ...................................................................................................... 139 Recent History ................................................................................................ 140 Doctrine and Operating Concepts ......................................................................... 141 Personnel and Training ...................................................................................... 144 Current Systems .............................................................................................. 146 Estimation of Resources Spent on Rapidly Deployable Forces ......................................... 149 Recent Operations ............................................................................................ 150 Outlook ........................................................................................................152 APPENDIX I C4ISR ..........................................................................................................155 Recent History: Late Soviet Ambitions to Twenty-First-Century Mishaps ..........................
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