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ISSUE 5 AADH05 OFC+Spine.Indd 1 the Mortar Company
ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY ISSUE 5 HANDBOOK HANDBOOK – ISSUE 5 PUBLISHED MARCH 2018 THE CONCISE GLOBAL INDUSTRY GUIDE ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENCE AADH05_OFC+spine.indd 1 3/16/2018 10:18:59 AM The Mortar Company. CONFRAG® CONTROLS – THE NEW HIGH EXPLOSIVE STANDARD HDS has developed CONFRAG® technology to increase the lethal performance of the stan- dard High Explosive granade for 60 mm CDO, 60 mm, 81 mm and 120 mm dramatically. The HE lethality is increased by controlling fragmentation mass and quantity, fragment velocity and fragment distribution, all controlled by CONFRAG® technology. hds.hirtenberger.com AADH05_IFC_Hirtenberger.indd 2 3/16/2018 9:58:03 AM CONTENTS Editor 3 Introduction Tony Skinner. [email protected] Grant Turnbull, Editor of Land Warfare International magazine, welcomes readers to Reference Editors Issue 5 of Shephard Media’s Artillery and Air Defence Handbook. Ben Brook. [email protected] 4 Self-propelled howitzers Karima Thibou. [email protected] A guide to self-propelled artillery systems that are under development, in production or being substantially modernised. Commercial Manager Peter Rawlins [email protected] 29 Towed howitzers Details of towed artillery systems that are under development, in production or Production and Circulation Manager David Hurst. being substantially modernised. [email protected] 42 Self-propelled mortars Production Elaine Effard, Georgina Kerridge Specifications for self-propelled mortar systems that are under development, in Georgina Smith, Adam Wakeling. production or being substantially modernised. Chairman Nick Prest 53 Towed mortars Descriptions of towed heavy mortar systems that are under development, in CEO Darren Lake production or being substantially modernised. -
Central Asia in the Crossfire Survival Or War?
WL KNO EDGE NCE ISM SA ER IS E A TE N K N O K C E N N T N I S E S J E N A 3 V H A A N H Z И O E P W O I T E D N E Z I A M I C O N O C C I O T N S H O E L C A I N M Z E N O T The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Caspian and the Northern Distribution Network: Central Asia in the Crossfire Survival or War? ZHULDUZ BAIZAKOVA Republic of Kazakhstan Open Source, Foreign Perspective, Underconsidered/Understudied Topics The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an open source research organization of the U.S. Army. It was founded in 1986 as an innovative program that brought together military specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived from unclassified, foreign media. Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly collaborative work by conducting unclassified research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered. Author Background Zhulduz Baizakova is a graduate from Kazakh National University and has a MSc degree in International Security and Global Governance, Birkbeck College, University of London, where she successfully defended her dissertation on NATO peacekeeping activities. She served for seven years in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, including a posting to the United Kingdom. Baizakova is currently specializing in defense and security issues in Central Asia. -
EURASIA Russia Fielding Two New Self-Propelled
EURASIA Russia Fielding Two New Self-Propelled Mortar Systems OE Watch Commentary: The accompanying excerpted article from Rossiyskaya Gazeta discusses Russian plans to field two new self-propelled mortar systems that are intended to support motorized rifle, airborne, and alpine infantry battalions. The 2S42 Lotos self-propelled mortar consists of a 2A60 120mm turret-mounted mortar mounted on a BMD- 4M airborne fighting vehicle chassis. The 2S41 Drok self- propelled mortar consists of 82mm turret-mounted mortar mounted on a Tayfun armored personnel carrier chassis. Russia already has self-propelled mortar systems in the inventory, including the 2S4 Tyulpan 240mm self-propelled mortar and the 2S23 Nona-SVK 120-mm battalion self- propelled gun, which functions as a hybrid mortar, gun, and howitzer. End OE Watch Commentary (Bartles) Russian Missile Troops and Artillery Emblem. Source: Russian government, via Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Medium_emblem_of_the_Russian_Missile_Troops_and_ Artillery.svg, Public domain “New self-propelled mortars designed for the Russian army -- the 2S42 Lotos self-propelled artillery gun and the 2S41 Drok wheeled self-propelled piece... are destined for the inventories of motorized rifle, air assault, and alpine infantry battalions.” Source: Aleksey Petrov and Yegor Badyanov, “Выстрелил и скрылся: зачем нужны новые самоходки “Лотос” и “Дрок” (Fire and Take Cover: Why the Need for the New Self-Propelled ‘Lotos’ and ‘Drok’),” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 22 July 2019. https://rg.ru/2019/07/22/ vystrelil-i-skrylsia-zachem-nuzhny-novye-samohodki-lotos-i-drok.html Fire and Take Cover: Why the Need for the New Self-Propelled Lotos and Drok As we know, mortars are utilized as the basic means of delivering suppressive fire against enemy manpower, destroying an adversary’s concealed artillery positions, and hitting his military hardware. -
Israeli Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa 3
SIPRI Background Paper October 2011 ISRAELI ARMS TRANSFERS SUMMARY w Israel accounted for less than TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 1 per cent of transfers of major weapons to sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2006–10. siemon t. wezeman* Deliveries consisted mainly of small numbers of artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles, armoured vehicles and patrol craft. However, in addition to I. Introduction major weapons, Israel also supplied small arms and light Israel is one of a range of smaller suppliers of major weapons and other mili- weapons, military electronics tary equipment to sub-Saharan Africa. It has long sold or given weapons to and training to several a host of developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and the countries in the region. Israeli deals are often accompanied by serving or retired Israeli military person- weapons, trainers and brokers nel and Israeli civilian contractors as instructors.1 Although Israeli arms have been observed in exports, especially of major weapons, to sub-Saharan Africa are limited, numerous African trouble spots Israeli weapons, brokers and instructors are likely to sometimes have a more and may play a bigger role than significant impact than mere numbers of supplied weapons imply. their numbers imply. While exports of major weapons from Israel are well documented, infor- The Israeli arms export decision-making process mation on other weapons and equipment, on training and on motivations for remains unclear. Issues like and restraints on exports is very much based on occasional statements from human rights and potential officials or companies and on media reports. Since the United Nations Reg- diversion or misuse of delivered ister of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) became operational in 1993, Israel weapons seem to have gained has submitted data on exports of major arms every year. -
Acknowledgement of Manuscript Reviewers 2018
Tobacco Induced Diseases Editorial Acknowledgement of manuscript reviewers 2018 James Elliott Scott1,2, Israel Agaku3 CONTRIBUTING REVIEWERS The editors of Tobacco Induced Diseases would like to thank all our reviewers who have contributed to the journal in Volume 16 (2018). AFFILIATION 1 Department of Oral Biology, Rady Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada 2 Biology of Breathing Group, Children’s Hospital Research Institute, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada 3 Harvard School of Dental Medicine, Boston, United States CORRESPONDENCE TO James Elliott Scott. Department of Oral Biology, Rady Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Manitoba, 780 Bannatyne Avenue, Winnipeg, MB R3E 0W2, Canada E-mail: [email protected] Tob. Induc. Dis. 2019;17(February):10 https://doi.org/10.18332/tid/104388 Antonio Abbate Hemantha Amarasinghe Montse Ballbè Italy Sri Lanka Spain Suhaj Abdulsalim Tatiana Andreeva Davut Baltaci Saudi Arabia Ukraine Turkey Aderonke Akinkugbe José Antunes Amitav Banerjee United States Brazil India Nour Al-Sawalha René Arrazola Yael Bar-Zeev Jordan United States Australia Abdulmohsen Al-Zalabani Rehab Auf Arzu Beklen Saudi Arabia United States Turkey Muath Aldosari Francisco Ayesta Helen Binns United States Spain United States Fatmah R. Ali Raed Bahelah Linda Bledsoe United States Yemen United States Qasem Alomari Sabeeh A. Baig Pinar Bostan Kuwait United States Turkey Published by European Publishing on behalf of the International Society for the Prevention of Tobacco Induced Diseases (ISPTID) © 2019. Scott J. E. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) 1 Tobacco Induced Diseases Editorial Marc T. -
External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces, Working
External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces Working Paper DMITRY GORENBURG January 2014 Contents Summary iii Abbreviations vi 1. Introduction 1 2. Central Asian military capabilities and plans 2 I. Kazakhstan 3 II. Uzbekistan 8 III. Turkmenistan 12 IV. Kyrgyzstan 15 V. Tajikistan 20 VI. Overall trends in Central Asian military and security force capabilities 24 3. Assistance from Russia and former Soviet states 26 I. Equipment sales and donations 26 II. Cooperation in military exercises and joint operations 36 III. Bilateral exercises and training agreements 40 IV. Goals and consequences of Russian military assistance 46 4. Assistance from the United States 49 I. Equipment sales and donations 51 II. Cooperation in military exercises and joint operations 56 III. Goals and consequences of US military assistance 66 5. Assistance from other countries 69 I. Equipment sales and donations 69 II. Exercises and training 76 III. Goals and consequences of military assistance from other states 81 6. Conclusions and recommendations 83 I. Efforts to manipulate threat perceptions to increase local power 84 II. The impact of foreign assistance on military capabilities 85 III. The impact of foreign assistance on the capabilities of security services 87 IV. Recommendations 88 Summary As the drawdown of United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan has accelerated in preparation for the end of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2014, media attention has come to focus on the extent to which equipment being withdrawn from the region will be left behind for Central Asian states to use. At the same time, recent agreements for the extension of Russian military basing agreements in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have drawn attention to the extent to which Russia is providing military equipment and other forms of security assistance to the region. -
Worldwide Equipment Guide
WORLDWIDE EQUIPMENT GUIDE TRADOC DCSINT Threat Support Directorate DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Worldwide Equipment Guide Sep 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Page Memorandum, 24 Sep 2001 ...................................... *i V-150................................................................. 2-12 Introduction ............................................................ *vii VTT-323 ......................................................... 2-12.1 Table: Units of Measure........................................... ix WZ 551........................................................... 2-12.2 Errata Notes................................................................ x YW 531A/531C/Type 63 Vehicle Series........... 2-13 Supplement Page Changes.................................... *xiii YW 531H/Type 85 Vehicle Series ................... 2-14 1. INFANTRY WEAPONS ................................... 1-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicles AMX-10P IFV................................................... 2-15 Small Arms BMD-1 Airborne Fighting Vehicle.................... 2-17 AK-74 5.45-mm Assault Rifle ............................. 1-3 BMD-3 Airborne Fighting Vehicle.................... 2-19 RPK-74 5.45-mm Light Machinegun................... 1-4 BMP-1 IFV..................................................... 2-20.1 AK-47 7.62-mm Assault Rifle .......................... 1-4.1 BMP-1P IFV...................................................... 2-21 Sniper Rifles..................................................... -
Defence Economic Outlook 2020 Per Olsson, Alma Dahl and Tobias Junerfält
Defence Economic Outlook 2020 Per Olsson, Alma Dahl and Tobias Junerfält Tobias and Dahl Alma Olsson, Per 2020 Outlook Economic Defence Defence Economic Outlook 2020 An Assessment of the Global Power Balance 2010-2030 Per Olsson, Alma Dahl and Tobias Junerfält FOI-R--5048--SE December 2020 Per Olsson, Alma Dahl and Tobias Junerfält Defence Economic Outlook 2020 An Assessment of the Global Power Balance 2010-2030 FOI-R--5048--SE Title Defence Economic Outlook 2020 – An Assessment of the Global Power Balance 2010-2030 Titel Försvarsekonomisk utblick 2020 – En bedömning av den glo- bala maktbalansen 2010-2030 Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--5048--SE Månad/Month December Utgivningsår/Year 2020 Antal sidor/Pages 86 ISSN 1650-1942 Customer/Kund Ministry of Defence/Försvarsdepartementet Forskningsområde Försvarsekonomi FoT-område Inget FoT-område Projektnr/Project no A112007 Godkänd av/Approved by Malek Finn Khan Ansvarig avdelning Försvarsanalys Bild/Cover: FOI, Per Olsson via Mapchart Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, vilket bl.a. innebär att citering är tillåten i enlighet med vad som anges i 22 § i nämnd lag. För att använda verket på ett sätt som inte medges direkt av svensk lag krävs särskild över- enskommelse. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. 2 (86) FOI-R--5048--SE Summary The global military and economic power balance has changed significantly during the past decade. -
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received As of 19:30, 9 May 2019 KYIV 10 May 2019
Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 9 May 2019 KYIV 10 May 2019 This report is for the media and the general public. Summary Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region. It recorded ceasefire violations and military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including some used as part of military-style parades in Donetsk and Luhansk cities. It observed fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Troitske and residential property in Zolote-4/Rodina. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka, in the area of which it recorded about 125 explosions. The Mission observed events in several regions of Ukraine commemorating Victory Day and Remembrance and Reconciliation Day. It observed military-style parades in non-government-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk cities. Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske and a border crossing point near Dovzhanske.* Ceasefire violations[1] In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 450 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 115 explosions). More than three fifths of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including about 125 explosions near the Pumping Station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). -
Xenta Series Radars for Superior Detection and Performance Against Drones and Aerial Targets in Air Defense and Critical Infrastructure Applications
a8.90 D 14974 E D European & Security ES & Defence 9/2020 International Security and Defence Journal COUNTRY FOCUS: POLAND ISSN 1617-7983 • Dutch-Belgian www.euro-sd.com • Naval Cooperation • Logistic Trucks • Multinational Corps Northeast • Armoured Vehicles from • Equipping Medical Responders Eastern Europe for CBRN Scenarios September 2020 • The Art of Electronic Eavesdropping • European 8x8 Vehicles Politics · Armed Forces · Procurement · Technology ELCAN SPECTER® WEAPON SIGHTS Long range. Close up. One sight. Only the ELCAN Specter® DR dual role weapon sight can instantly switch between close-combat battle mode and precision ranged fire mode. It delivers superior capabilities to protect troops – and provide a trusted advantage – across any domain, any challenge, and every mission. RTX.com/ELCAN ©2020 Raytheon Company, a Raytheon Technologies company. 20RIS013_ELCAN_ADLO_210x297.indd 1 8/20/20 3:09 PM Editorial Eastern Mediterranean: Paris Shows Impatience – with Ulterior Motives? In view of Turkey's actions in the Eastern Mediterranean, France announced that it would increase its mili- tary presence there. On closer inspection, Paris is using units of the French armed forces on the ground to take a stand. Two RAFALE B of the 4th Fighter Wing, sent to Cyprus for an exercise from 10 to 12 August, Photo: author made a stopover in Crete on 13 August. A French C-130FR HERCULES tanker aircraft is also present at the Andreas Papandreou air base in Paphos (Cyprus), also in connection with the exercise. The helicopter carrier (PHA) TONNERRE with support material on the way to Beirut was temporarily joined by the frigate LA FAYETTE, which was in Larnaca (Cyprus) as part of a bilateral exercise with the Hellenic Navy. -
Handbook on Chemical Weapons Convention for Indian Chemical Industry and Chemical Traders
HANDBOOK ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION FOR INDIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND CHEMICAL TRADERS 1 DEPARTMENT OF CHEMICALS & PETROCHEMICALS, MINISTRY OF CHEMICALS & FERTILIZERS GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI April, 2010 2 INDEX Sr.no. Contents Page No. 1. Introduction 5 2. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 7 3. The CWC Act, 2000 8 4. Government of India Notifications related to CWC 9 5. CWC Declarations 10 5.1 Schedule chemicals and Discrete Organic Chemicals 10 5.2 Declaration criteria for Schedule chemicals and unscheduled 11 Discrete Organic Chemicals (OCPFs) 5.2.1 Schedule 2 Chemical 11 5.2.2 Schedule 3 Chemical 11 5.2.3 Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs) 12 5.3 List of schedule 2 chemicals, and commonly traded 12 schedule 2 chemicals 5.4 List of Schedule 3 chemicals 13 5.5 Identification of Scheduled / Unscheduled Chemicals 13 5.6 Deadline for various declarations 13 5.7 Industry Declaration forms 14 5.7.1 Declaration forms for Schedule 2 Chemical 14 5.7.2 Declaration forms for Schedule 3 Chemical & OCPFs 14 5.7.3 Guidelines for completing declaration forms 15 5.8 Specific explanations 20 5.8.1 Specific explanations relating to industry declarations 20 5.8.2 – 5.8.5 Specific explanations relating to Schedule 2 & 3 Chemicals 22 5.8.6 Specific explanations pertaining to OCPF declarations 25 5.8.7 – 5.8.8 Common problems in declaring OCPFs 27 3 5.9 Description of Codes used in declaration forms 28 5.10 Confidentiality classification 30 6. General procedure for export & import of Schedule 30 Chemicals 7. -
Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016
The Russian Armed Forces are developing from a force primarily designed for handling internal – 2016 Perspective Ten-Year in a Capability Military Russian disorder and conflicts in the area of the former Soviet Union towards a structure configured for large-scale operations also beyond that area. The Armed Forces can defend Russia from foreign aggression in 2016 better than they could in 2013. They are also a stronger instrument of coercion than before. This report analyses Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective. It is the eighth edition. A change in this report compared with the previous edition is that a basic assumption has been altered. In 2013, we assessed fighting power under the assumption that Russia was responding to an emerging threat with little or no time to prepare operations. In view of recent events, we now estimate available assets for military operations in situations when Russia initiates the use of armed force. The fighting power of the Russian Armed Forces is studied. Fighting power means the available military assets for three overall missions: operational-strategic joint inter-service combat operations (JISCOs), stand-off warfare and strategic deterrence. The potential order of battle is estimated for these three missions, i.e. what military forces Russia is able to generate and deploy in 2016. The fighting power of Russia’s Armed Forces has continued to increase – primarily west of the Urals. Russian military strategic theorists are devoting much thought not only to military force, but also to all kinds of other – non-military – means. The trend in security policy continues to be based on anti- Americanism, patriotism and authoritarianism at home.