External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces, Working

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External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces, Working External Support for Central Asian Military and Security Forces Working Paper DMITRY GORENBURG January 2014 Contents Summary iii Abbreviations vi 1. Introduction 1 2. Central Asian military capabilities and plans 2 I. Kazakhstan 3 II. Uzbekistan 8 III. Turkmenistan 12 IV. Kyrgyzstan 15 V. Tajikistan 20 VI. Overall trends in Central Asian military and security force capabilities 24 3. Assistance from Russia and former Soviet states 26 I. Equipment sales and donations 26 II. Cooperation in military exercises and joint operations 36 III. Bilateral exercises and training agreements 40 IV. Goals and consequences of Russian military assistance 46 4. Assistance from the United States 49 I. Equipment sales and donations 51 II. Cooperation in military exercises and joint operations 56 III. Goals and consequences of US military assistance 66 5. Assistance from other countries 69 I. Equipment sales and donations 69 II. Exercises and training 76 III. Goals and consequences of military assistance from other states 81 6. Conclusions and recommendations 83 I. Efforts to manipulate threat perceptions to increase local power 84 II. The impact of foreign assistance on military capabilities 85 III. The impact of foreign assistance on the capabilities of security services 87 IV. Recommendations 88 Summary As the drawdown of United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan has accelerated in preparation for the end of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2014, media attention has come to focus on the extent to which equipment being withdrawn from the region will be left behind for Central Asian states to use. At the same time, recent agreements for the extension of Russian military basing agreements in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have drawn attention to the extent to which Russia is providing military equipment and other forms of security assistance to the region. This raises questions about the actual extent of external support for military and security forces in Central Asia and the potential impact augmentation of these forces could have on regional security. In recent years, all Central Asian governments have increased spending on their military and security forces. This increase has been most pronounced in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The result of this increase in expenditures is a gradual increase in capabilities, although the extent of improvement varies significantly from country to country. While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan appear to be on their way to building military forces that are relatively capable by developing world standards, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still have significant problems maintaining even a small rapid reaction force in a high state of readiness. Turkmenistan remains an odd case, with the wealth to develop a serious military force but without the human resources to develop a strategic plan for creating a military that meets its security needs. Russia remains the main source of military and security assistance for most Central Asian states. Russia’s primary goal in the region is to keep the Central Asian states in Russian orbit while making sure that US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces leave the region after the completion of the operation in Afghanistan. Russian military assistance to the weaker Central Asian states can be described as a quid pro quo arrangement, wherein Russia provides political and military support for the ruling regimes in exchange for basing rights and a certain level of acquiescence on Russian foreign policy priorities in the region. Although Russian military and security assistance to Central Asian states is relatively limited in nature, the small size of the market and the limited starting capabilities of the Central Asian military and security forces mean that even relatively limited assistance can have a sizeable impact on security and stability in the region. Going forward, this impact is likely to be relatively mixed. On the one hand, efforts to create a unified air defence system and to improve counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities are likely to help local armed forces protect their countries from the threat of infiltration by radical Islamic groups. However, the extent of this danger to Central Asian security has been repeatedly overstated, by both local leaders and their Russian partners, in order to justify assistance requests and subsequent security cooperation. Most local leaders face a greater threat from internal iv SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES instability and regime collapse than from outside infiltration. Especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and 2011–12 electoral protests in Russia, Russian and Central Asian leaders see regime stability as their highest security priority. To the extent that Russia provides equipment and training to security services without regard for how such assistance may be used, it may prove to be useful for helping local leaders protect themselves from popular protests by repressing internal opposition movements. For much of the last decade, assuring continued access for transferring supplies and personnel to Afghanistan has been the highest priority for the USA in Central Asia. Other goals, including counter-terrorism, counter- narcotics, and democracy promotion, have been pursued, but only rarely have they been allowed to infringe on the priority of the Afghanistan mission. In a period of reduced budgets and limited resources, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will inevitably result in a decreased emphasis on all forms of assistance to Central Asia. The region will once again become a relatively low priority for the US Department of Defence. Security assistance budgets for states in the region have already been cut in recent years and are likely to be cut further in years to come. Central Asian leaders sense that the withdrawal period presents a final opportunity to receive significant amounts of military assistance from the USA. The countries that are most interested in such equipment include Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have the financial wherewithal to buy new equipment and are not very interested in donations of used armaments. Much of the discussion about the extent of such assistance has overstated both the amount and significance of equipment likely to be provided and the potential impact of such assistance on regional security. To date, the US Government has not agreed to transfer any excess defence equipment from the Afghanistan operation to Central Asian states. While it is likely that at least some Excess Defence Articles (EDA) equipment will be transferred to Central Asian states at some point in the future, the equipment is not likely to include major weapons systems or even small arms. The security consequences of such donations will be limited. The greater threat to regional security is posed not by the potential provision of excess military equipment from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops leaving Afghanistan, but by long-standing training programmes for the region’s special forces. In recent years, special forces troops trained by the US military have engaged in combat against local insurgents and have fired on unarmed protesters and other civilians in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and possibly Kazakhstan. Training programmes such as these are much less costly than equipment donations and are more likely to be maintained as part of general military assistance programming after ISAF forces leave the region. While Russia and the USA are the primary providers of military and security assistance to Central Asian states, other countries also play a role in the region. The European Union (EU) and its member states have been particularly active in efforts to improve local capacity in counter-narcotics and SUMMARY v border control. European defence industry has also become the preferred alternative for Central Asian states seeking to diversify their sources of military equipment. Turkey has sought to use cultural ties with the region to establish its role as a senior partner, though with mixed success. India has made an effort to hedge against China and Pakistan, its traditional rivals, by seeking to establish a military presence in Tajikistan, though this effort has met with little success to date. China’s limited role has been most significant, from a strategic point of view. While it has quickly come to dominate regional economic life, it has limited its role in the region’s military and security affairs in order to avoid alienating both Russia and local populations. Overall, this report concludes that external military assistance to Central Asian states is unlikely to have a serious negative impact on regional stability and security. With the end of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the region’s decade-long position of prominence on the international arena is likely to fade. Instead the states of the region will increasingly be left to their own devices, with internal instability the most serious threat. External military assistance will be limited and will do little to strengthen local armed forces, though steps have to be taken to ensure that such assistance does not enhance the ability of internal security forces to harm civilians. Abbreviations CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization EDA Excess Defence Articles GDP Gross domestic product IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ISAF International Security Assistance Force MRL Multiple rocket launcher NATO North Atlantic
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