Operational Environment Enterprise
US TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity Red Diamond
Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate
Fort Leavenworth, KS Volume 5, Issue 6 JUN 2014
INSIDETHIS ISSUE Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer Hybrid Threat ...... 4 at 18-22 August 2014 Reader Survey ...... 5 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Coup d’état CAR ...... 8 US Army TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) CDET Threat ...... 15 Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)
Fires...... 19 Regular Forces Active Supporters Tajikistan ...... 22 Irregular Forces Noncombatants ATN and CTID ...... 26 Criminal Organizations MSEL Design ...... 27 Terrorism Relevant Population IED Volgograd ...... 31 Big Changes in Store for CTID’s Threat Tactics Instruction
by Jennifer Dunn, Threat Assessment Team (DAC) OEE Red Diamond published monthly August 2014 is the next CTID Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer (HT TTT) course. CTID by TRISA at CTID hosted a Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer (HT TTT) class here at Fort Leavenworth in March 2014. The class was a resounding success with over 60 students traveling Send suggestions to from installations and units both within the CONUS and OCONUS. For those of you CTID that have participated, one of the unique things you may have noticed about this ATTN: Red Diamond course is that it serves a large and diverse audience. Our students come from a Dr. Jon H. Moilanen variety of units and duty positions. They include observer/controllers at training CTID Operations centers, to designated OPFOR, to battalion S2s, to members of the capability BMA Contractor BMA Contractor development community. and Angela Wilkins Over the past year as our student population has grown and we have transitioned Chief Editor the delivery of the course from a one-instructor-over-eighty-students format to BMA Contractor two-instructors-over-sixteen format, we have had a lot of lessons learned. These lessons learned have led to a significant shift in the way ahead for CTID resident course training on Threat Tactics. This article will lay out the changes that are coming for future Threat Tactics training. (continued at page 4)
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RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST by Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations and Chief, Red Diamond Newsletter (BMA Ctr)
This issue of the Red Diamond newsletter spotlights the propellant, or in some cases all three considerations. August 2014 CTID Hybrid Threat Train the trainer course For training, a Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) and related updates being instituted to ensure an organizes exercise messages by several categories, opposing force (OPFOR) relevant for training. Results of subject, time, date, and/or message number. Relevant a recent CTID survey to Red Diamond users provide key messages in a MSEL can shape effectiveness in a feedback being incorporated into future lessons. Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) exercise. One article assesses the IED bombing of the train Examining an OPFOR company-size detachment (CDET) station in Volgograd, a hub between the Caucasus model illustrates combined arms principles based on region and Moscow. Similarly, turmoil is standard fare functional analysis. The CDET is typical in a complex OE in the Central African Republic (CAR) as seen in the with threats and/or hybrid threat. article that is Part Two of the three-part series Email your topic recommendations to: reviewing the 2013 rebel offensive. An article on Tajikistan concentrates on the military variable and Dr. Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations, BMA CTR operations in this operational environment (OE). [email protected] and Another article focuses on how range of an indirect fire Angela M. Wilkins, Chief Editor, BMA CTR weapon system can be increased through modifications [email protected] of the firing system, the projectile or munition, the
CTID Red Diamond Disclaimer The Red Diamond presents professional information but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they reference. The Red Diamond staff reserves the right to edit material. Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the US Army for information contained therein.
Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate Know the Threats Know the Enemy
We are at War and Combating See https://atn.army.mil/ Training for Operations Terrorism CTID Operational Environment Page Lebanon
TRISA
Training Adaptive Soldiers in Subterranean OE
TRISA Combating Terrorism (CbT) Poster No. 09-14 U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (Photo: U.S. Army Image-LTC S. Lumbaca) Red Diamond Page 2
Director’s Corner: Thoughts for Training Readiness CTID
by Jon Cleaves, Director, Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (TRISA-CTID)
The August 2014 Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer (HT TTT) course at Fort Leavenworth, based on the enrolled students to date, signals a full class load. We continue to collect requests for attendance on our stand-by list but can currently make offers (no guarantees) for stand-by attendance in the 18-22 August 2014 course. CTID is studying how to increase the availability of the value-added training on threats and the hybrid threat, and may have some additional options in FY 2015. One training option that is currently available is a CTID mobile training team (MTT) that can come to your unit or activity and provide a condensed three-day or full five-day hybrid threat course. Several units have invited us to their unit locations and used Army Foundry Intelligence Training Program funding to support this TRADOC G2 Operational Environment Enterprise (G2 OEE) training. Army Regulation 350-32, Army Foundry Intelligence Training Program, states roles and responsibilities among Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, Direct Reporting Units, US Army Reserve, and Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States in the use and programming of foundry training resources. Department of the Army Civilian and government contractor military analysts at CTID can shape an MTT with unit or activity leaders to the particular needs of a unit. A recent success story supported one segment of an annual training event for a military intelligence company. Selected junior enlisted, noncommissioned and commissioned officers of the unit, as well as other members of battalion and brigade staffs participated in a three-day hybrid threat train the trainer course focused on the US Army’s Training Circular 7-100 series with threat concepts and systems, tactics and techniques, and practical exercises to improve situational awareness and understanding of complex operational environments, persistent conflict, and threats and hybrid threat. JON
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BIG CHANGES IN STORE FOR CTID’S THREAT TACTICS INSTRUCTION (cont. from page 1)
For the past fourteen years CTID has offered a resident course of instruction on the Hybrid Threat; it has more recently been known as the “Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer.” As many of you know, this course acted as an introduction to Hybrid Threat concepts, actors, actions, and operations. As the Army is transitioning from a war-time Army to a peace- time Army and as it shifts training focus from Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRXs) to Decisive Action training events, the best way CTID can support these changes is to modify the delivery of our instruction on Threat Tactics. The initial round of significant changes to the course of instruction will be presented to students in March of 2015.
Figure 1. Photo collage from multiple small-group classroom sessions in March 2014 HT TTT
The March 2015 course will not be a Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer. Instead, CTID will introduce its first “Threat Tactics” course. The course of instruction will shift from a familiarization fire of threat tactics to a more in-depth detailed training event focused on tactics. In order to provide this revamped course of instruction, CTID will spend the next nine months developing new course material. In general, the content of the new class will minimize discussion of actors and maximize time on tactics and various functional areas. Blocks of instruction on OPFOR Mission Essential Task List (METL), Information Warfare (INFOWAR), Reconnaissance (RECON), Air Defense, and Fires will be developed with a deeper look into these topics.
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Additionally, new practical exercises will be developed to reinforce the lessons from the revised course material. The course will culminate in one day dedicated to offensive tactics and operations and a second day dedicated to defensive tactics and operations. The intent of all these changes is provide a course of instruction that will provide a better, more thorough understanding of threat tactics for the training community. Expect invitations for the new course of instruction to go out sometime in the Fall of 2014. If you or your organization would like to be included on the distribution list for the invitation for this new course of instruction, email your request to [email protected]. In an effort to ensure we are meeting all the needs of all of our customers, provide us feedback on your requests for course content. If you have attended, are planning to attend, or use CTID’s Hybrid Threat material to teach at your own unit or installation and would like to see specific examples of actors, actions, or operations, please contact us so that we can update the course material to better serve you! Issues and/or questions you can assist in identifying for possible use in the course include― • What specific threat tactics questions do you have? • What would you like to see in a course that is designed to teach more advanced threat tactics material? • How do you want to experience practical exercises that focus on a certain echelon of threat/hybrid threat? • What tactical topics should be expanded in detail a particular opposing force (OPFOR) offensive mission task? • What tactical topics should be expanded in detail a particular opposing force (OPFOR) defensive mission task? As a final note, the above mentioned changes do not affect the Hybrid Threat Train the Trainer event planned for this August. CTID is currently refining material for the 18-22 August course, which will be similar to what was taught in March 2014. The course is currently full but we are running a stand-by list for units interested in trying to get their people a slot. To register for the course, contact Jennifer Dunn at [email protected] or 913-684-7962.
THE RED DIAMOND: READERS RESPOND by Penny Mellies, Deputy Director (DAC)
Our mission in producing the monthly newsletter, the Red Diamond, is to analyze, articulate, and disseminate various operational environment (OE) conditions and threat tactics to the Army. Continued dialogue with our community of users is critical to our mission success.
Figure 1. G2 OEE Red Diamond newsletter banner (example) With that in mind, from 22 April 2014 to 23 May 2014 TRISA-Threats/CTID solicited your feedback on the Red Diamond. Using Survey Monkey software, CTID developed a nine-question survey and asked our readers to participate. Almost 10% of the readership took the online survey. The respondents included intelligence analysts, instructors, education and
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leader development trainers, unit trainers, Combat Training Center/exercise planners, combat and capabilities development analysts, and unit S2s. The survey results, comments, and suggestions were both illuminating and useful. When asked “What article topics are the most useful?” the majority responded that they found “discussion of new or emerging threat tactics, techniques, and procedures” to be of the most benefit. A close second was the “analysis of current threat actors.” The topic category viewed as not-as-useful was the “overview of threat weapon systems.” This question allowed for a respondent to select as many topic areas as needed, given that most issues have a variety of topic types and are not single topic issues.
Figure 2. Question 1: What article topics are the most useful to you? Given the goal of the Red Diamond is to proliferate an understanding of various OEs, threats, and threat tactics across the Army, the above responses indicate that the periodical is meeting the needs of its users. Below is a sampling of the survey responses and comments. Question two solicited a better understanding of how the newsletter is actually being used. The open text response box for this question generated interesting feedback. Answers ranged from “for professional knowledge and development” to the common comment “to stay current on current and future OPFOR/threat TTP.” The following responses show the range of application of the Red Diamond: • Evaluation of current topics of interest for TRADOC • Use it for information to incorporate into my lesson plans • Stay informed and to spark professional discussion within my organization • Stay current on emerging threats as well as what is going on around the world • Use it as a monthly OE professional development periodical • Bring current, detailed, and real-world information into training scenarios • Scenario development • Training and professional development • To stay current on threats that aren’t in other sources • Doctrinal update
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• Exercise design tool • Threat understanding and awareness When asked about the method of delivery of the newsletter, close to 60% of the respondents found the current electronic delivery method of the Red Diamond to be extremely convenient, while some respondents indicated they would like to have hard copies of the newsletter. We remain open to suggestions on Red Diamond delivery. There is no distribution restriction on the newsletter, meaning that users are free to copy, print, or electronically forward the publication as needed. Close to 50% of the respondents noted that they used the Red Diamond on a weekly basis, while more than 10% say they use it on a daily basis.
When asked what changes would most improve the Red Diamond, almost half of the respondents said they would make no changes to publication. Those wanting changes responded with the following suggestions: • Remove the redundant advertisement of doctrinal pubs and manuals • Figure out how to make if more user friendly at the SSG/2LT level, instead of a routine newsletter send out a weekly sort of smart card or synopsis – something they could use on a smart phone • Less emphasis on theater-based threats (where we are and have been) and more emphasis on real world threats (where we are going) • Do OSINT studies of nation states, use DATE OE related countries • More hybrid threat tactics • A classified version of the Red Diamond at the SECRET//NOFORN level • Make it more interactive over time • More detailed table of contents • Simpler graphics for the tactics • Change delivery method to MilSuites • Use videos The final question was designed as an open comment box for respondents to provide TRISA with any comments, suggestions, or concerns about the Red Diamond. Fewer than half of the respondents provided comments on this question, but of those that did offered comments that were mostly positive and educational. The following bullets illustrate the responses: • Consider sponsoring a threat cell branch at each Center of Excellence (COE) that fully integrates into that COE’s initiatives and concept development. For example, SMEs on the ground that have reach back to TRISA and can support local missions. • The December best of the best for the year is a great way to review the best articles of the year. • Please make sure this newsletter doesn't go away. • The Red Diamond is valuable for units to understand how the OPFOR fights and what individuals are current threat actors world-wide. It brings a touch of reality to the unclassified realm. • Keep up the good work! Excellent source for intelligence professionals. • I would like to see some examples in other languages: e.g. Spanish, Dari, and Pastho.
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TRISA will continue to seek user feedback on all of its products, and the Red Diamond staff welcomes topic suggestions for future articles. For all of those who took the time to respond, thank you. If you did not have time to respond, feel free to contact us at anytime with ideas or comments on the Red Diamond. ______
Coup d’État in Central African Republic (Part Two)
by Laura Deatrick, OEA Team (CGI Federal Ctr)
A former French colony, the Central African Republic (CAR) has had a stormy history since gaining independence in 1960. Power has primarily been transferred via coup d’état, with the only peaceful transition occurring in 1993. Rebel groups form often and easily, and CAR has had nearly continual foreign troop presence – French, African Union, and UN – in ongoing international attempts to stabilize the country and keep peace. This article is the second in a series that explores the most recent coup d’état in CAR, which occurred on 24 March 2013 when the Séléka rebel group overran the capital. (Part One of this series appears in the March 2013 Red Diamond.) As of 9 December 2012, CAR was experiencing an uneasy peace. Rebel groups that had signed peace agreements with the government during the previous five years were still awaiting the fulfillment of many of the promises made, including the release of political prisoners and the completion of the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration process for former Figure 1. Location of Central African Republic members. Only a few weeks earlier, threats of an attack The expected attack did not materialize, however, and made by a breakaway faction of the Union of the townspeople eventually returned to their homes. Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), led by Michel Then in late November, armed rebels had attacked the Djotodia, had caused many residents of the northern northern town of Kabo, but Central African Forces (fr: city of Ndélé to flee. Forces Armées Centrafricaines; FACA) troops had been able to repulse them.1
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10 December 2012 Séléka began its first offensive on 10 December 2014. A group of men armed with automatic weapons attacked the city of Ndélé in the morning, sending hundreds of civilians fleeing into the bush, to a Catholic mission, and to the local airfield, the latter of which was protected by Figure 2. 10 December 2012 the Central African Multinational Force (fr: Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale; FOMAC). CPJP 15-17 December 2012 members awaiting DDR and FACA troops were present A few days later, a rebel contingent trekked in Ndélé; the attackers defeated the FACA troops, who approximately 110 km southwest from Ndélé to retreated toward Kaga Bandoro. Reports conflict as to Bamingui, attacking the town on 15 December. The whether the CPJP members fought with FACA, or chose group succeeded in both defeating the FACA troops that not to participate in the fighting. There were also were in the immediate area and taking possession of reports that the attackers cut phone lines and took the town. The following day, this same rebel group 2 hostages during or shortly after the battle. ambushed a unit of FACA soldiers that were headed to Ndélé was not the only location of armed offensives on Ndélé in order to retake the city. An unnamed military 10 December. Nearly 300 km to the east, a second source stated that 40 troops were not accounted for group of rebels attacked and captured the town of Sam after the ambush, and that the rebel group had Ouandja. The group then moved 100 km southwest. captured two supply vehicles loaded with weapons, [Note. Distances mentioned and routes shown on fuel, and ammunition in the same attack. The group graphics are most likely scenarios based on CAR’s road continued its advance on 17 December, traveling an system. Only select roads are shown on graphics for additional 110 km south to capture the town of Mbrès late in the day. Upon learning this news, residents of purposes of clarity to the town of Ouadda, which it also 4 captured.] A faction of the Union of Democratic Forces the nearby town of Kaga Bandoro began to flee. for Unity (UFDR), led by Michel Djotodia, was Up to this point, government officials and the media immediately suspected of all three attacks. This had assumed that the Djotodia-led faction of the UFDR suspicion was confirmed the following day, when a was solely responsible for the week-long rebel UFDR spokesman took responsibility for the attacks and offensive. This appeared to be confirmed on 11 claimed to have captured some FACA members and a December when the group claimed responsibility for 3 vehicle-mounted heavy machine gun at Ouadda. the previous day’s attacks. On 17 December, however, Séléka CPSK-CPJP-UFDR (Séléka) released a statement publically announcing its formation and insisting that the administration meet its obligations as codified in the previous peace accords and hold talks with the new
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rebel group. If the government refused, Séléka would towns. The troops traveled through Kabo toward Sibut, act to overthrow it. stopping at Kaga Bandoro for the night. That same day, the FACA detachment stationed at nearby Batangafo reportedly abandoned the town and headed for the city of Bossangoa.6 19-21 December 2012 The town of Kabo, lying 180 km due west of Bamingui, was the next town to fall. The western Séléka group, reportedly on motorcycles and horseback, attacked the town early on 19 December with small and heavy weapons. The population fled into the bush and local government troops retreated before the rebels. Séléka members reportedly looted the town, captured arms and vehicles from the FACA base, and cut local communication lines. Afterward, the Séléka contingent left the town and headed southwest toward the town of Batangafo, only 7 60 km away. Figure 3. 15-17 December 2012 Announcements and warnings were the order of the day. Séléka warned the Chadian troops against attacking the group and announced plans to move 18 December 2012 toward the town of Bouca via Batangafo. The Bozizé Approximately 200 km southwest of Ouadda lies the Administration stated that the rebels had yet to make diamond-mining city of Bria, which also boasts an any formal demands of the government, and airfield and a military base. The eastern Séléka group announced its intentions to retake Bria and Mbrès, attacked the city in the early morning hours of 18 followed by Bamingui. December with small arms and heavy weapons. FACA The international community also weighed in, with the troops stationed at the base fought back but were African Union (AU) demanding the rebels “withdraw unable to defeat the rebels, and eventually retreated immediately and without condition,” France calling for a southwest toward Bambari, abandoning the base. One “national dialogue,” and the International Committee of media report indicated that Séléka members looted the Red Cross reporting that thousands had been 5 shops in Bria after the battle. displaced due to the current conflict.8 Mid-morning on 20 December found the Séléka contingent driving into Batangafo on motorcycles and at least one truck–the latter probably captured at the FACA base in Kabo. The residents of Batangafo had not waited to meet them. By the time the Séléka contingent entered the town it was nearly deserted, and the few offices that were still operating immediately closed upon the rebels’ arrival. The local FACA troops and police force (gendarmerie) had already fled to Bossangoa, leaving no impediment to the subsequent looting by the new arrivals.9 Figure 4. 18 December 2012 The day brought movements by other armed forces as well. Two thousand Chadian soldiers entered CAR at President Bozizé’s request, tasked with assisting FACA in securing the capital and retaking the fallen cities and Red Diamond Page 10
morning of 22 December, and later justified its actions by alleging that it encountered FACA troops on the road the night before. The rebels arrived in four vehicles and, according to one report, immediately started searching houses. Later that same day they advanced another 50 km to Ndassima, a gold-mining town, and captured it as well.12 On the morning of 23 December, FACA troops heading to Bria encountered Séléka forces just five km north of Bambari, which lies 50 km south of Ndassima. Two Figure 5. 19-20 December 2012 hours of fighting ensued, with the government forces eventually fleeing 70 km west to Grimari. That same day, Séléka announced a cessation of hostilities to await negotiations with the government; it Séléka took possession of Bambari and reportedly would not attack any additional towns, but neither captured eight FACA vehicles and cut phone lines to the would it relinquish any of those already won. The UN city. Though Chadian forces were located at the city, 13 Security Council simultaneously called for the rebels to they reportedly did not engage the rebels. stop their advance, surrender control of the conquered towns, and engage in dialogue. By this time Chad had clarified its position regarding the presence of its armed forces in CAR, which had arrived at Sibut and taken up positions there. Chadian officials insisted that their troops were not there to attack Séléka, but to maintain peace so negotiations could be held between the rebels and the CAR government. President Bozizé, however, had no intention of negotiating with Séléka. Instead, he prepared to depart for Ndjamena, Chad, where the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) had called an 10 Figure 6. 22-23 December 2012 emergency summit to discuss the situation in CAR. At this juncture President Bozizé agreed to negotiate Chad hosted the regional emergency summit on 21 with the rebels, with the caveat that they first withdraw December. ECCAS leaders called for an immediate from their current positions. Séléka refused, but did ceasefire; the relinquishment of captured cities/towns request an “inclusive dialogue” to settle their within one week; and negotiations between the rebels differences. The group also claimed that one of its units and the CAR government, to be held in Libreville, was only 85 km away from the capital city of Bangui, Gabon. 14 though this was not confirmed by outside sources. Though reportedly ruling out military intervention, one 25 December 2012 report indicated that ECCAS intended to create a regional interdictory force using troops from Chad and On 25 December, the western-most contingent of the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central Séléka traveled to Kaga Bandoro, 120 km southeast of Africa (fr: Mission de la Consolidation de la Paix en Batangafo, by vehicle and motorcycle. The rebels Centrafrique; MICOPAX). In the meantime, FACA forces attacked the town, training heavy weapons on military and Chadian troops reinforced their positions in the city and government targets. 11 of Bambari, southwest of Bria. FACA troops stationed there fought back, but eventually 22-23 December 2012 retreated to Sibut. Local residents were forced to flee, and rebels looted many of the public buildings, Séléka’s promise to halt its advance proved to be short- 15 including the hospital and schools. lived. The eastern rebel contingent captured the town of Ippy, located around 90 km west of Bria, on the
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occupied strategic positions in the town and cut the phone lines. That same day the additional FOMAC troops authorized by ECCAS arrived in the country.19
Figure 7. 25 December 2012 26-27 December 2012 Hundreds of Bangui residents surrounded the French Embassy on 26 December, throwing stones at the compound and tearing down its French flag. The protest was a reaction to the country’s perceived refusal to help its former colony, as France had declared that its troops were in CAR solely to protect French citizens and assets. Figure 8. 28-29 December 2012 Bozizé formally apologized to France the following day, 30 December 2012 - 4 January 2013 and requested assistance from the US and France in fighting the rebel offensive; both countries later President Bozizé, perhaps appreciating the vulnerability refused.16 of his position, made a three-fold offer to Séléka on 30 December: He would negotiate without preconditions; Séléka announced that it would forbear attacking form a unity government with the rebel alliance; and Bangui at this juncture, claiming that President Bozizé step down as president at the end of his term in 2016. had already lost the contest. Rumors swirled alleging Séléka responded by claiming that it did not want to that the rebels had bypassed Sibut and reached the govern and that it would consider Bozizé’s offer. It also town of Damara, only 75 km north of Bangui, but were promised not to attack Bangui either before or during subsequently proven to be false. the peace talks. The UN condemned the rebel group’s offensive and The next day, however, the group rejected the announced the evacuation of all non-essential UN proffered terms, stating that it did not trust the personnel to Senegal. The US followed suit, relocating 17 president to keep his word. Séléka also accused the its embassy staff from Bangui to Kenya. government of attacking citizens belonging to suspected 28-29 December 2012 pro-rebel ethnic groups and arming anti-rebel 20 Government troops staged a counteroffensive at civilians. Bambari early on 28 December in an effort to retake the The next few days saw a build-up of international city; they failed and were eventually forced to retreat. troops in Damara. Soldiers from South Africa, Gabon, That evening, both FACA and Chadian forces withdrew the Republic of the Congo, and Cameroon augmented from Sibut to Damara. ECCAS agreed to send additional the FOMAC, Chadian, and FACA forces already present. FOMAC forces to CAR to augment the 500 troops On 2 January 2013, the key players all made major already present, while France reiterated that it would announcements. President Bozizé fired his army chief of not intervene militarily in the ongoing crisis. Séléka staff and his defense minister, who also happened to be agreed to attend unconditional peace talks with the 18 his son. Séléka agreed to halt its advance on Bangui and government, to be held in Libreville, Gabon. to attend negotiations in Gabon, and FOMAC declared During the morning of 29 December, Séléka members – that a rebel attack on Damara would be seen as a likely from the western group – arrived at Sibut on “declaration of war.”21 trucks and motorcycles. Firing their weapons, the rebels
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5 January 2013 Though claiming that they were there to protect civilians, there were reports of random shootings, During the early hours of 5 January, members of the destruction of property, and rape by the rebels. eastern Séléka group attacked and captured the towns of Alindao and Kouango, located 120 km southeast and As had occurred in other towns, the majority of the 110 km southwest of Bambari, respectively. local residents sought shelter in the bush. Séléka later claimed that it attacked Alindao because the group was being targeted by Ugandan troops that were in the country to help track down Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).22 7 January 2013 Representatives of the CAR government and the Séléka rebels arrived in Libreville, Gabon, to begin peace talks. By this time Séléka controlled nearly half the country, having captured at least 15 different cities and towns in the span of just four weeks. Figure 9. 5 January 2013
Conclusion Political tensions, rebel groups, and forceful regime changes are standard fare in the Central African Republic. Part 1 of this series focused on political events leading up to the beginning of the Séléka rebellion and the composition of the rebel group. This article reviewed the rebel offensive of December 2012-January 2013. Part 3 of this series will focus on the January 2013 peace talks and the rebel offensive of February-March 2014.
Figure 10. 10 December 2012 - 5 January 2013 in Central African Republic
Sources For source questions and a complete list of sources, please contact the author.
Notes The sources listed below are not a complete listing of those consulted; rather, they cite unique information not included in other reports.
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1 Radio Ndeke Luka, “Attaque rebelle, panique générale à Ndele [fr: Rebel attack, general panic at Ndele],” 10 December 2012; RFI, “RCA: l'armée tchadienne en renfort des troupes centrafricaines face à la rébellion [fr: The Chadian army reinforces Central African troops facing rebellion],” 19 December 2012. 2 Agence France-Presse, “Central Africa says repelled rebel attack,” ReliefWeb, 11 December 2012; Agence France-Presse, “Heavy fighting in northern CAR, many flee: military,” Google News, 10 December 2012; ANP/AFP, “Four dead, 22 troops captured in CAR rebel attack: sources,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 15 December 2012; Associated Press, “Rebels in Central African Republic take 7th town,” Town Hall, 20 December 2012; Médecins Sans Frontières, “MSF Responds to Conflict in Northeastern Central African Republic,” ReliefWeb, 14 December 2012; Radio Ndeke Luka, “Attaque rebelle, panique générale à Ndele [fr: Rebel attack, general panic at Ndele],” 10 December 2012. 3 Agence France-Presse, “Central Africa says repelled rebel attack,” ReliefWeb, 11 December 2012. 4 Paul-Marin Ngoupana and Madjiasra Naka, “Chad sends troops to back CAR army against rebels,” Google News, 18 December 2012; Reuters, “Centrafrique: 40 militaires portés disparus après une embuscade près de Ndélé [fr: Central Africa:40 military personnel disappear after an ambush near Ndélé],” Centrafrique-Presse, 17 December 2012; Xinhua, “Centrafrique: Appui confirmé de l'armée tchadienne pour combattre les rebelles dans le nord [fr: Central Africa: Confirmed Chadian army support for fighting rebels in the north],” 20 December 2012. 5 Christian Panika, “Chad troops enter Central Africa to help fight rebels: military,” Google News, 18 December 2012; Paul-Marin Ngoupana and Madjiasra Naka, “Chad sends troops to back CAR army against rebels,” Google News, 18 December 2012; RFI, “RCA: l'armée tchadienne en renfort des troupes centrafricaines face à la rébellion [fr: The Chadian army reinforces Central African troops facing rebellion],” 19 December 2012. 6 Reuters, “RCA les rebelles de la coalition Seleka suspendent leurs opérations militaires [fr: CAR: the rebels of the Seleka coalition suspend their military operations],” Centrafrique Presse Info, 20 December 2012. 7 Christian Panika, “Rebels continue Central Africa push as Chad troops arrive,” ReliefWeb, 19 December 2012; Médecins Sans Frontières, “As Violence Surges Anew in CAR, Families Again Flee Into The Bush,” ReliefWeb, 21 December 2012; Xinhua, “Centrafrique: Appui confirmé de l'armée tchadienne pour combattre les rebelles dans le nord [fr: Central Africa: Confirmed Chadian army support for fighting rebels in the north],” 20 December 2012. 8 Quotes: Christian Panika, “Rebels continue Central Africa push as Chad troops arrive,” ReliefWeb, 19 December 2012; Paul-Marin Ngoupana, “Rebels seize CAR town, push closer to capital,” Reuters, 19 December 2012. Unique information: Hippolyte Marboua, “2,000 troops from Chad to fight CAR rebels,” Yahoo News, 19 December 2012; Médecins Sans Frontières, “As Violence Surges Anew in CAR, Families Again Flee Into The Bush,” ReliefWeb, 21 December 2012; RFI, “RCA: l'armée tchadienne en renfort des troupes centrafricaines face à la rébellion [fr: The Chadian army reinforces Central African troops facing rebellion],” 19 December 2012. 9 Médecins Sans Frontières, “As Violence Surges Anew in CAR, Families Again Flee Into The Bush,” ReliefWeb, 21 December 2012; OCHA, “Insecurity in the northern region of CAR,” HDPT CAR Information Bulletin No 208, 14-18 December 2012; Reuters, “RCA les rebelles de la coalition Seleka suspendent leurs opérations militaires [fr: CAR: the rebels of the Seleka coalition suspend their military operations],” Centrafrique Presse Info, 20 December 2012. 10 Hippolyte Donossio, “RCA : les rebelles de la coalition Séléka suspendent leurs opérations militaires [fr: CAR: The rebels of the Séléka coalition suspend their military operations],” RFI, 20 December 2012. 11 Radio Ndéké Luka, “La ville de Ippy conquise par Séléka en pleine trêve [fr: The city of Ippy conquered by Séléka in the middle of a truce],” Centrafrique-Presse, 22 December 2012; RFI, “Centrafrique: Les rebelles du Séléka progressent encore [fr: Central Africa: The Séléka rebels advance again],” AllAfrica, 23 December 2012. 12 Radio Ndéké Luka, “La ville de Ippy conquise par Séléka en pleine trêve [fr: The city of Ippy conquered by Séléka in the middle of a truce],” Centrafrique-Presse, 22 December 2012. 13Christophe Rigaud, “Centrafique: Une compagnie rebelle à 85 km de Bangui [fr: Central Africa: A rebel company 85 km from Bangui],” Afrikarabia, 23 December 2012; Elysée Guedjand, “Crisis in the Central African Republic,” International Partnership for Human Development, 3 January 2013. 14 Quote and unique information: Christophe Rigaud, “Centrafique: Une compagnie rebelle à 85 km de Bangui [fr: Central Africa: A rebel company 85 km from Bangui],” Afrikarabia, 23 December 2012. 15 Agence France-Presse, “CAR rebels seize another town in latest offensive,” Africa Review, 26 December 2012; Elysée Guedjand, “Crisis in the Central African Republic,” International Partnership for Human Development, 3 January 2013. 16 BBC News, “Central African Republic's Bozize in US-France appeal,” 27 December 2012. 17Raluca Besliu, “Rebels in the Central African Republic approach the capital,” Digital Journal, 30 December 2012. 18 BBC News, “Central African Republic to hold talks with rebels,” 28 December 2012. 19 Agence France-Presse, “Central African City Is Seized by Rebels,” New York Times, 29 December 2012; BBC News, “Central African Republic crisis: Bozize promises coalition,” 30 December 2012; Reuters, “CAR rebels occupy Sibut after army withdraws: resident, official,” 29 December 2012. 20 BBC News, “Central African Republic crisis: Bozize promises coalition,” 30 December 2012; BBC News, “Central African Republic crisis: Bozize offer rejected,” 31 December 2012. 21 Quote: BBC News, “Central African Republic rebels halt advance on Bangui,” 2 January 2013; Krista Larson, “Troops from Chad draw red line for rebels in Central African Republic,” San Jose Mercury News, 2 January 2013. 22 Michael Martinez and Nana Karikari-apau, “Rebels assault 2 towns in Central African Republic despite peace talk plans,” CNN. 5 January 2013; Xinhua, “Fears of resumption of hostility between Central African Republic gov't and rebels,” 7 January 2013.
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The Company Detachment (CDET)
Threat Tailored Force Structure
by Jon H. Moilanen, CTID Operations (BMA Ctr)
Army missions for the foreseeable future will often occur in complex operational environments (OEs) with dynamic and uncertain circumstances, and enemies and adversaries with the ability to adapt and counter the advantages of a land power opponent. Recognition of an adaptable threat and/or hybrid threat can be demonstrated in a number of organizational configurations for training. Considering only one type of threat to plan and train against is a shallow understanding of history, contemporary conditions, and practical expectations for the future. Adversaries and threats abound in today’s OEs and present a range of capabilities that often combine regular and irregular forces toward a common goal or objective. Joint Operations (JP 3-0) defines an adversary as a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. The US Army defines threat and hybrid threat in its doctrine with an additional emphasis on capability and intent to harm, and infers an expanded capability and intent when forces and/or elements combine to achieve mutually benefiting effects.
Threat Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland.
Hybrid Threat The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations
The US Army Training Circular (TC) 7 -100 series and opposing force (OPFOR) field manuals in transition to the TC 7-100 series are the source for threats and hybrid threats for Army training, professional education, and leader development. The Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program (AR 350-2) defines the opposing force concept within the framework of an OE and describes the various uses of opposing forces in Army and other activity training and events. This Army regulation describes a threat opposing force (OPFOR) is a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces (doctrine, tactics, organization, and equipment) used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forces.
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At the lower tactical echelons of regular forces―battalion and company―threat organization of combat power is typically tailored. Based on mission requirements, a task-organized threat battalion or company is designated a detachment. Detachments are the smallest combined arms threat formations and are by definition task-organized. Units configured from battalions are termed battalion-size detachments (BDETs), and those formed from companies are termed company-size detachments (CDETs). The largest threat tactical-level organizations are divisions and brigades and typically tailor organizational structure for operations. Detachments operate under the command and control (C2) of a division or brigade headquarters. For operations, a tactical group is a task-organized division or brigade that has received an allocation of additional elements in order to accomplish its mission. Tactical groups formed from divisions are division tactical groups (DTGs) and those from brigades are brigade tactical groups (BTGs). All threat forces, organizations, and elements are expected to adapt quickly to the tactical situation and accomplish its assigned mission. Detachments focus on the purpose and intent of their tactical mission and continue to act on that intent when the details of an original order have become irrelevant through enemy action, updated intelligence, and/or unforeseen events. Nonetheless, units task-organized at the company echelon are typically tailored to execute one combat mission at a time. Company Detachment (CDET) Examining a company-size detachment model illustrates threat combined arms principles based on functional analysis of mission requirements. An example of a CDET illustrates elements of C2, tailored organization, support relationships, and functional capabilities in order to accomplish a mission.
Functional Analysis An intelligence analysis methodology that uses the concepts of functional tactics to predict probable and/or possible enemy courses of action.
Functional Tactics The idea that threat/hybrid threat tactical action is best understood and described by the functions each force, element, or actor performs in order to bring about mission accomplishment.
Command and Control Threat units use four C2 and support relationships, summarized in Table 1. (See also, TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics, Ch. 2.) Note. The OPFOR uses “C2.” These relationships are flexible and may change during the course of an operation in order to best achieve a mission. The reinforced and detached amplifiers―the plus or minus amplifier symbols within parentheses―to indicate increased or decreased capabilities on US Army unit symbols is not typically used with OPFOR symbols.
• Constituent units are those forces assigned directly to a unit and forming an integral part of it. They may be organic to the table of organization and equipment (TOE) of the administrative force structure forming the basis of a given unit, assigned at the time the unit was created, or attached to it after its formation. • Dedicated is a command relationship identical to constituent with the exception that a dedicated unit still receives logistics support from a parent headquarters of similar type. • Supporting units continue to be commanded by and receive their logistics from their parent headquarters, but are positioned and given mission priorities by their supported headquarters. • Affiliated organizations, typically nonmilitary or paramilitary groups such as criminal organizations, insurgent organizations, and/or guerrilla units are operating in a detachment’s AOR and coordinate actions for a common purpose and/or mutual support for a limited period of time. No command relationship exists between an
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affiliated organization and the detachment in which it operates. This affiliation is common among hybrid threat operations. Table 1. Threat command and control (C2) and support relationships Relationship Commanded by Logistics from Positioned by Priorities from Constituent Gaining Gaining Gaining Gaining Dedicated Gaining Parent Gaining Gaining Supporting Parent Parent Supported Supported Affiliated Self Self or “Parent” Self Mutual Agreement
The company structure―a standard organization of personnel and equipment―is a headquarters and subordinate platoons and/or other elements. Tailored elements can be a reinforcement and/or reallocation of platoons, sections, squads, or teams. Affiliated elements may act in concert with a CDET but have no C2 relationship. Function and Mission The basic type of threat detachment is, whether formed from a battalion or a company, the independent mission detachment (IMD). IMDs are formed to execute missions that are separated in space and/or time from those being conducted by the remainder of the forming unit. (See Figure 2. for an example of a CDET task organization.) TC 7-100.2, Opposing Force Tactics, describes other types of detachments. Functional detachments include but are not limited to— • Counterreconnaissance detachment. (See chapter 5.) • Urban detachment. (See chapter 5.) • Security detachment. (See chapter 5.) • Reconnaissance detachment. (See chapter 7). • Movement support detachment. (See chapter 12.) • Obstacle detachment. (See chapter 12.) Function and Capability The allocation of threat forces to a detachment is mission-focused by functional requirements and unit capabilities. Examples include
• Artillery or⎯ mortars. • Air defense. • Engineers with obstacle, survivability, and/or mobility assets. • Heavy weapons including heavy machineguns, automatic grenade launchers, or antitank guns/missiles. • Units or activities with specialty equipment such as: o Flame weapons. o Guided missiles. o Specialized reconnaissance assets. o Rotary-wing assets. o Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) o Unified action elements from joint, combined, or other intergovernmental activities. o Chemical defense, medical, logistics, signal, and/or electronic warfare units.
The example in Figure 2 is a CDET based on a motorized infantry company headquarters. One of the three platoons is task-organized. Other units are a 120-mm mortar section, 107-multiple rocket launcher section, antitank AT-14 guided missile squad, engineer reconnaissance squad, NBC reconnaissance squad, special purpose forces information warfare team, and an affiliated insurgent direct action cell. Note. OPFOR uses “NBC” for its nuclear, biological [and radiological],
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and chemical unit designations. (See TC 7-100.4, on Army training Network (ATN), for detailed information on unit or organization capabilities.)
CDET
Company Platoon Platoon Platoon HQ
Functional Capability and Task Organization Options
Affiliated Platoons Sections Squads Teams Elements
Figure 2. Company-size detachment (CDET) (example) Implications for Training The CDET is a company-size tailored organizational structure that can be expected as typical in a complex OE with threats and/or hybrid threat. The threat is an adaptive organization and will rarely display a unit organizational structure that is not task-organized for a mission. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. The CDET can easily transition command and control relationships, as well as coordinate support by affiliation with insurgents, guerrillas, criminal organizations, and/or other irregular elements. Notwithstanding, vulnerabilities can emerge from temporary organizations―and with thorough intelligence collection and analysis―can be acquired, confirmed, and targeted for a designated effect. ______
In Review: Army 3Q/FY14 Antiterrorism Awareness Theme ANTITERRORISM SYNCHRONIZATION
Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) APR MAY JUN
TRISA Threats Terrorism Team (T3) Advisory
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Artillery and Mortar Projectiles
by Walter L. Williams, Training, Education, and Leader Development Team Leader (DAC)
Can artillery and mortar projectiles travel farther than their advertised or published range? The answer to the question is simply yes. This historical example illustrates the point: While supporting the Normandy Invasion during WWII, the battleship USS Texas conducted a fire mission against a target that was out of the range of her 14-inch (360-mm) guns. From 6 June to 9 June, the USS Texas provided support to Army units with her 14-inch and 5-inch guns firing on German positions. She returned to Plymouth, England for rearm and resupply before returning to the French coast on 11 June to support the army in its advance inland. Around 15 June, army units had advanced to the limit of the USS Texas’ gun range. Her last fire support mission against German tank and troop concentrations was so far inland that to get the needed range, the captain ordered the starboard torpedo blister (a form of passive defense against naval torpedoes featured in the construction of warships during the period between World War I and World War II) flooded with water to provide a list of three degrees to provide the 14-inch guns enough elevation to complete the fire mission. While this is an example of adapting a fire support system at sea to increase the range, this same feat can be accomplished on land. Generally, the range of an indirect fire weapon system (such as artillery or mortar) may be increased through modifications of the firing system, the projectile or munition, the propellant, or in some cases all three. However, during combat operations there is not enough time to go through a structured or formal combat developmental process to increase the range of systems. Field expedient or adaptive measures must be taken to ensure target engagement. In the case of the USS Texas, the advertised range of the 14-inch/45 caliber gun was approximately 13 miles or 20.9 km (see table 1). The German targets were slightly outside of the maximum range. The ship’s captain understood the risk of bringing his ship closer to shore would more than likely increase her vulnerability to German indirect fire batteries as well as grounding the ship. Thus, applying the adaptive tactic of listing the ship increased her range in order to engage and destroy the enemy targets. Table 1. Range of USS Texas 14-inch gun With 1,500 lbs. (680.40 kg) With 1,275 lbs. (578 kg) High Elevation Mark 16 Armor Piercing (AP) Capacity (HC) Range @ 15 degrees (maximum 23,000 yards (21,030 m) (approx. 23,500 yards (21,490 m) elevation un-modernized turrets) 13 miles)
A way that this same feat can be accomplished on land is to position the firing system at a higher elevation of altitude than the target. Indirect fire munitions fired at a higher altitude usually travel farther than nominal or advertised ranges due to several factors. The air is less dense at higher altitudes than at sea level, and the less dense air translates to lower air resistance. The lower air resistance facilitates an increase in the munitions’ range. Every good fire supporter or planner (OPFOR or rotational training unit) understands the relationship or effects of altitude on a target and the firing unit. Normally, a forward observer (FO) will pass on the critical information of the vertical interval to the supporting fire direction center (FDC). The vertical interval is the difference between the firing system and the target location. If the firing system is emplaced in a position lower than the target location, the vertical
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interval is considered to be positive. In this case an FO would send an “up correction” based on the difference in altitude. If the firing position is higher than the target location, the vertical interval is considered to be negative. Thus, the FO would send a “down correction” based on the difference in altitude. Both the FO and the FDC account for the projectile trajectory during the transmission of the firing mission. The flight path of a projectile from the muzzle of the firing system to the point of impact is defined as the projectile trajectory. The highest point of the trajectory path is called the summit. The ascending portion of the projectile trajectory is the distance between the exit point on the muzzle of the firing system to the summit. The descending portion of the projectile is the distance from the summit to the point of impact. (See Figure 1.) The projectile has the potential to travel to or exceed the advertised range as long as there are no obstructions (natural or man-made) between the firing system and the target.
Summit Ascending Descending Portion Portion
Maximum Ordinate
Firing System Ground Level Point of Impact Figure 1. Projectile trajectory Now, consider the firing tables. Firing tables are usually developed under optimal conditions such as no wind and average air density and temperature. The weight of the projectile and the propellant temperature are accounted for during the test firings. Both the firing system and target are at the same altitude. There are no obstructions (natural or man-made) between the firing system and the target. The end result is a hit on anything within the maximum firing range of the system. However, it is important to note that while “Kentucky Windage” may be applied during a particular fire mission supporting an operation, a change or addendum to the firing table must be made to ensure the accuracy and consistency of rounds during future firing missions. The issue becomes one of accuracy and consistency when firing an indirect fire weapon system, especially at longer ranges. Accuracy can be defined as a measure of the precision required for the mean point of impact (MPI) of a group of rounds to be placed on a target. Consistency, on the other hand, is a measurement of the spread or dispersion of the rounds about the MPI aimed at the same target. (See Figure 2.)
Accurate and Consistent Accurate but Inconsistent
Inaccurate and Inconsistent Inaccurate but Consistent Figure 2. Accuracy and consistency
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For example, during the India-Pakistan fighting in the Kargil Region (especially near the Siachen Glacier) in the late 1990s, the firing tables for the Krasnopol semi-active laser-guide projectile were modified due to the high altitude conditions. Both the firing systems and the targets were at the same altitude within the region of operations. The initial Krasnopol firing tables were developed at a much lower altitude. Planners had to account for the fact that while the Krasnopol was laser-guided munition, it was important to account for the change in operational altitude and temperature. In order to achieve the desired accuracy and consistency, the Krasnopol test team had to determine the muzzle velocity for each charge used to fire the Krasnopol and the chamber pressure/acceleration associated with the firing at the higher altitude. Tactical Implications There are several reasons to account for the desire to have long-range capable systems and projectiles. First, longer range systems and projectiles facilitate the ability to concentrate more indirect fire weapon systems onto a specific target enabling surprise, shock action, and a heavier weight of fire. Second, the increase in range allows the engagement of lucrative or high payoff targets positioned within the depths and flanks of enemy positions. Third, the longer range also allows the firing system to fire from a position out of the range of enemy direct fire weapon systems as well as some indirect fire weapon systems. As previously stated, there are times during combat operations in which field expedient or adaptive measures must be taken to ensure target engagement. First, the FO (time permitting) can construct a manual or digital terrain sketch to aid in the target location. The terrain sketch offers a rough panoramic view of the observer’s area of responsibility. Some of the items that may be included in the sketch consist of the following: • Crests, hills, ridges • Other natural terrain features such as streams, rivers, lakes, and vegetation • Skyline or the horizon • Man-made features such as buildings, roads, power lines, towers, antennas, and battlefield debris • Labels (reference points and targets) A copy of the terrain sketch may be on hand at the FDC as a reference document during the conduct of fire missions. If time is not available, the FO must communicate this info to the FDC to ensure obstacles or barriers to the trajectory of the munitions are identified prior to engagement. The overall goal is for the round adjustment to be more effective and timely to ensure the respective target destruction criterion is achieved. Second, the firing unit commander designates a position for the firing unit to displace to facilitate the firing mission. Time permitting, the FDC may provide the firing unit commander the probable location; the firing unit must displace to a position that offers the ideal location for firing the projectiles to meet the desired range. The FDC calculates the firing data (deflection and elevation) and charges required for the mission to be successful. Figure 3 offers a rough illustration (not to scale) of the difference in firing positions and altitude as well as the probable flight trajectory. Firing position 1 shows the advertised range of the projectile for the respective firing system and is within the range of the target direct and indirect fire weapons systems. Firing position 2 illustrates the adaptive or field expedient method where the firing unit is displaced to a higher altitude to facilitate the firing of the projectiles at a longer range.
Firing Position 2
Firing Position 1 Sea Level Target
Figure 3. Ranges
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The adaptive range may travel a few hundred meters to a few kilometers. The adaptive firing method may not be effective against moving targets as with stationary targets. The accuracy and consistency of the projectiles may not be as effective as what has been published as the advertised range. But, the firing mission effectiveness may be measured or gauged through the target actions or response. If the target takes protective measures such as displacing out of the adaptive firing unit’s range or a number of personnel and/or equipment is damaged or destroyed, it could be that the enemy leadership responded in a way that they did not want. As a final note to the historical example, with combat operations beyond the range of her guns on 16 June, the USS Texas left Normandy for England on 18 June 1944.
Sources “14" - 45 cal. Naval Gun.” USSTexasBB35.com. Artillery: Still Not Good Enough. Krasnopol's Triumph in the Himalyas. “USS Texas (Battleship # 35, later BB-35) -- Part II. Naval History and Heritage Command. Williams, Walter L. and Michael D Holthus. "Krasnopol: A Laser-Guided Projectile."
TAJIKISTAN: MILITARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT by Steffany A. Trofino, CTID Threats (DAC)
Tajikistan became independent in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. A landlocked nation of central Asia, its total land mass equals 143,100 square kilometers, comparable to the state of Wisconsin.1 Neighboring countries include China, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan. Formally, the government structure is a republic. The chief of state is President Emomali Rahmon and the head of government is Prime Minister Kokhir Rasulzoda. Economically, Tajikistan has a variety of private freedoms, combined with centralized economic planning and government regulation. Tajikistan is a member of several international organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), and it formally joined the World Trade Organization in March of 2013. Dushanbe, located in the west, is the capital of Tajikistan. The primary threat actor operating inside Tajikistan is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has known links with al-Qaeda. In recent years the group has focused on trafficking narcotics throughout Central Asia, with Tajikistan being a primary transit point for the proliferation of narcotics from Afghanistan to Russia and eastern European markets.
Figure 1. Tajikistan
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Military Tajikistan is the only former Soviet republic that did not create its armed forces from old Soviet Army units. Lacking direct support from Moscow, the newly-formed republic was forced to develop its armed forces from scratch. Today, Tajikistan’s military includes Army, Border Guards, National Guard, and Air Force units. Overall, armed forces capabilities are limited.2 While the United States has invested millions of dollars in Tajik civil-military projects, the overall condition of conventional forces is poor. In recent years, the government has accepted cooperative military assistance from both Russia and the United States, with Russia supporting the majority of Tajikistan’s military advancements. The Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division (headquartered at the capital, Dushanbe) is the largest support network for Tajikistan’s Army. The 201st Motor Rifle Division includes 7,000 Russian troops stationed at bases near Dushanbe, Kulob, and Korgon- Teppe. The country has established a system of conscription and alternative service for the purpose of national defense. The length of service is two years and enrollment takes place twice per year (spring and autumn). Deferments of military service are offered for men attending secondary school. Tajik media has reported numerous cases of forced conscription.3 As of 2011, an estimated 15,000 to 16,000 young men were reportedly being forced into military service annually. Tajikistan’s armed forces are incapable of projecting force beyond their borders, concentrating instead on internal security and protecting its borders with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. As the US draws down its efforts inside Afghanistan, border security will become more important for Tajikistan, as criminal groups will have the ability to increase proliferation of narcotics throughout the area. Currently Tajikistan’s military is ill-equipped and too poorly-trained to counter an invasion on its own should the country be attacked. Equipment used by the Armed Forces is tier two, older Soviet military equipment. The equipment is in poor condition and in need of maintenance. Chain of Command The president is commander in chief of the Tajikistani National Army. Since 1992, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has struggled to establish itself as the principal center of operational control over the army. Today, Tajikistan’s MoD is dysfunctional; however, a large Russian General Staff mission attached to the MoD exerts considerable influence over all aspects of Tajik defense policy. Russia's senior military adviser has an ambassadorial status that affords him direct access to the president and the cabinet. Tajikistan’s most important senior military leaders include: • Supreme Commander in Chief: President Emomali Rahmon • Minister of Defense: Colonel General Sherali Khayrulloyev • Chief of Staff, Armed Forces: Lieutenant General Ramil Nodirov • Commander, Air and Air Defense Force: Major General Vyacheslav M. Groudyna Army The Tajikistani army, headquartered in Dushanbe, numbers about 7,300 personnel. Army garrisons are located in Dushanbe, Chorukh-Dayron, Kulyab, and Kurgan-Tyube. Units include: • 3 motor rifle brigades (including one training brigade) • 1 air assault brigade • 1 artillery brigade • 1 SAM regiment • 1 air defense brigade Air Force Tajikistan has few resources of its own to sustain a viable air defense force. As such, it remains part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Air Defense System. Consequently, its national airspace is monitored and patrolled by the Russian Air Force. While the air force transferred some surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to the army, there is no coherent network of air defense posts or stations maintained solely by one service.
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The Air Force operates with approximately 1,800 active duty personnel. There are two main airfields: Ayni Air Base, with a paved runway of 2,633 meters, and the Dushanbe International Airport, with a paved runway of 2,631 meters. The only force in Tajikistan with effective air attack capabilities is a Russian squadron with Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, located at Ayni Air Base. Known fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft operating inside Tajikistan include: • 4 Aero L-39 Albatros fixed wing trainers located at Ayni Air Base • 4 Mi24 Hind combat helicopters • 11 Mi8 Hip Light Attack and Logistical Transport helicopters • 1 Tu-134A Transport Table 1. Tajikistan Armed Forces Equipment ARMY (As of August 2013, Russian origin tier two unless otherwise noted) Armored Equipment in Artillery Systems in Service AT/Missile Weapons in Service Service T-72 MBT 30 Howitzer, 122-mm-D30 10 SA 2-Guideline 20 T-62 MBT 6 Howitzer, 122-mm BM-21 MRL 3 SA-3 Goa Unknown BMP-1 IFV 8 Mortars, 120-mm 10 SA-7 Grail Unknown BMP-2 IFV 15 FIM-92A Stinger (US) Unknown BTR-60/70/80 APC 23 AIR FORCE (As of August 2013, Russian origin tier two unless otherwise noted) Fixed Wing Aircraft in Rotary Wing Aircraft in Service Missiles in Service Service Tu-134A Transport 1 Transport, Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip 11 L-39 Albatros 4 Attack, Mi-24 Hind 4 (training)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Operations inside Tajikistan Locally, the most significant threat to Tajikistan from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) remains the organization’s proliferation of opium from Afghanistan, as the country is a key transit hub of heroin supplying Europe, Russia, and Asia. Of all opium transferred out of Afghanistan, 70% is controlled by the IMU.4 Corruption of local law enforcement as well as Tajikistani border guards is problematic due to low wages. Known areas of operation of the IMU specific to Tajikistan are restricted to the country’s main highway system due to difficult mountainous terrain. Most narcotics shipments are transferred via the Pamir Highway corridor (also known as the M41) as this is the country’s main transportation highway. Towns identified along this route that are key to illicit trafficking include Khorog in the Shughnon District of the autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan, which is ideally located on the border of Afghanistan. Additionally, Chorku, in the Isfara District of Northern Tajikistan, as well as the town of Tavildara, in the southern central region, have been identified as primary transit hubs. An additional transit route within the country includes the E009 highway that connects the towns of Jirgatal, Khorugh, Ishkoshim, and Lyanga to China. The majority of IMU regional support stems from the corrupt political system prevalent throughout Tajikistan. Local politicians, law enforcement, and border guards are known to accept bribes from IMU members seeking to transit narcotics throughout the country. With the removal of US forces from Afghanistan, trafficking of narcotics will most likely increase the potential for considerably destabilizing the limited security structure within Tajikistan. The IMU force currently operating throughout the region is reported to number between 200 and 300 total members.5 This includes detachments operating throughout Central Asia and outside the boundaries of Tajikistan.
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Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Operations inside Afghanistan On a larger, regional scale, the IMU has been active both inside Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area as well as throughout Afghanistan. Maintaining links with both countries and militants within the region directly facilitates the group’s illicit drug activity. The group has known supportive links with al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban militants operating throughout Afghanistan. Notably, the IMU claimed responsibility for the 15 October 2011 attack on the Provincial Reconstruction Team base in Panjshir, the 19 May 2011 suicide assault on Bagram Airbase, and most recently, the attack against a US military convoy on 18 October 2013 in which an IMU member drove a motorcycle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) into the side of the coalition forces’ convoy outside Bagram Airbase. All three attacks included the use of suicide vehicle borne IEDs. The IMU has reportedly also used rocket-propelled grenades. The IMU will continue to perpetrate attacks throughout Afghanistan in concert with al-Qaeda and Taliban militants against identified threats that target the IMU’s opium-trafficking activities, as most of the funds derived from this illicit activity support the group’s operations. Guerrilla Forces The locally established L'ali Badakhshan Party is based in the Gorno-Badakhshan region of eastern Tajikistan, and at one time had as many as 5,000 fighters. Today, the exact strength level is unknown due to some members joining the fight in neighboring Afghanistan. Several leaders of L'ali Badakhshan live in Talokan, the capital of Takhar Province in northeastern Afghanistan, where they receive financial support and militant training. L'ali Badakhshan Party members regard themselves as ethnic Pamiris and seek to establish an independent state for the Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan. The key differences between ethnic Pamiris and Tajiks are language, religion, and culture. Pamiris are considered a minority group and identify themselves as Shia, while Tajiks are predominately Sunni. The Pamiris’ language is a dialect of Iranian Farsi. In 1991, the L'ali Badakhshan Party successfully lobbied to establish Gorno-Badakhshan as an autonomous region, only to have this declaration rescinded in 1992 by parliamentary officials in Dushanbe. This precipitated the onset of Tajikistan’s civil war, which began in 1992 and ended in 1997. Members of L’ali Badakhshan Party supported the opposition during the civil war known as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). In 1997 the United Nations sponsored an armistice between warring parties and a comprehensive peace agreement was signed. In 1998 members of the UTO, which included extremist members of L'ali Badakhshan Party, splintered into the newly-established IMU and continued to seek support for an independent state of Gorno-Badakhshan. Currently, an uneasy truce throughout Gorno- Badakhshan remains in effect as the IMU exerts regional influence and supports stability that underwrites the organization’s illicit drug-trafficking activity. Criminal Organizations Tajikistan is a central transit hub for the proliferation of narcotics from Afghanistan to Russia, China, and eastern European countries.6 This causes increased instability along transit routes as local warlords seek to control elements traversing their territory. Additionally, the trafficking of persons through Tajikistan to Russia or Asian countries has become more prevalent in recent years. The IMU is the primary threat actor supporting criminal trafficking of narcotics across the Tajikistan border. The Taliban and al-Qaeda support the trafficking of narcotics from Afghanistan, and both groups have direct links to the IMU. Non-Military Armed Combatants There are Russian foreign advisers serving as liaison officers to the Tajikistani military. This relationship instills a considerable amount of influence from the General staff level over Tajikistan’s military. Some of these advisers may be armed and have the potential to act aggressively, if ordered by senior leaders, to protect Russian interests should confrontation occur. Force Protection Issues On 3 September 2013 a car bomb in the northern city of Khujand detonated outside a police installation, resulting in 25 police officers injured.7 Today, instability throughout Tajikistan stems largely from supporters of political opposition groups who oppose the peace agreement that ended the Tajikistan civil war in 1997 and installed a pro-Russian
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government. Primary targets of hostility are government representatives; however, thousands of innocent civilians have been killed, blurring the line between acts of insurgency and acts of terrorism. A counterterrorism operation in Gorno- Badakshan during July 2012 resulted in the deaths of more than 30 terrorists. In addition, with the proposed US drawdown in Afghanistan, the risk for the potential of Gorno-Badakshan to become increasingly more unstable is high, as the region shares a 1,400 km border with northern Afghanistan. Training Implications In the context of the current military and security environment of the country of Tajikistan, there is no specific threat against US military interests at this time. However, as the US prepares to withdraw its forces from neighboring Afghanistan, a potential exists for increased trafficking activity from Afghanistan through Tajikistan, which may further destabilize the already fragile security environment.
Notes 1 CIA World Factbook. “Tajikistan.” 13 November 2012. 2 “Tajikistan: Overview.” Military Periscope. 1 August 2013. 3 Eurasianet. “Tajikistan: Using Force to Maintain a Standing Army.” 4 April 2012. 4 Military Review. Falkenburg, Luke. “Trafficking Terror Through Tajikistan.” August 2013. 5 US Department of State. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2012: Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 30 May 2013. 6 Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. “Tajikistan: Country Profile.” January 2007. 7 Nichol, Jim. “Tajikistan: Recent Developments and US Interests.” Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress. 25 September 2013. ______
Where to find back-issues of TRADOC G2 OEE Red Diamond
https://atn.army.mil 1
2
3
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MASTER SCENARIO EVENTS LIST (MSEL) DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT by Patrick Madden, Training, Education, and Leader Development (TELD) Team (BMA Ctr)
A Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) MSEL is an important management tool for providing stimulation to training units during exercises. Like a synchronization matrix, it gives the exercise control staff a list of all messages in one table that is organized by several categories, such as subject, time, date, message number, etc. It provides the exercise staff a management tool to control and adjust messages as the exercise progresses. It also provides an organized method by which the overall exercise director can routinely review and approve release of future messages during the course of the exercise. Messages randomly transmitted to the training unit have the potential to disrupt, confuse, or derail an exercise without this close management. In order to develop an effective MSEL and appropriate messages, one must first understand and apply important design factors of the exercise. Exercise Design The beginning step in constructing a relevant MSEL is to ensure the supporting messages are linked to the exercise scenario and training objectives. The scenario provides key information such as operational themes and environment. The operational themes (e.g. offensive operations, irregular warfare, wide area security, etc.) provide key information that enables the development of relevant messages and MSEL. The operational environment describes the conditions that are a major part of the scenario and component of training objectives. Training objectives provide the most critical foundation for developing relevant messages. They are statements that describe the desired outcome of the training activity and are the primary reason exercises are conducted regardless of whether the messages drive or augment the exercise. All messages developed should either be linked, directly or indirectly, to specific training objectives. Each message should list the specified training objective(s) it supports.
Figure1. Master scenario events list (example)
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Additional training parameters that are important to know are the training audience, time parameters, and type of exercise. Information such as unit type, size, experience, and previous training exercises are all helpful for applicable message development. The length of the exercise determines the amount of messages and whether there is time to develop multiple messages leading up to key events. It also determines the level of complexity and the volume of messages. For example, there may be a well-trained unit that could receive and use complex messages. However, if there is not enough time in the exercise to exploit the information, it can become a distraction or insignificant. The type of exercise is also important to understand. Designing relevant messages for a brigade staff exercise focusing on the military decision-making process (MDMP) is much different in scope than for an entire brigade combat team (BCT) conducting a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) rotation at one of the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Understanding all of these exercise design variables mentioned above helps provide a good foundation for a cohesive and appropriate organization of supporting messages. MSEL Design MSEL design varies according to the components of the exercise parameters discussed in earlier paragraphs. In other words, exercise design should drive the design of the MSEL and its messages, not the other way around. However, there are some common MSEL items that are normally required. Below is an example of a MESL based on a combined effort of TRADOC G2 organizations and the Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICoE). This illustration is a smaller portion of a larger MSEL, based on the DATE and designed to support a five-day, home station training exercise for a brigade staff. The following paragraphs provide a breakdown of the various components of this MSEL. Located at the top of this illustration are days of the exercise with the specific messages apportioned below each day. Numerical dates are not specified since it was intended to be generic enough for it to be used for numerous brigades conducting home station training. There is also no specified time for each message. This allows flexibility for various MSEL managers to use it with different exercise time cycles. If the MSEL was only intended for one-time use, then the dates and times would be specified. Also note that the messages are not necessarily listed in numeric order. The reason for that is twofold. First, the numbers are part of a larger set of insurgency messages not shown in this portion of the overall MSEL. Second, the design of this MSEL was built to be modular. If a training unit only wanted to use the criminal network message traffic they could do so by simply using the messages in the order they are listed. Also, located just below the days, on the left side of the illustration, is the criminal element and their subordinate factions respectively. Listed below each faction are general themes summarizing the activity contained in the messages for that day. Below, at the bottom left of the page is a legend defining the color codes used in this MSEL. Each color corresponds to a specific type of message. This helps to quickly identify the nature of a given message. Yellow messages are linked messages that provide indications and warnings of possible future activity. Red messages are key events that are the execution a specific criminal activity forecasted earlier. Blue is a message that details an activity by coalition or US organizations that are not part of the training unit, but impact its activity. Example message shown in Blue is the discovery by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of a mass grave, which is tied to a training objective of supporting mass atrocity response operations (MARO). Messages in green indicate armed conflict between different criminal organizations. Purple is a message of significant impact on the training unit, and requires personal review and approval by the exercise director or designated representative. The message depicted in purple dealing with chemical weapons is also one of the unit’s training objectives. However, injecting this message could cause disruption or distraction from other more fundamental objectives, such as conducting offensive operations. For this reason it is coded purple for appropriate approval, disapproval or put on hold for a more appropriate release time. To the right of this legend are two final color codes used for this MSEL. The brown code is for messages released, while the gray located to its right is for messages on hold. The intent for these color designations is to facilitate the tracking of messages, differentiating between those already sent and those in a hold status that may be released during the exercise. If the exercise director puts a message on hold, like the critical event described above, the color of that message would be changed to gray so that it is not inadvertently released into the exercise.
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The MSEL format discussed in this example makes it much easier for the MSEL manager or exercise staff to identify criminal organizations, factions and themes, as well as the type and summary content of each message in sequential order by exercise day. This makes the management of messages much easier, helps prevent training unit confusion, and adds to realistic training. MSEL Management The management of the MSEL depends on several factors. The size, type, and length of exercise are all significant factors that impact how the MSEL is managed. The management of the MSEL may only require a minimal staff if the exercise is small in scale, only involves the primary staff of the training unit, is short in duration and completely driven by messages. To the degree that the reverse is true, then there may be a requirement for breaking down the supporting messages into categories, assigning these categories to sub-MSEL managers with an overall manager in charge. For example, using the previous illustration, a sub-MSEL manager may be required for each of the insurgent and criminal organizations if the size and scale of the exercise requires it. Determining the exact management staff is challenging, especially if the exercise is a unique, onetime event. Even combat training centers (CTCs) that conduct repetitive exercises adjust their staffs in order to meet changing exercise and MSEL design challenges. Another important part of managing the MSEL is ensuring that the MSEL manager attends and participates in key exercise decision meetings. These events, sometimes referred as White Cell or Exercise Director Meetings, are normally conducted every day and result in decisions that affect all facets of the exercise. Impacting the decisions are input from participants, such as the observer controllers (OCs), training unit, OPFOR trusted agents, senior mentors, and joint and interagency participants. As part of these meetings, the MSEL manager should also participate and brief current and proposed message traffic. Slides, which are periodic extracts of the MSEL, are normally used and easier to understand than a spreadsheet containing hundreds of messages. An example of a briefing slide of proposed messages from a recent Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) division Warfighter is listed below. (See Figure 2.) Messages proposed are for the next 48 hours and are shown on the right hand side. The stars depicting a numeric code may represent one message or several messages focused on a given subject. The map on the upper left hand side shows the locations for these events. On the lower left is a color-coded legend indicating whether the messages are planned, briefed previously (released), dynamically scripted, or changed/deleted. Immediately right of the legend shows the total amount and type of attacks irregular forces will conduct during the next 48 hours, which are implemented by both messages and the simulation. Since this example shows a time period starting at the beginning of the exercise, all messages on the right side are shown as planned, pending permission of the exercise director for release. Not discussed previously is the term dynamic scripting. It is a very important type of message that the MSEL manager uses in order to provide relevancy during an exercise. This is especially true during exercises in which simulation and message traffic are used. For example, message traffic providing information on planned insurgent attacks along a major supply route may become irrelevant if the training unit decides not to use this route. Since the attacks were part of the training unit’s objectives, the MSEL manager may decide that the current messages be placed on hold, delayed, or that other messages be created to match the actual route being traveled. Depending on the type of exercise, dynamic scripting may become frequent and will require skilled and timely scripting in order to impact the training unit. MSEL managers should expect and anticipate the need for quick creation of new messages based on the scenario and performance of the training unit. The exercise director plays a key role in providing regular guidance to the MSEL manager on potential message traffic. Regular input from various members of the training staff, unit performance, and status of training objectives, are all important inputs. Synthesis of this information should facilitate accurate decisions to hold, modify, create or release messages already planned. The key role of the MSEL manager is to present current and proposed messages in a condensed and easy to understand format for decision makers. This requires constant monitoring of messages released and the response of the training unit. Also important is participating in internal exercise staff After Action Reviews
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(AARs). Learning and sharing what worked well and what did not work well can increase the efficiency and relevancy of the MSEL and its messages.
Figure 2 . Master scenario events list injects (example) Ensuring the MSEL contains messages that are relevant and accurate is critical for effective training exercises. Understanding the design of the exercise and all its components such as the exercise scenario and training objectives are critical in the creation of the MSEL and associate messages. Organizing the MSEL into an easy and comprehensive format will facilitate more efficient and accurate management of messages. Participating in key exercise decision meetings and presenting current and proposed messages to the exercise director helps ensure that only appropriate messages are released. All these elements combined enable the MSEL manager to provide the training audience with accurate, timely, and relevant messages. ______
Hybrid Threat The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Unified Land Operations, ADRP 3-0
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TERRORISM AND THE OLYMPICS: THE VOLGOGRAD IED BOMBINGS by Jim Bird, OE Assessment Team (Textron Systems Ctr)
Only weeks before the scheduled start of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, a series of IED blasts stoked fears that terrorists might prove capable of derailing the event. Europe, Russia, and the United States often clash on issues touching on geopolitics, but the Olympic Games, held every four years, offer at least some relief from the ceaseless thrusts and counterthrusts that dominate the high stakes game of geopolitics. Since the Munich Olympics of 1972, preparations for these competitions have been carried out under a specter of terrorism that, more than a half century later, still overshadows the bonds of peace and goodwill shared among young athletes and spectators from all over the world. The Winter Olympics at Sochi were no exception.
The December 2013 Attacks Two days later, on Sunday, 29 December, a sinister orange flash lit up the interior of the main train station As Russians made preparations for the coming games as in Volgograd. That city of about one million people, well as their traditional New Year’s celebrations, a spate known to history by its former name of Stalingrad, lies of IED attacks occurred at varying distances from the about a day’s drive (400 miles) northeast of Sochi and Olympic village. The first, on 27 December 2013, was a approximately 550 miles southeast of Moscow, the remotely-detonated car bomb emplaced near a police nation’s capital. Volgograd is a major railway hub for station and central market area in downtown transporting commuters back and forth between the Pyatigorsk, about 170 miles northeast of Sochi. It killed 1 Caucasus region and Moscow. Sixteen people died and three people, two of whom were police officers. more than forty sustained injuries as a result of the Volgograd train station bombing.2
Figure 2. Volgograd station bombing 29DEC13 Figure 1. IED bombings, winter 2013
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The Sunday blast occurred at around 12:45 p.m. local a twisted, gutted carcass, its roof blown off and bodies time, as holiday travelers crowded the train station. and debris strewn across the street.”4 Images captured on closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras showed a person jumping over metal detectors at the station’s main entrance, and setting off a suicide vest that contained an estimated 22 pounds of TNT encased by shrapnel. First responders arrived at the scene to find bodies strewn inside and outside the station entrance, and an amalgam of twisted and singed metal and shrapnel- damaged walls. Shortly thereafter ambulances arrived to transport the dead and injured to a nearby hospital. One witness declared, “People were lying on the Figure 4. Volgograd trolley bus in operation ground, screaming and calling for help….I helped carry out a police officer whose head and face were covered in blood.”3 Authorities initially placed bodies outside the front entrance of the station, which served as a makeshift morgue. In the aftermath of the attack, Russian President Vladimir Putin directed that security measures be tightened at railway stations and airports throughout the country.
Figure 5. Destroyed trolley bus in 30Dec13 bombing Authorities immediately concluded that the attack had been perpetrated by a suicide bomber who had mounted the bus and ridden a short distance alongside the other passengers. Again, President Putin lost little time in issuing directives, as the Kremlin phrased it, “to strengthen security Russia-wide and specifically in the Volgograd region.”5 The combined death toll for both late December Volgograd bombings eventually reached 34, placing them in a different league in comparison to piecemeal IED casualties sustained across Russia throughout 2013.6 Speculation, Tactics, and “Russia’s Most Wanted Man” As rumors swirled in the days immediately following the December attacks, many Russians were inclined to believe that the perpetrators were women commonly Figure 3. Putin at Volgograd bombing site known as “Black Widows.” Black Widows are typically Citizens of Volgograd were still reeling from Sunday’s female suicide bombers of Chechen or other North attack on the main train station when a second blast Caucasus origin whose husbands met their demise at 7 ripped through a trolleybus the following day during the hands of Russian counterinsurgency forces. To morning rush-hour, leaving another 14 people dead. conclude that the Volgograd attackers were women was logical, based on an attack carried out two months The New York Daily News reported that “a Reuters earlier, in the same city. It was then that another journalist saw the blue-and-white trolleybus reduced to Volgograd resident, a 30-year-old native of Dagestan
Red Diamond Page 32 named Naida Asiyalova, donned her hijab, boarded a millennium as a key figure in the Islamist insurgency in bus, and almost immediately detonated a suicide vest. the North Caucasus.12 In 2007, an internationally- The explosion left six people dead and another 28 banned terrorist organization called the Caucasus wounded, some in grave condition. Her husband, Emirate (CE) designated Umarov as its leader, or emir. Dimitry Sokalov, had fallen under the sway of militant Islam in 2009 after moving to Moscow, where the pair first became acquainted. Dimitry personally packed the explosives belt that facilitated his wife’s “martyrdom” in October 2013. Russian analysts claim that since 2000, over two dozen Black Widows have carried out similar 8 suicide attacks. Officials publicly noted a probable linkage between the Figure 6. Doku Umarov two back-to-back late December bombings in The group’s primary objective is to throw off Russian Volgograd, indicating that both IED devices were authority in the North Caucasus and substitute it with a similarly made and encased by equally similar pan- Islamic caliphate, governed by sharia law, that fragmentation containers. Because both bombings would encompass Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. seemed to match the Black Widow template, it made In early 2013, Umarov told his followers to forbear perfect sense to believe that “these unfortunate zombie attacking civilians and civilian facilities in Russia. women” (as one Russian Middle East expert termed them) also played a key role in the December attacks.9 By June, however, he had reversed course, reviling the Evidence gathered at the scenes as well as videos Olympic Games as “Satanic Acts” that were taking place subsequently released by the alleged perpetrators, over the “bones of our ancestors,” and calling on however, failed to validate these suspicions. Forensic believers to disrupt the games by using “maximum 13 evidence from the Volgograd train station included a force.” Suspected of several high-profile attacks in “torn male finger” wrapped around the pin of a hand Russia over the past several years, Umarov’s reputation grenade.10 A closer analysis of the CCTV footage also as the “Osama bin Laden of Russia” goes a long way in indicated that the perpetrator was male. Genetic explaining why that country deployed a force testing of body fragments found on board the numbering more than 40,000 to provide security for the 14 destroyed trolleybus confirmed that a male terrorist 2014 Olympics. carried out that attack as well. Meanwhile, the Russian president had staked his Finally, on 19 January 2014, a group calling itself Ansar reputation on ensuring that the games in Sochi, al Sunnah released a video on a militant website scheduled to take place between 7-23 February 2014, claiming responsibility for the December attacks. The would be one of the safest ever recorded in the annals statement indicated that the bombings were in of the event. In support of that goal, authorities assured retaliation for “atrocities carried out by the the public that Sochi would be protected by a “ring of 15 disbelievers” in the Caucasus, and promised future steel.” The Federal Security Service of the Russian bombings as an antidote to Kremlin corruption.11 The Federation (FSB)—an institutional descendant of the same video showed two men who were purportedly the former Soviet KGB—spearheaded an Olympic task force same individuals who carried out the December that imposed draconian security measures and Volgograd attacks. Less than a week later, on 25 ultimately numbered close to 100,000 personnel. January, a second video emerged with a similar Another disturbing feature of the Volgograd IED attacks message, warning Russians that they could expect was a realized potential by militants to reach outside repeated attacks unless they rebelled against the the cordon around Sochi and strike at will across broad policies of Vladimir Putin. stretches of the Russian countryside. This raised the Ansar al Sunnah’s spokesman, “Umar,” mentioned his possibility of employing a long-distance strategy to group’s fealty to a notorious Islamic Chechen separatist disrupt the Olympics. The December Volgograd leader long known to Russian authorities: Doku bombings were the deadliest terrorist attacks in Russia Umarov. Styled “Russia’s most wanted man,” Umarov outside the North Caucasus since an IED blast at a surfaced shortly after the beginning of the new Moscow airport in 2011 took the lives of 37 people.
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Figure 7. OSAC map depicting the Sochi winter Olympics security zone Meanwhile, it was impossible to concentrate such a In the days immediately preceding the Olympics, beefed-up security presence around Sochi without rumors of Black Widows continued to circulate, even as diminishing the availability of security forces elsewhere. Russian officials pondered yet another concern: that the By January 2014 the terrorists’ demonstrated ability to Volgograd bombings were intended as a diversion that strike at key transportation hubs outside the North would draw attention away from some other far more Caucasus inspired considerable anxiety throughout the catastrophic attack. Their immediate concern was that a Russian security establishment. “Rarely do you have a Black Widow had somehow managed to penetrate the terrorist group,” declared Fran Townsend, a CNN security cordon around Sochi. national security analyst, “come out and say ‘We’re Authorities circulated leaflets showing a picture of going to try and disrupt these games.’”16 The FSB and Ruzanna Ibragimova, a 22-year-old widow of an other security organizations had little choice but to take insurgent, who allegedly had been spotted in the city’s Umarov and other purveyors of the Caucasus Emirate at downtown area a short time before. Despite these their word. In the waning days of January 2014, with the frenetic precautions, FSB spokesman Alexei Lavrishchev Olympic opening ceremonies less than two weeks away, continued to insist a full month after the Volgograd the game was on between Russian security forces and bombings that “no concrete threat to the Games” had the Caucasus Emirate regardless of what happened at 17 been discovered. Sochi.
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A Misdirected Propaganda Campaign almost $2 billion was allocated to security measures; that’s even more than the sum for the London As the pressure mounted before the curtain rose on the Olympics.”23 7 February opening ceremonies, many Russians and outsiders alike continued to share the same fears Despite such expressions of confidence, few could deny expressed in Echo Moskvy (Moscow’s Echo) that the that the Olympics presented a unique window of Volgograd bombings might turn out to be “but a mere opportunity for terrorists. Any incident, even a minor harbinger of what might happen during the Olympic one, would cast a pall over the Games and spoil Games.”18 The doubts of some natives began to focus Vladimir Putin’s main chance to showcase Russian on what they perceived as an ill-advised, state-blessed prosperity, know-how, and global power status. The propaganda campaign that attempted to blame Russia’s Kremlin’s challenge was comparable to the fable about woes on liberals, the West in general, and Americans in the little Dutch boy who used his finger to plug a hole in particular. George Mirsky, a prominent Russian scholar the dyke: he was fine, so long as no other leaks whose specialty is Middle East studies, pointed to what occurred that required additional fingers. Although he believed to be a fundamental difference between security forces on several occasions demonstrated an the terrorist threat to the West and the one faced by ability to disrupt individual CE cells, they were hard- Russia: “In the west,” said Mirsky, insurgents “do not pressed to defend against scores of dispersed local cells think of annihilation of the United States or Britain, but that operated independently, or lone wolves acting out here they have an important task – to destroy Russia . . . individual agendas. I repeat, their objective is to destroy the Russian The problem derived in part from the Caucasus Federation . . . to tear away Tartarstan and Emirate’s hierarchical structure. As emir, Umarov Bashkortostan, to plant on these lands the green occupied the top leadership position, presiding over a banner of the Caliphate.”19 It seemed ludicrous to collection of local cells, called jamaats, spread across Mirsky to blame Americans, liberals, and homosexuals, the North Caucasus region. Typically a shura council when the real threat to Russia’s national sovereignty would rubberstamp individual cell leaders hand-picked originated in a synthesis of separatist movements and by Umarov. After pledging bay’at (loyalty) to Umarov, militant Islam in the North Caucasus. these subordinate leaders would then disperse to run Global Jihad as a Two-Count Movement their respective units with varying degrees of autonomy, tailoring tactics, weapons, and internal From the vantage point of most observers, the outcome organizational structures to fit their particular locales. of the larger game between Russia’s security forces and Meanwhile, with all the international media attention Doku Umarov’s Caucasus Emirate remained in doubt focused on Sochi, any disruption during the games until after the Olympics ended. The international press would embarrass the Russian government and reap was pessimistic. A journalist for National Public Radio, high dividends for the CE in the information warfare for example, declared that “even if there is no bomber, (INFOWAR) arena. A BBC Moscow correspondent, and even if the Olympics go off without a hitch, the Daniel Sandford, argued that the Volgograd attacks terrorists may have already succeeded, to some degree, 20 proved “that the bombers do not need to attack Sochi in disrupting the games.” Despite such comments, directly to attract international attention—any target in Russian officials did their best to remain upbeat. A Russia will do.”24 spokesman for Russia’s National Olympic Committee denied the necessity for taking additional security The potential for violence directed against the precautions, insisting that “everything needed has international community at large was symbolic of a already been done.”21 For its part, the International doctrinal change-of-course directed by Umarov, who Olympic Committee issued a statement stressing that originally sought mainly to achieve independence of Olympic security was a host-nation responsibility and North Caucasus states from the Russian motherland. In expressing confidence “that the Russian authorities will October 2007, however, after assuming the mantle of be up to the task.”22 A former member of a Russian emir of the CE, he dialed up rhetoric condemning special forces unit doubted that fear of terrorists would Western countries as enemies of Islam. This move on have much impact on prospective Olympic attendees. Umarov’s part signified a closer relationship between Aleksey Popov declared, “The people who were the Caucasus Emirate and al-Qaeda, and simultaneously planning to come will still do it. They are safe because adjusted the goals of his movement to establish what
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STRATFOR analyst Scott Stewart calls a “transnational Most importantly, the unprecedented security entity” that seeks “to first establish a state . . . they can measures taken in advance of the Olympics paid off for rule under jihadist principles, and then use that state as President Vladimir Putin. Between 7 and 23 February, a launching pad for further conquests . . . . The caliphate no significant terrorist attacks materialized either in would then be extended globally, bringing the entire Sochi or elsewhere in Russia to mar the range of 98 world into submission.”25 By extension, the CE course events held at 11 venues throughout the Olympic change also amounted to declaring open season on any village. Putin had made good on his promise to make and all Westerners attending the Sochi Olympics. the Olympics safe. A report from the US Department of Blending religion, politics, and culture into a single alloy, State’s Overseas Advisory Council indicated that “the Doku Umarov now included Americans, Europeans, and Olympic Park averaged over 100,000 visitors a day and Russians alike within the overarching category of more than 1,170,000 tickets were sold to spectators “Crusaders.”26 from 126 countries.”30 Caucasus Emirate Falls on Hard Times Perhaps the crowning achievement for Russia’s security forces came about two months after the Games Ironically, painting his enemies in such broad strokes concluded. It goes without saying that they had not underscored a new reality in international politics. If been idle in the first three months of calendar year they agreed on nothing else, the US, Europe, and Russia 2014. During that period they conducted over 30 at least could share the same enemy in common: counterterrorist operations, and as part of that process namely, the threat of transnational jihad. killed 13 warlords and 65 insurgents, besides detaining By 2011 the US State Department had marked the 240 additional terrorists. Caucasus Emirate as a terrorist organization and Doku Finally, on 8 April 2014, Aleksander Bortnikov, the head Umarov as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. of Russia’s FSB, officially confirmed the death of Doku According to Danial Benjamin, the Department of Umarov who, according to Bortnikov, had been State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “the attacks “neutralized” during the course of a “combat perpetrated by Caucasus Emirate illustrate the global operation.”31 The authorities declined to specify exactly nature of the terrorist problem we face today. We stand when Umarov’s death occurred, but it almost certainly in solidarity with the Russian people in our 27 happened sometime during the first quarter of 2013, condemnation of these deplorable terrorist acts." As probably in connection with one of the above- the Olympics approached, the State Department mentioned counterterrorist operations. augmented Russian efforts by offering a $5 million reward for information leading to the location of The Caucasus Emirate still exists, and continues to pose Umarov.28 a threat to Russia, Europe, and the United States. In the aftermath of the Volgograd bombings, however, its By mid- to late January 2014, events seemed to break in reach and capabilities were greatly diminished thanks to favor of Russian security efforts. Among all the rumors the cooperative efforts of security forces throughout making the rounds that winter, a new one surfaced the international community. Russians, Europeans, and indicating that Doku Umarov was dead. Officials in Americans can all rest a little easier with Doku Umarov Russia failed to confirm the rumor, although its no longer a player on the world stage. source—an announcement made by Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov—lent it considerable credence. Still, Knowledge of how the Caucasus Emirate threat actors skeptics were quick to note that on several occasions affected the Sochi Winter Olympics will improve the the CE chief had mistakenly been declared deceased situational awareness and effectiveness of any before, only to disappoint authorities by resurfacing contingency force deployed to the Northern Caucasus again later on. operational environment. Although Doku Umarov now lies in the dustbin of history, the terrorist organization Then at the end of the month, Russia’s National Anti- he led, though weakened, is still there, and the specter Terrorism Committee announced that they had of the 1972 Munich Olympics will continue to haunt confirmed the identities of the two male suicide future Games. bombers who carried out the December attacks in Volgograd. They also confirmed the detention of two alleged accomplices, both from Dagestan.29
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Sources “Ansar al-Sunnah—North Caucasus.” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. Undated. Borshchevskaya, Anna. “Russia’s Antiterrorism Measures as Sochi Olympics Approach.” OE Watch. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. December 2013. “Bus Blast Kills 14 in Russia in Deadly Blast Just One Day After Suicide Bomber Killed at Least 17 in Same City.” New York Daily News. 30 December 2013. “Chechen Rebel Leader Doku Umarov ‘Dead.’” BBC News Europe. 18 March 2014. Cohen, Tom and Jethro Mullen. “Russia Bombings Raise Questions About Sochi Olympics Security.” CNN World. 4 January 2014. “Consecutive Volgograd Suicide Bombing Kills at Least 14.” Real-time Analysis and Publication of IED Data (RAPID) Weekly News Update. Vol.4, Issue 31, Item 38. 3 January 2014. “Consecutive Volgograd Suicide Bombing Kills At Least 15.” RIA Novosti. 31 December 2013. Copeland, Larry and Andrea Yu. “Second Suicide Bomber Hits Russian City; 14 Killed.” USA Today. 30 December 2013. “Daily Report: 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics.” U.S. Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council. 24 February 2014. De Carbonnel, Alissa and Steve Gutterman. “Female Suicide Bomber Attacks Russian Bus, Kills Six.” Reuters. 21 October 2013. “Designation of Caucasus Emirate.” US Department of State. 26 May 2011. “EUCOM Case Study 1: PBIED (Black Widow) Attack on Government Building in Dagestan.” Global IED TTP: Understanding the Threat. Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID), TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA). December 2013. Finch, Ray. “Anti-Americanism in the Kremlin Narrative.” OE Watch. Foreign Military Studies office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. October 2013. Finch, Ray. “Otkuda Ugroza? [From Whence the Threat?]” OE Watch. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. February 2014. Flintoff, Cory. “Russians Fear A Sochi Legacy of ‘Black Widows,’ Not Gold Medals.” National Public Radio. 24 January 2014. Gutterman, Steve. “Russia Says Identifies Bombers, Arrests Two in Volgograd Blasts.” Reuters. 30 January 2014. “Internationally-wanted Terrorist Doku Umarov And His Gang ‘Neutralized’—FSB Chief.” RT.com News. 8 April 2014. Isachenkov, Vladimir. “Russia Suicide Bombing: Attack on Train Station Kills at Least 15 in Volgograd.” The World Post. 29 December 2013. Kangas, Emily. “Death of Umarov?” Russia’s Most Wanted Man Threatens Sochi 2014 Olympics.” OE Watch. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. February 2014. Kangas, Emily. “Russia’s Most Wanted Man Threatens Sochi 2014 Olympics.” OE Watch. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. August 2013. Kangas, Emily. “Successful Counterterrorist Operation.” OE Watch. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. December 2013. Kangas, Emily. “Suppressing Terror in the North Caucasus.” OE Watch. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. November 2013. Kovlayova, Albina and Alexander Smith. “Volgograd Suicide Bombers Identified; Two Accomplices Arrested.” NBC News. 31 January 2014. “Profile: Chechen Rebel Leader Doku Umarov.” BBC News Europe. 18 March 2014. Roggio, Bill. “Islamic Caucasus Emirate Claims Suicide Bombings in Southern Russia.” Long War Journal. 19 January 2014. “Russia’s Quiet War: Five Myths About the North Caucasus’ Insurgency.” U.S. Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council. 2012. “Second Blast in Russia’s Volgograd Kills 14 on Bus.” Haaretz.com. 30 December 2013. “Sochi 2014: A Security Challenge.” STRATFOR Global Intelligence. 9 December 2013. “Sochi Security Update 2.0.” U.S. Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council. 28 January 2014. Stewart, Scott. “Gauging the Jihadist Movement, Part 1: The Goals of the Jihadists.” STRATFOR Global Intelligence. 19 December 2013. “Suicide Bomber Hits Russia’s Volgograd Train Station.” BBC News Europe. 29 December 2013. “Terrorism Suspected in Deadly Russia Bus Blast.” France24.com. 22 October 2013. “Volgograd Bombings.” U.S. Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council. 31 December 2013.
Notes 1 “Volgograd Bombings,” U.S. Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council, 31 December 2013. 2 “Suicide Bomber Hits Russia’s Volgograd Train Station,” BBC News Europe, 29 December 2013. 3 “Suicide Bomber Hits Russia’s Volgograd Train Station,” BBC News Europe, 29 December 2013. 4 “Bus Blast Kills 14 in Russia in Deadly Blast Just One Day After Suicide Bomber Killed at Least 17 in Same City,” New York Daily News30 December 2013. 5 “Second Blast in Russia’s Volgograd Kills 14 on Bus,” Haaretz.com, 30 December 2013. 6 Cory Flintoff, “Russians Fear A Sochi Legacy of ‘Black Widows,’ Not Gold Medals,” National Public Radio, 24 January 2014. 7 “EUCOM Case Study 1: PBIED (Black Widow) Attack on Government Building in Dagestan,” Global IED TTP: Understanding the Threat. Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID), TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), December 2013. 8 Emily Kangas, “Successful Counterterrorist Operation,” OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 2013. 9 Ray Finch, “Otkuda Ugroza? [From Whence the Threat?],” OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 2014. 10 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Suicide Bombing: Attack on Train Station Kills at Least 15 in Volgograd,” The World Post, 29 December 2013. 11 “Sochi Security Update 2.0,” U.S. Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council, 28 January 2014. 12 Emily Kangas, “Russia’s Most Wanted Man Threatens Sochi 2014 Olympics,” OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2013. 13 Bill Roggio, “Islamic Caucasus Emirate Claims Suicide Bombings in Southern Russia,” Long War Journal, 19 January 2014; Emily Kangas, “Russia’s Most Wanted Man Threatens Sochi 2014 Olympics,” OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2013; Tom Cohen and Jethro Mullen, “Russia Bombings Raise Questions About Sochi Olympics Security,” CNN World, 4 January 2014. Red Diamond Page 37
14 Emily Kangas, “Death of Umarov?,”OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 2014. 15 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Suicide Bombing: Attack on Train Station Kills at Least 15 in Volgograd,” The World Post, 29 December 2013. 16 Tom Cohen and Jethro Mullen, “Russia Bombings Raise Questions About Sochi Olympics Security,” CNN World, 4 January 2014. 17 Steve Gutterman, “Russia Says Identifies Bombers, Arrests Two in Volgograd Blasts,” Reuters. 30 January 2014; Cory Flintoff, “Russians Fear A Sochi Legacy of ‘Black Widows,’ Not Gold Medals,” National Public Radio, 24 January 2014. 18 Stefano Manyi, “Russia: Terror Against Terrorism,” Moscow’s Echo, 6 November 2013, as quoted in Anna Borshchevskaya, “Russia’s Antiterrorism Measures as Sochi Olympics Approach,” OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 2013. 19 Georgiy Mirsky, “Again Volgograd: Where is the Enemy?,” blog entry, quoted in Ray Finch, “Otkuda Ugroza? [From Whence the Threat?]” OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 2014. 20 Cory Flintoff, “Russians Fear A Sochi Legacy of ‘Black Widows,’ Not Gold Medals,” National Public Radio, 24 January 2014. 21 “Consecutive Volgograd Suicide Bombing Kills At Least 15,” RIA Novosti, 31 December 2013. 22 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Suicide Bombing: Attack on Train Station Kills at Least 15 in Volgograd,” The World Post, 29 December 2013. 23 “Consecutive Volgograd Suicide Bombing Kills At Least 15,” RIA Novosti, 31 December 2013. 24 Suicide Bomber Hits Russia’s Volgograd Train Station,” BBC News Europe, 29 December 2013. 25 Scott Stewart, “Gauging the Jihadist Movement, Part 1: The Goals of the Jihadists,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 19 December 2013. 26 Bill Roggio, “Islamic Caucasus Emirate Claims Suicide Bombings in Southern Russia,” Long War Journal, 19 January 2014; Scott Stewart, “Gauging the Jihadist Movement, Part 1: The Goals of the Jihadists,” STRATFOR Global Intelligence, 19 December 2013. 27 “Designation of Caucasus Emirate,” US Department of State, 26 May 2011. 28 Tom Cohen and Jethro Mullen, “Russia Bombings Raise Questions About Sochi Olympics Security,” CNN World, 4 January 2014. 29 Emily Kangas, “Death of Umarov?,”OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 2014; Albina Kovlayova and Alexander Smith, “Volgograd Suicide Bombers Identified; Two Accomplices Arrested,” NBC News, 31 January 2014. 30 “Daily Report: 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics,” U.S. Department of State Overseas Security Advisory Council, 24 February 2014. 31 “Internationally-wanted Terrorist Doku Umarov And His Gang ‘Neutralized’—FSB Chief,” RT.com News, 8 April 2014. ______
CTID DAILY UPDATE: MONTHLY RECAP by LTC Shane Lee and CPT Ari Fisher, Training, Education, & Leader Development Team CTID analysts produce a CTID Daily Update to assist our readers’ focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community. Each CTID Daily Update is organized topically across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). This list highlights key updates during the current month. An article’s inclusion in the Update does not reflect an official US government position on the topic. CTID does not assume responsibility for the accuracy of each article. US Army TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity
TRISA CTID Daily Update
MONTH IN REVIEW
June 2014 Sampler Cyber: NSA Chief: Military Not Organized for Cyber Warfare Defense: 10 Technologies the U.S. Military Will Need For the Next War EUCOM: Thousands of al Qaeda terrorists are on the loose in US and Europe – under the radar of Western intelligence Iraq: Report: ISIS steals $429m from central bank after capturing Mosul Turkey: ISIS and the threat to Turkey Ukraine: Fighting erupts as pro-Russian rebels reject Ukrainian president's cease-fire Conditions in the Complex Operational Environment …Now and for the Foreseeable Future Red Diamond Page 38
CTID Points of Contact CTID Mission Director, CTID Jon Cleaves DSN: 552 CTID is the TRADOC G2 lead to study, design, document, [email protected] 913.684.7975 validate, and apply hybrid threat in complex operational Deputy Director, CTID Penny Mellies [email protected] 684.7920 environment CONDITIONS that support all US Army and joint training and leader development programs. UK LNO Warrant Officer Matt Tucker [email protected] 684-7994 Operations–Military Analyst Dr Jon Moilanen [email protected] BMA 684.7928 Military Analyst Steffany Trofino • Determine threat and OE conditions. [email protected] 684.7960 • Develop and publish threat methods. Threat Assessment Team Lead DAC 684.7934 Jerry England [email protected] • Develop and maintain threat doctrine. Military Analyst DAC Jennifer Dunn • Assess hybrid threat tactics, techniques, and [email protected] 684.7962 procedures (TTP). Military Analyst DAC Kris Lechowicz [email protected] 684.7922 • Develop and maintain the Decisive Action
Worldwide Equipment Guide John Cantin Training Environment (DATE). [email protected] BMA 684.7952 • Develop and maintain the Regionally Aligned Train-Edu-Ldr Dev Team Lead DAC 684.7923 Forces Training Environment (RAFTE) products. Walt Williams [email protected] • Support terrorism-antiterrorism awareness. TELD Team/RAF LNO LTC Shane Lee [email protected] 684.7907 • Publish OE Assessments (OEAs). TELD Team/Team/RAFCoE LNO CPT CPT Ari Ari Fisher Fisher • Support threat exercise design. [email protected] 684.7939 • Support Combat Training Center (CTC) threat TELD Team/JMRC LNO Mike Spight [email protected] CGI 684.7974 accreditation.
TELD/MCTP LNO Pat Madden BMA • Conduct “Advanced Hybrid Threat Tactics” Train [email protected] 684.7997 the Trainer course. OE Assessment Tm Lead BMA 684.7929 • Conduct hybrid threat resident and MTT COE Angela Wilkins [email protected] train the trainer course. Military Analyst Laura Deatrick [email protected] CGI 684.7925 • Provide distance learning (DL) COE Train the
Military Analyst H. David Pendleton Trainer course. [email protected] CGI 684.7946 • Respond to requests for information (RFIs) on Military Analyst Rick Burns [email protected] BMA 684.7897 threats and threat issues. OE Assessment Team Dr Jim Bird YOUR Easy e-Access Resource [email protected] Textron 684.7919
With AKO access--CTID products at: www.us.army.mil/suite/files/11318389
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