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2019 China Military Power Report OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 Office of the Secretary of Defense Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $181,000 in Fiscal Years 2018-2019. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $169,000 in DoD labor. Generated on 2019May02 RefID: E-1F4B924 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as Amended Section 1260, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.” OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Executive Summary OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China WHAT IS CHINA’S STRATEGY? achieve greater efficiency, innovation, and growth. In recent years, China’s leaders China’s leaders have benefited from what they elevated this initiative, known as Civil- view as a “period of strategic opportunity” Military Integration (CMI), to a national during the initial two decades of the 21st strategy that incentivizes the civilian sector century to develop domestically and expand to enter the defense market. The national China’s “comprehensive national power.” CMI strategy focuses on hardware Over the coming decades, they are focused on modernization, education, personnel, realizing a powerful and prosperous China that investment, infrastructure, and logistics. is equipped with a “world-class” military, securing China’s status as a great power with > China’s leaders are leveraging China’s the aim of emerging as the preeminent power growing economic, diplomatic, and in the Indo-Pacific region. military clout to establish regional preeminence and expand the country’s In 2018, China continued harnessing an array international influence. China’s of economic, foreign policy, and security tools advancement of projects such as the “One to realize this vision. Ongoing state-led efforts, Belt, One Road” Initiative (OBOR) will which China implements both at home and probably drive military overseas basing abroad and which often feature economic and through a perceived need to provide diplomatic initiatives, also support China’s security for OBOR projects. security and military objectives: > China conducts influence operations > China continues to implement long-term against media, cultural, business, academic, state-directed planning, such as “Made in and policy communities of the United China 2025” and other industrial States, other countries, and international development plans, which stress the need institutions to achieve outcomes favorable to replace imported technology with to its security and military strategy domestically produced technology. These objectives. The Chinese Communist Party plans present an economic challenge to (CCP) seeks to condition foreign and nations that export high-tech products. multilateral political establishments and These plans also directly support military public opinion to accept China’s narrative modernization goals by stressing surrounding its priorities like OBOR and proprietary mastery of advanced dual-use South China Sea territorial and maritime technologies. claims. > China’s leaders seek to align civil and defense technology development to i OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Recognizing that programs such as “Made in BUILDING A MORE CAPABLE China 2025” and OBOR have sparked PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY concerns about China’s intentions, China’s In support of the goal to establish a powerful leaders have softened their rhetoric when and prosperous China, China’s leaders are promoting these programs without altering the committed to developing military power programs’ fundamental strategic goals. commensurate with that of a great power. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH Chinese military strategy documents highlight TO MANAGING REGIONAL the requirement for a People’s Liberation DISPUTES Army (PLA) able to fight and win wars, deter potential adversaries, and secure Chinese China seeks to secure its objectives without national interests overseas, including a growing jeopardizing the regional stability that remains emphasis on the importance of the maritime critical to the economic development that has and information domains, offensive air helped the CCP maintain its monopoly on operations, long-distance mobility operations, power. However, China’s leaders employ and space and cyber operations. tactics short of armed conflict to pursue China’s strategic objectives through activities In 2018, the PLA published a new Outline of calculated to fall below the threshold of Training and Evaluation that emphasized realistic provoking armed conflict with the United and joint training across all warfare domains States, its allies and partners, or others in the and included missions and tasks aimed at Indo-Pacific region. These tactics are “strong military opponents.” Training focused particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its on war preparedness and improving the PLA’s territorial and maritime claims in the South and capability to win wars through realistic combat East China Seas as well as along its borders training, featuring multi-service exercises, long- with India and Bhutan. In 2018, China distance maneuvers and mobility operations, continued militarization in the South China Sea and the increasing use of professional “blue by placing anti-ship cruise missiles and long- force” opponents. The CCP also continued range surface-to-air missiles on outposts in the vigorous efforts to root out corruption in the Spratly Islands, violating a 2015 pledge by armed forces. Chinese President Xi Jinping that “China does The PLA also continues to implement the not intend to pursue militarization” of the most comprehensive restructure in its history Spratly Islands. China is also willing to employ to become a force capable of conducting coercive measures – both military and non- complex joint operations. The PLA strives to military – to advance its interests and mitigate be capable of fighting and winning opposition from other countries. “informatized local wars” – regional conflicts ii OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China defined by real-time, data-networked theater commands, each of which is command and control (C2) and precision strike. responsible for developing command strategies PLA modernization includes command and and joint operational plans and capabilities force structure reforms to improve operational relevant for specific threats, as well as flexibility and readiness for future deployments. responding to crises and safeguarding As China’s global footprint and international territorial sovereignty and stability. Taiwan interests have grown, its military persistently remains the PLA’s main “strategic modernization program has become more direction,” one of the geographic areas the focused on investments and infrastructure to leadership identifies as having strategic support a range of missions beyond China’s importance. Other strategic directions include periphery, including power projection, sea lane the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and security, counterpiracy, peacekeeping, China’s borders with India and North Korea. humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and noncombatant evacuation operations. China’s overall strategy toward Taiwan continues to incorporate elements of both China’s military modernization also targets persuasion and coercion to hinder the capabilities with the potential to degrade core development of political attitudes in Taiwan U.S. operational and technological advantages. favoring independence. Taiwan lost three China uses a variety of methods to acquire additional diplomatic partners in 2018,
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