DOCSLIB.ORG

China's Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China's Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations The modular transfer system between a Type 054A frigate and a COSCO container ship during China’s first military-civil UNREP. Source: “重大突破！民船为海军水面舰艇实施干货补给 [Breakthrough! Civil Ships Implement Dry Cargo Supply for Naval Surface Ships],” Guancha, November 15, 2019 Primary author: Chad Peltier Supporting analysts: Tate Nurkin and Sean O’Connor Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this commissioned research report. 1 Contents Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 4 Methodology, Scope, and Study Limitations ........................................................................................................ 6 1. China’s Expeditionary Operations Logistics System ...................................................................................... 8 China’s Logistics Reform Effort: Dimensions and Drivers .............................................................................. 8 Military and Geopolitical Drivers of PLA Logistic Reform ............................................................................... 8 Logistics Support Department and Joint Logistics Support Force ............................................................... 12 Continuing Development Priorities and Challenges ..................................................................................... 17 Integration and Bureaucratic Resistance ................................................................................................... 17 Enhancing Military-Civil Fusion ................................................................................................................... 17 Informatization of Logistics Systems .......................................................................................................... 18 Combat Readiness: Training, Talent Recruitment and Retention, and Exercises ................................ 19 Discipline and Corruption ............................................................................................................................ 21 2. Bases and Basing Objectives ......................................................................................................................... 22 PLA Basing Strategy 2020 – 2030 ................................................................................................................. 36 PLA Basing After 2030 .................................................................................................................................... 37 3. PLA Expeditionary Operations Capabilities and Sustainment ..................................................................... 39 PLAN Expeditionary Capabilities .................................................................................................................... 39 PLAN Future Force Requirements ............................................................................................................ 44 PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) deployment ................................................................................................ 46 PLAN Expeditionary Logistics Models ........................................................................................................... 48 PLAAF Expeditionary Capabilities .................................................................................................................. 52 4. Role of Civilian Organizations in Expeditionary Operations ......................................................................... 54 Civilian overseas port facilities ......................................................................................................................... 55 RO-Ros and Container ships .......................................................................................................................... 55 Tankers ............................................................................................................................................................. 57 Strategic airlift .................................................................................................................................................... 57 Recommendations for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 59 Appendix A: Gulf of Aden Task Forces .............................................................................................................. 62 Appendix B: Djibouti Base and Potential Base Locations ................................................................................ 63 Appendix C: Satellite Imagery of Potential Overseas Chinese Bases ............................................................ 84 Endnotes ............................................................................................................................................................. 103 2 Abbreviations ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare BRI Belt and Road Initiative CCTV China Central Television COSCO China Ocean Shipping Company CMC China Central Military Commission DoD Department of Defense (U.S.) GLD General Logistics Department HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance JLSB Joint Logistics Support Base JLSC Joint Logistics Support Center JLSF Joint Logistics Support Force LHD Landing Helicopter Dock LPD Landing Platform Dock LSD Logistics Support Department / Landing Ship Dock MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit MND Ministry of National Defense NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operation PLA People’s Liberation Army PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy PLANMC People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps UNREP Underway Replenishment XAC Xi’an Aircraft Company 3 Executive Summary China is prioritizing three military development goals through 2030: 1. The ability to impose unacceptable costs on the access of, or freedom of maneuver within, China’s first and second island chains. This includes the South and East China Seas as well as the waters out to Guam. 2. The ability to contribute to international commons operations, which China perceives as the responsibilities of a great power.1 This is seen through China’s involvement in the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy task force missions and participation in overseas humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. 3. Defending China’s overseas economic interests, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including infrastructure and overseas Chinese nationals. The risk of terrorist activity targeting Chinese facilities and personnel is likely to be a major driver of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) expeditionary combat operations through 2030. In pursuit of these goals, China has pursued both organizational reforms as well as new military capabilities to aid in expeditionary operations. As part of broader organizational restructuring beginning in 2015, the PLA created the Logistic Support Department (LSD) and Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) to better support joint operations. The administrative separation of these two organizations divides responsibilities for force management and logistics implementation / operations support, countering corruption, enhancing joint logistics between the services, and better aligning the organizations with Central Military Commission (CMC) strategic planning. The JLSF manages the implementation of the joint logistics support system, coordinating logistics, personnel, and supplies to theater commands. Based at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base (JLSB), the JLSF directs five joint logistics support centers (JLSC) aligned with a specific theater command. The LSD provides PLA-wide strategic logistics planning, coordinates military-civil fusion, and determines strategic priorities. Together the two organizations are responsible for diverse logistics activities including inventory and warehousing, medical services, transport, force projection, oil pipelines, engineering and construction management, reserve assets management. Additionally, both the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) are rapidly expanding their offensive and logistical capabilities. These include the introduction of the PLAN’s Type 055 destroyers, Type 075 landing helicopter docks (LHD), Type 901 fast replenishment ships, and indigenously designed aircraft carriers (including the Type 002 and future Type 003), as well as the PLAAF’s Y-20 strategic transport aircraft, the Y-20 tanker variant, and the J-20 fifth-generation fighter. Despite these advancements, the PLA is still in the early stages of developing its expeditionary
Load more

Recommended publications
  • China's Merchant Marine
    “China’s Merchant Marine” A paper for the China as “Maritime Power” Conference July 28-29, 2015 CNA Conference Facility Arlington, Virginia by Dennis J. Blasko1 Introductory Note: The Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook defines “merchant marine” as “all ships engaged in the carriage of goods; or all commercial vessels (as opposed to all nonmilitary ships), which excludes tugs, fishing vessels, offshore oil rigs, etc.”2 At the end of 2014, the world’s merchant ship fleet consisted of over 89,000 ships.3 According to the BBC: Under international law, every merchant ship must be registered with a country, known as its flag state. That country has jurisdiction over the vessel and is responsible for inspecting that it is safe to sail and to check on the crew’s working conditions. Open registries, sometimes referred to pejoratively as flags of convenience, have been contentious from the start.4 1 Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), a Senior Research Fellow with CNA’s China Studies division, is a former U.S. army attaché to Beijing and Hong Kong and author of The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2006).The author wishes to express his sincere thanks and appreciation to Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, U.S. Navy (Ret), for his guidance and patience in the preparation and presentation of this paper. 2 Central Intelligence Agency, “Country Comparison: Merchant Marine,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2108.html. According to the Factbook, “DWT or dead weight tonnage is the total weight of cargo, plus bunkers, stores, etc., that a ship can carry when immersed to the appropriate load line.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing the Training and Operational Proficiency of China's
    C O R P O R A T I O N Assessing the Training and Operational Proficiency of China’s Aerospace Forces Selections from the Inaugural Conference of the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) Edmund J. Burke, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Mark R. Cozad, Timothy R. Heath For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/CF340 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9549-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface On June 22, 2015, the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), in conjunction with Headquarters, Air Force, held a day-long conference in Arlington, Virginia, titled “Assessing Chinese Aerospace Training and Operational Competence.” The purpose of the conference was to share the results of nine months of research and analysis by RAND researchers and to expose their work to critical review by experts and operators knowledgeable about U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • USS CONSTELLATION Page 4 United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service National Register of Historic Places Registration Form
    NPS Form 10-900 USDI/NPS NRHP Registration Form (Rev. 8-86) OMB No. 1024-0018 USS CONSTELLATION Page 4 United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service National Register of Historic Places Registration Form Summary The USS Constellation’s career in naval service spanned one hundred years: from commissioning on July 28, 1855 at Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia to final decommissioning on February 4, 1955 at Boston, Massachusetts. (She was moved to Baltimore, Maryland in the summer of 1955.) During that century this sailing sloop-of-war, sometimes termed a “corvette,” was nationally significant for its ante-bellum service, particularly for its role in the effort to end the foreign slave trade. It is also nationally significant as a major resource in the mid-19th century United States Navy representing a technological turning point in the history of U.S. naval architecture. In addition, the USS Constellation is significant for its Civil War activities, its late 19th century missions, and for its unique contribution to international relations both at the close of the 19th century and during World War II. At one time it was believed that Constellation was a 1797 ship contemporary to the frigate Constitution moored in Boston. This led to a long-standing controversy over the actual identity of the Constellation. Maritime scholars long ago reached consensus that the vessel currently moored in Baltimore is the 1850s U.S. navy sloop-of-war, not the earlier 1797 frigate. Describe Present and Historic Physical Appearance. The USS Constellation, now preserved at Baltimore, Maryland, was built at the navy yard at Norfolk, Virginia.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Global Media Footprint
    February 2021 SHARP POWER AND DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE SERIES China’s Global Media Footprint Democratic Responses to Expanding Authoritarian Influence by Sarah Cook ABOUT THE SHARP POWER AND DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE SERIES As globalization deepens integration between democracies and autocracies, the compromising effects of sharp power—which impairs free expression, neutralizes independent institutions, and distorts the political environment—have grown apparent across crucial sectors of open societies. The Sharp Power and Democratic Resilience series is an effort to systematically analyze the ways in which leading authoritarian regimes seek to manipulate the political landscape and censor independent expression within democratic settings, and to highlight potential civil society responses. This initiative examines emerging issues in four crucial arenas relating to the integrity and vibrancy of democratic systems: • Challenges to free expression and the integrity of the media and information space • Threats to intellectual inquiry • Contestation over the principles that govern technology • Leverage of state-driven capital for political and often corrosive purposes The present era of authoritarian resurgence is taking place during a protracted global democratic downturn that has degraded the confidence of democracies. The leading authoritarians are ABOUT THE AUTHOR challenging democracy at the level of ideas, principles, and Sarah Cook is research director for China, Hong Kong, and standards, but only one side seems to be seriously competing Taiwan at Freedom House. She directs the China Media in the contest. Bulletin, a monthly digest in English and Chinese providing news and analysis on media freedom developments related Global interdependence has presented complications distinct to China. Cook is the author of several Asian country from those of the Cold War era, which did not afford authoritarian reports for Freedom House’s annual publications, as regimes so many opportunities for action within democracies.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions
    CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER AMBITIONS An Update Nan Li and Christopher Weuve his article will address two major analytical questions. First, what are the T necessary and suffi cient conditions for China to acquire aircraft carriers? Second, what are the major implications if China does acquire aircraft carriers? Existing analyses on China’s aircraft carrier ambitions are quite insightful but also somewhat inadequate and must therefore be updated. Some, for instance, argue that with the advent of the Taiwan issue as China’s top threat priority by late 1996 and the retirement of Liu Huaqing as vice chair of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1997, aircraft carriers are no longer considered vital.1 In that view, China does not require aircraft carriers to capture sea and air superiority in a war over Taiwan, and China’s most powerful carrier proponent (Liu) can no longer infl uence relevant decision making. Other scholars suggest that China may well acquire small-deck aviation platforms, such as helicopter carriers, to fulfi ll secondary security missions. These missions include naval di- plomacy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antisubmarine warfare.2 The present authors conclude, however, that China’s aircraft carrier ambitions may be larger than the current literature has predicted. Moreover, the major implications of China’s acquiring aircraft carriers may need to be explored more carefully in order to inform appropriate reactions on the part of the United States and other Asia-Pacifi c naval powers. This article updates major changes in the four major conditions that are necessary and would be largely suffi cient for China to acquire aircraft carriers: leadership endorsement, fi nancial affordability, a relatively concise naval strat- egy that defi nes the missions of carrier operations, and availability of requisite 14 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW technologies.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Media Governance System
    China’s Media Governance System: A Partial Overview By Susanne Chan Email: [email protected] 1. CPC CC Leading Groups 2. Major Party and State Agencies Given the range of relevant agencies under media governance, the following materials will focus on those pertaining to cybersecurity and informatization. 1. CPC Central Committee’s Leading Groups (or Leading Small Groups) (中央常委领导小组) Chinese leaders use informal leading groups at the top to issue guiding principles that involve the coordination of multiple bureaus or departments in policy formulation and implementation. The following groups report directly to the Party Politburo Standing Committee and the Party Secretariat, and supersede other government agencies in the power structure. CPC CC Leading Groups Leader Functions Controls all national and Party propaganda, publicity and information 1957- Coordinates propaganda, ideological, cultural, media, and Central Leading Group for publishing activities Liu Yunshan Propaganda and Ideological Work Oversees CPC Propaganda Department and the State Council (CLGPIW; 中央宣传思想领导小组) Information Office (SCIO) Group leader is usually a Party Politburo Standing Committee member Manage internet related issues, including the expansion of online services, internet security issues, jurisdiction over internet censorship policies This group is in part a reconstitution of the following groups: 2014- - State Informatization Leading Group - State Network and Information Security Coordination Group Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization Xi Jinping The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC 国家互联网信息 (CLGISI; 中央网络安全和信息化领 办公室, founded in 2014), also known as the Office of the Central 导小组) Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, operates directly under this leading group. It is the enforcement agency for the internet content provision sector.
    [Show full text]
  • A Brief Review on Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System
    International Journal of Mechanical And Production Engineering, ISSN: 2320-2092, Volume- 5, Issue-6, Jun.-2017 http://iraj.in A BRIEF REVIEW ON ELECTROMAGNETIC AIRCRAFT LAUNCH SYSTEM 1AZEEM SINGH KAHLON, 2TAAVISHE GUPTA, 3POOJA DAHIYA, 4SUDHIR KUMAR CHATURVEDI Department of Aerospace Engineering, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun, India E-mail: [email protected] Abstract - This paper describes the basic design, advantages and disadvantages of an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) for aircraft carriers of the future along with a brief comparison with traditional launch mechanisms. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the feasibility of EMALS for the next generation indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vishal. I. INTRODUCTION maneuvering. Depending on the thrust produced by the engines and weight of aircraft the length of the India has a central and strategic location in the Indian runway varies widely for different aircraft. Normal Ocean. It shares the longest coastline of 7500 runways are designed so as to accommodate the kilometers amongst other nations sharing the Indian launch for such deviation in takeoff lengths, but the Ocean. India's 80% trade is via sea routes passing scenario is different when it comes to aircraft carriers. through the Indian Ocean and 85% of its oil and gas Launch of an aircraft from a mobile platform always are imported through sea routes. Indian Ocean also requires additional systems and methods to assist the serves as the locus of important international Sea launch because the runway has to be scaled down, Lines Of Communication (SLOCs) . Development of which is only about 300 feet as compared to 5,000- India’s political structure, industrial and commercial 6,000 feet required for normal aircraft to takeoff from growth has no meaning until its shores are protected.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Air Force and Its Antecedents Published and Printed Unit Histories
    UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AND ITS ANTECEDENTS PUBLISHED AND PRINTED UNIT HISTORIES A BIBLIOGRAPHY EXPANDED & REVISED EDITION compiled by James T. Controvich January 2001 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTERS User's Guide................................................................................................................................1 I. Named Commands .......................................................................................................................4 II. Numbered Air Forces ................................................................................................................ 20 III. Numbered Commands .............................................................................................................. 41 IV. Air Divisions ............................................................................................................................. 45 V. Wings ........................................................................................................................................ 49 VI. Groups ..................................................................................................................................... 69 VII. Squadrons..............................................................................................................................122 VIII. Aviation Engineers................................................................................................................ 179 IX. Womens Army Corps............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 中國遠洋控股股份有限公司 China COSCO Holdings Company Limited*
    Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited and The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited take no responsibility for the contents of this announcement, make no representation as to its accuracy or completeness and expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss howsoever arising from or in reliance upon the whole or any part of the contents of this announcement. 中國遠洋控股股份有限公司 China COSCO Holdings Company Limited* (a joint stock limited company incorporated in the People’s Republic of China with limited liability) (Stock code: 1919) CONNECTED TRANSACTIONS — ACQUISITIONS OF EQUITY INTERESTS IN OFFSHORE COMPANIES On 5 August 2016, the Group and COSCO SHIPPING Group entered into the Offshore Companies SPAs, pursuant to which the Group conditionally agreed to acquire and other members of the COSCO Group or CS Group conditionally agreed to sell certain equity interests in the Offshore Companies. As at the date of this announcement, COSCO is the controlling shareholder of the Company and COSCO SHIPPING is the indirect controlling shareholder of the Company which holds the entire equity interests in COSCO and China Shipping. Being a member of the COSCO Group or the CS Group, the sellers to the Offshore Company SPAs are connected persons of the Company for the purpose of Chapter 14A of the Listing Rules and the Proposed Transactions constitute connected transactions under Chapter 14A of the Listing Rules. As the highest applicable percentage ratio as defined under the Listing Rules in respect of the Proposed Transactions exceeds 0.1% but is lower than 5%, the Proposed Transactions are subject to reporting and announcement requirements under Chapter 14A of the Listing Rules but are exempt from independent shareholders’ approval requirement.
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 China Military Power Report
    OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 Office of the Secretary of Defense Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $181,000 in Fiscal Years 2018-2019. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $169,000 in DoD labor. Generated on 2019May02 RefID: E-1F4B924 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as Amended Section 1260, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years.
    [Show full text]
  • SKI-JUMP LIMITATIONS and PLAN's SOLUTIONS
    CAPS In Focus 25 July 2017 www.capsindia.org 61/17 SKI-JUMP LIMITATIONS AND PLAN’s SOLUTIONS Arjun Subramanian P Reports on Chinese naval aviation have been in the news lately and Chinese media is abuzz with photographs of the J-15 fighters operating from the PLAN’s first carrier – the Liaoning. The carrier was en-route to Hong Kong1 along with two escort warships when the flight operations were conducted. The PLAN even released a long video of the operations which gives some insights into the J-15 fighter and the role it will play. There is also some news on China building a carrier borne AEW aircraft to be operated from its CV-001 type vessels.2 China’s lone carrier, the refurbished old Soviet vessel – Varyag – is PLAN’s first experience with an aircraft carrier which it is so actively and boastfully projecting. China is steadily improving and adding up to its naval power projection capability. The released video was of very good resolution where every minute detail was visible and which enables inference of certain information.3 The video primarily contains take-offs and landings of the J- 15 fighter with and without load-outs. In several take-offs, the J-15 can be seen carrying the PL-12 medium range and PL-8 short range air-to-air missile in the middle and outer hard-points respectively. The PL-12 is an active radar-guided BVR missile and is similar to the Russian R-77 Adder and it is widely claimed that its seeker head is the same design as that of the R-77.4 The PL-8, on the other hand, is an IR guided missile and is believed to be based on the Israeli Python-3.5 In few other launches the aircraft can be seen taking off and landing with two YJ-83K anti-ship missiles slung under the centre-wing hard-point on each wing.
    [Show full text]
  • Shipbuilding Industry 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Shipbuilding Industry Content
    UKRINMASH SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY CONTENT 24 М15-V Marine Powerplant CONTENT М15-A Marine Powerplant 25 М35 Marine Powerplant М10/M16 Marine Powerplant 4 PROJECT 958 Amphibious Assault Hovercraft 26 UGT 3000R Gas-Turbine Engine KALKAN-МP Patrol Water-Jet Boat UGT 6000 Gas-Turbine Engine 5 GAYDUK-M Multipurpose Corvette 27 UGT 6000+ Gas-Turbine Engine GYURZA Armored River Gunboat UGT 15000 Gas-Turbine Engine 6 PROJECT 58130S Fast Patrol Boat 28 UGT 15000+ Gas-Turbine Engine CORAL Patrol Water-Jet Boat UGT 16000R Gas-Turbine Engine 7 BOBR Landing Craft/Military Transport 29 UGT 25000 Gas-Turbine Engine TRITON Landing Ship Tank 457KM Diesel Engine 8 BRIZ-40М Fast Patrol Boat 30 NAVAL AUTOMATED TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM BRIZ-40P Fast Coast Guard Boat MULTIBEAM ACTIVE ARRAY SURVEILLANCE RADAR STATION 9 PC655 Multipurpose Fast Corvette MUSSON Multipurpose Corvette 31 SENS-2 Optical Electronic System Of Gun Mount Fire Control 10 CARACAL Fast Attack Craft SAGA Optical Electronic System Of The Provision Corvette 58250 PROJECT Of Helicopter Take-Off, Homing And Ship Landing 11 GURZA-M Small Armored Boat 32 SARMAT Marine Optoelectronic Fire Control System Offshore Patrol Vessel DOZOR Of Small And Middle Artillery Caliber 12 KENTAVR Fast Assault Craft SONAR STATION MG – 361 (“CENTAUR”) PEARL-FAC Attack Craft-Missile 33 TRONKA-MK Hydroacoustic Station For Searching 13 NON-SELF-PROPELLED INTEGRATED SUPPORT VESSEL Of Saboteur Underwater Swimmers FOR COAST GUARD BOATS HYDROACOUSTIC STATION KONAN 750BR Fast Armored
    [Show full text]