VOLUME 5 2014–2015

ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT: from COOPERATION to CONFRONTATION? 2013–2017

Compendium of works from the China Leadership Monitor

ALAN D. ROMBERG ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT: from COOPERATION to CONFRONTATION? 2013–2017

Compendium of works from the China Leadership Monitor

ALAN D. ROMBERG

VOLUME FIVE

July 28, 2014–July 14, 2015

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The Henry L. Stimson Center 1211 Connecticut Avenue Northwest, 8th floor Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: 202.223.5956 www.stimson.org Preface

Brian Finlay and Ellen Laipson

It is our privilege to present this collection of Alan Romberg’s analytical work on the cross-Strait relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. Alan joined Stimson in 2000 to lead the East Asia Program after a long and prestigious career in the Department of State, during which he was an instrumental player in the development of the United States’ policy in Asia, particularly relating to the PRC and Taiwan. He brought his expertise to bear on his work at Stimson, where he wrote the seminal book on U.S. policy towards Taiwan, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, and facilitated countless meetings between policymakers and scholars of the U.S., Taiwan, and the PRC. Alan was also a contributor to the Hoover Institution’s China Leadership Monitor on the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan triangle, and these three volumes collect his essays written between 2013 and 2017. These volumes accompany volumes 1-3, From Confrontation to Cooperation, which compile Alan’s articles written between 2006 and 2012. We have reprinted the body of Alan’s work for the Monitor so that his meticulous record and analysis of a decade of cross-Strait relations can be an ongoing resource for students, scholars, and practitioners. We are thankful to Dr. Alice Lyman Miller, editor of the Monitor, for reflecting upon Alan’s contributions in the introduction to these three volumes. We are also grateful to Alan’s colleagues for enriching Alan’s work throughout his career and for their support now, especially Jeffrey A. Bader, the members of the Harvard University Taiwan Studies Workshop led by Professor Steve Goldstein, and Yun Sun, each of whom wrote reflections to close each volume. Over almost two decades at Stimson, Alan worked with and mentored many staff and interns. Our gratitude goes to the East Asia team who worked closely with Alan for many years, especially Program Co-Directors Yuki Tatsumi and Yun Sun. Assisting Alan in his thorough documentation and study of cross-Strait developments were many dedicated interns, including Ran Zheng, Emily Chen, Xiao Han, Rongfei Gou, Michelle Chang, Antonio Liao, Guan Wang, Emily Law, Sandy Lu, and Summer Tan. Thanks are also due to Research Associate Pamela Kennedy and Research Intern Summer Tan for helping to prepare this book for publication, and to former Research Associate Hana Rudolph for supporting Alan’s research. 4 | Across the Taiwan Strait

Finally, a special thank you to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in D.C. for recognizing the value of Alan’s work, supporting his research during his years at Stimson, and for making this publication possible. Sincerely,

Brian Finlay Ellen Laipson President and CEO President Emeritus Table of Contents

Preface Brian Finlay and Ellen Laipson ...... 3

Introduction Alice Lyman Miller ...... 7

Abbreviations ...... 11

Chapter One Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics China Leadership Monitor, No. 44, July 28, 2014 ...... 13

Chapter Two Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath China Leadership Monitor, No. 45, October 21, 2014 ...... 33

Chapter Three The Times They Are A-Changin’ China Leadership Monitor, No. 46, March 19, 2015 ...... 59

Chapter Four Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity China Leadership Monitor, No. 47, July 14, 2015 ...... 87

Reflection: Alan D. Romberg as a Mentor Yun Sun ...... 111

About Stimson and the Author ...... 115 Introduction

Alice Lyman Miller

I began as the China Leadership Monitor’s founding general editor in 2001. The Monitor was inspired by a good idea by Michel Oksenberg, who had played a central role in the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in 1979. Mike observed that analysis of Chinese leadership politics – once a staple of the China-watching field – was disappearing from public discourse about contemporary China and U.S.-China relations. As political science departments turned to investigating issues in Chinese affairs that were susceptible to quantitative methods, as area studies were in decline, and as U.S.- PRC normalization afforded direct access to aspects of China previously impossible, academic China specialists could increasingly tell us about issues in ward politics in Shanghai or anti-Japanese protests in local Fujian. But dissections of the political balance of power in the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo remained a black box and rarely appeared in even the most prominent academic journals on contemporary China. Journalists working in Beijing on occasion wrote about leadership politics, but most brought to their work little or no background in Chinese affairs or in the politics of communist political orders, and their tours in China were usually too short to enable them to build the long-term perspectives needed to follow the Chinese leadership. From its inception, the Monitor sought to address the emerging gap that Mike perceived.

The intended audience for the Monitor has been American policy-makers in government and the broader policy-interested public. Writing analysis of leadership politics for the Monitor therefore requires several skills: precision and clarity; deep background in the history of Chinese politics; thorough acquaintance with proven Kremlinological methods of analyzing elite politics as they apply to the leadership of the People’s Republic; big files and a good memory; a direct, get-to-the-point writing style, and a large dose of humility ingrained from the difficulty of penetrating the black box of Politburo politics. Neither the quantitative preoccupations of contemporary political science nor the social science jargon of academics address these requirements well. The pool of potential candidates therefore has drawn largely from specialists in the U.S. Government, analysts in the public policy think tanks that seek to inform government policy, and academics who have some government experience under their belts. 8 | Across the Taiwan Strait

The Monitor has regularly published four, later three issues a year. A team of the same authors write for each issue, each writing on the specific policy area in which they have recognized expertise. The Monitor’s first writers on the politics of Chinese foreign policy were Tom Christensen, who left the group in January 2006 to serve as deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia under the Bush administration, and Bob Suettinger, a career analyst of Chinese affairs who had served several years as Asia director on President Clinton’s National Security Council and who pinch-hit for Christensen for five issues. Christensen’s departure required finding a replacement to cover his package of the politics of Chinese foreign policy-making, arguably the foremost topic among those addressed by the Monitor. As in the case of enlisting ghost-busting services, the basic question was, “Who ya gonna call?” At that point I had known Alan Romberg for almost 30 years. I knew of his long, distinguished service at State, especially in posts on U.S. relations with Asia. In debates in informal settings over that time, I had heard him expound credibly on issues ranging from intermediate missile deployments in Europe, Japanese defense policy, Hong Kong politics since unification with the PRC, Beijing’s approach to the two Koreas, and, of course, sensitive issues in U.S.-China relations. He had graduated from Princeton, my own alma mater, but I did not hold that against him. He seemed the right guy. I was delighted, therefore, when he agreed to join the crew of Monitor analysts. But there was a catch: he preferred not to cover all of Chinese foreign relations, only the PRC-Taiwan cross-Strait relationship and the U.S. role in it. I knew from numerous previous informal interactions that this topic was of sustained interest to Alan. In addition, his Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations had been published by Stimson three years earlier and offered the most authoritative and thorough analysis of the Taiwan question in U.S.-China relations available. So his proposal was sensible, and I agreed. I resolved the need for Monitor coverage of the larger topic of Chinese foreign relations by gaining funding for a seventh slot in the Monitor crew and recruiting Carnegie specialist Michael Swaine, who remains a regular and reliable contributor. The Monitor’s crew of authors is not exactly an anarcho-syndicalist autonomous collective. But its internal dynamic does seem to replicate the collective leadership ground rules that Deng Xiaoping sought to instill and that seemed to prevail for a long time in the Politburo we all sought to analyze. Each member is a recognized authority on the topic they cover for the Monitor, and each possesses a strong personality and holds strong opinions. As a group they often came to divergent conclusions about the same topic, and I recognized at the outset that there could be no hope of imposing an office line on the issues of the day – much better to let our intended readership Introduction | 9 see our differences and draw their own conclusions. Nevertheless, what members of the Monitor group shared in common has been only the most nominal respect for the authority of their general secretary…er, I mean, general editor. Consequently, editing the Monitor has been a great school in the personalities, character, priorities, and foibles of the publication’s authors, in addition to their analytical and writing skills. Alan’s precision and clarity with regard to sensitive political questions was immediately apparent from an exchange we had over the heading in the Monitor’s table of contents for his first submission, in January 2006. Without much reflection I had proposed the rubric “China-Taiwan-United States.” Alan responded immediately by proposing the rubric “PRC-Taiwan-United States,” reflecting the prevailing ambiguities of contending ideas of what constitutes “China” in the triangular relationship. Over time, I came to appreciate that, in addition to the many other skills he brought to the Monitor, Alan was a master of the art of strategic submission. At the beginning of each project year, we negotiate deadlines for submission of drafts for the issues to appear that year, taking into account anticipated major events in leadership politics such as party congresses and Central Committee plenums, National People’s Congress sessions, and the like. These agreements in deadlines turned out to be less like mandatory state plans and more like advisory plans. Some authors, marching to some inner clock set by experience in government bureaucracies or by an admirably compulsive need to get things done, reliably hit the negotiated deadlines. Others dithered, torn by the hope for some new shred of evidence that would clarify an ever- ambiguous interpretive picture or by demanding professional schedules or by innate tendencies in favor of procrastination. The resulting spread in submissions between those who hit deadlines and those who did not could be a matter of weeks. For Alan, this situation evoked a strategy that tried to reconcile his characteristic respect for professional discipline in hitting deadlines and has preoccupation for timeliness in analysis – even in a quarterly publication. Sometimes Alan submitted close to the deadline, but he would then insist in a chain of emails on revising what he had submitted in light of some new development or piece of evidence. Later on, he developed the technique of carefully watching the submissions by other members of the crew and timing his submission not to be absolutely last, but close enough to it to allow him to present his most up-to-date analysis. Eventually, we agreed that he could post his submissions on the Stimson Center’s website ahead of their appearance in the Monitor, but that did not alter his shrewd tactics of strategic submission. For me as editor, managing the various of tactics of submission deployed by Alan and his Monitor colleagues was a course in appreciating the different sensibilities of talented analysts while extending sufficient latitude to coax their best analytical efforts. I have long pondered how much my understanding of the dimensions of 10 | Across the Taiwan Strait leadership politics in Hu Jintao’s frustrated second term as party general secretary reflected this experience as Monitor editor. Between January 2006 and September 2017, Alan wrote 37 articles for the China Leadership Monitor on the complex dynamics of cross-Strait relations and the U.S. role in them. Each reflected his deep understanding of the triangular politics, his exhaustive research apparent in his footnotes, the clarity of his straight-ahead prose, and his abiding interest and concern for this sensitive area in U.S. foreign policy. They will stand for a long time as representing not the first cut at history but rather something much closer to history’s final cut. Abbreviations

4NPP 4th Nuclear Power Plant ADIZ Air defense identification zone AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AIT American Institute in Taiwan APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ARATS Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CAA Civil Aviation Administration CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CBM Confidence building measures CCP Chinese Communist Party CCTV China Central Television CEC Central Executive Committee CPC Communist Party of China CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies DPP Democratic Progressive Party EACS European Association for Chinese Studies ECFA Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement EPA Environmental Protection Agency EY Executive Yuan FEPZ Free Economic Pilot Zones FTA Free Trade Agreement HFAC House Foreign Affairs Committee ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization JIDD Jakarta International Defense Dialogue 12 | Across the Taiwan Strait

KMT Kuomintang LY Legislative Yuan MAC Mainland Affairs Council NGO Nongovernmental organization NPC National People’s Congress NPF National Policy Foundation NSC National Security Council PFP People First Party PLA People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ROC Republic of China ROK Republic of Korea S&T Science and technology SEF Straits Exchange Foundation STA Services Trade Agreement TAO Taiwan Affairs Office TiSA Trade in Services Agreement TPP Transpacific Partnership TSU Taiwan Solidarity Union UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNSC United Nations Security Council U.S. United States USN United States Navy WHA World Health Assembly WHO World Health Organization WTO World Trade Organization

Chapter One

Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics

China Leadership Monitor, No. 44 July 28, 2014

In Taiwan this spring, domestic political developments attracted more attention than those on foreign fronts. The “Sunflower” student-led occupation of the Legislative Yuan (LY), continuing interparty stalemate over the cross-Strait trade in services agreement (TiSA) and LY supervision of cross-Strait negotiations, revision of the referendum law, and the fate of the 4th Nuclear Power Plant (4NPP) sparked bitter political conflict. At the same time, both major parties have begun the process of choosing new leaders. Although we do not delve into the details of all of those developments here, they are all of some consequence and are sure to have an impact not only on domestic politics but also on cross-Strait relations.

On the People’s Republic of China (PRC) side, Xi Jinping’s policy toward Taiwan continued to attract attention, with the unification-related messaging of late 2013 giving way to an approach more appealing to Taiwan.

We simply mention here but do not discuss in this essay that there have been several developments in U.S.-Taiwan relations. Most notably, a number of senior American officials visited Taiwan this spring, most important among them the Cabinet-level Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator. Her visit, and action by the House of Representatives to approve the sale of guided-missile frigates to Taiwan, were warmly welcomed on the island but, as expected, sharply criticized by Beijing.

Protests Reshape Taiwan Politics

For three weeks, from mid-March through early April, Taiwan political circles were consumed with the so-called Sunflower student-led movement. The demonstrations that began on March 18 were initially triggered by anger at a Kuomintang (KMT) parliamentary maneuver to overcome Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) tactics to stall LY consideration of the TiSA1 The Ma administration and the KMT LY caucus argued that, while an item-by-item review and vote had been agreed to, the DPP was impeding deliberations and insisting on what would likely be devastating 14 | Across the Taiwan Strait modifications. It was believed that if these efforts succeeded, they would either kill the TiSA or, at the very least, require renegotiation with Beijing, which the Mainland had broadly hinted would be unacceptable. There was also concern that should the LY demand TiSA modifications, no other trading partner would want to negotiate with Taiwan, as they would fear that any agreed terms could be subject to tinkering by the legislature, an untenable approach to trade talks.2 The fact that the New Zealand and Singapore economic cooperation agreements were approved without amendment was not reassuring, since they were of relatively small economic significance compared with other agreements that might be negotiated in the future. Although President Ma Ying-jeou strongly defended both the procedural and substantive aspects of the TiSA agreement,3 the DPP — as well as the demonstrators — insisted that the Ma administration’s “black box” approach to negotiations had yielded results damaging to the Taiwan economy in general and to job opportunities in particular. Moreover, concerns were also raised about the implications for national security of greater Mainland participation in the Taiwan economy. The only remedy, the opponents argued, was detailed LY review of TiSA combined with active LY supervision and involvement in negotiation of any future cross-Strait agreements. The student-led demonstrations — which quickly involved physical occupation of the LY and even an attempt to occupy Cabinet offices — grew out of long- simmering dissatisfaction among various student and other civic groups with the Ma administration that paralleled DPP concerns. The demonstrators demanded that the administration withdraw the TiSA and defer LY consideration of it until a law had been passed to provide for LY oversight.

Implications for Cross-Strait Relations

The demonstrations carried with them a number of important implications for cross- Strait relations. First, as several public opinion polls showed, and as Beijing learned, they reflected anxiety not just among the students and their fellow demonstrators but more broadly in Taiwan society about possible repercussions from greater economic interaction with — and dependence on — the Mainland. And while some of this concern centered around fear about the economic fallout, some also was related to worry that a certain inevitability regarding eventual unification was being created, an inevitability that was quite disturbing to a populace that did not want unification.4 Second, although the DPP has vigorously denied that it instigated the demonstrations and occupation of the LY despite the fact that several of the leaders had worked for Tsai Ing-wen in one capacity or another in the past,5 DPP leaders gave significant public support to the demonstrations once they got under way. Then-DPP Chair Su Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 15

Tseng-chang said the protestors occupying the LY were “a shield to our democracy”6 and praised them as “great” and “doing the right thing,” while his predecessor (and now successor) as party leader, Tsai Ing-wen, said she was “moved” by the young people, and urged that they be protected.7 Prominent DPP legislator Hsiao Bi-khim made an open appeal to the international community to support the students and, as she put it, “express concern for the status [of] Taiwan’s democracy and survival.”8 Senior DPP leader and former premier Frank Hsieh noted that DPP lawmakers took turns guarding the doors of the LY to shield the students after the occupation began and even joined them in their sit-in of the Executive Yuan compound and in a massive protest rally in front of the Presidential Office.9 Particular focus is now on Tsai as the new party chair and likely DPP presidential candidate in 2016. Tsai had been arguing for some time, and not simply since the Sunflower movement emerged in March, that the party needs to connect better with Taiwan “society” and mainstream opinion, creating a framework that she had previously called the “Taiwan consensus.”10 But after the events of the spring, Tsai contended that the Sunflower movement had, as one paper reported it, “changed everything,”11 and that the next generation had “come of age.” She observed that the student protest changed both the way people in Taiwan looked at domestic politics as well as how the PRC should understand Taiwan public opinion and what it must do to engage with it.12 In light of all of this, it was not surprising that when Tsai announced her candidacy for party chair, she emphasized the need for greater inclusiveness as well as for forging greater connections with civil society and groups that share a similar vision of Taiwan. She said, “The DPP must open its doors to civil society, and allow it to become part of the party.” Having made a clarion call that “It is our responsibility and our mission to rebuild public confidence in politics, trust in political parties [i.e., the DPP], and usher in the next era for politics in Taiwan,” she went on: “My decision to run for chairperson is also a call for everybody that shares this vision, to come together and become the change we want for this party.”13 Nonetheless, perhaps reflecting a concern that the DPP agenda might be “captured” by the social movements, Tsai commented a few days later that, while the DPP and many civil society institutions shared the same goals, political parties and social movements were not the same; each had its own role in society.14 Separate or not, the student movement’s wariness about cross-Strait relations fits nicely with positions Tsai has taken over time. Although she has generally emphasized pragmatism in cross-Strait ties during recent years — and we will discuss this further in future essays — to the extent that she is successful in bringing younger people into the party as well as cooperating with civil society organizations in forging a “Taiwan consensus,” their skeptical views about ties to the Mainland are likely to carry some 16 | Across the Taiwan Strait weight, including in the presidential campaign. In this context, it is important to note that Tsai believes that forging a consensus on the concept of sovereignty is the most important issue for the Taiwan people at the moment,15 and as DPP chair she intends to establish dialogue with civic groups on a number of topics, including “a cross- Strait policy in line with Taiwan’s strategic interests.”16 In terms of the impact of recent events on the DPP’s prospects in the upcoming elections, especially in the presidential contest in 2016, at the same time that the DPP has been criticized by some people for being too involved with the students as well as too tolerant and even supportive of their conduct, the party has been chastised by others for offering support to the protestors that was both too little and too late. As the party’s U.S. representative explained to Washington-based media, while the Sunflower movement has apparently hurt the KMT, it has not had a positive impact on the DPP’s standing.17 One DPP gadfly, former DPP legislator Julian Kuo Cheng- liang, said this was due to the fact that the DPP had been unable to assume a decisive leadership role during recent protests,18 a judgment echoed by other DPP members as well.19 Whatever one’s analysis of the causes, the lack of a boost for the DPP appeared to be substantiated by polling results.20 The third point about the demonstrations is that they brought to the fore the issue of the TiSA process and revealed widespread public dissatisfaction with it, to the point that, while the administration did not withdraw the agreement as opponents demanded, nonetheless the KMT not only had to agree to return the agreement to committees for a section-by-section review and vote, but as a matter of practicality, and in accordance with a surprise decision by LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng,21 the TiSA will not be taken up until after an LY oversight bill has been adopted. This sequence will not only strengthen the LY’s role regarding TiSA (as well as any future cross-Strait agreements) but, despite efforts to speed things up in the meantime, including by convening a special LY session in June,22 it may well also delay the process such that TiSA will not be considered until sometime in 2015. The prospect of considerable delay was obvious before the Sunflower movement broke out, but the protests contributed significantly to the dynamic that now virtually ensures slow movement. Three final points about the implications of Taiwan’s current domestic situation for cross-Strait relations. First, although it now seems certain that the LY supervisory legislation will precede any consideration of the TiSA, it is not a foregone conclusion that the supervisory legislation itself will easily be agreed to. Almost a dozen versions have been submitted, some of which are worded in ways that carry a strong sense of “Taiwan independence.” None of those highly provocative versions is likely to be adopted. But a confrontation in the LY over establishing procedures is inevitable, and even at this early stage there has been filibustering and other legislative maneuvering.23 These delays, as well as the Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 17 number of proposals and the tone of some of them, have created some anxiety on the Mainland about the implications for the future. Second, if the LY insists on amending TiSA rather than approving it and then fixing it with a supplementary agreement later on, the Mainland’s willingness to renegotiate the text is not certain. Some people say that Beijing has already closed the door to renegotiation. At this point that would seem to be an over-reading of the situation. But the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) has gone to some lengths to discourage LY revisions and to make clear that, whatever its ultimate position, the Mainland has not said the door is open to renegotiation, as some press reports had suggested.24 Third, Taiwan’s domestic situation could well affect other cross-Strait developments. Although at various points officials on both sides of the Strait have struggled to deny that the LY controversy over ratification of the TiSA has affected other Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)-related agreements,25 the fact is that meetings on the commodities trade agreement have been postponed26 and concerns have been expressed about the linkage among these agreements. Moreover, no doubt chastened by criticism for not protecting Taiwan businesses and workers adequately in the services sector, Taiwan officials have warned their commodities trade agreement negotiating counterparts that if certain problems in sensitive industrial sectors such as petrochemicals, panels, automobiles, and machines tools were not resolved, there was no chance that Taiwan would sign a commodities agreement.27 Other cross-Strait exchanges have also been affected. TAO head Zhang Zhijun’s return visit to Taiwan, which had been anticipated during April, was postponed, as were other planned visits.28 Not only had Zhang been expected to announce agreement on the long-negotiated reciprocal establishment of Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) offices during his visit (and this may still happen if he comes later),29 but Mainland commentators are also beginning to talk of other significant consequences. In mid-May, for example, a well-known Taiwan scholar from Shanghai, Yan Anlin, suggested that the anti- TiSA activity in Taiwan and the student movement not only could have an impact on Taiwan’s economic development and cross-Strait economic cooperation, but it could also affect SEF-ARATS dealings referring specifically to the reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices. Moreover, Yan raised the specter of longer- term complications after 2016 when he speculated that all of this could well hamper any adjustment of the DPP’s Mainland policy.30 On a hopeful note, Xiamen University Taiwan expert Liu Guoshen observed that Tsai Ing-wen had spoken of maintaining cross-Strait peaceful development and said that, in assessing its policy toward Taiwan, Beijing would “seek truth from facts” and would pay attention to any changes in the DPP’s policy. But at the same time he also expressed the view that if the DPP returned to power the Mainland would inevitably be very 18 | Across the Taiwan Strait concerned, since the political foundation between the DPP and the Mainland is weak.31 Nonetheless, Liu said, even though the anti-TiSA student movement would have some impact on Beijing’s Taiwan policy — “It must have an impact, because this is quite a big event” — based on Xi Jinping’s conversation with James Soong, the Mainland’s original policy framework would not change and the impact of the protests would likely be that Beijing would be more meticulous, perhaps allowing people in the lower middle class to enjoy more of the benefits from cross-Strait relations.32 There are also questions about the degree to which all of this, in turn, will affect Taiwan’s ability to participate in regional economic activity, where PRC cooperation is essential. As we pointed out in our last essay,33 as Zhang Zhijun reportedly said to Wang Yu-chi when they met in February,34 Beijing insists that finishing the post- ECFA agenda takes precedence over Taiwan’s interest in participating in regional organizations such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). To the extent that Beijing continues to insist on this sequencing, the prospects for Taiwan’s larger trade agenda could be significantly affected. While American officials have stated they see no “direct” connection between the fate of TiSA or other cross- Strait ties and U.S. attitudes toward Taiwan’s interest in TPP35 and have sought to downplay the PRC’s role, it is widely believed that as a practical matter Beijing has sufficient leverage among the current 12 TPP negotiating parties to block Taiwan’s application if it chooses to do so.36 Beyond this, many people now believe that the entire cross-Strait agenda faces dim prospects for the duration of the Ma administration. Even if TiSA passes unscathed, or if the PRC cooperates in renegotiating portions of it, and even if the remaining ECFA follow-on agreements on commodities trade and dispute resolution are then completed, there is clearly no enthusiasm in the Taiwan body politic for a robust program of further agreements at this point, and President Ma is not well placed to force things through. Perhaps there could be more cultural and educational exchanges, but probably not any formal umbrella agreements.37 And if there is any life left in the idea of political talks (beyond Track II), it is clearly on life support. In line with this, as we have discussed in a number of recent essays, the issue of a potential Ma-Xi meeting is still pending. Although the Mainland continues to say that it is “positive and open” to a meeting38 and to suggest ideas that could promote a conclave between the two leaders, such as a “third venue” in addition to Taiwan or the Mainland,39 we have seen how difficult it has been to create mutually agreeable conditions for that even without the recent complications. However, if the net result of the recent domestic turmoil in Taiwan is to downgrade even further any interest on the island in cross-Strait political dealings, or tolerance for making concessions to the Mainland, the prospects for such a “summit,” while Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 19 not totally destroyed, would seem to be dimmer than ever. Moreover, even though a “Green” poll taken during the demonstrations showed that over half of respondents supported the notion of a Ma-Xi meeting,40 after she assumed office as DPP chair, Tsai Ing-wen again skeptically questioned the purpose of such a meeting and insisted that the administration spell out the costs and benefits.41 All of this being said, while acknowledging the Mainland’s disinclination to convene a Xi-Ma summit at any international event, including the Beijing APEC leaders meeting in November, and while recognizing the need for caution due to the Taiwan domestic requirements, Ma Ying-jeou has spoken more than once recently in favor of a meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), calling it the “best opportunity.”42 And though Ma has said that, due to Beijing’s reluctance about that venue, Taiwan has no other proposal to resolve the problem,43 he obviously hopes the idea is not dead. (In response to Ma’s renewed references to APEC, Beijing once again rebutted the notion of a summit there or in any other international setting.44) Viewed in longer-term perspective, it also would seem that much of the energy may have gone out of the entire cross-Strait agenda not only for the duration of Ma’s term but possibly at least for a while beyond 2016. Certainly no DPP leader is going to promote a robust cross-Strait agenda even if the PRC is flexible enough to engage with a leader in Taipei who at the most will have done no better than express indirect “tolerance” for and “non-denial” of “one China.” Moreover, on the KMT side, it is noteworthy that the person widely seen as the leading candidate for the party’s presidential nomination, New Taipei Mayor Chu Li-luan, has suggested that too much attention may be being paid to the Mainland. While the services trade agreement was stalled in the LY in April, Chu commented that by being over-focused on the Mainland market Taiwan might have missed opportunities elsewhere. “When you only see China, and can’t see Indonesia, with its 300 million population, what kind of world perspective is that?”45

So the driving force for vigorous cross-Strait progress that Ma has provided may have passed its peak for some time to come.

On the Other Side of the Strait

We closed the last essay with an “afterword,” noting that Xi Jinping’s tone with Lien Chan in February seemed somewhat different not only from that during his own meeting with Vincent Siew in October, but especially from some of the speeches given by senior officials following the Siew meeting. In his more recent statements, including in his meeting with People First Party (PFP) president James Soong in early May, Xi reinforced the approach he took with Lien Chan. In the wake of the Sunflower movement, Xi indicated that he wanted to reach out to broader segments 20 | Across the Taiwan Strait of Taiwan society so as to better understand their concerns based on Taiwan’s unique experiences and aspirations. However, Xi also reiterated his views on the concept of a cross-Strait “family” and the mutual benefit to be achieved in realization of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, labeling the “China dream” as the common dream of people on both sides of the Strait. And in the wake of the domestic controversy in Taiwan over ratification of the services trade agreement, Xi stressed that economic integration between Taiwan and the Mainland would bring positive results for both sides and should not be disturbed.

Based on the concept that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are of one family, there is no difficulty that cannot be overcome as long as each side feels for the other and treats the other with sincerity . . . We’d like to know more about the practical needs of the Taiwan people, especially those of the grassroots, and take proactive and effective steps to take care of vulnerable groups.46

Xi denied that the Mainland had any intention to “take advantage of Taiwan” or that there was any risk of one side “compelling or swallowing” the other.47 At the same time, in articulating “four noes” for Soong,48 Xi stated unequivocally that “the staunch will” to check Taiwan independence splittist plots “will not waver.” Opposition to “Taiwan independence” is, of course, a hardy perennial of PRC statements on cross-Strait relations. But the strength of this particular statement, and its inclusion in what was otherwise a positive formulation, apparently stemmed from concern that the Sunflower movement was grounded in hostility toward the Mainland and aimed at Taiwan independence.49 It probably also reflected Beijing’s understanding (right or wrong) that the DPP’s approach to TiSA and to LY supervision of cross-Strait negotiations also reflected a Taiwan independence agenda.50

Xi’s reference to “one family” was, of course, not new. He had used it with Lien Chan in February and Li Keqiang had done so with Vincent Siew at Boao in April.51 In fact Xi had used it with Siew at Boao a year earlier, in April 2013,52 as well as with Wu Poh-hsiung in June.53 Xi’s reference to it in his meeting with Lien in February had been explained by TAO head Zhang Zhijun as both showing “sincerity” to take care of Taiwan compatriots and reflecting Xi’s true understanding of Taiwan people and his good intention to develop a good future with Taiwan compatriots.54 But it was not imagery that warmed the hearts of all people in Taiwan. Following Xi’s meeting with Soong, one Taiwan paper editorial pointed to recent polls that revealed people on the island saw the Mainland getting a greater benefit from the relationship than Taiwan did. The editorial also reported that those polls showed strong support for independence and against unification, concluding: “The idea that more exchanges will help promote closer ties and ‘family feeling’ is too simplistic.”55 Similarly, DDP Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 21

Chair Su Tseng-chang reacted by stating that Taiwan doesn’t want to be part of the PRC’s family; it is already a sovereign, independent country.56 Although Xi sought to focus on the fact that the three positive aspects of his “four noes” were consistent elements in China’s cross-Strait policy,57 his emphasis on “family” nonetheless conveyed an implicit negative message like that in Wen Jiabao’s imagery of people on the two sides being “brothers.” As we discussed last year, Wen’s message that “we are doing Taiwan favors because we are brothers” suggested that if they were not brothers, then the Mainland would not do those favors for Taiwan.58 The “family” imagery contained a similar implied conditionality. In early May, China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Taiwan Research Institute head Zhou Zhihuai sought to reassure his interlocutors during a visit to Taipei that that Xi’s “generation-to-generation” comment to Vincent Siew in October59 did not indicate a sense of urgency. Rather, Zhou said, Xi envisaged a slow process like “simmering stew.”60 This policy, he explained, was basically a continuation of Hu Jintao’s dictum, “Unification is a long process; we must still engage in a long-term struggle with Taiwan independence forces.” It is not important, Zhou asserted, which generation solves the issue; what matters is how the people on both sides of the Strait can live happily.61 A somewhat different theme was struck by a senior official of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s Central Policy Research Office, Qiu Dunhong. Qiu published an article in late April that was perhaps aimed at a domestic PRC audience rather than a cross-Strait readership, but that nonetheless attracted a lot of attention in Taiwan.62 He agreed with Zhou’s general theme of patience, and laid out a three- stage timetable for unification, with the first stage an extended period of peaceful development. But what was particularly striking — and different from the line that appeared in official statements and articles after the turn of the year — was Qiu’s bold connection of peaceful development to peaceful reunification. The first subheading of his article read: “The only goal of peaceful development is peaceful unification” ( 和平发展的唯一目标是和平统一). Moreover, he made explicit a linkage that had generally been phrased only indirectly before: “By national rejuvenation we mean not only making the country strong and the people affluent and enhancing our cultural soft power but also achieving the motherland’s complete reunification and the nation’s great unity” (我们说民族复兴，不仅要强国富民 和增 强文化软实力， 而且要实现祖国的完全统一和民族大团结.) It does not seem likely that Qiu’s themes will replace the kinder, gentler approach that Xi and others have been taking in direct conversation with Taiwan representatives since January. And, indeed, an article penned by Zhang Zhijun in late April focused on self-confidence (自信), mutual trust (互信), and faith (信心) as key elements undergirding cross-Strait economic cooperation and peaceful development of 22 | Across the Taiwan Strait cross-Strait relations, which, in turn, will create conditions more beneficial to Taiwan’s participation in regional economic cooperation.63 And he and Chen Deming provided similar messages of reassurance to Taiwan visitors throughout the recent period,64 without mentioning reunification or rejuvenation. But Qiu’s article is important as a frank statement reminding everyone that goals have not changed, and that there is a purposefulness in Beijing’s approach that is not always stated. Qiu’s timetable for reunification was not urgent, and there is nothing inconsistent between his article and what others are saying. But it spelled out connections in unvarnished terms that usually are framed more indirectly. In any case, in the current situation, Beijing has struggled to cope not only with the short-term implications of the Sunflower student movement in Taiwan but with the increasingly evident long-term anxiety throughout Taiwan society about becoming overly tied to — and dependent upon — the Mainland. As to the short term, the PRC has more or less rolled with the punches. It has taken some rhetorical shots at the student movement and the chaos it created (ironically occasionally lecturing Taiwan about the requirements of democracy). But mainly it has sought in relatively low-key fashion to tout the benefits to Taiwan of economic ties, including the services trade agreement,65 and to echo Xi’s statements to Lien Chan and James Soong that the Mainland wants to listen more carefully to all voices in Taiwan, especially those at the grass roots.66 In light of the prominent role of students in the protests, Beijing also moved to woo Taiwan students through more youth exchanges.67 Although TAO Director Zhang Zhijun, in the course of discussing the work program for 2014 in March, had spoken about plans to announce a “new policy” toward Taiwan to benefit as many “grassroots masses” as possible,68 both he and ARATS President Chen Deming acknowledged in May, in the wake of the developments we have been discussing, that “some new conditions and new problems” (一 些 新 情 况 、新 问 题 ) had emerged and that negotiations were facing “an even more complicated situation” (更复杂的形势). But they emphasized the themes sounded by Xi. Despite the earlier postponement of Zhang Zhijun’s return visit to Taiwan and delay in establishing the regular dialogue mechanism between TAO and the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) agreed to in February,69 they pledged to continue to press forward for ratification of agreements already signed as well as for negotiation of the remaining ECFA agenda, the reciprocal exchange of SEF and ARATS offices, the signing of agreements on avoiding double taxation and strengthening taxation cooperation and environmental cooperation, and the launching of preliminary studies on cross-Strait cooperation in education, science and technology, culture, agriculture, and other areas.70 Longer term, however, Mainland observers could not avoid considering the problematic attitudes that had been revealed in the broad public support for the Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 23 issues the students had raised, if not necessarily their tactics. Recognizing that it was “inevitable” that there would be “some estrangement due to the historical and realistic situations,” the TAO concentrated its fire on Taiwan independence activities. The door was open for exchanges with “any political party, group or person who adheres to the one-China principle and opposes the ‘Taiwan independence’ stance in Taiwan,” one statement contended, but there would be no compromise regarding opposition to Taiwan independence activities. Perhaps referring to the fact that the Sunflower leaders had outspokenly supported Taiwan independence in other contexts71 but only focused their LY occupation protest on domestic economic and political issues, spokesmen cautioned that compatriots on both sides of the Strait should be wary of “Taiwan independence” forces that always “play tricks” to undermine cross-Strait peace and development.72

Looking Ahead to Taiwan Elections

This then gives rise to the question of how the Mainland currently views the DPP and is likely to treat it both in the presidential campaign and, should it win the 2016 election, once it takes office. Things may change, of course, and various responsible DPP officials caution that one should wait to see how Tsai Ing-wen approaches cross- Strait issues once she settles into the position of party chair — and if she becomes the DPP presidential nominee. They note that she was largely responsible for putting off for future consideration any changes in the party’s position at the January 2014 China Affairs Commission meeting, purposely leaving a “blank” in the box notionally labeled “cross-Strait policy.”73 That said, as we have noted before, at the same time Beijing has welcomed a wide variety of DPP members and officials to the Mainland, and has engaged with them when visiting Taiwan, the level of suspicion about the party’s ultimate intentions remains high, as does the bar for dealing on a party-to-party basis. The DPP has sought to persuade the Mainland — and others — that despite its support of the student protests it is not opposed to free trade but is merely concerned with due process and principles of fairness and reciprocity.74 And it has sought to disabuse them of the idea that the party harbors any intention either to actively promote an independence agenda or to use legislation in any way. Perhaps these arguments have registered, but as discussed above, so far they appear not to have been persuasive. During his recent trip to Taipei, Zhou Zhihuai argued that most people in Taiwan prefer maintenance of the status quo, and that the most significant factor in maintaining the status quo is opposition to Taiwan independence. Indeed, he said, a key factor in the CCP-KMT cooperative relations is their common position on this, including their common support of the “1992 Consensus.” But as for the DPP, Zhou said, despite some promising signs in 2012 when Frank Hsieh Ch’ang-ting and Chen 24 | Across the Taiwan Strait

Chu visited the Mainland, after the Sunflower student movement the DPP threw all of that to the wind. As a result, DPP cross-Strait policies still lack this essential foundation, he observed, and the party should ponder why the DPP and KMT can cooperate reasonably well, whereas there is no party-to-party contact between the CCP and DPP. His downbeat conclusion was that, taking all the factors into account, for the DPP “there still is a very, very long road to travel and much to do” (還有 一段很長很長的路要走，還需要付出努力) before the party can reconcile with the Communist Party.75 As stated earlier, it is too soon to tell what this will mean for the Mainland’s position in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election. Zhou referred favorably to the notion of “abandoning independence [or] freezing independence” (棄獨, 凍獨),76 saying that if the DPP could take this first step, then perhaps reconciliation would be possible. (Readers may recall the Mainland had commented favorably on the idea of freezing the 1991 DPP charter provision promoting a Republic of Taiwan when such a freeze was proposed for consideration by the January DPP China Affairs Commission meeting, and then had criticized the commission’s failure to adopt the proposal.77) While skeptical of her “deep Green” history, Mainland scholars have adopted something of a wait-and-see attitude toward how Tsai will move on cross-Strait relations.78 If she and her colleagues can, for example, resuscitate the idea of a freeze, one suspects that this could go some way toward facilitating not only direct DPP-CCP interaction, but perhaps a smooth cross-Strait relationship if the DPP takes power again in 2016. However, all that clearly lies in the realm of speculation at this point.

Notes

1 Sophia Yeh, Chen Wei-ting, and Lilian Wu, “KMT lawmaker claims trade-in-service pact ‘passed’ despite no review,” Central News Agency (hereafter abbreviated CNA), March 17, 2014, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201403170031.aspx. 2 In the wake of the weeks of protest and the uncertain prospects of the TiSA, Taiwan’s economics minister said that many countries had grown hesitant and indefinitely postponed scheduled trade talks with Taipei. (Huang Chiao-wen and Maia Huang, “‘Countries’ shelve FTA talks over China pact row: Minister,” CNA, April 21, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404210025.aspx.) 3 “President Ma’s remarks on the cross-Strait trade in services agreement,” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), March 23, 2014, http://english.president.gov.tw /Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=31967&rmid=2355&sd=2014/03/23&ed=2014/03/25. 4 A Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR) poll in February reinforced results from similar polls in the past that a large majority of respondents oppose unification. TISR found that 64 percent of respondents did not approve of ultimate reunification as against 19.4 percent who did. Perhaps of some importance for the future, 82.7 percent of 20- to 29-year-olds opposed ultimate unification. The same poll also found that 47.8 percent of respondents supported ultimate independence, as against 34.1 percent who did not. Among 20- to 29-year-olds, 68.5 percent Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 25

supported ultimate independence. (“Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey,” TISR, February 21, 2014, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/files/archive/185_7548d355.pdf.) A TISR poll in late May revealed a similar breakdown of opinion regarding the nature of the current relationship. 59.7 percent of respondents believed cross-Strait relations were “state-to- state” relations, and 61.7 percent did not agree that the two sides belonged to “one China” (up from 48.1 percent in April 2013). (Those who believed Taiwan and the Mainland belong to “one China” slipped from 39.1 percent in the April 2013 poll to 26.8 percent now. “Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey,” TISR, May 29, 2014, http://www.tisr.com.tw/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ TISR_TMBS_201405_2.pdf.) 5 Tsai did not deny that the students had had previous connections with her, but her spokesman insisted that their participation in the protest movement was based on their own ideals and was undertaken as a matter of their own volition. (Justin Su and Y.F. Low, “Ex-DPP chairwoman plays down connection with student protestors,” CNA, March 25, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ aipl/201403250013.aspx.) 6 “DPP ultimatum to Ma: demand substantial review, restart negotiations with China,” DPP Department of Foreign Affairs, March 20, 2014, http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.com/2014/03/dpp- ultimatum-to-ma-demand-substantial.html. 7 Sophia Wu Justin Su, and Lilian Wu, “DPP mobilizes to support student protestors at legislature,” CNA, March 21, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201403210029.aspx. 8 “Open letter by DPP legislator Hsiao Bi-khim,” March 25, 2014, http://www.scribd.com/ doc/214724832/Open-Letter-by-DPP-Legislator-Hsiao-Bi-khim. 9 Justine Su and Lilian Wu, “Ex-premier calls for party conference after student protest,” CNA, April 8, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404080026.aspx. 10 She did so at the beginning of January (Justin Su and Jay Chen, “Opposition party needs to reconnect with society: former chief,” CNA, January 1, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ aipl/201401010019.aspx), in the middle of the month in the context of the China Affairs Commission’s report (“Tsai emphasize Taiwan Consensus,” Taiwan News Online, January 10, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news _content.php?id=2387159), and again in February (Chris Wang, “DPP must work with social forces: Tsai,” Taipei Times, February 11, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archi ves/2014/02/11/2003583253). 11 Chris Wang, “Sunflowers changed everything: Tsai,” Taipei Times, May 5, 2014, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/05/06/2003589690. 12 Ibid. 13 “To reestablish trust, to regenerate Taiwan—announcement on becoming a candidate for the chair of the DPP” (重建信任、台灣再生—參選民主進步黨主席聲明), March 15, 2014, Tsai Ing- wen blog, http://www.iing.tw/2014/03/blog-post.html. Now at https://plus.google.com/+%E8%94 %A1%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87/posts/2CQL245QUSB. 14 “Tsai Ing-wen: Goals of better cross-Strait relations, more youth in DPP,” Taiwan News Online, May 18, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2484859. 15 Justin Su and Evelyn Kao, “DPP head calls for consensus on sovereignty concept,” CNA, May 31, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201405310022.aspx. 16 Tsai Ing-wen, “Rebuilding a contract of trust between the party and society—the party chair candidate’s political views and live questions and answers with the media” (重建黨與社會的信 任契約—參選黨主席政見及現場媒體問答), April 17, 2014, http://www.iing.tw/2014/04/blog- post_17.html. 26 | Across the Taiwan Strait

17 Yu Donghui, “Wu Jaushieh: No sign of positive impact on the DPP from the Sunflower student movement” (吳釗燮：未見太陽花學運對民進黨正面影響), China Review News, May 9, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1031/7/6/5/103176522.html?coluid=1&kindid= 0&docid=103176522&mdate=0509084102. 18 “Julian Kuo: DPP might not be a beneficiary from civil movements after all,” China Times (translated in KMT News Network, May 5, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type =article&mnum=112&anum=14484). 19 One DPP legislator said the party could not pretend that the protest had nothing to do with what she described as the DPP’s incapacity to fulfill its role; another said the party was unable to find its role in the student movement and that the DPP was in a dilemma because it could involve itself neither too deeply nor too lightly in the movement. (Justine Su and Lilian Wu, “Ex-premier calls for party conference after student protest,” CNA, April 8, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ aipl/201404080026.aspx.) 20 In a poll in early May, Taiwan Indicators Survey Research found that while the KMT had a higher negative rating than the DPP (51.8 percent vs. 44.1 percent), the KMT was nonetheless supported by 27.9 percent of respondents as against only 27.6 percent for the DPP. Independents soared to 41.5 percent. (“Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, May 1-10, 2014,” TISR, May 13, 2014, http:// www.tisr.com.tw/?p=4145.) This was consistent with a pro-Green poll (Taiwan Thinktank) some weeks earlier, during the demonstrations, which showed that while the KMT had a very high dissatisfaction rate among respondents (78.3 percent), with an extremely low support rate (11 percent), the opposition party also did not fare well. The DPP garnered a support rate of only 29.6 percent as against a dissatisfaction level of 52.9 percent. (Zou Liyong, “Green camp public opinion poll shows more than half support Ma-Xi meeting, more than half identify themselves as Taiwanese” [綠營民調過半支持馬習會 過半自認台灣人], China Review News, April 2, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1031/0/6/8/103106860.html?coluid=93&kindid= 2931&docid=103106860&mdate=0402155957.) Moreover, a TISR polling series that tracks party identification showed that a lead of 5.4 percentage points that the DPP enjoyed over the KMT as of March (27.4 percent vs. 22.0 percent) had become a KMT 3.1 percent advantage by May (24.8 percent vs. 21.7 percent). And if all “Blue” vs. all “Green” parties were taken into account, the Blue parties enjoyed an identification rate 4.8 percent higher than the Green parties (32.2 percent vs. 27.4 percent). This is the first time since fall 2013 that the KMT/Blue parties have enjoyed an advantage over the DPP/Green parties in this poll. (“Party Identification Tracking Analysis in Taiwan as of May 2014,” TISR, http://www. tisr.com.tw/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TISR_PID_Tracking_2014062.pdf.) 21 “Speaker promises that monitoring mechanism will be completed before pact review,” Formosa Television News (FTVN), April 6, 2014, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read .aspx?sno=824E5D7D9FC262D80C503FC0D436F41B. Now at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=HaKdAnDHzow. 22 “Legislative Yuan agrees on extra session,” Taiwan News Online, May 22, 2014, http://www. taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2488285. 23 Tai Ya-chen, Wen Kuei-hsiang, Tseng Ing-yu, and Elizabeth Hsu, “DPP filibuster obstructs review of cross-Strait monitoring bill,” CNA, May 27, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ aipl/201405270029.aspx. 24 The TAO spokesperson took note in mid-April of reports coming out of Taiwan that the TiSA could be renegotiated. She said there is no precedent for that. Moreover, SEF and ARATS had been authorized to conduct negotiations and had engaged in talks in a “responsible” way bringing bona fide benefits to people on both sides. (“TAO: There is no precedent for renegotiating cross- Strait agreements” (国台办：两岸协议没有重谈的先例), Taiwan Affairs Office, April 11, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201404/t20140411_6002693.htm.) Although Taiwan media interpreted this as saying Beijing would not renegotiate agreements (Lawrence Chiu and Lilian Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 27

Wu, “China nixes reports of agreeing to renegotiate grade pact,” CNA, April 11, 2014, http:// focustaiwan .tw/news/acs/201404110038.aspx), at this point that seems not to be true. Indeed, that same day in commenting on the issue of renegotiation at Boao, the head of the TAO’s economy department, Xu Mang, while denying press reports that Zhang Zhijun had said the TiSA could be renegotiated, nonetheless said: “First, Taiwan has to think it through, and if it requests that the pact be renegotiated, we’ll study it.” (Eva Feng and Lilian Wu, “China open to studying pact renegotiation: official,” CNA, April 11, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201404110032.aspx.) The situation was further confused when MAC Minister Wang Yu-chi said that, if there is even a single change in TiSA, Taiwan would “have no choice but to renegotiate.” (Shih Hsiu- chuan, “Renegotiating pact possible: MAC head,” Taipei Times, April 12, 2014, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/04/12/2003587832.) This led various media to report Wang had indicated that renegotiation would take place. The following day, the MAC issued a press release saying that Wang’s remarks had been over-read, that he was only “analyzing” the situation, not saying that the MAC was planning to renegotiate. The MAC press release pointed out that while Wang had noted that the Mainland had never said the two sides could not renegotiate, it also had not said that they could do so. (Hsieh Ai-chu, “Did Wang Yu-chi show flexibility on renegotiation? MAC: Over-interpretation” [王郁琦對重談 鬆口？陸委會：過度解讀], Commercial Times, April 12, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/ newspapers/20140412000127-260203.) 25 Scarlett Chai and Jeffrey Wu, “Taiwan, China negotiators affirm talks unaffected by controversy,” CNA, April 16, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201404160026.aspx. 26 “Because of concern over the services trade agreement, consultations on commodities trade have suffered a setback” (服貿卡關 貨貿諮商進度受挫), Commercial Times, May 6, 2014, http:// www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140506001107-260202. However, MAC head Wang Yu-chi told the LY that the commodities agreement talks had not been “suspended” and that the two sides were looking for “another time” to convene. That said, he also cautioned that changing a single provision of the TiSA during legislative review would invalidate the entire agreement, which could impact negotiations of future cross-Strait trade agreements. (Wen Kuei-hsiang and Frances Huang, “Talks on trade-in-goods pact with China postponed,” CNA, May 8, 2014, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201405080011.aspx.) 27 Rita Cheng and Elizabeth Hsu, “China urged to fix problems linked to cross-Strait trade talks,” CNA, May 18, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201405180019.aspx. 28 Scarlett Chai and Lilian Wu, “Chinese groups cancel visits to Taiwan over pact controversy,” CNA, April 7, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404070026.aspx. While Zhang’s visit had not been rescheduled as of this writing, other visits resumed in mid-May. (Scarlet Chai and Lee Hsin- Yin, “With end of protests, Chinese delegations resume Taiwan visits,” CNA, May 12, 2014, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201405120027.aspx.) 29 Some people have suggested that although the final stumbling block about “humanitarian visits” to detained citizens has largely been resolved (“Humanitarian visitation rights to be included in cross-Strait agreement,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], May 6, 2014, http://www1. kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14488), and the reciprocal exchange of SEF and ARATS offices is apparently on the brink of realization, even that could be delayed. In our judgment, any extended delay by Beijing would be self-defeating and is unlikely. While it probably will be held off until Zhang Zhijun visits Taiwan (now hoped for by the end of June), failure to announce agreement at that time would convey an extremely negative signal about PRC intentions that runs counter to what Xi and others have been saying. 28 | Across the Taiwan Strait

30 Ti Szu-chia, “Mainland scholar: Student movement could affect cross-Strait relations” (陸學 者：學運可能影響兩岸關係), CNA (domestic), May 17, 2014, http://www.cna.com.tw/news/ acn/201405170234-1.aspx. 31 Chang Ch’ien, “Liu Guoshen: The Green camp must clearly recognize the main direction of cross- Strait relations” (劉國深：綠營應認清兩岸大方向), CNA (domestic), May 19, 2014, http://www. cna.com.tw/news/acn/201405190192-1.aspx. 32 Chang Ch’ien, “Liu Guoshen: Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan is likely to become more meticulous” (劉國深：北京對台政策會更細膩), CNA (domestic), May 19, 2014, http://www.cna.com.tw/ news/acn/201405190175-1.aspx. 33 Alan D. Romberg, “From Generation to Generation: Advancing Cross-Strait Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 43, p. 7, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/ CLM43AR.pdf. 34 “Services pact will not hinder regional integration,” Economic Daily News Commentary, February 14, 2014, translated in Taiwan Today, February 23, 2014, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem =214661&ctNode=1767. 35 Elaine Hou, “Services pact not directly linked to Taiwan’s TPP bid: U.S. official,” CNA, April 21, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404210047.aspx. 36 An economics official in Taiwan pointed out that the PRC is the largest trading partner of six of the twelve countries currently negotiating TPP and the second largest partner of five others. Given that TPP operates by consensus, Beijing’s attitude is obviously of great significance. (Elaine Hou, “Ties with China linked to Taiwan’s TPP bid: official,” CNA, April 24, 2014, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404240015.aspx.) 37 The cultural affairs ministers were having a hard time even getting together. Consistent with what we discussed in the last essay, forms of address beyond the MAC and TAO were not resolved, and this issue reportedly led to the cancellation of a planned meeting between Taiwan’s minister of cultural affairs, Lung Ying-tai, and her PRC counterpart, Cai Wu. (Sabine Chen and Y.F. Low, “Planned cross-Strait culture ministers’ meeting canceled,” CNA, April 10, 2014, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201404100016.aspx.) As we had indicated previously (Romberg, “From Generation to Generation,” endnote 28), Lung had conditioned her visit to the Mainland on being received in an “appropriate status.” That obviously did not work out. As to a cross-Strait agreement on cultural affairs, which we have previously pointed out is something on Beijing’s agenda but not Taipei’s, the Taiwan ministry of culture once again said it was not promoting – and had never promoted – such an agreement. (Cheng Ching-wen, “Ministry of Culture: Never promoted cross-Strait culture agreement” [文化部：從未推動兩岸文 化協議], CNA [domestic], April 20, 2014, http://www.cna.com.tw/news/aedu/201404200250-1. aspx.) 38 “Mainland open to cross-Strait leaders summit: spokeswoman,” Xinhua, April 16, 2014, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/16/c_133267348.htm. 39 On the meeting site, a Taiwan National Security Council official said a meeting in a “third place” is not impossible. But he reiterated Taiwan’s basic principle that Ma should meet Xi in his capacity of president and that the meeting must have a positive effect. Interestingly, the official also revealed that there is an NSC task force that convenes regularly to assess the possibility of a Ma-Xi meeting. (Ho Meng-k’uei, “NSC: If there is no positive result, Ma and Xi need not meet” [國安會：若無正面效應 馬習不必會], Storm Media, March 4, 2014, http://www. stormmediagroup.com/opencms/news/detail/ e131c922-a359-11e3-9f4a-ef2804cba5a1/?uuid=e131c922-a359-11e3-9f4a-ef2804cba5a1.) 40 Zou Liyong, “Green camp public opinion poll,” see endnote 20. While 53.3 percent of respondents supported a Ma-Xi meeting, the poll also showed, however, that a near majority (49 percent) worried that such a meeting would lead to reunification (43.8 percent disagreed). Consistent Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 29

with this result, and with another poll discussed earlier (endnote 4), this poll showed that if the status quo could not be maintained, over two-thirds (67.2 percent) supported founding a new state (as against 20.4 percent who favored unification). Over two-thirds (68.7 percent) also favored moving to independence if the Mainland used force. When respondents were asked about identity, if given the option to choose dual Chinese and Taiwanese identity, 37 percent took that option while 58.2 percent chose Taiwanese only and 2.3 percent opted for Chinese only. But if not given the option of dual identity, 88.4 percent identified themselves as Taiwanese as against 7.7 percent who said they were Chinese. 41 Chris Wang, “Ma-Xi meeting benefits should be clarified: Tsai,” Taipei Times, June 2, 2014, http:// www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/06/02/2003591829. 42 Lauly Li, “Ma eyes APEC as Xi meeting venue,” China Post, May 26, 2014, http://www.chinapost. com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2014/05/26/408646/Ma-eyes.htm. 43 “The President is interviewed by the Japanese Yomiuri Shimbun” (總 統 接 受 日 本《 讀 賣 新 聞 》專 訪), Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), May 31, 2014, http://www.president.gov. tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=32310&rmid=514. 44 “No need to arrange cross-Strait leaders’ meeting at int’l events: spokesman,” Xinhua, May 28, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/28/c_133367945.htm. (The transcript of the TAO press briefing cited by Xinhua is at http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201405/ t20140528_6230440.htm.) 45 Wang Hung-kuo and Lilian Wu, “New Taipei mayor: Taiwan might have overfocused on China,” CNA, April 8, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201404080033.aspx. 46 “Cross-Strait economic integration win-win: Xi,” Xinhua, May 7, 2014, http://english.cri. cn/6909/2014/05/07/2821s825265.htm. 47 Rita Cheng, Tsai Su-jung and Kuo Chung-han, “China wants to enhance dialogue with Taiwan society: Xi Jinping,” CNA, May 7, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201405070040.aspx. 48 Xi’s “four noes” were that the policy of promoting peaceful development of cross-Strait relations will not change; pragmatic measures to boost cross-Strait exchanges, cooperation mutual benefit will not be abandoned; sincere enthusiasm to unite with Taiwan compatriots in common endeavors will not wane; and the firm will to curb Taiwan independence is unshakable. (“Cross-Strait economic integration win-win: Xi,” Xinhua, May 7, 2014, http://english.cri. cn/6909/2014/05/07/2821s825265.htm.) In Chinese they read: “我们推动两岸关系和平发展的 方针政策不会改变，促进两岸交流合作、互利共赢的务实举措不会放弃，团结台湾同胞共 同奋斗的真诚热情不会减弱，制止‘台独’分裂图谋的坚强意志不会动摇.” (“TAO: General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech clearly expresses the fundamental orientation and policies of the Mainland’s Taiwan work” [国台办：习近平总书记讲话表明了大陆对台工作的基本方针政策], Taiwan Affairs Office, May 14, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201405/t20140514_6159895. htm.) 49 In commenting on a poll in Taiwan in the midst of the protest showing that 40 percent of respondents were dissatisfied with the DPP’s alleged indiscriminate hostility against the Mainland, the TAO spokesman equated this attitude to a toxin, saying “Only by eliminating this toxin will the DPP find a way out for future development.” (“Mainland tells DPP to drop hostility,” Xinhua, March 26, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/26/c_133215138. htm.) (In Chinese, “只 有 去 除‘ 逢 大 陆 必 反 ’的 毒 素 ，民 进 党 才 能 找 到 自 身 发 展 的 出 路 ,” Transcript of TAO press briefing, March 26, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201403/ t20140327_5912763.htm.) 50 Qi Xianghui, “DPP caucus proposes ‘Regulations on concluding agreements between Taiwan and China,’ TAO: Absolutely will not permit ‘Taiwan independence’ to destroy cross-Strait relations” ( 民进党党团提“台湾与中国缔结协议处理条例” 国台办：绝不允许“台独”破坏两岸关系), Xinhua, April 3, 2014, http://www.chinesetoday.com/zh/article/864661. 30 | Across the Taiwan Strait

51 Chen Jianxing, “Strait Commentary: Give Taiwan precedence, pursue cross-Strait win-win” ( 海峡时评：对台湾优先 谋两岸双赢), Xinhua, April 11, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ politics/2014-04/11/c_1110211662.htm. Now at http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-04/11/ content_2657702.htm. 52 “President Xi meets Taiwan politician,” Xinhua, April 8, 2013, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/ Headline/201304/t20130409_4055150.htm. 53 Zhang Yong, “CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping meets KMT honorary chairman Wu Poh- hsiung” (中共中央总书记习近平会见中国国民党荣誉主席吴伯雄), June 13, 2014, http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-06/13/c_116137343.htm. 54 Chen Jianxing, “With feelings of sincerity, with rich meaning, inspired by popular sentiment— TAO Director Zhang Zhijun talks about how to understand General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech about Taiwan” (感情真挚、内涵丰富、感召人心—中台办主任张志军谈对 习近平总书记对台重要谈话的理解), Xinhua, February 21, 2013, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/ wyly/201402/t20140221_5713228.htm. 55 “Taiwan not on the same page as Xi Jinping’s ‘family planning.’” WantChinaTimes.com (editorial), May 8, 2014, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1701&MainCatID=17 &id=20140508000017. 56 Zou Liyong, “Su Tseng-chang declares Taiwan independence is a fact, doesn’t want to become one family with China” (蘇貞昌聲稱台獨是事實 不願與中國做一家人), China Review News, March 11, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1030/6/6/9/103066997.html?coluid= 142&kindid=0&docid=103066997&mdate=0311155748. 57 Ibid. 58 Alan D. Romberg, “Striving for New Equilibria,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 41, June 6, 2013, p. 2, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM41AR.pdf. 59 Romberg, “From Generation to Generation.” 60 Lin Kelun, “In cross-Strait relations ‘simmer the stew on a low flame,’ take opportunities as they arise” (兩岸「小火慢燉」 順勢而為), United Daily News (hereafter abbreviated UDN), May 16, 2014, http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0005/258628/web/#3L-4794225L. 61 An article in a PRC-owned Hong Kong newspaper by Mainland analysts similarly sought to explain Xi’s “four noes” statement and the interpretation offered by the TAO as designed to reassure people in Taiwan about the consistency of Mainland policy and to “dispel misgivings of some people on the island” [打消島內某些人的疑慮] over any readjustment. (“Adhere to the trend of the healthy development of cross-Strait relations” [順應潮流讓兩岸關係健康發展], Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, http://news.takungpao.com.hk/paper/q/2014/0517/2481050.html.) 62 “Promote peaceful development to achieve peaceful reunification: Study General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech when meeting with Lien Chan” (促进和平发展 实现和平统一学习 习近平总书记会见连战的重要讲话), Guangming Daily, April 22, 2014, http://cpc.people.com. cn/n/2014/0422/c64387-24925270.html. What attracted some people’s attention at first was that Qiu used a term for talks “on an equal footing” (对等) preferred by Taiwan and that suggests equal status of the interlocutors rather than the term Beijing usually uses (平等), which has a more restricted meaning regarding not the status of the interlocutors but the manner in which those particular talks would be conducted. Some people wondered if this was a precursor to an important conceptual shift in the PRC position on dealing with Taiwan. After consideration, this appeared unlikely, at least in terms of any near-term significance. 63 “TAO Director Zhang Zhijun: Strengthening economic cooperation will benefit compatriots on both sides of the Strait” (国务院台办主任张志军：加强经济合作造福两岸同胞), Hong Kong Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics | 31

Ta Kung Pao (from China Economic Net), April 26, 2014, http://news.takungpao.com/taiwan/ shizheng/2014-04/2442783.html. 64 “Zhang Zhijun: Cross-Strait economic and trade cooperation will not change” (張志 軍 ：兩 岸 經 貿 合 作 不 變 ), China Times, May 23, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/ newspapers/20140523000911-260108. 65 “Mainland hopes for implementation of cross-Strait service trade pact,” Xinhua, April 17, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-04/17/c_133270512.htm. 66 Ni Hongxiang, “Zhang Zhijun: The two sides of the Strait should treasure the correct path of peaceful development” (張志軍：兩岸應珍惜和平發展正確道路), China Review News, April 10, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1031/2/1/7/103121781.html?coluid=1&kindid=0&docid=1031217 81&mdate=0410114155. Readers may recall that this emphasis on the grass roots was a theme from about the time of the 18th Party Congress. (Romberg, “Following the 18th Party Congress: Moving Forward Step- by-Step,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 40, January 2013, p. 11, http://media.hoover.org/sites/ default/files/documents/CLM40AR.pdf). At some point that theme seemed to have faded, but it clearly is now back in vogue. 67 Lawrence Chung, “Beijing to launch Taiwan charm offensive in wake of protests,” South China Morning Post, April 17, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/ 1484896/beijing-launch-taiwan-charm-offensive-wake-protests. 68 Cha Wenye, “Zhang Zhijun: Looking forward to the two sides of the Strait getting closer and more intimate” (张志军：期待两岸越走越近，越走越亲), Xinhua (domestic), March 5, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-03/05/c_119627103.htm. Now at http://big5.gwytb.gov. cn/wyly/201403/t20140305_5775190.htm. 69 “Zhang Zhijun postpones visit to Taiwan indefinitely,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), March 25, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&a num=14275. 70 “Zhang Zhijun: ARATS should conscientiously plan for cross-Strait consultations and negotiations” (张志军：海协会要认真规划两岸协商谈判), Zhong Xin She, May 8, 2014, http://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/2014-05/4990566.html. The agreement on tax issues had been scheduled to be signed at the 10th SEF-ARATS meeting in late February, but was put off. At that meeting, however, agreements were signed on meteorological and seismic monitoring cooperation. (“SEF, ARATS hold cross-Strait talks in Taipei,” Taiwan Today, February 27, 2014, http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=214854&CtNode=414.) 71 “Protest leaders reveal their true identities: Taiwan independence supporters,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), April 8, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=art icle&mnum=112&anum=14353. 72 “Xi’s comments show Mainland’s good faith to Taiwan: spokesman,” Xinhua, May 14, 2014, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-05/14/c_133333548.htm. 73 With Tsai’s backing, the China Affairs Commission adopted a provision calling for “actively seeking public consensus in Taiwan,” setting aside Frank Hsieh’s proposal for support of “constitutional consensus.” (“Tsai emphasizes Taiwan Consensus,” Taiwan News Online, January 10, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2387159.) Tsai also opposed debating all aspects of the policy (as advocated at the time by then-DPP Chair Su Tseng-chang) on the grounds that some aspects were suitable for debate but debate on others could harm flexibility. She said any debate would need to be carefully devised and well planned, striking a balance between DPP core values and political realities, and this would take time. Meanwhile, Tsai advocated that, in the process of finding that balance, there was need to communicate with the Taiwan public and interact with Beijing. (“DPP to hold intraparty debate 32 | Across the Taiwan Strait

on Mainland China policy,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], January 13, 2014, http:// www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13981.) 74 Chris Wang, “Trade pact siege: DPP voices conditional support for service trade pact,” Taipei Times, April 2, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/ 04/02/2003587098. Joseph Wu Jaushieh also stressed this point in a journal interview and in conversations with Americans and others. (Jung-Shin Ho, Kwangyin Liu, “Joseph Wu: We resist China, not free trade,” CommonWealth Magazine, no. 545, April 17, 2014, http://english.cw.com. tw/article/article.action?id=416.) 75 Lin Kelun, “Zhou Zhihuai: DPP-CCP reconciliation has a very, very long way to go” (周志 懷：民共和解 有很長很長的路要走), UDN, May 15, 2014, http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/ PID0005/258628/web/#2L-4794217L. 76 Ibid. 77 Romberg, “From Generation to Generation,” p. 13. 78 “Wait and see, say Chinese scholars on Tsai’s return as DPP head,” WantChinaTimes.com, April 17, 2004, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140417000139& cid=1101.

Chapter Two

Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath

China Leadership Monitor, No. 45 October 21, 2014

While in reality adjusting to an evolving situation both on Taiwan and in cross-Strait relations over the past few months, all parties concerned have sought to portray their approaches as consistent and undisturbed by “some situations” that could have thrown things off course. Whether it was the Mainland recalculating its tactics in the light of the spring “Sunflower Movement” or the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) putting off reconsideration of its policy toward the Mainland until after the November local elections, everyone seemed to see advantage in staying steady on course and avoiding high-profile adjustments. In the absence of reliable indications of where the DPP was heading in its cross-Strait policy Beijing was careful not to commit itself fully to its future policy toward the DPP. However, not only did the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) dismiss assertions that DPP victories in November would lead Beijing to move in the party’s direction and caution that reliance on the mainstay “1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future” would “not work,” but Xi Jinping personally weighed in forcefully reaffirming that “one country, two systems” is the Mainland’s “basic guiding principle” for resolving the Taiwan question and the “best way” to achieve national reunification.

It seemed obvious that the Mainland was surprised, not by the existence of the attitudes and problems that surfaced in the spring, but by the breadth of support in Taiwan for the student-led “Sunflower” protest movement and by the widespread lack of trust and apparent depth of public anxiety about possibly falling into a People’s Republic of China (PRC) reunification trap. As one senior Chinese official put it, problems had arisen in the course of cross-Strait economic exchanges and cooperation that had not been considered or noticed in the past, and Beijing would now pay more attention to the groups that would benefit from such exchanges and cooperation.1 Hence, at least until Xi’s meeting with a pro-unification group from Taiwan in late September, Beijing wrapped itself even more closely around an approach that turned its back on last fall’s emphasis on unification and focused instead on “listening” to various views 34 | Across the Taiwan Strait on the island and reinforcing the argument that “peaceful development” of cross- Strait ties would yield mutual benefits. The Ma administration also promoted an image of continuing progress in cross- Strait negotiations, albeit in the context of concern that political obstructionism in the Legislative Yuan (LY) would deprive Taiwan of the fruits of those negotiations and eventually cause it to lose out to competitors in the Mainland market such as South Korea. Led by its new party chair, Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP continued to duck on issues relating to any change in its cross-Strait policy, reserving its position until after the November local elections. In the meantime, seeking to bolster its position in those elections, the DPP hammered away with its charges of the Ma administration’s inefficiency as well as its lack of competence and inability to inspire trust.

Zhang Zhijun Comes A-calling

PRC State Council TAO Director Zhang Zhijun’s visit to Taiwan June 25–28 was the most important cross-Strait event since spring, reciprocating Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) head Wang Yu-chi’s trip to the Mainland in February. While some people criticized Zhang’s timing because it overlapped with consideration by the LY of controversial cross-Strait issues, there was probably very little choice. His visit had been postponed from spring due to the Sunflower demonstrations, and if it had not been rescheduled soon, the opportunity might have slipped away altogether in the face of Taiwan’s looming November 29 local elections and 2016 presidential and legislative contests. In his travels around the island, the TAO head stopped in New Taipei, Kaohsiung, and Taichung, where he met with the incumbent mayors (including Kaohsiung’s DPP mayor Chen Chu) as well as with local civic and business groups along the way. The most prominent outcome of the visit seemed to be the “institutionalization” of exchanges at the ministerial level, though substantively there was also agreement to discuss further a number of important pending issues.2 Raucous demonstrations against Zhang led to a curtailment of his schedule,3 but in determined fashion he appraised the visit as “successful”4 despite “some situations”5 while official PRC media described the visit as “epoch-making.”6 Beijing described the Sunflower Movement of March and April and those who demonstrated against Zhang in June as representing a “small minority” who wished to derail cross-Strait relations. Nonetheless, it appears that the degree of public support for the student-led Sunflower Movement and the widespread concern expressed about falling into a PRC unification trap caught the Mainland by surprise. Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 35

In this context, Zhang’s spokesman acknowledged that “some new circumstances had emerged” (出 现了一 些 新 情 况).7 Nonetheless, Beijing sought to portray its policy toward Taiwan as consistent and claimed steady progress in cross-Strait dealings. It asserted that it adhered to “four continuities”8 and insisted that numerous reports that various negotiations had been suspended were inaccurate.9 Rather, Beijing asserted, the direction and pace of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations had not changed. Instead of yielding to pessimism, the Mainland reasoned that cooperation was based on mainstream popular sentiment on both sides of the Strait that is supportive of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and during Zhang’s visit the two sides agreed to promote such developments and to “more effectively respond to the expectations of the public on both sides of the Strait”10 Though it tended naturally to stress some of Taipei’s own concerns, the Ma administration’s assessment was generally upbeat as well.11 Still, it was clear that the MAC felt it needed to proceed prudently in ongoing negotiations so as not to create misunderstandings and suspicions among the Taiwan public.12 Certain specific issues of importance were addressed but not resolved during Zhang’s visit. On the long-pending issue of reciprocal establishment of Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) offices, even though the key obstacle of “humanitarian visits” had ostensibly been resolved,13 the most Zhang would say about it was that “On the basis of making reasonable arrangements for the issue of visitations, the two sides will resolve other remaining problems pragmatically and properly and complete their consultations as soon as possible.”14 In August, senior MAC officials described those “remaining problems” as “technical but politically sensitive.”15 But by late September, Taiwan officials were saying that what was really holding things up was PRC unease about the stalemate over adoption of an LY oversight bill.16 It is worth noting, however, yet further delay is possible even after the oversight bill is passed, as DPP officials have been signaling plans to raise specific concerns with aspects of the office exchange agreement once it comes to the LY for approval.17 In a meeting with Taiwan scholars, Zhang was also pressed on an issue that has been raised many times by both the Taipei government and the opposition, namely, why the PRC does not recognize the “reality” of the Republic of China’s (ROC) existence. He deflected the question by saying that Taiwan was not willing to engage in political negotiations, thus leaving several issues unresolved18 and conveying the impression that political talks would lead to a change in Beijing’s position on at least some of those issues. That said, recognizing the existence of the ROC hardly seemed likely to be one of them. 36 | Across the Taiwan Strait

Though the task for now is to implement the studies and other measures agreed upon,19 and he indicated that he has no plan to visit Taiwan again anytime soon, Zhang insisted, “it definitely won’t be my last visit.”20 Meanwhile, there were mixed signals regarding whether Wang Yu-chi would join Taiwan’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting delegation in Beijing in November. When the idea first emerged in the press, it appeared such a meeting would be feasible,21 but later reports indicated Beijing had vetoed Wang’s inclusion in the Taiwan delegation.22 A month before the APEC meeting was to convene the issue was still unresolved.23

Negotiations Resume, but Prospects Remain Clouded

While both governments argued that negotiations were moving ahead in various channels, the fact remained that the cross-Strait services trade agreement (TiSA) remained stuck in the legislature pending approval of an LY oversight bill, which also was not making progress. As if to rebut the reports that various talks were in limbo due to the LY stalemate,24 a new round of commodities talks was held in Taiwan in mid-September after an almost 11-month hiatus. But with indications from the Taiwan side ahead of time that they faced a “very, very big gap,”25 it is not surprising that little progress was made. The two sides talked about the sectors that concerned each the most, but also apparently came away realizing that they needed to learn more about each other’s industrial and product structure, a task characterized by the chief Taiwan negotiator as “time-consuming.”26 Moreover, even if that very complicated negotiation on the handling of thousands of items is concluded soon (and though Taiwan is seeking early signature on the agreement,27 estimates put conclusion likely into 2015 rather than the original end-of-year target date28), it is unclear how that agreement could jump the queue ahead of the oversight bill or, whenever it comes up for LY consideration, how it will fare.

Having learned from the TiSA experience, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs undertook an initiative to promote public understanding of the benefits of the proposed agreement,29 even promising daily updates of negotiations as they are held.30 Meanwhile, Taipei hinted it would try to overcome the challenge posed by the projected early approval of a PRC-Republic of Korea (ROK) Free Trade Agreement (FTA) not by speeding up Taiwan’s own negotiating calendar, but by seeking even more favorable PRC tariff treatment for Taiwan than is being given to Korea.31 Relatedly, in seeming recognition that Taipei could not speed up the TiSA ratification process in the LY (or the merchandise trade negotiations), after what seemed to some people to be an effort by the Mainland to squeeze Taipei into acting faster by arguing Taiwan could lose market share if an FTA with South Korea were signed before the LY acted,32 Beijing backed away from that line of argument. While continuing to state that the “ball” was in Taiwan’s court regarding the merchandise trade pact,33 Beijing Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 37 replaced its warnings about the dire consequences of delay with reassurances that Taiwan would always hold a favored position. Indeed, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Standing Committee Member and chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Yu Zhengsheng, who had raised the issue of Taiwan losing out, now stressed that the Mainland was willing to let “Taiwan compatriots” be the first to share the opportunities opened up by the PRC’s development. He observed that the Mainland has always created active conditions for cooperation among companies on both sides and that this cooperation policy would not change.34 In addition, although Beijing’s chief cross-Strait negotiator said PRC-ROK negotiations were going smoothly and were already 90 percent complete,35 reports on the latest round of talks suggested tough going, so the point may be moot.36 In any case, even if the Beijing-Seoul pact is completed in the near future, Yu Zhengsheng tried to reassure Taiwan visitors that China and South Korea would reduce tariffs only gradually to mitigate its impact on the Mainland’s own economy, and that therefore “this would not go so far as to have a disastrous effect” (不至於會 造成災難性的影響) on Taiwan exports.37 Nonetheless, even though the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ Investment Commission predicted that the annual total of PRC investment in Taiwan in 2014 would approximate the 2013 total,38 uncertainty in the LY situation and with regard to the upcoming elections seemed to be the culprit in an over 25 percent drop in Mainland investment in Taiwan during the first eight months of the year.39 Hinting at some flexibility in the legislature to get things moving, for his part Ma said in late August that he was looking forward to negotiations with the opposition in the LY to push forward the legislative review of the TiSA when the new LY session began in September. What this meant was not clear, and a month into the new session there is no sign of a breakthrough. While DPP chair Tsai Ing-wen sought to lay responsibility for the LY delay at Ma’s feet, primarily due to his “political warfare” against LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng since last September,40 Ma countercharged that the delay was due to DPP obstructionism, challenging the opposition to explain how the largest opposition party could expect to earn people’s confidence if it did not know how to deal with cross-Strait affairs properly.41 Despite the LY situation, the administration was looking for other ways to proceed with cross-Strait activities. It reportedly was giving consideration to breaking out cross-Strait banking sector cooperation from the services trade pact to enable Taiwan banks to operate more freely on the Mainland in the near term, assuming that Beijing agreed.42 Other cross-Strait activities were also proceeding. These included a visit to Taiwan in late August by a TAO deputy director who met with a large number of fishermen and their representatives to talk about how to maintain stability in the price of fish 38 | Across the Taiwan Strait exported to the Mainland as well as a potential plan to jointly establish a large seafood factory. 43 (If these efforts succeed, it would be the first time the two sides will have cooperated in fishery operations.) In terms of how to approach Taiwan’s aspirations for participation in various regional groupings – with a special focus on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) – the way ahead is unclear. So far Beijing has maintained that the Economic Cooperation Framework Agenda (ECFA) agenda must be finished first. On the other hand, the potential for some adjustment was seen by some in the fact that it was agreed during Zhang Zhijun’s visit to Taiwan that the two sides would conduct a “joint study” on the matter. That said, the two sides interpreted the “joint study” agreement differently. As described by Mainland officials, this study was to address appropriate approaches and feasible ways to link cross-Strait cooperation and development to the process of regional economic cooperation.44 However, a Mainland Affairs Council vice minister said that the “so-called ‘joint study’” merely meant that the two sides could discuss the issues concerning cross-Strait economic cooperation and participation in regional economic organizations if the PRC were a member of such an organization, as it is in RCEP; it “absolutely” (絕對) did not mean that Taiwan must conduct a joint study with the Mainland before joining regional economic integration.45 In any case, when asked about the state of play, Taiwan officials reported in mid-August that the TAO had offered no specific work plan and was still doing some research about how the Mainland would approach the study.46 In mid-October a Mainland official confirmed that the joint study had not yet begun.47

Political Issues

Although Wang Yu-chi verified reports that Zhang had proposed political talks during his visit to Taiwan48 (and in a major article in early fall Zhang referred once again to Xi Jinping’s admonition from a year ago that political differences could not be allowed to be passed on from generation to generation49), no doubt even without such talks the PRC will continue its efforts to win hearts and minds. How it will do that is still a work in progress. To some extent the Mainland may have reverted to the view that people in Taiwan really only care about their pocketbooks50 and Beijing seems to have discounted any significant benefit from greater flexibility on such issues as international space. Moreover, although in the view of some seasoned observers Xi is more open-minded than Hu,51 there were instances of retrograde and ham-fisted PRC behavior that reinforced Beijing’s image of small-mindedness. A prominent example was seen at the meeting in Portugal of the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS), Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 39 where the Mainland delegation sought to virtually erase the role of a prominent Taiwan foundation that had been a longtime participant in EASC activities.52 On a more positive note, in August the PRC’s Maritime Search and Rescue Center and Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration carried out a joint search and rescue drill near Matsu Island, the third time they have done this,53 and plans were announced soon after for another such joint exercise in 2016.54 Still, Taipei continued to resist Beijing’s efforts to make common cause on more political maritime issues such as sovereignty questions in the South China Sea.55 All of this was largely overwhelmed by Xi’s statement to a visiting pro-unification delegation from Taiwan that “‘peaceful reunification, one country, two systems’ is the Mainland’s guiding principle for resolving the Taiwan question and the best way to achieve national reunification” (“和 平 统 一 、一 国 两 制 ” 是我们解决台湾问题的 基本方针, 我们认为, 这也是实现国家统一的 最佳方式).56 This formulation has consistently been rejected across the political spectrum in Taiwan, and although Xi sought to soften the point by saying that the Mainland would take into account Taiwan’s history and circumstances57 – and perhaps in time one might learn what he has in mind – it had no impact on the negative reaction to his statement in Taiwan. If anything, his resurrection of the linkage stressed last fall between peaceful development and peaceful reunification only intensified the reaction.58 Finally, the turmoil that almost immediately afterward broke out in Hong Kong over implementation there of “one country, two systems” only served to drive yet another nail into the coffin of the that approach in the minds of people in Taiwan. Even before the recent demonstrations in Hong Kong, the attitudes of people in Taiwan were reinforced by the PRC State Council White Paper on the practice of “one country, two systems” in the former British colony. That paper sternly reminded readers that China’s central government asserts comprehensive jurisdiction over all local administrative regions and that there is no such thing as “residual power.”59 And as if to make sure no one missed the relevance of Beijing’s attitude regarding center-local relations to cross-Strait relations, the day after the White Paper was issued, in a response to Tainan Mayor William Lai Ching-teh’s argument to a Shanghai audience that Taiwan’s future must be decided by Taiwan’s people, the TAO reiterated the Mainland’s long-standing position that the island’s future must be decided by “all the people” of China, “including” the people of Taiwan. Predictably this statement met with a universally hostile response in Taiwan.60 Still, Beijing did make various efforts to improve its understanding of Taiwan and its image there. In addition to Zhang Zhijun’s visit, other senior visitors pursued agendas guided by the new emphasis on better understanding the thoughts and sentiments of the “three middles and one young” (三中一青), i.e., the grassroots in Taiwan, 40 | Across the Taiwan Strait including small and medium enterprises, the middle and lower classes, the common people in central and southern Taiwan, and the youth.61 This was an important focus of ARATS Vice President Sun Yafu’s agenda when he traveled to Taiwan in mid-June, where his agenda included conversations with Taiwan independence advocates Koo Kuan-min and Wu Rong-yi at the Taiwan Brain Trust.62 In that exchange, Sun pushed hard on the PRC’s commitment to promoting cross- Strait peaceful development and continuing to adopt effective measures to advance cross-Strait interactions.63 Although he predicted that deeper problems were inevitable and stressed, therefore, the necessity that people on both sides “give each other more understanding, respect and consideration from the perspective of one family,” Yu Zhengsheng adopted a similar line. Yu reaffirmed the concept of putting people first as well as seeking benefits for them as the starting point and foundation of Taiwan policy.64 The possibility of a summit meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping at the APEC leaders meeting in Beijing in November was finally put to bed with Ma’s appointment of former Vice President Vincent Siew to represent him.65 But the question of such a meeting at a different venue continued to attract attention. In part this was because Ma had on several occasions expressed his interest in a meeting with Xi, frequently reiterating, “we will not give up [on holding a summit] if given a chance, but we will not push for it if conditions are not ripe.”66 Such a meeting would help lay an important foundation for future cross-Strait dealings, he has argued.67 The PRC’s interest in a Xi-Ma meeting has also been evident in stories about possible “creative” approaches by Beijing regarding venue even going beyond the “conventional” idea of a meeting in Singapore.68 In light of all of this, rumors continued to circulate about the possibility that quiet cross-Strait discussions of the issue were going on at some level. But no obvious solutions to the questions of venue, titles, and agenda69 were evident, while public opinion in Taiwan seemed to be cooling on the idea.70 The DPP, unsurprisingly, voiced concern over a secret deal for a Ma-Xi meeting designed to advance Ma’s political agenda and demanded a full public accounting.71 DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen called on the Ma administration to allow the LY to oversee the process of arranging such a meeting as well as to allow the public to follow the discussions and negotiations that would take place during such a meeting.72 To what extent this issue will get tied up with the ouster of the deputy head of MAC and SEF, Chang Hsien-yao, based on possible charges of leaking information to Beijing – or even spying on behalf of the PRC – remains to be seen. At this writing, as voices in Taiwan, primarily from the DPP, are calling for a suspension of all negotiations with the Mainland and a review of agreements already reached, both Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 41 the Ma administration and the PRC have sought to downplay the significance of the Chang case. Beijing declined to comment on the matter at all for over three weeks other than asking for clarification from the MAC about what was going on and how it would affect future interactions73 while also expressing the hope that the Taiwan media would not make “irresponsible and unfounded” conjecture on the issue.74 TAO head Zhang Zhijun finally did make a minimal statement in early September, saying he hoped that cross-Strait peaceful developments would not stagnate over a “recent isolated case.”75 In any case, while this matter has severely roiled the waters in Taiwan in recent weeks, we are not going to try either to detail the controversy here or speculate on its implications. Presumably we will have greater clarity on the matter by the time of the next CLM essay.

DPP Goes on the Offensive against Ma, Ducks on Cross-Strait Policy

In her resumed role as DPP chair, spearheading the local election campaign for late November, Tsai Ing-wen has engaged in a relentless attack on the Ma administration’s capabilities and performance. At the party’s national congress in late July she proclaimed: “The time for change has arrived…This year, 2014, will be the year when change comes to Taiwan…The 2014 elections will mark the beginning of the transformation of Taiwan’s politics.76 But despite the intensity of the campaign, and the advantage that DPP or DPP- backed candidates seem to enjoy in specific local constituencies in the run-up to the November municipal election, polls did not immediately reflect a major shift in overall public attitudes, and some media commentators cautioned against any assumptions about a major shift in power.77

In the course of the discussion, Tsai continued to deflect consideration of the party’s cross-Strait policy until a more propitious moment, presumably after the November elections and perhaps even further until after, as she clearly hopes, she locks up the DPP presidential nomination. In that regard, although the issue of “freezing” the DPP 1991 “Taiwan independence” plank is the subject of sharply disparate views within the party at this point, which is one reason Tsai wants to put off addressing it,78 it is the most likely area where the party might in due course show some flexibility. This is especially so since a strong majority of the public seems to support the idea.79 However, despite her overall approach of pragmatism toward relations across the Strait,80 of which an eventual “freeze” could be a part, Tsai’s expressed confidence that the Mainland would “shift in the direction” of the DPP if it won a substantial victory in November81 was rebuffed by Beijing both publicly and privately. 42 | Across the Taiwan Strait

Publicly, a TAO spokesman responded to Tsai’s statement with familiar formulas that there would not be the slightest compromise in opposition to Taiwan independence “splittist” plots.82 Privately one senior official asked rhetorically what basis there might be for Tsai’s statement about a PRC shift.83 In the wake of the party’s non-action on the freeze proposal at its July 20 national congress, the TAO spokesman went further. Addressing the familiar Mainland requirement that the DPP has to give up its “Taiwan independence” advocacy of “one country on each side” [of the Strait], he observed that even if the 1991 plank were frozen and the party tried to base cross-Strait relations instead on the 1999 Kaohsiung Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, “that would not work” (行不通).84 Although the logic of this rebuff is not new, Beijing rarely if ever has been that direct in rejecting the 1999 resolution before. The Mainland seems genuinely to be asking itself whether the DPP is holding to its cross-Strait line simply as part of its effort to resume office or instead is seeking to position things to eventually achieve Taiwan independence. Whatever judgment people might make, all of this led one senior Mainland expert on Taiwan to argue that the DPP remains the biggest obstacle to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. He cited the party’s obstructionism in the legislature and its position on Taiwan independence as still being a “real threat” (現實威脅).85 He also said that if Tsai Ing-wen does not intend, or is not able, to adjust the party’s Mainland policy, then the Mainland “should not harbor any illusions about the DPP” (不應該對民 進黨抱有幻想). Freezing the Taiwan independence plank would be an important indicator regarding reconciliation between the DPP and CCP, he said, but it would not be the only indicator. In a judgment reminiscent of how Beijing approached Chen Shui-bian when he was first elected, this expert said that the CCP will not only listen to what the DPP says but, “more important” (更重要), it will watch what it does. 86

While there have been obvious signs of different points of emphasis and even discontent within the DPP,87 most senior DPP stalwarts have stood by Tsai’s approach. When Tainan Mayor Lai visited the Mainland for the first time in early June, he generally echoed Tsai’s positions. Arguing for greater cross-Strait cooperation rather than confrontation,88 Lai pointed out to his Mainland interlocutors that the call for independence preceded the DPP’s formation and that altering the DPP’s 1991 “independence party platform” would not help reconcile differences.89 Rather, he argued, the pro-independence narrative represents the idea of many in Taiwan and further understanding about the spirit of the platform is needed on the PRC’s part if it wishes to forge stronger ties between the sides.90 At the same time, Lai reiterated a position adopted by the party some years ago, that while the DPP advocates independence for Taiwan it would respect the decision of the people of Taiwan with regard to Taiwan’s future.91 Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 43

The TAO responded to Lai stating, “we welcome all Taiwan compatriots equally no matter what he or she advocated in the past, as long as he or she currently favors, supports and participates in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.” 92 But, the spokeswoman reiterated, the Mainland’s opposition to the “Taiwan independence separatist conspiracy” is clear, consistent, firm, and unshakable. On the other hand, after his return to Tainan, Lai also urged moderation within the party, saying that if DPP members insist on focusing on tensions between the two sides, the party could find it difficult to make headway in cross-Strait ties.93 Moreover, DPP gadfly Julian Kuo Cheng-liang pointed out that DPP local officials such as Lai and Chen Chu had a different stand from Tsai Ing-wen with respect to such issues as Free Economic Pilot Zones (FEPZs). The mayors, he explained, were by and large receptive to the FEPZ program, whereas Tsai publicly opposed it.94 In general, Tsai and the DPP took a position that welcomed cross-Strait exchanges, but “without preconditions.”95 She told a foreign audience in Taipei that the party’s engagement with the Mainland “will be consistent, responsible, and predictable” (將 會是具一致性、負責任、 可預測的).96 Since it is well known that the PRC will deal with individual DPP leaders but not with the party unless it embraces “one China” and abandons “Taiwan independence,” the call for “no preconditions” and the effort to project a position of reasonableness without accepting some form of “one China” would seem to fall rather short of what Beijing is calling for. Overall, of course, however the party eventually positions itself on cross-Strait policy (which we will talk about more in future essays), the DPP has tried to treat that policy as “just one of” the major issues facing Taiwan.97 That said, when Tsai has criticized Ma for overemphasizing ties with the Mainland as opposed to diversifying Taiwan’s economic relations with the region (a widely endorsed goal), she appears to have put principled considerations ahead of practical ones. That is to say, voters might respond to the DPP’s criticism of the Ma administration’s domestic economic policies and performance as well as aspects of various cross-Strait agreements negotiated in recent years. However, while Tsai’s argument that cross-Strait relations must be “synchronized with Taiwan’s integration into regional economic activity” (同步融 入區域經濟的整合), including TPP, RCEP, and bilateral trade accords,98 may be reasonable in theory and desirable as a matter of policy, in practice it would seem to give short shrift to a critical reality: Beijing has a potentially very large role in determining whether any of those efforts at diversification will succeed. One example of where Beijing has demonstrated its willingness to throw its weight around in this regard was the recent public statement by the PRC ambassador to Malaysia directly opposing a Malaysia-Taiwan FTA.99 Moreover, Taiwan’s economic affairs minister indicated quite recently that the Mainland has obstructed economic and trade talks with more than one partner who earlier had been willing to proceed.100 44 | Across the Taiwan Strait

The Ma administration has, of course, also sought to promote market diversification101 and it has adopted the position that it need not – and cannot – depend only on Beijing’s agreement. Further, it has argued, along with the DPP, that it is critical for the United States, Japan, and others to support Taiwan’s participation in international arrangements. Indeed, on substantive grounds there is every reason to maintain that when Taiwan qualifies, Washington, Tokyo, and others should express their backing in order to help create a positive international climate. Nonetheless, while the Ma administration does not accept that Taiwan needs the PRC’s “consent” to sign agreements,102 in acknowledging that one of the most important reasons to complete the ECFA agenda is to gain Beijing’s support for broader Taiwan economic and trade diversification, it has implicitly recognized the reality of Beijing’s sway over many of Taiwan’s trading partners.103 Meanwhile, although Taiwan’s economy is growing reasonably well (most predictions for 2014 GDP growth now center somewhere around 3.5 percent or even higher) and unemployment has dipped slightly below 4 percent, public opinion remains generally downbeat about the economy as well as much else. With the local elections only weeks away,104 one might normally assume this negative attitude would redound to the benefit of the “out-of-power” party. In fact, however, as suggested earlier, recent polling shows a general dissatisfaction with both major parties.105 As a result, party identification according to two major polls is pretty even.106 While that parity represents a slide over time for the KMT and the Blue camp, the fact is that the DPP and the Green camp have not substantially benefited. Some relatively short-term factors could enter in to tilt the election decisively in one direction or another, as the Taiwan electorate has been known to shift suddenly in response to major events. But that is not true of all events, even major ones. As an example of the latter, while the tragic gas explosion in Kaohsiung at the end of July resulted in a lot of finger pointing regarding who was responsible, and while it will hopefully lead to some reforms with respect to laying and monitoring of pipelines in the future, it is unlikely to have a major impact on either the Kaohsiung mayoral election or the broader the political scene. Perhaps more fundamental is a question of who can attract the youth vote. Both sides are working hard to corral it,107 and both may succeed to some extent. But the leaders of the Sunflower Movement, while obviously opposed to the Ma administration, have also expressed dissatisfaction with the DPP.108 So, while the effort to woo young people might matter in terms of political participation in the long run, whether it will have a short-term impact is not obvious. Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 45

Notes

1 Wang Zongming, “Sun Yafu delivers a speech in Taipei: peaceful development will not be interrupted” (孫亞夫臺北演講：和平發展不能中斷), China Review News, August 7, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&do cid=103327054. 2 Wang Yao: “Zhang Zhijun, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, on results of his visit to Taiwan and on his impression of Taiwan; Cross-Strait ties advance an important step, interview” (国台办主任张志军谈访台成果与体会, 两岸关系迈出重要一步), People’s Daily, July 1, 2014, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0701/c83083-25222725.html. As translated by Open Source Center (OSC, CHO2014070142396130), the items of consensus reached between the two sides included: Continue to deepen cross-Strait economic cooperation and promote the ECFA’s follow-up negotiation process and initiate joint study work as soon as possible; discuss in a pragmatic manner proper methods and feasible ways on the convergence between cross-Strait common development and regional economic cooperation process; make continued consultations on mutual setting up of representative offices between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation; pragmatically and properly resolve other leftover problems and complete consultations at an early date on the basis of making reasonable arrangements for visitation problems; continue to push for the study and resolution of mainland tourists’ transit problem in Taiwan and of facilitating the exchange of visits between the compatriots on the two sides of the Strait; support relevant authorities of the two sides of the Strait to conduct timely communication through proper channels; continue to jointly cultivate the cross-Strait tourism market, strive to maintain tourism quality, and promote the healthy, orderly, and sustainable development of cross-Strait tourism; support relevant authorities on the two sides of the Strait to appropriately expand non-group tours of mainland citizens to Taiwan; continue to expand and deepen exchanges and cooperation in culture, education, science, and technology between the two sides of the Strait; promote exchanges in news media between the two sides of the Strait; vigorously support and carry out exchanges of visits between grassroots people and between youths and students between the two sides of the Strait. In the next step, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council will continue to maintain communication and contact, and gradually push for implementation of the agreed items through appropriate channels. 3 Scarlett Chai, Wu Tzer-hao, and Lilian Wu, “Chinese official cancels last stop due to security concerns,” Central News Agency (CNA), June 28, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ acs/201406280012.aspx. 4 Rita Cheng and Elizabeth Hsu, “Zhang describes his Taiwan trip as ‘a successful visit,’” CNA, June 29, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406290015.aspx. 5 “Bloody protest erupts as Chinese minister visits Kaohsiung,” Taiwan News Online, June 27, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2514790. 6 “Mainland’s Taiwan affairs chief concludes epochmaking island visit,” Xinhua, June 29, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/867927.shtml. 7 Chen Binhua and Liu Gang, “Taiwan Affairs Office: Zhang Zhijun and Wang Yu-chi reach positive consensus at second meeting” (国台办：张志军与王郁琦第二次会面达成积极共识), Net Ease, June 25, 2014, http://news.163.com/14/0625/19/9VK1F9N600014JB5.html. 8 The “four continuities” were: 1) The Mainland will continue to push forward cross-Strait economic interactions and cooperation; 2) The Mainland will continue to promote healthy and orderly development of Mainland tourists visiting Taiwan; 3) The Mainland will continue 46 | Across the Taiwan Strait

comprehensive interactions with the grassroots in Taiwan; and 4) The Mainland will continue to provide facilities for cross-Strait interactions and exchanges of personnel. (“Sun Yafu: Xi Could Come to Taiwan First,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], June 16, 2014, http://www1. kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14669.) 9 Huang Boning, “Fan Liching: Reports on ‘suspension’ of cross-Strait negotiations are inaccurate” (范麗青：有關暫停兩岸協商消息不準確), China Review News, June 11, 2014, http://hk.crntt. com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=103232921. 10 Chen Binhua and Liu Gang, “Taiwan Affairs Office: Zhang Zhijun and Wang Yu-chi reach positive consensus.” 11 “MAC press release on Zhang visit to Taiwan,” June 25, 2014, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem =109410&ctNode=6337&mp=3 12 Private conversations. 13 Alan D. Romberg, “Sunshine heats up Taiwan politics, affects PRC tactics,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 44, July 28, 2014, p. 14, endnote 29, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/ research/docs/clm44ar-201408.pdf. 14 “在就探視問題作出合情合理安排基礎上，務實妥善解決其他遺留問題，盡早完成協商.,” Lan Hsiao-wei, “Zhang Zhijun: To understand Taiwan, you must grasp the inner society” (張 志軍：了解台灣 須掌握隱性社會), China Times, July 1, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/ newspapers/20140701000372-260102. 15 Private conversation. 16 Ch’ou P’ei-fen, “With the failure to pass the oversight bill, the reciprocal establishment of offices is stuck” (兩岸監督條例不過 卡死互設辦事機構), Storm Media, September 25, 2014, http://www.stormmediagroup.com/opencms/investigate/detail/5ef743fe-43fc-11e4-88c5- ef2804cba5a1/?uuid=5ef743fe-43fc-11e4-88c5-ef2804cba5a1. 17 Private conversation. 18 “Zhang Zhijun: Several issues unsolved as Taiwan shuns political negotiations,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), June 27, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/ page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14739. 19 During his visit to the United States in September, Zhang explained the three principal tasks in the coming phase of the Mainland’s Taiwan work. The first, he said, was to continue efforts to strengthen and consolidate mutual political trust across the Strait and to make sure that the momentum of peaceful development was not interfered with or disrupted. Second, the Mainland would continue to promote cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation to make sure that people benefit from peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and develop an even more solid foundation and powerful driving force for peaceful development. That would include follow-up talks on the ECFA agenda, allowing Mainland travelers to transit through Taiwan en route to other destinations, the exchange of representative offices, and a “joint study by the two sides on connecting simultaneous economic development across the Strait to Taiwan’s participation in regional integration” (共同研究两岸经济共同发展和台湾参与区域经济整合相衔接). Third, the Mainland would continue to fight against “Taiwan independence” and to eliminate the “negative factors” (消极因素) that disrupt peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and exchanges and cooperation. (“Zhang Zhijun talks about his visit to the United States: strengthen mutual trust in peaceful development of cross-Strait relations” (张 志 军 谈 访 美 之 行 ：增 强 对 两 岸关系和平发展信心), China Review News, September 7, 2014, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/ la/201409/t20140907_7247662.htm.) It was later reported that Zhang had said that while the Mainland would study the possibility of allowing PRC travelers to transit Taiwan en route to third destinations, because this would require passport examination and hence constitute a “political issue,” for the sake of equity Taiwan should Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 47

abolish Taiwan Strait mid-line restrictions. The MAC responded that allowing transit stops is a practice of ordinary air transport and travelers would not “enter” Taiwan, implicitly rejecting Zhang’s demand. (Lan Hsiao-wei, “In order for Mainland travelers to change planes [in Taiwan], Taiwan must revoke the Taiwan Strait mid-line” [陸客中轉 台須開放海峽中線], China Times, September 9, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140909000388-260108.) 20 “TAO’s Zhang concludes historic visit to Taiwan,” China Post, June 29, 2014, http://www. chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2014/06/29/411196/TAOs-Zhang.htm. 21 Tony Liao and Y.F. Low, “Cross-Strait affairs chiefs of Taiwan, China may meet at APEC,” CNA, September 3, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201409040012.aspx. 22 Huang P’ei-chun and Wang Meng-lun, “China rejects ‘national’ development council, Kuan Chung-ming cannot attend APEC” (中國拒「國」發會 管中閔不能出席APEC), Liberty Times, September 26, 2014, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/816552. It should be noted that a few days earlier Wang Yu-chi had indicated there might be an issue about his attendance as well, though he attributed it to considerations on the Taiwan side. (Chou Yi-ling, “Wang-Zhang meeting at APEC, Wang Yu-chi: Still needs to be discussed thoroughly” [APEC王張會 王郁琦： 還要研議],” CNA [domestic], September 22, 2014, http://www.cna.com.tw/search/hydetailws. aspx?qid=201409220045&q=APEC.) 23 Ying Jun-jie and Maubo Chang, “No word yet on meeting between chiefs of cross-Strait affairs: MAC,” CNA, October 8, 2014. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201410080040.aspx. 24 Yang Wen-chi and Lin An-ni, “Mainland suspends all negotiations; President’s Office and the government seek remedy” (兩岸各項協商中斷 府院謀求補救), Economic Daily, June 9, 2014, accessed June 9 at http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT4/8728131.shtml?ch=rss_endpopular, currently available at http://www.fyjs.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=1053561. According to this article, the negotiations that were suspended included the commodities trade agreement and an agreement on a dispute resolution mechanism (both ECFA follow-on accords), plus agreements on airline schedules, sightseeing, sea transportation, and postal services. 25 Huang Chiao-wen and Christie Chen, “Groups protest Taiwan-China trade-in-goods talks,” CNA, September 10, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201409100017.aspx. 26 Milly Lin and Lilian Wu, “Taiwan, China conclude latest round of trade talks,” CNA, September 12, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201409120030.aspx. According to Taiwan’s chief negotiator, Yang Jen-ni, director-general of the Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan’s concerns focused on the four key sectors of autos, petrochemicals, flat panels, and machine tools, while the PRC was more concerned about “old economy sectors” such as textiles, garments, and shoes. It was also reported that the Mainland demanded that Taiwan open its market to 830 kinds of agricultural products and primary industrial goods, whereas the Taiwan negotiators said they would continue to give priority to Taiwan’s agricultural development and the interests of Taiwan farmers. While they said that they would therefore continue to ban Chinese agricultural products that may have food safety concerns or affect Taiwan farmers’ interests, it was unclear whether Taiwan would allow an increase of certain agricultural products on an ad hoc basis. (Liu Li-shan, “Tariff reductions on the four big industrial products in the commodities trade talks will be discussed again next time” (貨貿談判四大產業降稅 下回再議), UDN, September 12, 2014, http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN5/8930839.shtml.) In any event, a PRC commerce ministry spokesman concluded after the latest round of talks that whether the commodities trade agreement could be completed before the PRC-ROK FTA would be determined by the willingness of what he called “high-echelon officials” on both sides of the Strait to make concessions and to open their markets on “an equal footing.” (“Mainland official: Disparity in market liberalization stalls cross-Strait MTA,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], September 17, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=11 2&anum=15144.) 48 | Across the Taiwan Strait

27 Milly Lin and Elaine Hou, “Taiwan seeks early signing of goods agreement with China: official,” CNA, August 25, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201408250028.aspx. 28 Huang Chiao-wen and Y.F. Low, “Trade-in-goods pact with China unlikely this year: official,” CNA, June 9, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406090011.aspx. 29 “MOEA steps up communication on goods pact,” Taiwan Today, September 17, 2014, http://www. taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=221731&ctNode=445. 30 “Economics Minister promises to disclose trade talk details,” Taiwan News Online, September 22, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2577463. 31 Lin Meng-ju and Y.F. Low, “Taiwan adjusting strategy for trade talks with China,” CNA, July 4, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201407040014.aspx. 32 “Yu Zhengsheng on STA: Mainland has to move on,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), July 8, 2014. http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx ?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14786. According to this account, Yu brought up the TiSA with a visiting Taiwan General Chamber of Commerce delegation, implicitly pointing to the pending PRC FTA with South Korea and arguing that the Mainland would not deliberately delay concluding various “other” bilateral trade accords and agreements while waiting for Taiwan to ratify the TiSA. As he put it, China “cannot move too slowly.” In this same timeframe, PRC Vice Minister of Commerce Gao Yan was quoted as saying that it would be “a pity” if PRC-ROK agreement came first and Taiwan lost its edge and started to lag behind. (John Liu, “Taiwan trade talks still on table: MOC vice minister,” China Post, July 9, 2014, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/ taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2014/07/09/411959/Taiwan-trade.htm.) According to some estimates, a PRC-ROK FTA could affect as much as 20 or 25 percent of Taiwan’s exports to the Mainland, resulting in a loss of 5 percent of its market share. (Huang Chiao-wen and Y.F. Low, “Merchandise trade deal with China unlikely this year: minister,” http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201408200012.aspx.) 33 Scarlet Chai and Lilian Wu, “‘Ball in Taiwan’s court’ on trade-in-goods pact: Chinese official,” CNA, September 4, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201409040038.aspx. 34 “Let Taiwanese first share the Mainland’s development: official,” Xinhua, August 18, 2014, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-08/18/c_133566326.htm. 35 Scarlet Chai and Lilian Wu, “‘Ball in Taiwan’s court’ on trade-in-goods pact: Chinese official,” CNA, September 4, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201409040038.aspx. 36 Kim Ji-Yoon, “Korea-China FTA talks end with little progress,” JoongAng Daily, September 27, 2014, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2995388&cloc=joongang daily. 37 Lan Hsiao-wei and Luo Yin, “Yu Zhengsheng tells Taiwan businessmen seeking national treatment that it will be gradually implemented” (台商享國民待遇 俞正聲： 逐步推進), China Times, August 19, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140819000736-260110. 38 Liu Ching-yu, “Effect of opposition to the services trade agreement? Mainland investment in Taiwan drops over 25%” (反服貿效應？陸資來台降逾25％), China Times, September 23, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140923000095-260203. 39 Milly Lin and Lilian Wu, “China’s investments in Taiwan drop by 25 percent,” CNA, September 22, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201409220034.aspx. 40 John Liu, “DPP is responsible for Legislature impasse: Chen,” China Post, August 31, 2014, http:// www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2014/08/31/416175/DPP-is.htm. 41 Claudia Liu and Y.F. Low, “President hoping for legislative review of China services trade pact,” CNA, August 30, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201408300023.aspx. Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 49

42 Huang Chiao-wen, Yin Chun-chieh, and Elaine Hou, “Taiwan mulling separating banking sector from China services pact,” CNA, August 19, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201408190031. aspx. Also, Ch’iu Chin-lan, “Financial Supervisory Commission reconsiders…four financial activities could be delinked from TiSA” (金管會盤點…四金融項目 拚與服貿脫鉤), Economic Daily, September 1, 2014, http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0008/264662/web/#2L-5125469L. 43 “TAO deputy director visits Taiwan,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), August 28, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=15050. 44 “Sun Yafu gives a speech in Taipei, Peaceful development cannot be disrupted” (孫亞夫臺北演 講 ：和 平 發 展 不 能 中 斷 ), China Review News, August 7, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/ doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=103327054. 45 “MAC: Joint study by two sides of Strait will help Taiwan join RCEP (Interview)” (陸委 會：兩岸共同研究 有助台入RCEP, 時間), RTI, August 7, 2014, https://tw.news.yahoo. com/%E9%99%B8%E5%A7%94%E6%9C%83-%E5%85%A9%E5%B2%B8%E5%85%B1%E5 %90%8C%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6-%E6%9C%89%E5%8A%A9%E5%8F%B0%E5%85%A5r cep-061500092.html. 46 Private conversation. 47 Private conversation. 48 Wang Ch’ao-yu and Li Ming-tsung, “Regarding political talks, Wang Yu-chi says the time is not ripe” (政治談判 王郁琦：時機不成熟), CNA (domestic), July 1, 2014, http://www.cna.com.tw/ news/aipl/201406300352-1.aspx. 49 “Striving to advance the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations is an unstoppable historic trend—studying the important remarks of General Secretary Xi Jinping regarding work related to Taiwan” (努力推动两岸关系和平发展成为不可阻挡的历史潮流—学习习近平总书记 关于对台工作 的重要论述) Qiu Shi, September 12, 2014, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/ qs/201409/11/c_1112445496.htm. 50 Rita Cheng and Elizabeth Hsu, “Zhang describes his Taiwan trip as ‘a successful visit.’” Zhang was cited as having told visiting Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin in Beijing after the TAO chief’s return to the Mainland that he sensed most people in Taiwan at the grassroots do not like talking politics but care more about economic problems, so future development of cross-Strait ties should concentrate on economic issues and practical people-to-people exchanges. 51 Lin Shu-yuan and Lilian Wu, “China’s policy toward Taiwan has changed under Xi: ex-security official,” CNA, June 15, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406250024.aspx. 52 The essence of the matter is that a senior (vice minister-level) PRC official disrupted the meeting of the European Association for Chinese Studies (EACS) in Portugal in July by seeking the removal material relating to long-time sponsor of the event the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation and of references to an exhibition and donation of books by the Taiwan National Central Library. The President of EACS posted a letter of protest following the event that read in part: “Under no circumstances will the EACS ever bow to demands to censor the contents of conference materials that its members have themselves funded, in this case its Conference Programme, by, for example, altering the text provided by its long-term sponsor the CCKF, or by deleting mention of the exhibition and donation of books by the Taiwan National Central Library, or by the deletion of any other information that conference organizers deem relevant to include. “Such interference in the internal organization of the international conference of an independent and democratically organized non-profitable academic organization is totally unacceptable. It cannot and will never be tolerated by the EACS.” (EACS website, http://chinesestudies.eu/?p=585) A detailed report of the incident was also posted on the EACS website at http://chinesestudies. eu/?p=584. 50 | Across the Taiwan Strait

53 Liu Chien-pang and Lilian Wu, “Taiwan, China conduct joint maritime rescue drill in Taiwan Strait,” CNA, August 7, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201408070025.aspx. 54 Jason Pan, “Coast Guard plans Taiwan-China sea exercises in 2016,” Taipei Times, October 5, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/10/05/2003601339. 55 Chang Kuo-wei, “Foreign ministry rules out cross-Strait cooperation in territorial claims in the South China Sea” (聲索南海 外交部稱兩岸不會合作), China Times, September 19, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140919000949-260301. On the other hand, they did cooperate in the rescue of a PRC fishing crew in distress near the Diaoyu islands. (Chang Kuo-wei, “Government ships cooperate for the first time in the area of Diaoyu Island” [兩岸 公務船 首在釣島海域合作], China Times, September 21, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/ newspapers/20140921000728-260301.) 56 Zhao Bo and Xu Xueyi, “General Secretary Xi Jinping Meets with Taiwan Peaceful Reunification Groups” (习近平总书记会见台湾和平统一团体联合参访团), Xinhuanet, September 26, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/26/c_1112641354.htm. 57 “一国两制” 在台湾的具体实现形式会充分考虑台湾现实情况，充分吸收两岸各界意见和建 议， 是能充分照顾到台湾同胞利益的安排. 58 Xi said: “The peaceful development of cross-Strait relations is the correct path leading to peaceful reunification.” (两岸关系和平发展是通向和平统一的正确道路). Zhao Bo and Xu Xueyi, “General Secretary Xi Jinping Meets with Taiwan Peaceful Reunification Groups.” 59 Text of the June 10, 2014, State Council Information Office White Paper (“Full text: The practice of the ‘one country, two systems’ policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region [HKSAR]”) is available in English at http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/ node_7207387.htm.) To get the full flavor of this point, and its likely impact in Taiwan, it is worth reviewing in full the point made in the White Paper: Fully and Accurately Understanding the Meaning of “One Country, Two Systems” “One country, two systems” is a holistic concept. The “one country” means that within the PRC, HKSAR is an inseparable part and a local administrative region directly under China’s Central People’s Government. As a unitary state, China’s central government has comprehensive jurisdiction over all local administrative regions, including the HKSAR. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is not an inherent power, but one that comes solely from the authorization by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of the HKSAR is not full autonomy, nor a decentralized power. It is the power to run local affairs as authorized by the central leadership. The high degree of autonomy of HKSAR is subject to the level of the central leadership’s authorization. There is no such thing called “residual power.” With China’s Constitution stipulating in clear-cut terms that the country follows a fundamental system of socialism, the basic system, core leadership and guiding thought of the “one country” have been explicitly provided for. The most important thing to do in upholding the “one country” principle is to maintain China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and respect the country’s fundamental system and other systems and principles. The “two systems” means that, within the “one country” the main body of the country practices socialism, while Hong Kong and some other regions practice capitalism. The “one country” is the premise and basis of the “two systems,” and the “two systems” is subordinate to and derived from “one country.” But the “two systems” under the “one country” are not on a par with each other. The fact that the mainland, the main body of the country, embraces socialism will not change. With that as the premise, and taking into account the history of Hong Kong and some other regions, capitalism is allowed to stay on a long-term basis. Therefore, a socialist system by the mainland is Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 51

the prerequisite and guarantee for Hong Kong’s practicing capitalism and maintaining its stability and prosperity. For Hong Kong to retain its capitalist system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy with “Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong” according to the Basic Law, it must fully respect the socialist system practiced on the mainland in keeping with the “one country” principle and, in particular, the political system and other systems and principles in practice. The mainland should respect and tolerate the capitalism embraced by Hong Kong while upholding its socialist system, and draw on the successful experience of Hong Kong in economic development and social management. Only by respecting and learning from each other can the “two systems” in the “one country” coexist harmoniously and achieve common development. 60 “Transcript of the TAO Press Conference,” June 11, 2011, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn /xwfbh/201406/t20140611_6301692.htm. The full text of the statement read: 我们对民进党的政 策是明确的、一贯的。我们反对“台独”分裂图谋的立场是坚定的、不可动摇的。我们多次讲 过，对于台湾人士，无论是谁，以前有过什么主张，只要现在赞成、支持和参与两岸关系和平 发展，愿意到大陆来交流访问，我们都乐观其成。我还要强调，大陆和台湾尽管尚未统一， 但中国的主权和领土完整没有分裂，两岸同属一个中国的事实从未改变，两岸不是国与国 关系。任何涉及中国主权和领土完整的问题必须由包括台湾同胞在内的全中国人民共同决 定。) (Emphasis added). The reaction in Taiwan was predictably fierce across the political spectrum. The Mainland Affairs Council issued a statement: “We will insist that the developments concerning Taiwan’s future and cross-Strait relations should be determined by Taiwan’s 23 million people, as ordained by the structure of the Constitution of the Republic of China. This is the consensus reached in Taiwan.” (Katherine Wei, “Taiwan’s future to be decided by its people: MAC,” China Post, June 12, 2014, http://www.chinapost.com.tw /taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2014/06/12/409959/Taiwans-future.htm.) As one KMT legislator put it, “Every time the (Taiwan Affairs Office) issues a statement, it becomes more difficult for lawmakers here to review legislation. I implore [TAO officials] to keep their mouths shut.” (國台辦)每一次再發一次言，我們立法院要審法案就會更難，所以請他們 先閉嘴吧”) (“Chinese official’s comment on Taiwan sovereignty rankles Taiwanese politicians,” Formosa Television News [FTVN], June 11, 2014, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=9 1B06425B040CD7713D15771170DB017.) ARATS Vice President Sun Yafu responded to that criticism during a visit to Taiwan shortly thereafter that “it isn’t a matter of agreeing or not agreeing, that is our view” (「這是我們的看 法」，「不是認同不認同的問題」). (Chou Yi-ling, “Sun Yafu is low-key in speaking of Taiwan’s future” [台灣前途說 孫亞夫低調], CNA [domestic], June 12, 2014, http://www.cna.com.tw/ news/aipl/201406120275-1.aspx.) 61 Chen Luo-wei, “Contacting the three middles and one youth, the Blue no longer monopolizes the right to dialogue” (接觸三中一青 藍不再壟斷話語權), United Daily News, June 13, 2014, http:// paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0005/260196/web/#3L-4892523L. 62 “Sun Yafu calls on Taiwan independence kingpin Koo Kuan-min,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), June 13, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=1 12&anum=14662. 63 Chou Yi-ling and Scully Hsiao, “China striving to understand Taiwan’s people: ex-official,” CNA, June 12, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406120033.aspx. Afterward, Koo Kuan-min said that while Zhang should be treated as a guest, the Mainland’s attitudes are unacceptable. He reported that he had told Sun Yafu, “If China’s basic attitude does not change, then having ten people like Zhang Zhijun visit will do no good.” (“Koo Kwan-min: Making nice with Zhang Zhijun is not enough,” Taiwan News Online, June 30, 2014, http://www. taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2516709.) 52 | Across the Taiwan Strait

64 “Top political advisor vows understanding on Taiwan,” Xinhua, June 15, 2014, http://europe. chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-06/15/content_17588526.htm. 65 “Ma names Siew APEC leaders’ summit envoy,” Taiwan Today, October 9, 2014, http://www. taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=222710&ctNode=445. 66 Kelven Huang and S.C. Chang, “Taiwan not giving up on summit with Chinese president: Ma,” CNA, August 28, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201408280038.aspx. He raised it again in an interview in late September with Beijing-based European correspondents. (Shih Hsiu-chuang, “President remains optimistic on Xi meeting at APEC,” Taipei Times, September 24, 2014, http:// www.taipeitimes.com/Ne ws/taiwan/archives/2014/09/24/2003600458.) 67 In his late-June interview with Wealth magazine, Ma laid out at somewhat greater length than usual his rationale for pursuing such a meeting (assuming conditions could be agreed). He said, “Mainland China is our No. 1 trade partner, our No. 1 region of business investment and the source of our highest trade deficit. We have more than 8 million people visiting back and forth between Taiwan and China. Under such conditions, it should be natural for the leaders of the two regions to meet, and such a meeting is not something that should not happen…It is especially important for some key concepts and principles, such as the ‘1992 consensus’ and ‘one China, with different interpretations.’ We should stabilize these concepts in a high-level summit meeting, so that it can become a ‘highly stable framework.’ This would be good for both Taiwan and mainland China.” He reiterated, however, that meeting at APEC “is our only plan” though adding, “but we cannot force the issue.” (Tzou Jiing-wen and Jason Pan, “Meeting with Xi to lay foundation: Ma,” Taipei Times, June 20, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archi ves/2014/06/20/2003593195.) 68 Tsai Hui-chen, “Xi Jinping’s suggestion to meet Ma in Kinmen fails to become a reality, Yu Zhengsheng pinch hits” (習近平提議金門會馬破局 俞正聲代打), Storm Media, June 23, 2014, http://www.stormmediagroup.com/opencms/investigate/detail/5204d2a6-f77c-11e3-b79d- ef2804cba5a1/?uuid=5204d2a6-f77c-11e3-b79d-ef2804cba5a1. Now at http://www.stormmg1. com/article/22003. 69 In a mid-September interview, former TAO Deputy Director Wang Zaixi laid out a very ambitious set of goals for a Ma-Xi meeting. He observed that settling cross-Strait political differences would be an important goal, and in this vein, he said, officially ending the state of hostilities was one objective. For this, Wang went on, it was very important to establish military mutual trust mechanisms. He also talked of coming to a common understanding on opposing Taiwan independence as well as “jointly safeguarding the territorial integrity of the motherland” (共同捍衛祖國領土完整), all of which could be written into a peace accord. Signing such an accord might not mean achieving unification, but it would establish that the two sides are of one family, Wang said. (Lin Yan, “Wang Zaixi talks with China Review News: Cross-Strait relations cannot be reversed” [王在希語中評：兩岸關係不會逆轉], China Review News, September 17, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=93&kindid=10095&do cid=103387172.) While one can see the benefit of such a set of goals from Beijing’s perspective, the very ambitiousness of the proposal makes it virtually impossible for Taiwan. 70 A poll conducted in late June asked respondents if they supported a meeting between Ma and Xi before Ma’s term ends in 2016. The result was that 54.4 percent opposed it, 26.5 percent said it was necessary and 19.1 percent gave no answer. A similar poll in August last year had found that 43.2 percent supported such a meeting, while 36 percent disapproved of it. Asked what issues should be raised if the meeting took place, “Taiwan’s future should be decided by its 23 million people” ranked first among the responses at 77.1 percent. It was followed by “respect for the ‘status quo’ of the Republic of China (ROC)” at 73.7 percent, non-interference in Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and activities at 73.5 percent, renouncing the use of force against Taiwan at 72 percent, and a bilateral peace agreement at 65.3 percent. (Chris Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 53

Wang, “Support for Ma and Xi meeting plummets: poll,” Taipei Times, July 1, 2014, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/ar chives/2014/07/01/2003594089. The original polling data from TISR are at “Public opinion poll press release, Survey of trends in Taiwan public opinion on two sides, two government and freezing the Taiwan independence plank” [台灣民心動態調查、 兩岸兩府與凍獨」民調 新聞 稿], June 30, 2014, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/files/archive/224_af5cee95.pdf.) A poll by TISR later in the summer revealed that respondents had mixed views about Ma’s reasons for wanting to go to the APEC leaders meeting in Beijing in November and to meet with Xi Jinping. 21.4 percent thought it was to secure Ma’s personal place in history; 25. 5 percent thought it was to obtain benefits for Taiwan; 15.5 percent thought it was to begin cross-Strait political talks; 18.2 percent saw it as aimed at moving toward unification with the Mainland; and 19.2 percent didn’t know or had no response. (“Public opinion poll press release, Survey of trends in Taiwan public opinion on Ma-Xi meeting together with unification vs. independence and identity” [台灣民心動態調查、 馬習會與統獨認同」民調 新聞稿], TISR, August 29, 2014, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/files/archive/250_fc4e7cfb.pdf.) 71 Yang Shu-mei and Chu Chen-kai, “Premier Jiang: Taiwan hopes to bring about a Ma-Xi meeting at APEC” (江揆：台灣盼促成APEC馬習會), China Times, July 25, 2014, http://www.chinatimes. com/newspapers/20140725001441-260102. 72 “Tsai Ing-wen: As envoy to deliver APEC summit invitation, Gong’s status too low,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), September 4, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw /english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=15085. 73 Lo Yin-chong, “TAO declines to comment on sacking of Chang Hsien-yao,” WantChinaTimes. com, August 20, 2014, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&Main CatID=11&id=20140820000149. 74 Lawrence Chiu and Kuo Chung-han, “Beijing concerned over Taiwan media’s handling of MAC controversy,” CNA, August 22, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201408220027.aspx. 75 “Zhang Zhijun: Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Remains on Track,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), September 2, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article &mnum=112&anum=15073. 76 “Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen’s Remarks at the DPP National Party Congress,” DPP News Network, July 22, 2014, http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.com/2014/07/chairperson-tsai-ing-wens-remarks-at. html. 77 “Nine-in-one elections: A Blue camp debacle?” (－九合 一 選舉藍營會崩盤嗎?), China Times (editorial), September 4, 2014, translated by Dateline Taipei, https://datelinetaipei.wordpress. com/2014/09/04/nine-in-one-elections-a-blue-camp-debacle/. A public opinion poll conducted in September showed the KMT regaining a slight lead over the DPP (22.2 percent vs. 19.6 percent), albeit with a huge proportion of respondents (44.7 percent) adopting a position of neutrality among the parties. (Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR), “Party Identification Tracking Analysis in Taiwan,” September 2014, http://www.tisr.com.tw /wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TISR_PID_Tracking_201410.pdf.) 78 Justin Su and James Lee, “Freezing Taiwan independence clause will take time: DPP head,” CNA, July 2, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201407010037.aspx. At the party congress, Tsai argued that there was not enough time in the meeting to consider the issue thoroughly and referred it to the party’s Central Executive Committee (Chris Wang, “DPP’s Tsai evades charter clause fight,” Taipei Times, July 21, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archi ves/2014/07/21/2003595581.) For a sense of the range of views within the DPP, see Wen Kui-hsiang and Lilian Wu, “Some DPP lawmakers against freezing Taiwan independence article,” CNA, June 19, 2014, http://focustaiwan. tw/news/aipl/201406190029.aspx; Lee Hsin-fang and Jake Chung, “Yao Chia-wen excoriates 54 | Across the Taiwan Strait

move to alter DPP charter,” Taipei Times, July 5, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/ archives/2014/07/05/2003594400; “Kuo Cheng-liang calls on Yu Shyi-kun to be a man of his word on Taiwan independence,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), July 3, 2014, http://www1. kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=14768; and Lee Hsin-fang, “Tsai, Su condemn movement to freeze fundamental clause,” Taipei Times, July 20, 2014, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/07/20/2003595513. The issue of the independence clause also occasioned a sharp exchange between Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen. Ma suggested that “Taiwan independence” is not really an issue, so there is no need to place any emphasis on it, to which Tsai retorted: “He is not the DPP chairman. President Ma should mind his own business. We will take care of ourselves. He doesn’t need to bother.” (Wang Yu-chung and Lee Hsin-fang, “Ma, Tsai spar on independence clause,” Taipei Times, July 3, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/N ews/taiwan/archives/2014/07/03/2003594239.) 79 Wen Kuei-hsiang and Elizabeth Hsu, “Most think freezing independence clause helps cross-strait ties,” CNA, August 29, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/20140829003 1.aspx. 80 Tsai explained the party’s position on cross-Strait relations as follows: At present, the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future represents the consensus within the DPP on Taiwan’s future and the status of cross-Strait relations; indeed, it has become the consensus of the people of Taiwan. On the basis of this consensus, the DPP hopes that the two sides of the Strait can engage in more stable and higher quality interactions, to increase mutual understanding and build mutual trust. Thus, we will adopt a more confident, proactive, and pragmatic attitude in our approach, while also demonstrating our stability and consistency. But we will continue to insist that no cross-Strait contact may harm Taiwan’s democracy, threaten our national sovereignty, or undermine the ability of the people of Taiwan to carry out their will as the master of their own house. This principle and stance is one that will never change.” —“DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen’s Comments on Proposed Freeze of Independence Platform,” DPP News Network, July 22, 2014, http://dpptaiwan.blogspot.com/2014/07/ dpp-chair-tsai-ing-wens-comments-on.html; now at http://archive.is/NmxUG. 81 In an interview in July, Tsai put it this way. Because it attracted so much attention, we quote it in full: I have to admit that from 2008 to 2012, the party was focused on contesting elections and spent very little time on taking care of external matters. Now, both subjective and objective conditions are better than they were in 2012. We are also confident that we can maintain stable relations with China so that cross-strait relations would not be affected by a change in the ruling party. If you were China, how would you view this round of elections? In the previous round, they were afraid of making a bad bet. They had put their money in 2008 on the KMT, and if the situation had been reversed in 2012 (i.e., the KMT and Ma had lost to the DPP and Tsai), then that would have indicated the failure of all of its Taiwan policies and led to the resignations of many people. And Hu Jintao’s historical legacy would have had to be rewritten. So they were very nervous. They felt pressure to protect Ma Ying-jeou and not allow the tables to be turned in Taiwan. But after 2012, a new phase has begun. China is now again worried about betting on the wrong horse in 2016, being forced to deal with a situation it cannot control and having to interfere heavily. Simply put, whoever has power, different parties will shift their direction toward those with power. The DPP’s biggest challenge is to do well in this year’s local elections. If we Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 55

do well, even China will shift in the direction of the DPP. If they feel that the DPP has the best chance of winning in 2016, they will automatically create the conditions for that. In my experience, when China wants to do something, it is able to do it. It has a huge system to handle Taiwan issues. If China shifts course, the United States will have no reason to object.” —“Tsai Ing-wen: Election win will shift China toward DPP,” interview by Sara Wu, Jun-Shin Ho, and Hsiao-Wen Wang, Commonwealth [translated from Commonwealth Magazine No. 551], July 10, 2014, http://english.cw.com.tw/article/article. action?id=380.) Emphasis added. 82 “TAO spokesman: There will not be any compromise in opposition to ‘Taiwan independence’” (国台办发言人:反对“台独”的立场不会有任何妥协), Taiwan Affairs Office, July 11, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201407/t20140711_6568505.htm. 83 Private conversation. 84 “TAO: DPP’s desire to use the ‘Resolution on Taiwan’s Future’ to handle cross-Strait relations will not work” (国台办：民进党想以“台湾前途决议文”处理两岸关系行不通), Xinhuanet, July 21, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201407/t20140721_6677499.htm. 85 Lin Yan, “At the opening of the Santai meeting in Xining, Zhou Zhihuai makes four suggestions” (三台會西寧開幕 周志懷提四建議), China Review News, July 23, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/ crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=93&kindid=10095&docid=103298731. 86 Zheng Qiao, “Zhou Zhihuai: The coming two years are a critical period in cross-Strait relations for turning challenges into opportunities” (周志懷： 未來兩年是兩岸關係化挑戰為機遇關鍵 期), China News Network, July 23, 2014, http://big5.chinanews.com:89/tw/2014/07-23/6418883. shtml. 87 One point that seemed more confined to specific individuals than others was former Vice President Annette Lu Hsiu-lien’s complaint that Tsai had arbitrarily decided that the DPP should back non-party candidate Ko Wen-je for mayor of Taipei. Lu demanded that if Ko loses (as of this writing he is ahead of KMT candidate Sean Lien, but the gap is reportedly closing), Tsai should step down as DPP chair. (“Annette Lu: Hold Tsai Ing-wen accountable if Ko Wen-je loses,” Taiwan News Online, June 17, 2014, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2506523.) 88 Eva Feng and James Lee, “Taiwan, China should cooperate, not counteract: Tainan mayor,” CNA, June 6, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406060029.aspx. 89 Yang Sz-ruei and Elizabeth Hsu, “Tainan mayor urges common ground between DPP, China” CNA, June 8, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406080010.aspx. 90 Eva Feng and Lee Hsin-Yin, “Diversity of voices needed in Taiwan-China relations: Tainan mayor,” CNA, June 7, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406070021.aspx. Tsai endorsed this position later that same day in a Facebook posting. (Yang and Hsu, “Tainan mayor urges common ground between DPP, China.”) 91 Cheng Chung-sheng, Eva Feng, Wang Chao-yu, and Y.F. Low, “Beijing reiterates opposition to Taiwan independence,” CNA, June 7, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406070015.aspx. 92 “Taiwan Affairs Office: We hope that all Taiwan parties and people from all sectors of society will actively support cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation” (国台办：希望台湾各党派 各界人士积极支持两岸交流合作), June 7, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201406/ t20140607_6280687.htm. 93 Yang and Hsu, “Tainan mayor urges common ground between DPP, China.” 94 “Kuo: DPP Local Gov’t Chiefs in Dilemma after Tsai Publicly Opposes FEPZs,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), June 11, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=a rticle&mnum=112&anum=14651. That said, in a broadside attack on Chen Chu when speaking 56 | Across the Taiwan Strait

on behalf of her KMT opponent in the Kaohsiung mayoral race, Ma Ying-jeou criticized Chen Chu for opposing the pilot zone proposal. (Katherine Wei, “Ma blasts Kaohsiung mayor for disaster response,” China Post, October 9, 2014, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/ national-news/2014/10/09/419015/Ma-blasts.htm.) 95 Justin Su and Y.F. Low, “DPP open to cross-Taiwan Strait exchanges without preconditions,” CNA, June 6, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201406060012.aspx. 96 “Press release: DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen attends reception with diplomatic representatives to mark the 28th anniversary of the founding of the party” (民進黨主席蔡英文出席紀念創黨28 週年外交使節酒會新聞稿), DPP, September 23, 2014, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content. php?&sn=7363. 97 In her speech to the DPP national party congress, Tsai identified numerous issues, including the staggering cost of housing, the increasing cost of everyday goods, stagnating salaries, a dysfunctional plan for a 12-year mandatory education system, a social welfare system that makes it increasingly difficult to take care of the young and old, problems with food safety, the lack of an engine of economic growth, the lack of economic strategy, a broken constitutional structure that does not properly reflect the public will, a lack of transparency in cross-Strait relations (which are monopolized by business interests), and the loss of a grasp of fairness. Saying that Taiwan deserved a government that is more efficient and more capable, Tsai identified a fundamental issue as the lack of trust in government and in politics. (“Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen’s Remarks at the DPP National Party Congress,” DPP News Network, July 22, 2014, http://dpptaiwan.blogspot. com/2014/07/chairperson-tsai-ing-wens-remarks-at.html.) 98 “Tsai Ing-wen: Ma and his policies alienate Taiwan from rest of the world,” Taiwan News Online, August 12, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2548259. 99 “Huang Huikang: Not opposed to unofficial relations—Malaysia-Taiwan must not sign an FTA” (黃惠康：不反對非官方聯繫‧馬台不能簽自貿協定), Sin Chew Daily, August 19, 2014, http://news.sinchew.com.my/node/382358. It may well be that negotiation of an “economic cooperation agreement” with Kuala Lumpur would not generate such a direct objection, since its “official” character could be fuzzed up, as in the case of New Zealand, Singapore, and others. But PRC officials continue to refuse to express blanket acquiescence (as opposed to case-by-case consideration) even to “economic cooperation agreements,” due to concern about the “status” of Taiwan as one of the agreement partners and the need to avoid any sense of “officiality.” What seems clear is that Beijing has no intention of changing its position in the absence of cross-Strait political dialogue to establish clear ground rules. In this case, the fact that the Malaysian king was due to pay a state visit to China shortly may have given Beijing additional leverage to voice its objection without fear of criticism from the government in Kuala Lumpur. (“Yang di-Pertuan Agong and consort accorded state welcome in Beijing,” Malaymail online, September 4, 2014, http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/ article/yang-di-pertuan-agong-and-consort-accorded-state-welcome-in-beijing.) 100 Huang Chiao-wen, “Economics Minister: Mainland obstructs other countries’ trade and economic negotiations with Taiwan” (經 長 ：陸 阻 撓 他 國 與 台 經 貿 談 判 ), CNA (domestic), October 4, 2014, http://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/201410040321-1.aspx. 101 “Taiwan eyes stronger regional economic ties,” Taiwan Today, September 19, 2014, http://www. taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=221884&ctNode=445. 102 Huang Chiao-wen and Elaine Hou, “Taiwan doesn’t need China’s consent on FTA with Malaysia: minister,” CNA, August 21, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201408210025.aspx. 103 Although one economic ministry official briefing the LY in June said that six countries were negotiating bilateral FTAs with Taiwan (Malaysia, Vietnam, Chile, Peru, Brunei, and Australia; Judy Li, “Taiwan Negotiates with 6 Nations to Ink FTA,” Taiwan Economic News, June 10, 2014, http://cens.com/cens/html/en/news/news_inner_46378 Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency—Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath | 57

.html), in late August the economics minister acknowledged that “more than one country” had planned to negotiate economic pacts with Taiwan early this year, but the plans did not move forward after the PRC stepped in and told them “the timing is not right” until after the ECFA follow-on agreements were completed. (Wu Ching-chun and Y.F. Low, “Economics minister urges support for trade pact with China,” August 30, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ aipl/201408300030.aspx.) He did so again responding to inquiries at the LY in October. (Liu Ching-yu, “Duh Tyzz-jiun: When cross-Strait relations are healthy this aids in negotiating and signing FTAs” [杜紫軍：兩岸關係好有助洽簽FTA], China Times, October 7, 2014, http://www. chinatimes.com/newspapers/20141007000110-260203.) 104 The process and other details of the November elections, including which seats are at stake, are available at “Year-end election campaign to roll September 1,” Taiwan News Online, August 31, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2561314. 105 Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Surveys provide warning signs for DPP: think tank,” Taipei Times, August 16, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/08/16/2003597536. 106 “Party Preferences Trend Distribution in Taiwan (1992/06~2014/06),” Election Study Center, NCCU, Important political attitude trend distribution, July 9, 2014, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/ course/news.php?Sn=165; Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR),“Party Identification Tracking Analysis in Taiwan,” September 2014, http://www.tisr.com.tw/wp-content/ uploads/2014/10/TISR_PID_Tracking_201410.pdf. 107 Kelven Huang, Hsu Chih-wei, and Scully Hsiao, “President praises student policy proposals in annual youth meeting,” CNA, August 31, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201408310018. aspx; Chris Wang, “DPP programs aim to involve youth in politics,” Taipei Times, July 16, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/07/16/2003595227. 108 Jason Pan, “Student leader disagrees with DPP,” Taipei Times, August 1, 2014, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/08/01/2003596412.

Chapter Three

The Times They Are A-Changin’

China Leadership Monitor, No. 46 March 19, 2015

If Beijing was surprised by the extent of public support in Taiwan for the “Sunflower Movement” last spring,1 along with everyone else they were stunned by the extent of the Kuomintang (KMT) debacle in the November 29, 2014, “9-in-1” local elections. For the Mainland, the principal consequence is the need to think through the potential implications of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) return to the presidency in 2016 and possibly even DPP control of the Legislative Yuan (LY) for the first time. There is unanimity among Mainland observers regarding the need for a harsh People’s Republic of China (PRC) response if the DPP openly rejects “one China” and refuses to move away from support of “Taiwan independence.” Opinion is far more divided, however, about how Beijing would – or should – react if the DPP fashions an approach that avoids such direct challenges to the Mainland’s bottom line.

That said, although the November results gave the DPP momentum and left the KMT largely dispirited, there are many reasons why a DPP victory in 2016 is hardly a foregone conclusion. In recognition of that reality, both of Taiwan’s political parties are working hard to position themselves for the upcoming contest.

KMT Disaster at the Polls

The disaster suffered by the KMT at the polls in November has been well documented and does not need detailed rehashing here.2 Suffice it to say that only one KMT mayor now governs in the six major municipalities (whereas the party previously held seats in three of the then-five major cities) and only six KMT mayors are in office in all 22 cities and counties – down from 15 before the election. The DPP now occupies 13 mayors’ seats, including four in the major municipalities.3 Although the formally nonpartisan status of the winning candidate in Taipei, Ko Wen-je, probably helped him achieve victory, in fact he was closely aligned with the DPP during the campaign.4 Setbacks for the KMT were widely predicted, but nothing on the order of the actual catastrophe it encountered. As the final days before election were counted down, 60 | Across the Taiwan Strait some polls even purported to show the KMT candidates closing in on the DPP favorites in Taipei and Taichung.5 In the end, however, not only did the DPP sweep both cities,6 but island-wide the DPP gained 47.56 percent of the valid ballots cast, while the KMT received only 40.70 percent,7 garnering 1.9 million fewer votes than in the 2012 general elections.8 If one counts Ko Wen-je’s 854,000 votes as “quasi-DPP,” then the total for the “DPP” topped 56 percent of the total votes cast.9 Nonetheless, the DPP was careful not to crow too loudly. And well it might have exercised caution. Two polls, one in the immediate wake of the election and one a few weeks later, found that the main reason for the KMT’s disastrous defeat was the public’s strong disapproval of President Ma and Premier Jiang Yi-huah’s performance, especially among younger people.10 Even Tsai Ing-wen did not claim that overwhelming support for the DPP was responsible for the outcome, but observed instead that, while the DPP made people “feel at ease,” the results were due to voter dissatisfaction with the KMT.11 That being said, clearly the DPP emerged with substantial momentum for the presidential contest in January 2016, and possibly even for a shot at a majority in the Legislative Yuan. Poll after poll in the wake of the November elections showed widespread expectation that the DPP would win the presidency.12 Moreover, whereas polls before the election showed that, although KMT support was dropping precipitously, the DPP seemed not to be gaining, that situation has changed. As late as September, the KMT had even regained a slight lead over the DPP in terms of party identification in one poll.13 Starting in December, however, the DPP began to garner more support, so that by late February it led the KMT by over nine percentage points (28.3 vs. 19.0), or over 10 points (35.5 vs. 25.3), if one counts responses in favor of all pan-Blue and pan-Green parties, including smaller ones.14 On the other side of the aisle, the KMT emerged from November dazed and dispirited. However, when three days after the debacle President Ma Ying-jeou announced that he would resign as party chair, the sole KMT survivor in the major municipality contests, New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu Li-luan, quickly announced that he would vie for the KMT chair. Chu had only squeaked by with a winning re-election margin of 1.28 percent, or fewer than 25,000 votes, as against his 5 percent or 100,000-vote victory margin against Tsai Ing-wen in 2010.15 But he was clearly the best hope to lead the party, and all other contenders quickly dropped out and announced their backing for Chu. Chu termed the people’s anger at the KMT “vicious,” blaming the party’s problems on the failure of the market economy and a dysfunctional political system as well as nepotism and cronyism that had plagued affairs to the point where the general public felt it had not received dividends from the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. In explaining his decision he said, “For the sake of Taiwan’s democracy, I The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 61 cannot leave the KMT in the lurch. I have to run for chairman. It does not matter if people favor the KMT in power or bring it down in the future, we must stand by the people all the time, stick to the values of fairness and justice, and regain the founding principles of the party.” He went on, “we cannot let one-party dominance undermine democracy in Taiwan.”16 It should be noted that despite the solid DPP victory in mayoral and county commissioner elections, when it came to city and county council elections, although the DPP reaped a slightly higher number of votes (4.52 million or 37.08 percent of the valid votes vs. the KMT’s 4.49 million or 36.86 percent), the KMT still won more city council seats (386 vs. the DPP’s 291).17 Moreover, the KMT won the speakership in 15 of the 22 local councils island-wide,18 including in 5 of the 6 special municipalities.19 Hence, it remains to be seen whether or not the mayoral and county commissioner elections will be a harbinger for 2016. As chairs of the DPP and KMT, Tsai and Chu immediately laid out a series of positions designed to give their respective parties the initiative over the coming year of campaigning (and presumably for a longer-term future, as well). Both had to deal with divisions within their parties, though with the DPP, differences perhaps center more on process and ideology,20 while current KMT differences appear to arise from concern about local versus central party control and the political liabilities of being too closely identified with the Ma administration. For her part, in an effort to build on the moment of November 29, Tsai characterized the local election results as an “historic prologue for change.” She said that the party must embrace one principle: “Facing the power of the people, we should only become more humble” beginning “from the ground up” to “win back Taiwan, one step at a t i m e .” 21

Expanding on this theme, Tsai demanded that DPP officials act in accordance with the principles of “transparency, cooperation, and efficiency” to pursue goals that included making public not only expenditures but also the details of policy development and implementation. Creating maximum public benefits without an “ego” or “partisan bias” was important. Moreover, she counseled that successful governance at the local level would be the key to gaining the trust needed to convince voters to grant the DPP the mandate to govern at the center.22 In her mid-February Facebook announcement that she would vie for the DPP presidential nomination,23 Tsai expanded on the principles she intended to espouse as Taiwan’s leader. She said that the time of “party politics” (政黨政治) is ebbing in Taiwan and a “new era has started that truly belongs to the people” (開創一個真正屬 於人民的時代). Maintaining that she is her own person, “not Chen Shui-bian, not Ma Ying-jeou,” Tsai asserted that this is the time for “new politics, a new system, and a new beginning” (新的政治, 新體制和新的開始), with the “new politics” characterized 62 | Across the Taiwan Strait not only by transparency (透明) but integrity (清廉), participation of the people ( 參與), tolerance (參與), and a clear demarcation of rights and responsibilities (權責 分明). “Taiwan needs reform” (台灣需要改革), she proclaimed. It will involve pain, Tsai said, and she called for people to unite and overcome that pain. In her announcement she also included a theme that was directly relevant to cross- Strait relations and that has continued to be prominent in official DPP statements since then. She said that the “new politics” she espoused included the need to “consolidate sovereignty” (主權鞏固). When registering for the nomination contest the following day, Tsai expanded on this point. She noted that the DPP’s priority of focusing on consolidating national sovereignty differed from the KMT position and that the DPP sought to adopt a “new kind of political and cultural perspective” regarding cross- Strait policy, “leaving behind” the KMT’s “outmoded policies” and shaping a “new future” for cross-Strait policy.24 A theme that developed over the succeeding weeks was that “cross-Strait exchanges must not be allowed to harm Taiwan’s sovereignty and security” (兩岸的交流不得傷害台灣的主權與安全).25 As time went on, when Mainland officials talked about the necessity to embrace “one China” and dismiss “Taiwan independence,” the DPP responded by stressing the policy of “three benefits” (三個有利) and “three insists” (三個堅持),26 rather than directly refuting Beijing’s line. Tsai voiced assurances that the DPP would fulfill its responsibility to maintain peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations27 and that this would be a priority goal that conformed to the expectations of people on both sides of the Strait and the hopes of the international community. 28 Tsai and her colleagues also underscored, however, that meeting those hopes and expectations was a responsibility not just of one side but of all sides.

On the KMT side, with Chu Li-luan as the only registered candidate for party chair,29 the effort focused on trying to reknit the fabric of the party with strong leadership from the center and wholesale reform of the organization’s structure and personnel at all levels. In setting out on his task, Chu likened the November results to a tsunami and called for deep soul-searching, revival of the party’s “founding spirit,” positioning of the party side-by-side with the people, and open-mindedness to attract more younger people as party members.30 He called for tax reform to correct for what he said was the lack of fairness and justice that characterizes a market economy, leading to a social divide between those on government payrolls and labors and farmers.3132 Chu downplayed the importance of any one person, including himself in his prospective role as party chair, and stressed instead the need for a team effort. He said The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 63 that, while the president had to bear responsibility for what he termed the “erroneous policies and inappropriate deeds” 33 that led to peoples’ unhappiness with government, the economy and life in general had caused the shattering defeat, that responsibility also needed to be shared by all KMT colleagues, including local leaders like himself.34 At the same time he was diagnosing the causes of the November debacle, Chu was also putting forth bold new proposals in an effort to regain the people’s support. These included a call to shift to a parliamentary system, perhaps akin to the semi- presidential system in France, lower the voting age (also favored by the DPP),35 introduce absentee voting,36 and work to ensure that the executive branch of the government keeps in step with the legislature.37 As part of the reform process, he appointed a new party secretary-general and two “full-time” senior politicians (and former mayors) as party vice chairmen.38 After delaying for several weeks to allow an orderly process, Chu moved decisively to stem the long-standing controversy within the party and rally members around the center by confirming that LY speaker Wang Jin-pyng was “without any doubt” a KMT member and announcing that the party would no longer pursue the case initiated under Ma Ying-jeou to expel Wang from the party.39 Ma, despite his public expression of disappointment and disagreement with that decision,40 quickly dropped his public opposition and affirmed that he supported the KMT’s solidarity and its reforms. As he put it after some very sharp questioning41 at a meeting at the party think tank, the National Policy Foundation (NPF), where he appeared with Wang and Chu in a gesture of unity, “I’ve heard your wise opinion” (各位的高見，我都聽進去了).42 In fact, reorganization of the NPF itself was one of Chu’s announced reform steps. He took over as chairman from former vice president Lien Chan and replaced NPF management personnel closely associated with Lien, choosing two KMT vice chairmen as vice chairmen of the foundation along with a new board of directors and supervisory board.43 In making these changes, Chu said that the NPF would focus primarily on strengthening the party’s ideals and on studying public affairs and theories, as well as bringing in younger academics to help keep up with the development of new technologies and the thinking of the electorate. Moreover, the foundation would work closely with the KMT’s LY caucus in drafting “bread-and- butter” bills and promoting public policies.44 Chu cut back on the party’s staff and revamped the leadership structure of local KMT chapters, picking heads from among the party’s representatives to parliamentary bodies at different levels. A KMT vice chairman was assigned to implement that reorganization scheme, signaling a major break with party tradition, according to which such organizational matters had usually been handled by lower-level officials at the department level. This change was judged by political observers as likely leading to improved coordination between the local chapters and elected KMT officials.45 64 | Across the Taiwan Strait

The measures by both DPP and KMT leaders to strengthen their respective parties’ positions heading into 2016 predictably generated a certain amount of internal discontent both at staff and political levels. KMT staff, for example, complained that provision had not been made for reemploying them elsewhere,46 and various KMT LY members were unsuccessful in seeking endorsement to become candidates for at-large seats out of fear that their district seats were at risk due to the overall decline in KMT support.47 Chu said they were needed where they were. As for the DPP, it was described by one not unsympathetic observer as “a notoriously divided party; united in opposition, but after that divided in policies, leadership and goals.”48 Not only did it have to cope with the alleged acceptance of bribes in connection with the selection of the Tainan city council chairman,49 but there were complaints about the early schedule and regulations for the DPP primary50 and the apparent effort to rush through Tsai’s nomination despite what one senior dark Green stalwart called her lack of “global perspective.”51 Tsai will obviously have to deal with such complaints. But given her high standing within the party and the fact that she is running unopposed for the nomination, these will not be major problems for her. The more serious controversies may arise later this spring, when Tsai seeks to cobble together a cross-Strait policy that she hopes will be tolerable for Beijing yet also acceptable within the DPP as well as to various civic groups, especially younger voters, who will be on alert against the slightest hint of compromise on sovereignty.52 In an effort to get as broad support as possible, even going back to the November election when the DPP declined to field a candidate in the Taipei mayoral contest in favor of backing Ko Wen-je as an “independent” candidate, Tsai has sought to harness as broad a constituency as possible to the DPP cause. With Ko Wen-je in particular, on a political talk show on November 18, for example, Tsai said that “the DPP hopes that he will coordinate with DPP local government heads to maximize public policy outcomes.” That statement eventually led to release by the DPP’s Taipei chapter of the “text” of a verbal agreement from the preceding June that laid out the reasonably extensive terms of cooperation fixed between Ko and the DPP.53 While the terms of the agreement did not exactly lash him up with the party, they certainly put him on the DPP side of the line in terms of coordination and mutual support. Especially in light of Ko’s obvious popularity, Tsai has continued to court him despite his unpredictable nature.54 When Ko expressed skepticism about the 1992 Consensus and suggested that rather than focusing on “one country, two systems” it would be more appropriate to think about “two countries, one system” (兩國一制),55 Tsai moved quickly to support him by “explaining” that he meant “we are all insistent on Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence” (我們大家都堅持台灣主權獨立).56 In so doing, of course, she once more put focus on the sovereignty issue in a way that The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 65 will likely make it harder to blur the issue to satisfy Beijing as the campaign rolls on. Despite the tether this created on Tsai’s freedom of action, the importance of Ko’s backing was reinforced by a poll in late February showing that almost 37 percent of respondents said they would support the candidate Ko favored.57 Despite these efforts to maximize her base, as one prominent critic, former DPP legislator Julian Kuo Cheng-liang, summed things up, Tsai has three major hurdles in the presidential election. Two are related to domestic issues, namely, a lack of momentum in southern Taiwan, where there has been a sense of voter alienation due possibly, Kuo thought, to Tsai’s reserved personality; and insufficient support from grass-roots counties, which, Kuo said, the DPP has long ignored. The third is that cross-Strait issues could affect Tsai’s election prospects in Taipei City and New Taipei City, where she needs to put forth concrete proposals.58 At this point, while most people believe Tsai will win, polls vary widely about how well she would do if, contrary to his repeated statements that he will not run, Chu Li-luan were the KMT nominee. Although one poll in February showed Tsai in the lead by 52 percent vs. 33 percent,59 another showed them within two points of one another at 43 percent vs. 41 percent.60 So how does the cross-Strait issue play in Taiwan politics at this point?

Reaching Across the Strait

Chu Li-luan has introduced a certain degree of nuance to the KMT’s cross-Strait policy. For example, in an exchange of notes with Xi Jinping following Chu’s ascension to the KMT chair, Chu strongly endorsed the 1992 Consensus, praising the progress made in cross-Strait relations over the past six years on the basis of that consensus and expressing the hope that the two parties could broaden exchanges to promote the sustainable development of peace and prosperity on both sides of the Strait.61 At the same time, in responding to Xi, just as he had done when he met with Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) head Zhang Zhijun in New Taipei last June, Chu tweaked the usual formulation of “seeking common ground while reserving differences” (求同存 异) to call for “seeking common ground while respecting differences” (求同尊異). Moreover, while Chu has endorsed resumption of the annual KMT-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forum (formally the Cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Cultural Forum) and said his own attendance would be “very natural,”62 he has evaded the question of whether he actually would attend. In addition, while he has not dismissed the notion of a meeting with Xi Jinping, he has indicated that it is premature to talk about that and said that any such meeting would have to be preceded by party-to-party negotiations.63 66 | Across the Taiwan Strait

When addressing the issue of who benefits from cross-Strait relations, Chu placed these concerns in a larger context.

Undeniably the rapid progress of cross-Strait ties in recent years has had a big psychological effect on Taiwanese society, while increased economic and trade exchanges between the two sides have also raised concerns about a widening wealth gap in Taiwan. These are the questions facing us. The KMT must examine these issues seriously.64

The DPP’s call for change, of course, has been much sharper. For a long time, in her role as chair of the DPP, Tsai Ing-wen has been seeking to reassure everyone, including foreign envoys in Taipei and various governments abroad – most especially the United States – that the party wants active exchanges with the Mainland65 and that engagement with Beijing “will be consistent, responsible and predictable” (將會是具 一致性, 負責任, 可預測的).66 At the same time, she has pledged to “remain vigilant in the defense of our hard-earned freedoms and right to decide our own future” ( 我們依然保持警覺， 以捍衛我們得來不易的自由，與決定自己未來的權利).67 As already discussed, many observers point to angst about Ma’s policy toward the Mainland as a critical background factor to the Sunflower Movement of March 2014 and an important element in the KMT’s spectacular defeat in November. Still, DPP spokesmen have been careful not to characterize cross-Strait issues as a prominent factor in those elections. Indeed, as part of a determined DPP effort to keep things quiet in the immediate wake of the election, Joseph Wu Jaushieh, the party’s secretary- general, went out of his way to say that cross-Strait relations “were not put to a referendum in the votes” and that the party would not interpret the election results as a setback for China or a failure of the KMT’s cross-Strait policies.68 In the course of doing this, Wu also reiterated a theme that has been prominent in Tsai Ing-wen’s own remarks, arguing that both sides have a responsibility to maintain stability. If, Wu said, the Mainland continues to assert that the DPP is at fault for the failure to establish party-to-party relations because it has not accepted certain preconditions, the situation in the Strait will not be peaceful and stable. Rather, what the DPP wants is to lower mutual mistrust and misunderstanding through more engagement, exchanges, and dialogue without preconditions. Nonetheless, while Wu said that the party would continue to probe for “the best approach to engage China” (與中國打交道的最佳 手法), he added that in the process “the DPP’s basic policy remains unchanged” (民 進黨的基本政策立場沒有改變).69 Tsai’s internal dilemma is clear. While some of her putative supporters are pushing a hard line in favor of asserting Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence, others are searching for accommodation. DPP cofounder, former premier, and presidential candidate Frank Hsieh Chang-ting, for example, cautioned that “the DPP must engage The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 67 in soul-searching and make a change in order to transform itself into a political party for all people. . . . On cross-Strait relations, the DPP must propose policies that are acceptable to 60–70 percent of the electorate.”70 Similarly, William Lai Ching-te, the very popular mayor of Tainan (viewed as a likely future presidential candidate and rumored to be Tsai’s choice as vice presidential running mate in 2016), urged prudence. “We should not provoke [the Mainland]. While it advocates unification, everyone knows that we advocate independence. If the issue of unification versus independence cannot be solved now, we should put it to the side. We can engage, as we seek common ground and shelve differences” (我們 不要挑釁它. 你們（中國）是主張統一， 這個我們大家知道，我們主張台灣 是獨立的，這個你們應該知道， 如果統一和獨立，一時間無法解決，不然我 們先放著，大家來交流，就是求同存異).71 An important part of the process for reconciling conflicting views and formulating the DPP’s position on cross-Strait relations will be to forge a consensus first among the party’s top leaders. In this effort, Tsai reconvened the China Affairs Committee in late January 2015, the first time it had met since May 2014 (at which time, in fact, the participants only had an “informal chat”). She also reconfigured the committee membership, where she now is chair, and mayors of major cities and a number of other senior DPP stalwarts sit as members.72 As an initial step even before a final position has been determined, Tsai has proclaimed that expanding DPP-run local governments’ ability to deal with cross-Strait affairs is a “top priority for the party at the current stage” (現階段的優先事項). In response, the party’s central committee has called for all DPP-run cities and counties to establish mechanisms like the one that already exists in Kaohsiung to manage such cross-Strait affairs as city-to-city exchanges.73 Even here, however, consistent with statements she and other DPP officials have been making, Tsai made clear that a premise for this activity is upholding national sovereignty (堅持國家主權). Will Tsai be able to come up with a formulation for cross-Strait policy that will be tolerable to Beijing, welcomed by people in Taiwan, and acceptable to the United States? She projects confidence that she can. Some people have suggested such a formulation might include “taking note of the 1992 Consensus,” agreeing to adhere to the Republic of China Constitution, or making a statement that the future cross- Strait relationship cannot be determined for a very long time to come and in any case is not to be decided by one political party but by the people of Taiwan. But most observers this analyst has spoken with in both Taiwan and the Mainland are skeptical there is a workable formula that can satisfy all the necessary players. We do not know, of course, what communication has transpired between Tsai and authoritative policy centers in Beijing. But statements coming from not only the TAO but also from Xi Jinping himself are not encouraging. 68 | Across the Taiwan Strait

In January, the TAO spokesman touted three common points between Xi Jinping and Chu Li-luan in their exchange of messages: both highly evaluated the good situation that has developed since 2008; both said they wanted to strengthen the common political foundation of the 1992 Consensus; and both were full of confidence and hoped to continue to promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations by making greater efforts for the benefit of people on both sides.74 By way of contrast, in that same press briefing, the spokesman affirmed the “consistent and clear” and unwavering policy toward the DPP and the Mainland’s firm opposition to Taiwan independence. As he put it: “The anchor of the steady development of cross-Strait relations is the ‘1992 Consensus.’ This is the crux of the matter. Only when the DPP goes with the historical tide and popular will and abandons its advocacy of ‘Taiwan independence’ can it find a way out for cross- Strait relations.” One well-placed person asked rhetorically, “If the DPP says it is for peace and stability and peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, but asserts at the same time that Taiwan is a sovereign, independent state, can we accept this?” Answering his own question he said: certainly not. Even more indicative is what Xi Jinping said when he addressed these issues in early March.75 At a meeting of various Taiwan-related groups attending the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in Beijing, Xi delivered what Xinhua labeled “an important speech” (重要讲话).76 Echoing some of the rhetoric he used when he met with a pro-unification group from Taiwan in September 2014,77 Xi described peaceful development of cross-Strait relations as a “bright road to peaceful reunification” (通向和平统一的光明大道). Identifying what some people have labeled the “four resolutes,”78 he devoted some attention to underscoring that the Mainland would not alter its dedication to seeking benefit for the people in Taiwan. Moreover, he stressed once again that he wanted to hear opinions and suggestions from various Taiwan circles, particularly at the grass roots. Mainland officials and experts went to some lengths to say that this indicated the terms of unification, even under “one country, two systems,” would be quite different from the Hong Kong experience.79 At the same time, Xi also stated in very firm terms that the “1992 Consensus” had “played an irreplaceable, important role” (发挥了不可替代的重要作用) in establishing cross-Strait mutual trust, carrying out dialogue and consultations, and improving and developing the cross-Strait relationship. “If the common political basis of the two sides of the Strait is disrupted, mutual political trust between the two sides of the Strait will no longer exist and the cross-Strait relationship will return to the old path of turbulence” (如果两岸双方的共同政治基础遭到破坏，两岸互信 将不复存在，两岸关系就会重新回到动荡不安的老路上去). Leaving no doubt about his message, Xi expanded on this point. The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 69

We always make the “1992 Consensus” the foundation of and the condition for carrying out exchanges with the Taiwan authorities and with Taiwan’s various political parties, with the core being recognition that both the Mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. As long as all political parties and groups on Taiwan can achieve that, there will be no obstacles for any political party or group to engage in exchange with the Mainland.

“Taiwan independence” splittist forces and their activities harm state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and they attempt to incite confrontation between the people and society on the two sides of the Strait and sever the spiritual cord of the compatriots on the two sides of the Strait, and they are the biggest obstacle for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and are the greatest threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait; hence the need to resolutely oppose them. Compatriots on the two sides of the Strait should maintain a high degree of vigilance against “Taiwan independence” forces.80 In response, DPP officials focused again on the “three benefits” and the “three insists,” with Tsai Ing-wen stressing that if her party wins the 2016 presidential election it will fulfill its responsibility to maintain peaceful and stable relations between the two sides. Once again as well, however, she stressed that it is not just Taiwan but both sides that have a responsibility to maintain peace and stability, no matter which party is in power in Taiwan.81 Tsai passed up the chance to directly rebut Xi with regard to the “1992 Consensus” and “Taiwan independence,” but two of her principal aides reiterated the importance of not allowing exchanges to harm Taiwan’s sovereignty or security.82 Meanwhile, Tsai tried to push the issue aside, arguing that focusing on “names or labels” (「名詞」 或者...「標籤」) would not help in the handling cross-Strait ties. Instead, she said, the focus should be on relevant substantive issues, and added that she hoped the two sides would show mutual respect as they strengthened bilateral communication and increased exchanges.83

Looking Ahead

Against this background, what can one expect over the coming months leading up to the presidential and LY elections that will be held jointly in January?84 In Taiwan, the most important debate, at least in the early months of 2015, will not be between the KMT and DPP, but within the DPP and between the DPP and the civic organizations it will seek to enlist to its cause. The critical issue in that debate is not likely to be over economic or social policy. There, Tsai Ing-wen will be able to forge a strong consensus based on a broad commitment to social and economic justice as well as reforming the domestic economic structure to enhance competitiveness. 70 | Across the Taiwan Strait

The debate will instead center around how far the party can go in trying to identify an adequate substitute for the “1992 Consensus” without sacrificing the party’s basic principles regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence. A debate will also take place in the Mainland about how to react to alternative DPP formulations, both during the campaign and if the DPP wins the presidency – especially if it wins the presidency and control of the LY. There appears to be a strong consensus in Beijing that the policy of peaceful development must be maintained if at all possible, albeit on condition that “one China” is not rejected and “Taiwan independence” is not promoted. (If the DPP directly challenges Beijing on those core conditions, the consensus appears to be that Xi operates on the premise that if someone gives him trouble, he will strike back even harder. As one well-informed Mainland observer put it, Xi is not looking for a fight, but he’s not afraid of one, either.) That said, the hard choices center around what to do if a victorious DPP adopts a more nuanced stance, one that does not accept either leg of the Mainland’s required foundation, but that does not directly challenge Beijing’s position, either. Some Mainland observers say that as long as a DPP government does not directly reject the two key pillars of “one China”85 and “no independence” it would be neither wise nor necessary to “punish” Taiwan. Relations would not advance, but they need not move backward. Others argue that ambiguity is unacceptable. It makes no sense, these people say, to maintain the current level of relations with an administration that does not subscribe to those critical conditions as the outgoing administration has done. If the DPP does not change its position, the Mainland shouldn’t act as though that doesn’t matter. Otherwise, in the words of one observer, this would be like accepting “soft independence.” Moreover, if the DPP comes into office with its current position and the Mainland does nothing, no future leader in Taiwan will subscribe to the concept of “one China.” Even on the question of how to react if the DPP “freezes” the 1991 “Taiwan independence plank” there are some important differences among influential people on the Mainland. No one thinks such a step would be enough to totally satisfy Beijing. But some say it would be a substantial step forward and could generate a proportionately substantial step on the Mainland’s part, perhaps in terms of opening party-to-party contacts. Others, however, say that while freezing the plank would be a “right step,” this could amount to no more than “playing with words.” After all, that plank and the 1999 Kaohsiung resolution on Taiwan’s future, which Tsai has described as “the DPP’s The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 71 consensus,” are two sides of the same coin. Both endorse separatism. “The two resolutions have a logical connection.” The bottom line one hears from virtually everyone on the Mainland is that Beijing has enough courage, determination, patience, and time to resolve the Taiwan issue and there is no reason to abandon a policy of many years’ standing. Meanwhile, although it is possible that the two sides can reach some agreement on passengers transiting Taiwan on the way to other destinations,86 there seems to be little if any prospect that the Mainland will acquiesce in greater international space for Taiwan before 2016, be that responding to Taiwan’s desire for participation in some UN specialized agencies or in terms of Taipei’s ability to conclude bilateral or regional economic agreements.87 (In that regard, it is noteworthy that some recent press reports indicated Beijing would like to conclude the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership [RCEP] in which the PRC is a major player by the end of 2015.)88 2015 will in all probability see a continuation of the series of meetings between the heads of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office. After much to-ing and fro-ing, and in a context of efforts to deny there is stagnation in cross-Strait relations,89 MAC head Wang Yu-chi did accompany Vincent Siew to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting in November 2014, where he and TAO head Zhang Zhijun agreed on six fairly broad points.90 They were due to meet again in Kinmen in early February, but a combination of a civil aviation accident in Taipei and (at least from Taiwan’s perspective) Beijing’s then-insistence on activating a civil aviation route near the center line of the Taiwan Strait led to postponement.91 At that point, fate stepped in and Wang resigned when prosecutors decided there was a lack of evidence to prosecute Wang’s former deputy for leaking secret information to the Mainland.92 A career diplomat who was at that moment the vice minister of Defense, Andrew Hsia Li-yan, took his place. Eventually Beijing agreed to postpone activation of the controversial air route, and so, though the issue remains unresolved, one could expect a Hsia-Zhang meeting in the not too distant future.93 One thing that will likely not be on the agenda, however, is the prospect of political talks, which Hsia, like his predecessor, has ruled out as premature due to a lack of domestic consensus and mutual trust.94 Although President Ma would like to finish off the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) agenda before he leaves office, this seems unlikely to happen. Based on conversations in Taipei, the most one should expect from the LY in terms of cross-Strait activity is passage of a supervisory bill giving the legislature a greater role in any dealings with the Mainland. But with eight competing drafts of the bill now before the legislature,95 even that is not certain. In that context, it is interesting, however, that the DPP is beginning to focus on the fact that it does 72 | Across the Taiwan Strait not want to be seen by Taiwan voters as totally obstructionist regarding cross-Strait dealings. Moreover, in considering the content of the legislation, it is clear that the DPP has started to think about how such a bill could affect its ability to fashion cross- Strait policy should it win the presidency. So the DPP may get behind a bill that could garner KMT support and be enacted into law. Even if a supervisory bill is adopted, however, indications are that there is not time on the legislative calendar for any of the follow-on ECFA agreements to be approved by the LY until after the change of administrations in Taipei in 2016. That includes the services trade agreement that has been sitting in the LY for over 18 months, as well as the commodities trade agreement that is still being negotiated.96 That said, there are hints in the air that when the LY finally does act on the services trade agreement, the DPP might not insist on reopening the existing agreed text but would settle for a supplementary deal to take care of its concerns. Ma would also like to conclude the reciprocal establishment of Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) offices that has been discussed between the two sides for two years. At the very least, according to some senior officials in Taipei, Taiwan hopes that an agreement can be signed even if the offices are not physically established. Even if that happens, however, once Beijing and Taipei come to terms, all eyes will turn to the LY to see how it will handle the agreement when submitted for legislative approval.

Conclusion

All things considered, in terms of real achievements, the prospects are that cross- Strait relations will mark time while the Taiwan elections play themselves out. Meanwhile, all parties on both sides of the Strait will be maneuvering to strike the right balance between seeking their maximalist goals and adopting positions that will actually advance their most basic interests. We will address all of this, including the strong U.S. interest in these subjects, in our next essay. The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 73

Notes

1 Alan D. Romberg, “Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency: Calm on the Surface, Paddling Like Hell Underneath,” China Leadership Monitor (CLM), no. 45, October 21, 2014, http://www.hoover.org/research/cross-strait-relations-portrayals-consistency-calm-surface- paddling-hell-underneath. 2 The KMT itself identified six reasons for its crushing defeat: A) The electorate cast their votes against the KMT to express dissatisfaction with KMT governance. B) The KMT failed to win the hearts and minds of the younger generation, including by ignoring the rallying effectiveness of the Internet. C) The KMT failed to effectively integrate Internet resources with the real world. D) The negative campaigning in the Taipei City mayoral election had spillover effects in other cities and counties. E) The KMT’s position in opposition to some civic groups adversely affected the KMT’s response to certain social issues. F) The KMT misjudged core campaign issues and failed to adjust its campaign strategies accordingly. (“KMT releases election review report, listing six major reasons for defeat,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], December 11, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=articl e&mnum=112&anum=15524.) 3 Kay Liu, “DPP wins higher percentage of popular vote than KMT in elections,” Central News Agency (hereafter abbreviated as CNA), November 30, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ aipl/201411300004.aspx. 4 “Ko: I reached verbal agreement with DPP last June,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), November 20, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&a num=15426. This is spelled out in further detail below; see endnote 53. 5 “KMT’s Hu Lags Behind in Poll by Only 3 Percentage Points in Taichung,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), November 14, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=articl e&mnum=112&anum=15402. 6 In Taipei, the independent candidate, Ko Wen-je, won by over 244,000 votes, pulling in some 57.16 percent of the ballots as against KMT candidate Sean Lien’s 40.82 percent. (Loa Iok-sin and Shih Hsiu-chua, “KMT Trounced,” Taipei Times, November 30, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes. com/News/front/archives/2014/11/30/2003605650.) 7 Kay Liu, “DPP wins higher percentage of popular vote,” see endnote 3. Since this was the first time that the special municipality elections were held alongside the city and county polls, an exact comparison is not possible. But it should be noted that in 2010 the DPP also won a higher percentage of the popular vote in the mayoral elections in the then-five special municipalities, 49.87 percent vs. 44.54 percent. 8 “KMT garners 1.9 million fewer votes compared to 2012 general elections,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), December 15, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=arti cle&mnum=112&anum=15539. This leaves open the hope for the KMT that in the next general election, in 2016, its supporters will turn out in greater numbers than they did this time around in the local elections. 9 “2014 Local Elections, Taipei City municipal mayor election,” November 30, 2014, provided to the author in hard copy. Although Ko has proven to be something of a wild card as a non– professional politician during his first three months in office, ruffling feathers among both some of his staff and various elements of the public (see endnote 54), his unorthodox style has proven extremely popular. A poll in early February indicated that he shared the highest respondent satisfaction rate among the six major municipality mayors (68 percent with Kaohsiung Mayor 74 | Across the Taiwan Strait

Chen Chu), shared the second highest rate of confidence in his future administration (70 percent, also with Chen Chu, slightly behind Tainan Mayor William Lai Ching-te), and third highest popularity (63 percent, several points behind Chen and Lai but well ahead of all others). (“Public Opinion Poll on the satisfaction rate of the six major municipality mayors one month after they took office” (六都市長就職一個月滿意度調查), TVBS, February 3, 2015, http://cc.tvbs.com.tw/ portal/file/poll_center/2017/20170602/20150203170729146.pdf.) 10 Stacy Hsu, “Strong disapproval of Ma led to KMT’s rout: survey,” Taipei Times, December 3, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/12/03/2003605849. The poll reported in this article was conducted by the Taiwan Thinktank over the two days following the election. The same organization conducted a poll in late December and reported that 87.3 percent of respondents (including 57.7 percent who self-identified as being affiliated with the “pro-Blue” camp) cited “below-par governance by the KMT central government” as a reason for the trouncing, 36.7 percent blamed it on the KMT candidates, but only 17.5 percent said the outcome was due to the DPP being a better party. (Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Ma’s disapproval rating hits record high,” Taipei Times, December 25, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archi ves/2014/12/25/2003607535.) 11 “DPP to play stabilizing role: Tsai,” Taiwan News Online, December 3, 2014, http://www. taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2635970. 12 Typical was a poll in late February by the Want China Times Media Group that showed Tsai would win 41.7 percent of voters’ support against what most people think would be the strongest KMT team, KMT Chair Chu Li-luan at the top of the ticket and Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng as VP candidate. That team garnered only 33.1 percent support. Over 57 percent of respondents thought that the DPP would win as against 9.2 percent who thought the KMT would. (“57.4% of voters favor DPP for Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election,” February 28, 2015, http:// www.wantchinatimes.co m/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150228000027&cid=1101.) 13 Romberg, “Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency,” (see endnote 1), p. 8. 14 Taiwan Indicators Survey Research (TISR), “Party identification tracking analysis in Taiwan,” March 5, 2015, http://www.taiwansecurity.org/files/archive/325_e896e30b.pdf. 15 Jason Pan, “Eric Chu survives with razor-thin majority,” Taipei Times, November 30, 2014, http:// www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/11/30/2003605659. 16 Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Eric Chu puts hand up for KMT role,” Taipei Times, December 13, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/12/13/2003606611. Chu’s December 11 announcement was posted on his Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/llchu under the heading “Restoring the founding spirit of the KMT; standing side-by-side with the people” (找回 創黨精神 和人民站在一起). 17 Elaine Hou, “KMT comes out on top in councilor elections,” CNA, November 30, 2014, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201411300007.aspx. Independents won 203 council seats and minor parties took 27. 18 Alison Hsiao, “KMT victorious in 15 council speaker ballots,” Taipei Times, December 26, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/12/26/2003607618. 19 Ted Chen, “KMT takes council speaker position in 5 of 6 special municipalities,” CNA, December 25, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201412250021.aspx. The speaker’s election in Tainan, however, where a KMT councilor was chosen by a council where the DPP held a 28-16 advantage over the KMT, was strongly believed to have been the result of bribery. Not only was the victor detained on vote-buying charges, but the DPP expelled five party members for being part of the conspiracy leading to that outcome. (Enru Lin, “DPP expels five Tainan City councilors,” China Post, January 1, 2015, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national- news/2015/01/01/425394/D PP-expels.htm. Now at https://chinapost.nownews.com/20150101-60053.) The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 75

20 The latest evidence of this occurred when, during a speech in the United States recently, a DPP spokeswoman referred to massive graft by Chen Shui-bian and attacked Chen’s son for forcing the party to reinstate his membership. (“DPP spokeswoman: Chen Shui-bian accepted huge sums of money from land development companies,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], March 9, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=15896.) Although the spokeswoman later apologized and resigned her DPP post, the prosecutor’s office said it would look into the graft charge. In the wake of all of that, although Tsai Ing-wen denied there was any factional infighting (“DPP leader rejects reports about factional infighting,” Taiwan News Online, March 14, 2015, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content. php?id=2703184), she called on members to be “cautious” regarding remarks about the party and its members, noting that inappropriate remarks could lead to unnecessary dissension and quarrels in party ranks, exacerbating challenges the party will face “from within, from our own pride and selfishness.” (“Tsai calls for unity and harmony in DPP,” Taiwan News Online, March 12, 2015, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2701910.) 21 “DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen statement on Nov. 29 elections results,” DPP, November 29, 2014, http:// english.dpp.org.tw/the-taiwanese-people-have-spoken/. 22 Chen Hui-Ping, “DPP sets out ‘three principles,’” Taipei Times, December 21, 2014, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/12/21/2003607227. 23 “Create an era that truly belongs to the people” (開創一個真正屬於人民的時代), February 14, 2015, https://zh-tw.facebook.com/tsaiingwen. 24 “Supporters weigh in on Tsai Ing-wen’s candidacy in 2016,” Taiwan News Online, February 2, 2015, http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=2690228&lang=eng_news&cate_ rss=TAIWAN_eng. Now at https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2690228. 25 “Chao Tien-lin: Both sides of the Strait have responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” (趙天麟：兩岸雙方都有責任維護台海和平穩定), DPP, March 5, 2015, http:// www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?&sn=7739”; “Chen Yun-peng [DPP spokesman]: Using the ‘three benefits’ and ‘three insists’ to promote peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations” (鄭運鵬： 以「三個有利」,「三個堅持」推動兩岸和平穩定關係), DPP, March 4, 2015, http://www.dpp. org.tw/news_content.php?&sn=7738. 26 As spelled out by the DPP’s director of China Affairs, Chao Tien-lin, the “three benefits” are that the promotion of cross-Strait relations in the future should benefit the development of freedom and democracy, that they should benefit the security and stability of regional peace, and that cross-Strait exchanges should be reciprocal and mutually beneficial. The “three insists” consist of making sure that the government’s policy-making is democratic and transparent, that cross-Strait exchanges and interactions should be based on the interests of the public, and that exchanges should be conducted with diversified participation under conditions of equal opportunity and that any fruits growing out of those interactions are shared by the whole society. (“Chao Tien-lin: Both sides of the Strait have responsibility to maintain peace,” see endnote 25. Despite this effort to change the focus away from the Mainland’s emphasis on “one China,” a senior PRC official dismissed the relevance of the “three benefits” and “three insists” to cross- Strait relations, noting that it would be hard to connect them with the “1992 Consensus.” (Lan Hsiao-wei and Lu Su-mei, “Chen Deming: The two sides of the Strait cannot bypass the 1992 Consensus” [陳德銘：兩岸無法繞過九二共識], China Times, March 13, 2015, http://www. chinatimes.com/newspapers/20150313000911-260108.) 27 Sophia Yeh and Elaine Hou, “DPP vows to maintain cross-Strait peace if it returns to power,” CNA, March 6, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201503060009.aspx. 28 Zane Kheir, “Tsai Ing-wen vows cross-Strait stability,” China Post, February 16, 2015, http://www. chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/02/16/429120/Tsai-Ing-wen.htm. 29 Chu won an uncontested election with 99.6 percent of the votes cast. Although turnout was relatively low, especially in Taipei, and so Chu’s total vote count was somewhat shy of Ma Ying- jeou’s when he won reelection as party chair in 2013 (196,065 vs. 202,750), the percentage of votes 76 | Across the Taiwan Strait

Chu won was the highest since the KMT first allowed members to vote for chairman in 2001. (Wen Kuei-hsiang, Claudia Liu, and Lilian Wu, “Eric Chu elected Kuomintang chairman,” CNA, January 17, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201501170027.aspx.) 30 “Eric Chu vows to transform KMT into party for all,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), December 29, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&a num=15607. 31 Ibid. 32 In fact, there is an ongoing debate about whether the income gap is actually growing. But the “true facts” probably matter very little, since the popular perception is that the gap is widening, and that the benefits of cross-Strait economic ties, including under the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), are unfairly distributed. In that regard, although the DPP has taken a strong view that the large corporations have overwhelmingly benefited at the expense of smaller firms that constitute the vast majority of the Taiwan enterprises, economic officials and President Ma himself argue that this is not so. As Ma said, “98% of Taiwan’s enterprises are small-to-medium sized. These enterprises also benefit from cross-Strait trade as 49.96% of those enterprises do business under [ECFA].” (“President Ma: 1992 Consensus is foundation of cross-Strait relations,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], February 25, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=15844.) Moreover, while unemployment as a whole is dropping, unemployment of young people, especially between 19 and 24 years of age, remains high and has fueled much of the youth discontent that has erupted. (According to Taiwan statistics, the unemployment rate for people aged 19–24, the politically active group of concern here, stood at 12.52 percent in January 2015. (“Manpower survey results in January 2015,” Directorate of Budget, Accounting and Statistics [DGBAS], http://eng.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=37139 &ctNode=1830&mp=5.) While this reflected a decrease over time, it was still obviously very high and stood in stark contrast to the overall unemployment rate of 3.71 percent. (“Important indicator based on manpower survey results, by year,” DBGAS, http://eng.stat.gov.tw/public/ Attachment/5225143152H1A3FB2M.pdf.) Perhaps another factor leading to youth dissatisfaction is that while over 60 percent of job respondents to a recent poll expressed interest in working in the Mainland, this was down nine percentage points from 2009 and set a new six-year low. This drop-off was attributed in part to the Mainland’s gradual economic slowdown and shifting consumer trends, which have tended to disadvantage jobseekers from Taiwan. Other top factors cited by respondents were “living condition considerations,” “unwillingness to leave [the] homeland,” and “dislike of local customs and habits.” (Enru Lin, “Taiwanese interest in China jobs slides,” China Post, February 26, 2015, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/asia-taiwan/2015/02/26/429726/Taiwanese-interest.htm. Now at https://chinapost.nownews.com/20150226-51159.) 33 Alison Hsiao, “Chu pushes for ‘open,’ stronger KMT at meetings,” Taipei Times, January 3, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/01/03/2003608363. 34 “Chu calls for unity in KMT,” Taiwan News Online, January 2, 2015, http://www.taiwannews.com. tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2659282. 35 “Eric Chu favors France’s semi presidential system: Report,” China Post, January 11, 2015, http:// www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/01/11/426220/Eric-Chu.htm. 36 Kelven Huang and Y.F. Low, “Chu to bid for KMT chair, rules out 2016 run,” CNA, December 12, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201412120008.aspx. 37 Claudia Liu and Y.F. Low, “New KMT chairman vows to synchronize executive, legislative branches,” CNA, January 19, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201501190011.aspx. 38 Claudia Liu and Jay Chen, “KMT announces executive shakeup,” CNA, January 19, 2015, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201501190010.aspx. 39 Claudia Liu and Elizabeth Hsu, “KMT drops legal action against legislative speaker in membership case,” CNA, February 25, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201502250018.aspx. The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 77

40 Claudia Liu and Elizabeth Hsu, “Ma disappointed at KMT’s decision to drop legal actions against Wang,” CNA, February 25, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201502250028.aspx. 41 Yang Yi, “Chu brings Ma into line and emerges as dominant voice within KMT,” WantChinaTimes.com, March 6, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?i d=20150306000060&cid=1101. 42 “Chu, Ma and Wang put aside their differences in show of unity,” Formosa Television News (FTVN), March 2, 2015, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=8191691B2BFD0CF0BFAE 600D3EEB7D99. 43 “KMT reshuffles think tank,” Taiwan News Online, February 20, 2015, http://www.taiwannews. com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2686781. 44 “National Policy Foundation, KMT Think Tank, Reorganized, Eric Chu Doubles as NPF Chairman,” Press release by KMT Culture and Communications Committee, February 10, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=111&anum=15799. 45 “KMT revamping local chapter leadership,” China Post, January 25, 2015, http://www.chinapost. com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/01/25/427354/KMT-revamping.htm. 46 “KMT layoffs incite backlash from staff,” Taiwan News Online, January 30, 2015, http://www. taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2680607. 47 “KMT revamping local chapter leadership,” (see endnote 45). 48 Jerome Keating, “Home stretch of presidential race,” Taipei Times, Op-ed, March 8, 2015, http:// www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/03/08/2003613023. 49 See endnote 19. 50 Loa Iok-sin, “DPP members protest primary rules, schedule,” Taipei Times, February 12, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/02/12/2003611397. 51 Katherine Wei, “Koo criticizes worldview of DPP’s Tsai,” China Post, February 5, 2015, http:// www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/02/05/428263/ Koo-criticizes.htm. Now at https://chinapost.nownews.com/20150205-54146. 52 The importance of younger voters was evident in an analysis done by the Academia Sinica’s Institute of European and American Studies. According to that assessment, whereas youth turnout had been about 60 percent in previous elections, it rose to 74 percent in November. This increase was seen as particularly important when compared with overall voter turnout of 67.5 percent. (Stacy Hsu, “Strong disapproval of Ma led to KMT’s rout: survey,” Taipei Times, December 3, 2014, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/12/03/2003605849.) Of relevance here is a recent poll that revealed that while over two-thirds of respondents do not approve of ultimate unification, among young people between 20 and 29 years of age the number is particularly high at 84 percent. (Chen Hui-ping, “Taiwan Indicator Survey Research [TISR], 84 percent of young people oppose unification” [台灣指標民調 八成四年輕人反對統一], Liberty Times, February 13, 2015, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/855726. Original TISR survey is at http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=5147.) Moreover, not only has Tsai continued to express support for the Sunflower Movement activists (recently indicted in connection with the occupation of government buildings last spring) for their “pursuit of democracy” (“Tsai Ing-wen, DPP show full support for indicted Sunflowers,” Taiwan News Online, February 11, 2015, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content. php?id=2687207), she is actively seeking greater participation from younger party members (“‘Open DPP’ seeks input from younger party members,” Taiwan News Online, February 2, 2015, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2681949) and has expressed an intention to cooperate with social movements and other forces in the run-up to the 2016 elections. (“DPP leader to talk to social movements as new parties emerge,” Taiwan News Online, February 24, 2015, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2693276.) (A report on the indictment of the Sunflower Movement activists is at “More than 100 Sunflower Movement activists indicted,” Taiwan News Online, February 10, 2015, http://www.taiwannews. com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2686647.) 78 | Across the Taiwan Strait

The degree to which Tsai is hoping to attract younger voters is also evident in her intention to rely on social networking platforms such as Facebook and the messaging app Line as a crucial part of her campaign. (Lu Chin-tsu, “DPP’s Tsai to promote campaign through Facebook and Line,” WantChinaTimes.com, March 10, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?c id=1101&MainCatID=11&id=20150310000110.) Finally, however, a complication in all of this is that the 2016 election may come at the time of university examinations, thus suppressing turnout by many potential younger voters, especially in the northern part of Taiwan. (“2016 presidential and legislative elections may conflict with university exams,” FTVN, March 9, 2015, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=180555 954705759C79942A0C5DDB8B4D.) Although the DPP’s first instinct was apparently to seek a change in the election date (which is still under consideration as of this writing), it subsequently proposed that universities adjust their commencement and examination dates to facilitate students’ ability to return to their hometowns to vote. (Alison Hsiao, “DPP urges university term date changes,” Taipei Times, March 11, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archi ves/2015/03/11/2003613288.) That proposal is also still pending. 53 “Ko: I reached verbal agreement with DPP last June,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), November 20, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&a num=15426. The full text reads: (1) On values and policy objectives, Ko pledges: A) I will discuss with other DPP city mayoral and county executive candidates how to formulate a joint platform, which will become my policy objectives if I am elected; B) If I am elected, I will jointly discuss important issues with DPP local government heads and after reaching a consensus, I will adopt a common stance. The DPP pledges: A) If Ko is elected, the DPP will not demand that he join the DPP; B) If Ko is elected, the DPP will not interfere with his personnel arrangements. (2) On campaigning structures, Ko pledges: A) I will do my utmost to stump for all 27 DPP candidates running for Taipei City Council for the sake of the smooth governance of Taipei City if I am elected; B) On the part of stumping for the DPP sub-district chief candidates, the Ko campaign office will participate in the nomination and campaigning task force set up by the DPP Taipei chapter. The DPP pledges: A) DPP Taipei City Council candidates will do their utmost to stump for Ko to win the election; B) The DPP Taipei chapter will promptly arrange for Ko to meet with DPP grassroots cadres to exchange views. 54 A sample of media headlines over the weeks starting even before Ko took office on December 25, 2014, will give readers a flavor of Ko’s “governing style” and the controversies he has stirred up. (Actually, similar verbal or administrative gaffes were evident during the campaign, but the following list should suffice to make the point.) It should be noted that in many of these cases, remedies were found, but that the controversies keep occurring has caught people’s attention. · “Mayor-elect’s vision of ‘open government’ raises doubts,” CNA, December 7, 2014. · “Ko backs discarded rail route,” Taipei Times, December 8, 2014. · “Taipei-Yilan rail rethink criticized,” China Post, December 8, 2014. · “Ko shortcomings clear without Lien,” Taipei Times (editorial), December 12, 2014. · “Ko’s decision over cultural director sparks criticism,” Taipei Times, December 18, 2014. · “6 Ko advisers quit over rumored culture pick,” China Post, December 18, 2014. · “Fifteen of Ko’s policy advisors resign over top executives selection process,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), December 22, 2014. · “Ko wants to know officials’ itineraries,” Taiwan News Online, January 3, 2014. · “One week in, independent Taipei mayor draws ire of DPP, KMT,” CNA, January 3, 2015. · “Ko’s new rules eye officials’ social lives,” Taipei Times, January 4, 2015. The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 79

· “Authority and authoritarianism: Leader, boss, tyrant,” United Daily News (editorial), January 16, 2015. · “Taipei mayor Ko faces rare criticism over police comments,” China Post, January 26, 2015. · “Taipei mayor blasted for being rude in criticizing gift,” CNA, January 26, 2015. · “Taipei mayor’s comments on benefits of colonization draw rebukes,” CNA, January 30, 2015. · “‘Don’t make me angry:’ Taipei to probe leak of internal document,” CNA, January 31, 2015. · “Ko is wrong in his ignorant evaluation of cultures,” China Post (editorial), February 2, 2015. · “Chinese media threatens Taipei after mayor’s remarks,” CNA, February 2, 2015. · “Taipei mayor angers gender rights activists,” CNA, March 7, 2015. 55 “Taiwan Affairs Office looks for recognition of the 1992 Consensus, Ko asks: what is the content?” (國台辦盼承認九二共識 柯P：內容是什麼), Apple Daily, November 25, 2014, http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20141125/512735/. Subsequently Ko expressed the hope that the annual Taipei-Shanghai forum could proceed regardless of differences over the 1992 Consensus. (Huang Yi-yuan and Chuang Hsiu-min, “Ko Wen-je: Already exchanged notes with Shanghai mayor, the twin-city forum should definitely be held” (已照會上海市長 柯文哲： 雙城論壇一定要辦), UDN, March 6, 2015, http://udn. com/news/story/7853/749299.) However, the initial response from Shanghai Mayor Yang Xiong did not say whether the forum would continue to be held. Instead it stressed that cooperation between Shanghai and Taipei had always been based on the “1992 Consensus.” Yang added that he hoped in the future both cities could continue to promote the peaceful development of cross- Strait relations on the basis of that Consensus with the concerted efforts made by all circles on Taiwan. (“Shanghai Mayor: Twin-city forums to be held on basis of ‘1992 Consensus,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], March 9, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=a rticle&mnum=112&anum=15889.) 56 “Tsai Ing-wen says that, in speaking of “two countries, one system,” Ko was thinking about expressing sovereignty and democracy” (談兩國一制論 蔡英文：柯想表達主權和民主), Liberty Times, February 2, 2015, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1221679. 57 “57.4% of voters favor DPP for Taiwan’s 2016 presidential election,” WantChinaTimes.com, February 28, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20150228000027 &cid=1101. 58 “Julian Kuo: Tsai faces three major hurdles in her presidential bid,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), March 3, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=1 12&anum=15866. 59 “Newspaper poll shows Tsai Ing-wen leading other candidates in presidential poll,” FTVN, February 16, 2015, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=CDD6472296C4D6CEC5412DF 2F48935B9 (reporting an Apple Daily poll). 60 Lai Hsiao-tung, “Eric Chu downplays rumors of possible KMT-PFP hook-up,” Taipei Times, February 17, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/02/17/2003611767. The polling data cited came from TVBS. 61 Lin T’ing-yao, “Chu Li-luan responds to Xi Jinping’s telegram: The two sides of the Strait should seek common ground and respect differences” (朱立倫回電習近平：兩岸應求同尊異), United Daily News (UDN), January 17, 2015, https://video.udn.com/news/264394. A photocopy of Chu’s letter is included in the story, as is a photocopy of Xi’s message of congratulations in a companion UDN piece by the same journalist, “Chu Li-luan is elected party head, Xi Jinping wires congratulations” (朱立倫當選黨魁 習近平致賀電), January 17, 2015, http://udn.com/ news/story/1/649697. 62 Chia Pao-nan, “Is a Xi-Chu meeting planned? Chu: Participating in the KMT-CCP forum would be very natural” (朱習會有譜？ 朱：參與國共論壇很自然), UDN, March 10, 2015, http:// paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0001/274803/web/#4L-5641556L. 80 | Across the Taiwan Strait

63 “KMT leader downplays China plans,” Taiwan News Online, March 10, 2015, http://www. taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2700850. Nonetheless, the PRC quickly welcomed the idea of a Chu visit “at a convenient time.” (Zhao Bo, “TAO: Welcome Chairman Chu Li-luan to visit the Mainland at a convenient time” [国台办:欢迎朱立伦主席方便时来大陆参访], Xinhua, March 10, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201503/t20150310_9237341.htm.) Almost as quickly, the DPP LY caucus convener raised questions about the propriety of a Chu-Xi meeting, expressing concern that the KMT would try to force the public to accept any deals struck with Beijing and suggesting that Chu would use any such meeting to evade legislative oversight. (Alison Hsiao, “DPP questions Chu-Xi meeting,” Taipei Times, March 13, 2015, http:// www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/03/13/2003613424.) Nonetheless, one poll showed that over half of respondents thought a Chu-Xi meeting would be helpful to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. (Lin T’ing-yao, “Global Views Survey Research Poll: 50 percent of people believe that a Chu-Xi meeting would be helpful to cross-Strait peace” [遠見民調：5成民眾 認為朱習會有助兩岸和平], March 13, 2015, http:// paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0005/275034/web/#3L-5652915L.) 64 Lawrence Chung, “KMT official in Taiwan warns of ‘psychological impact’ of rapid ties with Mainland China,” South China Morning Post, January 19, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/ china/article/1681890/kmt-official-taiwan-warns-psychological-impact-rapid-ties-mainland- china. 65 “DPP leader promises constructive exchanges with China,” Taiwan News Online, September 23, 2014, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2578015. In all of these statements, Tsai and the DPP only use “China” to speak of the other side, a point made by Mainland officials and experts to underscore their belief that the DPP rejects the notion of “one China” and remains committed to Taiwan independence. (Various personal conversations.) 66 “DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen attends the reception for diplomatic envoys to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the founding of the party” (民進黨主席蔡英文出席紀念創黨28週 年外交使節酒會新聞稿), DPP, September 23, 2014, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content. php?&sn=7363. Tsai titled her talk “Progress for Taiwan—Connecting to the world through democracy, liberty and social justice” (為台灣而進步─以民主、自由、社會正義連結世界). 67 Ibid. 68 Tony Liao and Lilian Wu, “DPP secretary-general speaks on party’s China policy in U.S.,” CNA, December 2, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201412030009.aspx. 69 Yu Donghui, “Wu Jaushieh: Taiwan local elections were not ‘China’s failure’” (吳釗燮:地方選舉 不是“中國的失敗”), China Review News, December 2, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/ doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=93&kindid=7950&docid=103509109. 70 “Frank Hsieh: DPP must change its cross-Strait and economic policies,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), December 3, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article &mnum=112&anum=15483. 71 “Lai Ching-te warns DPP against complacency, advocates engagement with China,” FTVN, December 19, 2014, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=0B9A7BF6BF3406215F65264E 47509C2C. The English is not a word-for-word translation of the Chinese, but both are from the FTVN website. 72 “DPP to convene again ‘[Mainland] China Affairs Committee’ following a long recess,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), January 19, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx ?type=article&mnum=112&anum=15697. 73 “Central Committee proposes that every county and city establish a mechanism to manage cross-Strait relations, to promote high-quality exchanges” (中委會建議各縣市成立兩岸事 務處理機制，推動優質交流), DPP, January 21, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content. php?&sn=7659. 74 Transcript of the TAO press briefing for January 28, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/ xwfbh/201501/t20150128_8856502.htm. The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 81

75 Premier Li Keqiang also addressed Taiwan in his work report to the 3rd session of the 12th National People’s Congress the next day. He used similar points about the political foundation of cross-Strait relations, but in a much more truncated form than Xi had. (“Li Keqiang talks about the orientation of Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan work” (李克强谈港澳台工作方针), Xinhuanet, March 5, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201503/t20150306_9202029.htm.) In his post-NPC press conference, Li made the following comments: People on both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one big family. As long as we continue to adhere to the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, oppose Taiwan independence and uphold peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, we will be able to lay a more solid foundation for cross-Straits business cooperation and expand the room for such business ties. To boost the economic cooperation between the two sides, we need to get both wheels in motion. One wheel is to enhance institution building. For example, the follow-up consultations on ECFA should be advanced. The other wheel is to boost mutual opening-up. As far as the mainland is concerned, closer attention will be paid to the investment made by Taiwan business people on the mainland. Here I would like to ask you to convey a message to all these people, which I believe will prove to be quite reassuring to them, that is the mainland will continue to protect the lawful rights and interests of Taiwan business people on the mainland and continue to pursue preferential policies towards them as appropriate. In terms of opening-up, we will give priority to Taiwan in terms of both depth and intensity of opening-up steps. We welcome people from Taiwan, including young people, to the mainland to do business. We also want to further enhance personnel interflow between the two sides so as to bring the hearts and minds of people across the Straits closer to each other. (“Full text: Premier Li Keqiang meets the press,” Xinhua, March 16, 2015, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/16/c_134071708_11.htm. A video of Li’s press conference is available at http://news.cntv.cn/special/2015lianghui/shipindianbo/zlhjjz/ index.shtml. His comments on Taiwan come at 1:20:53.) 76 “Xi Jinping emphasizes: Sticking to the path of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, promoting joint development benefits compatriots on both sides of the Strait” (习近平强调：坚 持两岸关系和平发展道路 促进共同发展造福两岸同胞), Xinhua, March 4, 2015, http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-03/04/c_1114523789.htm. 77 Alan D. Romberg, “Cross-Strait Relations: Portrayals of Consistency,” CLM 45, endnote 58. 78 Resolutely pursue peaceful development, adhere to the common political foundation, bring benefits to the people on both sides of the Strait, and join hands in realizing national rejuvenation. A version of this is outlined in Sun Liji, “Xi’s principle to shape cross-Strait relations,” Global Times, March 8, 2015, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/910842.shtml. 79 Private conversations. 80 我们始终把坚持“九二共识”作为同台湾当局和各政党开展交往的基础和条件, 核心是认 同大陆和台湾同属一个中国.只要做到这一点，台湾任何政党和团体同大陆交往都不会存 在障碍.“台独”分裂势力及其活动损害国家主权和领土完整，企图挑起两岸民众和社会 对立,割断两岸同胞精神纽带，是两岸关系和平发展的最大障碍，是台海和平稳定的最大 威胁，必须坚决反对。两岸同胞要对“台独”势力保持高度警惕. A good English-language summary of Xi’s remarks is available at “Xi Jinping: Cross-Strait relations to return to turbulence without 1992 Consensus,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), March 5, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&a num=15874. A Mainland scholar known for seeking constructive approaches to cross-Strait relations, Shanghai Institute of East Asian Studies Director Zhang Nianchi, put the case even more bluntly: “If a DPP that has not “engaged in soul-searching,’ that has not ‘undergone a major transformation,’ and that is ‘anti-China’ takes power again in 2016, not only would it be a huge disaster for the two 82 | Across the Taiwan Strait

sides of the Strait, it would also be an unprecedented disaster for Taiwan.” (一個沒有“反省”的 民進黨，一個沒有“轉型”的民進黨，一個“反中”的民進黨，倘若2016年可以重新上 台，不啻是兩岸一場巨大災難，也是台灣的一場空前災難; Zhang Nianchi, “On Xi Jinping’s view of unification” [論習近平的統一觀], Zhongguo Pinglun (monthly), November 2014, No. 203, http://mag.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/search/siteDetail.jsp?id=103455415&sw=13. Now at http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1034/5/5/4/103455415.html?coluid=33&kindid=546&do cid=103455415.) A week after Xi’s remarks, TAO head Zhang Zhijun authored an article in People’s Daily commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law (Romberg, “Cross-Strait Relations: In Search of Peace,” CLM, no. 23, January 2008, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/ files/uploads/documents/CLM23AR.pdf, p. 6). In it, Zhang stressed legal dimensions of cross- Strait relations and the commitment to completing unification. But he also said he held out a vision that “the national unification we pursue will not be unification in form only, but more importantly one in which people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share the same mindset” ( 我们所追求的国家统一不仅是形式上的统一，更重要的是两岸同胞心灵契合). The fact of the matter is that this is unlikely to have any particular appeal in Taiwan in any foreseeable timeframe. (An English report of Zhang’s remarks is found in Yin Chun-chieh and Lilian Wu, “China to push cross-Strait peace via ‘legal’ means: official,” CNA, March 13, 2015, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201503130021.aspx. Zhang’s original article is found at “Zhang Zhijun: Use legal methods to promote peaceful development of cross-Strait relations” (张志军：运用 法治方式扎实推进两岸关系和平发展), People’s Daily, March 13, 2015, http://tw.people.com. cn/n/2015/0313/c14657-26688584.html.) 81 “Tsai Ing-wen: The two sides of the Strait have responsibility to uphold peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, but must attach importance to public opinion, transparency and communication,” DPP, March 6, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?&sn=7740. 82 See endnote 25. 83 Sophia Yeh and Elaine Hou, “DPP vows to maintain cross-Strait peace if it returns to power,” CNA, March 6, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201503060009.aspx. One such substantive issue that does not receive a lot of public attention but is clearly on the minds of people on the Mainland is how a DPP administration would handle the so-called “9-dashed line” or “U-shaped line” in the South China Sea. Some readers may recall that we alluded to Mainland sensitivity to Taiwan’s handling of South China Sea issues a year and a half ago when Taiwan reached a reconciliation agreement with the Philippines in 2013. (Romberg, “Settling in the for the Long Haul: Stability with Chinese Characteristics,” CLM 42, October 2013, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/rese arch/docs/clm42ar.pdf, endnote 46.) Subsequently Ma Ying-jeou adopted a position that was widely seen as consistent with international practice – including with regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – but that did not give up the territorial claims and thus avoided a rift with Beijing. (“Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou clarifies the ‘U-shaped’ line,” BienDong.net, December 9, 2014, http:// www.southchinasea.com/analysis/934-taiwanese-president-ma-ying-jeou-clarifies-the-u-shaped- line.html.) Senior PRC experts, however, have recently expressed concern that a DPP administration might give up those claims. (Private conversations.) These concerns will no doubt be further fueled by a recent statement by a KMT LY member that a former DPP vice minister of defense had told the Voice of America the DPP was mulling relinquishing Taiwan’s claims. (Lawrence Chiu, Lu Hsin- hui, and Ted Chen, “Defense minister to brief legislators on Spratly Islands,” CNA, March 8, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201503080014.aspx.) 84 Claudia Liu and Ted Chen, “Combined legislative, presidential elections to take place in 2016: CEC,” February 12, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201502120027.aspx. The difference in how the two parties see their equities affected by such an arrangement is apparent in Chu Li-luan’s expressed skepticism about combining the elections (Chen Hui-ping and Jake Chung, The Times They Are A-Changin’ | 83

“Chu pans plan to combine polls,” Taipei Times, February 3, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/taiwan/archives/2015/02/03/2003610710) and Tsai Ing-wen’s hope to institutionalize the arrangement. (“DPP chairwoman wants law combining all future presidential and legislative elections,” FTVN, February 13, 2015, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=35A804C4753 BC7353578A9F38A602571) 85 PRC officials generally refer to the “1992 Consensus,” but what comes through clearly is that any consensus with a “one China” element will serve as the basis for cross-Strait relations and that, conversely, without that the relationship will suffer. Some people point to the utility of the “1992 Consensus” because of what they call its “constructive ambiguity.” On the other hand, there is widespread recognition on the Mainland that, since the term is a KMT invention, and since the DPP – including Tsai personally – has said there was no consensus, it is virtually impossible for the DPP to adopt that wording. 86 Technical talks were held in Beijing in late November, shortly after the Zhang-Wang meeting addressed below. While it was agreed that further discussions would be held, SEF reflected a degree of skepticism in issuing a statement expressing the hope that the Mainland would present a viable plan soon to provide convenience for Chinese travelers and help enhance exchange between people on both sides. (Yin Chun-chieh and Y.F. Low, “Taiwan, China open talks on cross-Strait transit,” CNA, November 27, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201411270015. aspx.) 87 Last summer Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun had agreed to undertake a joint study on the question of participation in regional economic integration. Nothing happened until January, but even then the consultations held in Beijing were only “preparations” for such joint research. As the TAO spokesman explained, the two sides exchanged comments on the goals, principles, agenda, and procedures of initiating the joint research. (Transcript of the TAO press briefing, January 28, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201501/t20150128_8856502.htm.) That being said, Taipei has been actively negotiating less comprehensive but important deals with various neighbors, including, for example, 10 agreements that have been signed with Japan since early 2013. (Tang Pei-chun and Maobo Chang, “Taiwan, Japan sign 4 MOUs, working toward economic pact: official,” CNA, November 20, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ aipl/201411200027.aspx.) It also has negotiated numerous specific agreements with others such as the recently signed aviation pact with Poland. (“Taiwan, Poland ink air transport pact,” Taiwan Today, March 11, 2015, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=228156&ctNode=445.) 88 Koh Gui Qing and Pete Sweeney, “China says aims to finish Asian free-trade talks by December,” Reuters, March 7, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/07/us-china-parliament-trade- idUSKBN0M303620150307. 89 “Zhang Zhijun affirms that the results of the Zhang-Wang meeting are beneficial to the continued promotion of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations” (张志军肯定张王会成果有益 于继续推动两岸关系和平发展), [a transcript of Zhang’s session with reporters’ immediately after the Zhang-Wang meeting], Taiwan Affairs Office, November 13, 2014, http://www.gwytb. gov.cn/wyly/201411/t20141113_7990664.htm. 90 They were: · Peaceful development of cross-Strait relations should be promoted steadily on the foundation of the 1992 Consensus. · Both sides will actively promote ECFA follow-up consultations, including the commodities trade agreement. · With regard to the establishment of reciprocal SEF and ARATS offices, both sides will properly handle issues that concern the two sides of the Strait and promote consultations to hammer out pending issues as soon as possible. · They will authorize SEF and ARATS to hold consultations on transit connections to foreign destinations for Mainland tourists in Taiwan without the current red tape. 84 | Across the Taiwan Strait

· With regard to enhancing cross-Strait economic cooperation and Taiwan’s accession to regional economic integration agreements, MAC and TAO will both start to study concrete measures to promote those ends. · Both sides agree to continually strengthen cooperation with regard to food safety issues on the basis of the cross-Strait Food Safety Agreement concluded in 2008. (“Wang and Zhang reach six points of consensus in Beijing,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], November 13, 2014, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=11 2&anum=15392.) 91 “Both sides agree to postpone ‘Wang-Zhang meeting,’” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), February 6, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&a num=15786. 92 Page Tsai, Y.F. Low and Lilian Wu, “Prosecutors drop case against former MAC deputy chief,” CNA, February 10, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201502100018.aspx. 93 The TAO spokesperson stated on March 11 that the two sides have “continuously maintained communication” (一直保持着沟通) regarding a date for Zhang to visit Taiwan and meet with the head of MAC. (Transcript of TAO press briefing, March 11, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov. cn/xwfbh/201503/t20150311_9251552.htm.) While we assume a visit might come relatively soon, this statement, in response to a question, did not provide much of a clue about when that might be. 94 Shih Hsiu-chuan, “No cross-Strait political talks: Hsia,” Taipei Times, March 10, 2015, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/03/10/2003613188. 95 Li Wen, “Sunflower anniversary to be marked by rallies,” Taipei Times, March 10, 2015, http:// www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/03/10/2003613208. 96 Some in the DPP believe a commodities agreement will be less complicated than the services trade agreement because it affects fewer people, but one nonetheless gets the impression from conversations in Taipei that a major problem in getting a commodities agreement is that Beijing is holding back on items Taipei wants to include. (Private conversations.)

Chapter Four

Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity

China Leadership Monitor, No. 47 July 14, 2015

Although the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) is only scheduled to name its presidential candidate in mid-June, the campaign has been well under way since late spring. While the KMT has sought to keep public attention focused on cross-Strait issues, opposition candidate Tsai Ing-wen has sought to neutralize the issue by declaring that she would maintain the “status quo of peace and stability” while at the same time deflecting attention from it by arguing that there are more important domestic issues at stake. Still, Tsai dropped some intriguing if ambiguous hints of flexibility on cross-Strait policy during her Washington visit in early June.

Though largely following lessons learned in the past about the potential backlash from interfering in Taiwan elections, Beijing has continued to emphasize that adherence to a “one China” approach is essential to keeping cross-Strait relations on an even keel. Nonetheless, some nuance has also been discernible in the Mainland’s statements.

Tsai Is Nominated by DPP, Seeks to Project an Image of Unity and Responsibility

In mid-April, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) formally nominated its chairperson, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, as the party’s candidate in the January 2016 presidential contest, automatically placing her in an advantageous position due to the shift in political fortunes in the November 2014 local elections.1 In accepting the nomination, Tsai attacked the KMT for its failed leadership on domestic issues such as wealth distribution, unemployment, and Taiwan’s economic governance structure. But articulating an effective cross-Strait policy has proved to be more challenging. As we discuss in more detail below, Beijing has insisted on adherence to the “political foundation” of “one China” if relations are to prosper. Unwilling to directly endorse 88 | Across the Taiwan Strait this position, Tsai has tried to balance the necessity of maintaining workable relations with Beijing against a need to remain true to the DPP’s position on Taiwan’s sovereign, independent status (unrelated to the Mainland). In doing so, she has attempted in various ways to persuade all audiences that she can successfully straddle these requirements. Speaking in early April to the DPP’s China Affairs Committee, Tsai equated “maintenance of the status quo” with “preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait and continuing the current stable development of cross-Strait relations” (維繫台海和平 及持續兩岸關係穩定發展).2 In accepting the party’s nomination several days later, she repeated this mantra but, reflecting both her emphasis on democracy and the need to be true to DPP doctrine, she added that “no matter which party governs in the future, cross-Strait relations must always be in accordance with the will of the people” (無論是哪一黨執政，兩岸關係都必須以人民的意志為依歸).3 As we have seen, this has proven inadequate to stem all criticism from within the party. Editorial commentary from normally supportive media has pointedly observed that DPP supporters have been quick to criticize candidates who did not uphold certain values and ideals.4 Some “dark Green” party members, such as former Vice President Annette Lu Hsiu-lien, have called on Tsai to “clarify” what the “status quo” is, reminding her of the party’s 2007 Normal Nation Resolution as well as the 1991 Taiwan Independence Clause and the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, all of which are grounded in the fundamental principle that Taiwan is a sovereign, independent country separate from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).5 Prominent Taiwan independence advocate Koo Kuan-min, having initially said he supported Tsai, distanced himself from her after her statements. As Koo put it, “Maintaining the status quo would be a fatal wound to the nation. It is the policy that would bring the least trouble. However, it is also the most meaningless one.”6 Pressuring her from another perspective, others in the party argued that while the DPP need not bow to Beijing’s demands to openly embrace “one China,” if it did not explicitly abandon the goal of formal independence, it would destabilize cross-Strait relations7 and bring them to a “screeching standstill.” 8 In response, Tsai has defended her position as one designed to maintain transparency in talks with the Mainland, pay attention to public participation, and emphasize fairness in cross-Strait relations,9 asserting that this is “not inconsistent with” the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future.”10 That being said, Tsai took matters further in a public speech in Washington in early June.11 First, she repeated language used before in committing herself to “a consistent, predictable and sustainable relationship with China.” Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 89

But then, in language that, while ambiguous regarding the question of “one China,” was clearly designed to resonate in Beijing, Tsai expanded on what maintaining the status quo would involve.

If elected President, I will push for the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing ROC [Republic of China] constitutional order.12

In answer to a question, she amplified the definition of the “existing ROC constitutional order,” saying that it includes “the provisions of the constitution, subsequent amendments, interpretations, court decisions, and practices by the government and different sectors of the population. Anything that is related to the constitution, the interpretation, and practices are part of this constitutional order.”13 This language seemed intended to convey the message that while Tsai would not embrace the “political foundation” of “one China,” as Beijing insists, she would not act in a manner inconsistent with it. Along the same lines, although she was unwilling to endorse or even recognize the existence of the “1992 Consensus,” she sought to convey similar consistency regarding the agreements reached that year.

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait should treasure and secure the accumulated outcomes of more than twenty years of negotiations and exchanges. These accumulated outcomes will serve as the firm basis of my efforts to further the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations.14

Tsai said that as president she would follow not only DPP positions but the will of all the people, and would ensure that the “spirit of cooperation” that has underpinned improved relations would continue.

The president elected by the people of Taiwan represents all the people of Taiwan in conducting external affairs. Therefore the conduct of cross-strait policy must transcend the position of a political party and incorporate different views. A leader must take into account public consensus when making decisions. . . .

Through principled engagements, joint initiatives, and dialogue, I will ensure that the spirit of cooperation that has guided the betterment of China-Taiwan relations continues.

Although initial negative responses to Tsai’s speech both by some “dark Green” elements within the DPP as well as by Beijing have been registered,15 more meaningful reactions should become clearer over time. Neither of those audiences was going to like what she said. But at least most people in the DPP camp will likely recognize the importance of her statements to Tsai’s election chances, and the leadership in Beijing 90 | Across the Taiwan Strait may see in them a way out of a potential problem that, in light of all the Mainland’s other challenges, it doesn’t need at this time. In any case, at the same time the DPP has been struggling with articulating its own views in a way that could bridge various gaps, it has strongly criticized KMT Chairman Eric Chu’s continued advocacy of the 1992 Consensus, including his position in a May 4 meeting with Xi Jinping (discussed below). Tsai expressed alarm regarding what she called Chu’s desire to serve as the “custodian” of the 1992 Consensus legacy and to maintain a KMT monopoly on cross-Strait relations. Moreover, in a formal party statement, DPP Chinese Affairs Director Chao Tien- lin severely criticized the KMT chairman for saying that “both sides of the Strait are part of one China” (兩岸同屬一中).16 This, Chao said, went beyond Ma’s “one China, respective interpretations” position, making even greater concessions than Ma with regard to Taiwan’s sovereignty, and further limiting Taiwan’s presence on the international stage.17 The DPP further charged that Chu’s effort to drive cross-Strait relations through KMT-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) channels was an attempt to avoid accountability to the legislature. Not only did the party condemn such an effort, but it foreswore following a similar pattern: “For a long time, the KMT has made cross- Strait relations something between the KMT and the CCP, something that is within the privileged class, and something that is dealt with secretly. The DPP will not follow it and Taiwanese will not accept it.”18 Obviously this does not mean the DPP is giving up on working through some direct channel19 to come up with a formula acceptable on both sides of the Strait for managing relations. Indeed, the language Tsai used at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) may be a reflection of that effort. In any event, we have not reached the end of that story. As Tsai put it in her China Affairs Committee speech, “The DPP will begin dialogues with the Mainland in an active and pragmatic manner, and seek solutions that are acceptable to both sides of the Strait. The DPP will also deal with core issues in cross-Strait relations in a gradual manner and demonstrate our sincerity and resolution to deal with all issues.”20 As part of the effort to facilitate such a relationship, it is evident that Tsai Ing-wen, though not everyone in the DPP, has decided to avoid language that would trigger rejection from Beijing. For example, recently she has stopped referring to Taiwan’s “sovereignty” (主權) separate from “China.” In her speech at the China Affairs Committee meeting, although she referred to “popular sovereignty” as manifest in democracy, when talking of Taiwan’s future Tsai used different terms, speaking of safeguarding “future autonomy” (未來自主性), that is, the “right to choose,” and of preserving the greatest possible space and choice for the next generation (為下一代 留住最多的空間和選擇).21 Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 91

Obviously this does not mean the DPP is compromising its principled stand. Despite Tsai’s avoidance of it, the term “sovereignty” was used in the party’s criticism of Chu Li-luan’s trip to China. It was used again in the statement issued by the DPP Central Standing Committee following its meeting in early May, in which the party committed itself to both the maintenance of peace and stability in the Strait as well as to the protection of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the preservation of the democratic values and future autonomy.22 In commenting specifically on the meeting between the heads of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) scheduled for late May (discussed further below), the DPP also cited sovereignty, saying that any exchange with the Mainland must be based on the principles of “sovereignty, reciprocity, and democracy” (主權, 對等, 民主).23 As noted earlier, Tsai has not focused exclusively on cross-Strait issues. Rather, she has suggested that much more attention should be paid to Taiwan’s many domestic issues. “We all know that playing the cross-Strait card cannot solve all the problems in Taiwan; we need to shift our attention back to domestic economic and social issues that truly concern us” and the “real challenges” that people face.24 She criticized President Ma Ying-jeou for “only talking about cross-Strait relations” in his mid-May interview with the Wall Street Journal. Instead, she said, as the leader of a nation he should reprioritize his agenda and focus on issues such as the domestic economy, income distribution, and food safety.25 Indeed, seemingly adopting a somewhat naïve posture (hard to do for someone as sophisticated as Tsai), she went as far as to say that she didn’t understand why the “1992 Consensus” had become such a hot topic in the wake of Chu’s China trip.26

Mr. Chu Goes to Beijing

After much dodging and weaving about whether he would meet with PRC leader Xi Jinping (and presumably following a lot of behind-the-scenes negotiation), KMT Chairman (and New Taipei Mayor) Chu Li-luan finally made known that he would go to the KMT-CCP forum (formally known as the Cross-Strait Trade and Cultural Forum) in Shanghai on May 3 and meet with Xi in Beijing on May 4. Speaking at the forum, Chu praised the “Joint Vision for Cross-Strait Peaceful Development” laid down by then KMT Chairman Lien Chan and CCP Chairman Hu Jintao in 2005, stressing that the annual forums held since then had propelled the healthy development of cross-Strait relations. Chu called for continuing to push forward peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, deepening exchanges and sharing the fruits of those relations widely, vowing that the KMT would continue to conduct relations on the basis of the “1992 Consensus.”27 Chu’s counterpart at the forum, Yu Zhengsheng, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and fourth-ranking member 92 | Across the Taiwan Strait of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, also made a speech. Foreshadowing a point Xi would make to Chu the next day, Yu observed that, after 10 years of development, “cross-Strait relations are now standing at a new historical starting point” (两岸 关系站在了新的历史起点上). As if to ensure that no one missed his meaning, he immediately continued by stating that what he called obstructionist and destructionist Taiwan independence splittist forces were still the biggest threat to peace and stability across the Strait. The key to moving ahead with peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, Yu said, was to continue to adhere to the political foundation of the “1992 Consensus” and opposition to “Taiwan independence.”28 All of this, of course, was but a prelude to the important business at hand: Chu’s meeting with Xi Jinping the next day. That meeting was not an occasion to strike deals. Rather it allowed both party leaders to lay out the basics of their positions on cross-Strait relations going forward. Whether Xi assumed Chu would, despite his protestations to the contrary, allow himself to become the KMT candidate for president – and possibly even win – seemed less important than Xi’s determination to reiterate and to some extent refine positions he had outlined in earlier statements. The meeting provided the opportunity for Chu to outline the principles that would guide him as he sought to bring the KMT back from the November defeat and, if not in 2016, then in the future take back the reins of leadership in Taiwan and shape its cross-Strait policies in ways that would be acceptable to the PRC while, crucially, meeting the demands of the Taiwan public. In his opening remarks, Chu began with a reference to the fact that in 1992, through great efforts of those in an older generation on each side, “both parties reached agreement on the 1992 Consensus that the two sides of the Strait belong to one China, although there were some differences regarding the content and definition” ( 雙方達成了兩岸同屬一中，

但內涵、定義有所不同的九二共識).29 Making clear the KMT’s continuing adherence to that Consensus, Chu went on to note that, after 2005, the KMT incorporated it into the party charter and that over the past 10 years the KMT and the CCP had achieved a great deal, transforming confrontation and turmoil into reconciliation and peaceful development. At the same time, “on the basis of the 1992 Consensus” (在九二共識的基礎之上), Chu said he hoped that Taiwan would have greater opportunities to expand its international space and to participate in international activities and organizations. He specifically expressed the hope that Taiwan could cooperate in regional economic activities including participation in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Mainland’s “one belt, one road” programs, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Finally, Chu held out a vision of deepening of the 1992 Consensus and promoting cooperation between future generations, with the two sides working together on issues such as regional peace, environmental protection, and economic cooperation. Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 93

During a post-meeting press conference, Chu said that the key point for the two sides was to shelve disputes and jointly push for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. At the same time, he stressed, it was important to respect criticism and different opinions, and noted that he had explained to Xi the different opinions on Taiwan and their historical background.30 In reporting Xi Jinping’s extended remarks, China’s official Xinhua news agency, as well as China Central Television (CCTV), led with the observation that Xi emphasized that “cross-Strait relations are at an important new juncture” (两岸关系处于新的重 要节点上).31 He said the past ten years had shown that it was necessary to stick to the course of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and he put forth a five- point proposal to facilitate continued progress. The first point was that adherence to the 1992 Consensus and opposition to Taiwan independence constituted the political foundation, “the core of which is to recognize that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China” (其核心是认同大陆和台湾同属一个中国). As he had in his meeting with various Taiwan-related groups attending the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in Beijing in March and with a pro-unification delegation from Taiwan in September 2014,32 Xi laid special emphasis on this argument. As he put it, “We have always taken adhering to the 1992 Consensus as the foundation33 for our contacts with Taiwan authorities and all Taiwan political parties.” And as he had done on those two previous occasions, Xi spoke of deepening the “integration of the interests” (利益融合) of both sides of the Strait and of the need to “take into full consideration” (充分考虑) the feelings of societies on both sides and to make diligent efforts to expand the scope of benefits for people on both sides and their sense of making achievements. The Mainland was willing to share development opportunities with Taiwan compatriots “first” (首先) and “give priority” (优先) to opening up to Taiwan and protecting the legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan firms investing on the Mainland. Here Xi added a point on Taiwan’s desire for participation in regional economic activities.

The two sides of the Strait can strengthen their study of the issue, discuss it in a pragmatic manner, and make proper arrangements as long as they do not run counter to the “one China” principle. The Taiwan side has expressed its desire to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and we welcome that.

Xi did two other things of particular note in this presentation. First, in arguing about the essential nature of “heart-to-heart communication” (心灵沟通) and greater mutual understanding, he echoed Chu Li-luan’s position that the two sides need to “respect differences” (尊重差异) (and not merely set them aside). 94 | Across the Taiwan Strait

And second, although he did not imply a timeframe by using the “generation-to- generation” reference he had with former Vice President Siew Wan-chang (Vincent Siew) in Bali in 2013,34 Xi returned to the theme he had struck over the previous two years on the need to build mutual political trust and have the courage to face up to long-standing political differences and difficult problems between the two sides and to actively explore ways to resolve them.

Nuances?

In looking at these various statements, it seems to this analyst that there are nuances in the PRC position that are worth exploring. Perhaps reflecting the internal consideration being given to how to react to a DPP victory discussed in our last essay,35 one could argue that there is some difference implied between the consequences of a successful DPP that simply does not endorse the “political foundation” as identified by the Mainland versus the consequences of a DPP that engages in outspoken rejection of the elements of that foundation. In light of Tsai’s latest statements about acting in accordance with the “existing ROC constitutional order” and using the “accumulated outcomes” of the past more than 20 years as the “firm basis” for her efforts to promote peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations, that nuanced difference might eventually be more important than ever. On various occasions, Xi and others have repeatedly stated that adhering to the “1992 Consensus” and opposing “Taiwan independence” constitute a prerequisite for the Communist Party to engage with Taiwan authorities and political parties. Conversely, as he put it in his statement to Taiwan-related attendees at the CPPCC in March, failure to accept that “foundation” and to recognize the “one China” core of the “1992 Consensus” would undermine mutual trust and lead back to the “old path of turbulence” (动荡不安的老路).36 On that occasion Xi also added a sentence not found in the transcript of his formal remarks as reported in PRC print media: “It is frequently said that ‘if the foundation is not sturdy, the earth will move and the mountains will shake’” (常說「基礎不牢，地動山搖」).37 This was widely taken in Taiwan as a threat. In his meeting with pro-unification Taiwan activists last September, Xi laid out the logic for this position.

Containing “Taiwan independence” splittist activity is the necessary requirement to ensure peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. There was a time a number of years ago when “Taiwan independence” splittist forces took advantage of being in power to pursue their splittist line, damaging national sovereignty and territorial integrity, wrecking peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, provoking cross-Strait confrontation and anxiety, and inflicting grave harm on the people on both sides of the Strait, especially Taiwan people. Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 95

Compatriots on both sides of the Strait remember this as if it just happened and welcome the new situation in which they can safeguard peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

What requires vigilance is that “Taiwan independence” splittist forces have by no means given up and are still doing their utmost to stir up cross- Strait hostility and confrontation and to hinder cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, and are still the greatest real threat to peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.38

That said, when citing what would trigger not just stasis in relations but actual retrogression, Beijing has often seemed to refer to active rejection of the elements of the foundation and active advocacy of independence positions rather than simply not embracing “one China.” Thus, for example, in responding to Tsai Ing-wen’s April 9 DPP China Affairs Committee statement about maintaining the cross-Strait status quo of peace and stability, the TAO said that if one persisted in the “‘Taiwan independence’ splittist position of ‘one country on each side of the Strait’” it was bound to destroy the political foundation of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and bring about “turbulence” (动荡不安) in cross-Strait relations, and on this point there were already historical lessons.39 The day before, responding to a question about whether the Mainland visit of the DPP’s China Affairs Department head as part of a Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) delegation would lead to DPP-CCP exchanges, the TAO spokesman said such exchanges would be impossible if the DPP still advocated “Taiwan independence.”40 Xi made a similar statement, though obviously at a much more authoritative level, in his meeting with Chu Li-luan on May 4.

To deny the 1992 Consensus, challenge the legal basis of both sides of the Taiwan Strait belonging to one China, or engage in “one country on each side of the Strait” or “one China, one Taiwan” would undermine the fundamental interests of the nation, the country and the people, and shake the cornerstone of the development of cross-Strait relations, and there would be no possibility of peace and no possibility of development.41

Moreover, in commenting on Tsai Ing-wen’s then-impending visit to the United States, the TAO expressed opposition to “any person in any form carrying out ‘Taiwan independence’ splittist activities internationally.”42 Having said that, while the focus of many statements has been on the consequences of actions to refute “one China,” it still must be noted that Xi’s splitting of the phrase “peaceful development” on an earlier occasion to focus on “peace” separately – stating that “peace is precious, peace requires safeguarding” (和平是寶貴的，和 平需要維護)43 – and then going on two months later with Chu Li-luan to talk 96 | Across the Taiwan Strait about the impossibility of peace if the cornerstone of relations were undermined, elicited worried questions from observers in Taiwan about whether Xi was raising the specter of some kind of “non-peaceful” approach in response to merely not embracing “one China.” Moreover, when speaking “on background” to the Mainland press, an unidentified senior TAO official charged that, not only did the DPP do its best to push for de jure independence when it was in power under Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), but since 2008 the DPP had done its best to sabotage the process every time cross-Strait relations were making progress. “This completely demonstrates how stubborn the DPP is when it insists on tearing apart China and Taiwan, and shows us what the party is truly like, trying to sabotage the peaceful progression of cross-Strait relations.”44 In other settings, PRC officials have sought to tar Tsai with a Chen Shui-bian brush, arguing that some of Chen’s most provocative positions – as well as Lee Teng-hui’s – were Tsai’s doing. In making this point, the officials implied that the essential requirement is to accept a “one China” foundation, not merely avoid saying provocative things.45 This seemed also to be the message of Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) vice chairman (and former TAO deputy director) Sun Yafu during a recent trip to Taiwan. After having touted the benefits of the developments in cross- Strait relations since 2008, Sun became the first PRC official to spell out publicly some of the consequences if the “common political foundation” were weakened or undermined. “Relations would become turbulent, consultations would be broken off, conditions for exchanges and cooperation would shrivel up, and management of issues related to foreign affairs would become difficult to handle” (兩岸關係動 盪, 協商中斷, 交流合作的環境限縮, 涉外事務問題難處理).46 He went further to observe that obtaining the benefits of trade and investment with the Mainland and of Taiwan’s participation in regional economic activities all required cross-Strait relations that be “compatible” (相適應的) with such business arrangements. So, it would be premature to draw firm conclusions about how Mainland reactions might differ depending on how actively rejectionist DPP positions turn out to be. An important consideration to keep in mind is that Beijing harbors deep suspicions about Tsai Ing-wen’s ambitions regarding “Taiwan independence,” arguing that she will say one thing during the campaign and move in a different direction once elected. As noted, officials and experts link her to the most provocative aspects of both Lee Teng- hui and Chen Shui-bian’s separatist cross-Strait policies,47 something that her recent reference to China as a “neighboring country”48 in a Wall Street Journal opinion article will do nothing to change. But, as we said at the beginning of this section, given the nuances evident in Beijing’s statements, as well as the urgency and severity of the myriad of other challenges facing Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 97 the PRC leadership, one should remain alert to the possibility that the Mainland might limit its reaction if Tsai continues to adopt positions that, while perhaps ambiguous, could be interpreted as not inconsistent with “one China.”

Managing Daily Cross-Strait Relations

While a great deal of attention is being focused on the future of cross-Strait relations, challenges remain for those seeking to manage ties on a day-to-day basis, challenges that are related to both specific cross-Strait issues and domestic Taiwan politics. In our last essay, we noted that implementation of a proposed new PRC north-south commercial air route near the Taiwan Strait mid-line (labeled M503) had been put into abeyance by agreement between Taipei and Beijing.49 Subsequent negotiations between the two sides resulted in the Mainland moving the route ever-so-slightly farther west away from the mid-line and in banning PLA aircraft from that area. Moreover, it was agreed that the east-west routes Beijing had planned at various points along M503 would not be implemented at the present time. The Ma administration argued that, however small the adjustment in the route and however limited the time needed for PLA aircraft to cover the limited area from which they had been excluded, Taiwan was no worse off than before. Moreover, the result was a success for the manner in which the administration conducts cross-Strait relations because Beijing had engaged in negotiations about an activity taking place totally on the western (Mainland) side of the mid-line. The Mainland Affairs Council also made known polling results from the respected National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center revealing that almost 60 percent of respondents accepted the specific adjustments the government had accepted and that slightly over 60 percent believed that ongoing coordination over the route as well as over establishment of a cross-Strait flight control mechanism was conducive to regional air security.50

The DPP objected to both the PRC action to proceed with the route and the Ma administration’s handling of the issue. When a test run of the route was undertaken on March 15, the DPP complained that “China was able to force Taiwan to go along with its unilateral move” and said that the party had lodged a “formal protest” against China for doing so.51 It also charged that the Ma administration had rashly agreed to the establishment of the dangerous route because it was anxious to hold a high- level MAC-TAO meeting that had been postponed in part because of the M503 controversy, rather than vetting the issue properly with the people.52 Moreover, although the United States commended Taipei and Beijing for reaching a consensus, saying that the agreement “supports international civil aviation safety in the region and serves as a positive example of Taipei and Beijing managing issues through consultation and dialogue,”53 a DPP spokesman condemned the 98 | Across the Taiwan Strait government’s handling: “This kind of passive and incompetent attitude and practice has jeopardized the country’s best interests.” 54 As we noted above, Taiwan has expressed strong interest in joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Reportedly after Taipei had considered the issue for some time,55 former vice president Vincent Siew raised it in a very brief (reportedly 45-second) encounter with Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum on March 28, where Xi apparently expressed a willingness to discuss related issues,56 a sentiment he repeated in his May meeting with Chu Li-luan. Taipei then submitted an application to join as a “founding member” of AIIB on the last day such applications were being accepted (March 31). But although at various times and various levels the Mainland had expressed a “welcoming attitude” (欢迎态度) toward Taiwan’s participation “in an appropriate capacity” (以适当名义),57 the founding member application was turned down. Action on Taiwan’s application to participate as a non-founding member is still pending. The Ma administration has made clear that, while it wants to join AIIB, and it is flexible on the name used, for example, “Chinese Taipei” (中華台北), it would only proceed if participation is possible on a “dignified and equal” basis. It also said it had appropriately handled its application, protecting Taiwan’s interest in full participation as well as properly managing cross-Strait relations by sending its letter of intent both directly to the AIIB’s provisional secretariat and separately via the TAO (which then forwarded it to the secretariat).58 Although the Legislative Yuan (LY) had reached a bipartisan consensus that a letter of intent to join AIIB should be submitted under conditions that maintained the country’s dignity and upheld its interests,59 a prominent DPP lawmaker accused the administration of violating those terms and committing a “complete denigration of the nation.” He pointed out that while the minister of finance may have signed the letter of application as ‘minister,’ he did not use his full official ROC title and no reference to the Republic of China was included as part of the ministry’s address in the letterhead.60 DPP members also complained that the decision had been made by President Ma alone, without due consultation within the legislative or even the executive branch.61 In any event, though Taiwan’s participation would be of both economic and political benefit, like the other items “agreed” by MAC head Andrew Hsia Li-yan and TAO head Zhang Zhijun in Kinmen in late May,62 given the prolonged consideration of many similar questions, actual agreement and implementation are likely to be more difficult and protracted than spinmeisters in both places have suggested.63 Among the issues raised by Hsia in Kinmen was also the draft PRC national security law published in early May that asserted it is the “common duty” (共同义务) of all Chinese “including compatriots in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan” (包括港澳 Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 99

同胞和台湾同胞在内) to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.64 Hsia observed that the proposed act failed to recognize that the two sides of the Strait are ruled by different governments and ignored the desire of Taiwan’s people to maintain the political status quo. Zhang replied that the proposed revision reflected Beijing’s long-standing position.65 “We voiced our displeasure,” Hsia reported, “and [Zhang] explained his stance. That ended the matter.”66

W(h)ither the KMT?

As of this writing, the only registered and qualified candidate for the KMT presidential nomination is LY Deputy Speaker Hung Hsiu-chu. Ms. Hung needs to garner over 30 percent backing in a two-part public opinion poll to be taken June 12–13, one part simply reflecting support for her, the other pitting her head-to-head against Tsai Ing- wen. Despite some recent surveys that show Hung gaining significant support – to the point of closing in on or even surpassing Tsai67 – it remains a possibility that she will not succeed in passing the 30 percent marker. In that case, the KMT will need to decide how to proceed. It is on that basis that some party members still hold out hope that Chu Li-luan can be drafted to become the candidate even though LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng has put himself forward as a suitable alternative. We will hold off further comment on the KMT fortunes at this point, pending the formal nomination process. But, despite Ms. Hung’s polling gains, most observers believe that unless something catastrophic derails Tsai’s campaign, even strong PRC statements about the negative consequences of Tsai’s failure to embrace a “one China” position may not be enough to upset what seems like an inevitable DPP victory.

U.S. Stays above the Political Fray But Retains a Strong Interest in Effective Management of Cross-Strait Relations

As opposed to the impression many people had during the 2012 Taiwan presidential election, the United States is taking a studiously neutral position in the 2016 contest. In this regard, a State Department spokeswoman noted that American officials had had “a constructive exchange on a wide range of issues” with Tsai Ing-wen during her 68 recent visit. That said, one should not underestimate the seriousness of cross-Strait relations for the United States and the continuing attention they will receive in Washington. As Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel put it, the U.S. has “a huge and long- standing interest in peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations.”69 100 | Across the Taiwan Strait

The U.S. position goes beyond the articulation of that critical goal and also focuses on the need for both sides to adopt policies characterized by restraint and flexibility in order to carry on constructive cross-Strait dialogue and maintain the current low level of tension. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton recently delivered a comprehensive statement on American Taiwan policy that made these points along with reiteration of U.S. policy based on the three U.S.-PRC joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.70

An important ingredient of . . . close [U.S.] cooperation [with Taiwan] in recent years has been the stable management of cross-Strait ties. We have an abiding interest in the preservation of cross-Strait stability, and this interest informs our overall approach to cross-Strait issues. . . .

We have welcomed the steps both sides of the Taiwan Strait have taken in recent years to reduce tensions and improve cross-Strait relations. We encourage authorities in both Beijing and Taipei to continue their constructive dialogue on the basis of dignity and respect. Our policy on cross-Strait relations is not directed only at one side of the Taiwan Strait or the other. There should be no unilateral attempts to change the status quo, and that applies to both sides.

Even as we discuss our abiding interest in peaceful and stable cross- Strait relations with our friends on Taiwan, we also encourage Beijing to demonstrate flexibility and restraint. The benefits that stable cross-Strait ties have brought to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the United States, and the region have been enormous. It is important that both sides of the Strait understand the importance of these benefits and work to establish a basis for continued peace and stability.

Thus, those in the Mainland who distrust Tsai Ing-wen and would have the United States oppose the DPP or “instruct” the DPP what policies to adopt will be disappointed. Similarly, anyone in Taiwan who thinks the quality of future U.S. ties with Taiwan will not be conditioned in significant measure by the degree to which Taipei adopts constructive and effective approaches to cross-Strait relations is ignoring history. Proper management of cross-Strait ties does not constitute the sum and substance of U.S-Taiwan unofficial relations or U.S.-PRC relations. But given the potential impact of developments in cross-Strait ties on U.S. national interests, no one should doubt that this is an issue to which Washington will attach great importance. Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 101

Notes

1 Alan D. Romberg, “The Times They Are A-Changin’,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 46, March 19, 2015, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm46ar-new.pdf. 2 “DPP China Affairs Committee: Maintain Cross-Strait Status Quo,” DPP, April 10, 2015, http:// english.dpp.org.tw/dpp-china-affairs-committee/. Chinese text at http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_ content.php?sn=7802. 3 “DPP Nominates Chair person Tsai Ing-wen as 2016 Presidential Candidate,” DPP, April 15, 2015, http://english.dpp.org.tw/dpp-nominates-tsai-ing-wen/. Chinese text is included in the “Press Release of the 9th Session of the 16th Central Executive Committee” (民主進步黨第十六屆第九 次中執會新聞稿), April 15, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=7807. Some people have seen this as indicating Tsai would not be wedded to the most fundamentalist aspects of DPP doctrine if elected. Others, however, worry that “the will of the people” will be invoked as an excuse not to adopt workable arrangements with Beijing. 4 “DPP must stay united and win trust,” Taipei Times (Editorial), March 22, 2015, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2015/03/22/2003614103. 5 “Annette Lu urges Tsai to clarify her ‘status quo’ policy,” Taipei Times, April 18, 2015, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/04/18/2003616218. The 1991 “independence plank” in the DPP charter called for establishment of a “Republic of Taiwan” (台灣共和國) through a plebiscite and the establishment of a new constitution. The Chinese-language text of that plank as well as of the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future and the 2007 Normal Nation Resolution are all available at http://www.dpptp.org.tw/about/program. php?click=1. The 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future asserted that Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent state unrelated to the PRC and that any change in that status requires a plebiscite. (An English- language text of that resolution can be found at http://www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm.) The party has taken the position that this superseded the 1991 independence plank. The 2007 resolution on a normal nation, however, referred to several “abnormal” constitutional, international, and political aspects of Taiwan’s existence and called for name rectification and a new constitution to be ratified “at a proper time” through a referendum to make clear the “fact” that Taiwan is “an independent, sovereign state.” It also called for joining the United Nations, an important background factor related to the referendum to join the U.N. “in the name of Taiwan” that created tensions in cross-Strait relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations in 2007–2008. Beijing has frequently cited not only the continued existence of the 1991 plank in the DPP charter but also the 2007 resolution, as well as the debate regarding a “second republic constitution” that year, as evidence that the DPP is dedicated to eventual Taiwan independence. (An English-language text of the 2007 resolution can be found at http://www.dpp.org.tw/upload/policy/20071029100043_ link.pdf .) 6 Loa Iok-sin, “DPP’s China policy draws fire,” Taipei Times, April 30, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes. com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/04/30/2003617140. It is not impossible that Koo’s statement was spurred in part by a TAO spokesman statement that day. The spokesman said that it was an unchanging fact that since 1949, although the two sides of the Strait were not united, the Mainland and Taiwan belonged to one China. Moreover, the spokesman added, since 2008, the two sides had brought about peaceful development on the basis of the “1992 Consensus.” “This,” he said, “is the cross-Strait status quo” (这就是两岸关系现状). (“Transcript of the TAO press briefing,” April 29, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201504/ t20150429_9696542.htm.) 7 Lu Hsin-hui and Scully Hsiao, “DPP elder urges end of pursuit of Taiwan de jure independence,” CNA, April 6, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201504060017.aspx; Lu Hsin-hui and Evelyn Kao, “Taiwan’s status quo is that of sovereign, independent ROC: DPP member,” Central 102 | Across the Taiwan Strait

News Agency (hereafter abbreviated CNA), April 12, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/ aipl/201504120012.aspx. 8 “Hsu [Hsin-liang]: Effective DPP governance impossible if Mainland rejects contacts with Tsai,” China Times (translated in KMT News Network, April 17, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/ page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=16061). 9 Matthew Strong, “Tsai explains Taiwan-China status quo,” Taiwan News Online, May 23, 2015, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2742150. 10 Worthy Shen and Y.F. Low, “DPP chairwoman defends promise to maintain cross-Strait status quo,” CNA, May 23, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201505230019.aspx. On the 1999 Resolution, see endnote 5. 11 Tsai Ing-wen, “Taiwan meeting the challenges, drafting a model of new Asian value,” Speech to CSIS, June 3, 2015. The authoritative English version, along with section-by- section translation into Chinese, is available on the DPP website at http://www.dpp.org.tw/ news_content.php?kw=&m1=06&y1=2015&menu_sn=&sub_menu=43&show_title=&one_ page=10&page=1&start_p=1&act=&sn=7911&stat=&order_type=desc&order_col=add_ date&data_type=%E6%96%B0%E8%81%9E. 12 因此，在當選總統之後，我將在中華民國現行憲政體制下，依循普遍民意, 持續推動兩岸 關係的和平穩定發展。(From DPP-provided text; see endnote 11.) 13 Transcript of Q&A session provided by the U.S. Mission of the DPP. 14 兩岸之間應該珍惜並維護二十多年來協商和交流互動所累積的成果, 我將在這個堅實基礎 上, 持續推動兩岸關係的和平穩定發展。(From DPP-provided text; see endnote 11.) 15 Shih Ming-te, a veteran political activist and one-time head of the DPP, quickly lashed out at Tsai, calling her a “female version of Ma Ying-jeou” and charging that she lacks leadership and has no core values. (Loa Iok-sin, “Shih Ming-te pans Tsai Ing-wen’s China stance,” Taipei Times, June 5, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/06/05/2003619976.) The TAO had responded to Tsai’s June 1 Wall Street Journal op-ed piece (“Taiwan can build on U.S. ties,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-can-build-on-u-s-ties-1433176635) without addressing her specific points but saying that, by denying the foundation and continuing to adhere to the “one country on each side,” there would be no way out for cross-Strait relations. (Li Hanfang, “TAO reiterates: There is no way out for the DPP in persisting in a ‘Taiwan independence’ splittist position” (国台办重申：民进党坚持“台独”分裂立场没有出路), Xinhua, June 3, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201506/t20150603_9948750.htm.) In a similar vein, after Tsai’s speech at CSIS, the foreign ministry, which mainly focused on warning the United States not to abandon its “one China” policy or send “misleading signals” to “Taiwan independence” splittist forces, also did not address any of the specifics of what Tsai had said. Rather, it only expressed “resolute opposition” to any individual or organization engaged in international “Taiwan independence” splittist activities. (“Transcript of foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei’s routine press briefing,” June 5, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1270836.shtml.) In a way, the PRC ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai, likely pre-positioned the PRC’s response by arguing the day before Tsai spoke at CSIS that she should accept the “one China” principle rather than playing deceptive tricks through making ambiguous statements on whether she will abandon her ambition to seek the island’s independence. (“China-U.S. common interests outweigh differences: Chinese ambassador,” Xinhua, June 2, 2015, http:// news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-06/03/c_134294149.htm.) Cui elicited an angry reaction across the political spectrum in Taiwan by casting this in terms of a “test” by the 1.3 billion Chinese people on the Mainland that Tsai should pass. (Loa Iok-sin, “DPP condemns Chinese ambassador to the US,” Taipei Times, June 4, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ archives/2015/06/04/2003619871; Elaine Hou, “Chinese diplomat’s comments inappropriate: foreign minister,” CNA, June 4, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201506040018.aspx.) Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 103

16 Yeh Su-ping and Ted Chen, “Opposition party raises alarm over Chu-Xi meeting,” CNA, May 4, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201505040034.aspx. 17 “DPP statement regarding the Chu-Xi meeting” (民主進步黨針對「朱習會」之聲明), DPP, May 4, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=7842. The party’s four criticisms of Chu’s meeting with Xi were: 1. Chu’s formulation on “one China” went beyond Ma’s “one China, respective interpretations” and accepted Beijing’s “one China framework” and exacerbated the problem regarding safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. 2. By saying he inherited the results of the 2005 Lien-Hu meeting, Chu deepened the limitation of cross-Strait relations to CCP-KMT affairs (國共化) and pushed relations on the basis of party interests (以黨領政). 3. In saying he would further push the five visions from the Lien-Hu meeting, Chu indicated he would likely negotiate a peace agreement under the “one China framework.” 4. In saying he would strive for greater international participation under the 1992 Consensus, Chu had abandoned the position of safeguarding national sovereignty and would shrink Taiwan’s international participation. 18 Loa Iok-sin, “DPP rejects unofficial ties with CCP: spokesperson,” Taipei Times, May 3, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/05/03/2003617374. For his part, Chu vigorously rejected the charges against him. He asserted that KMT-CCP ties were not a substitute for ties between governmental authorities and he wondered aloud why there were no party ties between the DPP and CCP. “Smearing the exchanges between the KMT and the CCP, and maliciously distorting and taking my statements out of context might win elections,” he said, “but we cannot afford to lose Taiwan.” (KMT Culture and Communications Committee, “Chu: Does DPP really want to return to the generation of cross-Strait confrontations?” KMT News Network, May 7, 2015, http://www.taiwannpfnews.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article& mnum=111&anum=16072.) 19 Yuan-Ming Chiao, “Cross-Strait peace can be maintained under DPP: Tsai,” China Post, March 23, 2015, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/03/23/431779/ Cross-strait-peace.htm. Now at https://chinapost.nownews.com/20150323-47171. Tsai observed, “in the past we have maintained communications with each side, and we hope that these communications will result in each side being able to accept one position.” 20 “Tsai: DPP will strive to maintain the cross-Strait status quo if returned to power,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), April 10, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=a rticle&mnum=112&anum=16032. 21 “Press release of the 2nd session of the DPP China Affairs Committee” (民主進步黨中國事務委 員會第二次會議新聞稿), DPP, April 9, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content .php?sn=7802. An authoritative DPP English-language translation is at http://us7.camp aignarchive1.com/?u=514c164469699ac1ac10bfe93&id=030617ca8b&e=5dc267bc37. 22 “Press release of the 29th Session of the 16th Central Standing Committee of the DPP” (民主進 步黨第十六屆第二十九次中常會新聞稿), DPP, May 6, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_ content.php?&sn=7848. 23 “The DPP’s response to the Hsia-Zhang meeting” (民主進步黨針對夏張會之回應), DPP, May 15, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=7870. In light of Chu Li-luan’s presentation to Xi Jinping, the DPP also said that the MAC should state clearly its rejection of a “one China framework” (一中框架) and the notion that “both sides belong to one China” (兩岸 同屬一個中國). 24 Shih Hsiu-chuang and Loa Iok-sin, “Tsai looks ahead as Chu attacks cross-Strait views,” Taipei Times, May 7, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/05/07/2003617690. 104 | Across the Taiwan Strait

25 Wang Yu-chung, “Tsai Ing-wen: When Ma Ying-jeou was interviewed by foreign media, all he talked about was cross-Strait relations” (小英：馬英九接受外媒訪問 只會講兩岸), Newtalk.tw, May 12, 2015, https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2015-05-12/60036. The president’s office struck back saying that Tsai apparently did not understand the importance of the cross-Strait peace, prosperity and stability for many countries and investors in Asia, and hence the interest of foreign media in the issue, and that she evidently had not yet prepared well for participation in the election. (Wang Yu-chun, “President’s Office criticizes Tsai in turn for not understanding cross-Strait questions, says she hasn’t prepared well for participating in the presidential election” (總統府反批蔡對兩岸議題不解 沒做好參選總統準備), Liberty Times, May 12, 2015, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1315451.) In an interview a few days earlier, Ma also asked rhetorically why, if the cross-Strait policy he had followed for the past seven years was such a failure, Tsai was now saying she wanted to maintain the status quo. (Paul Beckett and Charles Hutzler, “Q&A: Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou on China ties, policy and his legacy,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ q-a-taiwans-president-ma-ying-jeou-on-china-ties-policy-and-his-legacy-1431309939.) As had others, Ma questioned whether the DPP had any steps ready to actually ensure the status quo. (Claudia Liu, Lee Shu-hua, Sophia Yeh, and Y.F. Low, “Ma meets press to mark 7th anniversary of presidency,” CNA, May 18, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201505180011.aspx.) 26 Hsiao Po-yang and Lilian Wu, “Maintaining status quo means keeping cross-Strait peace: DPP chairwoman,” CNA, May 8, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201505080023.aspx. On the other hand, Tsai revealed a somewhat sarcastic bent when she reacted to Ma’s challenging her on what status quo she was seeking to maintain, and how she would maintain it: “I do not know if he is asking the question for political manipulation or for the good of Taiwan. If he’s truly concerned about making Taiwan a better place, he should stop talking like a broken record, repeating the same question every day. There is only about a year left in his term as president. He has not done much for the country in the past seven years; he should seize the year to do more things, so that people might have a better impression of him when he leaves office.” (Loa Iok-sin, “Tsai turns focus to nation’s south,” Taipei Times, May 15, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/taiwan/archives/2015/05/15/2003618332.) 27 Chen Jianxing, Pan Qing and Xu Xiaoqing, “Yu Zhengsheng and Chu Li-luan attend the 10th Cross-Strait Trade and Cultural Forum and deliver speeches” (俞正声,朱立伦出席第十届两 岸经贸文化论坛并致辞), Xinhua, May 3, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015- 05/03/c_1115159990.htm. 28 Ibid. Yu also laid out three other requirements: focusing on the common welfare of compatriots on both sides; continuing to help young people realize their dreams; and continuing to promote the expansion of extensive cross-Strait public participation. The forum proposed a series of recommendations at its conclusion (“9 recommendations proposed at the KMT-CCP Forum,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], May 4, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=16131): 1. Continue to promote the development of economic integration and promote the standards in the institutionalization of economic cooperation across the Strait. 2. Continue to support large enterprises and actively establish a platform of cooperation for small and medium-sized businesses across the Strait. 3. Strengthen cooperation on agriculture and fisheries, so as to increase the market share of Taiwan’s agricultural products on the Mainland. 4. Pay more attention to sentiments of cross-Strait grassroots so that more people would be willing to devote themselves to cross-Strait peaceful development. 5. Create more opportunities for young students from the Mainland and Taiwan to study, work, and start their own businesses. 6. Deepen cross-Strait cooperation in the cultural and entertainment industries. 7. Deepen cooperation on cross-Strait education exchanges, and conclude related agreements. Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 105

8. Continue to promote and study transit in Taiwan for Mainland air passengers so as to provide further facilities for people on both sides. 9. Establish a platform to pragmatically study and explore Taiwan’s participation in the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, RCEP, and AIIB. 29 “Chu-Xi meeting, full text of Chu Li-luan’s speech” (朱習會 朱立倫談話全文), CNA, May 4, 2015, http://www.cna.com.tw/topic/popular/5027-2/201505045017-1.aspx. 30 “Xi Jinping proposes five points in cross-Strait relations,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), May 5, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&a num=16133. 31 Chen Binhua, “General Secretary Xi Jinping meets with KMT chairman Chu Li-luan” (习 近平总书记会见中国国民党主席朱立伦), Xinhua, May 4, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet. com/201505/04/c_1115169416.htm. 32 Romberg, “The Times They Are A-Changin’,” pp. 9–10. 33 The Xinhua Chinese-language report of Xi’s remarks referred to this as 基础 (see Chen Binhua, endnote 31). An English-language version of Xi’s remarks cited Xi as calling the 1992 Consensus the “prerequisite” for such contacts. (“Xi calls on building community of shared destiny across Taiwan Strait,” Xinhua, May 4, 2015, http://www.icrosschina.com/news/2015/0504/12081.shtml.) 34 Romberg, “From Generation to Generation: Advancing Cross-Strait Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 43, March 14, 2014, http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/ CLM43AR.pdf. 35 Romberg, “The Times They are A-Changin’,” pp.11–12. 36 Chen Binhua, “General Secretary Xi Jinping meets with KMT chairman Chu Li-luan,” see endnote 31. 37 This sentence was widely reported in the Taiwan press but was not included in the extensive Xinhua account referred to earlier. (Sung Ping-chung and Lu Su-mei, “Without mentioning it by name, Xi sends a message to the Green: acknowledge one China” [習不 點名向綠喊話：認同一中], China Times, March 5, 2015, http://www.chinatimes.com/ newspapers/20150305000881-260301.) However, Xi is seen and heard using it in a CCTV report on the meeting. (“Today’s News Broadcast” [今天新闻联播], March 4, 2015, http://xinwenlianbo. tv/cctv/21260.html.) In any event, whether using this phrase was meant to be as threatening as some in Taiwan felt it was is a little uncertain. But surely Xi is trying to get across the seriousness of the matter of accepting the existing “one China” foundation of cross-Strait relations. At the same time, this is apparently an idiom he has used in the past in other contexts. In 2006, for example, when he was party secretary in Zhejiang, Xi reportedly used it when talking about the importance of strengthening grassroots work and building a solid base of social harmony. And in January 2013, as general secretary of the Communist Party, he used it in speaking again about the importance of grass-roots activity. (“Xi Jinping again mentions the new application of the phrase ‘if the foundation is not sturdy, the earth will move and the mountains will shake’” [习近平再提“基 础不牢，地动山摇”有何新意], Chinese Communist Party News Network, February 5, 2013, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0205/c78779-20438523.html.) 38 遏制“台独”分裂活动是确保两岸关系和平发展的必然要求.2008 年前的一段时间, “台 独”分裂势力利用执政推行分裂路线，损害国家主权,领土完整，破坏台海和平稳定， 挑动两岸对抗紧张，给两岸民众尤其是台湾同胞带来深重祸害.两岸同胞对此记忆犹 新，期盼两岸关系和平发展新局面得以维护.需要警惕的是，“台独”分裂势力并未善 罢甘休，仍在竭力煽动两岸敌意和对立，阻挠两岸交流合作，仍然是两岸关系和平发 展的最大现实威胁. (Zhao Bo and Xu Xueyi, “General Secretary Xi Jinping meets with Taiwan peaceful reunification groups” [习近平总书记会见台湾和平统一团体联合参访团], Xinhuanet, September 26, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/26/c_1112641354.htm.) The mantra regarding the historical inevitability of unification but also that “Taiwan independence” splittist forces and their splittist activities are still the greatest threat to the 106 | Across the Taiwan Strait

peaceful development of cross-Strait relations also made its way into the section on China’s national security circumstances in the latest PRC defense white paper. (“China’s military strategy, full text” [中国的军事战略], PRC State Council News Office, May 26, 2015, http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-05/26/c_1115408217.htm.) 39 “Commenting on the DPP saying it will ‘maintain the cross-Strait status quo,’ TAO: The crux of the matter is to uphold well the political foundation of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations” (评民进党“维持两岸现状”说 国台办:关键是维护好两岸关系和平 发展的政治基础), Xinhuanet, April 10, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201504/t201 50410_9549691.htm. (Emphasis added) 40 “No CPC-DPP exchanges if ‘one China’ principle not upheld: mainland,” Xinhuanet, April 8, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/08/c_134133213.htm. (Emphasis added) 41 否认“九二共识”,战两岸同属一个中国的法理基础,搞“一边一国”,“一中一台”, 就会 损害民族,国家,人民的根本利益,动摇两岸关系发展的基石,就不可能有和平,也不可能有发 展. ( Chen Binhua, “General Secretary Xi Jinping meets with KMT chairman Chu Li-luan,” see endnote 31. Emphasis added.) 42 我们坚决反对任何人以任何形式在国际上从事“台独”分裂活动.(Transcript of TAO press briefing, May 13, 2015, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwfbh/201505/t20150513_9796382.htm. Emphasis added.) 43 Wang Li-chuan and Li Chun, “Xi Jinping: Without the 1992 Consensus cross-Strait relations will return to turbulence” (習近平：沒有九二共識 兩岸將重回動盪), United Daily News, March 5, 2015, http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0001/274565/web/#2L-5618706L. 44 Katherine Wei, “China criticizes DPP for ‘vague’ platform,” China Post, May 7, 2015, http://www. chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2015/05/07/435393/China-criticizes.htm. Now at https://chinapost.nownews.com/20150507-42290. 45 Private conversations. 46 Peng Weilin, “Sun Yafu warns: Relations could come to a standstill and cross-Strait exchanges could be unable to take a step forward” (孫亞夫示警：交流停滯 兩岸會寸步難行), China Review News, May 25, 2015, http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1037/6/7/5/103767548.html?coluid=1&kind id=0&docid=103767548&mdate=0525212503. At the same time, Sun is alleged to be the first PRC official to say on the record that the “1992 Consensus” is “one China, respective interpretations” (一個中國、各自表述). (Wang Chun- chung, “Cheng Kung University Professor Liang Wen-t’ao refutes Sun Yafu: Taiwanese are not Chinese” [成大教授梁文韜駁孫亞夫：台灣人不是中國人], Liberty Times, May 30, 2015, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/884881.) If that report is accurate, it would represent something of a breakthrough, because although Beijing hasn’t challenged Ma on this definition of the Consensus, it has also never openly endorsed it. In a March 2008 telephone conversation between Hu Jintao and George W. Bush, shortly after Ma Ying-jeou’s election, the Chinese interpreter said that Hu referred to the “1992 Consensus” as both sides recognizing there is only one China but agreeing to differ on its definition. This was not only reported by American officials listening in on the conversation but was also carried in the Xinhua English-language account of the conversation. (“Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet,” Xinhua, March 27, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ english/2008-03/27/content_7865209.htm. Now at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/zgxz/ t418675.htm.) However, this statement was not included in the Chinese-language version of the conversation. (“Hu Jintao: On the basis of the ‘1992 Consensus’ cross-Strait consultations and negotiations can be resumed” [胡锦涛:在”九二共识”基础上恢复两岸协商谈判], Xinhuanet, March 26, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2008-03/26/content_7865604.htm. Now at http:// news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-27/080515235575.shtml.) Moreover, senior PRC officials privately commented that Hu never said it. 47 Private conversations. Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 107

48 Ko Lin, “Tsai stresses status quo, says her U.S. visit not a ‘job interview,’” Taiwan News Online, May 31, 2015, http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2746440. 49 Romberg, “The Times They Are A-Changin’,” p. 12. 50 “Majority of the public support preliminary results acquired through the government’s handling of the Mainland’s M503 and other routes’ establishment,” Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) News Release No. 018, March 23, 2015, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=111265&ctNode= 6337&mp=3. Attachments to that press release included a summary of the results of the survey (http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/54161648539.pdf) as well as a chart showing the results of questionnaire broken out in percentage distribution (http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/ Attachment/541616474938.pdf). 51 Shelly Shan, “China begins M503 route tests,” Taipei Times, March 16, 2015, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/03/16/2003613650. 52 “DPP: One must not rashly consent to opening the new M503 route out of impatience to hold a ‘Hsia-Zhang meeting’” (民進黨：不能因急於進行「夏張會」而輕率同意啟用M503 新航線), DPP, March 17, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=7757. 53 Sophia Yeh, Tony Liao, and Elizabeth Hsu, “U.S. praises flight consensus; DPP blasts policymakers,” CNA, March 24, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201503240023.aspx. 54 “DPP: M503 handling does not serve the nation’s interests, the person in charge must bear political responsibility” (民進黨：M503處理不符合國家利益，主事者應負起政治責任), DPP, March 24, 2015, http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=7781. 55 “MOF reiterates stance on Taiwan’s AIIB bid,” Taiwan Today, April 2, 2015, http://www. taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=228968&ctNode=445. The minister of finance stated that the ministry had been studying the issue under Cabinet instruction since November 2014 and that the assessment had been completed in March after broad interagency consultation. He also pledged full liaison with the legislature and said that an inter-ministerial group had been established to enhance communication with the LY on a bipartisan basis. 56 “Siew delivers message to Xi as Boao Forum opens,” Taipei Times, March 29, 2015, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/03/29/2003614643. 57 Chen Jianxing, “TAO: Welcome the Taiwan side to participate in AIIB in an appropriate capacity” (国台办：欢迎台湾方面以适当名义参与亚投行), Xinhuanet, April 2, 2015, http://www.gwytb. gov.cn/wyly/201504/t20150402_9478697.htm. 58 Yin Chun-chie and Evelyn Kao, “Finance ministry will lead talks on Taiwan’s AIIB bid: MAC official,” CNA, April 2, 2015, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201504020029.aspx. 59 Chen Wei-ting, Tseng Ying-yu, Ta Ya-chen, Wen Kuei-hsing, Wei Shu, and Lilian Wu, “Lawmakers agree to submit letter of intent to join AIIB,” CNA, March 31, 2015, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201503310017.aspx. 60 Chiu Yen-ling, Wang Yu-chung, and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “AIIB letters lacked title, ROC n am e ,” Taipei Times, April 2, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archi ves/2015/04/02/2003614954. 61 Enru Lin, “President Ma made ‘unilateral’ call on AIIB: DPP,” China Post, March 31, 2015, http:// www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/business/2015/03/31/432432/President-Ma.htm. 62 The meeting had originally been scheduled for early February between Zhang and then–MAC head Wang Yu-chi, but that was put off because of an airplane accident at the time and also over the M503 issue. 63 An article in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ online publication claimed that Hsia and Zhang had “reached agreement on a number of key issues.” (“MAC, TAO heads wrap up Kinmen meeting,” Taiwan Today, May 25, 2015, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=230747&ctNode=445.) However, the Mainland Affairs Council’s news release enumerating the achievements was more nuanced in its presentation. (“Third meeting between heads of cross-Strait competent authorities held in Kinmen: Both sides insist on building momentum for cross-Strait developments and 108 | Across the Taiwan Strait

creating more palpable achievements on the ‘1992 Consensus’ basis,” MAC, News Release No. 25, May 23, 2015, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=111503&ctNode=6337&mp=3.) According to that news release, pledging to “push forward operational consultations for SEF-ARATS institutionalized negotiation agenda issues in hope to facilitate the holding of the Eleventh Round of High-Level Talks,” Hsia and Zhang said they would “continue active promotion of cross-Strait trade in goods negotiations and to coordinate respective relevant departments to promptly reach a consensus.” (It remains to be seen whether the Kinmen meeting will really spur meaningful positive developments in light of the fact that “no progress” was made in an early April meeting on lowering tariffs in four key industries. Wu Fu-hsiang, “Commodities trade negotiations, Reduction of tariffs in four industries make no progress” [貨貿談判 四產業 降稅沒進展], United Daily News, April 3, 2015, https://geft.edn.udn.com/files/16-1000-4310. php.) Although news reports coming out of the meeting said that there had been agreement to begin transits through Taiwan of Mainland travelers heading to onward destinations, the MAC announcement merely said that “the two sides will work together to facilitate a consensus in the first half of this year, actively coordinate relevant departments to promptly implement the policy, and will consult on further convenience measures for people’s exchange across the Strait.” (According to other reports, the Mainland had some issues to work out regarding travel documentation for Mainland tourists, and Taiwan had to adjust certain immigration and customs procedures. “Six points of consensus reached during Hsia-Zhang meeting,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], May 25, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mn um=112&anum=16213.) On the long-pending issue of reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices, according to the MAC news release, “both sides will promptly convene the eighth round of operational consultations after this meeting to pragmatically handle issues of mutual concern and promptly complete negotiations on the mutual establishment issue. Both sides understand that the safety of the institutions and their staff must be guaranteed, relevant competent authorities must be coordinated to complete respective internal legal operations and supporting measures for notifications and humanitarian visiting functions, and that the aim of the institutions’ establishment is to serve the people on both sides.” (Ma Ying-jeou told a group of correspondents ahead of the Kinmen meeting that, while negotiations regarding establishment of reciprocal SEF and ARATS offices were in their final stages, the PRC was concerned that ARATS sites could become gathering places for student movements in Taiwan or be politicized as having diplomatic functions. Yuan-Ming Chiao, “PRC has qualms over representative offices: Ma,” China Post, May 19, 2015, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/05/19/436365/PRC- has.htm.) 64 “Full text of the 2nd draft of the National Security Law” (国家安全法[草案二次审议稿] 全文), National People’s Congress, May 6, 2015, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/ flca/2015-05/06/content_1935766.htm. 65 Zep Hu and Y.F. Low, “Dignity key to Taiwan’s AIIB participation,” CNA, May 23, 2015, http:// focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201505230022.aspx. 66 Shih Hsiu-chuan, “China rejects Taipei’s defiance on law,” Taipei Times, May 24, 2015, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/05/24/2003619019. 67 “Poll: Hung Hsiu-chu’s 50 percent support greatly surpasses Tsai Ing-wen” (民調 洪秀柱5成 支持度大勝蔡英文), Apple Daily, June 1, 2015, http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/ article/politics/20150601/620310/; “Polls: Hung’s support rate climbs 3.3 percentage points in 6 days,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), June 2, 2015, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/ page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=16252. The former reported that Hung received 50.5 percent support in a head-to-head match-up with Tsai, as against the DPP candidate’s 28.45 percent. The latter reported a WantWantChina Times Polling Center survey in which Tsai led Hung by 31.4 percent to 27 percent. Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity | 109

A third poll showed Hung within 1 percentage point of Tsai, all of which suggests that either the Green is running a very sophisticated operation to tilt the polls so that Hung gets the nomination or some other dynamic is at work that is eating into Tsai’s lead. (“TVBS poll shows Deputy Speaker Hung behind Tsai by 1%,” China Post, June 5, 2015, http://www.chinapost. com.tw/taiwan/national/nationalnews/2015/06/05/437693/TVBS-poll.htm.) What is especially interesting about this last poll is that in a similar survey taken by TVBS two weeks earlier, Hung trailed Tsai by almost 30 points, 46 percent vs. 17 percent. (TVBS, “Public opinion poll regarding the support rate of popular candidates in the 2016 presidential election” [2016 總統大選熱門人選支持度調查], May 21, 2015, http://cc.tvbs.com.tw/portal/file/poll_ center/2017/20170602/20150522181222110.pdf.) 68 Daily Press Briefing, Department of State, June 5, 2015, https://20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ dpb/2015/06/243249.htm#CHINA. 69 William Lowther, “US not taking sides in elections: US official,” Taipei Times, May 23, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2015/05/23/2003618963. 70 “Taiwan: A vital partner in East Asia,” Remarks at the Brookings Institution, May 21, 2015, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/05/242705.htm. Reflection: Alan D. Romberg as a Mentor

Yun Sun

I first met Alan Romberg on August 19, 2004 for an internship interview at the Stimson Center. It was the second day after I arrived in the United States from China as a new Master of International Policy and Practice student at the George Washington University. At that time, I had no idea that I was meeting with a person who would have a determining impact on my professional career and personal development for the rest of my life. Just like during the following fourteen years, I had no idea that I had been blessed with the most valuable asset that anyone can ask for: the teaching, the mentoring, and the fatherly love from a wise, selfless man who sailed through life with principles and integrity. When I try to name the three top things that Alan has given or taught me, I have a difficult time doing so because his influence over my life and career has been so extensive and so profound. Most importantly, I would say that Alan has tried to teach me how to be a good person. Most people have a sense of principles and integrity but rarely do people have the frank honesty and firm conscience in terms of following them as Alan did. The policy world might be mostly gray and murky, but Alan always had an intellectual clarity that shone light through the fog of complex policy issues. His positions may not have been welcomed by all but all have to agree that his positions are honest, objective, and thus often unobjectionable. And the manner in which he conveyed his positions was always calm, unemotional, and respectful. For Alan, the truth about the issue was always more important than the politics and superseded the truth about the people. Through his own meticulous approach to research, his utmost attention to details, and his unswerving pursuit of the truth, Alan showed me the most important secret of being a good policy analyst. Good research is conditioned upon the ability to see what others don’t, to understand rather than to judge, and to speak from the facts rather than preferences. Especially in the China policy field where scholars’ views are subject to censorship and self-censorship, the lesson I learned from Alan is that nothing speaks louder than solid research. Alan used to say, “Focus on the issue, not the politics.” Indeed, when I immerse myself in the deliberations of the issues, the politics becomes less of an intervening variable. We are merely observers of politics 112 | Across the Taiwan Strait among and within nations. There is truth about policy issues. There is no truth about the politics. This is particularly true on the Taiwan issue, to which Alan dedicated years of his attention and work. At different junctures, the mainland and Taiwan each had disagreements about Alan’s views and positions. But both sides respected him as an authoritative voice and the conscience of the U.S. policy toward Taiwan. His vast knowledge of the history and details of cross-Strait relations had made him an indispensable member of the conversation and an honest interlocutor to promote an accurate understanding of the positions of all three sides. Alan’s focus on Taiwan is a particularly powerful example of the kind of person he is. He genuinely believed in the importance of the Taiwan issue in U.S.-China relations and the catastrophic danger of miscalculation as well as misunderstanding. In a think tank world driven by proposals and fundable projects, Taiwan has not been easiest topic for which to fundraise throughout the years, especially at the time when reconciliation and economic integration seemed to be the dominant theme between the mainland and Taiwan. However, Alan’s dedication to the issue, as well as his positions on it, had never been swayed by the availability or unavailability of funding. His dedication was absolute and his integrity was non-negotiable. In my fourteen years of professional career so far, Alan guided me through his own example on how to conduct good research and how to be honest to the facts. A good mentor willing to spend the time, energy and resources to help the younger generation in Washington is rare. But Alan was one of those few. In my most self-doubting years about myself and career, Alan was the one who pointed out the directions that I should pursue and the angles I should focus on to pursue them. I will never forget the many, many 7:30 AM breakfasts we had where he listened to my confusion, questions, and sometimes whining, and provided his observations and suggestions. I will never forget how he, at the age of seventy-seven, read my writings sentence-by- sentence and then gave me detailed explanations on why one preposition was better than another. Alan was not just my mentor but like my father since I came to the United States fourteen years ago. Now the world will never be complete again. He guided me, shaped me, shone light on me in the darkest days. I am what I am and who I am thanks to Alan. I am forever in his debt and will never be able to repay it. The only thing that I can do in his honor is to carry his torch forward, to conduct research in the way that he had taught me and with the same integrity that he had shown me, to be kind and helpful to the next generation of researchers as he had mentored me. In that sense, Alan will forever be with me, and be with us. About Stimson and the Author

Alan D. Romberg

Alan D. Romberg was a Distinguished Fellow and the Director of the East Asia Program at Stimson from 2000 to 2018. Before joining Stimson, he enjoyed a distinguished career working on Asian issues including 27 years in the State Department, with over 20 years as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. Romberg was the Principal Deputy Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Deputy Spokesman of the department. He served overseas in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Additionally, Romberg spent almost 10 years as the CV Starr Senior Fellow for Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and was special assistant to the secretary of the navy. Romberg received an M.A. from Harvard University, and a B.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

The Stimson Center

The Stimson Center is a nonpartisan policy research center working to solve the world’s greatest threats to security and prosperity. Think of a modern global challenge: refugee flows, arms trafficking, terrorism. These threats cannot be resolved by a single government, individual, or business. Stimson’s award-winning research serves as a roadmap to address borderless threats through collective action. Our formula is simple: we gather the brightest people to think beyond soundbites, create solutions, and make those solutions reality. We follow the credo of one of history’s leading statesmen, Henry L. Stimson, in taking “pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives.” We are practical in our approach and independent in our analysis. Our innovative ideas change the world. Across the Taiwan Strait These volumes compile the articles by Alan D. Romberg previously published in the Hoover Institution’s China Leadership Monitor. A dedicated scholar of East Asia, Romberg wrote on Taiwan for the Monitor for over a decade, closely tracking the political and economic developments of cross-Strait relations and analyzing them for American observers.

About the Author Alan D. Romberg was a Distinguished Fellow and the Director of the East Asia Program at Stimson from 2000 to 2018. Before joining Stimson, he enjoyed a distinguished career working on Asian issues including 27 years in the State Department, with over 20 years as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. Romberg spent almost 10 years as the CV Starr Senior Fellow for Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and was special assistant to the secretary of the navy.

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