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Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received As of 19:30, 9 May 2019 KYIV 10 May 2019

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Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Based on Information Received As of 19:30, 9 May 2019 KYIV 10 May 2019 Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 9 May 2019 KYIV 10 May 2019 This report is for the media and the general public. Summary Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region. It recorded ceasefire violations and military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including some used as part of military-style parades in Donetsk and Luhansk cities. It observed fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Troitske and residential property in Zolote-4/Rodina. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka, in the area of which it recorded about 125 explosions. The Mission observed events in several regions of Ukraine commemorating Victory Day and Remembrance and Reconciliation Day. It observed military-style parades in non-government-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk cities. Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske and a border crossing point near Dovzhanske.* Ceasefire violations[1] In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 450 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 115 explosions). More than three fifths of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including about 125 explosions near the Pumping Station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 135 explosions). Over four fifths of ceasefire violations, including almost all of the explosions, were recorded at easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). Fresh damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Troitske and to residential property in Zolote-4/Rodina On 8 May, on the northern edge of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) at a functioning school on Kvitkova Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in a second-floor south-facing window of a school building, assessed as caused by small- arms fire. The SMM also saw a fresh crater in a field, approximately 120m south-east of the school, along with nearby footprints and signs of digging, but was unable to assess the type of weapon or direction of fire. A local resident (male, 30 years old) told the SMM that he had been present in the area when he had heard shelling on the morning of 6 May. On the same day, at 52 1-a Vilna Street on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a crater assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round (unable to determine the direction of fire) on the side of a road about 5-7m west of the front gate of an uninhabited house. The SMM also saw the tailfin of an 82mm mortar round embedded in the ground about 4-6m east of the crater. About 5m west of the previously mentioned house, at 53 1-a Vilna Street, the SMM saw fresh holes in and scratches on the roof of a one-storey summer kitchen located 1m east of the main house. The SMM also saw over 50 holes in the east-facing gate of the house, in two north-facing doors and in two north-facing window frames, all assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel. A resident (male, 40 years old) told the SMM that he had been at home when he had heard an explosion in the yard on the evening of 7 May. Disengagement areas[2] Positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government- controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) on 9 May, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 800m-1km north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On 8 May, inside the Zolote disengagement area near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) as well as a person assessed as a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier. While in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) on the evening of 8 May, the SMM heard six shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area and within 5km of its periphery). Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government- controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) during the day, the SMM heard nine shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 1-3km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area and within 5km of its periphery).[3] Withdrawal of weapons The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of withdrawal lines Government-controlled areas 9 May The SMM saw: nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk) and four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) near Butkivka (95km north of Luhansk). Non-government-controlled areas 9 May The SMM saw: seven tanks (one T-34, three T-64 and three T-72), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1), three MLRS (BM-21), three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six towed howitzers (three D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and three 2A65 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Donetsk city (see below); six tanks (one T-34 and five T-72), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), five MLRS (BM-21), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and ten towed howitzers (five D-30 and five 2A65) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Luhansk city (see below); a tank (T-64), as part of an event commemorating Victory Day, about 80m from the SMM forward patrol base in Horlivka; and a tank (T-64) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites Government-controlled areas 9 May The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). Non-government-controlled areas 4 May Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of: 29 tanks (type undetermined) (as well as 11 impacts of undetermined weapons assessed as the result of recent training activities) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 25 April 2019) and 22 tanks (type undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers or mortars (type undetermined) and 12 towed howitzers or mortars (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2019). Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4] At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region 9 May The SMM noted that: three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were present, and two self-propelled mortars (2S9), 31 self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 and 28 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 22 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 33 MLRS (BM-27) continued to be missing. Weapons storage sites At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region 9 May The SMM noted that this site was abandoned and that 15 mortars (11 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and four BM-37, 82mm) and 30 tanks (T-64) remained missing. Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5] Government-controlled areas 8 May An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk). 9 May The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Talakivka (17km north- east of Mariupol). Non-government-controlled areas 9 May The SMM saw: three APCs (BTR-80), six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP-2) and two anti- aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Donetsk city; five APCs (BTR-80) and two IFVs (BMP-2) as part of a military-style parade in the centre of Luhansk city; and an APC (BTR-80), an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), as part of an event commemorating Victory Day, about 80m from the SMM forward patrol base in Horlivka. UAV seen flying in the security zone On 8 May, about 2km north-west of Troitske, the SMM saw a grey fixed-wing unidentified mini-UAV flying about 400m north of the patrol’s position at an altitude of 200-300m for about 20 minutes. SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka on 8 May and an assessment of the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) on 9 May. The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka.
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