DOCSLIB.ORG

Government to the Russian Federation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Government to the Russian Federation Government of the Russian Federation responses to questions 29th August, 2014 Aircrash Firstly, the Government of the Russian Federation expressed deep condolences to all the victims’ families and the governments of nations whose citizens were on board of MH-17 that was downed in Ukraine on July 17. The President of the Russian Federation instructed all the Russian military and civilian departments to provide all necessary assistance in investigating this crime. Russia strongly supported and welcomed unanimous vote on the UN Security Council resolution 2166 on the independent international investigation of MH-17 tragedy. Unfortunately, from the very beginning we have been witnessing attempts to hinder the implementation of that resolution. The demand for a ceasefire in the area of the crash was ignored by the Ukrainian authorities for more than 10 days. For us the issue is even more urgent since a number of western media and leadership of some countries irresponsibly hurried to blame the self-defense forces of Donetsk People’s Republic and even Russia for bringing the plane down. However, their arguments are limited to publications based mainly on fabricated photos and audio materials that have absolutely no connection with the technical expertise of the MH-17 flight crash circumstances. As the Russian Ambassador pointed at the meeting with the Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop on July 18, there is no way that the self-defense forces in Donetsk region are in possession of such complex weaponry that could hit the air-plane travelling at an altitude of over 10 000 meters. In the opinion of the military experts, only S-300 and Buk surface-to-air missile systems are capable of hitting targets at such altitude. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation at press-briefing on July 21 made some important points: 1. MH-17 deviated for 14 km from its original route over Donetsk. Data of black boxes that were passed by the Donetsk militiamen to the Malaysian investigators and the transcripts of exchange between the pilots of MH-17 and the Ukrainian air controllers (that up to now were not presented to the international community) should give the answer as to why it happened. 2 2. A Ukrainian combat jet (supposedly a SU-25) was detected at a distance of 1,8-3,1 miles from the Malaysian plane shortly before the crash. The presence of the combat jet was registered by the Rostov (South Russia) monitoring centre. SU-25 (NATO reporting name Frogfoot) ground attack aircraft can hit a target at a distance of 3,1 miles as it is equipped with air-to- air missiles. 3. MH-17 crashed within the operating range of the Ukrainian army’s self-propelled medium-range surface-to-air Buk missile systems. The Russian Defense Ministry has satellite images tracking the position of the Ukrainian air defense systems on July 14-18. The Russian monitoring systems detected up to 4 Ukrainian Buk M1 air defense systems in the crash area on the day of the accident. One of them was moved to the very vicinity of the self-defense forces without any obvious reason. The question arises as to why the Ukrainian military would deploy this weaponry if the armed militia in eastern Ukraine does not have an aircraft? Why did the system happen to be near the area controlled by militiamen shortly before the tragedy? Investigation Russia is fully committed to the international investigation in full compliance with Resolution 2166 and with active role of ICAO. We officially presented to the international community the data related to the incident as received through our space monitoring capacity. What is really puzzling is that everyone else has lost interest in this investigation. After the initial harsh, near-hysterical statements accusing Russia and self-defence fighters with such zeal, these people now seem to have been struck dumb. In effect, we alone are trying to keep this very serious issue in the focus of attention. We want to understand what is happening to the wreckage at the crash site and why has it not been thoroughly examined by the appropriate international investigating authorities? To what extent can an objective and independent investigation be assured without safe and unimpeded access of experts to the crash site, where Kiev continues its war activity in violation of the UNSC Resolution 2166? We are determined not allow the investigation of MH17 crash to be manipulated into oblivion like it already happened to investigations of many Ukrainian tragedies. Australian Government Please find enclosed herewith the official statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia regarding the position of the Government of Australia on MH-17. Nevertheless, despite harsh rhetoric of Abbott Government Russia provided all possible assistance in securing access of the multinational police team to the crash site in order to 3 recover the bodies of the victims. And now Foreign Minister of Australia is trying to use it as the evidence of the Russian involvement in Ukraine. Such approach, to say the least, is highly questionable. Sanctions is not at all our choice, but there should be no doubt that we will do whatever is necessary to protect our legitimate interests, including the interests of national security in all its dimensions. But Russia does not want to proceed along the road of escalation. We hope that the US, the European Union and others including Australia heed to the voice of reason and put an end to these meaningless tit-for-tat vicious circle which they themselves started. Russia’s involvement in Ukraine At the 2 July meeting the foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France in Berlin agreed that multilateral monitoring should be organised at those border checkpoints controlled by self-defence forces, not the Kiev authorities. Since then, OSCE observers have arrived at the Gukovo and Donetsk checkpoints, and have been working there and regularly reporting their findings to Vienna, in addition to reports by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (about 500 observers). They haven’t noticed anything crossing the border illegally – neither goods nor people nor ammunition. Nor have any questions been raised about the transparency of the border crossings controlled by self-defence forces in Ukraine. We also backed the German proposal to organise regular, real-time information exchange between the representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE working on both sides of the border to report any incidents. This is in Russia’s interest, since our territory is periodically shelled from Ukraine. While we believe the shelling is not intentional, it doesn’t make it any less dangerous for people who are being injured and whose property is being damaged. Moreover, according to the Russian Defense Ministry, 18 international inspections conducted in airspace over Russia had revealed no undeclared military activities on the part of Russia in regions bordering Ukraine. However active military operations of Ukraine’s armed forces on the border with Russia prevent similar inspections to be carried out in Ukrainian airspace. As for latest reports about so called Russian “invasion” in Ukraine, there is only one certain fact – Donetsk militia members entered Novoazovsk, everything else is just insinuations. Accusations relating to the alleged Russian military “convoys” have been heard during the past week and the week before that. All of them were proven false. There is nothing more there, it is 4 just the Ukrainian military losing their positions to militia who launched a counter-offensive. And President Poroshenko himself rightfully blamed mass desertions of Ukrainian commanding personnel for such military setback. And it is important to add that OSCE monitoring team in Ukraine has not seen any evidence of Russia crossing the border with troops and tanks. Settlement in Ukraine Russian position is simple. We do not stand for war, but for talks. We are for actually implementation of agreements on Ukraine that have been reached. For example, 21 February – a national unity government. The West, including the foreign ministers from Germany, France and Poland signed the document and then forgot about it. 17 April – the need to immediately begin a constitutional dialogue that is inclusive, transparent and open to the participation of all regions and political forces. This agreement was signed by Russia, Ukraine, the European Union and the United States. Then everyone, except Russia, forgot about it. On 2 July, the foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France called for an unconditional three-day ceasefire. No one, except Russia, has any memory of it. Now everyone is talking about preconditions. Peace in Ukraine can only be attained through broad national dialogue in which all regions and all political forces of the country must participate. It is important to create conditions in Ukraine for the state that respects all minorities, as well as the cultural, linguistic and religious preferences of each region. Of course, the decentralisation of authority and the competencies of the regions must be negotiated and agreed upon, because imposing anything on the Ukrainian regions from the centre is not easy to accomplish even under normal conditions, and is simply impossible now. However, the inclusive nationwide constitutional process did not start in April and the unconditional ceasefire is nowhere to be seen either. The point is for Kiev to stop war games and to abandon the illusion that the deep crisis in Ukraine can be resolved by winning the war against your own people. It is deeply saddening that the US and the EU continue to blindly support anything Kiev does. G20 As the Russian Minister Sergey Lavrov said in Hague in March 2014 “the G20 was not established by Australia” which government is considering not inviting President Vladimir Putin to the November G20 meeting in Brisbane.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Former Warsaw Pact Ammunition Handbook, Vol 3
    NATO Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence FORMER WARSAW PACT AMMUNITION HANDBOOK VOLUME 3 Air Forces Ammunition Aerial projectiles, bombs, rockets and missiles TRENČÍN 2019 Slovak Republic For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence FORMER WARSAW PACT AMMUNITION HANDBOOK VOLUME 3 Air Forces Ammunition Aerial projectiles, bombs, rockets and missiles For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence The NATO Explosive Ordnance Centre of Excellence (NATO EOD COE) supports the efforts of the Alliance in the areas of training and education, information sharing, doctrine development and concepts validation. Published by NATO EOD Centre of Excellence Ivana Olbrachta 5, 911 01,Trenčín, Slovak Republic Tel. + 421 960 333 502, Fax + 421 960 333 504 www.eodcoe.org Former Warsaw Pact Ammunition Handbook VOL 3 – Edition II. ISBN 978-80-89261-81-9 © EOD Centre of Excellence. All rights reserved 2019 No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner without the written permission of the publisher, except in the case brief quotations embodied in articles and reviews. For Official Use Only Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence Foreword Even though in areas of current NATO operations the insurgency is vastly using the Home Made Explosive as the main charge for emplaced IEDs, our EOD troops have to cope with the use of the conventional munition in any form and size all around the world. To assist in saving EOD Operators’ lives and to improve their effectiveness at munition disposal, it is essential to possess the adequate level of experience and knowledge about the respective type of munition.
    [Show full text]
  • Safe Havens in Syria: Missions and Requirements for an Air Campaign
    SSP Working Paper July 2012 Safe Havens in Syria: Missions and Requirements for an Air Campaign Brian T. Haggerty Security Studies Program Department of Political Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology [email protected] Copyright © July 15, 2012 by Brian T. Haggerty. This working paper is in draft form and intended for the purposes of discussion and comment. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies are available from the author at [email protected]. Thanks to Noel Anderson, Mark Bell, Christopher Clary, Owen Cote, Col. Phil Haun, USAF, Col. Lance A. Kildron, USAF, Barry Posen, Lt. Col. Karl Schloer, USAF, Sidharth Shah, Josh Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Alec Worsnop and members of MIT’s Strategic Use of Force Working Group for their comments and suggestions. All errors are my own. This is a working draft: comments and suggestions are welcome. Introduction Air power remains the arm of choice for Western policymakers contemplating humanitarian military intervention. Although the early 1990s witnessed ground forces deployed to northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti to protect civilians and ensure the provision of humanitarian aid, interveners soon embraced air power for humanitarian contingencies. In Bosnia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) success in combining air power with local ground forces to coerce the Serbs to the negotiating table at Dayton in 1995 suggested air power could help provide an effective response to humanitarian crises that minimized the risks of armed intervention.1 And though NATO’s
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016
    The Russian Armed Forces are developing from a force primarily designed for handling internal – 2016 Perspective Ten-Year in a Capability Military Russian disorder and conflicts in the area of the former Soviet Union towards a structure configured for large-scale operations also beyond that area. The Armed Forces can defend Russia from foreign aggression in 2016 better than they could in 2013. They are also a stronger instrument of coercion than before. This report analyses Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective. It is the eighth edition. A change in this report compared with the previous edition is that a basic assumption has been altered. In 2013, we assessed fighting power under the assumption that Russia was responding to an emerging threat with little or no time to prepare operations. In view of recent events, we now estimate available assets for military operations in situations when Russia initiates the use of armed force. The fighting power of the Russian Armed Forces is studied. Fighting power means the available military assets for three overall missions: operational-strategic joint inter-service combat operations (JISCOs), stand-off warfare and strategic deterrence. The potential order of battle is estimated for these three missions, i.e. what military forces Russia is able to generate and deploy in 2016. The fighting power of Russia’s Armed Forces has continued to increase – primarily west of the Urals. Russian military strategic theorists are devoting much thought not only to military force, but also to all kinds of other – non-military – means. The trend in security policy continues to be based on anti- Americanism, patriotism and authoritarianism at home.
    [Show full text]
  • (CUWS) Outreach Journal #1115
    USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal Issue No. 1115, 16 May 2014 Welcome to the CUWS Outreach Journal! As part of the CUWS’ mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved. FEATURE ITEM: “Biological Defense: DOD Has Strengthened Coordination on Medical Countermeasures but Can Improve Its Process for Threat Prioritization.” GAO-14-442 Report; published: May 15, 2014. Report publicly released: May 15, 2014; 55 pages. http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663212.pdf DOD has made progress in researching, developing, and making available medical countermeasures against biological threat agents, but does not use its established process for annually updating its list of threat priorities. DOD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) is researching, is developing, or has obtained Food and Drug Administration approval for countermeasures that address 10 of the 19 biological threat agents DOD has identified as threats to the warfighter.
    [Show full text]
  • Exclusive! NATO and Strategic JOINT WARFARE CENTRE
    MARCH 2018 • ISSUE NO. 33 jwc.nato.int EXCLUSIVE! NATO AND STRATEGIC JOINT WARFARE CENTRE NATO COMMUNICATIONS OTAN The Story So Far TRAINING AND SIMULATION INSIDE THE POWER OF NON-ATTRIBUTION IN MODERN INFORMATION WARFARE SUN TZU: THE ART OF WAR OTN PERA IO AL LEVEL LOGISTICS WARFARE DEVELOPMENT FOR MAJOR JOINT OPERATIONS AND COLLectIVE DeFENCE A/ 2 AD COMPONENT INTEGRATION CHALLENGES Presented by Advanced Layered Defence Systems MARCH 2018 • ISSUE NO. 33 jwc.nato.int EXCLUSIVE! JOINT WARFARE CENTRE NATO AND STRATEGIC NATO OTAN COMMUNICATIONS The Story So Far TRAINING AND SIMULATION THE POWER OF NON-ATTRIBUTIONINSIDE IN MODERN INFORMATION WARFARE SUN TZU: THE ART OF WAR OPERATIONAL LEVEL LOGISTICS ON THE COVER WARFARE The Joint Warfare Centre at sunrise in Jåttå, Stavanger. Photo by Major DEVELOPMENT Stephen Olsen, Norwegian Army. NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre is celebrating FOR MAJOR JOINT OPERATIONS its 15th anniversary throughout 2018 with key anniversary events, including AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE a special Summer Family Day and the main anniversary ceremony on A2/AD COMPONENT 23 October. BELOW: A photo collage illustrating NATO’s Joint Warfare INTEGRATION Development. Photos by NATO (AIRCOM and MARCOM). CHALLENGES Presented by Advanced Layered Defence Systems BACK COVER All photos by NATO, except for Norway and the United States by Jacob Østheim (Forsvaret) and Jordan Castelan (U.S. Air Force), respectively. 74 10 91 22 32 2 The Three Swords Magazine 33/2018 CNO TENTS March 2018 “A robust exercise programme is a clear and visible demonstration of our ability to deliver the appropriate strategic effects in different environments, but also a Issue No.
    [Show full text]
  • Punkbuster Manual Update Bf4
    Punkbuster Manual Update Bf4 PSA: The BF4 beta is now. Update Punkbuster manual. Step 1: Click on Then the Punkbuster setup should look like this, now choose "Check for updates". Punkbuster Download Battlefield 4 Beta (Today Downloads: 169) You can People with loading screen issues: Test a manual punkbuster update. For me it so. Battlelog is a free social platform that ties into Battlefield 4 and Battlefield 3 and To Manually update your local PunkBuster Security Files, choose "Save As". Go to their site and try a manual update of BF4's punkbuster client. BF4 621m Pilot snipe headshot on moving transport (DeltaBravo) by ashbask in Battlefield. Battlefield 4/Punkbuster Game Kick since update to Norton Security Special Offer Notifications, Firefox cleanup and I've turned all Task Scheduling to Manual. Battlefield 4 Aimbot Vehicle-JET ESP V3.16 Download Link. This means that the absolute only method to be caught using HAGs is by manual detection methods only. Anti-Ban Protection: Yes, Last AntiBan Module Update: 14/09/2015 PunkBuster & Fairfight Secure, Aimbot Assistance, Instant Kill, Auto Fire, Smart. Punkbuster Manual Update Bf4 Read/Download Exe). right click bf4 icon and select properties _compatibility_ now down the bottom tried literally everything like port forward, manual punkbuster install, re-install game Reinstall origin, reinstall the game, reinstall windows, reinstall drivers. I cant play bf4 at all after the small night map update. gamer and i have known about manual and automatic updating of punkbuster for 10 years at least. You must appeal any PunkBuster Ban with Even Balance by opening a ticket.
    [Show full text]
  • United Nations S/2019/83
    United Nations S/2019/83 Security Council Distr.: General 25 January 2019 Original: English Letter dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council The members of the Panel of Experts on Yemen have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Panel, prepared in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2402 (2018). The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014) on 8 January 2019 and considered by the Committee on 18 January 2019. We would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Ahmed Himmiche Coordinator Panel of Experts on Yemen (Signed) Fernando Rosenfeld Carvajal Expert (Signed) Wolf-Christian Paes Expert (Signed) Henry Thompson Expert (Signed) Marie-Louise Tougas Expert 19-00348 (E) 110219 *1900348* S/2019/83 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen Summary Throughout the reporting period, Yemen continued its slide towards humanitarian and economic catastrophe. The country remains deeply fractured, with the growing presence of armed groups and deep-rooted corruption exacerbating the impact of the armed conflict for ordinary Yemenis within both Houthi-held areas and liberated governorates. Although there has been activity on some fronts, notably along the coast of the Red Sea, the ground war remains predominantly confined to relatively small areas. Most Yemenis therefore carry on with their lives within an economy broken by the distortions of conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • Aviation Enthusiast Book Club (A Closed Facebook Group)
    Aviation Enthusiast Book Club (a closed Facebook group) Russia’s Air-Launched Weapons (Piotr Butowski) A book review by CDR Mark R Condeno, Philippines (1 December 2017) Published in the NOVEMBER 2017 PERSPECTIVE JOURNAL of the Philippine Air Force-Air Power Institute, Air Education Training and Doctrine Command, Fernando Air Force Base Lipa City, Batangas, Philippines. Two years ago, Russia stepped up its military presence in its involvement in the Syrian Civil War that begun in 2011, at first Military assistance was provided to the Syrian Forces from the refurbishment of its MI-24 Hind Attack helicopters to the delivery of the Buk Missile System. Three years later in October 2015, Russia unleashed its airpower with an airstrike at rebel strongholds in Rastan, Talbiseh, and Zafaraniya in the Homs province of Syria, utilizing SU-24 Fencer, SU-25 Frogfoot, SU-30 Flanker C and the SU-34 Fullback. The airstrikes highlighted the air launched weapon systems fielded by the Russian Air Force, from the well-known Cold War era UPK-23-250 gunpod to the MDS-1 Self-Propelled Bottom Mine. A lavishly and fascinating illustrated tome, notable aviation author Piotr Butowski (Russia’s Warplanes Volume 1 & 2) completes the trilogy of coverage on the Russian Air Force with this volume. The book is divided into eight chapters commencing with the service strategic weapons divided into three sections with a brief coverage on the nuclear and a detailed discussion into the present and future level strategic missiles, such as the Kitchen, Kent, Kickback, Club-A and the Brahmos A and NG jointly develop with India.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Nuclear Weapons Capability 【Overview】 Compared with the U.S
    Russian nuclear weapons capability 【Overview】 Compared with the U.S. French, and UK nuclear capabilities, Russian capabilities are quite vague. As for the data pertaining to the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty, Russia, unlike the U.S., has not disclosed any breakdown of the number of (deployed/non-deployed) launchers. On March 1, 2019, Russia announced that it possessed a total 524 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,461 deployed strategic nuclear warheads (U.S.Department of State 2019). This chart and the New START Treaty data can be reconciled by replacing the 200 warheads counted under “Strategic bomber payloads” with the estimated number of operational strategic bombers (50) to reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads to 512 and 1,432, respectively. Given Russiaʼs limited transparency and day-to-day fluctuations in deployments in reality, this is probably a reasonable estimate. Also, Russia has approximately 160 ballistic missiles on high alert (capable of launch in 15 minutes), and most of them are estimated to be ICBMs (Kristensen, Hans M. 2017). After 2008, 96% of deployed ICBMs are said to be on high alert (Podvig, Pavel 2014). Russia is in the process of systematically replacing Soviet-era SS-18, -19, and -25 systems with the latest SS-27M2 systems with complete replacement by 2020. SS-18s are likewise being replaced by SS-X-30 Sarmats under development. Strategic nuclear submarines and SLBMs will also be replaced by the latest Borei-class submarines and new SLBM Bulava. Elsewhere, Russiaʼs bombers, cruise missiles and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their launchers are all being modernized.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends Current Capabilities and Future Threat Outlook
    Whitehall Report 3-20 Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends Current Capabilities and Future Threat Outlook Justin Bronk Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends Current Capabilities and Future Threat Outlook Justin Bronk RUSI Whitehall Report 3-20, October 2020 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies ii Russian and Chinese Combat Air Trends 189 years of independent thinking on defence and security The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank. Its mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable world. RUSI is a research-led institute, producing independent, practical and innovative analysis to address today’s complex challenges. Since its foundation in 1831, RUSI has relied on its members to support its activities. Together with revenue from research, publications and conferences, RUSI has sustained its political independence for 189 years. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author, and do not reflect the views of RUSI or any other institution. Published in 2020 by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-Commercial – No-Derivatives 4.0 International Licence. For more information, see <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>. RUSI Whitehall Report 3-20, October 2020. ISSN 1750-9432. Printed in the UK by Kall Kwik. Royal United Services Institute Cover image: Courtesy of Lei Junqiang / Xinhua News Agency / PA for Defence and Security Studies Images.
    [Show full text]
  • (CUWS) Outreach Journal #1123
    USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal Issue No. 1123, 11 July 2014 Welcome to the CUWS Outreach Journal! As part of the CUWS’ mission to develop Air Force, DoD, and other USG leaders to advance the state of knowledge, policy, and practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, we offer the government and civilian community a source of contemporary discussions on unconventional weapons. These discussions include news articles, papers, and other information sources that address issues pertinent to the U.S. national security community. It is our hope that this information resources will help enhance the overall awareness of these important national security issues and lead to the further discussion of options for dealing with the potential use of unconventional weapons. The following news articles, papers, and other information sources do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved. FEATURE ITEM: “The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030”. Authored by John P. Caves, Jr. and W. Seth Carus; National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Occasional Paper 10, June 2014. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/occasional/cswmd/CSWMD_OccationalPaper-10.pdf This publication explores the impact of technological change and the evolving geopolitical environment on the future weapons of mass destruction threat. Technological advances will enable new forms of chemical and biological weapons, and may increase proliferation risks for nuclear weapons.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization
    Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization Updated September 13, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45861 SUMMARY R45861 Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: September 13, 2021 Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization Amy F. Woolf Russia’s nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems—including intercontinental Specialist in Nuclear ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy Weapons Policy bombers—and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines and aircraft while developing new types of delivery systems. Although Russia’s number of nuclear weapons has declined sharply since the end of Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory. Doctrine and Deployment During the Cold War, the Soviet Union valued nuclear weapons for both their political and military attributes. While Moscow pledged that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, many analysts and scholars believed the Soviet Union integrated nuclear weapons into its warfighting plans. After the Cold War, Russia did not retain the Soviet “no first use” policy, and it has revised its nuclear doctrine several times to respond to concerns about its security environment and the capabilities of its conventional forces. When combined with military exercises and Russian officials’ public statements, this evolving doctrine seems to indicate that Russia has potentially placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and may threaten to use them during regional conflicts.
    [Show full text]