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Test Proves That One Aerial Bomb Maywreck a Dreadnought

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Test Proves That One Aerial Bomb Maywreck a Dreadnought " " " * v " **. ^»*i>l-' J U ill/ A 1 LIB, , il.iiM Altl ¿ ¿ , 1 íJ ¿ 1 I I_.' ___ _ Test Proves That One Aerial Bomb May Wreck a Dreadnought A LL that was left of the wheelhouse and the forward fun- **¦ nel of the battleship Indiana after the explosion of the bomb '"TI/RECK of the forward 8-inch turret of the Indiana, j against tvhich the 900-pound bomb ivas exploded F "" smmsMsmsssssssssssimsmssMsssssssMswsMSSMsWSMsss^ rVHE bomb was the ¦*¦ placed aft of forward 8-inch turret at the point indicated by the arrmo i ; A T the left is a view of the vessel the amidships> first deck { .,.** being blown away \ A T THE right is a view of the second deck looking forward, ^ the X showing where the bomb exploded j ITHE picture at the lower left hand show's the third deck and -* the ammunition hoist. Had the ship been in commission the magazine probably ivould have been exploded j AT the lower hand is shown the **¦ right destruction wrought I on the fourth deck I _..-..__ ____-.... < By Quarterdeck THE seven pictures on this page there, and the campaign could not suffice to show the destruc¬ have been undertaken at all if th« tive effect of a bomb, not only Turks had been supplied with ar- on the upper works of a air force, not to speak of submarine* battleship, and bot upon the lower decks as well. torpedoes. In this case the target was the Discussion Demanded old battleship Indiana, formerly This article is not sensational It commanded by Captain H. C. Tay¬ is a fair statement concerning the lor, U. S. N., when she fought ir uses of bombing and torpedo planes Sampson's fleet at the Battle of in naval warfare, with a brief refer¬ Santiago. ence to the support¡ne: value of sub- The bomb, containing 900 pound: marines and mines in the attack of TNT, was laid on the decl upon a fleet. near the forward eight-inch turre The Navy Department, for r^a- on the port side of the ship. Th sons best known to itself, has not npper boat deck was blown ofl published the result of the Indiana the second and third decks wer experiment, nor has it invited or dis- wrecked fore and aft and the ex encouraged a free and thorough plosion penetrated downward to th cussion as to the effect of new weap- fourth deck. ons upon naval warfare by officer of the navy who are best qualifiée There can be no doubt that th by their recognized ability, stud) forward magazine would have blow and experience to give intelligent up had the ship been In action e opinions on the subject. the time, thus completely destroyin The Navy Department is forcing the to the front the building progran'. ship. But in any event a stud of old. of these 1916.a plan five years pictures will ..-,. demonstrat . .t without giving due consideration to that the on the .¦.......m personnel involved i explosion Indiana we must But can ne hit him? That is the' ficct by bombing planes would best would the present and the future. It seem- at, be very good. Would an vention is no handling the ship and in mannin not jump immediately to the con- succeed at by means difficult, and enemy -were added to ingly ignores, or fails to reaiizi. j question. night, at dusk, or just admiral view such an air attack battleships the forward elusion that all surface with by such means the fleet, in addition his trouble?. that a modern fleet must operate battery of tho Ind battleships The chance of hitting a ship with before dawn. A fleet under steam indifference? ana aro to a rain of bombs from upan three planes instead of one. would have been ho\ useless. This experiment con- a bomb from an at above, may Consider the difference in effec¬ placed airplane has been sea, composed of battleships 600 It was on on the belorv am de demonstrated the battle find itself surrounded a surface, the surface combat. clusively demonstrated that such discussed more or but feet long at intervals of by barrage tiveness of a sixteen-inch gun mount¬ less, experi- 1,500 feet, front in France that a tremendous of mines above the sitrface of the sea. ships are weak laid in several lines across ed on shore as with Wore« if Dropped From Plat lamentably against ment alone can decide. There are either in single column or in several expenditure of compared bomb¬ In fact, we may say that, the Navy a ammunition by anti¬ its track by airplanes. In some It mast be heavy charge exploding on deck. those who assert a fact, ing planes against a fleet. The Department does not exhibit a prop' remembered that th that good per¬ parallel 'columns, presents a big and aircraft guns was necessary to of the gun bomb was But they are also vulnerable bring attacking airplanes might be costs §500,000. It fires a shell er understanding of a one-plan* simply laid on the de< against centage of hits may be expected. vulnerable horizontal target to at¬ down an the of airplane. The loss of aii"- assigned duty bombing and weighing a ton with a small burst¬ fleet, not to say a three-plane fleet. and exploded. the dow high-angle fire from big guns whose The Navy Department should have tack from the air. others to Manifestly planes from such fire was said to mine-laying. ing charge of high explosive. The We find our surface fleet divided- ward effect of the shells, falling at long range upon solved this For explosive wou problem long ago. Ex¬ instance, four battleships in have been only one-tenth of 1 The Plane chances of hitting a moving ship at not concentrated for war. Wc Arn¬ have been unarmored decks or periments with per Torpedo mach greater and tl penetrating dummy bombs would column.one following directly be¬ cent! And In ten to twenty miles are rather small, old and useless ships in commis¬ thin armor, reach suffice. yet these anti-aircraft discussing an air attack upon a U> havoc more had t may the maga- hind the others.will cover a total whereas ten bombing planes, each sion and an insane proposition widespread I guns were mounted on not on a fleet we must not .ante zines and the as land, forget the torpedo $50,000, could ten add to the number such impedi¬ bomb been dropped or pi destroy ship, at the A Vulncrahlc distance of 6,900 feet. The hori¬ costing carry 1,- of Battle of Target moving ship! The use of search¬ plane. This weapon may, and in 000-pour.d bombs to a distance of ments to the while scores ej jected from an airplane a few Jutland. Before we assert In zontal deck of fleet hrj considering this question of space the four ships lights a fleet fact miles off are a' dred that the can by betrays its position should, always bc^ used in con¬ fifty shore, return for a modern destroyers rusting feet high at a airplane' sink a dread¬ would cover a total flying »peed hitting from an airplano we must length of 2,400 and its formation. A with an new supply and make a second at¬ navy yards for want of men to 9¥t* more than a nought we must be assured that bombing plane junction attack by bomb¬ hundred miles an hoi it in all fairness remember feet, about one-third of the total at a of tack in about one hour! In other tnaml can that the flying speed 150 miles an ing planes. Imagine a force of Even that land it» bomb vn her deck; in hour at fifty as a in Thr admitting the fall! chance of hitting a ship by gunfire length of the column. night is not easily hit, even words, distinguished army of¬ Rear Admiral Goodrich, of othnr words, can it ex¬ if it is seen. torpedo planes swooping down well ficer "neither North has de¬ veioefty the bomb would not ha reasonably nt a distance of from five to ten Suppose a flotilla of many bomb¬ declares, coast de¬ American Review, cansed it to pect to score a hit? The ahead and on one or both bows of fense guns nor a defending fleet of clared that tlifi navy is owned h penetrate one or m< effect of miles was very small ing planes attacks either fron A this until-Admiral Barrage of Minen a fleet and a3 battleships need fire a gun in re¬ the country and the that B deck«, and, with a explosion might have been in ahead or discharging many people; delayed-action ft Fiske's telescope Right and various from astern, flying Even if wo admit thnt the attack of a 7tot great measure predicted an ex¬ dircctlj the chanci torpedoes at the ships. Thus the pelling foreign fleet is owned by individuals o^ postponed the 1 by and scientific over and if we ii explosion of pert on explosives. Wo range-finding gunnery lengthwise the column oj of scoring a direct hit by a bomt fleet would have a properly organized air should not be controlled by them can, of course: control devices were be attacked from above charge until it reached the see« our invented. It is ships. In this case the lateral er from an force." a manner that imperils the ruUtof destroy enemy if we can explode no mcan3 airplane is very small wt ns well as from under water tr third it hi» by improbable that similar ror in by It is safe to declare that a battle It is time that which rep deck, in well kno magazine 1 methods will dropping bombs would bi must not forget that enemies Congress, be adapted to airplane ingenuity maj that could not well be fought fleet will never again a resents the should take ful' that the downward impnl»«? of 1 small, and as the vulnerable a approach people, Chances of Hitting attack.
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