David R. Jones, ed.. The Military Encyclopedia of and Eurasia. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1998. xi + 241 pp. $32.50, cloth, ISBN 978-0-87569-198-5.

Reviewed by Johanna Granville

Published on H-Russia (May, 1999)

This book, edited by David Jones of the Rus‐ of the and the bombs' weight given the sian Research Center of Nova Scotia, is the eighth negligible lift capability of the early airplanes. In volume of The Military Encyclopedia of Russia the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, Bulgarian pilots or and Eurasia. The encyclopedia contains thirty- passengers in the plane would simply drop the eight detailed entries, about more than thirty-four bombs weighing only four to eight kilograms from diferent types of aerial bombs, including: the ear‐ the plane over the target. But this method entailed liest bombs designed in imperial Russia, propa‐ risks to the plane and its passengers, and also was ganda or "agitation" bombs, aiming and marker not always accurate. Faulty fuses and hazardous bombs (to help pilots navigate), anti-airplane storage conditions added to these problems. bombs, anti-tank bombs, concrete-piercing The or agitation (agitat‐ bombs, fragmentation bombs, anti-submarine sionnaia avatsionnaia bomba) was apparently bombs, laser-guided bombs, anti-bridge bombs, frst used by the Germans in World War One (pp. nuclear bombs, anti-personnel bombs, and chemi‐ 92-97). Balloons were used to drift over enemy cal and bacteriological bombs. Indeed, the Rus‐ territory and drop propaganda by timed release. sians must have believed strongly in Henry The Bolsheviks in Russia then adopted this Ger‐ Adams' aphorism: bombs educate vigorously. man technique in their civil war against the Each section averages about four pages and con‐ Whites. To illustrate the importance of propagan‐ cludes with an extensive bibliography of almost da to the red command, Soviet aerial theorist A.N. exclusively Russian-language sources dealing Lapchinskii wrote, "According to ofcial fgures with that specifc type of aerial bomb. Jones and covering the full period of the Civil War (from No‐ his colleagues draw extensively from other prima‐ vember 1917 to 1922), during a total of 19,377 sor‐ ry sources, such as the notes of the U.S. military ties, Soviet pilots dropped some 9,000 kilograms attache in Riga in the interwar period (located in (19,845 lbs) of leafets as compared to 94,508 kilo‐ the National Archives). grams (208,390 lbs) of bombs" (p. 93). Jones's volume starts out with entries about Thanks to the reports by the U.S. Military At‐ some of the earliest aerial bombs developed in the tache in Riga in 1925, we have some idea about early 1900s, which included free-fall bombs, "agi‐ how these early propaganda bombs were con‐ tation" bombs, aiming bombs, marker bombs, and structed: "The devices involved simple cassettes anti-airplane or anti-Zeppelin bombs. Soviet inno‐ or containers, possibly of the same kind employed vators encountered many problems with these in dropping aerial 'fechettes' or 'darts' (strely)" (p. early models, involving, for example, the accuracy 93). One such container, referred to as the "Krilov H-Net Reviews

Apparatus," was specifcally "used for distribution mans than Russians were afected by these propa‐ of propaganda leafets" and consisted of a "box ganda bombs. made of veneer" that was 0.91 meters (36 in.) Moreover, the Soviet writer Lapchinski cited long, 0.57 meters (22.3 in.) wide and 0.46 meters with pride an event that allegedly took place on (18 in.) deep. A small " compartment" the Eastern Front in February 1919. Then, an or‐ was ftted with a safety pin much like a hand der of the Twentieth Rife Division recounts, the and attached to the bottom. By means of proclamations distributed by Red fyers provoked a time fuse, this could be set to explode at a de‐ marked demoralization within the ranks of the sired height above the ground so as to break open opposing White army, and so brought the deser‐ the box and scatter its load of propaganda leafets. tion of two regiments to the Reds. "The leafets of These early uses of propaganda were not at Soviet power, which were spread by ," frst fully understood within the Soviet military, in Lapchinski concluded, "were powerful 'explo‐ part because there was no larger propaganda or‐ sives' that ripped whole regiments away from the ganization to support these eforts in the early enemy." Later during the 1930s the agitation or years. In addition, many Soviet ofcers and pilots propaganda bomb became (and remains) a stan‐ scofed at this method of delivering propaganda, dard item in the Russians' arsenal of free-fall mu‐ arguing that airplanes should be used only to nitions (p. 103). drop "real ." However, soon a lighter The purpose of another early type of aerial type of paper was invented and a greater quantity bomb, the so-called aiming bomb (pristrelochnaia of leafets could be dropped within a single bomb, avatsionnaia bomba) was to test a certain locale and there were some signs that the propaganda to ascertain the location of the enemy and thereby had an efect on the German soldiers in World conserve the more powerful and expensive muni‐ War One (p. 96). tions for the real targets. As the accuracy of Soviet In addition to "agitation" bombs dropped bombs improved, these aiming bombs became from planes and balloons, the Soviet Red Army less necessary. A third type of aerial bomb that ap‐ also used radio loud speakers to broadcast Ger‐ peared before World War One was the marker man-language propaganda in rear areas. (Inciden‐ bomb (aeronavigatsionnaia aviatsionnaia bom‐ tally, much later, in World War Two, East German ba), which was intended to serve as an aid to aeri‐ communist leaders were recruited for this activi‐ al navigation. This bomb could be dropped over ty, including the future S.E.D. party leader Walter water or land. The earliest versions of this type of Ulbricht, who edited the German language radio bomb were made of glass and flled with a bright broadcasts, along with such writers as Erich dye substance that would spread once the bomb Weinert and Willy Bredel. Ulbricht was attached had burst. The resulting patch of color on either in 1942 to the political section of the Don front.) land or water helped pilots orient themselves. As for the efect during World War One of These free-fall air navigation bombs were frst these leafets and radio broadcasts on the enemy, used in the First World War, and were included in one would think that this propaganda would not the specialized munitions developed for the Red be efective, since the soldiers on the other side Air Forces during the 1920s (pp. 98-99). would probably recognize this as propaganda and Although the anti-airplane bomb (pro‐ ignore it. Indeed, according to some accounts, the tivosamoletnaia aviabomba) also appeared dur‐ propaganda had little efect. However, one Ger‐ ing the First World War, the Russians used it most man writer, Klaus Uebe, opined that more Ger‐ often against slow-moving German dirigibles rather than against airplanes. As Jones points out,

2 H-Net Reviews these zeppelins were considered ideal targets be‐ The paradox is that this German assistance also cause "they were the only aerial platform that made Russia more vulnerable to the German mili‐ could carry enough bombs to infict real damage." tary. As a result, one can see examples of how They were hundreds of feet long, flled with high‐ Russian fears of the German military have shaped ly fammable hydrogen, and moved very slowly, Russian habits and military culture. thus were easy to hit (p. 100). Some aircraft pilots The 1939-1940 "Winter War" with Finland used darts with hooks at the end that would in and ensuing Second World War provides another theory be dropped en masse over the balloon. example of how close German-Russian military When these hooks caught onto the fabric, the "in‐ collaboration backfred. In addition to learning cendiary device ignited both the balloon and the from the Germans about , hydrogen inside." The "Fusee Nicolardot" was one the Russians had apparently requested assistance favorite dart used by the Russian Imperial Aerial in 1939 from their new German allies for help in Fleet. laying naval mines in Finland by air. Many of the From the welter of facts in this military ency‐ Soviet bombs in this period were "duds": they had clopedia, one can discern an interesting and para‐ poor fusing devices and failed to go of as doxical pattern of relations between the German planned. The Russian subsequently withdrew and Russian military complexes. Beginning with their request, because they had learned how to do the Treaty of Rapallo (April 1922) the two "outcast lay mines on their own. Later, during World War nations" of Europe assisted each other militarily Two, after had invaded the USSR, Soviet and economically. Restricted after World War One military personnel began to steal superior Ger‐ by the Versailles Treaty, the German army was man bombs that they had acquired and simply able, through its work with Russia, to maintain a loaded them into Soviet planes (p. 69). By 1944 the high standard of training, technical knowledge, German Luftwafe discovered this practice. The and familiarity with new weapons and equip‐ Germans then began to make "booby-trapped ment. The Weimar government was willing to bombs," and the Soviet pilots ended up mining work with the Bolshevik regime, which had been their own territory (p. 70). no party to the Versailles treaty and claimed no Although, according to the U.S. military at‐ monetary reparations. The , in turn, tache in Riga, it became harder during the Stalin had concluded from the failure of proletarian rev‐ years to obtain detailed bomb information, we do olution in Germany and Hungary that the time know that under Stalin's leadership Soviet bomb was not ripe for the sovietization of Europe. technology improved rapidly. By 1943 when the By entering into normal diplomatic relations Soviet Union gained the ofensive against Ger‐ with Germany, the USSR obtained needed manu‐ many, the Stalinist regime had mobilized its best factures and military training from Germany. scientists and engineers to improve the construc‐ Thus the German military played a key role in the tion of bombs, especially their fuses. The produc‐ development of the Soviet military, both with re‐ tion rate also increased; in 1943 the output of mu‐ spect to its weapons systems and strategy. nitions in this year was 28.9 percent greater than Throughout the individual entries in this encyclo‐ in 1942, and almost twice that of 1941 (p. 68). The pedia one encounters examples of how German Russians became more discriminating, using dif‐ practices infuenced Soviet military technicians ferent types of bombs for diferent types of mis‐ and strategists in the feld of propaganda (ex‐ sions. Navy became adept at disrupting plained above), mine-laying, nuclear weapons de‐ German shipping. One impediment to bomb pro‐ velopment, and chemical and biological weapons.

3 H-Net Reviews duction during World War Two was the constant each academic institute and one hundred stu‐ need to relocate munitions factories to the Urals. dents from each university, ready to work. Even after World War Two, the victory over In 1946, Stalin made the development of jet- Nazi Germany in 1945 brought no relaxation of propelled weapons his "highest-priority task."[1] tensions under which Soviet scientists worked. If The success of this crash program was, of course, anything, the pressures increased as the Soviet demonstrated in the test blast of August 1949 (p. Union suddenly found itself thrust into the atomic 81). This accomplished, the Soviet Union then be‐ age and forced to face a range of challenges gan deploying its own nuclear bombs and the unimagined only a few years earlier. Despite his TU-16A (NATO "Badger") , which entered public pronouncements deliberately downplaying production in late 1954, and was confgured to the signifcance of the atomic bomb, Stalin initiat‐ carry either a FAB-9000 or any one of the fve ed a "crash program" in the wake of the war (p. models of nuclear bombs then available. By 1955 80). Although much nuclear technology was the Soviet Union reportedly had produced an esti‐ stolen by the Soviet Union from the , mated 324 nuclear warheads, as well as 1,276 one document (not mentioned in Jones's encyclo‐ bombers, including some TU-4s and 600 Tu-16s pedia) which was declassifed in recent years re‐ for use in Europe. veals considerable German infuence on the fedg‐ Some of the most interesting portions of this ling Soviet nuclear program. On May 13, 1946, encyclopedia concern biological and chemical Stalin apparently issued a resolution to create a weapons. Here again we fnd that the Russian and "Special Committee on Reactive (Jet-Propelled) Soviet militaries frst experienced these weapons Technology" to oversee the fedgling Soviet missile at the hands of the Germans. Throughout the Cold program, an early version of the nuclear develop‐ War period the ofcial Soviet position was that ment program. the USSR had ratifed the Geneva Protocol of June In 1945, the First Main Administration of the 17, 1925 banning biological weapons, but that the USSR Council of Peoples' Commissars was formed, United States and a number of other nations-- which was devoted to the task of developing Japan, Brazil, Nicaragua, El Salvador, among oth‐ atomic weapons. Stalin planned to send groups of ers--never did sign it. highly paid Soviet scientists--chosen apparently While the Soviet ofcials steadfastly denied by Nikita Khrushchev--to Germany to "attach" that they ever experimented with either bacterio‐ themselves to German scientists. This May 1946 logical weapons in general, or aerobombs in par‐ resolution paved the way for the creation of nu‐ ticular, they pointed out that forms of biological clear weapons, carriers for these nuclear war‐ warfare extend as far as back as the Tatars. Jones heads, and missiles. It also created a new branch writes: "In the eyes of the Soviet/Russian commen‐ of the defense industry, both for missile building tators, the frst bacteriological projectiles were the and for the formation of the frst rocket units of bodies of plague victims hurled by the Tatars over the Soviet Armed Forces. In this document, specif‐ the walls of the Crimean fortress of Kafa (today's ic tasks were given to various ministries (each to Feodosia) to spread infection among members of have its own research institute). The plan also the Genovese garrison" (p. 136). Soviet commenta‐ stipulated that college students of "the higher tors also repeatedly charged that the Germans classes"--juniors and seniors-- be trained in reac‐ tried to use in both the World tive technology, so that by the end of the year Wars. Despite these ofcial denials, the notes of 1946 there would be two hundred students from the U.S. military attache in Riga suggests that the same "Kriltsov box" used for propaganda bombs

4 H-Net Reviews was also used in the 1920s to release microbes as As far as chemical weapons are concerned, well. the Tsarist army sufered at least twice as many Meanwhile, Soviet commentators have stated casualties from the poison gases used by Kaiser "after 1941 the United States developed, produced, Wilhelm's armies than did the armies of the other and stored biological weapons at a laboratory at European countries. This traumatic experience Fort Dietrick in Maryland and a facility at Pine apparently strengthened the Russian determina‐ Bluf in Arkansas." Despite these claims, scientifc tion to develop a sizeable arsenal of chemical research and development in the United States in weapons and led to a habitual reluctance to dis‐ bacteriological and biological warfare only card obsolete chemical weapons. During the emerged after the Second World War (p. 138). In‐ 1920s, the Red Army had developed its chemical terest both in the United States, and presumably capabilities and appropriate delivery devices in the USSR, focused on the efects of various tox‐ within the cooperative relationship established ins and the transmission of selected diseases with Weimar Germany and its Reichswehr after (most notably anthrax). Such eforts received still the Treaty of Rapallo. By 1926, the year in which additional impetus from advances made in micro‐ Lapchinskii published the analysis outlined above biology after 1969. The United States developed a in the frst edition of his Tactics of Aviation, a joint range of biological devices (which subsequently Russo-German test facility for aerial chemical were renounced unilaterally and destroyed). The tests, in which each party assumed an equal share problem military innovators encountered was of the operating costs, was at work near Saratov that of delivering the microbes to enemy territory (p. 152). without killing them in the process. To be deadly, The USSR continued to develop chemical the bacteria had to be kept alive, but in manufac‐ weapons, bombs included, throughout the 1930s. turing bacteriological bombs, often the explosion Soviet writers justifed this program by referring ended up killing the microbes. to the use of chemical means by Mussolini's Italy According to Jones, most Western specialists in Ethiopia (the frst real airborne chemical at‐ expressed doubts over the sincerity of Soviet dec‐ tack), by Japan in , and by the ongoing work larations of innocence concerning the develop‐ in Hitler's Germany that eventually produced the ment of their own biological weapons arsenal. phosphorous-based nerve gases Tabun and Sarin During the post-war period these critics pointed (p. 160). Throughout the Second World War, Jones to such incidents as the seeming anthrax outbreak asserts, Soviet planners had feared attacks by in Sverdlovsk during April 1979 as evidence of the choking agents like phosgene, vesicants such as work of a biological warfare laboratory in that mustard or Lewisite, and blood agents like hydro‐ city. With regard to toxin-based substances, their gen cyanide (p. 175). attention focused on the reported use of the so- The Soviet armies again came into contact called "Yellow Rain" against civilian targets in with the Germans' supply of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia, the Yemen, and later, Afghanistan. 1945 when they liberated Berlin. They transport‐ Delivered by aircraft, this reportedly covered ed the bulk of these weapons back to the USSR. It large areas with a yellow vapor or powder that is clear that the Soviet leadership long remained caused headaches, vomiting, spasms, contrac‐ convinced that in any future confict, chemical tions, and internal bleeding, followed by the de‐ warfare was real possibility and that the Soviet struction of the bone marrow and necrosis as the Armed Forces needed to be able to wage it. This skin blackens and immediately turns gangrenous conviction led to the Soviet penchant for stockpil‐ (p. 140).

5 H-Net Reviews ing equipment and retaining older systems, how‐ ever hazardous. In short, Jones's military encyclopedia, espe‐ cially this eighth volume, is a useful reference work. The only shortcoming is that it lacks an in‐ dex, making it difcult to look up a specifc term. Nevertheless, this volume complements well Jones's previous (seventh) volume in the series, which contains fve articles on aerial blockades of cities and regions in the Soviet Union during World War II and a fnal article about the aerial bomb itself, with precise defnitions. This military encyclopedia also makes a signifcant contribu‐ tion to the existing reference literature on Soviet airpower, consisting, for example, of Bill Gun‐ ston's Encyclopedia of Soviet Aircraft since 1917 and the articles in Jane's Soviet Intelligence Re‐ view and Jane's Defense Weekly. Note [1]. See "How the Rocket Forces Were Created in the USSR," [Kak Sozdalis' Raketnye Sily v SSSR] Military-Historical Journal, vol. 1 (January-Febru‐ ary, 1995): 53-57. The title is misleading; three doc‐ uments are published in this issue, one written in 1946 (below) and two written in 1959. Copyright (c) 1999 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ tact [email protected].

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-russia

Citation: Johanna Granville. Review of Jones, David R., ed. The Military Encyclopedia of Russia and Eurasia. H-Russia, H-Net Reviews. May, 1999.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3114

6 H-Net Reviews

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

7