David R. Jones, ed.. The Military Encyclopedia of Russia and Eurasia. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1998. xi + 241 pp. $32.50, cloth, ISBN 978-0-87569-198-5. Reviewed by Johanna Granville Published on H-Russia (May, 1999) This book, edited by David Jones of the Rus‐ of the bombs and the bombs' weight given the sian Research Center of Nova Scotia, is the eighth negligible lift capability of the early airplanes. In volume of The Military Encyclopedia of Russia the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, Bulgarian pilots or and Eurasia. The encyclopedia contains thirty- passengers in the plane would simply drop the eight detailed entries, about more than thirty-four bombs weighing only four to eight kilograms from different types of aerial bombs, including: the ear‐ the plane over the target. But this method entailed liest bombs designed in imperial Russia, propa‐ risks to the plane and its passengers, and also was ganda or "agitation" bombs, aiming and marker not always accurate. Faulty fuses and hazardous bombs (to help pilots navigate), anti-airplane storage conditions added to these problems. bombs, anti-tank bombs, concrete-piercing The propaganda or agitation bomb (agitat‐ bombs, fragmentation bombs, anti-submarine sionnaia avatsionnaia bomba) was apparently bombs, laser-guided bombs, anti-bridge bombs, first used by the Germans in World War One (pp. nuclear bombs, anti-personnel bombs, and chemi‐ 92-97). Balloons were used to drift over enemy cal and bacteriological bombs. Indeed, the Rus‐ territory and drop propaganda by timed release. sians must have believed strongly in Henry The Bolsheviks in Russia then adopted this Ger‐ Adams' aphorism: bombs educate vigorously. man technique in their civil war against the Each section averages about four pages and con‐ Whites. To illustrate the importance of propagan‐ cludes with an extensive bibliography of almost da to the red command, Soviet aerial theorist A.N. exclusively Russian-language sources dealing Lapchinskii wrote, "According to official fgures with that specific type of aerial bomb. Jones and covering the full period of the Civil War (from No‐ his colleagues draw extensively from other prima‐ vember 1917 to 1922), during a total of 19,377 sor‐ ry sources, such as the notes of the U.S. military ties, Soviet pilots dropped some 9,000 kilograms attache in Riga in the interwar period (located in (19,845 lbs) of leaflets as compared to 94,508 kilo‐ the National Archives). grams (208,390 lbs) of bombs" (p. 93). Jones's volume starts out with entries about Thanks to the reports by the U.S. Military At‐ some of the earliest aerial bombs developed in the tache in Riga in 1925, we have some idea about early 1900s, which included free-fall bombs, "agi‐ how these early propaganda bombs were con‐ tation" bombs, aiming bombs, marker bombs, and structed: "The devices involved simple cassettes anti-airplane or anti-Zeppelin bombs. Soviet inno‐ or containers, possibly of the same kind employed vators encountered many problems with these in dropping aerial 'flechettes' or 'darts' (strely)" (p. early models, involving, for example, the accuracy 93). One such container, referred to as the "Krilov H-Net Reviews Apparatus," was specifically "used for distribution mans than Russians were affected by these propa‐ of propaganda leaflets" and consisted of a "box ganda bombs. made of veneer" that was 0.91 meters (36 in.) Moreover, the Soviet writer Lapchinski cited long, 0.57 meters (22.3 in.) wide and 0.46 meters with pride an event that allegedly took place on (18 in.) deep. A small "explosive compartment" the Eastern Front in February 1919. Then, an or‐ was ftted with a safety pin much like a hand der of the Twentieth Rifle Division recounts, the grenade and attached to the bottom. By means of proclamations distributed by Red fyers provoked a time fuse, this could be set to explode at a de‐ marked demoralization within the ranks of the sired height above the ground so as to break open opposing White army, and so brought the deser‐ the box and scatter its load of propaganda leafets. tion of two regiments to the Reds. "The leaflets of These early uses of propaganda were not at Soviet power, which were spread by aircraft," first fully understood within the Soviet military, in Lapchinski concluded, "were powerful 'explo‐ part because there was no larger propaganda or‐ sives' that ripped whole regiments away from the ganization to support these efforts in the early enemy." Later during the 1930s the agitation or years. In addition, many Soviet officers and pilots propaganda bomb became (and remains) a stan‐ scoffed at this method of delivering propaganda, dard item in the Russians' arsenal of free-fall mu‐ arguing that airplanes should be used only to nitions (p. 103). drop "real explosives." However, soon a lighter The purpose of another early type of aerial type of paper was invented and a greater quantity bomb, the so-called aiming bomb (pristrelochnaia of leaflets could be dropped within a single bomb, avatsionnaia bomba) was to test a certain locale and there were some signs that the propaganda to ascertain the location of the enemy and thereby had an effect on the German soldiers in World conserve the more powerful and expensive muni‐ War One (p. 96). tions for the real targets. As the accuracy of Soviet In addition to "agitation" bombs dropped bombs improved, these aiming bombs became from planes and balloons, the Soviet Red Army less necessary. A third type of aerial bomb that ap‐ also used radio loud speakers to broadcast Ger‐ peared before World War One was the marker man-language propaganda in rear areas. (Inciden‐ bomb (aeronavigatsionnaia aviatsionnaia bom‐ tally, much later, in World War Two, East German ba), which was intended to serve as an aid to aeri‐ communist leaders were recruited for this activi‐ al navigation. This bomb could be dropped over ty, including the future S.E.D. party leader Walter water or land. The earliest versions of this type of Ulbricht, who edited the German language radio bomb were made of glass and flled with a bright broadcasts, along with such writers as Erich dye substance that would spread once the bomb Weinert and Willy Bredel. Ulbricht was attached had burst. The resulting patch of color on either in 1942 to the political section of the Don front.) land or water helped pilots orient themselves. As for the effect during World War One of These free-fall air navigation bombs were frst these leaflets and radio broadcasts on the enemy, used in the First World War, and were included in one would think that this propaganda would not the specialized munitions developed for the Red be effective, since the soldiers on the other side Air Forces during the 1920s (pp. 98-99). would probably recognize this as propaganda and Although the anti-airplane bomb (pro‐ ignore it. Indeed, according to some accounts, the tivosamoletnaia aviabomba) also appeared dur‐ propaganda had little effect. However, one Ger‐ ing the First World War, the Russians used it most man writer, Klaus Uebe, opined that more Ger‐ often against slow-moving German dirigibles rather than against airplanes. As Jones points out, 2 H-Net Reviews these zeppelins were considered ideal targets be‐ The paradox is that this German assistance also cause "they were the only aerial platform that made Russia more vulnerable to the German mili‐ could carry enough bombs to inflict real damage." tary. As a result, one can see examples of how They were hundreds of feet long, flled with high‐ Russian fears of the German military have shaped ly fammable hydrogen, and moved very slowly, Russian habits and military culture. thus were easy to hit (p. 100). Some aircraft pilots The 1939-1940 "Winter War" with Finland used darts with hooks at the end that would in and ensuing Second World War provides another theory be dropped en masse over the balloon. example of how close German-Russian military When these hooks caught onto the fabric, the "in‐ collaboration backfired. In addition to learning cendiary device ignited both the balloon and the from the Germans about propaganda techniques, hydrogen inside." The "Fusee Nicolardot" was one the Russians had apparently requested assistance favorite dart used by the Russian Imperial Aerial in 1939 from their new German allies for help in Fleet. laying naval mines in Finland by air. Many of the From the welter of facts in this military ency‐ Soviet bombs in this period were "duds": they had clopedia, one can discern an interesting and para‐ poor fusing devices and failed to go off as doxical pattern of relations between the German planned. The Russian subsequently withdrew and Russian military complexes. Beginning with their request, because they had learned how to do the Treaty of Rapallo (April 1922) the two "outcast lay mines on their own. Later, during World War nations" of Europe assisted each other militarily Two, after Germany had invaded the USSR, Soviet and economically. Restricted after World War One military personnel began to steal superior Ger‐ by the Versailles Treaty, the German army was man bombs that they had acquired and simply able, through its work with Russia, to maintain a loaded them into Soviet planes (p. 69). By 1944 the high standard of training, technical knowledge, German Luftwaffe discovered this practice. The and familiarity with new weapons and equip‐ Germans then began to make "booby-trapped ment. The Weimar government was willing to bombs," and the Soviet pilots ended up mining work with the Bolshevik regime, which had been their own territory (p. 70). no party to the Versailles treaty and claimed no Although, according to the U.S.