Biplanes and Bombsights: British Bombing in Word War I
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Biplanes and Bombsights British Bombing in World War I George K. WMiams Air University Press Maxell Air Force Base, Alabama May 1999 Library of Congress Cataloging-In-Publication Data Williams. George Kent, 1944- Biplanes and bombsights : British Bombing in World War I / George Kent Williams. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ' 1. World War, 1914-1918-Aerial operations, British. 2. Bombers-Great Britain. I. ' Title. D602.W48 1999 940 .4'4941-dc21 ~9-26205 CIP Disclaimer opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressedor implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release : distribution unlimited. e il Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . .. ' , ix INTRODUCTION . : . 1 - NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE (JULY 1916-MAY 1917) . .. ... 30f Notes . 2 BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS . 35 Notes . .. 67 3 41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS (JUNE 1917-JANUARY 1918) . 73 Notes . .. 125 4 . EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE (FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER 1918) . 133 Notes . 180 5 EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS . 189 Notes . 231 6 POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS . 239 Notes . 264 APPENDIX . 269 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 289 INDEX . 299 iii Illustrations Table Page 1 'Battle Casualties, Night Squadrons, June-November 1918 . 210 Photographs Handley Page . 9 DeHavilland 4B . 43 Me . 63 Foreword This study measures wartime claims against actual results of the British bombing campaign against Germany in the Great War. Components of the' Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), the Royal Flying Corps (RFC); and the Royal Air Force (RAF) conducted bombing raids between July 1916 and the Armistice. Specifically, Number 3 Wing (RNAS):, 41 ;Wing of Eighth Brigade (RFC), and the Independent Force (IF) bombed German targets from bases in France. Lessons supposedly gleaned from these campaigns heavily influenced British military aviation, underpinning RAF doctrine up to and into the Second World War. Fundamental discrepancies exist, however, between the official verdict and the firsthand evidence of bombing results gathered by intelligence teams of the RAF and the US Air Service . Results of the British bombing efforts were demonstrably more modest, and costs in casualties and wastage far steeper, than previously acknowledged . A preoccupation with "moral effect" came to dominate the British view of their aerial offensives. Maj Gen Hugh M . Trenchard played a pivotal role in bringing this misperception to the forefront of public consciousness . After the Armistice, the potential of strategic bombing was officially extolled to justify the RAF as an independent service. The Air Ministry's final report must be evaluated as a partisan manifestation of this crusade and not as a definitive final assessment, as it has been mistakenly accepted previously. This study develops and substantiates a comprehensive evaluation of British long-range bombing in the First World War. Its findings run directly counter to the generally held opinion. Natural limitations, technical shortfalls, and aircrews lacking proficiency acted in concert with German defenses to produce far less results than those claimed. Mention must be made here of the excellent appendix that concludes this study of British bombing efforts in the Great War. Prepared by Steve Suddaby, it presents a compact yet comprehensive view of British bombing raids against German targets during World War One. Both the author and Air University Press are indebted to Mr. Suddaby for his fine contribution to this treatise . George K. Williams Vi About the Author George K. Williams was born on 30 March 1944 in Lamar, Colorado. He graduated from Lamar High School in 1962 and entered the US Military Academy at West Point in 1964, graduating in June 1968 with a Bachelor of Science degree. He earned a Master of Arts in US Intellectual History from Cornell University in 1973 and a PhD in Modern History from Oxford University, England, in 1988. Colonel Williams was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the US Army upon graduation from West Point in 1968. Following graduation, he attended US Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He later completed the Armor Officer course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the Advanced Jumpmaster course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. From August 1968 to August 1969, Colonel Williams was a platoon leader with 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 82d Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg. From August 1969 to August 1970, he was a platoon leader and company commander with 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, I Corps, in South Vietnam. Upon returning to the United States, Colonel Williams completed the Armor Officer advanced course at Fort Knox and attended Cornell University at Ithaca, New York. From August 1973 to July 1975, he served as instructor of English at the US Military Academy. Colonel Williams was an exchange officer and assistant professor of English and Fine Arts at the US Air Force Academy from August 1975 to July 1976. He then returned to the US Military Academy and served as assistant professor and course director in the English Department until August 1977, when he completed an interservice transfer to the US Air Force and entered Air Weapons Controller training at Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. After graduation, he was assigned to 963d Airborne Warning and Control Squadron, 552d Airborne Warning and Control Wing, 'Ilnker AFB, Oklahoma. From October 1977 to July 1981, he served as airborne weapons controller, senior director, and airborne Vi battle staff member on the E-3A airborne warning and control system aircraft. Colonel Williams entered Oxford University in August 1981 and completed his resident studies in July 1984. He was assigned as special assistant to the commander, Air Force Logistics Command, from August 1984 to August 1985. He then served as Deputy Air Force Historian in the USAF Office of History, Washington, D.C., until November 1996, when he was assigned as research fellow, National War College, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. He retired from active duty in June 1998. Viii Acknowledgments Many fine people on both sides of the Atlantic encouraged and assisted in the convoluted development of this study. The sustained support of my family and the peerless example of Sir Michael Howard, decorated infantryman and Regius Professor of Modern History, have been particularly noteworthy and are gratefully acknowledged. LX THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Introduction In broad brush, this study balances wartime claims against actual results as determined after hostilities . It also documents the cost, in men and equipment, of the bombing offensive waged by 3 Wing, Royal Naval Air Service, and components of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Air Force-specifically 41 Wing, Eighth Brigade, and Independent Force, between July 1916 and the Armistice. The study's organization was based on the organizational scheme of Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland in their four-volume history of Bomber Command in World War II, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany. Maj Gen Hugh M. Trenchard's Independent Force, the major strategic force to undertake significant and protracted bombing operations in the Great War, levered into place the cornerstone of the postwar Royal Air Force and shaped its doctrine during the interwar years . It also conditioned domestic expectations concerning the offensive potential of aerial campaigns in any future conflict . The lessons supposedly gleaned from the Great War heavily influenced the progress of British military aviation during the 1920s and 1930s, underpinning RAF doctrines, expectations, and policies up to the initial phases of the Second World War. The subject thus deserves careful study in its own right. Fundamental discrepancies between the materials and conclusions reported in the January 1920 Air Ministry's classified evaluation of the Great War's long-range bombing offensive on the one hand, and those contained in seven volumes of evidence gathered firsthand by RAF intelligence officers who surveyed German-occupied territory immediately after the Armistice on the other, prompted an initial interest in this aspect of military history . Data from seldom-consulted records of the bombing study conducted independently by the United States Air Service complicated these differences. Subsequent examinations of RAF, Air Ministry, and other official archives brought even more contradictions to light. Opinion of British long-range bombing- efficacy during the First World War has previously been unduly influenced by two factors : , (1) the laudatory judgments rendered in the six-volume official history, The War in the Air, by Sir Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones, and (2) a retrospective awareness of the Anglo-American combined bombing offensive. Compared to the scale and intensity of its successor, the 1917-18 bombing effort seems to shrink into insignificance, serving merely as a slight and inconclusive prelude. Contributing further to this neglect has been the general unavailability of definitive materials - that might refute or corroborate the enthusiastic assessments of bombing promulgated in The War in the Air. By default, the flawed conclusions of the official history have been accepted and echoed by many later studies. Even those investigators who have delved deeper have often been led astray, most notably by the Air