Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: The US. Air Service in World War I. CONTENTS: v. 1. Final report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF. A tactical history of the Air Service, AEF.-v. 2. Some early concepts of military aviation. Includes index. 1. European War, 1914-1 91 8-Aerial operations, American. 2. United States. Army. A.E.F., 1917-1920. Air Service. 3. Aeronautics, Military-United States-History. I. Maurer, Maurer. 0606. U54 940.4 4973 75-42296 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock Number 008-070-00362-7 iii United States Air Force Historical Advisory Committee (As of September 1975) Dr. 1. 8. Holley, Jr Lt. Gen. James R. Allen Dr. Henry F. Graff Duke University Superintendent, USA F Columbia University Academy Dr. Robert F. Byrnes Dr. Louis Morton Indiana University Dartmouth College Lt. Gen. Albert P. Clark Dr. Forest C. Pogue USA F (ret.) Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research Lt. Gen. Raymond B. Furlong Mr. Jack Stempler Commander, Air University General Counsel, USA F Office of Air Force History Maj. Gen. John W. Huston Stanley L. Falk Carl Berger Chief Chief Historian Chief, Histories Division Max Rosenberg Lawrence J. Paszek Deputy Chief Historian Senior Editor V FOK~OK~ There has been a tendency to belittle the work of the U.S. Air Service in World War I while singing the praises of heroes like Rickenbacker and Luke. Compared with the bombing of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in World War II or the B-52's in Southeast Asia, the 138 tons of bombs dropped by the U.S. Air Service in France in 1918 may seem almost too insignificant to mention. Any such comparison, however, should not lead to a conclu- sion that World War I was of little importance in the overall history of the U.S. Air Force. The U.S. Air Service should be viewed in relationship to its own age. World War I was fought when aviation was still young. The first ace of the U.S. Air Service won his victories in a French plane that had a top speed of about 125 miles per hour and a tendency to shed the fabric of its upper wing in a dive. The American-produced DH-4, used by the 1st Day Bombard- ment Group, usually carried about 220 pounds of bombs for a mission, which meant a lot of sorties to deliver 138 tons of bombs. Aviation technology was not always equal to the tasks to be performed. A major goal of the U.S. Air Service, one not attained during the war, was the development of a bomber force capable of hitting strategic objectives in Germany. Tar- geting for the strategic campaign involved the identification of "a few indispensible targets without which Germany cannot carry on the war"-an idea that would be used years later against Hitler and the Third Reich. Interdiction, close air sup- port, and some other types of missions carried out by the US. Amy Air Forces in World War II, and by the U.S. Air Force at later times, had already been tried by the U.S. Air Service. Some documents illustrating various concepts and ideas for the employment of the U.S.Air Service in World War I have been selected for publication in this volume, one of a series being published by the Office of Air Force History. John W. Huston, Maj. Gen., USAF Chief, Office of Air Force History When the Great War began in Europe in August 1914, aviation in the U.S. Army was a function of the Signal Corps. Its mission was to support infantry and artillery by providing observation services. There were people in the Army and outside who could foresee no other military use for aircraft. Others believed that the airplane should be given a combat role. Some thought that aviation should be a separate combat arm. As news of aerial operations in the European war drifted across the Atlantic, there was more and more talk of buying fighting planes, battle planes, and bomb-dropping planes for the U.S. Army. Although some faltering steps were taken, little progress was made toward building a fighting air force-or even toward developing observation services for the ground forces-before the United States entered the war in April 1917. Having joined Great Britain, France, and Italy in war against Germany and Austria, the United States quickly drew plans for an air service to include fighting and bombing airplanes as well as observation planes and balloons. The allies, who had been fighting for two years or more and were much farther advanced in military aviation, provided valuable information to help the United States build up its air service. Allied contributions included not only technical data on new developments in aircraft and other aeronautical equipment but also information on how to use aviation in battle. One thing borrowed from the allies was the classification of military aviation into three, broad, functional areas labeled “observation,” “pursuit,” and “bombardment.” Another was the concept that aviation had two separate roles, one “tacti- cal,” the other “strategical.” In addition, the Allies provided ideas, along with detailed information about tactics, tech- niques, and procedures, that formed the foundation for the employment of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), in World War I. The wartime operations of the Air Service, AEF, included visual and photographic reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, infantry liaison, counterair operations, bombing and strafing in close support of ground forces, and interdiction of the enemy’s lines of communications. The war ended before US. units were ready for strategic air operations, but thinking on strategic air warfare had advanced far enough to raise, and tentatively answer, questions concerning area versus precision bombing and day versus night operations. Thus, US. military aviation in November 1918 was far different from what it had been when the war began four years earlier. viii There were wide differences of opinion in the U.S. Army as to how military aviation should be employed. There were those who believed that the sole function of aviation was to assist the ground forces. That point of view was held by Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief of the AEF, and by many other officers in command and staff positions in the U.S. Army. Others thought that aviation could best be used in a strategic role. While agreeing that some aviation had to be committed to supporting ground forces, they believed that aviation could make its greatest contribution toward winning the war by attacking strategic military and industrial targets behind enemy lines. This was the position taken by Brig. Gen. William Mitch- ell, the top-ranking air commander in the AEF. Many members of the Air Service, and some from other branches of the Army, held views somewhere between these extremes. The general inclination, even in the Air Service, however, seems to have been toward the view held by Pershing. The fundamental differences between Pershing’s and Mitch- ell’s thinking on aviation can be seen by comparing their ideas on air superiority. Both men believed it essential. Both gave it top priority. But they disagreed on what it was, and how to attain it. Pershing did not want enemy aircraft attacking his troops or otherwise interfering with his operations. The best way to prevent such attacks and interference, he thought, was to keep friendly airplanes over the lines in sufficient strength to command the air and thus prohibit the operation of enemy aircraft in the area. Mitchell, looking to the same goal, believed that the best way to attain it was to hit the enemy’s air strength behind the lines, removing the source of the threat by attacking the enemy’s airfields and shooting his planes out of the air before they could reach the front. The principal duty of aviation, in Pershing’s opinion, was to support ground forces by protecting them against hostile aircraft and by performing observation services for infantry and artillery. With command of the air over the battle front, his Air Service then might assist ground forces by attacking the enemy’s artillery and ground troops. Pershing believed that his Air Service attached too much importance to operations behind the lines to disrupt lines of communication. He ap- proved plans for organizing units for strategic missions but balked at the idea of creating an independent air force for strategic operations. Mitchell agreed that aviation units should be attached to ground forces, but he insisted that they be under the control of an air service commander. This was necessary, he believed, to IX permit concentration of air strength when needed, as well as for proper coordination and direction of air operations. Mitch- ell placed much greater emphasis than Pershing did on close support and interdiction. He and others of this thinking be- lieved that aviation could be used most effectively against strategic targets. For such operations, an air force working independently of ground forces was required. As indicated earlier, Mitchell did not have a chance to try out his ideas on strategic air warfare during World War I. The air units that fought under American command in World War I were attached to ground forces. Their missions were in more or less direct support of infantry and artillery. Thus the combat experience of the U.S. Air Service in World War I was exclu- sively in tactical air operations, a fact that was to have a profound influence on U.S.