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Beyond Bursting Bubbles

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Beyond Bursting Bubbles Beyond Bursting Bubbles Understanding the Full Spectrum of the Russian A2/AD Threat and Identifying Strategies for Counteraction Michael Jonsson and Robert Dalsjö (eds) FOI-R--4991--SE JUNE 2020 Michael Jonsson and Robert Dalsjö (eds) Beyond Bursting Bubbles Understanding the Full Spectrum of the Russian A2/AD Threat and Identifying Strategies for Counteraction FOI-R--4991--SE Titel Beyond Bursting Bubbles – Understanding the Full Spectrum of the Russian A2/AD Threat and Identifying Strategies for Counteraction Title Bortom bubblorna - Att förstå multidimensionell rysk avreglingsförmåga och identifiera strategier för att motverka det Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--4991--SE Månad/Month June Utgivningsår/Year 2020 Antal sidor/Pages 212 ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet Forskningsområde Övrigt FoT-område Inget FoT-område Projektnr/Project no I1490021 Godkänd av/Approved by Johannes Malminen Ansvarig avdelning Försvarsanalys Bild/Cover: Shutterstock/ Igor Dolgov Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, vilket bl.a. innebär att citering är tillåten i enlighet med vad som anges i 22 § i nämnd lag. För att använda verket på ett sätt som inte medges direkt av svensk lag krävs särskild överenskommelse. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. 2 (212) FOI-R--4991--SE Sammanfattning Stater som har förmågan att använda en kombination av sensorer och långdistans- robotar för att hindra antagonister från att operera inom en exkluderingszon sägs besitta avreglingsförmåga (eng. A2/AD). Denna studie fördjupar analysen av Rysslands A2/AD-förmåga, med utgångspunkt i en FOI-rapport publicerad 2019 (Bursting the Bubble). Tio internationella experter bidrar med kapitel om fem teman – rysk avreglingsförmåga idag och i framtiden; handlingsoptioner för att motverka rysk A2/AD i Europa; koncept för att försvara eller återta territorium inom en fientlig exkluderingszon; metoder att hantera hotet från långräckviddig precisionsbekämpning; samt hur rysk avreglingsförmåga påverkar maktbalansen i Europa. Studien utmynnar inte i någon enskild, övergripande slutsats, men betydande samsyn föreligger hos merparten av författarna. Å ena sidan kan Ryssland inte skapa ogenomträngliga ”bubblor” där Västs stridskrafter inte kan operera. Å andra sidan bedöms motåtgärder mot rysk A2/AD vara komplexa, resurskrävande och behäftade med risker för höga förlustsiffror. De kritiska faktorerna är vilka förmågor som krävs, förväntade förlustsiffror, realistiska tidshorisonter – och politisk vilja att axla de kostnader och risker som krävs. Flera av författarna menar att rysk A2/AD-förmåga vore svårast att hantera under ett snabbt krisförlopp – till exempel ett landangrepp i Baltikum – där förstärkningar och luftunderstöd krävs omgående, varför motåtgärder behöver vara väl förberedda. Jämfört med Bursting the Bubble breddas analysen med t ex elektronisk krigföring, cyber och icke-militära metoder, samt fördjupas. Betydande osäkerhet eller oenighet kvarstår även kring temata såsom nivån av integration inom ryskt luftvärn; påverkan av smygförmåga; känsligheten för elektronisk krigföring m.m. Nyckelord: Avreglingsförmåga; A2/AD; Baltikum; Nato; Ryssland; sjömål; markmål; luftmål; radar; motmedel; skenmål; Iskander; S-400; Bastion 3 (212) FOI-R--4991--SE Summary States with the ability to use a combination of sensors and long-range missiles to prevent adversaries from operating and thus creating an exclusion zone, are said to possess anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This collection of essays uses our previous FOI report on Russian A2/AD capabilities (Bursting the Bubble) as a point of departure. Ten experts analyse five themes: Russian A2/AD capabilities today and in the future; options for counter-A2/AD operations in Europe; concepts for defending or reconquering territory under a hostile A2/AD umbrella; different approaches to managing the long-range precision strike threat; and the impact of A2/AD on the balance of power in Europe. The study does not arrive at any single, overarching conclusion, but there is significant convergence of views amongst a majority of the authors. On the one hand, Russia cannot create impenetrable “bubbles” where NATO forces cannot operate. On the other hand, counter-A2/AD operations are complex, requiring significant assets and capabilities, and carry significant risk of high attrition rates. The critical factors are the assets required, expected attrition rates, the time frames needed – and political will to shoulder costs and risks. A majority of the authors also argue that Russian A2/AD would be at its most troublesome during a short, sharp war, making well-rehearsed countermeasures essential. Compared to Bursting the Bubble, the multi-domain character of counter-A2/AD operations, including i.a. electronic warfare and non-military means, is emphasised, thus deepening the granularity of the analyses. Considerable uncertainty or disagreement remains on topics such as the level of integration within Russian air defences, the impact of stealth, and electronic warfare. Keywords: A2/AD; Baltic Sea Region; NATO; Russia; air defense; anti-ship missiles; radar; decoy targets; Iskander; S-400; Bastion 4 (212) FOI-R--4991--SE Abbreviations A2/AD Anti-access/Area Denial AAM Air-to-air missile AB Adaptive Basing ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ACE Agile Combat Employment AESA Active Electronically Scanned Array (radar) AI Artificial Intelligence ASAT Anti-Satellite AWACS Airborne Warning & Control System BMD Ballistic Missile Defence BTGr Batallion Tactical Group C2 Command and Control (C2). C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence C5ISR Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance CCP Chinese Communist Party CEC Cooperative Engagement Capabilities DEAD Destruction of Enemy Air Defences DFE Dynamic Force Employment EDA European Defence Agency eFP enhanced Forward Presence EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach EMS Electromagnetic Spectrum EU European Union EW Electronic Warfare 5 (212) FOI-R--4991--SE FARP Fighter Arming and Refueling Points FOB Forward Operating Bases GPS Global Positioning System GRU Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye Razvedivatelnoye Upravlenie) HF High Frequency HQ Headquarters IADS Integrated Air Defence Systems IIR Imaging Infra-Red INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JEF Joint Expeditionary Force LoR Launch on Remote (LoR) MALD Miniature Air-Launched Decoy MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence Systems MDO Multi-Domain Operations MFI Multirole Fighter/Interceptor MOB Main Operating Bases NATINAMNDS NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO IAMD NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence NDS National Defense Strategy NFIU NATO Force Integration Units NTM National Technical Means OTH Over-the-horizon PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force PK Probability of Kill PRC People’s Republic of China 6 (212) FOI-R--4991--SE ROE Rules of Engagement SAM Surface-to-air missile SATCOM Satellite communications systems SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defences SOF Special Operations Forces SLOC Sea Lines of Communication SPOD Seaports of Debarkation SwAF Swedish Air Force TEL Transporter Erector Launcher TELAR Transporter-Erector Launcher and Radar UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle USAFE US Air Forces in Europe VDV Russia’s Airborne Troops [Vozdushno-desantnye voiska] VHF Very High Frequency VKS Russian Aerospace Forces [Vozdushno- kosmicheskie sily] 7 (212) FOI-R--4991--SE Contents 1. Beyond Bursting Bubbles ..................................................................... 11 Michael Jonsson and Robert Dalsjö, Deputy Directors of Research, FOI 2. Status and Future of Russian A2/AD Capabilities ................................ 23 Justin Bronk, Research Fellow, RUSI 3. Russian Air-to-air Power: Re-make, Re-model ................................... 41 Douglas Barrie, Senior Fellow, IISS 4. Adaptive and Dispersed Basing within an A2/AD Environment: Opportunities, Threats, and Concepts .................................................. 55 Jamie Meighan, Wing Commander, RAF 5. Applying Historical Attributes of Anti-access Strategies to Current Analysis ................................................................................................. 71 Sam J. Tangredi, Professor, US Naval War College 6. Defeating the A2/AD Umbrella – Concepts for Exploitation of Russia’s Operational Weaknesses ....................................................... 95 Anders Puck Nielsen, Royal Danish Defence College 7. Thoughts on Fighting inside an Enemy A2/AD Bubble ...................... 109 Ilmārs A. Lejiņš, Brigade General, Latvian Army 8. Different Approaches to Managing the Long-range Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat .......................................................................... 123 Robin Häggblom, Independent Analyst, Finland 9. The Case for NATO Theatre-range Missiles in Europe ..................... 149 Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor, University of Waterloo, and Luis Simón, Research Professor, Vrije Universiteit Brussel 10. Missiles Are Not the Only Threat ...................................................... 161 Keir Giles,
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