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Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region

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Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region PRIMER ON Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region John T. Watts · Christian Trotti · Mark J. Massa ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. Forward Defense Forward Defense helps the United States and its allies and partners contend with great-power competitors and maintain favorable balances of power. This new practice area in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security produces Forward-looking analyses of the trends, technologies, and concepts that will define the future of warfare, and the alliances needed for the 21st century. Through the futures we forecast, the scenarios we wargame, and the analyses we produce, Forward Defense develops actionable strategies and policies for deterrence and defense, while shaping US and allied operational concepts and the role of defense industry in addressing the most significant military challenges at the heart of great-power competition. This publication was produced in partnership with Lockheed Martin Corporation under the auspices of a project focused on the impact of emerging weapons on the Indo-Pacific region. PRIMER ON Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region John T. Watts · Christian Trotti · Mark J. Massa ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-111-6 Cover image: In this US Department of Defense (DOD) design, the Defense Advanced Research Products Agency’s (DARPA’s) Falcon Hypersonic Test Vehicle emerges from its rocket nose cone and prepares to re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere. Source: DOD illustration https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1934290/ hypersonics-remain-top-priority-for-dod/#pop3612183 This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. August 2020 Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region II ATLANTIC COUNCIL Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region Table of Contents Executive Summary 1 Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region 3 Introduction 3 Background 4 Technical Feasibility 6 Military Significance 7 Argument: They change the balance of power 7 Counterargument: They will provide an evolved capability, but are not a game changer 10 Hypersonic Weapon-Defense Systems 10 Pulse Check: Tracking Hypersonic Weapon Development of the Indo-Pacific Powers 11 Tier I: The Great Powers 12 The United States 12 Russia 15 China 18 Tier II: US Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific 19 Australia 19 India 20 Japan 21 Singapore 21 South Korea 22 Taiwan 22 Security Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region 22 Conclusion 24 About the Authors 26 ATLANTIC COUNCIL III Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region IV ATLANTIC COUNCIL Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region Executive Summary hile the ability of vehicles to travel at hyperson- chosen because it is a common geographic locus of all ic speeds—between Mach 5 and Mach 25—has three leading nations, as well as a majority of near-capa- been possible for more than half a century, the ble follower nations, while also containing several potential capability for reliable, sustained hypersonic flashpoints that could trigger a high-end conventional mil- Wflight has only recently neared maturation. Motivated by the itary confrontation. Accordingly, it is the most likely region return of great-power competition and the potential asymmet- in which states may witness the deployment and use of ric advantages provided by weapons travelling at such speeds, hypersonic weapons in the near term, which may radically three nations—the United States, China, and Russia—are now redefine regional defense dynamics. Despite these risks, at the forefront of developing operational hypersonic weap- many regional actors do not appear to have robust plans ons. Meanwhile, several other Indo-Pacific states are seeking for responding to or defending against these systems, as to develop such capabilities in the intermediate future. they may be constrained by a lack of understanding about how regional dynamics may be altered. Thus, the intent of This increased attention has been accompanied by ongoing this primer is to lay out the contours of the debate from debate about the strategic and military significance of hyper- a policymaker’s perspective by articulating the key issues sonic weapons. In short, will they fundamentally change the in a straightforward way, in order to further the discussion balance of power, or will they provide more of an evolved about the ways in which hypersonic weapons may change capability? The answer is still unclear, in part because their the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. To do this, it will ultimate capability will be unknown until the technologies cover several key facets of the current debate. reach full maturity, but also because it is not yet apparent how nations will employ them in the future or what norms First, the primer outlines the technological characteristics may be developed to constrain their employment. and applications of hypersonic vehicles. While hypersonic travel has been a scientific reality since space reentry Amidst such ambiguities, debates about new military tech- vehicles in the 1960s, current hypersonic weapons are nologies are valuable in preparing for alternative futures. Yet, different because they are designed to fly at hypersonic such debates are too often defined by technological oppor- speeds for sustained periods and are potentially maneuver- tunities and limitations. In reality, it is impossible to divorce able throughout their flight. There are currently three main these systems from the broader contexts in which they will forms of hypersonic weapons: “boost-glide,” “airbreathing,” operate, as the technologies themselves are only part of the and “gun-launched.” The potential applications for each of equation. Indeed, a variety of weapons systems can broadly these weapons vary based on their characteristics. A hyper- be characterized as “hypersonic weapons,” each with spe- sonic glide vehicle would need to be launched like other cific characteristics, tradeoffs, and potential applications. rocket systems, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles When confronted by such choices, there is no single path (ICBMs). They can travel at the upper limits of the accepted forward; policymakers and military planners should instead hypersonic speed range and are well suited to long-range consider how the capability at hand can maximize leverage employment. An airbreathing hypersonic missile, on the and solve dilemmas within their unique strategic environ- other hand, would likely be carried by an aircraft and em- ments. This explains why the technological opportunities ployed in a similar manner as a conventional cruise missile, and constraints inherent in hypersonic weapons have not with slower speeds and shorter range than a boost-glide uniformly affected US, Chinese, and Russian development system, but with greater tactical flexibility. Gun-launched hy- programs; rather, their respective military strategies have personic projectiles would be launched by, and employed played an important role in shaping early and evolving per- as, enhanced versions of naval guns or artillery pieces with ceptions. Thus, analysts and policymakers cannot begin to speeds at the low end of the spectrum and shorter com- understand and chart the implications of these weapons, as parative ranges. well as future escalation and conflict pathways, without prop- erly situating them within the underlying geostrategic and Second, the primer reviews the current debate over the regional contexts in which the major players operate. ultimate military relevance of hypersonic weapons, using potential escalation pathways in the Indo-Pacific as exam- Therefore, this primer seeks to marry technological char- ples. Those who proclaim the significance of this emerging acteristics, geostrategic and military imperatives, and capability argue that the compression of decision-making regional dynamics in order to provide a basis for further processes created by the limited time between launch analysis about hypersonic development and application and strike of the target (“flash to bang”), combined with trajectories in the Indo-Pacific. This particular region was its survivability against modern and near-term air-defense ATLANTIC COUNCIL 1 Primer on Hypersonic Weapons in the Indo-Pacific Region systems, makes this weapon a “game changer.” Indeed, it various foundations for offensive and defensive hypersonic presents difficult tactical, operational, and strategic dilem- capabilities, as well as nascent planning for developing and mas to a targeted force, which must balance among unfa- deploying those capabilities (likely in the 2025–2035 time- vorable alternatives such as dispersion, hardening, and the frame). Even so, the time lag to employment may consti- reconsideration
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