NOVEMBER 2019 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS An Open-Source Technical Review

Jill Hruby Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow About the Nuclear Threat Initiative The Nuclear Threat Initiative works to protect our lives, environment, and quality of life now and for future generations. We work to prevent catastrophic attacks with weapons of mass destruction and disruption (WMDD)—nuclear, biological, radiological, chemical, and cyber. 

An Open-Source Technical Review Open-SourceAn Technical Hruby Jill Sam Distinguished Nunn Fellow RUSSIA’S NEW RUSSIA’S WEAPON NUCLEAR SYSTEMS DELIVERY Copyright © 2019 Nuclear Threat Initiative

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the NTI Board of Directors or the institutions with which they are associated.  5 7 8 9 9 10 12 14 14 17 19 20 22 25 25 26 28 ...... Capabilities...... and Chinese Hypersonic Delivery System Summary

ICBM: Sarmat ICBM: Tsirkon and Avangard, Kinzhal, Hypersonic Delivery Systems: and Burevestnik Poseidon Delivery Weapon Capabilities: Advanced Strategic New Sarmat Multiple-Warhead HeavySarmat...... ICBM...... Multiple-Warhead Hypersonic Ballistic Missile. Air-Launched Kinzhal Avangard Boost-Glide Hypersonic Missile...... Tsirkon Hypersonic Cruise Missile Russian Hypersonic Technology Investment Technology Russian Hypersonic Russian Hypersonic Delivery System Summary U .S . Comparison of Russian, Chinese, and U .S . Chinese, Comparison of Russian,

www.nti.org NOTE NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCONTINENTAL

FOREWORD CONTENTS ...... SYSTEMS HYPERSONIC DELIVERY NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS...... 29 Poseidon Nuclear-Powered, Nuclear-Tipped Torpedo ...... 30 Burevestnik Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile ...... 33

CONCLUSION...... 36 Summary of the Primary Military Parameters and Technological Challenges of Russia’s New Nuclear Weapon Systems...... 37

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...... 38

ENDNOTES...... 39

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... Inside back cover

RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Foreword 5 The technical and safety issues that may The technical delay ... development and deployment of some of the Russian systems may and offer some additional time for U.S. renew and Russian leaders to re-engage crucial dialogue and cooperation. n March 2018, President Vladimir Putin unexpectedly turned his annual unexpectedly Putin annual his turned Vladimir 2018, President n March the about a show-and-tell into Assembly Federal Russia’s to televised address now,” us to “Listen delivery systems. weapon nuclear new five of development on update an offered Putin later, a year Less than the West. challenging said, he

www.nti.org Regardless, Putin’s nuclear initiatives are risky and complicate complicate and risky are initiatives nuclear Putin’s Regardless, alleged Russian by strained already relationship a diplomatic and Treaty Forces Nuclear Intermediate-Range from—the withdrawal U.S. of—and violations the of the duration extend will to agree whether countries the two regarding uncertainties to likely seemmore systems Russian The START). (New Treaty Reduction Arms Strategic New Jill Hruby’s paper, written during her tenure as the Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the at Fellow Distinguished Nunn the Sam as tenure her during written paper, Hruby’s Jill Using systems. focusestechnicalaspectson (NTI), of the these complex Initiative Threat Nuclear in noteworthy are that capabilities Russian a set of explores Hruby information, available publicly variety: and a new heavy breadth both technological of terms shorter-range and ballistic strategic- missile, intercontinental novel toward efforts development and weapons, hypersonic torpedo and a nuclear-powered as such systems strategic-range Russians the that concludes her paper cruise Though missile. and development their announced of most behind on are these systems of disclosure public Putin’s schedules, deployment and strength nuclear demonstrate to intends he that suggests the world. of the rest to and people his to innovation

Sam Nunn and Moniz Ernest J. Threat Initiative Nuclear Co-Chairs, FOREWORD

the systems, which are designed to evade U.S. missile defense, and previewed a sixth previewed and defense, missile evade designed to U.S. which are the systems, in nuclear-capable become system—may be to a conventional declared that—while the future. I Foreword

exacerbate strategic instability than convince Russia to prevent nuclear catastrophe. If a the United States to revisit its intent to develop new arms race is joined with ever-more lethal new nuclear capabilities, as announced weapons on both sides, we will be living in a in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. That far more dangerous world. instability also may have consequences beyond the bilateral U.S.–Russia relationship, as a Jill Hruby’s paper is not only a testament to persistent lack of dialogue and cooperation her abilities as a national security leader and between the world’s two largest nuclear scholar, but also to NTI’s commitment to powers, combined with the breakdown of Cold providing the scientific and technical basis for War arms control, will accelerate a broader policy experts to conduct further analysis of nuclear arms race and erode the international the impact these and other complex systems consensus on the goals of the Nuclear may have. The technical and safety issues that Nonproliferation Treaty. may delay the development and deployment of some of the Russian systems may offer some That’s why the development of these weapons additional time for U.S. and Russian leaders systems at this particular time, as well as some to re-engage and renew crucial dialogue and of the nuclear policies the United States is cooperation. They should do so now—before pursuing, should be a wake-up call for action it’s too late. on renewing dialogue and cooperation with

6 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Note From the Author 7 n late 2018, when I joined NTI as the Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow with an with Fellow Distinguished Nunn the Sam NTI as 2018, when I joined n late policy technical and issues, nonproliferation nuclear bridge help to objective delivery capabilities weapon nuclear Russia’s on information open-source official Russian through plentiful and available increasingly becoming was

statements, Russian media, international reporting, and defense-oriented blogs. defense-oriented and reporting, media, international Russian statements, the development about details release publicly to decision Putin’s Vladimir President this new to public the 2018 opened door of in March these newof systems to opportunity the policy analysts nuclear gives The information flow. information new a presents it time, At the same information. detailed unclassified more with work verify and that systems various on news with releases up keep to analysts for challenge combination The sources. other by corroborated and/or credible either are sources undertake to a comprehensive me prompted challenge and this new opportunity of it in the hopes available now information the open-source of evaluation review and forward. going and will today policy be analysts useful nuclear to www.nti.org This report is current to September 2019. While undoubtedly some of the information gathered gathered of information the some While undoubtedly 2019. to September reportis current This activities, and new development time, with will change the information and fully accurate not is resource and a foundation provides in this report the observation, information I hope additional community. non-proliferation thenuclear for In addition, I have provided relevant technical background and descriptions to provide context context provide to descriptions and technical background relevant provided I have addition, In is a technologyit hypersonic because to is especially This regard true with theinformation. for I some my NTI colleagues, also included of request At the field. in the nuclear new development context provide technology to Chinese in hypersonic activity and U.S. of the status on information developments. theRussian for To develop this report, I scoured the news media and blogs on the new Russian delivery systems delivery systems the new Russian on blogs the news media and I scoured this report, develop To reference a single only I found If the sources. with along I found, the information documented and the I included references, many I found If exception. rare with it, include I did not something, to indicated and of information range the presented I information, conflicting I found If information. actual with evidence of plans reported I compared possible, Whenever data. the predominant observed reported openly as tests. such system development,

NOTE AUTHOR FROM THE I Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

fter years of secret development of new nuclear weapon delivery systems designed to evade missile defense, Russia began openly reporting its nuclear activities in March 2018 with President Vladimir Putin’s Address to the Federal Assembly. Although it is hard to be certain Awhy these developments were revealed, it is widely speculated that Putin intended to demonstrate strength to the Russian people just before a Russian presidential election while simultaneously displaying Russian scientific and technological innovation to the United States and NATO. Putin’s clear message was that Russian innovation to evade U.S. missile defenses will preserve a formidable Russian nuclear deterrent force.

The number of innovative Russian nuclear weapon delivery systems under development is impressive—six in all. For ease of discussion, these six systems are grouped into three categories: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Hypersonic Delivery Systems, and New Advanced Strategic Weapon Delivery It is widely speculated that Putin Capabilities. intended to demonstrate strength This report uses exclusively open-source information to to the Russian people just before a analyze the six new delivery systems, providing the technical Russian presidential election while characteristics, deployment schedule, and military objectives of each. The descriptions include details of the design and test simultaneously displaying Russian results to the extent that information is available and credible. scientific and technological innovation In many cases, there are conflicting reports of capabilities to the United States and NATO. and deployment schedules, and those are included with an assessment of the most probable. The full report provides an overview of hypersonic missile technology and includes short summaries of U.S. and Chinese hypersonic programs for background and comparison. However, this report is primarily focused on the new Russian delivery systems summarized below.

8 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Executive Summary 9 propelled rocket is ignited and the missile the missile and ignited is rocket propelled 10. The Mach 5 to a speed Mach of obtains maneuverability, provide to fins has Kinzhal Russia aeroballistic. trajectory largely its is but dual-capable, as the Kinzhal declared has or to qualifiedcarry a conventional either aircraft theone-way When warhead. nuclear Kinzhal the account, is into taken range flight 2000 km (1240 mi) away, to up targets hit can has Kinzhal The capability. a medium-range is times and of hundreds to been tens tested Ten begun trial deployment. have to reported been modifiedto carry have one to said jets are many as claim reports Some a time. at Kinzhal be modifiedto carry eventually 50 jetsas might jets longer with Tu-22M3 and the Kinzhal, be modified might capacity more and range a time in the future. carry at to Kinzhals four Kinzhal include of militarythe The objectives such on high-value striketargets standoff carrier and installations missile-defense as groups. hypersonic boost-glide is a Avangard The been has development under that vehicle testing design Soviet times, with and since has been Avangard in 2014. The accelerated 2014, times since three tested successfully an on in December 2018 launched a test with speeds achieving over reportedly SS-19 ICBM The 6000 km (3700 mi). flying 20 and Mach composite be of to made reported is Avangard the high temperatures withstand to materials about reported is little but flight, hypersonic of The accuracy. or system communication its expected is the Avangard of version nuclear possibly or carry 150 kt to of a warhead the that originallystated Russians The larger. the SS-19s by on be deployed would Avangard has date this planned 2019, although of end the 2020 2020. Even to beensince updated be Tests to met. unlikely and ambitious goal is missiles Avangard a few of deployment and/or continued with possible 2020s is in the early technicalsuccess. and investment significant deployment nuclear regarding information No successful full-scale more flight but known, is would mating nuclear-warhead before tests of militarythe The objective be responsible. www.nti.org The Kinzhal is Kinzhal to modifiedbelieved The be a ground-launched, short-range, Iskander-M high to delivered is that missile solid-propelled a modifiedMiG-31 interceptor by altitude the jet, the solid- from jet. dropped Once Hypersonic Delivery Systems: Kinzhal, Hypersonic Delivery Systems: Kinzhal, and Tsirkon Avangard, The Sarmat is a liquid-fueled, multiple- a liquid-fueled, is Sarmat The to being developed ICBM heavy warhead The ICBM. (SS-18) Voevoda the aging replace 16,000 of a range expected is have to Sarmat a southern allow km (9900 mi), which would avoiding thereby targets, U.S. to approach in Alaska installations missile-defense current reportedly new California. The capabilities and include the Sarmat for development under complicate to engine a short-boost-phase new a and verification, and detection launch throw- body improve to composite-material silo. while the same using range and weight varies on Sarmat the of warheads number The advanced 24, and 3 to from in reporting Voevoda expected. The are countermeasures will likely the Sarmat and carries warheads, 10 expectedcarry an with 16 warheads 10 to the Additionally, 8 Mt. about of yield total expectedof is types carry to Sarmat different type being one ICBM, the same on warheads order In system. hypersonic the new Avangard of their end before the Voevodas replace to begin must the Sarmat of deployment life, 46 of the expectedin 2022, with deployment the ejection only date, 2027. To by completed of the phase the first possibly and mechanism full-scale and been tested, system have Sarmat at least is still is needed. Sarmat The testing behind the announced originally years four of down-selection some While schedule. occur will likely before capabilities advanced is the Sarmat deployment, and production increased range, a longer have to anticipated to characteristics some and throw-weight, difficultthan more interception missile make theVoevoda. for ICBM: Sarmat Sarmat ICBM: Executive Summary

Avangard is to evade missile defense and strike powered by a compact nuclear power plant high-value infrastructure at strategic range. to achieve its long travel distances and high speeds. A nuclear warhead of 2 Mt, possibly The Tsirkon is a hypersonic cruise missile surrounded by cobalt, would be carried by announced as having a conventional capability, the Poseidon and exploded to destroy targets but speculation abounds that it could carry through blast, radiation contamination, a nuclear warhead in the future. The Tsirkon and/or tsunami effects. The Belgorod, a special has a solid-fueled first phase, followed by a purpose submarine is being modified to scramjet second phase. In development since carry six Poseidons and Khabarovsk-class 2011, the Tsirkon is thought to be made of submarines are reportedly also undergoing a new metal alloy capable of withstanding modification to carry eight Poseidons each. the high temperature of hypersonic flight. Testing of the nuclear reactor to the propulsion Significant maneuverability during flight and system is believed to be underway. Even if the terminal phases is anticipated. The primary submarines meet the planned modification challenge for hypersonic cruise missiles is the date, deployment with the Poseidon is not reliability and lifetime of the scramjet engine. expected until the mid- to late-2020s at the Expected to be sea-launched, the Tsirkon earliest, given the present rate of development will likely obtain a speed of Mach 5 to Mach and testing of the torpedo. The Poseidon is a 6 and a range of about 500 km (300 mi). second-strike, strategic-range weapon targeted Successful tests from a ground-based launcher at coastal infrastructure or carrier groups using were conducted in April 2017 and December a delivery approach entirely distinct from 2018. The Tsirkon is expected to be deployed ballistic missiles. on Russia’s two Kirov-class battle cruisers after modifications. The first battle cruiser is The Burevestnik is a nuclear-powered, nuclear- expected to be ready to carry the Tsirkon in tipped subsonic cruise missile designed to 2022. Given the relative immaturity of scramjet have a range of about 23,000 km (14,000 engines and the new metal alloy production, mi). A compact nuclear power plant would Tsirkon deployment before the mid- to late- heat the air in a ramjet engine to allow long 2020s would be surprising. When deployed, flights. Compact nuclear power sources for the Tsirkon is expected to target missile- Burevestnik are being designed and tested, defense installations, decision centers, and but no long-range test has been successful. high-value assets from a safe distance without Although they are potentially feasible, there risk of interception, because of its speed and are risks associated with flying nuclear power maneuverability over short ranges. sources because they could fissure or lose isolation. Earlier attempts by the United States to develop nuclear-powered cruise missiles New Advanced Strategic Weapon were cancelled because of radioactive debris Delivery Capabilities: Poseidon and issues; however, significant advances in closed- Burevestnik loop compact nuclear power sources in the 1 MW–to–20 MW range have been achieved The Poseidon is a nuclear-powered, nuclear- since the U.S. efforts. The Burevestnik is the tipped torpedo designed to be released from least mature of the six new delivery capabilities, a submarine in safe waters and then travel at and only recently a deployment date of 2025 depths of 1000 m (3300 ft) and speeds of 111 was announced. Realistically, it seems that kph (70 mph) for distances of 5000 km (3100 deployment could be at least a decade away, mi) or more. First revealed in a suspected if ever. The Burevestnik is a second-strike, intentional leak in 2015, the Poseidon is strategic-range weapon of a type that has not being designed to be difficult to detect and been deployed by any other nation. intercept. The Poseidon is expected to be

10 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Executive Summary 11 that a nuclear warhead is needed to achieve the needed is achieve to warhead a nuclear that objective. military sources government Russian Generally, the overstate reporting open associated and forecast and all the systems of capabilities resources The schedules. unrealistically rapid the design, testing, complete to required these each of of deployment and production, accident very A fatal significant. are systems radioactive material, 2019 involving in August reactor, nuclear a compact believed be to from the Nyonoksa at occurred a sea on platform is the reporting Although range. test missile involved likely this accident speculative, quite The the new delivery of systems. one of testing at the fire earlier an and accident Nyonoksa 2019, may in April plant, production Sarmat new nuclear for program Russia’s that indicate behind too aggressive, is delivery vehicles precautions. safety bypassing and schedule, the development following and Understanding delivery nuclear-weapon the new Russian of arms-control future for important is systems policy strategic-stability and agreements provide to reportis intended This decisions. background open-source unclassified, how policy of inform analysis to information and stability strategic affect might systems such options. arms-control future www.nti.org Whether or when any nuclear options would would options nuclear when any or Whether uncertain is and these systems on be deployed known is Little reporting. open from missing the accuracy the delivery systems; of regarding the accuracy the lower be that may it however, the higher the probability these systems, of All six of these nuclear delivery systems have have delivery systems theseAll nuclear of six none programs; test and development ongoing depiction computer-graphic to limited are have seems the to Kinzhal Only alone. begun trial and testing deployment. completed and the Sarmat needed is before testing More willtests These be deployed. are Avangard observed because they involve internationally Avangard and the Sarmat The launches. ICBM beginning sometime bewill deployed likely 2025 unless continued between 2022 and availability material or withsafety difficulties other systems—Tsirkon, The encountered. are mature less Burevestnik—are and Poseidon, before be to deployment-ready unlikely and significant because of late-2020s the to mid- successful system- two Only technical hurdles. taken place, have the Tsirkon of tests level short to due range limited had both have and Poseidon The engines. scramjet of lifetimes system- for ready yet not are Burevestnik and which tests, the subsystem and testing, level have a year, once about been conducted have propulsion focused the nuclear-powered on systems. Introduction

INTRODUCTION

ince the United States withdrew from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, Russia has been working on advanced nuclear-weapon delivery systems that could evade evolving U.S. missile defenses. For years, the Russian efforts were kept largely under wraps, but in his 2018 Presidential SAddress to the Federal Assembly,1 Russian President Vladimir Putin began openly discussing the development of five new nuclear-weapon delivery systems. In his March 1 address that year, Putin spent about 45 minutes—a full 40 percent of the time—announcing the new nuclear-weapon delivery systems (and one additional laser system), complete with videos and graphics to emphasize that these new systems were state-of-the-art and near deployment-ready. In his 2019 address the following February,2 Putin announced another new weapon-delivery capability3 and provided an update on the status of the systems announced in 2018. In his addresses, Putin repeatedly stressed that these systems were designed to evade U.S. missile defenses being deployed globally at fixed sites and on mobile sea-based platforms.

Although it is hard to be certain why these developments Putin’s clear message was that Russian were revealed, it is widely speculated that Putin intended to demonstrate strength to the Russian people just before a Russian innovation to evade U.S. missile presidential election, while simultaneously displaying Russian defenses will preserve a formidable scientific and technological innovation to the United States and Russian nuclear deterrent force. NATO. Putin’s clear message was that Russian innovation to evade U.S. missile defenses will preserve a formidable Russian nuclear deterrent force. The six nuclear-weapon delivery systems that President Putin announced in 2018 and 2019, in order,4 are: (1) Sarmat—a multiple-warhead heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), (2) Burevestnik—a nuclear-powered cruise missile, (3) Poseidon—a nuclear-powered torpedo, (4) Kinzhal—an air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile, (5) Avangard—a boost-glide hypersonic vehicle, and (6) Tsirkon—a sea-launched hypersonic missile.5 Of the six new delivery systems, only one, the Sarmat, is a predictable development effort; it replaces an aging ICBM, with

12 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Introduction 13 Russia’s pursuit of these capabilities is likely likely is these capabilities of pursuit Russia’s factors, of a combination by motivated is deterrent its the belief that including be, eroded by in the future could being, or negotiate to the desire defenses; missile U.S. to States the United with new agreements threatening other and defenses missile limit spend to the U.S. force the goal to capabilities; the aspiration defense; missile on money more in nuclear- States the United out-innovate to the need to and delivery options; weapon sector. the powerful defense-industrial support communication of the degraded state Given and Russia, and States between the United systems these new weapon for the potential to is important it stability, strategic affect to delivery systems, the Russian understand deployment their likely and their capabilities, new the summarizes This paper schedules. delivery systems nuclear-weapon Russian information, open-source available using system’s each a summary of including and/ announced technical characteristics, reported and date, deployment likely or future inform to meant is military It objectives. the arms- on in thepolicy community work of implications stability strategic and control Other advances technological these systems. also impact may simultaneously being made the but stability, strategic and control arms best are here reported developments Russian reporting. open-source from understood New advanced strategic weapon delivery weapon strategic advanced New Burevestnik Poseidon, systems: ICBM: Sarmat ICBM: Kinzhal, delivery systems: Hypersonic Tsirkon Avangard, f f f f f f www.nti.org In this paper, these weapons will be discussed these weapons this paper, In maturity of in order and categories, in three follows: as category, each within added evasive features. The other five new five other The features. added evasive new utilize delivery vehicles nuclear-weapon defenses. missile evade to U.S. technologies Poseidon, range—Avangard, strategic are Three U.S. long-standing Burevestnik—despite and neither is defense missile that statements strategic Russian against effective nor at aimed underwayis program The capabilities. number the sheer given scope, in its ambitious variety the technological as well as systems of sophistication. and There is no specific open-source information information specific no is open-source There be used would that warheads the nuclear about the yield systems, some For these systems. on the news but reported, is weapon the nuclear of isalso no There inconsistent. often is reporting contain whether the warheads of discussion physics or materials nuclear reused new or conducted not has Because Russia packages. is 1990, it since a full-scale test nuclear nuclear the planned that assume to reasonable already packages will usewarheads physics repackaged potentially but tested designed and packages new physics or thenew systems, for computer and designed subscale with testing simulations. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

Sarmat Multiple-Warhead Heavy ICBM

The first system announced by Putin in his March 2018 address was a new ICBM called the Sarmat,6 a replacement for the R-36M2 Voevoda ICBM (called the SS-18 by NATO) deployed currently.7 Putin announced the Sarmat as more capable than the Voevoda. “Weighing over 200 tons, it has a short boost phase, which makes it more difficult to intercept for missile-defense systems,” he said. “The range of the new heavy missile, the number and power of its combat blocs is bigger than Voevoda’s. Sarmat will be equipped with a broad range of powerful nuclear warheads, including hypersonic, and the most modern means of evading missile defense…. Voevoda’s range is 11,000 km while Sarmat has practically no range restrictions…. It can attack targets both via the North and South poles.” The video accompanying his speech showed ICBM tracks from Russia to the United States through both a northern and a southern route. The RS-28 Sarmat is a liquid-fueled, multiple-warhead ICBM under contract to the Makeyev State Rocket Design Center since 20118 and being manufactured at the Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant (Krasmash).9 NATO refers to the new Sarmat as the SS-30 Satan 2. The Voevoda was designed and manufactured during Soviet times in Ukraine; its service life has been extended, and it is projected to go out of service as early as 2022, with the oldest units needing to be replaced as early as 2022 and all the units needing to to replaced by 2027,10 imposing a time constraint on the Sarmat development and deployment schedule.

Technical characteristics

The development of the Sarmat was reported Test footage of the Sarmat strategic missile system previously in open sources; however, some of the claims in Putin’s 2018 address were Source: Ministry of Defense, Russia new. The new capabilities, if realized, would

14 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 15

24

23

27 The missile is expected missile The 20 Whereas Putin claimed claimed Putin Whereas 21 and as many as 24 as many as and 26 References to throw-weight and and throw-weight to References 28 by reducing its missile airframe airframe missile its reducing by The Sarmat ICBM will be Sarmat The 22 but reports can be found referencing referencing be can found reports but 25 If the Sarmat range is 16,000 km is (9900 range the Sarmat If ICBM an with Russia willmi), it provide deployed currently is what beyond range ICBM deployed formerly to equivalent but ranges. Although there were two range options options range two were there Although for deployed originally and developed 6800 mi) for km (about Voevoda—11,000 km 16,000 (about and attack Pole a North only attack—the Pole a South 9900 mi) for the Voevoda of version deployed currently 6800 mi). 11,000 km (about of a range has hypersonic Avangard warheads. All reports warheads. Avangard hypersonic being designed is to the Sarmat suggest countermeasures of carry a combination different target can that warheads and locations. Number, power, and types and nuclear of power, Number, Voevodato 10 up carries warheads: The as well as each kt 750 about of warheads number The aids. penetration and decoys expected be warheads to the carried of on 10 to as reported frequently most is Sarmat 16, If the pulse-detonation engine test is is test engine thepulse-detonation If a scientific represents it reported, accurately a pulse- deploying However, breakthrough. be would the Sarmat on engine detonation require would likely and ambitious quite testing. more significantly Range: silos SS-18 missile placed into existing to launch- modifications with minimum infrastructure. area as few as three as few as weight by nearly 50 percent through the through 50 percent nearly by weight materials. composite advanced use of yield include up to 10 750-kt warheads (7.5 warheads 10 750-kt to up include yield “practically no range restrictions” for the for restrictions” range no “practically therange suggests reporting most Sarmat, 9900 mi), 16,000 kmwill (about be about the United to route Pole a South support to is the Sarmat larger, getting Without States. throw- and range its increased have to said weight to be about 36.3 m (109 ft) long and 3 m and (109 ft) long 36.3 m beto about (9 ft) in diameter. f f f f

11 16

is 15 Later Later 13 18 It is hard to be to hard is It 12 it is possible that a that possible is it 17 others claim it is a more a more is it claim others 14 supported by Energomash. Energomash. by supported 19 Some reports assert reports Some will the new engine orbit, into the Sarmat hyperaccelerate the of signature the infrared reducing early- for the time available as well as launch a launch. detect such to satellites warning being designed to lower the signature and/ the signature being lower designed to boost the thrust increase and speed or of names Reporting consistently the Sarmat. design agency; the engine as Energomash the PDU- report many whereas however, the used the engine on of a variant 99 is Voevoda, current that same month, it was also reported, also was reported, it month, same that was engine a full-scale detonation pulse Research Advanced the Russian by tested Foundation Since infrared signature is closely related to to related closely is signature infrared Since time, burn type, fuelengine composition, parameters, chamber geometry, rocket conditions, flight and Liquid fuels tend to produce longer boost longer produce to tend fuels Liquid solid fuels. than phases Short boostShort short-boost-phase phase: The because the puzzling, somewhat is claim fuel. uses liquid the Voevoda, like Sarmat, The Advanced Research Foundation Foundation Research Advanced The fuel and clean employ to said was engine high efficiency thermodynamic obtain increasing and cost lower while providing space missions. for the weight payload new engine and/or new fuel could cause cause new fuel could and/or new engine detect and to the boost be to harder phase the PDU- reported widely is It characterize. 2016, although in August tested 99 was the engine. about given detail is no definitive about what is behind the short- is the behind what about definitive substantial is there but boost-phase claim, the new first-stage suggesting reporting the PDU-99, the Sarmat, for engine advanced pulsed-detonation engine. pulsed-detonation advanced f f www.nti.org Below is an assessment of reported information information reported of assessment an Below is in to referred the capabilities detail to adds that the 2018 speech: make the Sarmat ICBM a more advanced advanced a more ICBM the Sarmat make new with the Voevoda, than capability evasive advanced military and characteristics technologies. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

Mt), 16 hypersonic glide vehicles yielding second may have also validated performance 500 kt each (8 Mt), 24 hypersonic glide of the initial flight phase. A third ejection vehicles each yielding 150 kt (3.6 Mt), or test may have been conducted in May 2018,32 combinations thereof. The total yield the and it is shown along with component missile can carry has been consistently manufacturing on a video released on July 28, reported to be about 8 Mt.29 If the number 2018.33 Although it was expected, no complete of warheads is 10, and the total yield is 8 flight testing of the Sarmat was conducted Mt, the Sarmat will be very similar to the in 2018, and full-scale tests were initially Voevoda deployed today.30 Given what is reported to be delayed to 2019.34 Given that reported about the size and weight of the preparation for such tests has not yet been Avangard, it is reasonable to assume the observed, it is reasonable to assume it could be Sarmat will not carry 24 warheads without 2020 before a full-scale flight test is conducted. significant re-engineering of the hypersonic Recent reporting described a fire at the Sarmat system. production facility in April 2019, and Russian government officials now say the tests will be ff Modern means to evade missile defense: completed by the end of 2020.35 The implication in Putin’s speech is that the Sarmat has modern evasive measures The development of Sarmat is behind the in addition to a short boost phase. Some originally announced deployment date of of these measures likely include the use 2016–2018.36 Current Russian plans indicate of improved decoys, making it hard for serial production in 2020 and operational radars to adequately track the correct deployment in 2021.37 These dates are target. (Decoys are already employed on the optimistic relative to expected final testing Voevoda.) The original Voevoda missile is timelines, which continue to be pushed out. sometimes said to have deployed fractional In early 2017, there were 46 Voevoda missiles orbital bombardment re-entry vehicles fielded,38 and it is generally believed that all capable of dynamically maneuvering will be gradually replaced by the new Sarmat outside of the ballistic track to make the ICBMs. It seems likely that Russia will be able warhead’s flight path and intended target to replace the Voevoda with some version of harder to predict.31 The Sarmat is expected the Sarmat at or before the end of life of most to carry the Avangard hypersonic missile, or all Voevoda missiles, but significant work which will likely have more non-ballistic and expenditure will be required. maneuverability. The claims of potential capabilities for the Military objective Sarmat are extensive, and it is reasonable to Historically, Russia has deployed a higher assume that trade-offs will be made between proportion of its strategic nuclear forces on realizing the advancements and the cost and land rather than at sea, in contrast to the schedule associated with deployment. An United States, which relies more heavily on open-ended development schedule for the sea-based weapons. Silo-based ICBMs are Sarmat is not a realistic option, since the viewed as the fastest response leg of a nuclear Voevoda lifetime is limited. triad but vulnerable to a first strike. Because of the number and types of warheads and Deployment schedule likely decoys intended for the Sarmat, Russia seems to be seeking to increase its ability to During his 2018 and 2019 addresses, Putin overwhelm any U.S. missile defenses and mentioned that the Sarmat was in active ensure that its strategic-range ICBM-based testing. There have been two tests (late nuclear missiles can penetrate existing or new December 2017 and March 30, 2018) of the missile-defense capabilities. ejection mechanism from the silo, and the

16 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Hypersonic delivery systems 17

42 Hypersonic weapons—combining the speed of ballistic weapons with the flight and maneuvering low-altitude capabilities of cruise missiles—are militarily advantageous, considered missile-defense especially to evade systems.

41 hree of the six new Russian capabilities are hypersonic weapon systems: systems: weapon hypersonic are capabilities the six new Russian of hree dominate systems hypersonic Since Tsirkon. and Avangard, Kinzhal, introduction a brief development, systems new weapon-delivery Russia’s of the description before here included is systems weapon hypersonic to Other characteristics of hypersonic systems, however, are potentially advantageous advantageous potentially are however, systems, hypersonic of Other characteristics While the name implies that speed is the distinguishing factor of hypersonic vehicles, for for vehicles, hypersonic of factor speed the distinguishing is that implies the name While 40

39

A hypersonic glide vehicle is typically boosted to hypersonic boosted typically hypersonic is to glide vehicle A hypersonic then from released a missile, by speed atmosphere in the upper the high edge speeds at at glide to unpowered the boost vehicle to the atmosphere through descending before the atmosphere of altitude to Because be need to delivered glidea target. vehicles as to vehicles. boost-glide referred often are systems hypersonic these vehicle, a lift speedand by spacecraft. glide and missiles both hypersonic on continued 1930s has begun in the late Research www.nti.org

Hypersonic vehicles travel at speeds of Mach 5 or higher—that is, over 6100 kph (3800 mph) at sea at (3800 mph) 6100 kph over is, higher—that 5 or Mach speeds of at travel vehicles Hypersonic level. HYPERSONIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS DELIVERY HYPERSONIC the Russian development activities. development the Russian weapon systems it is only one of the characteristics that provide advantage. Compared with today’s today’s with Compared advantage. provide that the characteristics of one only is it systems weapon compared However, speedadvantages. significant do offer vehicles cruise hypersonic missiles, advantage, an such have not do vehicles hypersonic ballistic systems, missile long-range with their of portion a large speeds during hypersonic at travel ballisticbecause already such missiles flight. Traditionally, hypersonic systems have been considered in two in two been considered have systems hypersonic Traditionally, cruise and missiles. glide vehicles categories: broad compared with ballistic missiles. Of particular interest are the ability to fly at low altitude, altitude, at low fly to the ability are ballistic with Of particular missiles. interest compared avoid to flight during maneuver to ability earth-based by detection difficult;making the sensors targets, of the unpredictability and interception; and detection For a ballistic trajectory. follow don’t vehicles hypersonic since the speed of weapons—combining hypersonic these reasons, maneuvering and flight the low-altitude with ballistic weapons militarily considered cruise of missiles—are capabilities especially systems. evade to missile-defense advantageous, T Hypersonic delivery systems

Characteristics of hypersonic glide vehicles In addition to the technical challenges already include: mentioned, there are some overarching issues ffhigh lift-to-drag ratio for any type of hypersonic weapon system. The most challenging is considered to be heat ff maneuverability during flight and on management, because hypersonic travel in the descent atmosphere results in surface temperatures of ffa shape that determines performance about 2000°C.47 These temperatures require the characteristics such as glide distance, speed, development of new materials and/or heat- and maneuverability, which is usually a removal methods to ensure survivability of conical body with fins or a delta-shaped the delivery vehicle (especially the nose cone, body, somewhat like a space shuttle but with sharp edges, and fins) and interior guidance sharper edges systems. The other significant technical challenge involves communication to and from Recently, the attributes of hypersonic glide the vehicle through the surrounding plasma vehicles, including speed, maneuverability, sheath48 that forms when vehicles travel at and low-altitude flight, have made them speeds above about Mach 8 or Mach 10 in the particularly attractive as weapons to evade atmosphere.49 missile defenses. Although hypersonic glide vehicles are not usually powered, a propulsion Hypersonic weapons are under development system to increase speed or maneuvering not only in Russia but also in the United capability (especially in the supersonic States and China, and to a lesser extent in the portions of the flights) can be integrated. United Kingdom, India, France, Australia, Japan, Germany, and likely elsewhere.50 Like other types of cruise missiles, hypersonic The U.S. and Chinese hypersonic weapon cruise missiles are powered throughout flight programs will be briefly described later in this and offer maneuverability combined with section, after the Russian system descriptions. high speed. Their range is determined by the Importantly, Russia and Chine are the only type of engine and fuel used. Hypersonic nations to declare intent to develop dual- missiles typically operate using air-breathing capable hypersonic missiles, which could carry supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) either conventional or nuclear warheads. The engines to accelerate and maintain missile Russian motivation for hypersonic weapons speed. A scramjet usually begins operating at is repeatedly stated to be missile-defense Mach 4 or Mach 5. Therefore, a hypersonic evasion.51 cruise missile must first be accelerated to Mach 4 or Mach 5 by other means, such as rocket As described in the following sections, the engines. The study of scramjet engines has Russians are developing both a hypersonic been underway since the 1950s,43 with the first glide vehicle and a hypersonic cruise missile. In successful flight tests in the 1990s44 and some addition, Russia has developed an air-launched breakthroughs since then.45 While elegant in hypersonic ballistic missile that it claims is theory, since they have no moving parts and in trial deployment. The hypersonic ballistic use air as the oxidant, scramjet engines that missile is a modified existing solid-propelled operate more than a few hundred seconds have missile delivered by a high-speed interceptor not yet been designed and tested; their range is aircraft. If successful in its efforts on these significantly limited.46 Because of the challenge three programs, Russia could deploy dual- of developing long-life scramjet engines or capable air- and ground-launched hypersonic an alternative, development of hypersonic weapons, and a conventional sea-launched cruise missiles technically lags behind that of hypersonic weapon that could be modified to hypersonic glide vehicles. be nuclear-capable.

18 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Hypersonic delivery systems 19

58 The range range The 60 it is is it 59 Russian Aerospace Forces launch the Kinzhal missile Aerospace Forces Russian Source: Ministry of Defense, Russia Kinzhal mounted on MiG-31K, 2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade Moscow 2018 Kinzhal mounted on MiG-31K, www.kremlin.ru Source: of Kinzhal if carried on the MiG-31K is 2000 is the if carried MiG-31K Kinzhal on of 1900 3000 km (about 1240 mi), and km (about cited range (The a Tu-22M3. mi) if carried on distance flight aircraft the one-way includes it is likely the Kinzhal can as well. Additionally, Additionally, well. as can the Kinzhal likely is it a thermonuclear has because the Iskander-M warhead, kt a 10–50 with option maneuver during the terminal phases of flight of the terminal phases during maneuver reasonable to assume that the Kinzhal would would the Kinzhal that assume to reasonable literature Russian Some yield. a similar have Tu-22M3 the upgraded that indicated has four to up carry alsobomber launch may and skepticism some is there although Kinzhals, or enough fast whether is the bomber about purpose. this for flies high enough Of all 52 The MiG- The 56 ground- 54 The Russian designation designation Russian The 55 The MiG-31K aircraft is aircraft MiG-31K The 57

53 launched, nuclear-capable ballistic missile nuclear-capable launched, small with fins rocket a solid-propellant using maneuverability. for 31K interceptor jets can carry and launch one one carry jets can launch and 31K interceptor time. a at Kinzhal the systems announced by Putin in 2018, Putin by announced the systems either believed is bethe Kinzhal to the one operational to closest or in trial deployment deployment. www.nti.org The Kinzhal hypersonic system involves the involves system hypersonic Kinzhal The jet carryingMiG-31K missile the Kinzhal at 18 km (59,000 ft) about of altitudes to releasedand speeds.is missile The supersonic 100 ft), (about meters of tens falls probably the used is protect to that cap ejects a rocket its uses thethen jet flight, during motor rocket hypersonic to accelerate to motors solid rocket 11, 2018 March A video on released velocity. of system. this test a flight shows Technical characteristics Technical Kinzhal, meaning “dagger,” is a hypersonic a hypersonic is “dagger,” meaning Kinzhal, from ballistic launched missile short-range weapon- Kinzhal The a high-speed aircraft. solid-fuel a short-range mates delivery system a modified MiG- to missile aeroballistic hypersonic provide jet, to 31 interceptor claimed, strike. Putin standoff medium-range speed, at a hypersonic “The missileflying the speed than of sound, 10 times faster flight of its phases at all alsocan maneuver to overcome which also it allows trajectory, anti- I think, prospective and, all existing systems, defense and anti-missile aircraft warheads and conventional nuclear delivering 2,000 kilometers.” of over in a range Kinzhal Air-Launched Hypersonic Hypersonic Air-Launched Kinzhal Missile Ballistic The Kinzhal is reported to be a substantially to reportedsubstantially be a is Kinzhal The (400 km short-range Iskander-M modified 310 mi), 500 km, 250 mi to to for the Kinzhal is Kh-47M2. The MiG-31 Kh-47M2. is the Kinzhal The for by jet called is the Foxhound interceptor modifiedto carry the version and the NATO, the MiG-31K. as to referred is Kinzhal maneuverable, and because the Iskander-M can can because the Iskander-M and maneuverable, Hypersonic delivery systems

and the missile range combined.) This a The Kinzhal provides evidence that the Russian medium- or intermediate-range system (never military, like the U.S. military, views air- covered by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear launched standoff, speed, and maneuverability Forces Treaty, because it is not land based) as critical assets for future warfare and even though Putin calls this and the other new deterrence. The United States has plans for a systems “strategic.”61 There are some reports of nuclear-tipped long-range standoff (LRSO) air- air refueling the MiG-31K while carrying the launched weapon, but the U.S. version is to be Kinzhal, suggesting the desire to increase the a strategic weapon deployed on heavy bombers overall range of the delivery system.62 The Su- and is not intended to be hypersonic. 57 stealth fighter is a prospective carrier if that jet is ever developed and deployed.63 Avangard Boost-Glide Hypersonic Deployment schedule Missile

Putin claims the Kinzhal began trial The Avangard is a “traditional” boost-glide 69 deployment in December 2017 in the Southern vehicle. The hypersonic glide vehicle is Military District, and Russian news media lifted into space using a multi-phase ballistic variously claim either more than 250 or missile and then released in low-earth orbit, 380 flights have occurred.64 Reports in U.S. descending to the edge of the atmosphere and 70 literature tend to corroborate significant testing gliding at hypersonic speeds. and trial deployment, although not necessarily Other than acknowledging Avangard’s the number of flight tests. It is reported that development by the industrial sector and 65 66 10 to 50 MiG-31Ks will be modified to carry stating that Russia is “one step ahead … in the Kinzhal, with at least six operational in most essential areas” of hypersonic technology, 67 March 2018. There is no specific reporting Putin did not elaborate on the Avangard in about the deployed Kinzhal missiles carrying his 2018 speech. In 2019, Putin said, “We have a nuclear warhead. A nuclear-tipped Kinzhal launched serial production of the Avangard would allow more military effectiveness with system ... As planned, this year, the first less accuracy than a conventionally tipped regiment of the Strategic Missile Troops will be Kinzhal but would risk nuclear escalation. The equipped with Avangard.” Iskander-M has a 5–7 m (16–23 ft) circular error probable (CEP)68 when coupled with Technical characteristics optical homing, a 30–70 m (98–230 ft) CEP when operating autonomously. The Avangard boost-glide hypersonic missile is believed to have been under development Military objective since the 1980s, first in the Soviet Union and then in Russia. There have been a few different The Kinzhal provides standoff air-launched development campaigns, with the most recent hypersonic strike capability with limited beginning in 2014. In total, there were about maneuverability. The Russian press states that 14 reported flight tests between 1990 and 2018, the military purpose of Kinzhal is to strike U.S. many of which were failures or only partially or NATO ship-based anti-missile systems or successful.71 In the latest campaign, there have land-based anti-missile systems in Romania been four confirmed tests, one reportedly (and Poland in the future). The declared unsuccessful and three reportedly successful. Russian purpose to destroy missile defenses The latest successful test was conducted is consistent with the technical characteristics in late December 2018 with the launch of and the number of modified jets, although an Avangard on an SS-19 ICBM from the this system could be used for other high-value Dombarovsky ICBM base in the southern Ural targets such as carrier groups. Mountains to Komchatka 6000 km (about 3700

20 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Hypersonic delivery systems 21 The 82 Without 81 Avangard depiction Source: Ministry of Defense, Russia Avangard computer graphicAvangard computer Source: Ministry of Defense, Russia It is probable that the Avangard development development the Avangard that probable is It aligned for were development the Sarmat and behind fell the Sarmat but initial deployment a to using be Kremlin seems The schedule. planning and testing by measure stopgap SS-19s. on the Avangard of initial deployment Each SS-19 will carry Avangard. one Deployment schedule Deployment plasma shaping, among others. among shaping, plasma communication through plasma or another another or plasma through communication method, the accuracy guidance sophisticated the increasing be could low, the Avangard of capability. a nuclear likelihood of

72 75 described 76 but the actual but A 150-kt A 150-kt but this is not not this is but 74 77 79 Technologies have have Technologies 80 on the Avangard seems more likely likely seems more the Avangard on 78 The boost-glide vehicle was shown by shown was The boost-glidevehicle 73 warhead It is unclear how the Avangard communicates communicates the Avangard how unclear is It accuracy achieved what the vehicle and testing. its during widely reported. reported. widely To date, SS-19 ballistic missiles (produced in SS-19 ballistic (produced missiles date, To provided Soviet times) have during Ukraine tests. the Avangard boostthe ICBM for geometry is undisclosed. The Avangard is is Avangard geometry undisclosed. The is vehicle, a delta-shaped as depicted typically Avangard The sheath. a plasma by surrounded be to 5.4 m (almost reported vehicle, a large is 18 ft) long. An SS-18 missile silo was converted for use for silo converted SS-18 missile was An too is because the the Avangard SS-19 with expectedis initial that It the SS-19 silo. for long will be SS-19 with Avangard of deployment deployment longer-term ballistic and missiles, missile will the new be Sarmat on The Avangard was announced as dual- as announced was Avangard The be could that a warhead with capable, are There nuclear. or conventional either yield, in the expected nuclear inconsistencies 2 Mt. to 150 kt from ranging earlier in this report. in this report. earlier The December 2018 Avangard test reportedly test Avangard The December 2018 high as Mach as 20 or Mach speeds of reached 27. www.nti.org mi) away. The test was declared by Putin an by Putin declared was test The mi) away. nation.” to gift the Year’s New “excellent Putin as a computer graphic, a computer as Putin The successful testing of the Avangard Avangard of the successfultesting The materials-science a significant represents order In achievement. heat-management and have to said is Russia success, achieve to that material a specialdeveloped composite the for the 2000°C temperatures withstood hypersonic intercontinental of minutes of tens withmay also equipped be vehicle The flight. system, a thermoregulation for the intended targets, assuming successful assuming targets, the intended for system. a navigation of development been maturing to enable communication communication enable to been maturing high or use of including plasma, through design, antenna vehicle frequencies, low magnetic and particle injection, placement, Hypersonic delivery systems

number of Avangard systems that can be the deployment of nuclear-tipped Avangard deployed on the Sarmat is uncertain. Russian systems. reporting claims the Sarmat can carry 16 Yu- 71s (conventionally tipped Avangard systems) In the next decade, there does not seem to be and up to 24 Yu-74s (nuclear-tipped Avangard a reasonable path for Russia to replace all, or systems).83 However, some sources suggest even most, of its ICBM-based warheads with that these numbers are overstated and that the Avangard systems. The limited number of 60 Sarmat could in fact carry only up to three Avangard systems sometimes reported seems 87 Avangard systems, and only if lower-yield more likely. and lighter glide vehicles are designed.84 The Avangard length (5.4 m or 18 ft) suggests a Military objective heavy system, and the large numbers (16 to 24) on a single ICBM seem unrealistic unless The Russians have said the purpose of the a lighter version of the Avangard is being Avangard hypersonic boost-glide weapon is developed. to destroy missile-defense installations and high-value targets. In the case of the Avangard It was announced that serial production of the hypersonic boost-glide weapon on the SS-19 Avangard has begun and two SS-19 missiles or Sarmat ICBM, high-value targets could deployed with Avangards are planned at include hardened targets such as missile silos Dombarovsky by the end of 2019.85 By the end or command centers in the United States. It of 2027, that regiment and one other are to is conceivable that a conventionally armed have six Avangard systems each, for a total of Avangard boost-glide system with modern 12 systems. Given that only three successful guidance and high speeds could be engineered flight tests of this design have occurred, to damage or penetrate hardened structures, the 2019 deployment seems ambitious and and a nuclear-armed Avangard would be probably unrealistic. However, the overall expected to be effective against these targets. number of 12 by 2027 seems credible given the existence of the SS-19 missiles and the maturity In addition to defense installations or of the Avangard, although it is confusing high-value targets in the United States, the relative to potential Sarmat deployment. In Avangard could provide a limited first-strike or retaliatory nuclear capability that could not be July 2019, there were U.S. media reports that 88 Russia was struggling to manufacture the challenged by missile defense. Essentially, the Avangard due to a lack of critical carbon-fiber Avangard can be viewed as an ICBM warhead components. In response to the U.S. reporting, replacement that can satisfy the same military Russian officials issued a statement that the objectives while evading missile detection or production and delivery of the Avangard were defense, and may be capable of destroying proceeding on schedule and that it was still high-value or hardened targets. slated to achieve initial operating capability by 2020.86 Tsirkon Hypersonic Cruise Missile

By today’s standards in either the United States While addressing the Russian Federal or Russia, more testing would be prudent Assembly on February 20, 2019, Putin before deployment of a nuclear warhead on described the Tsirkon as “a hypersonic missile these advanced systems. Perhaps the three that can reach speeds of approximately Mach successful tests are considered adequate for 9 and strike a target more than 1,000 km (620 the initial deployment of two conventionally mi) away… It can be launched from water, armed missiles, but an increased rate of from surface vessels and from submarines…”89 testing would be a strong signal of potential In that same speech, Putin announced, “Russia deployment of the full slate of 12 missiles or will be forced to create and deploy weapons

22 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Hypersonic delivery systems 23

99

100 98 101

97 There are reports that reports that are There The Tsirkon is said to to is said Tsirkon The 103 96 As with the Avangard, however, however, the Avangard, with As 102 The priority for the Tsirkon is sea- Tsirkon the for priority The Pyrotechnic release of the scramjet engine engine the scramjet of release Pyrotechnic to approach final before the missile from Russian is a There stability. more for target describes that this concept. patent the terminal target during Maneuverable extra protection for allowing approach, system. defensive any from A new fuel for the scramjet, called the scramjet, A new fuel for the of theDecilin-M, range extend to beDecilin-M to a high-missile. reported is be to fuel rumored aviation calorie synthetic fuel JP-10. synthetic the U.S. like the withstand A new metal to alloy hypersonic during obtained temperatures material of this new composition The flight. likely and be to highly reported classified is effort. development a long of the result 104, 105 f f f f Mashinostroyeniya. the communication through the plasma sheath sheath the plasma through the communication mentioned. not is guidance for believed have to are the Tsirkon of tests Early bomber the Tu-22M3 with been completed five at least by followed stage,” the “first as both the using a coastal platform from tests scramjet. and rocket tests conducted from the coastal platform in the coastal platform from conducted tests in 2016, and 2015, in March in late Nyonoksa been completely have not 2017 may February December 2017 and in April Tests successful. the with successful, reportedly 2018 were speed Mach of a maximum obtaining missile 8. f f f f In reporting about the Tsirkon, the plasma the plasma the Tsirkon, about reporting In described feature a positive as largely is sheath undetected go to the missile allows that radar absorbs the plasma since radar, by frequencies. be designed to use the 3S-14 Russia Universal Universal be use designedthe to Russia 3S-14 seaborne the same System, Launching Vertical in missiles, Kalibr and the Onyx as launcher deploy to affordable easy and it make to order submarines. and ships on The Tsirkon is reported to have some some have to reported is Tsirkon The including: potentially features sophisticated

93 is 91 The The 2018 The 95 90 warhead weight weight warhead 94

92 production agency is the Scientific Production Production the Scientific is agency production NPO or Machinery-building, for Organization The Russian designation for the Tsirkon the for designation Russian The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review indicates that that Review indicates Posture Nuclear U.S. potentially and will study States the United a nuclear-armed years in the coming pursue increasing cruise perhaps sea-launched missile, will be given the Tsirkon that the possibility these For in turn. option a nuclear-tipped of in this report covered is the Tsirkon reasons, systems. new nuclear-weapon 3M-22 or 3K-22, and the NATO designation is is designation the NATO 3K-22, and 3M-22 or SS-N-33. with a period of active testing beginning a period with testing active of at in 2015. The estimated is body length 33 ft), 11 m (24 to 8 to www.nti.org Open-source reporting on the Tsirkon is quite quite is the Tsirkon on reporting Open-source to reported is the Tsirkon although scarce, 2011, least at since been in development have Technical characteristics Technical To date, the Tsirkon has not been officially not has the Tsirkon date, To missile; described a nuclear-capable as to address in Putin’s the reference however, decision-making attack to deployment Tsirkon a with be deployed might it suggests centers sea- Tomahawk the U.S. (like payload nuclear initially cruise was when missile it launched occasionally news reporting and deployed), option. a nuclear-tipped mentions The Tsirkon is a hypersonic cruisehypersonic with missile a is Tsirkon The auses solid-fuel stage first The stages. two and the missile, the accelerate and lift to rocket move to motor uses phase a scramjet second a range speeds over hypersonic at the missile the scramjet of the lifetime by limited likely deployed) (or tested were the Tsirkon If engine. to deployment the similar in a way aircraft on the solid-fuel first the Kinzhal, for scheme be could eliminated. stage that can be used … in areas that contain contain that be can used in areas … that for the missile centers decision-making us.” threatening systems is 300 kg to 400 kg (660 lb to 880 lb), and and 880 lb), to 400 kg (660 lb 300 kg to is 30 km the trajectory along at peak altitude to 130,000 ft). 40 km (100,000 ft to Hypersonic delivery systems

based deployment, and tests from sea-based The Tsirkon deployment date has been platforms are said to be scheduled for late variously reported as 2018, 2022, and 2025113 2019. Some believe the Tsirkon will have a light and is likely planned to coincide with the version that will be air-deployed, likely from a refurbishment schedule of the battle cruisers. Tupolev Tu-160/M/M2 jet, although this seems However, given the significant technical to be quite speculative.106 challenges of developing and producing a reliable scramjet and a specialized metal- The range and speed mentioned in Putin’s 2019 alloy cruise missile body, deployment before speech (1000 km and Mach 9) are higher than the mid- to late 2020s seems highly unlikely previously reported. The difference between without an increased pace of development and the prior reporting and Putin’s speech could testing. come from technical improvements (such as a new fuel or longer-lasting scramjet), In addition to deployment on the battle misstatements about Tsirkon’s performance, cruisers, it is reported, the Tsirkon will or different versions of the Tsirkon being be carried by the Yasen-class (also called developed simultaneously; or it could be a Husky-class) submarine114 and perhaps the matter of various flight altitude and trajectory Steregushchiy-class corvettes,115 although options for the Tsirkon. Since previously neither carrier appears to be in near-term designed and tested scramjets have lasted plans. As mentioned earlier, there is also about six minutes, the range provided by speculation that a lighter version of the Tsirkon the scramjet at Mach 5 would be around 500 could be air-carried, and a version could be km (310 mi). Therefore, the highly reported created for export to India or elsewhere.116 Mach 5 to Mach 6 and 500 km (310 mi) range seems to be a realistic estimate. However, Military objective a semiballistic trajectory could potentially reach Mach 9 and 750 km (466 mi).107 If the The claimed military objective of the Tsirkon speculated air-launched version were to be is to destroy carrier groups before it can be developed, then a range of over 1000 km (620 intercepted. Given the hypersonic speeds and mi) could be possible, because the aircraft the relatively short travel distances if it were would provide some of the range.108 The lower- launched either from either shore or sea, the altitude version has the advantage of being total time to detect and intercept would likely more difficult to observe than the semiballistic be less than five minutes. Today’s U.S. and version. It is unclear whether the Tsirkon has U.K. ship-based defenses are not designed to high-g evasive-maneuvering capability. work at those speeds, and even if the missile were destroyed it would be close enough that Deployment schedule fragments could cause significant damage.

There are many discrepancies in the reported Secondary missions of the Tsirkon are said to deployment schedule. Tsirkon is expected to be land-based targets such as command and be deployed on Russia’s two heavy nuclear- control centers or missile-defense installations. powered battle cruisers currently undergoing Tsirkons carried by submarines that move close maintenance and modernization,109 the first to shore could target command and control expected to be complete 2021 or 2022.110 centers within a few hundred kilometers During modernization, the battle cruisers (about 100 mi) from the coast. The missiles will be equipped with 10 universal vertical would travel quickly and might be able to launchers to allow Tsirkons or other missiles to penetrate underground bunkers due to the 117 be used interchangeably.111 The launchers are momentum imparted by their high speed. said to hold up to eight missiles each for a total Tsirkon missiles deployed in Kaliningrad of 40 to 80 missiles depending on the type.112 could potentially reach the missile-defense installation in Poland.

24 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Hypersonic delivery systems 25 The Russians seem Russians The 121 intentionally ambiguous about which and how how which and about ambiguous intentionally will carry systems the new hypersonic of many and battle cruisers are being modified or being modified cruisers are battle and vehicle hypersonic in paralleldeveloped with type has vehicle Each hypersonic development. they together and delivery platform, a unique and ground-delivered, air-delivered, provide any that credible is It capabilities. sea-delivered carry warheads, could these systems of nuclear have systems ground-delivered and the air- and dual-capable. as been announced systems these to weapon refers Putin Although has the Avangard, one, only strategic, as initially As strike capability. strategic-range is weapon air-delivered the Kinzhal deployed, and capability, medium-range expected have to expected is weapon sea-delivered the Tsirkon capability. short-range have to date to successes and efforts Russian The ballistic hypersonic the Kinzhal that suggest in trial already deployment. likely is missile and investment significant and continued With have could Russia technical accomplishments, boost-glide vehicle hypersonic the Avangard the mid-2020s, and to in the early deployed cruise sea-launched in the mid- missile Tsirkon 2020s. late to already delays and the failures to due However, the significant with experienced, coupled testing, continue to required investment these weapons, deploying and producing, expected be not to are the deployments open-source or officials Russian as fast as fully are systems Which suggests. reporting when and produced, the number developed, will the depend on deployed they are how and and investment Russian pace of and magnitude China or U.S. perhaps and accomplishments, agreements. control arms or advancements, open- and statements government Official the most into insight provide reporting source plan. deployment Russian aggressive the dual-capable that argued have Some troubling quite is aspect these weapons of destabilizing. and Little is available in open in open available is Little 119 118 120 McClellan Air Force Base Force Air McClellan Radio Station Naval Creek Jim Camp David Camp Ritchie Fort the Pentagon the Pentagon f f f f f sources about advanced research programs programs research advanced about sources the systems three beyond underway in Russia presented papers by measured discussed. As Planes Space International the AIAA at Technologies and Systems Hypersonic and in 2017, ending years nine over Conference significantly lag publications research Russia’s and States, China,behind the those United of others. f f f f f www.nti.org Open-source reporting and observed and reporting Open-source testing provide efforts missile hypersonic Russian of types three developing is Russia evidence that ICBMs, aircraft, Jet vehicles. hypersonic of Russian Hypersonic Delivery System Summary The long-term success of Russian hypersonic hypersonic Russian of success long-term The near-term on dependboth may efforts and vehicles in hypersonic investments in investments long-term and delivery systems not this is While research. infrastructureand been has reported it this paper, the focus of have that ranges test three has Russia that and program, been the hypersonic used for tunnels. wind two Russian Hypersonic Technology Russian Hypersonic Technology Investment Russian state TV channel Russia-1 has has TVRussia-1 state channel Russian U.S. decision-making five of a list presented currently not which are of some centers, for targets be likely would that operating, deployed missiles hypersonic Tsirkon Russia’s submarines: on This list of targets seems to indicate that the that indicate to seems of targets list This centers decision-making of list target Tsirkon’s been yet fully developed. not has Hypersonic delivery systems

nuclear weapons, and secretive about what Today’s U.S. hypersonic-weapons program types of warheads will be deployed on these focuses exclusively on research and new systems. development for conventional-warhead delivery. Limiting the development of U.S. systems to conventional warheads requires U.S. and Chinese Hypersonic Delivery that a high degree of accuracy be achieved for System Summary militarily effectiveness, and some have claimed this puts greater technical demands on U.S. As mentioned earlier, the development of new development activities than those on Russia’s.123 hypersonic systems is proceeding not only The United States has no planned strategy for in Russia but also in the United States and hypersonic systems acquisition and is unlikely China, and to a lesser extent elsewhere. A brief to field a hypersonic-weapon system before summary of U.S. and Chinese developments 2022. It is expected that the Department of is included here to provide a context for Defense will request an acquisition program if evaluation of the Russian program. development programs succeed in the next few years. United States The U.S. program comprises a common glide Although the United States had early and vehicle called the Advanced Hypersonic intermittent forays into hypersonic weapon Weapon (AHW) along with Navy, Army, and and aircraft development, the latest weapon- Air Force delivery vehicles. In the original development efforts began in the early 2000s as boost-glide mode, AHW was designed to part of the conventional prompt global strike provide a range of 6000 km (3700 mi), a (CPGS) program.122 The primary motivations 35-minute time of flight, and accuracy of 10 m for CPGS were to better execute the war on (33 ft).124 In addition, the Defense Advanced terror by quickly reaching time-urgent targets Research Projects Agency (DARPA) continues across the globe and to penetrate anti-aerial/ research activities on more advanced glide anti-access denial systems. CPGS efforts vehicle and cruise missile concepts, along with resulted in two successful flight tests, in 2011 new delivery systems.125 and 2017, of a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, and a failed flight test in 2014. The 2011 test The common hypersonic glide vehicle was launched from Hawaii and landed in the development is led by the Navy and is an Marshall Islands, approximately 3700 km (2300 adaptation of the prototype designed by Sandia mi) away. The 2017 test was also launched from National Laboratories and successfully tested Hawaii. in 2011 and 2017. The booster systems are being developed by the services separately. With the intense development activities The Navy is developing an intermediate- in Russia and China, hypersonic-weapons range conventional prompt-strike weapon development was identified in 2019 by the U.S. as a submarine-launched system, with flight Department of Defense as a priority research- tests and prototyping expected through and-development area, and development was 2024, and the Army is developing a medium- accelerated by the John S. McCain National range (2250-km, 1400-mi) ground-based Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year hypersonic two-phase booster system.126 2019. The nature of the hypersonic-weapon The Air Force is developing a short-range development program changed from CPGS hypersonic conventional-strike weapon that to conventional prompt strike, with emphasis is a solid-rocket-powered hypersonic system, on short-, medium-, and intermediate-range to launch from the B-52, and a air-launched missiles. rapid response weapon with an range of 575 mi (925 km).127 Notably, the United States is

26 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Hypersonic delivery systems 27

135

133 This system is reported to reported is system This 132

134 Chinese Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Glide Chinese Hypersonic Guan Han AP Photo/Ng Source: The DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile medium-range DF-17 The specifically reportedly was to deliver designed the mated of tests Two HGV. the DF-ZF in November conducted system hypersonic reported was successful; the missile 2017 were 1400 over 10 Mach to 5 Mach at flown have to 60 km (37 about of altitude an km (870 mi) at the of meters” struck “within have to mi) and target. intended Some report the DF-17 hypersonic system system hypersonic the DF-17 report Some 2020, as early as operation willfor be ready have extreme maneuverability. extreme have In addition to the DF-17 medium-range medium-range the DF-17 to addition In ballistic specifically missile the for designed date, to testing used for and HGV DF-ZF Chinese ballistic other that speculate analysts be could usedmissiles boost to the hypersonic medium- believe Some the DF-21 glide vehicle. intermediate-range DF-26 or missile range anti-access/aerial an support could missile believe the DF-41 Many denial strategy. expected carry to development, under ICBM a 12,000- of be capable and warheads multiple carry could the DF-ZF km range, (7456-mi) U.S. the reaching of is capable DF-41 The HGV. mainland. and given the number of tests, it is reasonable reasonable is it tests, of the number given and 2020s in the early deployment that assume to its announced China recently possible. is The most most The 130 Images of the DF-ZF HGV have have HGV the DF-ZF of Images 128 129 131 not been released, and both conical-shaped both conical-shaped been and released, not have renderings delta-winged and renderings been posted. significant weapon development in China has has in China development weapon significant originally glide vehicle been the hypersonic recently more the WU-14 and as to referred has HGV DF-ZF The HGV. called the DF-ZF 2014—the times since nine least been at tested of at development the aimed tests seven first at aimed tests two the last and HGV the DF-ZF medium- a DF-17 to HGV the DF-ZF mating was the tests of one ballistic Only missile. range a failure. www.nti.org China appears to have been working on on been working have to China appears since systems weapon modern hypersonic and 2000s in academic, industrial, the early institutes. military research China In addition to developing conventional conventional developing to addition In also is States the United weapons, hypersonic technologies in new missile-defense investing hypersonic adversarial defeat can that weapons. The United States is also investing in research research in is also investing States United The and tunnels wind as infrastructure such technology at hypersonic for ranges test Today, facilities. government and universities critical 48 declared has States the United more development, hypersonic for facilities wind hypersonic two and ranges, 10 test than In development. in another with tunnels, Griffin, 2019, Michael in March testimony Secretary Under Defense’s of the Department have “We said, Engineering, and Research for we as testing, flight increased significantly 40 flight approximately conduct to intend the accelerate to years, few the next over tests years warfighters our to capability delivery of planned.” previously than earlier not developing an ICBM-boosted conventional conventional ICBM-boosted an developing not The this time. at weapon missile hypersonic the ICBM-boosted abandoned Pentagon systems such that concern of out approach missiles becould confused nuclear-armed with a nuclear cause unintentionally could and exchange. Hypersonic delivery systems

hypersonic vehicle system would be capable of with significant success. The United States carrying a nuclear warhead. adopted this focused approach later than China and is now developing multiple booster In addition to the DF-ZF HGV, China tested systems for air, ground, and sea launches. a delta-shaped hypersonic plane called the Russia has developed three types of hypersonic 136 Starry Sky-2 in August 2018, dropped three vehicles and has been developing air-, ground-, different scaled-down hypersonic aerodynamic and sea-launched systems that use different 137 shapes from a balloon in September 2018, boosters. released images of potential hypersonic cruise missile the Jai Geng No 1 in April 2019,138 and Each country can claim successes: China has is doing research on scramjet engines.139 In the completed the largest number of successful Starry Sky-2 test, a hypersonic glide plane was tests to date of a rocket-boosted glide vehicle. ground-launched, reached a top speed of Mach Russia was the first to trial deploy a hypersonic 6, conducted extreme maneuvers, maintained system, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic velocities above Mach 5.5 for 400 seconds, and missile. The United States was the first to have landed fully intact.140 a successful test of a hypersonic glide vehicle with significant range and accuracy. China has invested heavily in research capabilities for hypersonic technology and This technology race is playing out in real time, operates two test ranges and three wind and all three countries are significant players. tunnels, with a fourth in development. If the development and investments continue, it is likely that each country will deploy one or more hypersonic weapon systems. Whether Comparison of Russian, Chinese, and or not any or all countries will deploy nuclear- U.S. Capabilities tipped hypersonic weapons remains to be seen. Over the longer term, it is very likely that Russia, China, and the United States are without any new arms-control agreements, using different approaches to the pursuit of additional countries will also eventually deploy hypersonic weapons, in part because different hypersonic weapon systems. military objectives and gaps are being filled. Therefore, it is not straightforward to declare who is ahead or behind in development. In addition, significant investments are being made in hypersonic weapon development in all countries, and advances are rapid. For weapon efforts, China and the United States are each focusing on the maturation of one hypersonic glide body that will be carried by one or more boosters. In the case of China, the focus is on a ground-based rocket booster

28 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS 29 145 Two advanced new strategic-range new strategic-range advanced Two Putin. announced by systems were the Poseidon—a systems are The two nuclear-tipped nuclear-powered, torpedo—and the Burevestnik—a cruise nuclear-tipped nuclear-powered, missile. and because they are additions additions because they are and 141 undersea power sources for Arctic oil oil Arctic for sources undersea power 142 wo advanced new strategic-range systems were announced by Putin. Putin. by announced were systems new strategic-range advanced wo announcement) the after public Russian by the (named systems two The the torpedo—and nuclear-tipped nuclear-powered, the Poseidon—a are cruise These two missile. nuclear-tipped nuclear-powered, Burevestnik—a as well as to power high-energy weapons and bases overseas. and high-energy power weapons to as well as and new weapons such as the Poseidon, Burevestnik, and high-energy and laser announced Burevestnik, the Poseidon, as such new weapons and 144 143

in Putin’s 2018 speech. The United States is concentrating on small reactors for commercial commercial for reactors on small is concentrating States United 2018 speech. The in Putin’s purposes recovery, www.nti.org Because these systems have not been fully developed by others been others fully not by developed Because have these systems

WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS DELIVERY WEAPON NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC STRATEGIC NEW ADVANCED The two advanced strategic weapons rely on compact nuclear nuclear on compact rely weapons strategic advanced two The believed be to in development are that power for reactors Mechanical for Experimental Design Bureau Afrikantov at withthe All- affiliated a subsidiaryEngineering, Rosatom of (VNIIEF) in Experimental Physics of Institute Research Russian requirements power and system Because the propulsion Sarov. so different, are the drone underwater cruise and missile for a somewhat are reactors nuclear the compact likely is it technology has beenSmall-reactor design. advancing different on concentrating Russia decade, the with past over rapidly platforms, floating be can placed on that small reactors to the current strategic-range nuclear delivery means of heavy bombers, submarine-launched submarine-launched bombers, heavy of delivery means nuclear strategic-range the current to to experts refer nuclear U.S. some ICBMs, ballistic and missiles, is of primary systems both The characteristic “exotic.” them as interception. avoid to their ability

systems are quite different in their design features, development maturity, and even and even maturity, development features, in designtheir different quite are systems in this section together grouped they are military function.targeted Nonetheless, delivery long-range providing of objective strategic a common because they have technical the common and nations, other used by not means by weapons nuclear of source. power nuclear a compact they the use of depend on that characteristic T NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS

On August 8, 2019, a blast and fire involving speed multiple times higher than the speed a radioactive substance occurred on a sea of submarines, cutting-edge torpedoes and platform at the Nyonoksa (also written all kinds of surface vessels … They are quiet, Nenoksa) missile test site in the White highly maneuverable and have hardly any Sea. Initially Russian officials said the vulnerabilities for the enemy to exploit. ... testing involved a “liquid propellant rocket Unmanned underwater vehicles can carry engine”;146 later statements included “isotope either conventional or nuclear warheads, power source on a liquid fuel engine”147 or which enables them to engage various “isotope power source in a liquid propulsion targets, including aircraft groups, coastal system,”148 depending on the news source. fortifications and infrastructure.”155 Putin also The accident caused a fourfold to 16-fold said such capability was possible because of increased radiation level for about two hours an innovative nuclear-power unit tested in in the nearby town of Severodvinsk shortly December 2017 that was unique for its small after the explosion.149 Five scientists from size and amazing power-to-weight ratio, was VNIIEF were confirmed dead, two or more 100 times smaller than units powering modern additional people may have been killed, and submarines, and could also reach maximum others were injured in the accident.150 Russian capacity 200 times faster. reports have not provided the purpose of the testing, although Putin acknowledged it was The Poseidon, frequently referred to as an a promising weapon system. Initially the U.S. unmanned underwater vehicle, underwater press largely speculated the accident occurred drone, or torpedo, was previously called Ocean while testing the Burevestnik cruise missile.151 Multipurpose System Status 6 by the Russians Other reports claimed that the nuclear reactor and Kanyon by NATO. While most reporting could be for Poseidon.152 Later, some suggested about Poseidon refers exclusively to the that the radiation came from a radioisotope torpedo, there are numerous reports that claim thermoelectric generator used to keep the several delivery means for the Poseidon— Tsirkon warm before launch,153 although including a submarine-launched torpedo and 156 this theory has been proven unlikely due to another, called the Skif, that would consist of the radioisotopes identified in the hospital the torpedo in a container placed on the ocean where patients were treated and from later floor either by submarine or surface boat and 157 meteorological station reporting of isotopes. activated on demand at a later time. Because Finally, the accident was attributed in some the torpedo design for both delivery options reporting to the recovery of a Burevestnik is expected to be the same and reporting on missile from a previous test as opposed to the Skif is rare and not fully corroborated, a new test.154 In any case, the activity in the this section focuses exclusively on the sub- White Sea, with or without an accident, launched torpedo and its delivery platforms. If confirms that work is being done on novel the Skif is being developed, it has the potential compact nuclear power reactors involving to have significant military and strategic Rosatom. The accident is likely to slow stability implications. progress of the development activity. Technical characteristics Poseidon Nuclear-Powered, Nuclear- The design of Poseidon was first revealed in Tipped Torpedo open-source reporting in September 2015 by The Washington Free Beacon. It was further According to Putin in March 2018, Russia is exposed on Russian television in November developing “unmanned submersible vehicles 2015 when a meeting of Putin with his top that can move at great depths (I would say military officers looking at charts that were extreme depths) intercontinentally, at a plainly visible to the camera was aired.158

30 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS 31

166 Liquid-metal- The dimensions dimensions The 170 168 The videos showed videos The showed 167 Others have speculated Others have 169 Aft end of Poseidon Source: Ministry of Defense, Russia cylinder, with 1.5-m (5-ft) diameter and 4-m and 1.5-m (5-ft) diameter with cylinder, more is a 2-Mt that suggest (13-ft) length warhead. 100-Mt to a 50-Mt than probable from the video analysis coincide well with the with well coincide the video analysis from original drawings. the nuclear about reported detail is Little a is it report Some the Poseidon. for reactor gas-cooled reactor. that it is a modern fast-neutron reactor with with reactor a modern is fast-neutron it that a lead-bismuth likely metal coolant, a liquid the noise. reduce to mixture hardware on a factory computer- and on floor hardware underwater. the Poseidon of graphics generated the that indicates the video images of Analysis 20 and 7 ft) in diameter 2 m (about is Poseidon for with room long, to 80 ft) 24 m (66 ft m to a nuclear and in thecenter reactor a nuclear the front. toward warhead For comparison, the largest warhead ever ever warhead the largest comparison, For Bomba. Tsar the Soviet was 50-Mt deployed 7 ft) in 2.1 m (about was Tsar Bomba The worth is It 8 m (26 ft) long. and diameter claim the (3300-ft) depth 1000-m that noting seen credible is the most as it changed; not has the original assertions. of the announced Putin 2018, President July In sea for readiness and testing lab of completion published videos were and trials Poseidon, of media. in the Russian cooled reactors do not need an electromagnetic electromagnetic need an do not cooled reactors

164 both lesser

165 160 . The area set aside for for aside area set The 159 It was further suggested that further was that suggested It 163 161 that could destroy and contaminate contaminate and destroy could that 162 coastal cities, or destroy carrier battle groups groups carrier battle destroy coastal or cities, frequently was it Additionally, a distance. from be could enveloped the warhead reported exploded when it case, soin a cobalt that be dispersed particles would underwater cobalt radioactive fallout and water entrained with (a concept areas large contaminate would called “salting”). capabilities than originally reported and likely likely and reported originally than capabilities estimate An design maturation. of a result the into fit would that warhead a nuclear of warhead placement was shown as a cylindrical as shown was placement warhead 4 m and 5 ft) in diameter 1.5 m (about tube torpedowould The be 13 ft) in length. (about Khabarovsk- a by released and carried from the new special mission and/or submarine class called the Belgorodsubmarine a tsunami would be generated by the very by large be generated would a tsunami to harm additional causing explosion, nuclear infrastructure. and/or coastal areas large Assuming the torpedo is carried by a the torpedo carried is by Assuming the at waters, safe in launched and submarine 40 for speeds the travel torpedo reported could the Due coast. to a U.S. reach to more or hours the Poseidon time, travel high speed long and if the even detectable and be noisy likely would realized. are quiet it make to new technologies with defeat to be hard would it However, speed its because of resources U.S. available depth. and A few years later, in 2018, Russian media in 2018, Russian later, years A few speeds of Poseidon began reporting sources to 110 kph mph, 80 to (70 mph 70 knots 60 to warhead, a 2-Mt and 130 kph), www.nti.org As originally reported, the Poseidon would would thePoseidon reported, originally As to 50 Mt warhead, carry nuclear a very large 100 Mt, The revealed image provided detailed design provided revealed image The travel could torpedo a that for specifications obtain range, 6200-mi) a 10,000-km (about 185 kph), 115 mph, (about 100 knots speeds of m 1000 of depth a maximum achieve and a 1.6- have would torpedo itself The (3300 ft). This long. and m (79 ft) be 24 m (5-ft) diameter a submarine-launched twice the size of about is 30 times the size about ballistic and missile torpedo. regular of NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Source: H.I. Sutton, “Poseidon Intercontinental Nuclear-Powered Nuclear-Armed Autonomous Torpedo,” Covert Shores (website), February 22, 2019, www.hisutton.com/Poseidon_Torpedo.html.

circulation pump and provide gearless Alongside these accomplishments, needed operation with a turbine. modifications are said to have been made to the Belgorod submarine to allow it to In December 2018, Russia media announced carry the Poseidon. The Khabarovsk-class that the nuclear propulsion system of the submarines are also expected to be modified Poseidon was being tested in a sea area to be Poseidon carriers. Best estimates suggest protected from surveillance. The reactor was a potential for the Poseidon to be deployed in said to be installed in the hull of an operating 2027 or later. drone, and the tests being conducted were as part of experimental design work rather than On February 20, 2019, in his national address, full-fledged sea trials.171 The suspected test Putin announced, “[A]s soon as this spring submarine, the Sarov, was located on the White the first nuclear-powered submarine carrying Sea near Severodvinsk. this unmanned vehicle will be launched.”173 Later that day, video was released showing a Additional detailed open-source analysis Poseidon seemingly prepared for testing with 172 published in Feb 2019 contains satellite some obscured underwater footage. images of the Sarov being modified to carry Poseidon as far back as 2007 and being loaded In March 2019, TASS reported that the with Poseidon surrogates as early as 2012. Belgorod would complete dockside trials throughout 2019 and assume combat duty Deployment schedule in 2020. The Belgorod is a one-of-a-kind submarine said to be capable of carrying six From reporting and images, it seems clear Poseidon drones. It was also released that the that Russia has designed and built prototype Khabarovsk-class submarines will be made nuclear engines and torpedo bodies. Lab operational in 2022.174 The Russian state testing of the engines is reported to have armament program calls for the Russian navy been completed, and sea testing has started. to deploy 32 Poseidons from 2018 to 2027.175

32 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS 33 Burevestnik Cruise Missile Source: Ministry of Defense, Russia Burevestnik, Putin said, “It is a low-flying a low-flying is “It said, Putin Burevestnik, warhead, carrying missile stealth a nuclear unpredictable range, unlimited almost with interception bypass to trajectory ability and late “In claim, to on went He boundaries.” latest its launched successfully 2017, Russia the central at missile nuclear-powered nuclear- the flight During its ground. training design capacity its reached engine powered Now the necessary propulsion. provided and tests ground and launches the missile that a begin can developing we successful, were a strategic new weapon, type of completely nuclear-powered a with system nuclear his accompanied the video that In missile.” seen was a missile launching announcement, graphics computer-generated and the sky, into altitude a low at maneuvering it showed weaving terrain, mountainous through (With (With 176 From photos, videos, and reporting of the of reporting videos, and photos, From of images satellite with coupled Poseidon, clear it that seems modifications, submarine talking about just than more doing is Russia amount a substantial However, the Poseidon. be required would testing and development of been published. have that the claims realize to six Poseidons each, a fifth submarine each each submarine a fifth each, six Poseidons be needed.) would www.nti.org Of the systems announced in March 2018, in March announced Of the systems and surprising the most was that the one deployment the furthest from considered (“Announcer the Burevestnik 9M730 was nuclear- subsonic in English) the Storm” of cruise called missile, powered the SSC-X-9 discuss this to chose Putin NATO. Skyfall by well-known most the after immediately system the beginning near ICBM, the Sarmat system, Regarding new weapons. of rollout his of Burevestnik Nuclear-Powered Cruise Burevestnik Nuclear-Powered Missile The Poseidon was first discussed as primarily first was Poseidon The destroy to weapon second-strike a retaliatory coastal and cities U.S. contaminate and/or being intercepted. infrastructurewithout carrier aircraft address, in Putin’s However, Some targets. added Poseidon as were groups a has the Poseidon that suggests reporting scenario. the carrier-group nose for in its sonar unique not militaryare objectives declared The the newly including systems, Russian among aircraft targeting (for Kinzhal announced targeting (for Avangard and carrier groups) is it coastal Thus, cities). infrastructureand the primary intends Russian that possible at hold and be target to to purpose Poseidon of strike would coastal whilerisk cities, Avangard particularly States, the United of the interior fields. ICBM the U.S. Military objective The expectation is that two Khabarovsk-class Khabarovsk-class two is expectation that The Sea in the two in the Northern and submarines Poseidons will carryeach Pacific eight NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS

through missile defenses in the Atlantic, and the Burevestnik aims to be a subsonic, not a then flying around South America to the U.S. supersonic, missile, and the length of time in West Coast.177 flight is envisioned to be days, not months. However, the similarities cannot be missed: Technical characteristics they are both nuclear-powered, nuclear-tipped cruise missile concepts that reportedly would The Burevestnik is based on a concept that use terrain mapping for very long flight routes has been explored since early in the atomic and ramjet engines for propulsion. But there age: a nuclear-powered propulsion system that are other differences, as well. In Project Pluto, could allow a missile or aircraft to travel great the reactor was unshielded and the release of distances due to the high power-to-weight gamma radiation was considered an added ratio of nuclear fuel compared to other fuels. benefit. Today, much more is known about No such nuclear-power propulsion system has radiation effects, making it unlikely that been successfully deployed by any nation to Russia intends to spew radioactivity in the date, although many have been conceived and atmosphere around the globe as Pluto would some tested.178 have done. The eventual cancellation of the highly provocative Project Pluto should not be In the case of the Burevestnik missile, the used to dismiss Burevestnik. Nuclear reactor concept is to use a miniature nuclear power fuels and concepts have advanced, and it is plant carried in the missile to heat air in a more plausible that a high-energy-density, ramjet engine and provide propulsion during closed-cycle, small-volume nuclear reactor flight. The Burevestnik range is often described could be used to power a cruise missile. as “unlimited,” but most press reports say Nonetheless, the deployment of a nuclear- the missile could stay aloft for a day or two. powered cruise missile poses safety risks, Since it is anticipated to be a subsonic cruise including the dispersion of radiation if it were missile, this range could be 23,000 km (15,000 to be intercepted. mi) or more. In operation, the Burevestnik would carry a nuclear warhead (or warheads); In principle, even without interception, circle the globe at low altitude, avoid missile nuclear-powered missiles pose two significant defenses, and dodge terrain; and drop the risks if something goes wrong: the possibility warhead(s) at a difficult-to-predict location (or of a fissure occurring in flight, and that of locations). For reasons that seem more political the reactor’s losing its isolation. Clearly than technical, Putin sometimes refers to this the Russians are considering these risks; weapon as an unlimited-range Tomahawk. during the test flights the cruise missile was accompanied by two cargo planes (Il-76) put The Burevestnik concept is often compared to up by Rosatom and converted into laboratories Project Pluto, an idea pursued by the United equipped with material to detect radiation States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. and equipment to track the trajectory of the Project Pluto was led by what is now Lawrence missile.180 Additionally, the cruise missile needs Livermore National Laboratory and had an to “land” in a manner to avoid radioactive eventual goal to prototype a nuclear-powered contamination. ramjet engine for a supersonic low-altitude missile (SLAM). Conceptually, a SLAM missile Despite the potential dangers, the development would be launched with a rocket booster of the Burevestnik is reported to have begun and then fly on nuclear power for months at in 2011,181 with tests beginning by June speeds of Mach 3 to Mach 5, carrying multiple 2016. There is a consensus in the press, with nuclear warheads that could be released over purported agreement from U.S. intelligence the Soviet Bloc at any time.179 The SLAM would services, that the Burevestnik has been tested continue flying to conduct damage assessment. 13 times, with two partial successes.182 It is This comparison is flawed, however, because

34 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS NEW ADVANCED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS 35 Given the history of the history of Given Modern nuclear nuclear Modern 191 188 192

190 189 but for comparison the Tomahawk needs the Tomahawk comparison for but power. kW of 800 about No information about the yield or number of of number the or yield about information No carry would has a Burevestnik missiles nuclear in the sources. open appeared nuclear propulsion, deployment of an actual an of deployment propulsion, nuclear a decade within seems highlysystem unlikely. reactors from 1 MW to 20 MW thermal, 20 MW called MW to 1 from reactors small. The be quite can made microreactors, Energy a microreactor has of Department U.S. molten- liquid-metal-, gas-, exploring program that concepts heat-piped-cooled and salt-, commercial truck or by becould transported aircraft. Deployment schedule Deployment deployment, Burevestnik of reporting first The be would it suggested 2019, in September in 2025. deploy to ready Military objective is Burevestnik of militarythe The objective untraditional follow evade defense, to missile target any striketo able and be paths, flight military expert Russian warning. little with calleda the Leonkov Burevestnik Alexei use would which Russia retaliation, of weapon of allthe militaryrout the to finish ICBMs after a leave not infrastructure and civilian and survival. of chance There is some limited speculation that the speculation that limited is some There also could be released carriedBurevestnik and could what of images BM, and a MiG-31 from been have a MiG-31BM on be the Burevestnik published.

183 A recovery A recovery 184 The power rating of the rating The power 187 A nuclear reactor test that ended that test reactor A nuclear This test focused on testing focused the testing on test This 185 186 For flight testing, the Burevestnik is launched is launched Burevestnik testing, the flight For Its a solid-fueled with rocket. a ramp from In theory, flight. during starts propelling motor include does not it simple: is motor the nuclear need massive does parts not and moving any inletthe air penetrates reserves The fuels. of the nuclear the cruise reaches of missile, about of a temperature to heated is and reactor, releasedto is air then 1600°C. The 1400°C to the vehicle. propel engine, some say without the reactor. Videos Videos the reactor. without say some engine, released were being built the Burevestnik of national Putin’s after 2019, just in February address. by crashing into the sea could have been by been by the sea have could into crashing by less and safer design; a sea generally is crash community the international by noticeable is reactor if the nuclear crash a land than and latest, The radiation. emits and damaged conducted partially was second test successful, Yar the Kapustin 2019, at 29, January on range. test nuclear reactor for Burevestnik is unknown, unknown, is Burevestnik for reactor nuclear effort consisting of three Russian boats, boats, Russian of three consisting effort handle to the equipment with one including seen was in the reactor, nuclear the recovered U.S. and the British suspected crash. of area also are Burevestnik of pieces recover to efforts suspected. The partially successful test conducted in The partially conducted test successful in Putin by to referred and 2017, November a from a launch of consisted 2018 address, his Zemlya followed Novaya in platform mobile a and then flight of minutes two about by Sea. the Barents into descent www.nti.org believed that a test in September 2017 resulted resulted 2017 in September a test believed that radioactivity a source with Ru-106 of in a cloud River. the Volga and between the Urals CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

he large number and new types of nuclear-weapon delivery systems represent significant efforts by Russia’s military designers and its industrial complex. One of the new hypersonic systems, the Kinzhal, is in trial deployment, at least as a conventionally tipped aeroballistic missile. TAlthough advances are being made in replacing an older multiple-warhead ICBM with a more modern and capable version, the system is not yet fully tested, and deployment is behind schedule. The development of a nuclear-capable strategic- range hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and a potentially nuclear-tipped hypersonic cruise missile remains active but not mature, with the deployment dates likely after the early and mid-2020s, respectively. Russia’s efforts to create nuclear-powered torpedoes and cruise missiles, entirely new kinds of strategic nuclear-weapon delivery concepts, are further behind, and their ultimate success remains uncertain. The primary military parameters and the technological challenges for the six systems are summarized in an abbreviated form on the following page.

The projections collected from official Russian government statements and open-source reporting for this summary document have been found to be generally optimistic and ambitious. Most announced test dates and deployment dates have not been met, for reasons including, for example, a shortage of critical carbon-fiber material, a fire at the ICBM production factory, and a fatal explosion during testing involving a nuclear reactor. The number of issues being experienced in the development and deployment of these new systems may indicate an overzealousness by Russia to show progress now that the systems have been openly publicized. The announced deployment dates are therefore seen as the earliest possible dates; more realistic dates are likely farther in the future. The risks and rationale for pursuing such systems, as well as the implications of new technologies as hypersonics, should be a priority agenda item for the United States and Russia in their discussions of strategic stability and nuclear-risk reduction.

36 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS CONCLUSION 37

After 2030 (if ever) After 2027 2025–2030 or later Likely after 2022 but probably within 5 years . More testing anticipated before nuclear deployment . Trial Trial deployment in 2019 and continuing . 10 or more modified jets, each capable of carrying one missile . 2022–2027 Estimated Deployment Date Small nuclear-power Small nuclear-power plant coupled to ramjet engine Small nuclear-power Small nuclear-power plant for propulsion High-temperature new metal alloy, high-energy fuel, scramjet flight for about 5 minutes New composite material to withstand high temperatures for tens of minutes Modified intermediate-range missile delivered to upper atmosphere by MiG-31K interceptor jet Short-boost-phase, Short-boost-phase, high-thrust engine, composite material body more enabling range and throw weight Technological Technological Significance and Challenges Unknown Most likely 2 Mt (some say up to 100 Mt) No nuclear No nuclear capability announced but speculation it may come later 150 kt most likely but reports up to 2 Mt 10–50 kt Total 8 Mt, 8 Mt, Total likely carrying 10–16 but warheads, reports range from 3–24 warheads Reported Yield Nuclear Nuclear Nuclear Conventional Conventional or nuclear Conventional or nuclear Nuclear, with Nuclear, different types of warheads and decoys the including Avangard Reported Warhead Type(s) Over 25,000 km 10,000 km 500 km 6000 km 2000 km (including one-way aircraft flight distance) 16,000 km Reported Maximum Range Subsonic 100–200 kph Mach 5–6 Over Mach 20 Mach 5–10 Over Mach 20 Reported Maximum Speed in Testing Nuclear- powered cruise missile Nuclear- Nuclear- powered torpedo Hypersonic cruise Hypersonic boost-glide system Hypersonic aeroballistic, modified Iskander-M ground- launched missile Liquid-fueled, Liquid-fueled, multiple warhead ICBM to replace Voevoda (SS-18 Satan) Type Burevestnik (Skyfall) Poseidon Poseidon (Kanyon) Tsirkon Avangard Kinzhal RS-28 Sarmat (SS-30 Satan 2) System – Russian Common Name common (NATO designation) www.nti.org Summary of the Primary Military Parameters and Technological Challenges of Russia’s New New of Russia’s Challenges Summary the Primary of and Technological Military Parameters Systems Weapon Nuclear ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ill Hruby was named the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow in November 2018. She served as the director of Sandia National Laboratories from July 2015 to May 2017. Sandia is a Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration national laboratory with diverse national Jsecurity missions that include nuclear weapons, cyberspace, energy, non- proliferation, biological defense, and space.

During her 34 years at Sandia, she served as vice president of the Energy, Nonproliferation, and High-Consequence Security Division; leader of Sandia’s International, Homeland, and Nuclear Security Program; and technical director in Materials and Engineering Sciences and in Homeland Security and Defense Systems. She also held several leadership positions in materials science, weapon components, and micro-technologies. Hruby has authored numerous publications and holds three patents. Her awards include an R&D 100 Award, the Suzanne Jenniches Upward Mobility Award from the Society of Women Engineers, the US Department of Energy Secretary’s Exceptional Service Award, the National Nuclear Security Administrator’s Distinguished Service Gold Award, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service. In 2017, Business Insider named Hruby the second most powerful female engineer. Currently, Hruby is an advisor and board member on science and national security issues, a spokesperson for women in engineering, and a mentor for emerging leaders. She participates in engineering advisory councils for Purdue University and University of California at Berkeley. Hruby holds a bachelor’s degree from Purdue University and a master’s degree from the University of California at Berkeley, both in mechanical engineering.

38 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Endnotes 39 , March 29, , March , July 20, 2018, thediplomat. , July , July 8, 2019, www.newsweek.com/ , July Gady, “Russia Completes Ejection Tests”; and and Tests”; Ejection Completes “Russia Gady, 200-Ton Massive “Russia’s Majumdar, Dave War Be Nuclear Ready for Will RS-28 ICBM Interest National The in 2021,” “Sarmat,” Deagel. “Sarmat,” Satan ‘Invulnerable’ “Russia’s Brennan, David Be by Fire Ready to Will Missile 2 Nuclear Says,” Official Agency 2020, Space of the End Newsweek russia-satan-2-nuclear-missile-rs-28-sarmat- ready-fire-2020-1447994. Sarmat.” “RS-28 s.v. Wikipedia, 10 with Voevodais deployed Russian The earlier Various each. 750 kt about of warheads a as carried much as theVoevoda of versions warhead. 25-Mt Topol Fires “Russia Trevithick, Joseph Defeat to Tech New Test Ballistic to Missile War Zone The Systems,” Defense Missile December 26, 2017, www.thedrive.com/the- war-zone/17197/russia-fires-topol-ballistic- missile-to-test-new-tech-to-defeat-missile- defense-systems. Completes “Russia Gady, Franz-Stefan ICBM,” RS-28 Sarmat of Tests Ejection The Diplomat com/2018/07/russia-completes-ejection-tests- of-rs-28-sarmat-icbm/. Successfully “Russia News, Defence Daily ICBM RS-28 Sarmat Test-Fires 30, March Ballistic Missile,” InterContinental 2:27, www.youtube. video, 2018, YouTube com/watch?v=_7sWQKprv1k. Throw-weight is the weight of a the payload weight is the Throw-weight decoys, warheads, including carry, can missile them. houses that the bus and Nukes”; on Bluffing Isn’t Putin “No, Ritter, Deagel. “Sarmat,” and accessed (missile),” “R-36 s.v. Wikipedia, 5, 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-36_ March (missile). Sarmat.” of Images Reveals New “Russia RS-28 Sarmat.” Fire Test to “Russia Gady, 34 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 22 23 24 25 26 , , , March , March , March , March , Center for for , Center , 30 no. 3 (June 2017): 1101–1114. 3 (June , 30 no. Strategic and International Studies, May May Studies, International and Strategic 3, 2019, January modified17, 2017, last missilethreat.csis.org/missile/rs-28-sarmat/. “Russia Reveals New Images of Sarmat Heavy Heavy Sarmat of Images Reveals New “Russia Defence Ballistic Missile,” Intercontinental 06, 2019, 19, 2018, accessed March July Blog, defence-blog.com/army/russia-reveals-new- images-sarmat-heavy-intercontinental- ballistic-missile.html. II’ ‘Satan “SS-X-30 Project, Defense Missile Missile Threat (RS-28 Sarmat),” 22, 2018, www.theamericanconservative.com/ articles/no-putin-isnt-bluffing-on-nukes/. Dong, Shikui and He, Zhihong Niu, Qinglin Rocket of Characteristics Radiation “IR Motor Varying Under Plumes Exhaust of Journal Chinese Conditions,” Operating Aeronautics Deadliest Nuke “Russia’s Gady, Franz-Stefan The Diplomat Delay,” Faces Program Reveals “Russia MacDonald, Cheyenne Radical of Pulse- Test First World’s The DailyMail ‘Super-Rocket,” Detonation Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Test Fire RS-28 Fire Test to “Russia Gady, Franz-Stefan The Diplomat 2019,” in Early ICBM Sarmat October 3, 2018, thediplomat.com/2018/10/ russia-to-test-fire-rs-28-sarmat-icbm-in- early-2019/. Military to Guide Deagel, “Sarmat,” December 26, Civil Aviation, and Equipment 2018, www.deagel.com/offensive-weapons/ sarmat_a002919001.aspx. on Bluffing Isn’t Putin “No, Ritter, Scott American The Conservative Nukes,” 28, 2017, thediplomat.com/2017/03/russias- deadliest-nuke-program-faces-delays/. 29, 2016. www.dailymail.co.uk/ August sciencetech/article-3764051/Russia-reveals- world-s-test-radical-pulse-detonation-super- rocket.html. The PDU-99 engine is sometimes referred to referred is sometimes engine PDU-99 The 99. Project or the PDY-99 as RUSI, May 25, 2011, accessed March 05, accessed 25, 2011, March May RUSI, 2019, rusi.org/commentary/why-did-russia- opt-liquid-fuel-its-next-generation-icbms. 20 21 17 18 19 14 15 16 13

“Boost-Phase Defense Timeline,” American American “Boost-Phase Timeline,” Defense www.aps.org/newsroom/ Society, Physical pressreleases/upload/nmdgraphics.pdf; for Opt Russia Did “Why Yuri, Sutyagin, ICBMs?” Generation Next in Its Liquid-Fuel The West exclusively uses in fuels solid exclusively West The liquid-fueled considers generally and ICBMs obsolete. ICBMs Anatoly Zak, “Sarmat Intercontinental Intercontinental Zak, “Sarmat Anatoly www. Web, Space Russian Ballistic Missile,” russianspaceweb.com/sarmat.html. “Fire at Siberian Plant Producing Producing Plant Siberian at “Fire Out—Emergencies Ballistic Put Missiles 26, 2019 tass.com/ April TASS, Ministry,” emergencies/1056126. “Key Facts About Russia’s Advanced Sarmat Sarmat Advanced Russia’s About Facts “Key 1, 2018, tass. March TASS, System,” ICBM com/defense/992360. Wikipedia, s.v. “RS-28 Sarmat,” March 26, March Sarmat,” “RS-28 s.v. Wikipedia, 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RS-28_Sarmat. The Sarmat is named after the nomadic nomadic the after named is Sarmat The tribes, in the 6th who lived Sarmatian BCE area 4th in an centuries through Russia, modern-day parts of covering Kazakhstan. and Ukraine, The Burevestnik and Poseidon were named named were Poseidon and Burevestnik The Russian by the address annual 2018 the after poll. a web-based public through people It is unclear why this order was chosen; chosen; was this order why unclear is It be with to associated appear does not it other any or schedule, deployment maturity, measure. obvious The new delivery capability announced in announced new The delivery capability a nuclear explicitly not was 2019 (Tsirkon) it that abounds speculation but capability, included is it will be; therefore and/or could completeness. for here “Presidential Address to the Federal the Federal to Address “Presidential President ofthe website Official Assembly,” 20, 2019, en.kremlin.ru/ February Russia, of events/president/news/59863. “Presidential Address to the Federal the Federal to Address “Presidential of President ofthe website Official Assembly,” 1, 2018, en.kremlin.ru/events/ March Russia, president/news/56957. www.nti.org 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 ENDNOTES Endnotes

2018, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ 47 Charlis Muir, “The Challenges of Hypersonic 55 Michael Kofman, “Emerging Russian russias-massive-200-ton-rs-28-icbm-will-be- and Space Flight,” Royal Aeronautical Society, Weapons: Welcome to the 2020s (Part ready-nuclear-war-25135. 2016, www.aerosociety.com/Assets/Docs/ 1—Kinzhal, Sarmat, 4202),” Russia

35 Events/Conferences/2016/809/5.%20The%20 Military Analysis (blog), March 4, 2018 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Conclude Challenges%20of%20Hypersonic%20Flight. russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress. Testing Phase of RS-28 Sarmat ICBM pdf. com/2018/03/04/emerging-russian-weapons- in 2020,” The Diplomat, July 8, 2019, 48 welcome-to-the-2020s-part-1-kinzhal- thediplomat.com/2019/07/russia-to- Eric D. Gilman, John E. Foster, and Isaiah M. sarmat-4202/; and David Axe, “Is Kinzhal, conclude-testing-phase-of-rs-28-sarmat- Blankson, “Review of Leading Approaches Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile, a Game icbm-in-2020/. for Mitigating Hypersonic Vehicle Changer?” The Daily Beast, March 15, 2018, Communications Blackout and a Method of 36 Zak, “Sarmat Intercontinental Ballistic www.thedailybeast.com/is-kinzhal-russias- Ceramic Particulate Injection Via Cathode new-hypersonic-missile-a-game-changer. Missile”; and Sutyagin, “Why Did Russia Opt Spot Arcs for Blackout Mitigation,” NASA for Liquid-Fuel.” Glenn Research Center, February 1, 2010, 56 “Russia’s New Hypersonic Missile Put 37 Gady, “Russia Completes Ejection Tests”; and technical report, NASA/TM—2010-216220. Through Military Tests,” RT, March 10, 2018, www.rt.com/news/420947-russian- Majumdar, “Russia’s Massive 200-Ton RS-28 49 This plasma sheath is responsible for the well- hypersonic-missile-tests/. ICBM Will Be Ready for Nuclear War in known “blackout” period during space flight 2021.” as experienced during the Apollo missions. 57 Vladimir Karnozov, “Putin Unveils Kinzhal 38 Hypersonic Missile,” Aviation International Pavel Podvig, “Strategic Rocket Forces,” 50 “Gliding Missiles That Fly Faster than Mach News, March 2, 2018, www.ainonline.com/ Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 5 Are Coming,” The Economist, April 6, 13, 2007, accessed March 5, 2019, aviation-news/defense/2018-03-02/putin- 2019, www.economist.com/science-and- unveils-kinzhal-hypersonic-missile. russianforces.org/missiles/. technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that- 58 39 Hypersonic speeds are defined to be greater fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-coming. Dave Majumdar, “Why Russia’s Iskandar Missile Is a Killer,” The National Interest, July than Mach 5, subsonic speeds are below 51 Hypersonic weapons are more difficult to Mach 1, and supersonic speeds are between 19, 2018, nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why- detect and intercept than either ballistic or russias-iskander-missile-killer-26216. Mach 1 and Mach 5. traditional cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles 59 40 James M. Acton, “Supplement to Hypersonic are typically detected by satellite-based “Iskander-K Cruise Missile,” Military Today, Boost-Glide Weapons,” Science & Global infrared sensing of the boost phase, followed www.military-today.com/missiles/iskander_k. Security 23, no. 3 (2015): 191–219, DOI: by radar sensing from land and/or sea of htm. the flight trajectory. When both infrared 10.1080/08929882.2015.1087242. 60 and radar tracking confirm a missile launch Karnozov, “Putin Unveils Kinzhal Hypersonic 41 Richard Speier, George Nacouzi, Carrie A. and flight, the information is used either Missile.” Lee, and Richard M. Moore, Hypersonic to alert decision-makers or to attempt an 61 Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread intercept. Because hypersonic missiles fly Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 Km Range If of a New Class of Weapons. Santa Monica, CA: at lower altitudes than ballistic missiles, the Fired from Supersonic Bomber,” The National RAND Corporation, 2017. earth-based radar detection is less effective— Interest, July 19, 2018, nationalinterest. radar line-of-sight detection is limited by 42 Wikipedia, s.v. “Boost-Glide,” February 28, org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero- the curvature of the earth—and because 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boost-glide. ballistic-missile-has-3000-km-range-if-fired- of hypersonic missile maneuverability the supersonic-bomber. 43 Richard J. Weber and John S. MacKay, “An path is harder to predict. Traditional cruise 62 Analysis of Ramjet Engines Using Supersonic missiles can be detected by earth-based, If air re-fueling is feasible, the reported range Combustion,” September 1958, University of air-based, or space-based detectors—usually of the Kinzhal on the MiG-31K may reach the North Texas Digital Library, digital.library. positioned near the asset being protected. In sometimes-reported 3000 km. the case of a hypersonic missile approach, unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc57482. 63 Daniel Brown, “Russia Says Its Su-57 there is less time for interception once they 44 Stealth Fighter Will Be Armed with Deadly Alexander S. Roudakov, Vyachleslav L. are detected, and the maneuverability of the Hypersonic Missiles That Can Defeat All US Semenov, Valeriy I. Kopchenov, and John missile can also make effective interception Defenses,” Business Insider, December 10, W. Hicks, Future Flight Test Plans of an more complicated. Axisymmetric Hydrogen-Fueled Scramjet 2018, www.businessinsider.com/russia-says- Engine on the Hypersonic Flying Laboratory, 52 “Presidential Address to the Federal su-57-stealth-fighter-will-armed-hypersonic- November 1996, technical paper, web.archive. 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May 2018, static1.squarespace.com/ 47m2-kinzhal-hypersonic-missile/?fbclid=Iw static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/5b0e AR334P8op72opDndalhkUmfEP6EN3OHdo 46 In 2010, NASA and the U.S. Air b1b203ce644a398267ef/1527689654381/ faw1TVo1DfhpuJ01ReSUTWJ-io; Wikipedia, Force successfully flew the X-51A Russia%27s+Invincible+Weapons.pdf. “Kh-47M2 Kinzhal,” accessed March 1, 2019, Waverider with a scramjet for approximately en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kh-47M2_Kinzhal. 200 seconds at Mach 5, setting a new world 54 The Iskander-M is compliant with the 65 record for flight duration at hypersonic Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Axe, “Is Kinzhal a Game Changer?” The export version has a range of less than airspeed. The Chinese are reported to have 66 Kofman, “Emerging Russian Weapons (Part 300 km, but the Russian version is reported to achieved a 400-second flight with a scramjet 1).” on Starry Sky 2 in 2018. have a range of 400 km to 500 km.

40 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Endnotes 41 , December , February 22, 2019, , February “3M22 Zircon,” Missile Defense Advocacy Advocacy Defense Missile “3M22 Zircon,” 25, 2019, accessed March Alliance, missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat- and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/ russia/3m22-zircon/. Евгений Салтыков, “Для Гиперзвуковых Евгений Салтыков, “Для Гиперзвуковых Создано в России Ракет Крылатых [For Топливо” Новое Принципиально a created cruise Russia missiles hypersonic new fuel], Вести.Ru, March fundamentally 17, 2016, www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2732278. Ракета «Циркон»: Баранец, “Гиперзвуковая Российского Нового Боится НАТО Почему why rocket: Zircon Оружия” [Hypersonic weapons]. new Russian fears NATO Надводных“Способ Поражения Гиперзвуковой и Наземных Целей Для Его и Устройство Ракетой Крылатой Осуществления” surface hitting of [Method cruise hypersonic by targets ground and implementation] its device for and missile 11, 2016, www. April Поиск, Патентный and findpatent.ru/patent/257/2579409.html; / 3M22 / Tsirkon - T3K22 Zircon “SS-N-33 accessed April Global Security, n.d. Rocket.” 1, 2019, www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/russia/zircon.htm. Выходит Михаил, “«Циркон» Мошкин, goes РабочуюНа Скорость” [“Zircon” 17, 2017, speed], April Взгляд. working to vz.ru/society/2017/4/17/866694.html. “Analysis: 3K22 and 3M22 Zircon, the Next the Next Zircon, 3M22 and 3K22 “Analysis: the Russian of Missile Hypersonic Generation 7, 2016, April Recognition, Navy Navy,” www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus- analysis/naval-technology/3810-analysis- 3k22-and-3m22-zircon-the-next-generation- hypersonic-missile-of-the-russian-navy.html. Reveals Zircon “Putin Karnozov, Vladimir Aviation Specification,” 9 Missile Mach International News www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ defense/2019-02-22/putin-reveals-zircon- Виктор and mach-9-missile-specification; Ракета «Циркон»: Баранец, “Гиперзвуковая Российского Нового Боится НАТО Почему rocket: Zircon Оружия” [Hypersonic weapons]. new Russian fears NATO why 2017, www. 24, Правда, April Комсомльская krsk.kp.ru/daily/26670.5/3692150/. 9 Mach Reveals Zircon “Putin Karnozov, Specification.” Missile the for also is responsible NPO Mash missiles. Onyx and BrahMos Its Tested Has “Russia Episkopos, Mark Test Ten ‘Over Missile Hypersonic Tsirkon Interest National The Launches,’” 23, 2018, nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/ russia-has-tested-its-tsirkon-hypersonic- missile-over-ten-test-launches-39637. 102 98 99 100 101 93 94 95 96 97 102, no. 102, no. , July 4, 2019, , July The Tsirkon is sometimes spelled is sometimes Zircon, Tsirkon The since used is here Tsirkon Tsircon; or Zirkon, spelling. be seems common to the most it be may the Tsirkon of believeSome a version II. exported the BrahMos as and marketed missile supersonic a originalBrahMos, The a has India, and Russia by developed jointly called the Onyx. counterpart Russian-only may Russia speculation to ledthat has This Tsirkon hypersonic own its on be working not but a similar on India with working and II missile. BrahMos identical “Источник: первые комплексы «Авангард» комплексы первые “Источник: встанут боевое на дежурство в 2019 году” will be complexes Avangard first The [Source: October 29, 2018, in 2019], ТАСС, duty on tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5731436. the Federal to Address “Presidential 20, 2019. February Assembly,” be to Missile “Zircon Akulov, Andrei Leading in in 2018: Russia Produced Culture Strategic Race,” Arms Hypersonic December 16, 2016, www. Foundation, strategic-culture.org/news/2016/12/16/ zircon-missile-produced-2018-russia- leading-hypersonic-arms-race/. Ritter, “No, Putin Isn’t Bluffing on Nukes.” on Bluffing Isn’t Putin “No, Ritter, “Avangard Ministry Defense, of Russian area.” Dombarovsky from Launched missile to Said Tested, is System “Avangard Podvig, Deployment.” Be Ready for Fully to Russia “Report: Gady, Franz-Stefan Boost- Hypersonic Avangard 60 Produce The Diplomat Warheads,” Glide thediplomat.com/2019/07/report-russia-to- produce-60-avangard-hypersonic-boost- glide-warheads/. 60 Produce to Russia “Report: Gady, Boost-Glide Hypersonic Avangard Warheads.” Eric D. Gilman, John E. Foster, and Isaiah M. Isaiah and E. Foster, John Gilman, Eric D. Leading “Review Approaches of Blankson, Vehicle Hypersonic Mitigating for of a Method and Blackout Communications Cathode Via Injection Ceramic Particulate NASA Mitigation,” Blackout for Arcs Spot 1, 2010, February Center, Research Glenn NASA/TM—2010-216220; technical report, V.E. and A.C. Newell, Korotkevich, A.O. and Plasma Through “Communication Zakharov, Journal of Physics Applied Sheaths,” 8 (2007), zakharov75.itp.ac.ru/static/local/ zve75/zakharov/2007/2007-01-JAP_plasma. pdf. Vehicle.” Glide “Hypersonic Joseph, russian-aviation-engineer-questions- efficiency-precision-of-new-avangard- hypersonic-missile.html. 91 92 88 89 90 83 84 85 86 87 82 81 , “Russia’s Avangard Hypersonic Missile Missile Hypersonic Avangard “Russia’s 12, 2018, tass.com/ March TASS, System,” defense/993615. Questions Engineer Aviation “Russian Avangard New of Precision Efficiency, 10, January UNIAN, Missile,” Hypersonic 2019, www.unian.info/world/10403973- The United States does not have a megaton- a have doesnot States United The in the stockpile weapon ICBM-delivered class today. Russian Ministry of Defense, “Avangard “Avangard Ministry Defense, of Russian Area”; Dombarovsky from Launched Missile носителями первыми “Источник: and «Авангард» станут блоков гиперзвуковых ракеты The УР-100Н УТТХ” [Source: hypersonic Avangard of the carriers first UTTH will missiles], units be the UR-100N 20, 2018, tass.ru/armiya-i- March ТАСС, opk/5047200. Austin Joseph, “Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” Vehicle,” Glide “Hypersonic Joseph, Austin December (blog), 31, Talk Small World Big 7, 2019, austinstalk. 2018, accessed March blogspot.com/2018/12/hypersonic-glide- vehical.html. Podvig, “Avangard System is Tested.” is System “Avangard Podvig, Russian Ministry of Defense, “Avangard “Avangard Ministry Defense, of Russian Area,” Dombarovsky from Launched Missile 0:55, video, December 26, 2018, YouTube www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgzeS7-jgSY. The higher Mach number is to number believed be a Mach higher The the at being lower the speed sound of of result Is System “Avangard Podvig, high altitudes. Tested.” December 28, 2018, nationalpost.com/ news/world/russias-putin-oversees-test-of- hypersonic-weapon. Isachenkov, Vladimir. “‘Excellent New Year’s Year’s New “‘Excellent Vladimir. Isachenkov, ‘invulnerable’ Testing Putin after Boasts Gift’: Post National Missile,” Hypersonic Russian Pavel Podvig, “Avangard System is Tested, Tested, is System “Avangard Podvig, Pavel Deployment,” Be Ready for to Said Fully December Forces, Nuclear Strategic Russian 7, 2019, 26, 2018, accessed March russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/avangard_ system_is_tested_said.shtml. Acton, “Supplement to Hypersonic Boost- Hypersonic to “Supplement Acton, Weapons.” Glide The Avangard program has gone by several gone has program Avangard The Object including Russia, in names different seems Yu-74 15Yu71. and HGV, 4202, Yu-70 the Yu-71. of version beto the nuclear Circular error probable (CEP) is a measure of of a measure (CEP) is probable error Circular as defined is It precision. system’s a weapon the mean, on centered a circle, of the radius whose boundary the expected is include to the rounds. of 50 percent of points landing Demerly, “Russia Test Fires New Kh-47M2 New Fires Test “Russia Demerly, Kinzhal.” www.nti.org 80 78 79 77 75 76 74 73 72 71 70 69 68 67 Endnotes

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Missile Specification”; Macias, “Russia Again Development,” National Defense, July 11, 139 Successfully Tests”; and Мошкин, “«Циркон» 2019, www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ Brian Wang, “China Reveals Hypersonic Выходит На Рабочую Скорость” [“Zircon” articles/2019/7/11/defense-department- Scramjet Developments and Plans,” Next Big goes to working speed]. accelerates-hypersonic-weapons- Future, April 14, 2017, www.nextbigfuture. development. com/2017/04/china-reveals-hypersonic- 114 “Russia’s Zircon Hypersonic Cruise Missile. 127 scramjet-developments-and-plans.html. What We Know So Far,” South Front, Tadjdeh, “Defense Department Accelerates 140 February 21, 2019, southfront.org/russias- Hypersonic Weapons Development.” Liu Zhen, “China’s Hypersonic Aircraft, Starry Sky-2, Could Be Used to Carry Nuclear zircon-hypersonic-cruise-missile-what-we- 128 Klare, “An ‘Arms Race in Speed.’” know-so-far/. 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42 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Endnotes 43 , July 24, 2018, www. 24, 2018, , July , November 12, 2015, , November , February 6, 2019, thediplomat. , February Gady, “Putin: Russia Has Completed ‘Key ‘Key Completed Has Russia “Putin: Gady, St a g e .’” “Russia Launches Trials of Poseidon Poseidon of Trials Launches “Russia Nuclear CarryCan That Drone Underwater 19, 2018, tass.com/ July TASS, Warheads,” defense/1013969. Sutton, and Video”; Russian New “A Mosher, Torpedo.” “Poseidon Oceanic “Status-6 s.v. Wikipedia, System.” Multipurpose гидроакустическогоО возможностях обнаружения суперторпед системы «Статус-6» of [On the possibilities supertorpedoes of detection of hydroacoustic October vpk. 12, 2015, system,] the Status-6 name/news/145652_o_vozmozhnostyah_ gidroakusticheskogo_obnaruzheniya_ supertorped_sistemyi_status6.html. in “Poseidon Torpedo”; “Poseidon Sutton, of Trial Underwater ‘Starts’ Russia Action: December 25, RT, Drone,” Nuclear Strategic 2018, www.rt.com/russia/447350-russian- nuclear-drone-test/. Torpedo.” “Poseidon Sutton, the Federal to Address “Presidential 20, 2019. February Assembly,” Has Russia “Putin: Gady, Franz-Stefan Nuclear- of Trials’ of Stage ‘Key Completed The Drone,” Underwater Poseidon Capable Diplomat com/2019/02/putin-russia-has-completed- key-stage-of-trials-of-nuclear-capable- poseidon-underwater-drone/. Jeffrey Lewis, “Putin’s Doomsday Machine,” Machine,” Doomsday “Putin’s Lewis,Jeffrey Foreign Policy foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/putins- doomsday-machine-nuclear-weapon-us- russia/. Spriggs Greg the original reporting, Since a that suggested has Livermore Lawrence at not would explosion undersea nuclear 50-Mt Russian New “A be See very Mosher, large. Video.” Drone Underwater Poseidon Russian “Source: Nuclear Carrying of 2 Megatonne Capable 17, 2018, tass.com/ May TASS, Warhead,” defense/1004722. Oceanic “Status-6 s.v. Wikipedia, accessed August System” Multipurpose 9, 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Status-6_ Oceanic_Multipurpose_System. Experts Question Why You’d Ever Build Build Ever You’d Experts Why Question BusinessInsider One,” businessinsider.com/russia-doomsday- Mizokami, weapon-submarine-nuke-2018-4; Apocalypse Tsunami Nuclear “Russia’s Tor p e d o.” 175 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 163 164 165 166 , (blog), (blog), (blog), (blog), , June 29, , June , July 24, 2018, www. , July 2019, nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia- plans-build-four-submarines-armed-nuclear- drone-torpedoes-64776. Sebastien Roblin, “Russia Plans to Build Four Four Build to Plans Sebastien “Russia Roblin, Armed Nuclear-Drone with Submarines Interest National The Torpedoes,” Tsunami Nuclear “Russia’s Mizokami, Kyle ‘Poseidon,’” Named Is Torpedo Apocalypse Popular Mechanics Drawings of the Poseidon (then Status (then Status the Poseidon of Drawings Russian revealed by “accidently” 6) were captured NTVchannel when a cameraman to being shown the drawing a video of this judge sources intelligence U.S. Putin. TV state the Russian belink to intentional; Many a mistake. such risk not would station the enhance to believe the leak meant was others a weapon; such of value deterrence been be to leaked only have would believe it misleading. Torpedo.” H.I. “Poseidon Sutton, popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/ a22537135/russias-nuclear-tsunami- apocalypse-torpedo-is-named-poseidon/. August 15, 2019, russianmilitaryanalysis. August wordpress.com/tag/rtg/. the Federal to Address “Presidential 1, 2018. March Assembly,” Intercontinental “Poseidon H.I. Sutton, Nuclear-Armed Nuclear-Powered Covert ShoresAutonomous Torpedo,” www.hisutton.com/ 22, 2019, February Poseidon_Torpedo.html. of the Seabed violate Treaty could A Skif the emplacement 1972, which prohibits mass of weapons other and nuclear of and the seabed,destruction on ocean floor, It limit. the 12-mile territorial beyond subsoil be willing would whether Russia unknown is this treaty. violate to Michael Kofman, “Mystery Explosion Explosion “Mystery Kofman, Michael Not Probably It’s Site: Test Nenoksa at Russia Military Analysis Burevestnik,” says report intel “US Macias, Amanda triggered was explosion Russian mysterious nuclear-powered of mission recovery by 29, 2019, CNBC, August test.” not missile, www.cnbc.com/2019/08/29/intel-says- russian-explosion-was-not-from-nuclear- powered-missile-test.html. Matthew Bodner, “An Explosion. A Radiation Radiation A Explosion. “An Bodner, Matthew Cancelled. and Planned Evacuations Spike. Defense News in Russia?” Happening What’s 2019, www.defensenews.com/ 13, August global/europe/2019/08/13/an-explosion-a- spike-in-radiation-evacuation-preparations- what-exactly-happened-in-russia/. Dave Mosher, “A New Russian Video May May Video Russian New “A Mosher, Dave Trigger to Able Machine’ a ‘Doomsday Show Weapons Nuclear Tsunamis—But 300-foot 160 161 158 159 155 156 157 153 154 152 162 , , August , August , August 14, , August , August 10, , August , March 22, 2018, , March , August 6, 2019, www. 6, , August , September 12, 2016, , September , August 12, 2019, foreignpolicy. , August , August 12, 2019, www.nytimes. , August Jeffrey Lewis, “A Mysterious Explosion Took Explosion Mysterious “A Lewis,Jeffrey Really Happened?” What in Russia. Place Foreign Policy com/2019/08/12/russia-mysterious- explosion-arctic-putin-chernobyl/. David E. Sanger and Andrew E. Kramer, E. Kramer, Andrew and E. Sanger David Missile Nuclear New Suspect Officials “U.S. New Killed 7 Russians,” that in Explosion Times York com/2019/08/12/world/europe/russia- nuclear-accident-putin.html. Yaron Steinbuch, “Russia Says Radiation Radiation Says “Russia Steinbuch, Yaron Weapons Around in Area LevelsSpiked Post New York Explosion,” Test 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/world/ europe/russia-explosion-radiation.html. 2019, nypost.com/2019/08/14/russia-says- radiation-levels-spiked-in-area-around- weapons-test-explosion/. Andrew Roth and Dan Sabbagh, “Russia “Russia Sabbagh, Dan and Roth Andrew of Exploded Engine Rocket in Test Indicates The Guardian Reactor,” Nuclear Mini Andrew E. Kramer, “ Russia Confirms “ Russia E. Kramer, Andrew in Involved Were Radioactive Materials Times York New Deadly Blast,” 12, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ aug/12/russia-indicates-rocket-engine- exploded-in-test-of-mini-nuclear-reactor. “Russia Explosion: Five Confirmed Five Dead in Explosion: “Russia 9, 2019, August BBC News, Blast,” Rocket www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49301438. Sean Gallagher, “Best bad idea ever? Why bad “Best idea Why ever? Sean Gallagher, possible… is missile powered nuclear Putin’s Ars Technica awful,” and U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Nuclear of Office Energy, of Department U.S. Reactors Modular Small Advanced Energy, arstechnica.com/science/2018/03/best-bad- idea-ever-why-putins-nuclear-powered- missile-is-possible-and-awful/. Thomas Nilsen, “Russia Mulls Underwater Underwater Mulls “Russia Nilsen, Thomas The Oil,” Arctic for Reactors Nuclear Observer Barents thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic- industry-and-energy/2016/09/russia-mulls- underwater-nuclear-reactors-arctic-oil. 9, 2019, www.energy.gov/ne/ accessed August nuclear-reactor-technologies/small-modular- nuclear-reactors. Charles Digges, “Russia’s Floating Nuclear Nuclear Floating “Russia’s Digges, Charles The the Arctic,” Across Way Its Make to Plant Maritime Executive maritime-executive.com/editorials/russia- s-floating-nuclear-plant-to-make-its-way- across-the-arctic. on nuclear aircraft in mid- beginning the aircraft nuclear on terminated were projects 1950s. All previous deployment. before www.nti.org 151 150 149 148 147 146 145 144 143 142 Endnotes

176 “Poseidon,” Deagel, Guide to Military 183 “KRND Burevestnik—Unlimited Range 189 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Equipment and Civil Aviation, February 20, Cruise Missile,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed Energy, “What is a Nuclear Microreactor?” 2019 www.deagel.com/Defensive-Weapons/ March 8, 2019, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ October 23, 2018, www.energy.gov/ne/ Poseidon_a003297001.aspx. world/russia/krnd.htm. articles/what-nuclear-micro-reactor. 177 “Presidential Address to the Federal 184 “KRND Burevestnik—Unlimited Range 190 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Assembly,” March 01, 2018. Cruise Missile.” Energy, “What is a Nuclear Microreactor?” 178 Gallagher, “Best bad idea ever?” 185 Joseph Trevithick, “Russia Is Hunting for Its 191 Amanda Macias, “Russian nuclear missile

179 Crashed Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile with ‘unlimited’ range to be ready by 2025, Gallagher, “Best Bad Idea Ever?” and the U.S. Might Be Too,” The War Zone, US intelligence says,” CNBC, September 11, 180 Valentin Vasilescu, “MiG-31: The Vehicle August 21, 2018, www.thedrive.com/the-war- 2019, www.cnbc.com/2019/09/11/russian- for the ‘Burevestnik’, the Cruise Missile of zone/23058/russia-is-hunting-for-its-crashed- nuclear-missile-with-unlimited-range-to-be- Nuclear Propulsion?” Voltaire Network, nuclear-powered-cruise-missile-and-the-u-s- ready-by-2025-us-intel.html. might-be-too. October 6, 2018, www.voltairenet.org/ 192 “«Буревестник» назвали оружием article203357.html. 186 Panda, “Russia Conducts Test of Nuclear- возмездия России в ядерной войне” [“Petrel’ called the weapon of retaliation 181 “Russia Tests Nuclear Power Engine for Powered Cruise Missile.” for Russia in a nuclear war”] July 19, 2019, Its New Burevestnik Cruise Missile,” UA 187 Vasilescu, “MiG-31: The Vehicle for the iz.ru/900895/2019-07-19/burevestnik- Wire, February 17, 2019, uawire.org/russia- ‘Burevestnik’?”; “Nuclear Jet Engines: Too nazvali-oruzhiem-vozmezdiia-rossii-v- tests-nuclear-power-engine-for-its-new- Good to Be True?” The Restless Technophile, iadernoi-voine. burevestnik-cruise-missile. April 3, 2018, therestlesstechnophile. 182 Ankit Panda, “Russia Conducts Test of com/2018/04/03/russian-nuclear-drones/. Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile,” The 188 “Nuclear Jet Engines: Too Good to Be True?” Diplomat, February 6, 2019, thediplomat. com/2019/02/russia-conducts-test-of- nuclear-powered-cruise-missile/.

44 RUSSIA’S NEW NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS Acknowledgements

I am honored to have served as the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and grateful for the opportunity to work with NTI over the past year on the intersection of nuclear technology and nonproliferation policy. In particular, I would like to thank NTI Co-Chair and Chief Executive Officer Ernest J. Moniz and Co-Chair Sam Nunn for their leadership on reducing global nuclear threats and for their support for this technical review. I also would like to thank Lynn Rusten, vice president of NTI’s Global Nuclear Policy Program, and Mark Melamed, James McKeon, Erin Dumbacher, and Page O. Stoutland of NTI, as well as Herbert J. Scoville Fellow Sara Beth Marchert, for their contributions to the report. I also am grateful to Carmen MacDougall and Mimi Hall of NTI’s Communications team. I am grateful to Craig Fields, Chairman of the Defense Science Board, for his thoughtful technical review of the this report. 1776 Eye Street, NW | Suite 600 | Washington, DC 20006 | @NTI_WMD | www.nti.org