SIPRI Policy Brief November 2020

ADDRESSING SUMMARY w The proliferation of THREATS IN THE MIDDLE in the and North (MENA) is linked with EAST AND NORTH AFRICA intractable security dilemmas and conflicts, arms exports and the use of force by extra- tytti erästö and pieter d. wezeman regional states. Supply-side controls and other restrictions on missiles are necessary but likely insufficient if applied Missiles have played a distinct role conventional missiles are also without consideration of the in regional security dynamics in increasingly seen to threaten broader regional security the Middle East and North Africa international stability. Yet, no dynamics. Particularly when (MENA) since they were first international treaty is specifically limited to certain states deployed by countries in the region dedicated to regulating missiles. In alongside continued arms in the early 1970s.1 The addition, the voluntary multilateral exports to others, measures value of missiles derives from instruments that seek to control against missile proliferation their ability to deliver strategic the proliferation of missiles—the might end up contributing to strikes while keeping the attacker’s Missile Technology Control Regime the demand side of the problem own military personnel out of (MTCR) and the Hague Code of by exacerbating overall range of the adversary’s defensive Conduct (HCOC)—lack universal military asymmetries. Hence systems. Their perceived utility as support. As for the United Nations the need for confidence- and a military tool has increased due arms embargoes or specific legally security-building measures (CSBMs) and comprehensive to technological improvements, binding restrictions on missiles, risk assessment of arms export particularly in accuracy. While they have been applied only to policies, which could help 3 some states, such as and , specific states, notably . strengthen efforts to restrain have abandoned their past pursuit The absence of a clear normative both the further proliferation of missiles, today at least 10 out standard on missiles reflects and use of missiles in MENA. of 19 MENA states have missiles the desire of states to keep these that, launched from the ground or , along with most other from , can be used to attack military systems, within the realm high-value targets deep inside other of sovereign decision making. states (see table 1).2 This SIPRI Policy Brief Traditionally, the proliferation contributes to the discussion on of missiles has raised concerns due missile proliferation in MENA by to their potential use as delivery providing an overview of regional vehicles for nuclear weapons, but missile arsenals, and by considering ways to address related risks. With a focus on missiles with ranges above 1 See e.g. Karp, A., 250 kilometres, the first section Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford/ New York: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, describes missile arsenals in the 1996); and Gormley, D. M., Missile Contagion: region, focusing in particular on the Proliferation and the Threat arsenals of three states: Iran, to International Security (Praeger Security and . The paper then International: Westport, CT, 2008). 2 MENA includes Algeria, Bahrain, , Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 3 Prior to the current restrictions on Iran, Libya, Oman, , Tunisia, , Saudi Iraq and Libya have been under UN arms Arabia, and . embargoes that also covered missiles. 2 sipri policy brief

Table 1. Missile holdings of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 2020 Reported State of approximate production/ Decade of State Missile Name range (km)a design introduction Algeria Ballistic missilesc Iskander 300–400 Bahrain Ballistic missilesc ATACMS T‑2K 300 USA 2010s Egypt Ballistic missilesc Scud-B 300 1980s Air-launched missilesb (SCALP/) 250 . . Iran Ballistic missilesc Fateh-313 300 Iran 2010s Fateh-e Mobin 300–500 Iran 2010s Shahab-1 and -2 300–500 Iran 1980s Qiam 700 Iran 2010s Shahab-3 800–100 Iran/North Korea 700 Iran 2010s () 1 000 Iran . . Ghadr 1 600 Iran 2000s () 1 600 Iran . . (Sajjil-2) 2 000 Iran . . () 2 000 Iran/North Korea . . Martyr Hajj Qassem 1 400 Iran 2020s Surface-launched cruise missiles () 2 000 Iran . . Ya Ali 700 Iran 2010s () 2 000–3 000 Iran . . (Hoveizeh) 1 300 Iran . . Martyr Abu Mahdi 1 000 Iran 2020s Israel Ballistic missilesc -2 1 500–1 800 Israel 1990s (nuclear ) Jericho-3 >4 000 Israel 2010s (nuclear warhead) Predator Hawk 300 Israel 2010s LORA 300 Israel 2010s Air-launched missilesb Delilah 250 Israel 1990s Rampage 250 Israel 2020s Surface-launched cruise missiles Harop Loitering 1 000 Israel 2000s Munition Kuwait Air-launched missilesb (SCALP/Storm Shadow) 250 . . Qatar Ballistic missilesc BP-12A 300 2010s Air-launched missilesb SCALP/Storm Shadow 250 France 2020s Saudi Arabia Ballistic missilesc DF-3 2 200–2 600 China 1980s (Hrim-2) 280 Ukraine . . Air-launched missilesb SLAM-ER 250 USA 2010s SCALP/Storm Shadow 250 UK 2000s Turkey Ballistic missilesc Bora 280 Turkey 2010s (Bora-2) >280 Turkey . . Air-launched missilesb SLAM-ER 250 USA 2000s -launched cruise missiles (Gezgin) 1 000 Turkey . . addressing missile threats in mena 3

Reported State of approximate production/ Decade of State Missile Name range (km)a design introduction UAE Ballistic missilesc ATACMS T‑2K 300 USA 2010s Air-launched missilesb Black Shaheen 250 France 2000s

. . = not available or not applicable; ( ) = missile type ordered/under development but not yet in service; UAE = . Note: The table includes missiles with a range of 250 km or more that have been identified as in use or on order in 2020. The table does not include missiles that are merely rumoured to be in the arsenals of the states listed nor does it include previous holdings or missiles in the arsenals of non-state actors. Libya, Syria and Yemen are not included in the table as the status of their missiles after years of civil war is highly uncertain. a Reported approximate range is from the launching platform. In particular, for air-launched missiles the location of the launch can be hundreds or even thousands of kilometres outside the territory controlled by the deploying country. Reported ranges gener- ally vary between sources and are therefore an indication only. For missiles for which reported ranges differ significantly between sources, the range is given in parentheses. b Air-launched missiles include cruise missiles and -propelled missiles. c Ballistic missiles include land-based systems only, as none of the states in the table have sea-based ballistic missiles. Sources: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, ; Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘Country profiles’, [n.d.]; US , National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (NASIC: Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, July 2017). makes policy recommendations, section serves as a reminder that the highlighting the need to move accumulation of missiles in MENA beyond the selective focus on is a long-term process to which certain types of missiles in the extra-regional powers have also hands of certain states, towards contributed significantly. a more comprehensive approach based on greater transparency, Background responsible arms exports and Any discussion on missile confidence- and security-building proliferation in MENA would be measures (CSBMs). incomplete without acknowledging MISSILES IN THE MIDDLE EAST the role of extra-regional powers. AND NORTH AFRICA France supplied the technology for Israel’s first missile programme, This section provides an overview which led to the deployment of its of key missile holdings and recent Jericho missile in the early 1970s. missile use by MENA states.4 Iran, Egypt, Iraq and Libya also pursued Israel and Saudi Arabia stand out indigenous missile programmes in terms of the quality and quantity based on technology obtained of their missiles, as well as their from Europe, although these were readiness for using them against subsequently discontinued.5 Most adversaries. However, several other MENA countries, however, opted states in MENA also possess missile for importing missiles, reflecting capabilities (see table 1). While the their increasing availability on main focus is on the state of play in the international arms market. In the region, the brief background particular, the and the Democratic People’s Republic

4 If not indicated otherwise, all the data on of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) imports of missiles and other major arms in this supplied Scud short-range ballistic paper is based on the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, , Mar. 2020. 5 Karp (note 1). 4 sipri policy brief

missiles (SRBMs) to several MENA accuracy and manoeuvrability countries in the 1970s and 1980s.6 instead of range.9 Nevertheless, The use of Scud missiles played an Western states fear Iran could important role in the 1980–88 Iran– still develop nuclear-armed , contributing to Iran’s intercontinental ballistic missiles subsequent missile development. (ICBMs), possibly based on satellite- Iraq’s 1991 attacks launch vehicle (SLV) technology.10 against Israel and Saudi Arabia, The 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, in turn, were a or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Western states fear Iran could develop major factor behind Action (JCPOA), initially alleviated their investment in such concerns, which are linked to nuclear-armed intercontinental missile defences.7 efforts to prevent the proliferation ballistic missiles By showcasing the of nuclear weapons. However, the effectiveness of JCPOA has been eroded following guided missiles in , withdrawal from western military operations in the the agreement in 2018. The USA 1990s and 2000s led to increased partly justified its withdrawal by regional demand for similar arguing Iran’s missile activities weapons. At the same time, in went against UN Security Council particular the interventions in Resolution 2231 (2015), which was Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011 passed in connection with the reinforced the perceived need for JCPOA (see below). robust deterrence capabilities by Iran used SRBMs in retaliatory regional states that saw themselves attacks against the Islamic State as potential future targets of similar in 2017 and against US forces in ‘regime change’ wars. Iraq in January 2020.11 Iran has also reportedly supplied missiles Missile arsenals or related technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels Iran in Yemen, and the state has been In addition to the Iran–Iraq accused of a September 2019 drone War, Iran’s decision to rely on and cruise missile attack against 12 domestically-produced missiles as a Saudi oil facilities.

core element of its military arsenal 9 was influenced by its limited access See e.g. Mehr News, ‘IRGC chief says Yemen close to victory’, 19 June 2018; and 8 to foreign arms. Iran’s diverse Amir Hatami, quoted in arsenal consists mainly of ballistic MehrNews, ‘Iran to unveil new fighter jet; missiles with a range up to 2000 km. missile program remains top priority: Defense min.’, 19 Aug. 2018. Iran argues it does not need longer- 10 See for example Deutsche Welle, ‘Iran range missiles, and its testing has, in rocket launch condemned by , France, recent years, focused on enhancing UK and US’, 3 Aug. 2017. 11 NBC News, ‘Iran retaliates for Gen. Soleimani’s killing by firing missiles at US 6 Kadry Said, M., ‘Missile proliferation forces in Iraq’, 8 Jan. 2020; and Al-Jazeera, in the Middle East: A regional perspective’, ‘Iran fires missiles at ISIL positions in eastern Disarmament Forum, no. 2 (2001). Syria’ 19 June 2017. 7 Taremi, K., ‘Beyond the axis of evil: 12 Ahmadian, H. and Mohseni, P., ‘Iran’s Ballistic missiles in Iran’s military thinking’, Syria strategy: The evolution of deterrence’, Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 1 (2005), International Affairs, vol. 95, no. 2 (Mar. 2019), pp. 93–108; and Karp (note 1). pp. 341–64; and United Nations Security 8 Ajili, H. and Rouhi, M., ‘Iran’s military Council, Letter dated 27 Jan. 2020 from the strategy’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 6 (2019), Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the pp. 139–52. President of the Security Council, S/2020/70. addressing missile threats in mena 5

Israel SLAM-ER ALCMs from the USA.17 Saudi Arabia has used SCALP/ Israel is the only MENA state Storm Shadows against the Houthis possessing nuclear-armed missiles, during the military operation the Jericho series of ballistic ongoing in Yemen since 2015.18 missiles, with estimated ranges Saudi Arabia has a small arsenal 13 of between 1500 and 4000 km. of DF-3 ballistic missiles with a Objecting to Israel’s nuclear range of 2200–2600 km, supplied weapons, Arab states and Iran have in 1987 by China. Its reported long called for the establishment of purchase of more advanced DF‑21 a zone free of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in 2007 has not other weapons of mass destruction been confirmed.19 Following a 2016 (WMD), including their delivery order, an SRBM production line 14 vehicles, in the Middle East. from Ukraine is under construction Israel’s long-range conventional in Saudi Arabia. strike force relies on advanced combat aircraft, including aircraft Other MENA states equipped with domestically produced air-launched cruise In the Gulf region, the United Arab missiles (ALCMs). Israel also has Emirates (UAE) has acquired a various other types of missiles, sizeable arsenal of Black Shaheen such as precision-guided SRBMs ALCMs from France and ATACMS and loitering munitions.15 For T‑2K SRBMs from the USA. While example Israel has reportedly used there is no evidence these missile the domestically produced Delilah types have been used in the Saudi- ALCM and Rampage air-launched led military operation in Yemen, the guided rocket to attack Iranian UAE has reportedly 16 used shorter-range targets in Syria in 2018 and 2019. Israel is the only MENA state possessing ALCMs against Saudi Arabia the Houthis.20 The nuclear-armed missiles recent expansion Like Israel, Saudi Arabia has of Qatar’s armed forces included advanced combat aircraft equipped purchases of advanced combat with ALCMs, including SCALP/ aircraft equipped with SCALP/ Storm Shadows supplied by the Storm Shadow ALCMs from France . It has also ordered and BP-12A SRBMs from China. Iraq’s remaining missile arsenal was dismantled in 2003.21 In 13 Kile, S. N. and Kristensen, H. M., ‘Israeli nuclear forces’, SIPRI Yearbook 2018: the same year, Libya abandoned Armaments, Disarmament and International its previous nuclear and missile Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, programmes in agreement with 2018), pp. 278–79. 14 Erästö, T., ‘The lack of disarmament in the Middle East: Thorn in the side of the 17 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 4). NPT’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security 18 Chuter, A., ‘UK-supplied precision no. 2019/1, Jan. 2019. weapons prove popular in Saudi-led Yemen 15 Loitering munitions are comparable to campaign’, Defense News, 17 Oct. 2016. slow-flying cruise missiles. 19 Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘Saudi Arabia’, 16 Cenciotti, D., ‘Israel just released footage updated June 2019. of one of its missiles hitting an air-defense 20 Amnesty International, ‘Yemen: Coalition system in Syria’, Business Insider, 11 May used UK missile in unlawful airstrike’, 25 Nov. 2018; and Ahronheim. A., ‘Did Israel use the 2015. supersonic Rampage to strike Iranian targets 21 Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘Iraq’, updated in Syria?’, Jerusalem Post, 21 Apr. 2019. Jun. 2012. 6 sipri policy brief

western powers.22 Any remaining missiles that can penetrate such Scud SRBMs in the country are defences, notably through greater likely unserviceable. manoeuvrability. Egypt likewise seems to have Israel’s multi-layered defences abandoned its previous ambitions include domestically produced regarding domestic missile SAM systems like Iron Dome, as development, and it has instead well as the system developed focused on imports.23 For example in cooperation with the USA. Egypt ordered SCALP/Storm Saudi Arabia’s US-supplied missile Shadow ALCMs from France in defences consist primarily of Patriot 2015. Advanced Capability PAC‑3 SAM Algeria received Iskander SRBMs systems, which can be used against from Russia in 2017. Turkey has aircraft, cruise missiles and ballistic acquired SLAM-ER missiles, and it has also ordered the Israel and most of the Arab states of the ALCMs from the THAAD, a dedicated anti-ballistic USA, and, based on missile system. The efficiency Gulf have invested heavily in missile Chinese technology, of Saudi Arabia’s existing PAC-3 defence systems developed Bora SRBMs defences has been questioned as domestically. Turkey the systems have failed to intercept has also considered the development several missiles launched by the of longer-range ballistic missiles Houthis since 2017.25 The UAE is and is developing a cruise missile. 24 the first state outside the USA to The status of the Syrian and have deployed THAAD, in addition Yemeni missile arsenals—which to PAC‑3. Kuwait and Qatar also consisted mostly of SRBMs—is have PAC‑3s, and Bahrain ordered uncertain due to civil wars in those PAC‑3s from the USA in 2019. countries. Turkey has bought the S‑400 system from Russia. Missile defences TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE Israel and most of the Arab states APPROACH FOR ADDRESSING of the Gulf have invested heavily REGIONAL MISSILE THREATS in missile defence systems, based around surface-to-air missile Missile-related armament dynamics systems (SAMs), in response in MENA are not new, but they have to actual or perceived threats intensified, and missiles have been from non-state actors and Iran. used with increasing frequency in Paradoxically, this has partly recent years. However, thus far, driven Iranian efforts to develop the measures taken against missile proliferation have tended to focus mainly on Iran, with little attention 22 Kile, N. S., ‘Nuclear and non-proliferation’, SIPRI Yearbook 2004: paid to other relevant developments, Armaments, Disarmament and International such as the use of ALCMs within Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, the region by both MENA states 2004), pp. 617–19. and major powers. This indicates 23 Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘Egypt’, updated Jan. 2015. the need for a more comprehensive 24 Bekdil, B. E., ‘Turkey–Ukraine work approach to tackling the complex on missile engine could open door to tech transfer’, Defense News, 13 Oct. 2020; and Egeli, S., ‘Turkey embarks upon ballistic missiles: 25 Axe, D., ‘Did US missile defenses fail Why and how?’, Uluslararası İlişkiler, vol. 14, during Saudi Oil attack?’, National Interest, no. 56 (2017), pp. 3–22. 17 Sep. 2019. addressing missile threats in mena 7 missile-related threats in MENA. (UNROCA). Of the MENA states This section proposes steps that with significant missile arsenals, regional and extra-regional states, only Israel has reported regularly especially the suppliers of missile to UNROCA on its arms imports, technology, could take to contribute although not on the types of missiles to such an approach. While the long- discussed in this paper.28 term goal should be cooperative While it would be recommendable arms control involving missiles for all MENA states to participate and other military capabilities, in the above transparency this is hardly possible in the short instru­ments, it is important to be term given the persistent political cognizant of political obstacles that tensions and militarization in have prevented them from doing the region. Hence the following so thus far. Egypt and Iran have recommendations mainly focus on long objected to the HCOC as being transparency and other CSBMs. discriminatory, and Israel has like­ wise been reluctant to join.29 The Increase transparency through League of Arab States criticizes the relevant multilateral instruments exclusion of WMD from UNROCA reporting categories, opposing MENA states tend to be secretive the instrument on that basis.30 about their military arsenals, Although these positions are likely including missiles. This tendency is to persist, there might still be room enforced by the lack of transparency for considering participation in light by extra-regional states regarding of the potential benefits of increased their missile transfers to the region. transparency for developing In addition to feeding mutual cooperative security in the region. suspicions, secrecy complicates risk The lack of transparency is not assessments regarding the potential limited to MENA; states exporting negative impact of missile transfers missiles to the region often omit on regional security (see below). all or part of the information on Regional states could increase such transfers when reporting to transparency on missiles by UNROCA or in the framework of the joining the relevant international instruments. The HCOC promotes restraint though pre-notifications of 28 See UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, ballistic missile and SLV launches, UN Register of Conventional Arms. On among other measures.26 The 143 UNROCA see also Wezeman, P. D., Béraud- states that subscribe to the HCOC Sudreau, L. and Wezeman, S. T., ‘Transparency in arms procurement: Limitations and include the five MENA states of opportunities for assessing global armament Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia developments’, SIPRI Insights on Peace and and Turkey. 27 Additionally, states Security no. 2020/10, Oct. 2020. 29 See e.g. UN, General Assembly, First in the region could report their Committee, 73rd session, ‘Explanation of vote missile imports or holdings, or of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of submit a more general report on all Iran on draft resolution L.25 entitled: The their long-range weapons, to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, 2 Nov. 2018; and Smith, UN Register of Conventional Arms M., ‘The HCOC: Current challenges and future possibilities’, Paper, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, 2017. 26 Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), ‘Text of 30 Wezeman, S. T., The Future of the United the HCOC’, updated Nov. 2012. Nations Register of Conventional Arms, SIPRI 27 HCOC, ‘List of subscribing states’, Policy Paper no. 4 (SIPRI: Stockholm, Aug. updated Feb. 2020. 2003), pp. 12–13. 8 sipri policy brief

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).31 These the UK and the USA interpret states should improve their own it as imposing a moratorium on reporting and encourage regional such launches.34 Controversies states to participate in UNROCA. over technical definitions and inconsistencies in the application of Clarify international norms on missile-related norms point to the missiles need for an inclusive international discussion on missiles—possibly in The international norms regulating the form of a new attempt at expert missiles are weakened by contro­ dialogue on the topic within the UN versy over their interpretation. framework.35 For example, the 35 member states of the MTCR agree on strict limi­ Avoid exacerbating existing tations on the export of ballistic and military asymmetries in the region cruise missiles that can deliver a payload of at least 500 kilograms to Considering the military asym­ a range of at least 300 km, which the metries in MENA, any arms control MTCR defines as WMD-capable. approach that focuses solely on They also commit themselves to missiles without taking into account vigilance in the export other military capabilities and Outside of the MTCR, there is no of missiles that could broader regional security dynamics reach 300 km, regard­ is unlikely to get far. To curtail mili­ consensus on the definition of WMD- less of payload, even tarization in MENA, arms exports capable missiles or activities crucial for though the interpret­ to the region should be subject to their development ation of relevant limits more critical scrutiny. European has caused some Union (EU) states can exercise such controversy within the MTCR.32 scrutiny while assess­ing the risk However, outside of the MTCR that arms exports to MENA states there is no consensus on the defin­ may adversely affect regional stabil­ ition of WMD-capable missiles or ity, as required by the EU Common activities crucial for their develop­ Position on Arms Exports.36 A ment. Disagreements over this issue broad discussion on responsible have culminated in connection with arms exports to MENA could be Resolution 2231, which calls upon pursued amongst the 110 states Iran ‘not to undertake any activity that have ratified the ATT, which related to ballistic missiles designed requires states to assess the risk that to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons exports undermine peace weapons’ (until 2023).33 Iran argues and security. 37 Such assessments the resolution does not restrict its conventional missile tests or SLV 34 launches, whereas France, Germany, Erästö, T., ‘Dissecting international concerns about Iran’s missiles’, SIPRI Topical Backgrounder, 15 Nov. 2018. 31 Wezeman, P. and Wezeman, S. T., ‘The 35 Nakamitsu, I., Keynote address at the 2015 UN Register on Conventional Arms: Still 2nd (online) meeting of the Missile Dialogue time to improve’, SIPRI Expert Comment, Initiative, 7 Sep. 2020. 18 Sep. 2015. 36 Council of the , ‘Council 32 Missile Technology Control Regime, Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 Dec. ‘MTCR guidelines and the equipment, 2008 defining common rules governing software and technology annex’, [n.d.]; and control of exports of military technology and Lewis, J., ‘Storm Shadow, Saudi and the equipment’, Official Journal of the European MTCR’, Arms Control Wonk, 31 May 2011. Union, L3335, 8 Dec. 2008. 33 UN Security Council Resolution 2231, 37 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 7, United S/RES/2231, 20 July 2015. Nations Treaty Collection addressing missile threats in mena 9 should also take into account the Free of Nuclear Weapons and other presence or possible deployment WMD, which is also supposed of missiles and other weapons to cover delivery vehicles.39 Any by external states in MENA and far-reaching CSBMs are unlikely how this may affect armament without Israel, which boycotted developments in the region. the first UN conference on the establishment of such a zone in Strengthen conflict management November 2019.40 While Israel’s efforts and restore the Iran policy of nuclear ambiguity nuclear deal apparently prevents any meaningful MENA states could explore missile- It is important to de-escalate the discussion on related CSBMs as part of efforts for heightened tensions between Iran missiles in this and the USA, which partly derive establishing a Middle East Zone Free of context, certain steps from disagreements over missiles. could be explored Nuclear Weapons and other WMD Under President Donald J. Trump’s even without Israel administration the USA has sought or its full engagement. For example, to link this issue to negotiations on a regional dialogue could seek the country’s nuclear programme, to have states clarify the role of and pursued a campaign against missiles in their military postures, Iranian missiles and other major or to agree on pre-notification of conventional weapons at the cost missile and satellite launches. of the JCPOA.38 Traditionally, In principle, missile-related however, the USA has prioritized CSBMs could also be explored the need to prevent Iran from within some other diplomatic developing nuclear-capable missiles. process addressing broader security Were the USA to refocus on the issues—potentially among the more limited goal of nuclear non- Gulf states, or between Iran and proliferation, the most effective the USA.41 However, there is little way to do this would be to restore indication of political will to initiate the JCPOA—which could also such efforts, which would require work as a tool of bilateral conflict mutual recognition of security management between Iran and concerns and determination to the USA. An improvement of manage conflicts in a cooperative Iranian–US relations would also manner. Extra-regional actors alleviate Iranian threat perceptions should use their diplomatic leverage of the USA, which are a major driver to encourage MENA states to behind Iran’s missile activities. engage in regional dialogue in any Engage in confidence- and format that seems most feasible security-building measures to politically. Those external actors manage risks and address root 39 Davenport, K., ‘WMD-free Middle causes of militarization East proposal at a glance’, Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet, updated Dec. 2018. MENA states could explore missile- 40 UN, General Assembly, Conference on related CSBMs as part of efforts for the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free establishing a Middle East Zone of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, First session, Report of the conference on the work of its first session, A/CONF.236/6, 22 Nov. 2019. 38 BBC News, ‘Iran nuclear deal: UN rejects 41 See e.g. Luers, W., Pickering, T. and US bid to “snapback” Iran sanctions’, 26 Aug. Thielmann, G., ‘Dealing with Iran’s ballistic 2020. missile program’, National Interest, 8 Feb. 2016. 10 sipri policy brief

that are involved in regional conflict necessary but likely insufficient if dynamics, have deployed and used applied without consideration of the missiles in MENA or broader regional security dynamics. The proliferation of missiles in MENA is have supplied missiles Particularly when limited to certain to the region may have states alongside continued arms both a symptom and a source of regional limited credibility exports to others, measures against instability, linked with intractable in promoting missile missile proliferation might end up security dilemmas and conflicts related dialogue or contributing to the demand side CSBMs. However, of the problem by exacerbating this is, at the same time, reason for overall military asymmetries. including them in efforts to achieve As argued in this paper, a more dialogue and CSBMs. sustainable approach for restraining the further proliferation and use of CONCLUSIONS missiles in MENA would be based on addressing underlying conflicts The proliferation of missiles in though CSBMs involving both MENA is both a symptom and a regional states and external powers, source of regional instability, linked and on conducting more thorough with intractable security dilemmas risk assessments of arms export and conflicts. Export controls and policies to the region. other restrictions on missiles are addressing missile threats in mena 11

ABBREVIATIONS

ALCM Air-launched cruise missile ATT Arms Trade Treaty CSBM Confidence- and security-building measure EU European Union HCOC Hague Code of Conduct ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action MENA Middle East and North Africa MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime SAM Surface-to-air missile SLV Satellite-launch vehicle SRBM Short-range ballistic missile UAE United Arab Emirates UNROCA United Nations Register of Conventional Arms WMD of mass destruction SIPRI is an independent RECENT SIPRI PUBLICATIONS international institute Responsible Artificial Intelligence Research and Innovation for dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms International Peace and Security control and disarmament. Dr Vincent Boulanin, Kolja Brockmann and Luke Richards Established in 1966, SIPRI SIPRI Report provides data, analysis and November 2020 recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence: Can the European researchers, media and the Union Lead the Way in Developing Best Practice? interested public. Dr Vincent Boulanin, Netta Goussac , Laura Bruun and Luke Richards SIPRI Report GOVERNING BOARD November 2020

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr Tytti Erästö () is a Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme.

Pieter D. Wezeman (Netherlands/Sweden) is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Signalistgatan 9 Arms and Military Expenditure Programme. SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00 Email: [email protected] Internet: www.sipri.org © SIPRI 2020