DOCSLIB.ORG

Britain in the 2020S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Britain in the 2020S REPORT FUTURE PROOF BRITAIN IN THE 2020S Mathew Lawrence December 2016 © IPPR 2016 Institute for Public Policy Research INTRODUCTION Brexit is the firing gun on a decade of disruption. As the UK negotiates its new place in the world, an accelerating wave of economic, social and technological change will reshape the country, in often quite radical ways. In this report, we set out five powerful trends that will drive change in the 2020s. 1. A demographic tipping point: As the population grows, the UK is set to age sharply and become increasingly diverse. Globally, the long expansion of the working-age CONTENTS population is set to slow sharply. 2. An economic world transformed: The economic world order will become more Introduction ............................................................................................................ 3 fragile as globalisation evolves, trade patterns shift, and economic power gravitates toward Asia. At the same time, developed economies are likely to struggle to escape Executive summary: The UK in 2030 ..................................................................... 4 conditions of secular stagnation. The institutions governing the global economy are A world transformed: Five major disruptive forces reshaping Britain .................. 6 likely to come under intense pressure as the American hegemony that underpinned the postwar international order fades and the Global South rises in economic and Britain at the periphery? ..................................................................................8 geopolitical importance. The 2020s: A demographic tipping point for the UK ......................................10 3. Brexit – the aftershock: The economic implications of Brexit are likely to put the Stagnation blues? A global low growth decade .............................................12 country on a lower growth, lower investment trajectory, worsening the public Brexit: The aftershock ...................................................................................14 finances, with important consequences for the UK’s economy and living standards. Migration is likely to become more controlled. At the same time, politics – long Tectonic technological changes: A brave new world......................................16 subservient to a liberalising economic consensus – is likely to become increasingly Binding prometheus: Decarbonisation decade ..............................................18 assertive in seeking to reshape Brexit Britain. 10 challenges in the 2020s .................................................................................. 20 4. Technological transformation – between Star Trek and the Matrix: Exponential improvements in new technologies – computing power, machine learning, artificial Weakened economic foundations ..................................................................22 intelligence systems, automation, autonomous vehicles, health and resource A radically reshaped economy .......................................................................24 technologies, and the Internet of Things, among others – are expected to radically transform social and economic life. These changes have the potential to create an Different jobs, different lives ..........................................................................26 era of widespread abundance, or a second machine age that radically concentrates Intelligent automation: A future between Star Trek and the Matrix .................28 economic power. Which path we take – a future between Star Trek and the Matrix – will depend on the type of politics and institutions we build. A state under strain: Public finances in the 2020s .........................................30 The future of public services: Under pressure ...............................................32 5. The shock of the Anthropocene – instability in an age of natural systems decay: Climate change, biodiversity degradation, and resource depletion mean we will Inequality unleashed: Living standards, poverty and wealth ..........................34 increasingly run up against the limits of the physical capacity of the Earth’s natural Intergenerational strain ..................................................................................36 systems to reproduce life as at present. The natural constraints of the Anthropocene age – our new geological era in which humans are the primary shaper of the Earth’s A new ‘social’-ism?: Data ubiquity and the politics of the network ................38 ecology and ecosystems – will force us to build a collective, democratic politics A decade of democratic distress ...................................................................40 of restraint. The alternative is systemic degradation in ecosystems and rising inequalities in the years ahead. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 42 Together, these trends are going to reshape how we live and work, reorganise our social, economic and political institutions, and redistribute power and reward in society. References ........................................................................................................... 43 In the longer term, as machine learning and computing power divorces intelligence from consciousness, as improving health technologies allow for biological enhancements and species divergence, and as the final frontier is conquered by space travel, technological and social transformation will increasingly change what it means to be human. This is the world hurtling towards us, with very different futures and modernities becoming possible. Critically, there is immense potential for technological and economic change to be shaped to create a more abundant, democratic and equal society. However, we will have to better understand how our world is changing, and by what forces those changes are driven, if we are to build that future. As David Bowie said, ‘Tomorrow belongs to those who can hear it coming.’ 2 3 KEY FACTS ON CHANGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE UK IN 2030 1 in 3 Greying society: Between 2016 and 2030, the population aged 65+ PART 1: FIVE MAJOR DISRUPTIVE FORCES DRIVING CHANGE IN THE 2020S will grow by 33%, while the 16–64 population will grow by only 3%. 1. A demographic 2. A changing economic 3. Brexit: 4. Tectonic 5. Decarbonisation tipping point world order the aftershock technological shift decade population boom The UK’s population will grow, Economic power will Brexit was a profound shock Accelerating technological The imperatives of avoiding age dramatically, and become accelerate eastward even to the UK’s political and change will cause dramatic systemic climate change The UK will have the fastest growing population of any significantly more diverse, with as global growth rates slow economic order. While its shifts in the way we work, will drive a transformation major European country, and become the largest country in Europe the 2020s a tipping point to a due to demographic and long-term effects remain consume, and communicate. in how we produce and by population in the mid-2040s. radically different population productivity trends. The nature uncertain, it is likely to set the Politics, economics and consume energy by 2030. structure in future decades. of globalisation will evolve UK on a permanently lower power structures will be Transport and cities will also and trade patterns alter. growth and living standards profoundly disrupted, change. Natural systems Urbanisation will accelerate. trajectory, reshape our trading and with it social relations. that reproduce materials relationships, and reduce of life will break down, <50% European immigration. In causing largescale instability. Emerged markets? By 2030, almost half the world’s large the 2020s, the UK is likely Meeting the challenges of the companies are expected to be based in emerging markets. to adopt an increasingly Anthropocene age will be our mercantilist economic greatest collective political task. strategy as a result of Brexit. deficit PART 2: 10 MAJOR CHALLENGES BY 2030 Due to demographic trends, a structural deficit is likely to re-emerge 1. Stagnation the 2. A new economy: 3. The end of the long 4. Automation: 5. A state under strain: by the mid-2020s. new normal? caring and creative? twentieth century: work A brave new world public finances in an and business transformed ageing, low growth society Even as what we do and how Technological, social and Technological and cultural Intelligent automation will A combination of low £13 billion we work changes, the UK is demographic change will shifts will transform how radically reshape how we growth, political choices and likely to remain trapped in a shape the economy. Brexit, we work and reshape work, but won’t end work demographic change will Social care crisis: The adult social care funding gap is expected low growth, low interest rate and the likely depreciation of how businesses organise as we know it, at least in the shrink the state and put the to be £13 billion – 62% of the expected budget – in 2030/31. decade driven by demographic the currency, will accelerate themselves. Work is set to 2020s. Who benefits and who UK on course for a structural shifts, productivity trends, this change. The service become more insecure, more loses out will be shaped by deficit by 2030. weak investment, weak sector will grow, with creative polarised and more freelance. politics. labour power, high levels of and caring work surging. debt, and the
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2020 3
    SIPRI Fact Sheet March 2021 TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL KEY FACTS w The volume of international ARMS TRANSFERS, 2020 transfers of major arms in 2016–20 was 0.5 per cent lower than in 2011–15 and 12 per cent pieter d. wezeman, alexandra kuimova and higher than in 2006–10. siemon t. wezeman w The five largest arms exporters in 2016–20 were the The volume of international transfers of major arms in 2016–20 was United States, Russia, France, 0.5 per cent lower than in 2011–15 and 12 per cent higher than in 2006–10 Germany and China. Together, they accounted for 76 per cent of (see figure 1).1 The five largest arms exporters in 2016–20 were the United all exports of major arms in States, Russia, France, Germany and China (see table 1). The five largest 2016–20. arms importers were Saudi Arabia, India, Egypt, Australia and China w In 2016–20 US arms exports (see table 2). Between 2011–15 and 2016–20 there were increases in arms accounted for 37 per cent of the transfers to the Middle East (25 per cent) and to Europe (12 per cent), while global total and were 15 per cent there were decreases in the transfers to Africa (–13 per cent), the Americas higher than in 2011–15. (–43 per cent), and Asia and Oceania (–8.3 per cent). w Russian arms exports From 15 March 2021 SIPRI’s open-access Arms Transfers Database decreased by 22 per cent includes updated data on transfers of major arms for 1950–2020, which between 2011–15 and 2016–20.
    [Show full text]
  • [20Pt]Algorithms for Constrained Optimization: [ 5Pt]
    SOL Optimization 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Summary 2020s Algorithms for Constrained Optimization: The Benefits of General-purpose Software Michael Saunders MS&E and ICME, Stanford University California, USA 3rd AI+IoT Business Conference Shenzhen, China, April 25, 2019 Optimization Software 3rd AI+IoT Business Conference, Shenzhen, April 25, 2019 1/39 SOL Optimization 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Summary 2020s SOL Systems Optimization Laboratory George Dantzig, Stanford University, 1974 Inventor of the Simplex Method Father of linear programming Large-scale optimization: Algorithms, software, applications Optimization Software 3rd AI+IoT Business Conference, Shenzhen, April 25, 2019 2/39 SOL Optimization 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Summary 2020s SOL history 1974 Dantzig and Cottle start SOL 1974{78 John Tomlin, LP/MIP expert 1974{2005 Alan Manne, nonlinear economic models 1975{76 MS, MINOS first version 1979{87 Philip Gill, Walter Murray, MS, Margaret Wright (Gang of 4!) 1989{ Gerd Infanger, stochastic optimization 1979{ Walter Murray, MS, many students 2002{ Yinyu Ye, optimization algorithms, especially interior methods This week! UC Berkeley opened George B. Dantzig Auditorium Optimization Software 3rd AI+IoT Business Conference, Shenzhen, April 25, 2019 3/39 SOL Optimization 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Summary 2020s Optimization problems Minimize an objective function subject to constraints: 0 x 1 min '(x) st ` ≤ @ Ax A ≤ u c(x) x variables 0 1 A matrix c1(x) B . C c(x) nonlinear functions @ . A c (x) `; u bounds m Optimization
    [Show full text]
  • Aviation 2030 Disruption and Its Implications for the Aviation Sector Thriving on Disruption Series
    Aviation 2030 Disruption and its implications for the aviation sector Thriving on disruption series Major disruption is promised by a range of powerful new technologies and public pressure. Players that turn these trends to their advantage have the opportunity to reshape the industry. In this piece, we evaluate the potential for alternative energy sources, maintenance robotics, and the return of supersonic. We do this through the lens of 5 key player types. Christopher Brown Jono Anderson KPMG in Ireland KPMG in the US Global Strategy Group Kieran O’Brien Charlie Simpson KPMG International KPMG in Ireland KPMG in the UK Introduction Aviation has long been glamorous, but for some players in the value chain, it has also often proved to be unprofitable. Despite current headwinds, aviation Elsewhere in KPMG’s Mobility 2030 has arguably experienced a golden series,3 we have looked at changes age: a phase of relatively profitable affecting ground transport, and in growth, driven especially by ‘Getting Mobility off the ground’4 commercial passengers in developing we considered air-based disruption markets. The International Air in short-distance travel. In KPMG’s Transport Association (IATA) forecasts annual Aviation Industry Leaders that global passenger numbers will Report,5 we look at the ‘traditional’ almost double by 2037, reaching aviation industry’s topical issues. 8.2 billion annually.1 To match that demand, the aviation industry is In this paper, we focus on select continuing to raise output to historic issues for traditional aviation, with highs. In July 2018, Airbus announced that longer-term 2030 lens. In that over 37,000 new aircraft – valued particular, we consider the disruption at $5.8 trillion – are required over 20 potential related to developments in: years.2 With regular retirement of • Alternative energy sources older fleet, that equates to a doubling of the world’s passenger fleet to • Maintenance robotics more than 48,000 aircraft.
    [Show full text]
  • The 2020S Will Be a Crunch Decade That Will Determine the UK's
    Torsten Swati Stephen Charlie Henry Gregory Daniel Anna May 18th, Bell Dhingra Machin McCurdy Overman Thwaites Tomlinson Valero 2021 The 2020s will be a crunch decade that will determine the UK’s trajectory into the mid-21st century 0 comments | 5 shares Estimated reading time: 7 minutes As vaccines roll out and restrictions are lifted, public debate is turning to the economic recovery from COVID-19 and the deepest annual downturn for 300 years that came in its wake. But viewing the years ahead simply as the post-pandemic period is far too limited a frame, say the authors of the Economy 2020 Inquiry. Instead, the 2020s look set to be the decisive decade during which the UK will need to renew its approach to achieving economic success. The economic shock caused by COVID-19 and the associated containment measures resulted in the largest annual contraction in GDP in three centuries. Unprecedented scal support sustained household incomes and attenuated the rise in unemployment and business insolvencies. And a successful vaccination rollout means a recovery is now underway and forecast to continue, even if the uneven global rollout of vaccinations and related risk of mutations pose risks. Choices countries make do matter for their relative economic strengths As with any major recession, the pandemic will drive change for years to come. But it will do so in unique ways. All downturns have lasting impacts from the direct effects on people (e.g. unemployment) and rms (e.g. debt). This crisis will be no exception. The associated rise in unemployment will last for several years, while the highly unequal impact of the crisis will have a lasting legacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Trends 2025: a Transformed World
    This page left intentionally blank. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800; Fax: (202) 512-2104; Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington DC 20402-0001 ISBN 978-0-16-081834-9 To view electronic version: www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html November 2008 NIC 2008-003 We prepared Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World to stimulate strategic thinking about the future by identifying key trends, the factors that drive them, where they seem to be headed, and how they might interact. It uses scenarios to illustrate some of the many ways in which the drivers examined in the study (e.g., globalization, demography, the rise of new powers, the decay of international institutions, climate change, and the geopolitics of energy) may interact to generate challenges and opportunities for future decisionmakers. The study as a whole is more a description of the factors likely to shape events than a prediction of what will actually happen. By examining a small number of variables that we judge probably will have a disproportionate influence on future events and possibilities, the study seeks to help readers to recognize signposts indicating where events are headed and to identify opportunities for policy intervention to change or lock in the trajectories of specific developments. Among the messages we hope to convey are: “If you like where events seem to be headed, you may want to take timely action to preserve their positive trajectory. If you do not like where they appear to be going, you will have to develop and implement policies to change their trajectory.” For example, the report’s examination of the transition out of dependence on fossil fuels illustrates how different trajectories will entail different consequences for specific countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Read the Transcript
    A Deeper-Look: How military and development actors share the battlespace February 2020 Patrick Fine and Lieutenant General David Barno, USA, Retired Page 1 of 19 [Music] Patrick Fine: As we enter the 2020s, we see a world of growing great power competition where the effects of climate change are becoming more and more apparent and where non-state actors threaten sovereign states and national governments. We've seen more migration than ever before in history over the last few years, something we've explored in depth in previous podcasts, and we're seeing how these same factors fuel conflict and threaten longstanding international arrangements. Voiceover: A Deeper Look. Exploring what works and what doesn't in development, and the changes we can make together to turn ideas into action. Patrick Fine: Welcome, listeners. I'm Patrick Fine, CEO of FHI 360 and host of A Deeper Look. This season, we're taking a deeper look at the trends, ideas and forces that will shape the future of development. Today, I'm joined by Lieutenant General David Barno to explore how evolving security challenges will shape the way we think about and address human development needs. General, welcome to the podcast. Gen. David Barno: It's great to be here, Patrick. Patrick Fine: General, even as the world has grown more prosperous, we're seeing complex human development challenges, particularly in places affected by conflict. In our last episode, we had Masood Ahmed from the Center for Global Development, and he observed that a rising tide has lifted many boats, but there are places where the tide does not reach and those are characterized by fragility, instability, and conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • Macrotrends and Disruptions Shaping 2020-2030Vision 2050 Issue Brief Contents Context | 3
    Macrotrends and Disruptions shaping 2020-2030Vision 2050 issue brief Contents Context | 3 Macrotrends & Disruptions | 5 1 Macrotrends | 6 Demographics | 7 Environment | 8 Economics | 9 Technology | 10 Politics | 12 Culture | 13 2 High-level implications of the macrotrends | 14 3 Disruptions | 16 Conclusion | 22 Context a dynamic operating environment. the decade. It is powerfully In 2010, the World This means thinking about all the demonstrating the profound, Business Council pressures that shape the world wide-ranging – and, more for Sustainable we live in, and that business often than not, long-lasting Development (WBCSD) operates in, from demographics – consequences that such and economics, to technology and disruptions can have. released Vision 2050, a politics. WBCSD partnered with landmark piece of work Volans to explore the world that COVID-19 has triggered multiple that laid out a pathway lies ahead of us. A comprehensive disruptive shocks and accelerated research paper is available as a many of the macrotrends that we to a world in which nine had identified. It has made certain billion people are able to companion piece to this issue brief, offering the evidence behind things more likely and others less live well, within planetary our attempt here to summarize likely. With both the public health boundaries, by the macrotrends and potential crisis and the linked economic mid-century. disruptions likely to shape that turmoil still unfolding, there operating environment over the remains a high level of uncertainty In 2019, WBCSD decided to decade ahead. about what the full ramifications revisit its Vision 2050 work – 10 of COVID-19 will be for the decade years on, there has not been as As with any look into the future, ahead.
    [Show full text]
  • Astro2020 Science White Paper High-Energy Astrophysics in The
    Astro2020 Science White Paper High-Energy Astrophysics in the 2020s and Beyond Thematic Areas: ☐ Planetary Systems ☒ Star and Planet Formation ☒Formation and Evolution of Compact Objects ☒ Cosmology and Fundamental Physics ☒Stars and Stellar Evolution ☒Resolved Stellar Populations and their Environments ☒Galaxy Evolution ☒Multi-Messenger Astronomy and Astrophysics Principal Author: Name: Christopher Reynolds Institution: University of Cambridge, United Kingdom Email: [email protected] Phone: +44-1223-766668 Co-authors: Executive Committee of the AAS High-Energy Astrophysics Division (HEAD): Rob Petre (NASA-GSFC) Kristin Madsen (Caltech) Michael Corcoran (USRA) Gabriela Gonzales (LSU) Keith Arnaud (U.Maryland) Laura Brenneman (Harvard-Smithsonian CfA) Niel Brandt (Penn State Univ.) Laura Lopez (Ohio State Univ.) Neil Cornish (Montana State) Abstract: With each passing decade, we gain new appreciation for the dynamic, connected, and often violent nature of the Universe. This reality necessarily places the study of high-energy processes at the very heart of modern astrophysics. This White Paper illustrates the central role of high- energy astrophysics to some of the most pressing astrophysical problems of our time, the formation/evolution of galaxies, the origin of the heavy elements, star and planet formation, the emergence of life on exoplanets, and the search for new physics. We also highlight the new connections that are growing between astrophysicists and plasma physicists. We end with a discussion of the challenges that must be addressed to realize the potential of these connections, including the need for integrated planning across physics and astronomy programs in multiple agencies, and the need to foster the creativity and career aspirations of individual scientists in this era of large projects.
    [Show full text]
  • CONFLICTS to COME | 15 SCENARIOS for 2030 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
    CHAILLOT PAPER / PAPER CHAILLOT 161 CONFLICTS TO COME 15 scenarios for 2030 CONFLICTS TO COME COME TO CONFLICTS Edited by Florence Gaub With contributions from Natasha E. Bajema, Lotje Boswinkel, Daniel Fiott, | Franz-Stefan Gady, Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Kathleen 15 SCENARIOS FOR 2030 J. McInnis, Nicolas Minvielle, Andrew Monaghan, Katariina Mustasilta, Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Patryk Pawlak, Tobias Pietz, Sinikukka Saari, Stanislav Secrieru, Simona R. Soare, Bruno Tertrais and Olivier Wathelet CHAILLOT PAPER / 161 December 2020 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2020. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. print ISBN 978-92-9198-973-7 online ISBN 978-92-9198-972-0 CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-005-EN-C CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-005-EN-N ISSN 1017-7566 ISSN 1683-4917 DOI 10.2815/101723 DOI 10.2815/966219 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020. Cover image credit: Daniel Cheung/unsplash CONFLICTS TO COME 15 scenarios for 2030 Edited by Florence Gaub With contributions from Natasha E. Bajema, Lotje Boswinkel, Daniel Fiott, Franz-Stefan Gady, Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Kathleen J. McInnis, Nicolas Minvielle, Andrew Monaghan, Katariina Mustasilta, Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Patryk Pawlak, Tobias Pietz, Sinikukka Saari, Stanislav Secrieru, Simona R. Soare, Bruno Tertrais and Olivier Wathelet CHAILLOT PAPER / 161 December 2020 The editor Florence Gaub is the Deputy Director of the EUISS.
    [Show full text]
  • Defense Modernization Plans Through the 2020S: Addressing the Bow Wave
    JANUARY 2016 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 202 887 0200 | www.csis.org Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 301 459 3366 | www.rowman.com Cover photo: Huntington Ingalls Industries Defense Modernization Plans through the 2020s Addressing the Bow Wave A Report of the CSIS International Security Program ISBN 978-1-4422-5914-0 author Ë|xHSLEOCy259140z v*:+:!:+:! Todd Harrison Blank Defense Modernization Plans through the 2020s Addressing the Bow Wave AUTHOR Todd Harrison January 2016 A Report of the CSIS International Security Program Lanham • Boulder • New York • London About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full- time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015.
    [Show full text]
  • Simple Rules for a Complex World with Artificial Intelligence
    Simple Rules for a Complex World with Artificial Intelligence Jes´usFern´andez-Villaverde1 April 28, 2020 1University of Pennsylvania A complex world with AI and ML • It is hard to open the internet or browse a bookstore without finding an article or a book discussing artificial intelligence (AI) and, in particular, machine learning (ML). • I will define some of these concepts more carefully later on. • Many concerns: effects of AI and ML on jobs, wealth and income inequality, ... • Some observers even claim that gone is the era of large armies and powerful navies. The nations with the best algorithms, as the Roman said in the Aeneid, \will rule mankind, and make the world obey." 1 2 AI, ML, and public policy, I • One thread that increasingly appears in these works, and which is bound to become a prominent concern, is how AI can address policy questions. • Some proposals are mild. • For example, thanks to ML: 1. We might be able to detect early strains in the financial markets and allow regulatory agencies to respond before damage occurs. 2. We might be able to fight electronic fraud and money laundering. 3. We might be able to improve public health. • I do not have any problem with these applications. Natural extension of models used in econometrics for decades. 3 AI, ML, and public policy, II • Some proposals are radical: \digital socialism" (Saros, 2014, Phillips and Rozworski, 2019, and Morozov, 2019). • The defenders of this view argue that some form of AI or ML can finally achieve the promise of central planning: we will feed a computer (or a system of computers) all the relevant information and, thanks to ML (the details are often fuzzy), we will get an optimal allocation of goods and income.
    [Show full text]
  • Error Correction. Chilean Cybernetics and Chicago's Economists
    [2] Error Correction: Chilean Cybernetics and Chicago’s Economists Adrian Lahoud Cybernetics is a specific way of conceiving the relation between information and government: It represented a way of bringing the epistemological and the onto- logical together in real time. The essay explores a par- adigmatic case study in the evolution of this history: the audacious experiment in cybernetic management known as Project Cybersyn that was developed follow- ing Salvador Allende’s ascension to power in Chile in 1970. In ideological terms, Allende’s socialism and the violent doctrine of the Chicago School could not be more opposed. In another sense, however, Chilean cybernetics would serve as the prototype for a new form of governance that would finally award to the theories of the Chicago School a hegemonic control over global society. In Alleys of Your Mind: Augmented Intellligence and Its Traumas, edited by Matteo Pasquinelli, 37–51. Lüneburg: meson press, 2015. DOI: 10.14619/014 38 Alleys of Your Mind Zero Latency A­great­deal­of­time­has­been­spent­investigating,­documenting­and­disputing­ an­eleven­year­period­in­Chile­from­1970–1981,­encompassing­the­presidency­ of­Salvador­Allende­and­the­dictatorship­of­Augusto­Pinochet.­Between­the­ rise of the Unidad Popular and­its­overthrow­by­the­military­junta,­brutal­and­ notorious events took hold of Chile.1 Though many of these events have remained­ambiguous,­obscured­by­trauma­or­lost­in­official­dissimulation,­over­ time­the­contours­of­history­have­become­less­confused.­Beyond­the­coup,­the­ involvement of the United States or even the subsequent transformation of the economy, a more comprehensive story of radical experimentation on the Chilean­social­body­has­emerged.­At­stake­in­the­years­of­Allende’s­ascension­ to power and those that followed was nothing less than a Latin social labora- tory.­This­laboratory­was­at­once­optimistic,­sincere,­naïve,­and­finally­brutal.­ Few­experiments­were­as­audacious­or­prophetic­as­Allende’s­cybernetic­ program Cybersyn.
    [Show full text]